Airspace Review of Upper Airspace Services (East) … · ASIR data reflects that coordination...

Airspace Review of UAS (E) and Outback Groups Version: 1.0

Airspace Review of Upper Airspace Services (East) and

Outback Groups

July 2014

Office of Airspace Regulation of 32


DOCUMENT SPONSOR: OFFICE OF AIRSPACE REGULATION PROJECT NUMBER: 11 – 6 2011

TRIM REFERENCE: EF11/6303

FILE REF: D14/123002

Document control:

Version Issue/Nature of Revision Date

0.1 Draft for internal review 14 March 2014

1.0 Incorporates peer feedback 14 July 2014



1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This airspace review was commissioned in response to the Government„s expectation under the Australian Airspace Policy Statement (AAPS1) for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) to undertake regular and ongoing studies to meet its obligations under Section 13 of the Airspace Act 2007 (Act).

The purpose of this report is to review the airspace classification within the Upper Airspace Services – East Group (UAS (E)) and the Outback Group. Particular emphasis is placed on the safety of Passenger Transport2 (PT) operations.

1.1 Operational Context

The UAS (E) and Outback Groups are volumes of airspace located within the north eastern Flight Information Region (FIR). The UAS (E) Group and its associated sectors extend through the eastern oceanic area of the Australian coastline. The Outback Group and its associated sectors extend west of the Brisbane arrival and departure airspace to join the central Australian airspace volumes and north to the Gulf of Carpentaria, (refer to Figures 2 and 7). Refer to Annex B for Group Sector maps.

Airservices Australia (Airservices) provides an Air Traffic Control (ATC) service to aircraft operating under the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and a flight information service for aircraft operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).

Aircraft movements within these airspace volumes represent many facets of the Australian aviation industry and include:

En-route international and domestic flights,

Charter operations,

Medical, military and government flights, and

Private, sport aviation and recreational flying.

Traffic data provided by Airservices show that the Groups have seen a steady increase in traffic levels recently which has been reported to be in the vicinity of 2 - 2.5 % per annum for the UAS (E) Group and a 10% increase for the Outback Group. The traffic increases can be attributed to both international and domestic operations3 primarily as a result of a buoyant mining and resource sector supporting Fly in, Fly out (FIFO) workforce. The increase in traffic levels has placed some stress on the Air Traffic Services (ATS) system however, with the advent of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), the efficiency of the airspace is being maintained.

The airspace classifications within the UAS (E) Group and Outback Group comprises of Class A, E and G.

Electronic surveillance within the UAS (E) Group is a combination of traditional radar surveillance and ADS-B.

Traditional radar coverage is well supported along the east coast of Australia; however, coverage diminishes further to the east and west. ADS-B coverage supports the ATS provider at higher altitudes and allows for greater ATC efficiencies to suitably equipped aircraft. In areas where no electronic surveillance exists

1 A list of acronyms used within this report can be found at Annex A.

2 For the purposes of this review, PT services can be defined as activities involving Regular Public Transport (RPT) and all non-

freight-only Charter operations. 3 Airservices, UAS (E).



procedural separation techniques are applied to maintain safe and orderly traffic flows. However, ADS-B sites are limited within the oceanic region with Lord Howe Island the only site with ADS-B infrastructure installed. 1.2 Issues

Airspace user feedback from major airlines was received by the OAR during the course of the UAS (E) review. However, no airspace user feedback was received by the OAR for the Outback Group. During research, analysis, observation and consultation with Brisbane Centre Sector controllers the following issues were identified:

Transition and application between radar and procedural separation standards have resulted in some breakdown of separation and breakdown of co-ordination incidents.

There is a lack of surveillance within the reviewed airspace particularly the UAS (E) Group.

Co-ordinating aircraft with non-standard levels assigned at the FIR/UAS (E) eastern boundary.

An increasing number of aircraft are departing from the east coast of Australia west bound through the Outback Groups airspace for Western Australian mining operations.

Lower level airspace volumes (Class E and G airspace below Flight Level (FL) 180) experience increased traffic levels on days of resource industry crew changes.

Poor pilot flight planning contributes to increased air traffic controller workload due to time required to interact with ATC flight data record.

1.3 Findings / Conclusions

Aviation Safety Incident Reports (ASIR) data indicates some groupings of separation incidents occurring around the boundaries of where radar separation standards are applied and procedural standards are applied.

Based on the findings of this review the appropriate airspace arrangements are in place.

The early uptake of ADS-B and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) technology by both national and international carriers has aided in maintaining the efficiencies of the UAS (E) and Outback Group‟s airspace. However, there are still large areas where no surveillance exists within Oceanic airspace. There may be value in exploring the feasibility of ADS-B ground stations on Norfolk Island, New Caledonia, Vanuatu and Willis Island to feed into the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system.

ASIR data reflects that coordination between Australia‟s FIR boundary can be problematic resulting in some breakdown in coordination and loss of separation.

The activation of the coastal military restricted areas between Sydney and Brisbane causes a compression of air routes resulting in traffic inefficiencies from time to time. These inefficiencies are currently being addressed through the flexibility of the ATC system.

Poor and incorrect flight planning by operators and failure to maintain tracking tolerances is resulting in additional workload for ATC staff.



FIFO operations from east coast ports to Western Australian Resource centres places pressure on the ATC system from time to time.

