UNCLASSIFIED

Australian Aircraft Stores Capabilities in a Network Enabled Worldby

Malcolm G. Tutty FIE(Aust), FRAeS, CPEng, BEng

Minor Thesis submitted to the University of South Australia for the Degree of

MASTER OF ENGINEERING IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

System Engineering and Evaluation Centre (SEEC) School of Electrical and Information Engineering Building F, Mawson Lakes Campus University of South Australia Mawson Lakes, South Australia 5095

31 January 2005 UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARYThe future is not some place we are going to, but one we are creating. The paths to it are not found, but made. The making of these paths changes both the maker and the destination. Peter Ellyard

In recent years there has been what has been tantamount to a revolutionary shift in the focus of the profession of arms. The shift has occurred away from the platform-centric view popularised by the politicians and media as to how many tanks, planes and boats are needed for the defence force, to that of a capability management construct that is to be network-centric, interoperable and effects based. This is achieved by treating the military capabilities to achieve those end-effects as families of systems that need to be managed across the whole life cycle. The ability to undertake predictive modelling and simulation of the capabilities options available to a joint force commander to achieve the desired end-effects in the time available means that network-centricity is vital to capability development, as it is to those undertaking the combat operations. The level of interoperability of aircraft and stores is vital to Australia being able to fly and fight with our allies. Interoperability is, without exception, given a very high priority early in aerospace weapons programs in setting the standards required, but then seems to be left behind when fiscal realities start hitting home to save costs to that specific program. The level of interoperability for network enabled aircraft stores capabilities that are based on aircraft stores configurations certified by nationally recognised airworthiness bodies needs to, however, mature beyond such a technical emphasis to one of a people emphasis by addressing the command and control, and organisational elements to achieve certification of interchangeable aircraft stores capabilities at acceptable levels of risk during concept development, capability definition, acquisition and in-service phases. The current initiatives of the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee member nations, namely Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and the US, and several key commercial standardisation organisations that will affect how future aerospace weapon systems will be integrated to achieve interoperability between joint, allied, and coalition forces will be critically reviewed and options discussed to increase awareness of the challenges facing us. This thesis therefore has as its central premise the vision that Australias future joint defence force will inevitably have key operational and support systems network enabled with sensor and engagement platforms connected to it. The main questions resulting from this central premise are therefore, how soon can we make the most important parts of our joint forces network enabled whilst retaining the level of interoperability between all these families of systems at acceptable levels of risk. The prosaic answer is for Australia to focus on providing the secure, tactical level

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networks at the mission level for key aircraft stores capabilities in the short to medium term cognizant of the reputed transformation in NCW for the strategic and interconnectedness of everything at all levels that will occur in the longer term. Australia needs to implement an experimentation program that includes the use of air armament to explore whether such concepts are practicable. With such a bounded problem, systems engineering principles are most useful in helping identify and implement with rationally derived cost, schedule and performance criteria to help better manage the wider communities expectations. The antithesis of those expectations is self-evident in the wider understanding of the latest family of systems being planned for use within the next decade to make the network-centric warfare concept operationally effective. As a result of the research undertaken, the author can now navigate his way through the many layers of nuances and acronyms incorporated into the vision for network centric warfare, but does stand in awe as to the sheer magnitude of the operational concept envisioned, the systems engineering involved, and the resources that will be used to acquire and validate it in the timeframe being currently espoused publicly and within the defence community. Hopefully those having the occasion to read this minor thesis will also start to appreciate the magnitude of the network enabled vision being undertaken and the discipline that will be required to achieve it within the fragmented capability management and nascent systems engineering frameworks we have used to date.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThose whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious. Sun Tzu (500 BCE)

This work relates to an Australian Department of Defence Study Bank sponsorship by the Aerospace Operational Support Group, Royal Australian Air Force and also documents an Invited Paper at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (or NATO) Research & Technology Organisations Air Vehicles Technology Panel Symposium in June 2004 at Williamsburg, Virginia that was funded by the Department of the Navy Grant N00014-14-1-4066 issued by the Office of Naval Research International Field Office, London. The paper, the first by an Australian at this NATO Panel, discussed Australias perspective on the extant development and agreement of better, internationally recognised, technical standards addressing aircraft stores compatibility including: structures, electrical interfaces, EMC/EMI/HERO, safe escape, flight termination systems, safety templates, risk management and, most importantly, a method to verify the level of interoperability. The Australian and US Governments have a royalty free license throughout the world in all copyrightable material contained therein. My thanks to Group Captains Lindsay Ward, AFC, Mark Skidmore and Stephen Fielder, AM, for supporting the Defence Study Bank sponsorship so willingly. Perhaps they just wanted me to stop being bored from recalibrating those neophytes with a death wish for those of us who choose to make their theoretical dreams a reality and those who need to use such systems in combat. I wish to acknowledge the extensive support of Anthony Pilgrim and the administrative staff of the University of South Australia Systems Engineering and Evaluation Centre (SEEC) for the assistance and encouragement given to me in the progression of this endeavour and for overcoming the academic bureaucracy for me. It made my challenges seem less daunting. I also wish to acknowledge the philosophic discussions and guidance from Drs Stephen Cook, Viv Crouch, Carlo Kopp and especially Bill Filmer, AM. Without their mentoring on the many and often wayward research threads of mine over the years this thesis would not have been as comprehensive nor looked anything like the way it does now. Unbeknownst to them, their mentoring has fundamentally changed the way Australia views the systems engineering associated with changing the art of aircraft stores compatibility into more of a science. Finally, thanks to my long suffering wife, Anne, who has gamely stuck by me during my seemingly endless quest for knowledge and is certainly never, ever boring and the two greatest delights of my life since marrying Anne: Samuel Colin Norman and Sarah Wendy Wally. May

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they never see the fruits of this particular labour ever needing to be used in anger during their, or their childrens, life times.

DECLARATIONI declare that this material does not incorporate, without acknowledgement, any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge it does not contain any materials previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text. Please note that this thesis is derived from research based on unclassified, open sources and are those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the extant official views of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Department of Defence or the Australian Government. The thesis is intended to promote awareness and discussion on the challenges being faced to improve the understanding of network-centricity and interoperability with Australias joint forces, major allies and coalition partners as we undertake the transformation to a network enabled, effectsbased defence force. Any mistakes in trying to interpret and understand the context of some pretty mind blowing concepts or in attributing their source, however, are those of the author alone.

Malcolm G. Tutty

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TABLE OF CONTENTSSummary Acknowledgements Authors Declaration Table of Contents List of Figures List of Tables Glossary Abbreviations CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 1.0 Background 1.1 The Research Problem 1.2 Method 1.3 Delimitation and Assumptions 1.4 Structure of the Minor Thesis CHAPTER 2 - Review of the Literature 2.0 Background 2.1 Aircraft Stores Compatibility 2.2 Aircraft Stores Capability 2.3 Defence Capability Management 2.4 Future Operational Concepts 2.5 A Seamless Force through Interoperability 2.6 Network Enabled Operations CHAPTER 3 - Future Australian Aircraft Stores Capability Operational Concepts requiring Network Enabling 3.0 Background 3.1 Currently Approved ADF Air Armament Acquisitions 3.2 The Longer Term Future 3.3 Network Enabled Acquisitions 3.4 ADF Air Power Capabilities End-States CHAPTER 4 - Open System, Avionic and Network Enabled Architectures 4.0 Background on Australian Military Avionic Systems 4.1 So what is an OSA or an OSI? 4.2 The Future 4.3 Weapon Data Link Architecture 4.4 US network centric warfare 4.5 The Plug and Play Weapon 4.6 Networked systems the future 68 71 82 85 87 92 101 47 49 55 60 62 11 12 20 25 34 35 38 1 4 5 9 9 i iii iv v vii viii ix xv

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CHAPTER 5 - Standards and Risk Management 5.0 Background to Standardisation 5.1 Military Standardisation 5.2 Systems Modelling 5.3 Risk Management CHAPTER 6 - Implementation of Best Practice 6.0 Background 6.1 How to fix a complex system 6.2 The Future 6.3 Test & Evaluation Evolution CHAPTER 7 - Conclusions and Further Work 7.0 Background 7.1 Campaign / Theatre Level of Operations for air armament 7.2 Mission Level of Operations for network enabled aircraft stores capabilities 7.3 Engagement Level of Operations for network enables aircraft stores compatibility 140 142 149 154 124 124 131 138 105 107 111 115

REFERENCES APPENDICES:1. Aircraft Stores Certification Functional Flow Block Diagram Overview

