Agenda of ECSOEM/SC8/TG3 TASK GROUP ON HOISTING … · 2017. 6. 16. · ECSOEM/SC8/TG3 June 2017...

ECSOEM/SC8/TG3 June 2017 Agenda 12-June-2017

Agenda of ECSOEM/SC8/TG3 TASK GROUP ON

HOISTING EQUIPMENT (RP 8B and Spec 8C)

2017 Exploration & Production Standards Conference on Oilfield Equipment and Materials

Telus Convention Center Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Date: Tue. June 27 , 2017 Chairman: Faisal Yousef Time: 3:00 P.M. to 5:00 P.M. Vice-Chairman: Kurt Vandervort SC8 Agenda Item Numbers: [Year]NXX

[Year]: Single digit year of introduction N: 0 = No Specific Task Group 3= TG3 (Hoisting Equip.) XX = Sequential Number

1. Open Meeting Introduction and Safety.

2. Attendance List. Circulated attendance list and roster.

3. Minutes of 2015 TG3 Meeting.

4. Old Business - Hoisting Equipment (Items Y3XX)

a. Item 3301: Nominal Equivalent Stress API 8C Section 4.3.4

New Work Item Form Submitted by Bob de Pont and Norm Dyer

At The June 2013 Conference Background was presented by Norm Dyer. What stresses should be included in the nominal equivalent stress? Bob de Pont states that older specification define this as the principle stresses. Mark Sibille states this was removed because the Von Mises-Hencky is a standard engineering principle, so the equations were removed. This question arose due to the reference from Spec 16F for riser spiders and gimbals. The confusion comes from pressure vessel design practices being used alternatively to traditional Von Mises-Hencky theory. Motion by: Kurt Vandervort Second by: Bob de Pont


Motion to: Leverage this work item to include a brief review of the original Von Mises-Hencky concern and to perform a significant review of how 8C will address localized stress concentrations. Motion passed Work group Volunteers – Eric Deutsch, Faisal Yousef, Mark Sibille, Bob de Pont, Sumit Shah, Adrian Lis, Norm Dyer, Matthew Allen, Ruel Lataquin, Kurt Vandervort (Chairman), Mike Seminatore, Robbie Thibodeaux Options to address the initial question- 1) Instruct the original requestor to submit a formal RFI to API. 2) TG3 could propose and answer an RFI on this subject 3) The new work group could split the issues and address this concern first. 4) Throw this over the fence to 16F who may already be working on this issue. TG3 recommended Option 1.

After The June 2013 Conference Work Group meeting held October 16, 2013. Issues to be considered from Work Group meeting. 1. Archival/legacy design product that continues to be built and was

approved when originally introduced to the market, and has performed effectively needs to continue to be acceptable.

2. Design changes/new designs should have an option to be developed based on classical closed form equations coupled with SCF and the DSF must not exceed the yield stress or the ultimate strength. There will need to be some additional clarification regarding contact areas and contact stress.

3. There needs to be the inclusions of guidelines to allow the utilization of modern analysis methods along with acceptance critera so that these methods that provide information with greater detail can be used without adhering to the specific letter of the spec requiring parts that are not manufacturable or marketable because they are uneccessarily heavy/large.

Work Group to meet at 2014 Standards Conference. At The June 2014 Conference Kurt gave overview of workgroup meeting at conference – overview trying to replace/combine paragraph. (per notes on projector from Kurt ) Kurt explained 10% was just arbitrary number – needs more input – evaluation


Discussion on 10% cross section – engineering judgment – need help from feedback. Request to look at FEA’s – feedback – what stresses are actually. Need information to build a historogram. Methods proposed to be used as possible methods. Designers responsibility to prove viability Need emails on examples to be sent to him from various companies present. Disscusions: Robert Urbanowski – propose to send to current licensee’s by API – the request from Kurt Robert Urbanoski - Motion to send Kurt’s working draft to current licesee’s for their input on FEA cross section analysis on the 10% Faisal Yousef 2nd Motion passed After The June 2014 Conference Work Group to meet at the 2015 Standards Conference. At The June 2015 Conference Kurt - Asked task group to expand scope per notes from Work Group Meeting Monday June 22nd. It is noted that based on the feedback the philosophy we pursued as an outcome of last year’s meeting would not work and would not lead to a work product that would pass ballot so we recognized the need to change philosophy. One of the responding groups provided a “strawman” proposal for a new method and philosophy for this group. Some of the text of that proposal is included in the attached report from the feedback received.

Along with that we had two motions: The following motion was offered, seconded, and unanimously accepted. This group request from TG3 that the scope of our work be expanded to include the paragraphs 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 to allow the involvement of plastic and/or elastic/plastic analysis as a part of the overall design/analysis/test process.

Based on the above it is our assumption that the approval of the TG is a formality so we persevered to establish a new philosophical basis for our efforts going forward.

The second motion of the group is intended to be a basis for working forward from here.


The motion was also made, seconded and unanimously approved. The philosophy of the path forward is based on utilizing an Elastic/Plastic analysis for areas where the stress/strain exceeds the allowable as defined in section 4.3.4. The analysis shall be run to predict the failure load of the tool. The predicted load at failure is then divided by the SFD*(Ts/YS) to predict the rating of the tool. This analysis shall be validated by DVT. (Using the results of the DVT, the analysis shall be correlated with the actual behavior of the tool.) Note: the rating of the tool may not exceed a load at which the nominal stresses equal the allowable stress as defined in 4.3.4. In conjunction with the validation of the analysis a fatigue analysis will be required to verify the expected life of the tool is appropriate.

We will be pulling together a working group in September or October to put together verbiage to enable the implementation of the above motion into 8C. Those who would volunteer to work on this effort at to contact me in September and we will set the first meeting soon after that.

Motion to accept recomendation of work group – Mark Sibille 2nd by Bob De Pont Motion passed After The June 2015 Conference Work Group meetings held at Stress Engineering with the last meeting May 25, 2016. Work on developing wording for submission at the June Conference. Work Group meeting to be held at the 2016 Conference on Monday June 27th. At The June 2016 Conference In review of the document as was provided to the industry the

following items were discussed: 4.3.4 As presented the word “nominal” has been removed in

reference to nominal equivalent stress. It has been advocated that this be returned.

The discussion that followed was around the idea that “nominal”

implies some sort of average as in “nominal stress” also the idea of “equivalent stress” is well established. But “nominal equivalent stress” is not necessarily defined. Also, as a committee we have removed the term so that it is not seen as an average in the FEA realm but rather that the ASmax is an upper bound for any single nodal value of stress outside of the localized area of high gradient or geometric discontinuity.

The decision of the group is that we will work to include a paragraph

after the definitions for ASmax and before the start of 4.5.3 to clarify the meaning and intent here.


4.3.5 Changed wording to “high stress gradient” from

“stress/strain gradient”.

4.3.5.1 Put the word “equivalent” in with stress throughout so there is no lack of clarity. The calculation is still to evaluate based on the von Mises-Hencky Equivalent Stress throughout.

4.3.5.2 Had a lengthy discussion about the concern over intent vs

what the words as written communicate. The intent is to maintain the resulting products produced after this change to have the same robustness as the existing designs but that the specification be easier to apply and better describe the allowable stresses/strains.