Existing shielding of the ADS-B receiver at Lord Howe Island and general lack of ADS-B coverage within this region reduces effective surveillance.

1.4 Recommendations

It is important to note that the review may make recommendations based on existing and projected data. CASA applies a precautionary approach when conducting aeronautical studies and therefore the following recommendations are made:

1. The OAR should continue to monitor traffic levels and airspace efficiencies within the Outback and UAS (E) Groups.

2. Airservices should continue a review of routes in conflict prone areas to enhance airspace efficiency and traffic flow where possible.



Contents

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................... 3

2 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 7

3 GROUP AIRSPACE ............................................................................................ 9

4 SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS ................................................. 18

5 CONSULTATION ............................................................................................... 20

6 AIRSPACE REFORM ........................................................................................ 21

7 EVALUATION OF AIRSPACE MATTERS ......................................................... 22

8 ISSUES ............................................................................................................. 25

9 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................... 25

10 CASA RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................... 26

ANNEX A – ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................. 27

ANNEX B – GROUP AND SECTOR MAPS – HIGH AND LOW ................................. 28

ANNEX C – AUSTRALIAN AIRSPACE STRUCTURE .............................................. 30

ANNEX D – STAKEHOLDERS ................................................................................. 31

ANNEX E – DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATION OF TERMS ................................... 32



2 INTRODUCTION

The Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR) within the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has carriage of the regulation of Australian-administered airspace, in accordance with section 11 of the Airspace Act 2007 (Act). Section 12 of the Act requires CASA to foster both the efficient use of Australian-administered airspace and equitable access to that airspace for all users. CASA must also take into account the capacity of Australian-administered airspace to accommodate changes to its use. In exercising its powers and performing its functions, CASA must regard the safety of air navigation as the most important consideration.4

Section 3 of the Act states that „the object of this Act is to ensure that Australian-administered airspace is used safely, taking into account the following matters:

a. Protection of the environment,

b. Efficient use of that airspace,

c. Equitable access to that airspace for all users of that airspace, and

d. National Security.‟

2.1 Overview of Australian Airspace

In line with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 11 and as described in the Australian Airspace Policy Statement (AAPS), Australian airspace is classified as Class A, C, D, E and G depending on the level of service required to manage traffic safely and effectively. Class B and F are not currently used in Australia. The classification determines the category of flights permitted and the level of Air Traffic Services (ATS) provided. Annex C provides details of the classes of airspace used in Australia.

2.2 Purpose

The purpose of this airspace review was to conduct an assessment of the airspace within the Upper Airspace Services – East Group (UAS (E)) and Outback Groups.

The review forms part of the OAR airspace reform program to review Australia‟s airspace as required by the Act.

The outcome of the review is to demonstrate that all sensible and practicable precautions are in place to reduce the risk to acceptable levels. For the purpose of this review, a multifaceted approach was used including quantitative and qualitative analysis consisting of:

Stakeholder comment,

Site visit to Brisbane ATS Centre, and

Review of Aviation Safety Incident Reports (ASIR).

2.3 Scope

The scope of the review includes identification of and consultation with stakeholders to gather necessary data and information related to airspace issues within the UAS (E) and Outback Groups between Flight Level (FL) 180 and FL600. As a

4 Civil Aviation Act 1988, Section 9A – Performance of Functions



minimum, this includes consultation with Public Transport (PT)5 operators, Charter operators, Defence, and Emergency Services operators.

The review must also consider CASA‟s responsibilities in adopting a proactive approach to assess the Australian airspace system and its operations, and to identify and pursue airspace reform opportunities. The AAPS offers clear guidance to CASA on the Government‟s airspace strategy and policy, as well as processes to follow when changing the classification or designation of particular volumes of Australian administered airspace.

The scope of this review does not include a comprehensive review of operations within the Class G airspace contained within these sector groups. A review of Class G operations is limited to Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations only; however, should stakeholder and industry consultation indicate a requirement for further analysis of Visual Flight Rules (VFR) operations a separate and expanded risk assessment of Class G airspace within these sector groups shall be conducted.

2.4 Objective

The objective of this review is to review the airspace within the UAS (E) and Outback Groups to determine the appropriateness of the current airspace classification. This was accomplished by:

a. Investigating through stakeholder consultation, the appropriateness of the current airspace‟s classification, access issues, expected changes to the current traffic levels and mix of aircraft operations within the existing airspace;

b. Analysis of current traffic levels and mix of aircraft operations within the existing airspace‟s in relation to the level of services provided;

c. Identifying any threats to the operations, focusing as a priority on the safety and protection of PT services;

d. Carrying out a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the current airspace environment and the expected impact of any changes;

e. Identifying appropriate and acceptable risk mitigators to the known threats;

f. Reviewing Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) entries for applicability;

g. Ensuring that the issues are passed onto the relative stakeholder group for their consideration; and

h. Providing assurance to the Executive Manager of the Airspace and Aerodrome Regulation Division of the levels of airspace risk associated with operations within the Groups.

The OAR issues a review of its Permanent Legislative Instruments on a bi-annual basis. Any changes to airspace determined by this review with respect to airspace classifications, air routes, prohibited, restricted or danger areas will be reflected in these Instruments.

5 For the purposes of this review, PT services can be defined as activities involving Regular Public Transport (RPT) and all non-

freight-only Charter operations.