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2. ADF Aircraft Stores Compatibility Systems Engineering Framework 3. Defence Capability System Life Cycle Model 4. AAP 7001.054 Section 2 Chapter 11 Excerpts on Systems Engineering Model 5. International Standardisation Programs 6. ADF Aircraft Stores Capabilities Summary 7. ASC Risk Assessment & Tracking Version 2.0

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LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1-1 Cebrowskis prescient view of Network-centric Warfare Figure 1-2 USAF NCW and Air Armament network centric vision Figure 1-3 Knowledge Abstraction of Network Enabled and Military view of Operations Figure 2-1 Aircraft Stores Configuration Operating Limitations Figure 2-2 Australias Capability Management Life Cycle Figure 2-3 Application of the Australian Illustrative Planning Scenarios to air weapons Figure 2-4 ADF Network Centric Roadmap Figure 2-5 Air Combat System Interoperability Assessment using US LISI Model Figure 2-6 Network enabled information sharing between aircraft Figure 2-7 Sensor, Engagement and Information Grids of US network-centric information flow Figure 2-8 Global Information Grid Figure 3-1 Aircraft Stores Capabilities introduced into ADF Service Figure 3-2 ADF Aircraft Stores Capability Certification Process linkage with V&V T&E Activities Figure 3-3 Proposed Hypothetical Roadmap for Aerospace Capability Domain Figure 3-4 Proposed RAAF Force Restructure Figure 3-5 Northwest Australia and aircraft operating radius Figure 3-6 Woomera Test Range Concept of Operations for Network Enabling Figure 4-1 Independent Avionics Figure 4-2 Federated Avionics Figure 4-3 Integrated Avionics Figure 4-4 Advanced Integrated Avionics Figure 4-5 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Proposed Open System Architecture 53 57 58 67 68 68 69 69 71 2 6 10 17 26 31 34 37 41 43 44 47 49

Figure 4-6 Aircraft Avionics Open System Architectures and Interconnection versus time to obsolescence 72 Figure 4-7 SAE Miniature Munitions Standard, MIL-STD-3014 and MIL-STD-1760 Figure 4-8 OSA and MIL-STD-3014 Figure 4-9 MIL-STD-3014 Legacy Message Wrapper Figure 4-10 NATO Fuze Interoperability Figure 4-11 US Joint Vision 2010 Operational Concept Figure 4-12 Weaponised UAV Concept Figure 4-13 ALWI-2 (2004) Figure 4 Figure 4-14 ALWI-2 (2004) Figure 6 Figure 4-15a ALWI-2 (2004) Figure 7 Figure 4-15b ALW-2 (2004) Figure 13 vii 75 76 77 87 88 89 94 94 96 96

Figure 4-16 ALWI-2 (2004) Store Operating Systems Roadmap Figure 4-17 ALWI-2 Roadmap for Environment and certification interoperability Figure 4-18 Levels of US Aircraft Network Enabling Figure 5-1 Thamhain Program Conflict Level Tradeoffs Figure 5-2 Effect of Experimentation of defence capabilities. Figure 5-3 Sample ASC Flight Clearance Risk Assessment Model Result & Recommended Method for determining Consequence Figure 5-4 Proposed Risk Reduction Program Figure 5-5 ASC Risk Assessment & Tracking Chart Output Figure 5-6 Example of a more representative ASC RAT showing effect of prior analyses and factors Figure 5-7 Recommended Guidance for assessing program risk across a new systems life cycle Figure 6-1 ASC Engineering Data Package methods Figure 6-2 ADF DEF (AUST) 5664 Project Work Breakdown Structure Figure 6-3 US Acquisition System model changes Figure 6-4 US Acquisition System response times Figure 6-5 US Proposed Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Proposal Figure 6-6 USAF AFRL/MN three node Weapons Networking Concept Figure 6-7 US CJCS Capability Base Assessment summary

98 100 100 113 114 118 120 121 122 123 126 127 128 128 129 132 137

LIST OF TABLES Table 1 DSTO Organisational Interoperability Levels & Attributes Table 2 LISI and DSTO Organisational Interoperability Models Table 3 ADF Aircraft Stores Capability Summary Table 4 ADF DMO Project and Weapons Average Delivery Times Table 5 US Major Projects cost projections Table 6 Comparison of CMMI and Lean Aircraft Initiative 36 36 48 129 130 139

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GLOSSARY Aircraft. This includes fixed and rotary wing aircraft/aeroplanes both inhabited and uninhabited. Aircraft Store. Any device intended for internal or external carriage and mounted on aircraft suspension and release equipment, whether or not the item is intended to be separated in flight from the aircraft. All terms are as defined in AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) unless noted otherwise. Aircraft stores capability. The capability provided by specified aircraft stores configuration(s) certified as meeting approved operational suitability, effectiveness and preparedness criteria. Aircraft stores certification. An engineering, operational and logistics activity that results in the documentation by the Technical and Operational Airworthiness Authority Representatives that specified aircraft stores configuration(s) are operationally suitable, effective and that the preparedness status of the established integrated logistics support meets the endorsed Operational Requirement for the aircraft stores capability. Formal approval for authorisation and Release to Service of an aircraft stores configuration is accomplished through publication of appropriate technical orders and manuals and the provision of training in use of the systems. Aircraft stores clearance. Primarily a systems engineering activity that results in the documentation of the extent of aircraft stores compatibility to safely prepare, load, carry, employ and/or jettison specific aircraft stores configurations within specified ground and flight operating envelopes. Aircraft stores compatibility. The ability of each element of specified aircraft stores configuration(s) to coexist without unacceptable effects on the physical, aerodynamic, structural, electrical, electromagnetic or functional characteristics of each other under specified ground and flight conditions. Aircraft & Stores Compatibility Engineering Data Package (ASCEDP). A document that, for specified aircraft stores combination, documents all stores and aircraft CEDPs covering all engineering and operational aspects relevant to aircraft stores compatibility iaw ASCC AIRSTD 20/20 (1995) and MIL-HDBK-1763 at Military Handbook (1998) as a source for production of technical orders. An ASCEDP is required for all Australian State aircraft stores combinations. For Australia, AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) identifies the Stores and Aircraft CEDPs provided by the stores and aircraft engineering authorities respectively. collated Aircraft & Stores CEDPs are maintained by ASCENG. Aircraft Stores Compatibility Flight Clearance. A document issued by ASCENG that defines the extent of aircraft stores compatibility to safely prepare, load, carry, employ and/or jettison specific aircraft stores configurations within specified ground and flight operating envelopes. The

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Aircraft Stores Configuration. An aircraft stores configuration refers to an aerospace platform, incorporating a stores management system(s), combined with specific suspension equipment and aircraft store(s) loaded on the aircraft in a specific pattern. An aircraft stores configuration also includes any downloads from that specific pattern resulting from the release of the store(s) in an authorised employment or jettison sequence(s). Analogy. A form of reasoning in which similarities are inferred from a similarity of two or more things in certain particulars; or an agreement, likeness or correspondence between the relations of things to one another. Macquarie Concise Dictionary (1988) Armament. Force equipped for war, military weapons and equipment, process of equipping for war. Concise Oxford Dictionary (1964) ASCENG. Aircraft Stores Compatibility Engineering Agency. A tri-service agency reporting to Air Force responsible for airworthiness and suitability standards, planning, conducting, approving and supporting operations for all ADF State aircraft stores configurations. Avionic architecture. An avionic architecture describes the form, fit, function, and interface characteristics of the hardware and software elements that characterise the airborne mission system. JAST (1994) Capability. Ability to implement power. Concise Oxford Dictionary (1964); a quality that enables the achievement of an outcome. Commonwealth of Australia (2002a) Commonality. A state achieved when groups of individuals, organisations or nations use the same doctrine, procedures and equipment. ASCC (2005) Compatibility. The suitability of products, processes or services for use together under specific conditions to fulfil relevant requirements without causing unacceptable interactions. The capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference; or capable of orderly efficient integration with other elements in a system. Concise Macquarie Dictionary Concept. n. a thought, idea, or notion, often one deriving from a generalised mental operation. Macquarie Concise Dictionary (1988) Critical Operational Issue (COI). A key operational effectiveness or operational suitability issue that must be examined during T&E to determine the system capability to perform its mission. A COI is normally phrased as a question to be answered in evaluating a systems operational effectiveness/suitability. Critical Technical Characteristic (CTI). A quantitative or qualitative parameter of system performance whose measurement is a principal indicator of technical achievement. Critical technical characteristics must be testable, measurable and verifiable.

