Afterword What Has Philosophy to Learn From Tort Law

Afterword What Has Philosophy to Learn from Tort Law?

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ThePhilosophicalFoundationsofTortLawDavidG.Owen

Printpublicationdate:1997PrintISBN-13:9780198265795PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:March2012DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.001.0001

AfterwordWhatHasPhilosophytoLearnfromTortLaw?BERNARDWILLIAMS

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.003.0022

AbstractandKeywords

Philosophymightlearnfromtortlawthedifferencebetweenpracticalrealityandphilosophicalfrivolity.J.L.Austinwasdisposedtogivethatanswer.Austinsaidthatitwascommonsenseor,perhaps,ordinarylanguage,andonereasonhesometimesgaveforthisjudgementwasaquasi-evolutionaryone.Thischapterpresentswhatitcallsaquasi-evolutionaryaccountofthestrengthofsomelegalconceptsanddistinctions,thePicture.ThePictureiswithoutdoubthighlyidealised.Thereareperhapstwomaindirectionsfromwhichthissuggestionmaycome.OneobjectionisthatthePictureoverestimatestheeffectsoflegalargument.Theideahereisthatcasesaredecidedonthebasisofexternalvaluesorprinciplessuchaswealthmaximisation,utility,orequalfreedomandthatthelegalargumentsandtheconceptsinvokedinthem(fault,negligence,intention,proximityofcausation,orwhatever)are,atthelimit,merelyrhetoricaldecorations.

Keywords:philosophy,tortlaw,J.L.Austin,legalargument,wealthmaximisation,utility,equalfreedom,fault,negligence,intention


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I.TestingCommonSense:ThePictureOneanswertomyquestionisthatphilosophymightlearnfromtortlawthedifferencebetweenpracticalrealityandphilosophicalfrivolity.J.L.Austinwasdisposedtogivethatanswer.Austinwas,likeWittgensteinandNietzsche,struckbytheirresponsibilityofphilosophy,itslight-headedwillingnesstosupposethatlargeproblemscouldbeusefullyaddressedbysomedistinctionsorformulationsthatweresimplythoughtupofaSundayafternoon.(TherewasadifferencebetweenAustinandthoseothers:unlikethem,hedidmoreorlesstakeitforgrantedthattherewasasubject,philosophy,whichmightcometoconductitselfmoreseriouslyandusefullyintheserespects,evenifhewaslessthanclearabouttheformthatthesubjectmighttake.)

Whatisthiscontrast?Whatisitthatsupposedlyprovidesuswithdistinctionsmoreadequatethanthoseofferedbyphilosophy?Austinsaid(withsomereservations)thatitwascommonsenseor,perhaps,ordinarylanguage,andonereasonhesometimesgaveforthisjudgementwasaquasi-evolutionaryone,thatcommonsense(asIshallcallit)1hadbeen,atleastwithregardtocentralhumanconcerns,underheavyselectivepressureforaverylongtime,andthedistinctionsthathadsurvivedandflourishedinitwerelikelytoanswerfairlyreliablytohumanneeds.Thiswasnotaverygoodanswer,formorethanonereason,anditisnoteasytotellhowseriouslyAustintookit.However,itdoesatleastprovideastartingpointforthinkingaboutsomethinglessgeneral,acontrastdrawninsimilartermsbetweenphilosophyandthelaw.Austinalsoappealedtothelaw,andthefamousarticleAPleaForExcuses,inwhichhesetsoutsomeofhismethodological(p.488) concerns,mentionsa(rathergrisly)exampledrawnfromanineteenthcenturycase.2