3 GROUP AIRSPACE

3.1 UAS (E) Airspace Location and Structure To assist in the management of Australia‟s airspace, Airservices Australia (Airservices) has divided Australia into two Flight Information Regions (FIR). The airspace above and to the east of the FIR boundary line is controlled from Brisbane ATS Centre (Brisbane FIR). The airspace below and to the west of the FIR boundary is controlled from Melbourne Centre (Melbourne FIR). See Figure 1.

Figure 1: Flight Information Regions (Source: Airservices).

Airservices provides a contracted service for upper air services over Honiara and Nauru. This is depicted in Figure 1.

Each FIR is divided into smaller volumes and sub volumes know as Groups and Sectors. The UAS (E) Group and its associated high and low level Sectors are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.



Figure 2: UAS (E) Group – Airservices 29 May 2014.

Airspace Groups and Sectors are defined volumes of airspace designed to facilitate Airservices‟ management of air traffic. Airservices use their design criteria against a range of operational factors to determine a Sector‟s size and shape both laterally and vertically. Full size versions of the images are available in Annex B.



3.2 UAS (E) Group Sectors

The UAS (E) Group is divided into four Sectors, each with a vertical limit from the surface to Flight Level (FL) 600. The Sectors, depicted in Figures 3 to 6, are referred to as:

CORAL (COL);

FLINDERS (FLD);

LORD HOWE (HWE); and

TASMAN (TSN).

Figure 3: UAS (E) Coral Sector in Australia – Airservices 29 May 2014.

Figure 4: UAS (E) Flinders Sector in Australia – Airservices 29 May 2014.



Figure 5: UAS (E) Howe Sector in Australia – Airservices 29 May 2014.

Figure 6: UAS (E) Tasman Sector in Australia – Airservices 29 May 2014.



3.3 Outback Group Location and Structure

The Outback Group and its associated high and low level Sectors are illustrated in Figures 7 and 8.

Figure 7: Outback Group and HIGH Sectors in Australia – Airservices 29 May 2014.

Figure 8: Outback Group and LOW Sectors in Australia – Airservices 2 June 2011.

Airspace Groups and Sectors are defined volumes of airspace designed to facilitate Airservices management of air traffic. Airservices, using their design criteria against a



range of operational factors, determine a Sector‟s size and shape both laterally and vertically.

3.4 Outback Group Sectors

The Outback Group is located within the Brisbane FIR and is divided into three HIGH and five LOW Sectors.

The HIGH Sectors vertical limits are from Flight Level (FL) 285 to FL600. The three HIGH Sectors are:

ISA (ISA);

CARNARVON (CVN); and

WARREGO (WEG).

The LOW Sector vertical limits are from the surface to FL285. The five LOW Sectors are:

PRAWN (PWN);

BARKLY (BKL);

COOPER (COO);

EMERALD (EMA); and

DAWSON (DAN).

3.5 Airspace Management

Airservices manage the airspace within the UAS (E) and Outback Groups from Brisbane ATS Centre, 24 hours a day throughout the year.

Airservices manage the day to day traffic across the Group‟s airspace via a number of ATC consoles with Sectors being combined or separated in order to maintain traffic efficiencies.

Aircraft operating within areas of surveillance are provided with a surveillance separation service appropriate to the class of airspace the aircraft is operating in, whilst aircraft operating outside of surveillance areas are provided with a procedural separation service. IFR operations within Class G airspace are provided with a traffic information service. Procedural separation requires greater separation standards to be applied and thus has an impact on the efficiency of the airspace.

The radar surveillance coverage for the Outback Group covers all of the Carnarvon Sector and parts of the ISA and Warrego Sectors. Although a level of traditional radar surveillance exists across the Group‟s airspace, ADS-B technology is being used to fill surveillance gaps where the intent is to cover non-radar airspace.

3.6 Airspace Management Contracts with Solomon Islands and Nauru

Airservices have a contract with the Solomon Islands Government for the provision of ATS. The contract commenced on 21 May 2003. The agreed services include:

Management of the upper airspace in the Honiara FIR; and

Collection of air navigation fee revenue from aircraft/airlines that pass through the Honiara FIR upper airspace on behalf of the Solomon Islands Government.

Airservices also provides ATS within the Nauru FIR on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Nauru. This arrangement is set out in a letter of agreement (LOA 696 V7) dated 23 September 2010. Similar to the LOA with Honiara FIR‟s provision of services, Airservices are responsible for the provision of ATS and Search and



Rescue (SAR) alerting in Class A within Nauru FIR. Nauru Flight Information Centre (FIC) is responsible for the provision of FIS and SAR alerting services in Class G airspace within the Nauru FIR.

The Class A (FL245-FL600) airspace managed by UAS (E) for these regions are illustrated in Figure 7.

Figure 9: UAS (E) Group Honiara and Nauru FIR – Airservices 12 October 2011.

3.7 Airspace Classifications

The airspace within the Outback Group is mainly comprised of Class G from the surface to FL180, Class E from FL180 to FL245, thence Class A from FL245. However, there is also a volume of Class E airspace within the Emerald and Dawson Sectors with a lower limit of 8,500 feet above mean sea level. The airspace within the UAS (E) Group is oceanic and comprises of Class G from the surface to FL245 and Class A from FL245 to FL600.