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Effects. Are the physical, functional or psychological outcome, event or consequence that results from specific military of non-military actions. Ryan & Callan (2003) Effects-based Operations. Coordinated sets of actions [in the cognitive domain] directed at shaping the behaviour of friends, foes, neutral in peace, crisis and war. Smith (2002) The application of military and non-military capabilities to realise specific and desired strategic and operational outcomes in peace, tension, conflict and post conflict situations. Ryan & Callan (2003) Experimentation. n. the act or practice of making experiments; the process of experimenting; a product that is the result of a long experiment. Macquarie Concise Dictionary (1998) In the scientific method, an experiment is a set of actions and observations, performed to verify or falsify a hypothesis or identify a causal relationship between phenomena. The experiment is a cornerstone in the empirical approach to knowledge. Wikipaedia (2005) Fidelity The degree to which a model realistically represents the system or process it is modelling not necessarily the level of granularity, detail or complexity of the model. Function. A task, action, or activity expressed as a verb-noun combination (eg Brake Function: stop vehicle) to achieve a defined outcome. Electronic Industries Association (1999) Functional Requirement. A statement that identifies what a product or process must accomplish to produce required behaviour and/or results. Electronic Industries Association (1999) Interchangeability. The ability of one product, process or service to be used in place of another to fulfil the same requirements. A condition which exists when two or more items possess such functional and physical characteristics as to be equivalent in performance and durability, and are capable of being exchanged one for the other without alteration of the items themselves, or of adjoining items, except for adjustment, and without selection for fit and performance. ASCC (2005) Interoperability. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide the services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces, and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. The three levels of standardisation for interoperability as used by the ASCC nations are: Common, Interchangeable and Compatible. ASCC (2005) Level The typical differences in fidelity, intended use, types of resources and commitment, from low to high are 1 : 0 - Math Constructs, 1 - Computer Simulations, 2 - Hybrid Models, 3 - Virtual simulations, 4 - Distributed Model Networks, and 5 - Live Exercises. Model Any representation of a function or process, be it mathematical, physical, or descriptive. They are typically of two categories representations (employing some logical or mathematical rule) and simulations (which mimic the detailed structure of the system and may include

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See INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) Fig 4-64 for a more complete description.

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representations of subsystems or components) that may be made up of one or several of: physical, graphical, mathematical (deterministic) and statistical (probabilistic). Network-centric warfare. A network-centric force has the capability to share and exchange information among the geographically distributed elements of the force: sensors, regardless of platform; shooters, regardless of service; and decision makers and supporting organizations, regardless of location. In short, a network-centric force is an interoperable force, a force that has global access to assured information whenever and wherever needed. After the seminal NCW paper at Cebrowski & Garstka (1998) and Garstka (2000) which is also particularly relevant to aerospace applications. Network enabled operations. An information superiority-enabled concept of operation that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronisation. In essence, it translates information superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battlespace. The power of network enabling is derived from the effective linking or networking of knowledgeable entities that are geographically or hierarchically dispersed. The networking of knowledgeable entities enables them to share information and collaborate to develop shared awareness, and also to collaborate with one another to achieve a degree of self-synchronisation. After Kopp (2003) and Muir (2003). The state achieved when fighting units, sensors and decision makers are linked in a robust, continuous way that increases situational awareness and the capacity to act decisively that is superior to their adversaries. Tutty (2004) Open Systems Architecture. A systems architecture that employs a modular design and, where appropriate, defines key interfaces using widely supported, consensus-based standards that are published and maintained by a recognized industrial standards organization. Interface standards specify the physical, functional, and operational relationships between the various elements (hardware and software), to permit interchangeability, interconnection, compatibility and/or communication. The selection of the appropriate standards for system interfaces should be based on sound market research of available standards and the application of a disciplined systems engineering process. Key interfaces are interfaces between modules for which the preferred implementation uses open standards. These interfaces are selected for ease of change based on a detailed understanding of the maintenance concepts, affordability concerns, and where technologies or requirements are intended to evolve. Key interfaces should utilize open standards in order to produce the largest life cycle cost benefits. Interfaces at and above key interfaces are those that should be designated for use of open interface standards. Standards for interfaces below this level may also be open; however, selection is left to the supplier as part of detail design. MOSA (2004)

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Plug & Play Weapons. A concept of interfacing systems that defines the level of standardisation across system, software, electric, mechanical and environmental domains that enables an air vehicle to exploit the operational capabilities of a weapon / store without the need to have modifications embodied. ALWI-2 (2004) Provenance. The place of origin, as of a work of art. Concise Oxford Dictionary (1964) Requirement. See functional requirement. Risk. A measure of the uncertainty of attaining a goal, objective, or requirement pertaining to technical performance, cost, and schedule. Risk has two components the likelihood of an undesirable event will occur and the consequence of the event if it does occur. INCOSE SE Handbook (2000 Section 4.20) Risk Management the recognition, assessment, and control of uncertainties that may result in schedule delays, cost overruns, performance problems, adverse environment impacts, or other undesired consequences. Balances the level of acceptable risk with the potential rewards. Addresses uncertainties in both products and processes. Program & Environmental risk management have different objectives and require different methodologies. The framework must be developed with processes and methodologies that suit the best practices of the industry involved and the scale of the project or system being considered. An Acceptable Risk is the predetermined criterion or standard for a maximum risk ceiling which permits the evaluation of cost, national priority interests, and a number of tests to be conducted. Numbers of events and exposed numbers of personnel are essential in deriving this. INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) Similarity. State of being similar, a point of resemblance. In the ADF airworthiness parlance this indicates that an acceptable Certification Basis has been established by another recognised airworthiness agency. Standard. A description of a process, material, or product meant for repeated use in one of more applications covering: materials, processes, products and services. Commonwealth of Australia (2002b) Synchronisation. The ability of a well-informed force to organise and synchronise complex warfare activities from the bottom up. Cebrowski & Garstka (1998) Systems engineering. An interdisciplinary collaborative approach to derive, evolve, and verify a life cycle balanced system solution that satisfies customer expectations and meets public acceptability. An interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of successful systems. INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) It encompasses the system functionally from end to end and in a temporal sense from conception to disposal concentrat[ing] on the creation of hardware and software architectures and on the development and management of the interfaces between subsystems. Electronic Industries Association (1999)

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Simulation. A computer program that represents the operation of a function or process to the degree of accuracy necessary to meet its purpose. Typically realistic or representative scenarios are run in the time domain to simulate the behaviour(s) of the proposed or real system. INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) Validation. The process of evaluating a system or component during or at the end of the development process to determine whether it satisfies specified requirements. The process of determining the degree to which a model is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the model. American Institute for Aeronautic & Astronautics (1998) Confirms that the system, as built, will satisfy the users needs ensures that you built the right thing. INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) Verification. The process of evaluating a system or component to determine whether the products of a given development phase satisfy the conditions imposed at the start of that phase. The process of determining that a model implementation accurately represents the developers conceptual description of the model and the solution to the model. American Institute for Aeronautic & Astronautics (1998) Addresses whether the system, its elements, its interfaces, and incremental work products satisfy their requirements - ensures that you built it right. INCOSE SE Handbook (2000)

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ABBREVIATIONSAAP ADF ASC ASCC ASCENG C4ISR CEDP CF COTS DIE DMO DoD DSTO FEG JDAM JTeL JTRS LGB LISI NATO NEO NCW OSA OSI PGM RAF RAAF RNZAF RTO SAE SDB T&E UK UAV UCAV USA USAF USMC USN V&V WTR Australian Air Publication Australian Defence Force Aircraft stores capability Air Standardization Coordinating Committee Aircraft Stores Compatibility Engineering Agency, RAAF Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Compatibility Engineering Data Package Canadian Forces Commercial Off-The-Shelf Defence Information Environment Defence Materiel Organisation (US) Department of Defense Defence Science and Technology Organisation Force Element Group Joint Direct Attack Munition JTRS Technology Laboratory Joint Tactical Radio System Laser Guided Bomb Levels of Information Systems Interoperability North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Network enabled operations Network-centric warfare Opens Systems Architecture Open System Interconnection Precision Guided Munition Royal Air Force Royal Australian Air Force Royal New Zealand Air Force (NATO) Research and Technology Organisation Society of Automotive Engineering Small Diameter Bomb Test and Evaluation United Kingdom Uninhabited Air Vehicle Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle US Army US Air Force US Marine Corp RANGE ST TE US Navy Verification & Validation Woomera Test Range OU LIWOOMERA