Ifthelawforinstance,thelawofnon-intentionaltorts3usescertainconceptsordistinctionsthathavebeenvariouslyapplied,modified,andreinterpretedwithinalegaltraditionoveraperiodoftime,doesthisofferanyreasonatallforthinkingthatthoseconceptsanddistinctionsprovideasoundandreliablewayofthinkingabouttherelevantareasofexperience?Moreexactly,thequestioniswhethersuchfactsprovideanyindependentreason,sinceitmightbethatthelegaluseofcertainideasdidnomorethanwitnesstowhatwasclearanyway,thatthoseideasseemedobvioustocommonsense.Iftheuseofcertainideasinthelawdoesmoretoshowthatthoseideashavestrengththanisdonebythemerefactthattheyarepartofthecurrencyofcommonsense,thiswillhavetobeconnectedwithspecialfeaturesofthelawwiththeidea,mostplausibly,thatthelegalcontextisoneinwhichalotturnsontheoutcome,andhenceontheargumentsthatleadtoorlegitimatelegaloutcomes.Thisisitselfakindofevolutionaryargument.Thesenseinwhichalotturnsontheoutcomeisthattheissueislikelytobevigorouslydisputedbythepartiesinvolved,thatthedecisionmayhaveimplicationsforotherpartieswhowillwatchtheoutcomewithinterest,andsoforth,withtheresultthatonlyrobustlyarguedconclusions,whichareatleastconsistentwithpublicconceptionsofwhatmakessensinsuchconnections,arelikelytosurvive.Ishallcallthisquasi-evolutionaryaccountofthestrengthofsomelegalconceptsanddistinctions,thePicture.

II.TwoObjections


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ThePictureiswithoutdoubthighlyidealized.Itmaybesuggestedthatitisworsethanidealized,andrests,rather,onsomemistakeofprinciple.Thereareperhapstwomaindirectionsfromwhichthissuggestionmaycome.OneobjectionisthatthePictureoverestimatestheeffectsoflegalargument.Theideahereisthatcasesaredecidedonthebasisofexternalvaluesorprinciplessuchaswealthmaximization,utility,equalfreedomandthatthelegalargumentsandtheconceptsinvokedinthem(fault,negligence,intention,proximityofcausation,orwhatever)are,atthelimit,merelyrhetoricaldecorations.TheotherobjectionisthatthePictureunder-estimatestheautonomyandpeculiarityoflegalconcepts:thattherequirements,(p.489) purposes,andtraditionsofthelawarespecialenoughforitsdistinctionsandprinciplestostandatadistancefromcommonsenseandfromwhatpeopleneedtosayandthinkinextra-legalcontexts.

Thetwolinesofobjectionmayseemtoruninoppositedirections,butthisisnotnecessarilyso.Onecancombinethem,inclaimingboththatlegalargumentishighlytechnicalandthatitfailstodeterminetheoutcome.Indeed,thesuggestionmaybethatthereasonlegalargumentneedstobeverytechnicalisinordertoconcealthefactthatitfailstodeterminetheoutcome:thetechnicalitiesprovideamystificationthatconcealstheunderlyingprocesses.Whethertheobjectionsarecombinedinthiswayornot,theydobetweenthemthreatenthePicture,whichwasinvokedtoexplainhowprocessesofthelawcouldremindphilosophyofrealitybyshowingdistinctionsrecognizabletocommonsenseunderpressurewheremuchturnsontheoutcome.Broadlyspeaking,thefirstobjectionisthatthedistinctionsinvokedarerecognizabletocommonsense,butarenotunderpressure;thesecondisthatthedistinctionsmayperhapsbeunderpressure(iftheyarenotsimplyactingasamystification),buttheyandtheoutcomesthattheyareinvokedtosupportareonlyremotelyrelatedtocommonsense.Oneithershowing,theideathatthelawcanshedlightoncommonsense,orindeedonanythingoutsideitself,losesmomentum.

Neitherobjectionisfatal.Evenifwhatthefirstobjectionclaimsistrue,itisnotclearthatverymuchfollowsfromitforthepresentquestion.Rationalizationsmusthavesomeforceeventoserveasrationalizations,andtherationalizationswhich,onthisaccount,serveastherhetoricofthelegalprocessthroughwhichoptimalallocationsofcostsaremade(orwhateverthesupposedunderlyingprincipleorvalueistakentobe)musthavesomestrengthinordertodischargethisrole.Indeed,itmaybethattheywillturnouttohavealmostasmuchstrengthasthePicturerequires.