Nauru

Honiara



3.8 Restricted and Danger Areas

Restricted Areas (RA) are located at various locations within the UAS (E) and Outback Groups. RA areas mainly associated with defence flying operations. There are no Danger Areas located within UAS (E).

As part of the Aviation White Paper initiative on Flexible Use of Airspace, all RAs fall into one of three conditional status categories. The conditional status will give an indication as to the likelihood of obtaining a clearance to fly through restricted airspace. Notice to Airmen (NOTAMs) are issued to advise pilots that an RA is active and state the conditional status of the airspace. Pilots are required to check NOTAMs during flight planning.

3.8.1 Explanation of a RAs conditional status:

RA1. Pilots may flight plan through the RA and upon request will be granted a clearance from Air Traffic Control (ATC) when the area is active unless a NOTAM indicates that a clearance is not available.

RA2. Pilots may not flight plan through the RA or expect a clearance from ATC. However tracking may be offered through the RA on a tactical basis.

RA3. Pilots may not flight plan through the RA and clearances will not be available.

Further information regarding the default conditional status for a RA is available from the Airservices Australia Aeronautical Information Package (AIP) En-route (ENR) 1.4 5.3.2.26 and the Designated Airspace Handbook7 (DAH).

3.8.2 Controlling Authority

Flight within active RAs is subject to the conditions published in the AIP (En-Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) and DAH) and by NOTAM. To obtain access to a RA or airspace pilots must request approval from the Controlling Authority (see ERSA - Prohibited Restricted Danger8 (PRD)).

3.9 Surveillance

Figure 10 illustrates the combined coverage area of radar and ADS-B systems at FL300 across Australia. The ADS-B technology complements the existing radar infrastructure and provides Airservices with surveillance of suitably equipped aircraft. Aircraft operating at or above FL290 are now required to have ADS-B unless otherwise exempt.

In remote or oceanic regions where the environment prohibits the establishment of ADS-B ground stations and no radar capability exists, surveillance of suitably equipped aircraft can be achieved through Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Contract9 (ADS-C).

Outside of surveillance coverage, traffic management in Class A airspace is achieved through procedural control. This is the majority of cases for operations in UAS (E). Aircraft operating within the Outback Groups‟ airspace are mostly located within the surveillance area (ADS-B and radar surveillance). Compared with procedural separation, the provision of a surveillance separation service allows greater efficiencies in air traffic management. This is due to reduced separation standards between aircraft.

6 http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/publications/current/aip/enroute.pdf

7 http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/publications/current/dah/dah.pdf

8 http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/publications/current/ersa/PRD__2-Jun-2011.pdf

9 Refer to Annex C for a further description of ADS-C.

http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/publications/current/aip/enroute.pdf

http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/publications/current/dah/dah.pdf

http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/publications/current/ersa/PRD__2-Jun-2011.pdf



Figure 10: ADS-B and Radar Coverage at FL300 – Airservices: October 2013. (Legend: Radar coverage – Red, ADS-B coverage – Pink).

3.10 Airspace Users Users operating within the UAS (E) and Outback Group are PT aircraft, freight, charter, private operations, Defence, and Emergency Services. Operations within the Class G airspace may also be a similar sort of traffic mix but may also include sport aviation.

3.11 Aeronautical Information An assessment of the current AIP has been carried out during the course of this airspace review. Stakeholder feedback and industry consultation highlighted no issues in this regard.



4 SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS

4.1 Aviation Safety Incident Reports

All accidents and incidents involving Australian registered aircraft, or foreign aircraft in Australian airspace must be reported to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). The ATSB maintains its own database, the Safety Investigation Information Management System (SIIMS), in which all reported occurrences are logged, assessed, classified and recorded. The information contained within SIIMS is dynamic and subject to change based on additional and/or updated data. Each individual report is known as an Aviation Safety Incident Report (ASIR) and for identification purposes is allocated its own serial number.

The ATSB also receives incident information via pilot reports, Airservices‟ reports and from the Department of Defence‟s Aviation Safety Occurrence Reports. The following Tables contain ASIR data applicable to the Groups reviewed by the OAR.

Airspace related incidents occurring over the two year period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2013 were reviewed. Where the incident data provides altitude information those incidents recorded FL180 have not been considered. Incidents that occurred in Class G airspace have also not been considered in this review.

4.2 UAS (E) Group

For the period of 01 January 2012 to 31 December 2013, 144 airspace related ASIRs that met the criteria of this review were recorded. The incident categories are listed in Table 1:

Type of Incident Number of Incidents

Airborne collision alert system warning 0

Airspace Infringement 0

Breakdown of Coordination 28

Loss of Separation 10

Operational Non-compliance 102

ANSP Information/Procedural Error 4

Total 144

Table 1: ASIRs within the UAS (E) Group (01 January 2012 to 31 December 2013).

4.3 Outback Group Between the period 01 January 2012 to 31 December 2013, 50 airspace related ASIRs that met the criteria of this review were recorded. Incident categories are listed in Table 2:

Type of Incident Number of Incidents

Airborne collision alert system warning 1

Airspace Infringement 3

Breakdown of Coordination 8

Loss of Separation 4

Operational Non-compliance 33

ANSP Information/Procedural Error 1

Total 50

Table 2: ASIRs within the Outback Group (01 January 2012 to 31 December 2013).