This was followed by discussion about what we mean by “localized” stresses and how to define that. It was the consensus of the group that this is an engineering judgment issue. In the case of a monogrammed piece of equipment the design team’s judgment should be challenged by the auditor but it is acknowledged that in the end this requires engineering judgment.

Discussion also covered the topic of fatigue. It is again

acknowledged that this change appears to put more significance on the fatigue analysis. One proposal was to extend the defined life for the fatigue analysis by some safety factor. At this time it is the intent of the group to not be increasing the material utilization beyond what we have traditionally been doing but to redefine how that is quantified to make the specification better align with reality. To help get another look at this and to see if the net impact is to be changing/opening up the material utilization to higher levels it was agreed that those who had designs that had failed ADVT would be evaluated based on these new criteria to see if the new criteria would have caught them or not. If a firm does not have failed designs to evaluate/compare, look at others which do provide more insight to help us see if the net impact is to have increased the material utilization or not.

Work group to continue discussions. Next meeting scheduled mid

September to early October 2016.

After The June 2016 Conference The work group met and went through through the feedback received. The ballot verbiage was finazlized and sent to ballot. Ballot votes werte all affirmative but with technical comments that need to be resolved. The work group is planning on meeting at the Calgary conference on Monday June 26, 2017 to help resolve the comments.


b. Item 3302 : Spec 8C Marking Requirements

Randy Pyrch suggests that better guidance is required on the pin connection ratings and marking. Motion by: Mark Sibille Second by: Faisal Yousef Motion to: Form a work group to address and clarify the marking requirements in Spec 8C. Motion passed Work Group: Randy Pyrch(Chair), Sumit Shah, Adrian Lis, Eric Deutsch, Norm Dyer, Larry Childress, Bill Braman After The June 2013 Conference

Work Group to meet at 2014 Standards Conference.

At The June 2014 Conference Randy gave update – pin connection on top drive have possibility of 2 load ratings Need standard method for load rating on pin connection for top drive Need to look at marking section for name plate Work group to meet at conference for further discussion and meetings.

After The June 2014 Conference

Work Group to meet at the 2015 Standards Conference.

At The June 2015 Conference Randy Pyrch noted release of last edition regarding load rating on top drive. Include in Section 3, Terms, Definitions, and Abbreviations

Top Drive Elevator load path: Loads on a top drive transmitted through the elevator link ear attachments.

Top Drive Drill Stem Load: Axial load on a top drive transmitted through the rotary shoulder connection on the quill/stem to the drill stem.


Top Drive Non Drill Stem Load: Axial load on a top drive transmitted through the rotary shoulder connection on the quill/stem to other than drill stem (e.g. casing, riser).

Include in 9.19 Top Drive

Marking

The requirements of Section 10 shall apply. The manufacturer shall include any information required to clarify the load ratings in the equipment documentation.

Load ratings shall be marked as follows:

Elevator path load rating:

Stem/quill – Drill stem load rating:

Stem/quill – Non Drill Stem load rating:

(casing/riser)

Figure 12 – Rotary Swivel Connections

The Demarcation Figure 12 on Rotary Swivels should also contain a notation that: Section 4.3.8.3 shall apply.

10 Marking

10.6 Marking Method

Marking referred to in… will permit. New: “In case equipment has more than one load rating based on the application, information on the load rating shall be provided on the product by marking or on a permanent name plate. When no space is available for this information on the product, this information shall be provided in the manual.”

Questions - none Motion to accept Work Group’s proposed wording (as shown) to letter ballot – Robert Urbanowski Mark Sibille asked about additional wording that was being worked on. Notes were shown. Marking method 10.6 plus (marking, definitions, - whole sections) 2nd Mark Sibille.


Motion passed – one objection - Samir questioned name tags falling off – permanent

Sent to Letter Ballot

After the June 2015 Conference API Letter Ballot 3843 sent out, balloting closed, and comments are in resolution. At The June 2016 Conference Adrian Lis discussed amendments to item 3302 detailing

modifications made to definition as well as modification made to Figure 12 of API 8C.

Ken Kondo to email document detailing the modifications proposed

by Adrian for TG3 review and will coordinate with Randy Pyrch and Faisal Yousef.

After The June 2016 Conference The Randy Pyrch and Adrian Lis worked on comments resolution and as a result, a new draft was generated that need to be reviewed by the entire work group. A WG meeting is scheduled for Monday June 26, 2017 at the Calgary conference.

c. Item 4301: Sheave Rim Groove and Item 4302 Sheave Bore Centerline

New Work Items submitted by Robert Urbanowski

At The June 2014 Conference Robert talked about how these items came form Gary Robinson – these 2 New Work Items have merit for further consideration – thus New Work Items submitted Gave brief overview of scope


Looking for interested people to work on Work Group Volinteers to be added to list – Brent Dean Norm Dwyer

After The June 2014 Conference Paul Boeckman is assisting Robert Urbanowski with setting up a virtual work meeting to discuss proposed wording for Item 4301 and 4302. The virtual meeting will be taking place in the later part of May 2015. Robert Urbanowski (Precision Drilling) Chairman, Brent Dein (Wireco), Norm Dyer (DnV), David Beltran (Gunnebo Johnson), Min Kim (American Block), and Paul Boeckman (Crosby) are involved with the discussion.

Work Group to meet at the 2015 Standards Conference.

At The June 2015 Conference Item 4301: Sheave Rim Groove Robert presented minutes from WG – go thru wording and changes to profile and tread wear went over what was discussed API Spec 8C Proposed additional sentence to Paragraph 11.3 (c) 5th Bullet on Page 44

wear limits, including elevator bore wear limits (see API 8B, Table A.1, for method of computing and limitations on wear limits). Wear limits for hoisting sheaves shall include reference to groove profile and/or tread wear.

API RP 8B Proposed additional paragraph, image and note after existing paragraph 5.3.8.

5.3.9.1 Wear Limits for Sheaves

Wear limits for hoisting sheaves shall include criteria based on the allowable groove radii shown in API RP 9B, and the allowable change in groove depth, and/or minimum flange thickness dimensions provided by the manufacturer.


Note: Reference API RP 9B for Groove Radius Maximum Groove Radius Minimum New Groove Radius Minimum Worn

It was recommended to reference API 9B for sheave groove tolerances, but not repeat the same data for tolerances.

Motion by Mark Sibille, seconded by Mike Kubinski to remove the sheave tolerance and equal signs from reference to API RP 9B. Motion Carried.

Motion by Mark Sibille, seconded by Paul Boeckman to:

Send items above to SC8 TG3 for sixty (60) days comment

period This workgroup review comments received After disposition by this workgroup of all received comments,

send this item to letter ballot. Motion to follow recommendations of Work Group (as shown 60 days etc) Paul Boeckman 2nd Anthony Mannering Motion passed

Sent to Letter Ballot After The June 2015 Conference API Letter Ballot 3870 sent out with Ballot responses due June 14, 2016.