TH AUSTRA

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTIONWe are, by all accounts, in the midst of another technological revolution an information age, a time of near-infinite connectedness. Information storage and retrieval is the manifest purpose of the digital revolution. Relationships in these systems are mutual: you influence your neighbours, and your neighbours influence you. All emergent systems are built of this kind of feedback, the two way connections that foster higher-level learning. But it is both the promise and the peril of swarm logic that the higher-level behaviour is almost impossible to predict in advance. Johnson (2001) pp 113, 120 & 233

1.0 BackgroundThe advances made in the 100 years of manned flight from the earth are simply incredible. The scientific and engineering accomplishments in aerospace alone can be seen in the aerodynamic, structures, propulsion, life support and aircraft electronic (i.e., avionic) systems that are required to operate in the earths atmosphere as documented comprehensively by Winter and van der Linden (2003). Stanton (2001) and Collinson (2002) et al provide excellent overviews of the avionic systems that have been used for military aircraft systems in the latter part of the twentieth century. Aircraft avionic systems have typically been designed, until very recently, as stand alone systems that can perform navigation functions but can rarely communicate with other platforms or communicate in real time with the intelligence services that decide when and where they are used. This highly hierarchical isolated systems perspective, which is not just endemic in aircraft systems, is characterised by what is known as a platform-centric view. With this view, the integrating contractor is typically given a often limited charter to interface with other systems due to the plethora of system specifications involved, a lack of standard interfaces and an acquisition cost of the specific system treated in isolation of other like systems. These aircraft systems must be airworthy and be able to reliably undertake the missions for which they were built. The Australian Air Publication (or AAP) 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) builds on civilian and overseas military airworthiness systems by codifying Australias technical airworthiness requirements, including that required of air armament. The goal being aircraft stores capabilities that are operationally effective, suitable and prepared to meet defined ADF operational requirements into the future.

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Figure 1-1. Cebrowskis Network Centric Warfare emerging architecture courtesy Cebrowski & Garstka (1998) Recent articles in the open literature and press have continued to highlight the importance of network-centric warfare (NCW) initiated by Cebrowski & Gartska (1998) 1 , Gartska (2000) and more recently network enabled operations (NEO) to future Australian Defence Force (ADF) warfighting concepts at Muir (2003), Kopp (2003) and, most importantly in the ADFs doctrine at Commonwealth of Australia (2003b), (2003c) and (2003d). In 2004, the ADF finalised and published an agreed NEO doctrine at Commonwealth of Australia (2004a) and a roadmap at Commonwealth of Australia (2004a) along with an initial tranche of operational concepts. It is envisioned that these concepts will transform Australias current aerospace combat and associated training capabilities to achieve tailored end-effects during future NEO by acquiring a mix of advanced air armament and new command and control systems under a number of major and minor acquisition programs. These acquisition programs are typically cited as being fully interoperable between the three ADF services operating aircraft, with our allies and coalition partners principally via agreements and standards established by the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC). Capability management and systems engineering

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See Figure 1-1 for Their prescient view of the sensor, command and control and shooter systems grids abd perspective.

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techniques are also being introduced and applied across the majority of areas within the Department of Defence in Australia in an endeavour for the ADF to be a seamless joint force that is concept led and capability managed throughout its life. Therefore it is timely to review the current state of play between what has traditionally been seen diametrically opposite positions namely, airworthiness and information flow. Research into the application of systems engineering to address network enabled operations for future ADF aircraft stores capabilities being acquired by the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) is timely, due to the number of these programs and the considerable difficulties being experienced with numerous military aircraft integration programs as described publicly (belatedly some would say) by Cook (2003), Kinnaird (2003), Richards (2004), Lebihan (2002), Kopp (2003), et al. Such challenges are not however unique to Australia as evidenced by other nations fervently seeking changes to their acquisition systems as described by Hoyle (2004) et al. In Australia such acquisitions include inter alia Project AIR 5400 which is concurrently procuring the UK AIM-132 ASRAAM and US AIM-120C AMRAAM for air to air operations from RAAF F/A-18 Hornet aircraft with upgraded avionics and a helmet mounted sight, the Project AIR 87 acquisition of the Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter and AIR 6000 / New Aircraft Combat Capability with F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Similarly, several DMO Projects are addressing air to ground capabilities including: Project AIR 5398 with the AGM-142E Raptor Imaging IR guided missile with blast and penetrator warheads and the associated AN/ASQ-55 Data Link Pod on the F-111C AUP aircraft. Moreover, AIR 5418 is considering the acquisition of the Boeing SLAM-ER, Taurus KEPD 350 or AGM-158 JASSM missiles for AP-3C Orion and F/A-18, AIR 5409 which is considering GPS aided weapons and Joint Project (JP) 2070 which is procuring the Eurotorp MU90 Light Weight Torpedo for AP-3C and the ADFs maritime targets and submarines. Research into future Australian and allied air armament and avionic software systems engineering best practices is warranted to address the risk to future ADF operational needs to ensure the appropriate and timely allocation of funds. Improved methods or techniques to streamline the acquisition of operationally suitable and effective aircraft stores capabilities to meet defined operational requirements across all three services in a NEO environment are to be elucidated. Preliminary research by Knight (2004) and Watts (2004) also explores the impact of

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evolutionary systems and the science of networks have on the rate at which new capabilities can be created to meet evolving operation concepts. Certainly the robustness of the networks needs exploration when placed in the air armament context. It soon became apparent during the research phase that the network enabling of air armament may actually be the easier part of the Gordian Knot 2 of future joint and coalition battlespace operations to address. Whilst this issue may be seen to be outside the original scope of the research problem, fortunately the ADFs current NCW Roadmap envisions truly joint NEO by 2020 with extensive experimentation to ensure operational concepts appropriate to the Australian context are fully explored. The implications of future joint and coalition battlespace for operations will need to be reviewed and assessed, mainly for their direct impact and influence to ensure that air armament operation concepts do fit within the wider context of the problem space. This involved considerably more research and time than was originally envisioned by the author for a minor thesis! Hopefully it was not in vain.

1.1 The Research ProblemThe research will explore inter alia how national and international interoperability initiatives are affecting national and international aircraft stores compatibility clearance and certification practices. Moreover, the research will identify the systems engineering that should be applied during acquisition of future aircraft stores combat capabilities. The fundamental problem this research attempts to answer is: What systems engineering standards and best practice are best suited to reducing the risk of future avionics weapon systems acquisitions to achieve interoperable, network enabled operations for future Australian air armament? The sub-problems that stem from this research are: 1. What are the Australian aircraft stores capabilities that would be influenced by network enabled operations?

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The Gordian Knot is a metaphor for an intractable problem, solved by a bold stroke. The legend it refers to is associated with Alexander the Great who simply cut the previously unsolvable Gordian Knot with his sword.

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2.

What are the current and proposed system engineering standards and practices for avionic systems and network enabled systems development relevant to Australias future air armament acquisitions?

3.

How should such recommended standards and best practices be implemented and verified?

1.2 MethodThe ADF systems engineering framework of the Defence Capability Systems Life Cycle Management Manual at Commonwealth of Australia (2002a) and ANSI/EIA STD 632 at Electronic Industries Association (1999) needs to be reviewed to ensure requirements traceability and applicability to ADF weapon systems. The recommended systems engineering approach used by INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) and DMO should be considered. The proposed standards and best practice should also be suitable, with minimum tailoring, for the development of mission and safety critical software for use with air armament. The methodology to address each of the identified sub-problems is proposed below. The distinguishing characteristics of the research proposed to collect the necessary data are that successful outcomes are based on the criteria established by Leedy and Ormrod (2001, Table 5-1, p.102). Sub-Problem 1 What are the future Australian air armament requiring network enabling Purpose. Sub-problem needs to explore, interpret and build a theory. Nature of the Process. Sub-problem has potentially unknown variables, an emergent design that is probably context bound, in terms of avionic and network enabled systems. Methods of data collection. Literature searches and a survey of companies and individuals involved with air armament and NEO to ascertain if any unpublished opensource standards or practices are applicable to the Australian context of air armament. The researcher will also need to ensure experienced personnel are drawn from each of the disciplines that will be engaged in NEO for air armament. Form of reasoning used in analysis. Inductive reasoning will be required to draw inferences from the literature and surveys.

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Communicating findings. Narrative.