4.4 Review of ASIR Occurrence Categories and Sector Groups

The objective of the ASIR review is to determine if any of the incidents reported are attributable to the airspace classification. Particular emphasis has been placed upon the enroute portion of the Groups‟ airspace.

Figure 11 compares the ASIR occurrence types for each sector Group. The number and types of occurrences were similar for the most part. However, Operational Non-compliance for UAS (E) saw the greatest amount of recorded incidents.

Figure 11: Incidents by Sector Group and Type.

4.5 Incident Factors

Airborne collision alerts:

Only one incident was recorded as airborne collision alert between 01 January 2012 to 31 December 2013. That was a result of the crew failing to establish mutual separation with the other aircraft prior to descent.

Airspace infringements:

Over the two year period there were three airspace infringements that fell within the scope of the incident review. The infringements identified included;

Two of Class E airspace; and

One of restricted airspace10

Breakdown of coordination:

The 36 breakdown of ANSP coordination incidents were largely related to incorrect coordination details being passed on aircraft approaching an airspace boundary (16), coordination details being passed late on aircraft approaching an airspace boundary (12) and no coordination details being passed on aircraft approaching an airspace boundary (8).

10

Infringements of restricted airspace may be categorised as infringements of Class C airspace or PRD. Without additional

detail the airspace Class has been grouped in accordance with the original ATSB data.



Loss of Separation:

The 14 recorded loss of separation incidents that met the scope of this review were related to issues with ATC issuing level and track diversions that failed to meet the required separation standards.

Operational non-compliance:

The number of operational non-compliance incidents (135) made up over 64% of the total incidents. 19 of these involved aircraft not tracking in accordance with ATC clearances while 20 were related to aircraft not adhering to ATC tracking or level requirements. The remaining incidents involved aircraft not acting in accordance with ATC instructions, ATC clearance read back and communications frequency issues.

ANSP information or procedural error:

A total of 5 ANSP information or procedural error incidents met the review criteria. These incidents included events such as the crew not receiving an amended route clearance from the International Flightwatch. Another event recorded was ATC did not detect an incorrect cleared level read back from the crew and the aircraft climbed to a level without clearance.

4.6 Incident Summary

Incident locations were observed to be spread over each sector group with the distribution of occurrence locations (particularly operational non-compliance). The number and type of incidents recorded were similar across all four incident areas.

5 CONSULTATION

5.1 Stakeholder Consultation

Major stakeholders were provided with the scope and intent of this review. Articles highlighting the reviews aims and requesting stakeholder feedback were published in the Flight Safety Australia magazine and CASA‟s E-newsletter.

National stakeholders and industry consultative forums including Regional Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committee (RAPAC) and the Airspace Consultative Forum (ACF) were notified and supplied with scoping information and invited to provide comment in relation to this aeronautical study.

Information received, (where appropriate) was incorporated into this review. A list of stakeholders invited to participate in this review can be found in Annex D.

5.2 CASA

CASA employs Aviation Safety Advisors (ASA), Flying Operations Inspectors (FOI) and Aerodrome Inspectors throughout Australia as an integral mechanism for providing safety monitoring and promotion within the industry. As part of the consultation process, offices within CASA where invited to comment on potential issues of relevance in regard to the study airspace.

5.3 Defence

Defence OAR advised that Defence have no issues regarding the airspace contained within the Group‟s airspace.



5.4 Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP)

The OAR conducted a site visit to Brisbane ATS Centre during which ATS matters were discussed. Subsequent to the site visit further discussions were held with Airservices to discuss the provision of Air Traffic Management (ATM) and any airspace issues Airservices may have.

Both the UAS (E) and Outback Groups‟ airspace is considered to be an entry level or „ab-initio‟ sector by Airservices in which new air traffic controllers further develop their skills. The Outback Group‟s vertical airspace separates high level en-route traffic from lower level Class E and G traffic. This allows recently rated air traffic controllers to consolidate their skills within an airspace architecture that also satisfies Airservices policy of a service delivery environment.

Feedback in relation to the Group‟s airspace and functionality was positive from the ANSP with no major issues being highlighted for either of the Groups. The participation rate of RNP capable aircraft has allowed for greater airspace efficiencies within each sector group. This has also been aided with ADS-B coverage off Australia‟s coast line and a ground based receivers on Lord Howe Island. Further ADSB transmitter installation at Norfolk Island may enhance coverage. Based on the “line-of-sight” of ADS-B, maximum range off Australia‟s Coastline may exceed 250 nautical miles depending on aircraft altitude. Some shielding towards Australia‟s Coast line occurs at Lord Howe Island. This creates some interruptions in surveillance coverage with ATC having to manage separation standards.

No issues of concern were raised by the ANSP.

6 AIRSPACE REFORM

As required by the AAPS, this study takes into account the Government‟s requirement that CASA will continue the reform of Australia‟s airspace and move towards closer alignment with the ICAO system and the adoption of international best practice. This includes the adopting of proven international airspace systems adapted to benefit Australia‟s aviation environment.

Paragraph 8 of the AAPS 2012 states: „The administration of Australian-administered airspace:

shall be in the best interests of Australia;

shall consider the current and future needs of the Australian aviation industry;

shall adopt proven international best practice airspace systems adapted to benefit Australia‟s aviation environment; and

shall take advantage of advances in technology wherever practicable.‟

The purpose of this review is to review the airspace classification within the UAS (E) and Outback Groups. Particular emphasis is placed on the safety of PT operations. Based on the review of incidents and feedback from Industry, the appropriate airspace arrangements are in place.