At The June 2016 Conference Robert Urbanowski resolving comments on Letter Ballot 3870. After The June 2016 Conference Comments were resolved. This item will be removed from the agenda.

d. Item 4304 Prototype Testing of Washpipes With Mechanical Seals Bill Braman – new issue for discussion regarding prototype pressure testing of top drives Issue of what is considered to be a assembled test unit. Mechanical washpipe is designed to leak – leaks not allowed on pressure test by API 8C Question: Does a complete unit include washpipe?

Discussion: Norm – appears some do not do a complete test - but can test components to essentially complete but have to test all components. Bill Braman noted problem since unit is designed to leak and does not meet requirement for test. Does wording need to be revised for washpipe issues? New Work Item - define what is an assembled test unit Mark – Form Work Group to address equipment (mechanical seals) that have purpose leak design Study how to accommodate prototype testing of componemnts that are not compatable with leak free test. Robert Urbanowski – Motion regarding prototype pressure testing acceptance criteria and define what the test assembly consists of Ref : Section 9.9.2 Richard Acherman – 2nd Motion passed Work Group Volunteers – Richard Acherman, Fiasia Yousefl, Bill Braman, Paul Williams , Norm Dwyer , Jerry Johnson, Adrain Lis


Work Group Chairman: Bill Braman After The June 2014 Conference Bill Braman has retired from National Oilwell Varco and steped down from tbeing Chariman of the Work group. Cliff Swiontek as volunteered to Chair the Work Group. Work Group to meet at the 2015 Standards Conference. At The June 2015 Conference Cliff Swantec lead Work Group meeting on wording 9.9.2 - shown modifications - 2 lines added – individual parts can be tested and leakage allowed in 9.9.3. 9.9.2 Rotary Swivel Prototype Pressure Testing

The assembled test unit shall be statically pressure-tested. The individual parts of the unit can be tested separately if the holding fixtures simulate the load condition applicable to the part in the assembled unit.

The test pressure shall be twice the working pressure for working pressures up to and including 34.5 MPa (5000 psi). For working pressures above 34.5 MPa (5000 psi), the test pressure shall be at least 1.5 times the working pressure, but not less than 69 MPa (10,000 psi). The test pressure shall be held for two cycles of 3 min each in accordance with the pressure/time sequence specified in 9.9.3. Mechanical seal with designed control leakage used as the washpipe shall be exempt from the no visible leakage requirement of 9.9.3. Leakage rate not to exceed manufacturer limits. Question on pressure drop on hydrostatic test if this was same – this was not same. Robert Urbanowski asked question if it needed to be in both sections for leakage allowed. Fasil Yousef asked if this was latest version of 9.9.3 – Ballot Item to be reviewed for latest wording of this section for inclusion.

Motion - Robert Urbanowski when wording is massaged to meet latest proposed balloted edition that it goes out for letter ballot. 2nd Fasil Yousef Motion passed - one objection (Samir Ghalayini)

Sent to Letter Ballot


After The June 2015 Conference API Letter Ballot 3844 sent out, balloting closed, and comments are in resolution. At The June 2016 Conference Cliff Swiontek resolving comments on Letter Ballot 3844.

After The June 2016 Conference Reached to both people with negative votes, explained the draft and the operation of mechanical seals and they both changed from negative votes. All comments were resolved. This item will removed from the agenda.

e) Item 5301: Acceptance Criteria for Non-

Ferromagnetic Metals

New Work Itembrought up from an API Request for Inturpretation. Pat Johnson has volunteered to Chair the Work Group.

Magnetic particle inspection is not applicable to non-ferromagnetic materials. The current standard does not address testing methods or acceptance criteria for test methods on other materials. Work Group to meet at the 2015 Standards Conference. At The June 2015 Conference Pat Johnson went over Work Group’s meeting minutes as shown. The workgroup met and was called to order at 1:25. Pat Johnson presented the request made by Barry Phillips with MW Wirth for the development of acceptance criteria for non-ferromagnetic materials by the liquid penetrant method. Pat Johnson presented a rough draft using ASTM A903 a basis for criteria. Bob de Pont raised concerns as this did not address the fracture toughness of particular materials. It was mentioned that AMS 2175 is more specific relating to various types of materials. It was moved by Manolete Mena, seconded by Bob de Pont that AMS 2175 be examined to be the basis for acceptance criteria for non-ferromagnetic castings. The vote was held without further discussion and passed unanimously. Pat Johnson will obtain a copy of AMS 2175 and write a rough draft of the acceptance criteria. He will send the draft by email to all


attendees at the meeting with the goal of obtaining a draft for vote by the meeting in the summer of 2016. Going forward – rough draft – for next year ‘s Conference. At The June 2015 Conference Work group to meet at API 2016 Conference on Monday June 27th. At The June 2016 Conference Pat Johnson presented a draft based upon AMS 2175 for the

acceptance and rejection requirements. It was noted that the criteria may not be practical for large castings.

Mark Sibille moved that work continue on this item with input from manufacturers with experience in non-ferromagnetic castings, even if these castings are not used in the scope of API 8C. It was further moved that this criteria be compared to the criteria for welds. The motion was seconded by Larry Childress. The motion passed unanimously.

Pat Johnson will forward the draft by email to all attendees at the

meeting with the goal of obtaining a ballot draft by the meeting in the summer of 2017.

After The June 2016 Conference Pat Johnson received a response in the spring for a recommendation to the draft. The draft was then sent to the work group with a notice that it will be discussed at this summer conference. The work group will be meeting on Monday June 26.

f) Item 5302: Impact Property Requirements for Design Temperature and for SR2 After The June 2015 Conference Item 5302 replaced with Item 5306.

g) Item 5303: Scope of API 8C to be In Line with Scope of API 7K

Bob d Pont submitted the New Work Item to be included in the TG3 Meeting Agenda at the 2015 API Standards Conference In San Francisco.


Bob d Pont volunteeded to be Chairman of Work Group. At The June 2015 Conference Bob discussed wording of scope as submitted in new item work. Change scope to: This specification provides general principles and specifies requirements for design, manufacture, and testing of new hoisting equipment suitable for use in drilling and production operations and of replacement primary load-carrying components manufactured subsequent to the publication of this specification. Keep specification 8C in line with API 7K and have requirements for replacement primary load bearing replacement parts Mark Sibille discused the concept of replacement parts meeting the specs with this wording . Bob de Pont - Motion to send to leter ballot as propsed 2nd Paul Boeckman Motion passed

Sent to Letter Ballot After The June 2015 Conference API Letter Ballot 3845 sent out, balloting closed, and comments are in resolution. At The June 2016 Conference Bob de Pont resolving comments on Letter Ballot 3845. After The June 2016 Conference Comments were resolved. This item will be removed from the agenda.

h) Item 5304: API 8C Requirement to Test Elevator with Bore/Configuration Generating Highest Stresses & API 8B Requirement Reload Testing After Reboring Bob d Pont submitted the New Work Item to be included in the TG3 Meeting Agenda at the 2015 API Standards Conference In San Francisco. Bob d Pont volunteeded to be Chairman of Work Group.


At The June 2015 Conference Bob discussed 5.5 alternative design verification add requirement to test elevator after reboreing (8B) …. Good engineering practice …

API 8C section 5.5 Alternative Design verification test procedure and rating

Add requirement to test elevator with the bore/configuration that generates highest stresses in the parts.