Constellation Net (Air & Space) Vision TODAYINMARSAT/IRIDIUM ADV Polar C-130AMP C-5 KC-10 KC-135 UFO (UHF) MUOS C-37 CV-22 E-6 E-4BUHFU B-2 HF

Int Polar AEHF/EHF

MILSTAR

Connexion/INMARSAT DSCS Commercial C/Ku/Ka VC-25/C-32/C-40 (OSA/VIP/SAM) ETP

Capabilities Integration Directorate Capabilities Integration Directorate

XLink 16

EC-130

V-22 B-1 KC-XXX

TSAT C-17UH F

AC/MC/HC-130

E-10

E-3 MMP Tankers TUAV GH E-8 BAMS

ETP Follow On

AH-1Z Coalition C-130J F-3 P-3 AV-8B UH-1Y KC-130 EA-6B

B-52 RC-135 ABL Weapons MMA F/A-22 UCAV SDB E-2C II F-35 (JSF) F-16 Bk40/50 JASSM Nimrod ACS F-15E U-2 JSOW F-16 Bk30? ISR Network WF TACTOM A-10 MH-60 JCM HH-60 F/A-18 SBIRS F-117? IP WF EFA F-15C/D

WGS

Nat SYSTEMS

WNW, NDL, WIN-T TACP/ SOFLand Mobile

EPLRSJTEP

Predator

SBR

Surface Mobile

Global Joint Ground C2

ASOC

CAOC

Teleport

DCGS ISR Processing= IP Dynamic Routing = IP Data 38 X = Decommissioned Green Text = Added Capability

Fixed Joint Ground InfostructureNo Significant IP or Data Link Capability: C-5 C-130AMP KC-10 KC-135 CV-22 E-6 C-40 AIP MH-53E SH60 HH-60H Future Platforms: E-10 ABL UCAV CV-22 More Aircraft connected via Link 16 Forwarding/Gateway via ROBE, JTEP

Figure 1-2 USAF NCW and Air Armament network centric vision courtesy Ruff (2004) Sub-Problem 2 Standards and best practice for avionic and network enabled air armament systems Purpose. Sub-problem needs to explore, interpret and build a theory. Nature of the Process. Sub-problem has potentially unknown variables, an emergent design that is probably context bound, in terms of avionic and not yet context bound for NEO systems. Methods of data collection. Literature searches and surveys from companies and individuals involved not only with the hardware and software portions of the avionics, but also software engineering in other high risk applications need to be conducted to ascertain if any unpublished open-source standards or practices are applicable to Australian context such as the proposed US Weapon Data Link Architecture at WDLA (2004) for the US joint force operations as shown at Figure 1-2. The sub-problem is also intended to draw on a

wide cross-section of stakeholders including the commercial software industry, users as

6

well as the avionic software engineers themselves, to assess risk management implications. The researcher will also need to ensure experienced personnel are drawn from each of the disciplines that will be engaged in the NEO for air armament. The process may be based on changing or unknown variables 3 for high risk design applications that also has fundamental, ever increasing and considerably more time critical, human interaction with software based systems required. Assessing the personal views of the end users is obviously fundamental to the acceptance of such NEO systems into the ADF. Form of reasoning used in analysis. Inductive reasoning will be required to draw inferences from the literature and surveys. Communicating findings. Narrative. Sub-Problem 3 Recommend Standards, Best Practice and Verification Approach Purpose. To devise and implement a validation strategy for recommended standards and best practices. This will need to be described and then confirmed, if time permits. Nature of the Process. This sub-problem will be more focused, but will require in the first instance some description and explanation of the preferred approach. Methods of data collection. In parallel with the surveys and research for the other subproblems this issue requires that a recommended approach be drawn out of surveys/interviews and, if time permits, observation of some quantifiable and reasonably representative case studies or observation of a pilot study during an implementation phase by an organisation with representative stakeholders and users. One issue worth exploring is whether representative users and stakeholders can manage expectations based on established and agreed operational requirements any better than current practices or whether the late Senator Bobby Kennedys principle that, 25 percent of the people will be unhappy all of the time needs to be factored into the risk management approaches! The

researcher will also need to ensure representative personnel are drawn from each of the disciplines. Form of reasoning used in analysis. Inductive and deductive reasoning will be required.

3

How anyone will get users (such as fighter pilots), technicians, engineers (some of which are designers and others are involved in acquisition and certification), the command and control of physically remote Headquarters, commercial software developers and other stakeholders and project managers to agree on the metrics and what they mean should be interesting.

7

Communicating findings. Narrative to describe reaction to recommended standards and best practices as well as how statistics will be gained and supporting statistics if the validation phase or test cases can be implemented in the time available. Research Design. This analysis clearly indicates a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods are required for researching and collecting data for the problem and the subproblems posed as follows: Sub-Problem 1. Qualitative surveys will be conducted with specific personnel and groups of representative, experienced network enabling software personnel and observation of operations with aircraft avionic software development to determine suitability. Specifically support from Aerospace Development will be solicited for the qualitative questionnaires. The limited number of organisations available in Australia is the major area of concern with the sample size. Sub-Problem 2. Qualitative surveys will also be required with specific personnel and groups of representative, experienced avionics and avionic software personnel and observation of operations with avionic software development to determine suitability. Specifically support from avionic software support facilities, contractors and airworthiness authorities will be solicited for the qualitative questionnaires. The limited number of organisations available in Australia is the major area of concern with the sample size. This sub-problem warrants the time to invest in asking key overseas organizations the same questions in the hope answers will be received to meet the schedule. Qualitative surveys will also be required with the identified wider target audience (end users, DSTO, JEWOSU, key international agencies and commercial software developers being most notable) and an ethnography (based on more applications in recent years Leedy and Ormrod (2001, p.151)) is recommended. This is to gain insight into the cultural aspects of ADF users acceptance of the best practice options and metrics to establish avionics suitability against agreed operational requirements of NEO for air armament. The development and discussion on a hypothetical pilot/case study will be useful to establish the practicality of quantifying best practice

8

and metrics for sub-problem 3. Sub-Problem 3. Qualitative surveys will need to be conducted. Specifically, groups of representative, experienced personnel and observation of operations would need to be observed to determine suitability. The major concern is the ability to gain statistically valid information with the limited industry base in Australia.

1.3 Delimitations & AssumptionsThe research is to be based on unclassified, open-sourced literature, questionnaires and interviews. A significant risk is whether feedback is able to be provided by personnel and organisations in the time allocated for completion of a Masters program. The results and conclusions provided from the research must also be unclassified and suitable for public release. As this minor thesis is time limited, it will focus on the end-effects attainable through the application of systems engineering principles to military strategy and actions applicable to the application of interoperable air power capabilities and not on the alternative non-military socio-economic or diplomatic options. This will limit the discussion to the interface issues with the space, naval or land-based power also available to achieve national objectives. Unless noted otherwise the timeframes associated with the horizons discussed in the minor thesis are: near or short term is from now to five years, medium term is five to ten years, long term is 10 to 15 years and the far term is greater than 15 years.

1.4 Structure of the Minor ThesisThis minor thesis is composed of seven chapters. It makes extensive use of attributed figures and tables to help amplify the text when the figure or table is constantly referenced. The author believes that some readers will be suffering from a common ailment of those who try and penetrate the defence communities assumed knowledge of acronyms and may therefore be susceptible to acronym overload when it is not warranted. If any cases of imagery can be found that are not covered by an acknowledgement the author apologises for the oversight and will rectify it accordingly as it was not an act of commission. Chapter One provides the background, delimitations and the approach taken for the thesis.

9

Chapter Two provides a review of the literature and provides an introduction to aircraft stores capability and NEO in the Australian context. The approach taken follows the authors journey from aircraft stores compatibility systems engineering at the engagement level of Figure 1-3, through to understanding the family of systems that underpin current defence aerospace combat capabilities. This forms the basis of the contemporary understanding of capability management at the mission and theatre levels and hence air power at the campaign level. Chapter Three identifies Australias future aircraft stores capabilities that will need to be used by our people during combat in a network enabled world. Chapter Four discusses developments with avionic, open system and network enabled architectures pertinent to future aircraft stores capabilities. Chapter Five identifies the standards and risk management approaches needed to reduce acquisition risks for Australian aircraft stores capabilities. Chapter Six provides an overview for implementation of future aircraft stores capabilities in a network enabled world. Chapter Seven concludes the thesis with a summary of the major themes and conclusions along with recommendations for further work.

Representation of Operations

Campaign Theatre Mission

Organisations of Teams Tactics Teams of Teams Tactics

Team Tactics

Engagement Network Enabled

Individual Tactics

Figure 1-3 Knowledge Abstraction of Network Enabled and the Military Representation of Operations - Graphic is courtesy Farrier, Appla & Chadwick (2004).