7 EVALUATION OF AIRSPACE MATTERS

This review focused on the following methodologies to conclude that best and diligent practises are in place to ensure safety in the airspace under review:

a. Stakeholder consultation;

b. Site visits to Brisbane ATS Centre; and

c. Review and evaluation of ASIRs.

7.1 Evaluation of Stakeholder Interviews

Due to the high number of internationally registered aircraft and the dispersed geographical location of aircraft operators using these airspaces, face-to-face interviews with operators were not feasible. Feedback received in relation to the sector Groups have been incorporated into this review.

7.2 Brisbane ATS Site Visit

The OAR conducted a site visit to Airservices‟ Brisbane ATS Centre. Discussions regarding the Group‟s airspace were held with both management and ATC staff. Each sector within the UAS (E) and Outback Group was observed and ATC staff were invited to provide feedback on the Group‟s airspace.

7.3 Evaluation of ASIRs

ASIR data from the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2013 was reviewed. The Tables in Section 4 list the relevant types and numbers of occurrences that were recorded in the Groups‟ airspace.

The analysis did highlight that the majority of reported incidents are categorised as „Operational Non-compliance‟. Discussions with the Sector Group controllers suggested that a concentration of these types of incidents could be attributed to:

International pilots not understanding (or are unfamiliar with) Australian airspace procedures;

Changes in the separation standards that are applied to areas with surveillance and those without;

Pilot error or confusion with ATC instruction; and

ATC error.

The ASIR data when plotted highlighted a number of clusters of airspace incidents within the Howe and Tasman Sectors. These clusters where found to be in greater numbers along the boundary of the Ocean sector.

7.4 Sector Group Airspace

The main airspace considered within this assessment of UAS (E) and Outback Groups are controlled airspace Class A and Class E (see Annex C for explanation). ATC utilise a number of mitigators to reduce the risk of midair conflicts in controlled airspace. These include:

Transponder requirements. Aircraft operating in the controlled airspace must have a serviceable transponder. Provided the aircraft are within radar coverage, ATC are able to monitor the position of the aircraft and provide separation. Procedural separation is provided to IFR aircraft operating in areas



without surveillance. Additionally, aircraft operating with a serviceable transponder can be monitored by aircraft fitted with an Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS)11.

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). Most aircraft that use this airspace are fitted with ADS-B. Most areas of UAS (E) Sector Group has limited surveillance. Airspace surrounding Lord Howe Island has an ADS-B receiver which can gather aircraft positional information out to a maximum of 250 NM. This is the limit of effective surveillance.

Radio requirements. All aircraft operating in controlled airspace require continuous two-way radio communication.

Required Navigation Performance (RNP). In most upper airspace volumes, standards are applied to traffic density. RNP considers the navigation performance accuracy of aircraft operating within its defined airspace. The tolerances associated with RNP airspace are categorised by the required accuracy limit an aircraft must fly. For example, the UAS (E) airspace has a RNP performance requirement of RNP-10. This represents a requirement for the total system error not to exceed 10 nm for 95% of the flight time on any portion of any single flight.

The services and rules associated with controlled airspace (and the use of ACAS by some aircraft) means that the likelihood of a midair conflict between two aircraft within the controlled airspace portion of the UAS (E) and Outback Group is rare.

7.5 Environment

The OAR Environment Specialist reviewed the airspace assessing if there are current adverse aircraft environment impacts associated with:

noise;

gaseous emissions;

interactions with birds and wildlife; and

Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act)

issues.

Should an Airspace Change Proposal be lodged as an outcome of this airspace review that results in changes in aircraft traffic patterns and procedures, the above environment issues will require assessment.

Noise

Aircraft noise issues would not be related to the current Groups‟ airspace classification. Environmental assessment determined that aircraft operating at sub-sonic speeds at or above FL180 would not be audible on the ground.

Gaseous emissions

Airspace classification may affect aircraft fuel efficiency and associated gaseous emissions when certain RAs are active and traffic levels are high.

11

General exemptions against the requirement for carriage of SSR transponders (Transponder exemption) are in force for

aircraft certified without an engine-driven electrical system; e.g. balloons, ultralight aircraft, gliders and antique aircraft.



Bird and wildlife aircraft interaction and EPBC Act issues

The airspace under consideration is primarily from FL180 and above and there would be no negative bird and wildlife interactions and EPBC Act issues resulting from the current airspace design.

7.6 Efficient use of the airspace

Flight planning requirements for aircraft wishing to transit Restricted Areas (RAs) has changed as part of the Aviation White Paper initiative on Flexible Use of Airspace, with effect 18 November 2010. See paragraph 3.8.

The airspace above FL245 within the UAS (E) Group is partly covered by surveillance. Most of the Outback Group airspace has good surveillance coverage. Where surveillance does not exist, a procedural ATC service is provided. The use of regular air routes and Flextracks within the sector Group is good practice.