API RP 8B: add requirements for reload test after reboring API 8C section 9.8.3.6. is the use of “dummy pins” during load testing allowed, why would original pins be load tested and replacement pins not, one can provide a new elevator to the field with a replacement pin installed Need to be more specific on DVT and load testing requirements Bob d Pont - Motion to accept new work item to form Work Group to work on these items. 2nd Andre Vierue Motion passed After The June 2015 Conference Bob de Pont is retiring from NOV and will not be available for Chairing the Work group. A new Chairman will be appointed and Work Group formed. At The June 2016 Conference Looking for new chair for work group as well as members for this

work group. Larry Childress has volunteered to be a member of this work group.

After The June 2016 Conference No activity on this work item. New a new chair for this work item.

i) Item 5305: Manufacturing Process Controls After The June 2015 Conference New Work group formed from Task Group 6 in order to address API 18TR3’s work on API Monogram Program: Definition of a Manufacturer. Bo Creek was elected as the New Work Group Chaiman . The Work Group made a recommendation on the best way forward for consideration by the other SC8 Task Groups.


At the November 4, 2015 Work Group meeting language was drafted to send to Letter Ballot as a change to SC8/TG3 for inclusion in API 8C. The proposed wording was sent out by API under Letter Ballot 3737. The balloting was completed and the results were provided to the Work Group Chairman. At the same time it was determined the future of the proposed SC18 document (18TR3) was questionable and Item 5305 would be put on hold . At The June 2016 Conference Shawn Firenza advised that Monogram Review Board is currently

working on drafting advisory detailing requirements to be considered a manufacturer and is hoping to release the advisory by September 2016. Robert Urbanowski raised the question if task group should withdraw ballot and Shawn advised yes. Larry Childress asked if there was a timetable for withdrawing ballot and Shawn replied no.

Motion put forward by Shawn for TG3 to table item till advisory is

released by Monogram Review Board and TG3 will review the advisory and decide whether to withdraw Letter Ballot 3737. Motion seconded by Robert Urbanowski.

Motion passed unanimously.

j) Item 5306: Impact Property Requirements for Design Temperature and for SR2 Bob d Pont submitted the New Work Item to be included in the TG3 Meeting Agenda at the 2015 API Standards Conference In San Francisco. Bob d Pont volunteeded to be Chairman of Work Group. At The June 2015 Conference Bob d Pont discussed standard requirement is lower than SR 2 requirement. Raise impact propertires same as 7K to be consistant. Motion to accept new work item Bob d Pont 2nd Mark Sibille Motion passed Bob d Pont – Chairman, others (Mark Sibille & Andre Vierke) already drafted for Work Group – Kelly Carl, Randy Pyrch, Manolete Mena


Bob d Pont - Motion to change impact properties of 9.8.3.4 elevator slips. (Same as 7K ) 33 J (25 ft/lbs) at -20 degrees C (-4 degrees F) avg 3 tests with no individual value less than 26 J (19 ft/lbs) - send to letter ballot 2nd Mark Trevithick Samir Ghalagini make comment to look into further. Motion passed *Robert suggest to have a New Work item number for the above to be sent to letter ballot. New Work Item 5305.

Send to Letter Ballot After The June 2015 Conference Work Item 3505 was changed to Work Item 5306. Work on sending Item 5306 to Letter Ballot to be completed before 2016 API Conference. At The June 2016 Conference Work Item 5306 going to letter ballot for completion prior to 2017 API Conference. After The June 2016 Conference Ballot was sent out and closed with 21 affirmative votes and zero negative. There some comments that were resolved. This item will be removed from the agenda.

k) Item 6301: Inclusion of wording from API 7K on slips and spiders into API 8C for Slip-type Elevators and Slip-type Spiders raised by Kurt Vandervort

At The June 2016 Conference Kurt Vandervort proposed this motion based on modifications

currently being proposed to API 7K. Work item submitted to 1. Copy language for slips and spiders into API 8C from API 7K 2. Review modifications being made on API 8C related to nominal

stresses and place coordinate with TG2 on copying these modifications into API 7K.


Motion by Robert Urbanowski to accept this as a new work item. Motion seconded by Mark Sibille. Motion passed unanimously. Mark Sibille suggested Kurt Vandervort to be the chair for this work group. Volunteers for this work group include Larry Childress, Mark Sibille, Josh Hebert, and Harry Rodriguez.

After The June 2016 Conference No activity on this item. The work group is planning a meeting on Monday June 26, 2017.

l) Item 6302: Comparison between API 7K and API 8C on consistent wording that can be utilized.

At The June 2016 Conference Item was raised by Katie Burkle of API during TG3 meeting

conducted on Monday based on her review using word compare. Motion by Mark Sibille suggested to form a work group be to

compare API 7K & API 8C for consistency. Scope of work will involve 1) Mapping sections 4 through 8 of API 8C and 7K and

2) Determining context of both specifications. Motion seconded by Faisal Yousef and passed unanimously. Motion from Kurt Vandervort for Josh Hebert to chair this work group.

Motion seconded by Mark Sibille.

Volunteers for this work group to include Larry Childress, Harry Rodriguez, Mark Sibille, Kurt Vandervort, Surya Komaragiri, John Walker, and Odie Mena.

After the June 2016 Conference In May, 2017 Josh Hebert sent an email that would not be able to commit the time required to chaie this work group. Kurt Vandervort volunteered to chair a work group meeting on Monday June 26 and would try to find a volunteer to chair this work group going forward.

m) New Edition of API 8C


At The June 2016 Conference

Ken Kondo reminded everyone that the new edition 6th edition of API 8C will be released next year and balloted items will be included in the next edition which is estimated to be released mid-2017.

After The June 2016 Conference

A meeting was held in Houston with Katie Burkle, Mark Trevithick,

Faisal Yousef and Kurt Vandervort to review all closed ballots and whether we needed to wait on the 6th edition to include some of the open items. We agreed to request a two year extenstion on current edition to give us a couple of months to close some of the open items.

5.New Business

a. Review and address BSEE QC-FIT Report #005: Evaluation of Sheaves Failures

The following email was received from Austin Freeman:

Please find attached a recent BSEE publication of a QC-FIT report involving hoisting sheaves. In the report, BSEE has several recommendations to the OEM (NOV in this case) but also has recommendations to “industry” which could be interpreted to fall under the CSOEM jurisdiction. Therefore, I would like SC8 to consider forming a task group to review this report and the associated API standards and prepare a report suitable for eventual transmission to BSEE. If you agree to do so, in my opinion this report should address as a minimum: a. Industry comments on the report (agree/disagree/changes, etc.) b. Status of current API 8C revision in process, including anticipated publication date, and summary of changes (if any) on Hoisting Sheaves since the previous edition


c. Future suggested changes (if any) to API 8C and RP8B to prevent these types of issues in the future and the proposed timetable associated with those changes d. Status of API Monogram on Hoisting Sheaves [licenses, NCR reports (if any) on Hoisting Sheaves (get sanitized versions from Sharon Bowie)] Regarding the BSEE recommendation to revise API Q1: SC18 already has a TG working to revise API Q1 to address the controls necessary for sub-suppliers. Jason Kody – Shell (copied) is leading this TG and has a meeting planned June 19-20. I suggest you liaise with him to prevent duplication of efforts. If SC8 members are attending, please advise names/companies. In any case, please insure your SC8 report to the CSOEM for Calgary includes a status on this topic as BSEE is in attendance at that portion of the meeting.

b. Sheave Marking Requirement:

Update the marking requirements for sheaves (9.2.6) to be cleared as to the intent. This item was brought to the attention of TG3 through a request for interpretation from an API 8C licensee. Suggested new wording is:

“Sheaves shall be marked with the manufacturer's name or mark, the nominal wire rope diameter and the sheave outside diameter. These markings shall be cast or stamped on the side of the outer rim of the sheave.”