10

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATUREIf you are thoroughly conversant with tactics, you will recognise the enemys intentions and have many opportunities to win. Miyamoto Musashi, Samurai Swordsman

2.0 BackgroundAustralia is an island nation the size of Europe or the Continental USA, with a population of just over 20 million, a Gross Domestic Production of over $(US) 500 Billion, no nation state enemies or a direct military threat to the sovereignty of the nation. Australia has historically provided defence personnel and equipment for almost every UN peacekeeping operation since the UNs inception and has been punching above its weight during the War on Terror. With the strategic situation in mind, the Commonwealth Government has maintained defence expenditure at just over 2% of GDP for the last 10 to 15 years. As part of the 1997 Defence Reform Program, the Government decided that the ADF would be composed of a uniformed force of 50 000 with some 13 500 Air Force personnel and a greater involvement of Reserve forces. This situation was continued by the ADF involvement and leadership during the UN operations in East Timor in September 1999 and Australias relatively significant support to the War on Terror resulting from 11 September 2001 and the Bali Bombing on 12 October 2002. Strong public support was expressed during the review prior to the Defence White Paper (2000) being published and, with the subsequent War on Terror, funding increases in the subsequent Federal Budgets have occurred. Significant changes are also being proposed to the Defence Capability Systems Development and Management framework to address initiatives such as Acquisition Reform, formation of the Defence Materiel Organisation from the previously separate Defence Acquisition and Support Command organisations, Governments requirement for increased engagement in the capability development and approval process, and increasing Australian industries involvement to achieve self-reliance though the whole of life for the capability. Currently, Australia does not indigenously design, develop or manufacture complete military aircraft or aerospace weapons, these activities are conducted overseas. Traditionally much of the ADFs aircraft stores clearance work has been minimised in many areas by information being provided by the original operators of the aircraft who have previously certified weapons similar in type and role to those intended for use by the ADF. This has provided a clear basis for approving aircraft stores clearances by

11

analogy 4 . This situation has changed significantly with the ADF introducing weapons into all three services that are not currently operated by the original aircraft operators or have not previously been cleared for use on other remotely similar3 aircraft 5 by other competent military airworthiness authorities. Further details of the aircraft stores combinations being acquired are covered in Chapter 3 and more extensively at Tutty (2004). These imperatives require Australia to not only be self-reliant in undertaking aircraft stores compatibility in support of Flight Clearances and the certification of aircraft stores capabilities, but to be actively engaged in ensuring that international standards and methods being used are suitable to the ADF, the Australian environment 6 and the levels of interoperability identified with our allies and coalition partners. Historically, this has been primarily conducted via a number of international standardisation fora (as per the summary included in Appendix 5), the primary one being that of the ASCC between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the US. Chapter One highlighted that the approach to be taken in this chapter would be to follow the authors own journey from aircraft stores compatibility through to aircraft stores capability. This has been intentional as it parallels the ADF journey from a services / platform centric view of capability management to an effects based defence force. The chapter will culminate with a discussion as to how the ADF network centric warfare initiatives are currently impacting aircraft stores capability.

2.1 Aircraft Stores CompatibilityWhilst these definitions are covered in the Glossary, they are so fundamental that they are reiterated here to help fully appreciate what the functional and physical allocation used in the ADF aircraft stores capability certification process are: Aircraft Stores Compatibility. The ability of each element of specified aircraft stores configuration(s) to coexist without unacceptable effects on the physical, aerodynamic, structural, electrical, electromagnetic or functional characteristics of

4 5 6

See the Glossary for the context in which this and other key terms are used. The prime example is the RAAF being the sole operator of the F-111 aircraft since 1997 and the need to integrate standoff weapons to increase the aircrafts survivability due to the cost to incorporate low observable technology. One should envisage Middle Eastern temperature extremes and conditions in Central Australia with high humidity thrown in as well for good measure in the Northern Territory Australia.

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each other under specified ground and flight conditions at the Engagement or subsystem level. This specialised discipline of science and engineering was born during the Vietnam era. At this time combat aircraft purposely designed for a nuclear attack mission against Soviet Forces blundering through the Fulda Gap in Europe to use of the same aircraft in multiple fighter and attack roles using conventional weapon in numerous mixed loads or configurations. These mixed loads of aircraft stores configurations were, anecdotely, in the main effectively cleared by the air forces in the theatre of operations by trial and error with the operating envelopes and china graph marks on the windshield for aim point offsets! In the era of applying mass production techniques from industry, the US forces suffered significant reliability problems with aircraft structures and the new electronic systems failing repeatedly with abysmal weapons accuracy and effectiveness compared to the promises and/or expectations of the designers and contractors. While the accuracy had increased from World War II and the Korean War performance, tens of weapons were still required to service the desired mean point of impact. This meant repeated aircraft sorties into what was becoming a very hostile electronic warfare environment and losses increased commensurately. It took until 1984, however, for a standard to be agreed to by the all the US services as each undertook its own aircraft stores certification programs, often for the same aircraft and stores. Eventually Captain Charlie Epstein (USN Retd), serving in the USAF Armament Research Laboratory at Eglin AFB, FL, succeeded in having the minimum acceptable certification requirements and test methods agreed to by all the Services published as MIL-STD-1763, Aircraft/Stores Certification Procedures. During the US Secretary of Defence Bill Perrys anti-standards crusade of the mid-1990s this document was updated with considerable ASCC and Australian input prior to being published as MIL-HDBK-1763 at Military Handbook (1998). Aircraft Stores Clearance. Primarily a systems engineering activity used in Australia that documents in a Flight Clearance approved by ASCENG the extent of aircraft stores compatibility within specified ground and flight operating envelopes. Aircraft Stores Compatibility Flight Clearance. A document issued by ASCENG that defines the extent of aircraft stores compatibility to safely prepare,

13

load, carry, employ and/or jettison specific aircraft stores configurations within specified ground and flight operating envelopes. This document is a mandatory basis required by Commonwealth of Australia (2001) for release to service of the aircraft stores capability. Analogy. A form of reasoning in which similarities are inferred from a similarity of two or more things in certain particulars. Similarity. State of being similar, a point of resemblance. What is known as the systems engineering process is basically an iterative process of deriving/defining requirements at each level of the system, beginning at the top (the system level) and propagating those requirements through a series of steps which eventually leads to a preferred system concept, INCOSE SE Handbook (2000). Further iteration and design refinement leads successively to preliminary design, detail design, and finally, the approved design. At each successive level there are supporting, lower-level design iterations which are necessary to gain confidence for the decisions taken. During each iteration, many concept alternatives are postulated, analysed, and evaluated in trade-off studies. Systems engineering is involved in all steps and leads during the Mission Analysis, Requirements Analysis, Concept Analysis, and Conceptual Design phases down into the subsystem level, and integrates many other activities including design, design changes and upgrades; Goals & Objectives for element iteration; customer feedback, and operational support. The basic engine for systems engineering is an iterative process that expands on the common sense strategy of: 1. understanding a problem before you attempt to solve it, 2. examining alternative solutions (do not jump to a point design), and 3. verify that the selected solution is correct before continuing the definition activities or proceeding to the next problem. The basic steps in the systems engineering process are: Define the System Objectives (User's Needs from the systems level OCD and subsystem level ORD); Establish Performance Requirements (Requirements Analysis); Establish the Functionality (Functional Analysis); Evolve Design and Operations Concepts (Architecture Synthesis); Select a Baseline (Through Cost/Benefit Trades); Verify the Baseline Meets Requirements (User's Needs); and

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Iterate the Process Through Lower Level Trades (Decomposition) The context of systems engineering applied at ASCENG in support of major acquisitions, introduction into service and supporting in-service operations, is summarised in the functional flow block diagram (FFBD) at Appendix 1 and the systems engineering process at Appendix 2 (both derived by the author from AAP 001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004)). Some of the ADF Major Projects ARDU support the DMO with Test and Engineering support can involve over a billion dollars for the acquisition phase. However, even these Major Projects are typically broken down with all the myriad of agencies involved using the systems engineering process into manageable elements to become small sized projects 7 . Compared to the wide scope and applicability of ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) and INCOSE SE Handbook (2000) to major US acquisitions where $USD100 billion can be easily spent for a major systems life cycle, a small sized project that ADF acquisition agencies handle the engineering for is typically of the $AUD 100K to 10 Billion size where the support team of Commonwealth and contractor personnel rarely exceeds 10 to 50 personnel (who may all be assigned to multiple projects, of course). The issue of project size is particularly relevant to weapons where each aircraft stores combination has, to date rightly or wrongly, been effectively treated individually on a case by case basis and integrated to a common avionics and aircraft structure. The attributes used to tailor the systems engineering process will therefore be derived from experience with such an iterative approach. AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) ensures that all the authorised engineering organisations with a stake in meeting the Operational Concept have a top-level engineering management system framework based on ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) and Blanchard and Fabrycki (1998) that can be easily tailored to the scope of the aircraft stores certification effort being proposed. As shown graphically at Appendix 1, ASCENG and ARDU, upon receiving any tasking scopes the range of technical and flying support expected and tailors the project planning activities according to the amount of expected work. It also conducts a Risk Assessment Model review using all the technical, cost and

7

Note that the ADF has yet to formally agree on a common Systems Engineering framework for the whole of defence and DMO especially. The SE discussed here is based on Blanchard (1998) and is being developed in concert with ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) and ISO 15288 (2002). AAP 7001.053 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003) and AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004), whilst being primarily airworthiness regulatory in nature, provides the benchmark engineering framework of guidance for Project Design Acceptance Strategy, Type/Technical Certification Plan and Engineering Management Plans which identifies the tailored systems engineering processes to be used.