Thelatenteconomiccriteria,orwhatevertheymaybe,which,accordingtothetypeoftheoryinvokedbythefirstobjection,determinetheoutcomesatthefundamentallevelarenotmanifestlyinoperation.Iftheywere,thetheorywouldnotbecontroversial,anditwouldalsohavenothingnewtorecommendnormatively,if(assomesuchtheoriesdo)ithasthataim.Theargumentsthatdotheworkatthemanifestlevelmustbethefamiliarones.Thetheoryregardsthemasrationalizations,buttheymustneverthelessdosomework,sincesomeprocessisactuallygoingonatthemanifestlevel,andthatprocessmusthavesomeofthecharacteristics(ofclaimsbeingarguedagainstcounter-claimsandso


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on)thatwereidentifiedinthePicture.

Ofcourse,ifthetheoryclaimsthattheprocessesatthemanifestlevel(conventionalargumentaboutnegligence,proximatecause,andsuch)concealsomeothercriteria(economicorwhatever)whichactuallydeterminetheoutcome,itmustgivesomeaccount(asallsuchfunctionalisttheoriesmust)ofthewaysinwhichthoseothercriteriacanguide,beservedby,and(p.490) mostgenerallyrelatetothemanifestlevelofargument.Thiswillhavecertainimplicationsaboutthenatureoftheargumentsatthemanifestlevel:suchconventionalargumentsmay,forinstance,havetodisplayacertainflexibilityorporositywhichallowsthemtorespondtothefunctionalrequirementsoftheconsiderationsthatoperateatthelatentlevel.Butifthetheorycangiveanaccountofthis(anditwillnotbeacredibleorinterestingtheoryunlessitcan),thisresultitselfwillmaketheoperationsofthelawinterestingandindeedinstructivetophilosophy.Forthisporositycanscarcelybeafeatureoftheconventionalcriteriasimplyastheyareusedinthelaw.Ifthatwereso,theycouldnotsustainacrediblerationalization.Theporositywillratherhavetobeafeature,oratleastapotentiality,ofsuchcriteriaastheyareusedevenoutsidethelaw,andthisissomethingthatphilosophyshouldunderstandaboutthem.Moreover,itmaybethattheporosityoftheeverydaycommonsensecriteriaservestosomedegreethesamefunctionoutsidethelawas(accordingtothetheory)itservesinsidethelaw,ofallowingthecriteriatobemanipulatedinaccordancewitheconomicorotherlatentconsiderations,andifthatisso,itisequallysomethingthatphilosophyshouldunderstand.

Thesecondobjectionwasthattheargumentsandconceptsusedinthelawweretoospecialist,tooremovedfromextra-legalthought,toprovidephilosophywithanyinsightintothewaysinwhichextra-legalthoughtworks.Thereare,obviously,technicalaspectsofthelawforwhichthisistrue,butsofarasthemostimportantmattershereareconcernedmatterssuchasfault,intention,carelessness,proximatecauseandconsequence,andsoontheclaimissimplynotconvincing,atleastwhenanimportantconcessionhasbeenmade.Itistruethatthelawmustoftenreachaconclusionaboutquestionstowhichcommonsensewouldbehappytoleavetheanswerindeterminatetowhich,indeed,inmanycases,itwouldbeunhappytodoanythingbutleavetheanswerindeterminate.Therearefamiliarexamplesofthisinthecriminallaw.Iftheassailantpullsthetriggerinonejurisdictionandthebullethitsthevictiminanother,commonsensemaywellbecontenttosayjustthatmuch,butthelawneedstodecidewherethevictimwaskilled.Moresignificantly,therearequestionsofanagentsstateofmind,andasaninterestingifmarginalconsequenceofwhoisthecriminalagentincases,forinstance,ofhypnoticsuggestion.4Inallthesematters,thelawcanbeseenasforcingtheissuerelativetowhatIamcallingcommonsense;thoughIshallsuggestlaterthatincertainconnectionsthelawmaymerelybeamoredeterminedaccompliceofcommon(p.491)senseindoingthis,andindeedthatthisisonerespectinwhichphilosophymaylearnfromtheoperationsofthelaw.