6. Adjournment

QC-FIT EVALUATION OF SHEAVES FAILURES Office of Offshore Regulatory Programs

QC-FIT Report #005 May 2017

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On October 7, 2015, while conducting drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) for Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas at Grand Canyon Block 643 (“GC 643”), the Noble drilling crew discovered a crack in a sheave on the Sam Croft drilling rig. Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas reported the sheave failure to the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) as a near-miss incident. The failed sheave was a dual web design, 78 inches in diameter, and was in service for five months. The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), National Oilwell Varco (NOV), also informed BSEE about additional cracked sheaves on four rigs operating in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) and one operating in Colombia between February 7, 2015 and December 6, 2015 (Table 1). All of the affected 78-inch diameter dual web design sheaves were located in the derricks’ Crown Mounted Compensators (CMC). In response to these incidents, the OEM identified ten drilling rigs 1 that needed sheave replacements. Seven rigs were located in the GOM, one was located in Colombia, and two drilling rigs were under construction in Korea. The OEM issued Product Information Bulletins (PIB’s) 87819987 (Revisions 0 and 1) (Appendix I) for its 78-inch diameter dual web design sheaves in all positions within the CMC. These PIBs informed product owners about sheave failures which emphasized conducting weekly visual inspections for cracks between the hub-web weld joint. These PIBs also recommended replacement of the affected sheaves with single web design sheaves. There were no reported personnel injuries related to the sheave failures. The OEM ceased procurement of dual web design sheaves from the current manufacturer, and initiated replacement of all the dual web design sheaves with single web design sheaves from a different qualified manufacturer. Following the discovery on October 8, 2015 of a sheave failure on the Sam Croft drilling rig, BSEE assembled a Quality Control Failure Incident Team (QC-FIT) to conduct a technical evaluation of all equipment involved in this incident and determine if there were global quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC), technology, safety, and/or environmental concerns that required further action by BSEE and/or industry related to the design, materials, manufacture, construction, and use of these sheaves on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The QC-FIT technical evaluation consisted of meetings with the operator, contractors, and OEMs, as well as review of applicable reports, technical documents, and industry standards (see Appendix II – Asset Integrity Management). These activities provided relevant information about the sheaves’ design, material properties, and the manufacturing and welding processes used to ensure that the sheaves’ design was fit for service. The QC-FIT also verified with the International Regulators Forum (IRF)2 if there were any additional sheave failures within their areas of jurisdiction. The IRF did not report any additional sheave failures. In BSEE’s view, this issue had potential to impact drilling rigs globally but after confirming the lack of failures with the IRF, and noting that the failures were limited to one OEM’s product line, it was determined to be a localized issue which could be quickly and effectively addressed by the manufacturer.

1 As of January 30, 2017, nine of the ten identified drilling rigs replaced all of their 78 inch dual web design sheaves with single web design sheaves. 2 International Regulators Forum (IRF) is an international forum of twelve regulators dedicated to health and safety in the offshore upstream oil and gas industry.

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The QC-FIT team’s key concerns during the technical evaluation included the following:

• Design deficiencies that could result in failure which could pose a safety risk to personnel;

• Whether the design and the material mechanical properties (yield and ultimate tensile strengths) were adequate to meet the anticipated operating conditions;

• Whether the welding procedure used to create a hub-web weld joint was adequate for the design.

BSEE’s technical evaluation also included the review of third-party submitted data concerning the sheave evaluation. A comprehensive list of recommendations is outlined at the end of this report. Key findings include the following:

• The OEM PIBs’ recommend that sheaves’ product owners perform weekly visual inspections for cracks between the hub-web weld joint.

• The OEM’s root-cause analysis (RCA) identified the cause of the sheave failure to be the following: o The dual web design and hand weld root pass procedures resulted in a gap at the weld

joint. This gap prevented weld filler metal from an automated welding technique from penetrating and completely fill the gap on the inside of the hub-web weld joint. An automated welding technique with sufficient heat input should have been used to fill the gap along the backing surface of the hub-web weld joint. This would have allowed the weld to be more resistant to crack initiation.

o At the time of the RCA, the material test certificate for the hub and web plate from the steel supplier was not available to the test laboratory to verify with the OEM’s specified materials specification (alloy composition, mechanical properties, heat treatment) and with the analysis performed by the test laboratory.

• The effects of the design change for the 78-inch dual web design sheave were not fully evaluated by the OEM. The hub dimensions were reduced from 600 mm to 550 mm to decrease the moment of inertia, but the web plates' thickness of 12 mm was not changed. This decrease in the hub’s dimensions increased the sheaves’ load rating by approximately 11%, where the stress levels on the inside of the web plates exceeded allowable limits for compression by 27%. This design change resulted in cracks initiating at the gap of the root of the weld joint, resulting in fatigue failure.

As a result of these findings, in the interest of safety, BSEE recommends the following:

• The OEM should investigate why multiple sheave failures occurred on one rig. • Since the sheaves are interchangeable in other locations within the CMC assembly,

tracking the sheaves’ service life is challenging, therefore, operators and inspectors should conduct daily visual inspections of sheaves for cracks between the hub-web weld joint.

• BSEE agrees with the OEM’s recommendation that all CMC dual web design sheaves should be replaced with single web design sheaves. The single web design sheave results in a more robust hub-web weld joint and is not as susceptible to cracking as the dual web design sheave.

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• The OEM should conduct a finite element analysis (FEA) on the new single web sheave design to ensure that the operational stress concentrations and load levels remain within the load limits and have a built-in safety factor to assure safe operation.

• The OEM should follow API Recommended Practice (RP), 8B Eighth Edition, 2014, “Recommended practices for procedures for inspections, maintenance, repair, and remanufacture of hoisting equipment," 3 section 5.3.2.2, Category I and request that the operators and/or contractors should conduct daily visual inspections of the CMC 78-inch diameter dual web design sheaves for cracks until they are replaced.

• The OEM should follow appropriate sections of API Specification (Spec) 8C, Fifth Edition, 2012, “Drilling and Production Hoisting Equipment,” 4as follows: o Section 3.1.9 ‘Load Rating’ and Section 4.7 ‘Design Safety Factor’ specifies

consideration of both the static and the dynamic load conditions; and design safety factors for the design of the sheaves of the CMC assembly.

o Section 8.4 ‘Quality Control for Specific Equipment and Components’ requires verification that the material test certificates for the sheave bearing hub and the web plates meet the OEM’s specified material specifications requirements (alloy chemistry, materials mechanical properties, heat treatment, etc.). The OEM should also define the specific material properties, stress load conditions, manufacturing processes, and related welding procedures for the sheave intended functional purpose.