15

schedule criteria (developed from the software industry). The establishment of these business rules are vital to all the potential organisations involved being able to quickly scope out the level of support required in the timeframe and anticipated budget available. The ADF has been successfully halting projects in recent years when the allocated funds patently do not match the performance requested with the expected budget allocations and the level of (im)maturity of the contending systems. Then involvement by all parties, including representatives of the ultimate User, in the Conceptual/Functional Design Review will commit to an architecture (which may already exist hopefully and be properly systems engineered to an Operational Concept that is analogous to the ADFs already), the Preliminary Design Review is the design-to baseline where we commit to Configuration Item functionality and the Critical Design Review is our build-to baseline that commits us to manufacture. The degree of formality used in the design reviews and studies needs to be agreed in the project-specific Engineering Management Plans especially for all safety critical items (ie, anything with explosives in it and/or slim margins of safety in the structures), based on the experience levels and stability of the organisations involved in the subsystems and similar sized projects. Much is based on the trust between the organisations involved to keep the Operational Concept for the system and its associated measures of performance. If considerable personnel turnover is expected over the life of the projects implementation then more formality is usually put in place to address such risks. Significant Changes. The assessment of aircraft stores compatibility includes a review called a Judgement of Significance by qualified Design Engineers to determine what impact it will have on the following engineering disciplines for each aircraft stores combination required to determine if a significant change as defined in Regulations at AAP 7001.053 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003) Section 2 Chapter 3 Annex C and MIL-HDBK-1763 at Military Handbook (1998) is made to an aircraft stores configuration: Fit & Function Structural & Environmental; Aeroelasticity; Captive Compatibility, Flying Qualities & Performance; Employment & Jettison; and Ballistics and OFP Validation & Verification, Safe Escape & Safety Templates.

16

Depending on the maturity of the stores and/or aircraft, there are four separate compatibility situations involved when authorisation of a store on an aircraft is required. The four situations, in order of increasing risk, are: 1. Adding old inservice stores to the authorised stores list of old aircraft. 2. Adding old stores to the authorised stores list of a new aircraft. 3. Adding new 8 stores to the authorised stores list of an old aircraft. 4. Adding new or modified stores to the authorised stores list of new or modified aircraft.ALITITUDE ( ft)

30,000

CARRIAGE20,000300 K CAS 400 K CAS

500 K CAS

EMPLOYMENT10,000600 K CAS

700K CAS

0 0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2

MACH NUMBER

Figure 2-1. An Aircraft Stores Configuration Operating Limitation The assessment of aircraft stores compatibility will determine the operating limitations that will then be used by the aircrew in their Flight Manuals as shown at Figure 2-1. The aircraft stores configurations and expected operating limitations are always included in the OCD and/or ORD as they may not need to be the maximum that the aircraft with that weight and shape can achieve. For more mature aircraft and/or stores, and consequently those with less risk, the process at AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) is specifically tailored against the OCD and ORD such that only those phases required to be conducted by the ADF to introduce the store into service need to be undertaken. For example, if all the aircraft stores configurations have been successfully demonstrated or

17

certified by known T&E and airworthiness certification agencies to operating limits that satisfy the ADF Operational Requirement, an aircraft stores combination could be introduced directly into service with minimal risk. While this strategy has been extremely successful in minimising the work with a specific aircraft stores configuration in an acquisition process that is platform-centric, it is less successful in the authors view when viewed in the context of designing interchangeable stores on fewer platform types. This observation will be discussed further in Chapter Five in regards to what best practices are suited for the future. Using well established significant change criteria and the maturity of the aircraft stores combination, engineering personnel can now integrate the operational requirements against the current Engineering Management Plans for key system segments and predict the sequence of organisational interactions necessary to optimise the schedule. This will enable the capability to be entered into service and minimise the programmatic risk whilst ensuring the required levels of operational suitability and effectiveness. Although, this is not formalised until after the Critical Design Review in an ASC Similarity Survey, experienced personnel realise that selecting more mature aircraft and stores is fundamental to minimising the risk to cost, schedule and performance and the amount of systems engineering required to make configuration management, drawings and publications are made available with the equipment. One key strategy for defence acquisition in future, is for smaller steps to be taken in capability improvement through Pre-Planned Product Improvements and a spiralling concept throughout the systems life to meet changing needs and OCDs, especially for avionic systems where computing power improvements clearly outstrip the timeliness of the traditional defence acquisition processes. The success of such a strategy to establish clear baselines with tolerances for significant changes to control the update and amendment of extant ASC Engineering Data Packages and the associated ASC Flight Clearances, is fundamental to the order of magnitude increase in new aircraft stores combination being cleared by the ADF as a result of the ADF deciding to update aircraft OFPs and the acquisition of ADF unique aircraft stores configurations. During this process it is important to ensure adequate integration between aircraft and store in-service Authorised Engineering Organisations is undertaken by DMO, to ensure a whole of system approach is maintained and DMO short sightedness is

8 Or adding new aircraft stores configurations and/or expanding the flight operating envelope.

18

tempered appropriately to support the sustainment phase. This will ensure that either the aircraft or weapon sub systems are not traded off or compromised without input from all parties. If it is required, ASCENG will conduct such reviews if not planned in the ADF Project Design Acceptance Strategy already to ensure the whole of systems approach is maintained throughout the life-cycle. As engineered systems became more complex and include multiple software and personnel interactions, the engineering disciplines and organisations involved sometimes became fragmented and specialised in order to cope with this increasing complexity. Some organisations focused on the optimisation of their products and have lost sight of the overall system. Each organisation perceived that their part must be optimal, using their own disciplinary criteria, and may fail to recognise that all parts of a system do not have to be optimal for the system to perform optimally. This inability to recognise that system requirements can differ from disciplinary requirements is a constant problem in major systems development in Australia. The systems engineering process can be viewed as a major effort in communication and management of complex teams of experts that lack a common paradigm and a common language. Two of the vital tools that a systems engineer doing aircraft stores compatibility needs therefore, is to be able to conduct appropriate: Experimentation & systems modelling at the necessary level of fidelity across the broad range of engineering and programmatic disciplines, and Risk management of all the constituent elements of the system. Not only are these tools vital to the ultimate systems performance and safety in its use but they are two of the most commonly misused terms 9 and sources of activity traps if used inappropriately or in the place of positive management and active decision making for the system, its subsystems and for the super-system that it belongs to. The tailoring of these

tools to reduce the risks associated with aircraft stores capabilities will be discussed further in Chapter 5. Fast forward now to 1996 and the Defence Reform Program investigated ARDU and the ADFs weapons certification process and reaffirmed the philosophy used for clearing compatible aircraft stores configurations and the formal certification of the aircraft stores capability.