The use of user-preferred routes has increased the UAS (E) airspace efficiency. Airservices advised that the first stage of a flight plan conflict function, called Flight Plan Safety Net Alert (FPSNA) had been deployed in UAS (E). The FPSNA was an advisory safety net alerting tool for aircraft not subject to radar of ADS-B surveillance services. Airservices advised that „however controllers are still responsible for performing the tasks in relation to conflict detection and resolution and assuring aircraft separation without FPSNA‟. In addition, it was advised that:

Current procedural ATC operations are not considered limited or deficient. The rollout of the tool will support the controller in the conduct of their duties, but it is not required for the safety of air traffic operations.

From 12 December 2013, Australia mandated that all aircraft at and above FL290 must be ADS–B equipped. Post 12 December 2013 transponder equipped aircraft within the Outback Group will be under a full ATC surveillance service at and above FL290.

During the course of this review, the OAR did not identify any information that indicated the airspace configuration was inefficient.

7.7 Equitable Access

Access to the controlled airspace within the Sector Groups is available to all aircraft complying with the requirements of Class A and Class E airspace. There were no reports of aircraft being denied access whilst meeting these requirements.



8 ISSUES

Airspace user feedback was received by the OAR during the course of this review. During research, analysis, observation and consultation with Brisbane Centre Sector controllers the following issues were identified:

Transition and application between Radar and Procedural separation standards have resulted in some Breakdown of Separation and Breakdown of Co-ordination incidents.

There is a lack of surveillance within the reviewed airspace particularly the UAS (E) Group.

Co-ordinating aircraft with non-standard levels assigned at the FIR/UAS (E) eastern boundary.

An increasing number of aircraft are departing from the east coast of Australia west bound through the Outback Groups airspace for Western Australian Mining Operations (FIFO).

Lower level airspace volumes (Class E and G airspace below FL 180) experience increased traffic levels on days of resource industry crew changes.

Poor pilot flight planning contributes to increased air traffic controller workload due to time required to interact with ATC flight data record.

9 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

ASIR data indicates some groupings of separation incidents occurring around the boundaries of where radar separation standards are applied and procedural standards are applied.

Based on the findings of this review the appropriate airspace arrangements are in place.

The early uptake of ADS-B and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) technology by both national and international carriers has aided in maintaining the efficiencies of the UAS (E) and Outback Group‟s airspace. However, there are still large areas where no surveillance exists within Oceanic airspace. There may be value in exploring the feasibility of ADS-B receivers on Norfolk Island, New Caledonia, Vanuatu and Willis Island to feed into the ATM system.

ASIR data reflects that coordination between Australia‟s FIR boundary can be problematic resulting in some breakdown in coordination and loss of separation.

The activation of the coastal military restricted areas between Sydney and Brisbane causes a compression of air routes resulting in traffic inefficiencies from time to time. These inefficiencies are currently being addressed through the flexibility of the ATC system.

Poor and incorrect flight planning by operators and failure to maintain tracking tolerances is resulting in additional workload for ATC staff.

FIFO operations from east coast ports to Western Australian Resource centres places pressure on the ATC system from time to time.



Existing shielding of the ADS-B receiver at Lord Howe Island and general lack of ADS-B coverage within this region reduces effective surveillance.

10 CASA RECOMMENDATIONS

It is important to note that the review may make recommendations based on existing and projected data. CASA applies a precautionary approach when conducting aeronautical studies and therefore the following recommendations are made:

1. The OAR should continue to monitor traffic levels and airspace efficiencies within the Outback and UAS (E) Groups.

2. Airservices should continue a review of routes in conflict prone areas to enhance airspace efficiency and traffic flow where possible.

ANNEXES:

A. Abbreviations B. Group and Sector Maps – HIGH and LOW C. Australian Airspace Structure D. Stakeholders E. Definitions and Explanation of Terms



ANNEX A – ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Explanation

AAPS Australian Airspace Policy Statement

ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System Act Airspace Act 2007

ACF Airspace Consultative Forum ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast system AI Airspace Infringement

AIP Aeronautical Information Publication Airservices Airservices Australia AMSL Above Mean Sea Level

ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider ASA Aviation Safety Advisor ASIR Aviation Safety Incident Report (recorded by ATSB)

ATC Air Traffic Control ATI Air Transport Inspector ATS Air Traffic Service ATM Air Traffic Management

ATSB Australian Transport Safety Bureau CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority COL Coral

CTA Control Area DA Danger Area

DAH Designated Airspace Handbook

Defence Department of Defence

EMA Emerald EPBC Act Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999

ERSA En-Route Supplement Australia FIC Flight Information Centre FIR Flight Information Region

FIS Flight Information Service FL FLD

Flight Level Flinders

FOI Flying Operations Inspector FPSNA Flight Plan Safety Net Alert Ft Feet HWE Lord Howe

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation IFR Instrument Flight Rules

NM Nautical Miles NOTAM Notice to Airman OAR Office of Airspace Regulation

OCN Ocean Sector

PT Passenger Transport RA Restricted Area RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RAPAC Regional Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committee

RPT Regular Public Transport SAR Search and Rescue SFC Surface

TSN Tasman VFR Visual Flight Rules

VHF Very High Frequency VOR VHF Omnidirectional Range

UAS (E) Upper Airspace East WIL Willis



ANNEX B – GROUP AND SECTOR MAPS – HIGH AND LOW


ANNEX C – AUSTRALIAN AIRSPACE STRUCTURE Class Description Summary of Services/Procedures/Rules

A All airspace above Flight Level (FL) 180 (east coast) or FL 245

Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) only. All aircraft require a clearance from Air Traffic Control (ATC) and are separated by ATC. Continuous two-way radio and transponder required. No speed limitation.