• In this case of welding the dual web or a single web design sheave, weld cross-sections should be evaluated for weld integrity before engaged in for field service.

• Industry should evaluate API Specification Q1, Ninth Edition, 2013, “Specification for Quality Management System Requirements for Manufacturing Organizations for the Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry,” 5 for the following: o Industry should ensure that information on equipment failures are reported, analyzed,

and reported to the industry via the API Monogram Program and the SAFEOCS Program.

o Develop and implement improvements to API Spec Q1 Ninth Edition to address OEM’s oversight and auditing of subcontracted second-tier, third-tier, and lower-tiered vendors who perform a manufacturing process in the manufacturing chain. This would ensure proper manufacturing at the lowest levels.

o Develop improved QA/QC practices to verify design and inspection of manufacturing processes at each stage of an OEM’s supply chain. QA/QC practices should include controls for producing products and identifying nonconformities to industry standards and specifications.

3 API RP 8B is not incorporated by reference in BSEE regulations. 4API SPEC 8C is not incorporated by reference in BSEE regulations. 5 API Q1 Eighth Edition is incorporated by reference in BSEE regulations, not API Q1 Ninth Edition.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................ 5 ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................................................... 9 POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS .................................................................................. 11 APPLICABLE INDUSTRY STANDARDS ................................................................................. 111 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................... 13 ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................... 15 APPENDIX I………………..……………………..…………….……………...………..…15 APPENDIX II ......................................................................................................................... 23 LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES

FIGURES FIGURE 1 – CROWN MOUNTED COMPENSATOR (CMC) LOCATION ........................................ 5 FIGURE 2 - CMC ASSEMBLY - SHEAVES ARE INTERCHANGEABLE......................................... 5 FIGURE 3 – SHEAVES – FASTLINE ASSEMBLY ........................................................................ 6 FIGURE 4 – DUAL WEB DESIGN SHEAVE ASSEMBLY – WELD LOCATIONS IN RED ................. 6 FIGURE 5 – CRACKS IN WELD JOINT AND WEB PLATES ......................................................... 8 FIGURE 6 – DETAILED CROSS-SECTION OF WEB PLATES TO HUB WELD SECTION CRACK

INITIATION AT THE GAP AND PROPOGATION PATH................................................................. 9

TABLES

TABLE 1 – SHEAVE WEB PLATES AND HUB FAILURES ........................................................... 8

APPENDIX I

NOV PRODUCT INFORMATION BULLETIN NUMBER 87819987 REV 0 ................................. 16 NOV PRODUCT INFORMATION BULLETIN NUMBER 87819987 REV 1 ................................. 19

APPENDIX II

ASSET INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT CHART…………………………………………………22

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BACKGROUND Sheaves are pulleys that use wire rope to lift loads, apply forces, and transmit power. NOV-affected sheaves are located in the CMC assembly, which is installed on top of the drilling rig derrick (Figure 1) and consists of the crown block, sheave block, fast line, and dead line sheave clusters (Figures 2 and 3).

FIGURE 1: CROWN MOUNTED COMPENSATOR (CMC) LOCATION (OEM USER MANUAL)

FIGURE 2: CMC ASSEMBLY - SHEAVES ARE INTERCHANGEABLE (OEM USER MANUAL)

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FIGURE 3: SHEAVES - FASTLINE ASSEMBLY (OEM PIB#87819987)

For this particular design, the crown block uses seven interchangeable 78-inch diameter dual web design sheaves to control the 2 1/8” drill line. Ten drilling rigs were constructed using the 78-inch diameter dual web design manufactured by NOV. On February 7, 2015, while performing drilling operations off the coast of Colombia on the Bolette Dolphin drilling rig for Ecopetrol-Anadarko, Dolphin Drilling/Fred Olsen Energy identified the first sheave failure and reported to NOV. On March 8, 2015, while conducting maintenance inspections of the CMC, the drilling crew discovered large cracks on the dual web fast line sheaves on the Rowan Resolute drilling rig operating in the GOM. The OEM reported these sheave failures to BSEE. These sheave failures prompted the OEM to initiate an engineering RCA and a third-party metallurgical RCA of the failed sheave. The affected sheaves were dual web design sheaves, see Figure 4.

FIGURE 4: DUAL WEB DESIGN SHEAVE ASSEMBLY - WELD LOCATIONS IN RED (OEM PIB#87819987)

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NOV also informed BSEE about several offshore 78-inch diameter dual web design sheave incidents occurring between February 7, 2015, and December 6, 2015. A time line of these dual web design sheave incidents is as follows:

1. On February 7, 2015, while conducting drilling operations off the coast of Colombia for

Ecopetrol-Anadarko, the Fred Olsen drilling crew discovered a sheave failure on the Bolette Dolphin drilling rig. A crack was identified in the hub weld seam of the fastline sheave.

2. On March 8, 2015, while conducting drilling operations in the GOM for Anadarko, the drilling crew identified a sheave failure on the Rowan Resolute drilling rig. NOV contracted an independent third-party laboratory, Howard and Associates International (HAI), to perform a metallurgical RCA of this particular failed sheave. HAI completed the RCA for the sheave failure on August 6, 2015.

3. On August 14, October 2, and October 22, 2015, while conducting drilling operations in the GOM for Anadarko, the Rowan drilling crew discovered additional sheave failures on the Rowan Resolute drilling rig. For the October 22, 2015, incident, four of the seven sheaves failed on the crown block.

4. On October 7, 2015, while conducting drilling operations in the GOM for Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas, the Noble drilling crew discovered a sheave failure on a Sam Croft drilling rig. This sheave failure was reported to BSEE on October 8, 2015, as a near-miss incident. The sheave was in service for five months.

5. On November 10, 2015, while conducting drilling operations in the GOM for Repsol, the drilling crew reported a sheave failure on the Rowan Renaissance drilling rig.

6. On November 12, 2015, while conducting drilling operations in the GOM for Shell Offshore Inc., the Noble drilling crew reported a sheave failure on the Don Taylor drilling rig. A crack was identified on the first-reduction crown cluster dual web design sheave, which failed while under load. The sheave was in service for approximately two years.

7. On November 24 and December 6 of 2015, while conducting drilling operations off the coast of Colombia for Ecopetrol-Anadarko, the Fred Olsen drilling crew discovered additional sheave failures on the Bolette Dolphin drilling rig. The number of sheave failures on this rig was not reported by the operator.

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Table 1 SHEAVE WEB PLATES AND HUB FAILURES

Failure Date Operator Rig Contractor Location

Feb 7, 2015 Ecopetrol – Anadarko

Bolette Dolphin

Dolphin Drilling / Fred Olsen

Colombia

Nov 24, 2015 Ecopetrol – Anadarko

Bolette Dolphin


Colombia

Dec 6, 2015 Ecopetrol – Anadarko

Bolette Dolphin


Colombia

Mar 8, 2015 Anadarko Rowan

Resolute Rowan Drilling GOM

Aug 14, 2015 Anadarko Rowan


Oct 2, 2015 Anadarko Rowan


Oct 22, 2015 Anadarko Rowan


Oct 7, 2015 Freeport

McMoRan Oil & Gas

Sam Croft Noble Drilling GOM

Nov 10, 2015 Repsol Rowan

Renaissance Rowan Drilling GOM

Nov 12, 2015 Shell Don Taylor Noble Drilling GOM

The dual web design sheaves can be interchanged with the single web design sheave. The RCA conducted by the OEM stated that the dual web design sheave prevented weld filler metal from penetrating deep enough to fill the gap on the inside of the hub-web weld joint. Thus, a crack initiated at the gap of the root of the weld and propagated through the weld seam into the web plate (Figures 5 and 6).