9 Probably even more so than systems engineering itself!

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2.2 Aircraft Stores CapabilityThe critical definitions to this related, but distinct activity are: Aircraft stores certification. An engineering, operational and logistics activity that results in the Technical and Operational Airworthiness Authority Representatives and the Weapon System Manager approving a document called an Aircraft Stores Capability Certificate, that specified aircraft stores configuration(s) are operationally suitable, effective and that the preparedness status of the established integrated logistics support meets the endorsed Operational Requirement for the aircraft stores capability at the Mission or Platform level. Formal approval for authorisation and Release to Service of an aircraft stores configuration is accomplished through publication of appropriate technical orders and manuals and the provision of training in use of the systems. Hence, the certification of the aircraft stores capability tied together the People, Product and Process characteristics of the system being used in a single, concise document that is signed by the position responsible for the Operational Requirement. Aircraft stores capability. The capability provided by specified aircraft stores configuration(s) certified as meeting approved operational suitability, effectiveness and preparedness criteria. AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) provided specific guidance as to the operational suitability, effectiveness and preparedness issues to ensure that the ADF was certifying a capability and not just an airworthy configuration that could perform operationally during missions. Until the mid 1990s, Australia, like all other western nations at this time, certified aircraft stores configurations based on the aircraft platform at the Engagement or subsystem level of the representation at Figure 1-3. MIL-STD-1763, in particular, was very specific in tying aircraft stores certification to the promulgation of the appropriate Technical Orders etc, but the actual process relied on a Flight Clearance Recommendation (for T&E) or a Certification Recommendation (for service/fleet release) being issued by an organisation undertaking the aircraft stores compatibility assessment and little, or no, formal paperwork from the airworthiness or operational authority. In Australia, this was slightly different with the airworthiness organisation issuing what was called at the time an Aircraft Stores

20

Clearance Certificate. This document was based on an ARDU Test Report and a very long checklist of engineering issues that required over 50 signatures from each of the engineering discipline specialists; a sign-off process that took normally six to twelve months, unless the operational authority personally intervened with the Senior Logistics Engineer Officer (SLENGO) responsible for the checklist! A very interesting process as the more operationally relevant aircraft stores configurations with far greater risks, gave the engineers little to no time to do any engineering before SLENGO wanted to know why he hadnt signed the certificate. Anecdotally the UK system, from which the old Australian one was indubitably drawn, is still like this. The impact of Ground Test

Equipment and Mission Planning Equipment was reviewed, but as quite distinct systems that were always the responsibility of separate organisations, they were simply a check box that had in reality a human interface before flying the particular configuration. With todays integrated systems that are being updated significantly every six to twelve months at least, such a process would clearly be untenable with no chance of self-synchronisation and thus would be a clear safety risk as it would fail to draw the correct implications from other safety critical systems. Australia changed the thrust of this process in the early 1990s as part of the development of the technical and operational airworthiness systems embodied now in AAP 7001.053 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003) and AAP 7001.054 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003a). They retained the need to certify a baseline for an aircraft store, but by separating the Flight Clearance (ie, aircraft stores compatibility done by ASCENG) and the certification of the capability by the Technical and Operational Acceptance agencies embodied at the platform or Mission level for the representation at Figure 1-3. An overview of the integrated methods by which endorsed operational requirements for an aircraft stores capability are satisfied and the relationship with aircraft stores compatibility is provided in AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) in the form of a functional flow block diagram and framework for a project involving certification of a new 10 stores capability on a new aircraft diagrams (as shown at Appendix 1). The flowcharts of AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) are then specifically tailored to suit the risk mitigation strategy and the maturity of the aircraft stores combination being acquired so that analyses and review of existing technical information

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prevents any duplication of ground qualification or flight tests by the ADF to meet ADF airworthiness and Type Certification needs iaw DI(G) OPS 2-2 [at Commonwealth of Australia (2001)]. However, to certify we need to clearly establish a certification basis, ie an Operational Concept Initiation of Operational Needs. Any ADF Unit or Element seeking an aircraft stores capability, for either a new aircraft stores configuration, an expanded carriage or employment operating limitations, is able to raise a request for the aircraft stores capability to be certified by preparing an Operational Concept Document (OCD) iaw Commonwealth of Australia (2002a) and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (1992) 11 . This is shown at Appendices 1, 2 and 3 with respect to the resulting systems engineering activities and the typical capability system life cycle timeline currently expected by the acquisition system for a major new capability respectively. Such requests are recommended for approval and prioritisation by the appropriate Force Elements Group (ie Air Combat, Surveillance and Response, Army Aviation, Naval Aviation, Aerospace Operational Support, etc) and Commands (ie the HQs for Air, Maritime & Land Commands), and endorsed by Director General Aerospace Development 12 through the normal chain of command. The request for a new or enhanced/modified aircraft stores capability then results in the Acquisition Authority (typically DMO) performing a Requirements Analyses as per ANSI/EIA STD 632 (1999) and the INCOSE SE Handbook (2000). These requirements are included in the detailed Operational Requirement Document covering such information as described at AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) to establish the specific essential and desirable aircraft stores configurations, operating limits 13 and the associated Critical Operational and/or Technical Issues (COI/CTI) and Measures Of Effectiveness (MOE) required for the capability being sought. Further information may

10 In the context of this thesis a new store or aircraft constitutes one that the ADF has had no previous design disclosure for or has not operated inservice or one that has undergone significant modification. 11 There is an important principle to be noted here in citing American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (1992) for preparing an OCD. The OCDs prepared for Major aircraft acquisitions (ie over $AUD 20 M) may not have sufficient granularity for the air armament being proposed to identify the details required. OCDs for Major aircraft acquisitions will typically refer to subordinate subsystem OCDs that will include the specific air armament needs. 12 If a significantly enhanced capabilities are being sought in the view of HQAC or AFHQ. 13 See Figure 2-1for an example of an operating envelope respectively showing the carriage and employment limits that will eventually be promulgated in the Aircraft Flight Manual or Dash 1 during Aircraft Stores Certification.

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be required than that indicated to justify specific acquisition requirements, however, AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) identifies those issues that historically have substantially affected the airworthiness and the operational suitability, effectiveness and preparedness of the proposed aircraft stores capability. Should particular information not be available, then the introduction of the capability into service may be delayed depending on the cost implications associated with the level of capability being sought. Even at the early stages of certifying a capability the various agencies (ie the Users in the FEG, DSTO, Joint Ammunition Logistics Organisation (JALO) (the ADFs Explosive Ordnance maintenance and major EO Storage Facility managers), ARDU, ASCENG, etc) should be actively engaged by the Originator to assist in trade-off studies as described in more detail in AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004). ASCENG formally

addresses this trade-off by providing assistance in the preparation of the Operational Requirements Document and by preparing a Provisional ASC Similarity Survey 14 for the Originator and User of the proposed OCD and ORD. The Provisional ASC Similarity Survey provides an assessment of the certification basis and airworthiness impact in a format that ensures all necessary issues required for the ASC Similarity Survey and ASC Flight Clearance are addressed as early as practical to reduce the overall cost, schedule and performance risks to the Commonwealth and Contractor. Note that the Provisional ASC Similarity Survey does not constitute design certification (from a formal engineering perspective), as it need not be based on full design disclosure of the actual aircraft or store that is introduced into service. During the early stages of developing aircraft and weapons, limited technical information may be finalised depending on the maturity of the aircraft and/or stores. However, the technical information that is available is used by ASCENG to ensure that the capability certification process is tailored and based on the risk management strategy and the maturity of the aircraft stores combination and the approved Operational Requirement. This has repeatedly ensured that the total cost of the certification effort is minimised and that a qualitative edge over our potential adversaries is established.

14 A document summarising the technical review of the aircraft and store documentation to determine if sufficient engineering and test data is available to support an Aircraft Stores Compatibility Flight Clearance by similarity or analogy. If insufficient technical information is available or the data does not support a clearance to the limits requested in the ASC Operational Requirement then the Similarity Survey shall identify the information and testing necessary. The format and content of a Similarity Survey is the same as for an ASC Flight Clearance.

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All ADF Aircraft Stores Capability Certificates are based on having an approved Stores/EO Design Certificate, a Safety Case (covering the Safety & Suitability for Service (S3) for EO), an ASCENG Flight Clearance and an ILS Plan. Aircraft Stores Capability Certificates are reviewed and re-issued/amended when a significant change, as defined at AAP 7001.053, is made to an aircraft stores configuration. The AAP 7001.067 at Commonwealth of Australia (2004) functional flow block diagram (FFBD) summarised at Appendix 1 identifies the interactions necessary from all ADF and Contractor activities to achieve an operationally sustainable aircraft stores capability to meet the endorsed Operational Requirement. The efficient progress of the Aircraft Stores Certification effort, be it for the purpose of a concept demonstration, an OT&E or for combat operations, relies on the appropriate agencies undertaking the action(s) required of their organisation and proactively communicating progress and intentions when necessary. These activities are documented in a number of organisations processes that have been repeatedly accredited against ISO 9000 (2000) 15 for their suitability as a quality management system. All ADF and supporting contractors involved in aerospace engineering activities are required by the regulations in AAP 7001.053 at Commonwealth of Australia (2003a) to meet and be independently accredited against the latest ISO 9001 (2000) standard for quality management. ASCENG provides detailed systems engineering support to the acquisition during Requirements Elicitation/Definition, Concept/Functional Design Review, Preliminary Design Review and Critical Design Review during the ADFs System