III.ForcingTheIssueThelawoftortsinitsownwaysalsoforcestheissue,notablyontheextentand


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directnessofcausation,andonquestionsofstateofmindthatpresentthemselvesinrelationtosuchmattersasintent,recklessness,and,tosomeextent,negligence.Ithastoforcetheissue,forareasonthatsuperficiallyisthesameasthatforwhichthecriminallawhastodosothatitneedsaresult.Butthatphrase,thoughitappliestobothcases,concealssomeimportantdifferencesbetweenthem.Thecriminallawneedsaresultinthesensethatanaccusedperson,onceheorsheisaccused,mustbefoundguiltyornotguilty.Intort,5oncetheactionisunderway,eithertheplaintifforthedefendantmustsucceed,whichmeansinturnthatoneorotheroftheparties(orinsomeproportionboth)mustbearthecostofthelossordamage.Butthereisthebanaldifferencethatwithcrime,itis,aboveall,clearcasesthatcometocourt,andwithtortitis,aboveall,hardcases.Withtort,itisthelegalcharacteristicofbeingahardcasethathelpstogetittocourtinthefirstplace,butincrimeitisthearrestofasupposedcriminal.Someonemightsaythatinanabsolutelyidealworldallandonlyguiltycriminalswouldbeprosecuted,6buttherecouldbenoworldinwhichitwasonlysuccessfulplaintiffswhosecaseswereheard.Tort,byitsnature,mustbemorelikeasystemfortheallocationofcoststhanthecriminallawis,anditfollowsfromthisthattherecanbesystemsthatperformthatfunctioninadifferentway,suchasnofaultinsurancesystems,or,presumably,theprinciplesofwealthmaximizationiftheywereexplicitlyemployed.7

Itfollowsthatthesensesinwhichthecriminallawandtorthavetohaveananswerareratherdifferent.Inbothtypesofcase,ofcourse,therehastobeananswer,grantedthatthesystemexistsandthepartiesareincourt;buttheconditionsofbeingincourtarenotthesame,anditisalsoclearerwithtortthanwithcrimewhatadifferentsystemmightbe.Thismakesitspeciallyimportantthatthereshouldbeatheoryofwhattortlawis(p.492)supposedtobedoing,andthisinturnhasconsequencesforitsrelationstophilosophy.IfphilosophycanbeinstructedbythelawinthetermsofferedbythePicturethatistosay,throughseeingwhatdistinctionsandconsiderationsproverobustincircumstancesinwhichwehavetohaveanansweritwillneedanunderstandingofwhattheforcesarethatoperateonthelawandareexpressedinit,and,inparticular,ofwhatitisforthelawtohavetohaveananswer.Philosophy,then,willnotonlyhavetoattendtotheprinciplesandgoalsoftortlaw;itwillalsohavetounderstandatatheoreticallevelwhyithasthoseprinciplesandgoals.

IV.ThePlaceofTheoryThistheoreticalunderstandingmayitselfbeinpartphilosophical,andtothatextenttherelationsbetweenphilosophyandlawwillbe,unsurprisingly,reciprocal.Buttheunderstandingrequiredwillalsobepolitical.Inthisdimension,besidesthespecialreasonsforneedingatheoryofwhattortlawisupto,namelythattherearealternativesystemsthatmightperformsomeofitsfunctions,thereisamoregeneralreasonwhichtortlawshareswiththecriminallaw:thatbothoftheseoperationsoflawinvolvethedirectedexerciseofstatepower,anditisanaspirationofaliberalsocietythattheoperationsofpowershouldbesofaraspossibletransparent,inatleastthemodestsensethattheirsupposedlegitimationshouldnotrestonsystematicmisunderstanding.

Thismodestrequirementdoesnotimplythateverypoliticalpracticemustbelegitimated


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intermsofsometheory,stilllessthatallofthemmustbelegitimatedintermsofthesametheory.Butinastategovernedbylawtheoperationsofthelawrepresentthemostdirectapplicationofpowertotheindividual,andgrantedfurtherthehighlycontestedjustificationsoftheseoperationsinmodernliberalsocieties,itisinfactthecasethatinsuchsocietiesthedemandsoftransparencyareunlikelytobemetwithouttheresourcesofatheoreticalaccount.Someofthataccount,thoughpolitical,willundoubtedlyoverlapwiththephilosophicalcontributionandconstitutepartofapoliticalphilosophy.