FIGURE 5: CRACKS IN WELD JOINT AND WEB PLATES INDICATED BY RED ARROWS (OEM

PIB#87819987)

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FIGURE 6: DETAILED CROSS-SECTION OF WEB PLATES TO HUB WELD SECTION CRACK INITIATION AT THE GAP AND PROPOGATION PATH SHOWN BY THE RED ARROW (RCA REPORT)

The 78-inch diameter dual web design sheaves were designed per API Specification 8C, Fifth Edition, 2012, “Drilling and Production Hoisting Equipment.” The welding procedure specified a manually welded root pass followed by an automated Submerged Arch Welding (SAW) technique. This weld procedure did not allow for full penetration of the weld filler metal deep into the hub-web weld joint. Additionally, during the initial design stage of the sheave, the hub dimensions were reduced from 600 mm to 550 mm to decrease the moment of inertia. The web plates’ thickness of 12 mm was not changed, which resulted in load rating being increased by approximately 11%. The stress levels on the inside of the web plates exceeded the allowable stress limits for compression by 27%, which resulted in fatigue fracture failure. Following the RCA results, NOV issued two PIB’s 87819987 (Revisions 0 and 1) (Appendix 2) for all users to visually inspect for cracks on a weekly basis at the hub weld on the 78-inch diameter dual web design sheave and initiated replacement of all the dual web design sheaves with single web design sheaves. The single web design sheave allows welding on both sides of the hub-web weld joint, as opposed to welding only one side for the dual web design sheave. This change results in a more robust weld joint as the weld filler metal will fill the gap of the root of the weld joint.

ASSESSMENT Following the discovery of the sheave failure on the Sam Croft drilling rig on October 8, 2015, BSEE convened the QC-FIT within the Office of Offshore Regulatory Programs to evaluate any technology or safety issues associated with the use of 78-inch dual web design sheave equipment on the OCS. The QC-FIT was tasked with determining if there were QA/QC, technology, safety, or environmental concerns that required further action by BSEE and/or industry, especially if these concerns related to the design, manufacture, and use of sheaves either on the OCS or globally. The OEM initiated an RCA evaluation to determine the root cause for an earlier March 8, 2015 sheave failure that occurred on the Rowan Resolute rig in the GOM.

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OEM ENGINEERING RCA The OEM initiated an Engineering RCA investigation to determine the root cause of the dual web design sheave failures with cracks in the hub-web weld joint. The Engineering RCA investigation included a review of the sheave design, loading conditions, and manufacturing and maintenance procedures. A summary of the OEM’s RCA findings are listed below:

• The OEM verified that the sheave failure was due to high nominal stress levels in the sheave hub-web connection in combination with the additional stress concentration caused by the dual web design, which prevented welding of the inside of the hub-web weld joint and resulted in a gap. This stress concentration caused the crack initiation at the gap of the weld, which propagated through the weld into the web plates (Figures 5 and 6).

• The OEM specified a hand weld root pass procedure, followed by an automated SAW technique welding procedure. This procedure did not allow for a full penetration depth of the weld filler metal on the inside of the hub-web weld joint, creating a stress concentration.

• During the initial design phase, the hub dimensions were reduced from 600 mm to 550 mm to decrease the moment of inertia. The web plates' thickness of 12 mm was not changed. As a result of the hub dimension reduction, the sheaves’ load rating was increased by approximately 11%. The stress levels and the impact of the design change were not fully evaluated by the OEM. The stress levels on the inside of the web plates exceeded allowable stress limits for compression by 27%, resulting in fatigue failure.

THIRD-PARTY METALLURGICAL RCA On August 6, 2015, the independent third party HAI provided the RCA report to the OEM for the metallurgical analysis of the March 8, 2015 sheave failure on Rowan Resolute rig. The metallurgical analysis included an evaluation of the sheaves’ chemical composition; material properties; microstructure of the weld joint; and evaluation of the material specifications for the sheave bearing hub and the web plates. A summary of the third party’s metallurgical RCA findings are listed below:

• The hand welding at the hub-web weld joint followed by an automated SAW did not allow the weld filler metal to fully penetrate at the root of the weld between the web plates and the hub. This led to a gap on the inside of the hub-web weld joint, creating a primary stress riser that caused initiation of cracks in the weld.

• Cracks were observed in two locations (at the hub to the plate weld joint and across the web plates). The cracks initiated at the gap of the root of the weld and propagated through the weld into the web plate (Figures 4 and 5).

• At the time of the RCA, the material test certificate for the hub and web plate from the steel supplier was not available to the test laboratory to verify with the OEM’s specified materials specification (alloy composition, material properties, heat treatment) for the analysis performed by the test laboratory.

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BSEE’s RECOMMENDATIONS: In response to the described RCAs, BSEE recommends the following:

1. The OEM should conduct a finite element analysis (FEA) on the new single web sheave design to ensure that the operational stress concentrations and load levels remained within the load limits and that the sheaves had a built-in safety factor to assure safe operation.

2. The OEM should verify the material test certificates for the sheave hub and the web plates conforms to the specified material design specification requirements (alloy chemistry, material properties, heat treatment, etc.).

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS The RCA investigation identified the following potential contributing factors to the sheave failure:

• The 78-inch dual web design sheave service life cannot be traced because they can be interchanged within the CMC.

• The Engineering RCA investigation attributed that the reduction in hub dimensions from 600 mm to 550 mm diameter to decrease the moment of inertia with the same web plates thickness of 12 mm resulted in overloading conditions leading to the fracture of the sheave.

• The Metallurgical RCA investigation attributed the sheaves’ failure to the dual web design of the sheave. The dual web design prevented welding on the inside of the web plates to the hub. The OEM specified a manually welded root pass, followed by an automated SAW technique welding procedure. This procedure did not allow for a full penetration depth of the weld filler metal, which resulted in a gap between the inside of the web plate to the hub weld joint. This gap between the inside of the web plate to the hub weld joint allowed for stress concentration and crack initiation at the gap of the root of the weld (Figure 6).

APPLICABLE INDUSTRY STANDARDS DESIGN The dual web design was based on onshore static loading conditions in accordance with API Specification 8C, Fifth Edition, 2012 “Drilling and Production Hoisting Equipment.” API Specification 8C specifies the following:

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• Sheaves are considered to be hoisting equipment. Hoisting equipment is designed, manufactured, and tested so that it is fit for its intended purpose. The equipment must be designed for simple, safe operation and safely transfer the load for which it was intended.

• The design should consider both the static and the dynamic load conditions, and a design safety factor for the design of the sheaves of the CMC assembly. The equipment design should be assessed for fit for service and should address excessive yielding, fatigue loading, and buckling as possible failure modes.