B

In control Zones (CTRs) of defined dimensions and control area steps generally associated with major capital city controlled aerodromes

IFR and Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flights only. All aircraft require a clearance from ATC and are separated by ATC. Continuous two-way radio and transponder required

C

In control zones (CTRs) of defined dimensions and control area steps generally associated with controlled aerodromes

All aircraft require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace. All aircraft require continuous two-way radio and transponder.

IFR separated from IFR, Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and Special VFR (SVFR) by ATC with no speed limitation for IFR operations.

VFR receives traffic information on other VFR but are not separated from each other by ATC. SVFR are separated from SVFR when visibility (VIS) is less than Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC).

VFR and SVFR speed limited to 250 knots (kt) Indicated Air Speed (IAS) below 10,000 feet (ft) Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL)*.

D

Towered locations such as Bankstown, Jandakot, Archerfield, Parafield and Alice Springs

All aircraft require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace. For VFR flights this may be in an abbreviated form. As in Class C airspace all aircraft are separated on take-off and landing. All aircraft require continuous two-way radio and are speed limited to 200 kt IAS at or below 2,500 ft within 4 NM of the primary Class D aerodrome and 250 kt IAS in the remaining Class D airspace.

IFR are separated from IFR, SVFR, and are provided with traffic information on all VFR. VFR receives traffic on all other aircraft but are not separated by ATC. SVFR are separated from SVFR when VIS is less than VMC.

E Controlled airspace not covered in classifications above

All aircraft require continuous two-way radio and transponder. All aircraft are speed limited to 250 kt IAS below 10,000 ft AMSL*,

IFR requires a clearance from ATC to enter airspace and are separated from IFR by ATC, and provided with traffic information as far as practicable on VFR.

VFR do not require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace and are provided with a Flight Information Service (FIS). On request and ATC workload permitting, a Radar / ADS-B Information Service (RIS) is available within surveillance coverage.

F Not currently used in Australia

G Non-controlled

Clearance from ATC to enter airspace not required. All aircraft are speed limited to 250 kt IAS below 10,000 ft AMSL*.

IFR requires continuous two-way radio and receive a FIS, including traffic information on other IFR. VFR receives a FIS. On request and ATC workload permitting, a RIS is available within surveillance coverage.

VHF radio required above 5,000 ft AMSL and at aerodromes where carriage and use of radio is required.

* Not applicable to military aircraft. **If traffic conditions permit, ATC may approve a pilot's request to exceed the 200 kt speed limit to a maximum limit of 250 kt unless the pilot informs ATC a higher minimum speed is required.



ANNEX D – STAKEHOLDERS

Position Organisation

Chief Pilot Alliance Airlines

Head of Flight Operations Cobham Aviation Services

Chief Pilot Jetstar

Chief Pilot Queensland Government Air Wing

Chief Pilot Regional Express Airlines and Pel-Air

Chief Pilot Skytrans

Mangers of Line Operations Virgin Australia Pty Ltd

Manger Operations Qantas

Deputy Chief Pilot QantasLink

Chief Pilot Regional Link

Chief Pilot Royal Flying Doctor Service

PBN Manager Air New Zealand

UAS (E) Group Sector Controllers Air Traffic Control Group

UAS (E) Group ATC Line Manager Air Traffic Control Group

Outback Group Sector Controllers Air Traffic Control Group

Outback Group ATC Line Manager Air Traffic Control Group

Aviation Safety Advisor (ASA) Safety Analysis and Education Division, CASA

Flying Operations Inspector (FOI) Operations Division, CASA

Air Transport Inspector (ATI) Operations Division, CASA

Defence OAR Department of Defence – RAAF



ANNEX E – DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATION OF TERMS

Danger Areas: The declaration of a Danger Area defines airspace within which activities dangerous to the flight of aircraft may exist at specified times. Approval for flight through a Danger Area outside controlled airspace is not required. However, pilots are expected to maintain a high level of vigilance when transiting Danger Areas. Danger Areas are primarily established to alert aircraft on the following:

Flying training areas where student pilots are learning to fly and / or gather in large numbers;

Gliding areas where communications with airborne gliders might be difficult; Blasting on the ground at mine sites; Parachute operations; Gas discharge plumes; and Small arms fire from rifle ranges.

Flextracks: A Flextrack is a non-fixed route that is optimised for the prevailing weather. These high altitude jet stream winds can dramatically affect an aircraft‟s speed over the ground. The use of Flextracks can deliver savings of aircraft fuel and time.

Flight Information Service (FIS): A service provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights.

Restricted Area: The declaration of a Restricted Area creates airspace of defined dimensions within which the flight of aircraft is restricted in accordance with specified conditions. Clearances to fly through an active Restricted Area are generally only withheld when activities hazardous to the aircraft are taking place, or when military activities require absolute priority.

Restricted Areas are mainly declared over areas where military operations occur. However, Restricted Areas have also been declared to cater for communications and space tracking operations or to control access to emergency or disaster areas. Restricted Areas are generally promulgated at specified times and dates. For example, a temporary Restricted Area may be declared for special events where there may be a public safety issue, such as the Avalon Air Show or the Commonwealth Games.

Airspace Review of Upper Airspace Services (East) … · ASIR data reflects that coordination...

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