MATERIAL API 8C Specification, Fifth Edition, Section 6 “Material Requirements” should define specific material properties requirements, design load conditions, and manufacturing processes that support reproducibility and verification of the equipment’s function and fitness for service. WELDING API Specification 8C, Fifth Edition, Section 7 specifies ‘Welding Requirements’ for primary load-carrying components. The weld’s mechanical properties, as determined by the welding procedure qualification test, shall at a minimum meet the specified design materials mechanical property requirements. The welding design should ensure complete fusion of the weld with the base metal. All welding processes performed on sheave components should be performed per qualified welding procedures in accordance with the following:

• Product Specification Level 1 (PSL1): American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B31.3 “Process Piping Codes,” (2014);

• American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler Pressure Vessel Code (ASME BPVC) Section IX “Welding, Brazing, and Fuzing Procedures, Welders, Brazers, and Welding, Brazing, and Fusing Operators – Welding, Brazing and Fusing Qualifications,” (2014);

• American Welding Society (AWS) D1.1 “Structural Welding Code,” Twenty-Third Edition (2015); ISO 15614-1 “Specification and Qualification of Welding Procedures for Metallic Materials, — Welding Procedure Test — Part 1: Arc and Gas Welding of Steels and Arc Welding of Nickel and Nickel Alloys,” First Edition (2012);

• American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM) A488 “Standard Practice for Steel Castings, Welding, Qualifications of Procedures and Personnel,” (2016).

In the case of this evaluation, the OEM’s welding parameters should have specified that sufficient heat be applied to achieve a wider, deeper penetration along the backing surface gap of the root of the weld. This would have enabled the weld to be more resistant to crack initiation. QUALITY ASSURANCE API Specification Q1, Ninth Edition, provides guidance for OEM’s QMS and establishes the minimum requirements for organizations that manufacture products or provide services or service-related products for use in the petroleum and natural gas industry. The purpose of this guidance is to help ensure that the equipment is manufactured per the OEM’s QMS-specified requirements. API Spec Q1 also provides guidance for the following:

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• The oversight and auditing of subcontracted second-tier and third-tier vendors who

perform a manufacturing process in the manufacturing chain. This ensures proper manufacturing at the lowest levels.

• Verification of the design and manufacturing processes at each stage of an OEM’s supply chain. QA/QC practices should include controls for producing expected products, identifying nonconformities, and ensuring compliance with the requirements of the applicable API product specification(s) and/or standard(s).

In the case of this evaluation, sheave failure falls under the “Control of Nonconforming Product” section of API Spec Q1 which specifies guidance for identifying product failures after delivery and the appropriate action to address the effects of the nonconformance. The design and development process for this designed sheave was not followed appropriately; therefore, the verification/validation of the dual web sheave design was not evaluated per this standard. If the design and risk assessment criteria were followed during the sheaves’ design change procedure, per API Specification Q1 the associated risk may have been identified.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS As a result of these findings from this QC-FIT evaluation, in the interest of safety, BSEE recommends the following:

• The OEM should investigate why multiple sheave failures occurred on one rig. • Since the sheaves are interchangeable in other locations within the CMC assembly,

tracking the sheaves’ service life is challenging, therefore, operators and inspectors should conduct daily visual inspections of sheaves for cracks between the hub-web weld joint.

• BSEE agrees with the OEM’s recommendation that all CMC dual web design sheaves should be replaced with single web design sheaves. The single web design sheave results in a more robust hub-web weld joint and is not as susceptible to cracking as the dual web design sheave.

• The OEM should conduct a finite element analysis (FEA) on the new single web sheave design to ensure that the operational stress concentrations and load levels remain within the load limits and have a built-in safety factor to assure safe operation.

• The OEM should follow API Recommended Practice (RP), 8B Eighth Edition, 2014, “Recommended practices for procedures for inspections, maintenance, repair, and remanufacture of hoisting equipment," 6 section 5.3.2.2, Category I and request that the operators and/or contractors should conduct daily visual inspections of the CMC 78-inch diameter dual web design sheaves for cracks until they are replaced.

• The OEM should follow appropriate sections of API Specification (Spec) 8C, Fifth Edition, 2012, “Drilling and Production Hoisting Equipment,” 7as follows:

6 API RP 8B is not incorporated by reference in BSEE regulations. 7API SPEC 8C is not incorporated by reference in BSEE regulations.

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o Section 3.1.9 ‘Load Rating’ and Section 4.7 ‘Design Safety Factor’ specifies consideration of both the static and the dynamic load conditions; and design safety factors for the design of the sheaves of the CMC assembly.

o Section 8.4 ‘Quality Control for Specific Equipment and Components’ requires verification that the material test certificates for the sheave bearing hub and the web plates meet the OEM’s specified material specifications requirements (alloy chemistry, materials mechanical properties, heat treatment, etc.). The OEM should also define the specific material properties, stress load conditions, manufacturing processes, and related welding procedures for the sheave intended functional purpose.

• In this case of welding the dual web or a single web design sheave, weld cross-sections should be evaluated for weld integrity before engaged in for field service.

• Industry should evaluate API Specification Q1, Ninth Edition, 2013, “Specification for Quality Management System Requirements for Manufacturing Organizations for the Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry,” 8 for the following: o Industry should ensure that information on equipment failures are reported, analyzed,

and reported to the industry via the API Monogram Program and the SAFEOCS Program.

o Develop and implement improvements to API Spec Q1 Ninth Edition to address OEM’s oversight and auditing of subcontracted second-tier, third-tier, and lower-tiered vendors who perform a manufacturing process in the manufacturing chain. This would ensure proper manufacturing at the lowest levels.

o Develop improved QA/QC practices to verify design and inspection of manufacturing processes at each stage of an OEM’s supply chain. QA/QC practices should include controls for producing products and identifying nonconformities to industry standards and specifications.

8 API Q1 Eighth Edition is incorporated by reference in BSEE regulations, not API Q1 Ninth Edition.

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ACRONYMS API American Petroleum Institute ASME American Society for Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing Materials AWS American Welding Society BPVC Boiler Pressure Vessel Code BSEE Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement CMC Crown Mounted Compensator FEA Finite Element Analysis GC Grand Canyon GOM Gulf of Mexico HAI Howard and Associates International HC Hydraulic Connector IRF International Regulators Forum ISO International Organization for Standardization NOV National Oilwell Varco OCS Outer Continental Shelf OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer PIB Product Information Bulletin PSL Product Specification Level QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control QC-FIT Quality Control Failure Incident Team QMS Quality Management System RCA Root Cause Analysis RP Recommended Practice SAW Submerged Arch Welding

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APPENDIX I

NOV Product Information Bulletin Number 87819987 Rev 0

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NOV Product Information Bulletin Number 87819987 Rev 1

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APPENDIX II

Asset Integrity Management

Reference: Asset Integrity Management Handbook, Peter McClean Millar, 2015.

Sections that were evaluated are design, materials, standards, construction (manufacture), inspection, etc.

Agenda of ECSOEM/SC8/TG3 TASK GROUP ON HOISTING … · 2017. 6. 16. · ECSOEM/SC8/TG3 June 2017...

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