ThecallontheoryatthispointisquitedifferentfromtheideaexpressedbyRichardWrightinhiscontributiontothisvolume,8thatrationalityrequiresatheorywhichoffersaunified,monistic,basisforbotheverydaymoralityandthelaw.Ihavearguedelsewhere9thattheaimofturningeverydaymoralityintoatheory,andindeedtheideathatithasorshouldhaveamonisticbasis,aremisguided.Thesituationwithpoliticalphilosophyisnotentirelythesame,andthereismoreplacefortheoryinit.The(p.493) reasonsforthisarespecialtopoliticalphilosophy.Theyaregroundedbothinthegeneralpointthatpoliticsisimmediatelyinvolvedintheapplicationofpower,10andalsoinamorelocalpoint,thatlegitimationinthemodernliberalstaterequiresonsuchmattersahighlevelofdiscursiveexplanation.Ifouraimweretodevelopaunitarytheoreticalaccountofeverydaymoralityandthelawonamonisticbasis,theseconsiderationswouldseemtofavorapicture(thoughitwouldnotstrictlyimplyit)inwhichtherewasaprimacyofphilosophyoverthelaw.Philosophicalreflectionandthetheorywhich,onthisview,itgenerateswouldbethoughttomaketheworkingofthelawintelligible,ortoprescribehowitmightbeimprovedsoastobemoreintelligible.Onthisview,itwouldbeamatterofwhatphilosophycoulddoforthelaw.ButontheaccountIamsuggesting,philosophytriestolearnfromtheoperationsofthelaw,inconjunctionwithatheoryofwhatthelawisuptoatheorypartlyprovidedbyphilosophyitself.

V.InTheMicrowaveWhatmayphilosophylearnfromlaw?Theoriginalsuggestionwasthatitmightlearntherobustnessofsomefamiliardistinctions,judgedfromthewayinwhichtheybehaveunderpressure,whenthelawhastohaveananswer.Thereareindeedexamplesthatfitthismodel.Itisimportantthattheyarenotmostlikelytoshowupinconnectionswhichfromthepointofviewoflegaltheoryarethemostcontroversial.Theirrobustnessmayshowup,rather,inthefactthattheyaretakenforgrantedinlegalargument,andarenotmadethefocusofattackbyanyoftheparties.Considerthematterofintentintortorcriminallaw.Itmayindeedbecontroversialinaparticularconnectionwhetheritmattersornotthattheagentintendedtheoutcome;anditmay,further,becontroversialwhatwouldcountasshowingthathedidintendtheoutcome(oratanyrateshouldbetreatedassomeonewhointendedtheoutcome).Butbehindallthistherewillbeasteadystreamofassumptionsaboutsituationsinwhichitisabsolutelyclearthathedidintendtheoutcome,andthatitisrelevantthatheintendedtheoutcome.

Again,evenwhenitisindisputewhethertheagentintendedthisoutcome,thedisputeitselfrepresentshimashavingdonesomethingsintentionally.Itmaybethoughtthatthisissimplyuninteresting,sincetothis(p.494) extentthelawisuncontroversiallyusing


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thematerialsofcommonsensematerials,forinstance,thatmayhavebeenofferedinevidencebycitizenswhoaremerely,intheserespects,usingtheresourcesofcommonsense.Butthatisthepoint,thatacertainstoreofsharedinterpretationsandconceptssurvivescrutiny,everyday,underlegalprocessandprovidethestructureofthelawsoperations.Theyarelikecontainersthatcanwithstandthemicrowave.Onanygivenoccasionitisthestufftheycontainthatisthecenterofinterest,andthelegalprocessisdirectedtoseeinghowthatstuffwillturnout;butitissignificant,asthePicturesuggesteditwas,thattherearesomefamiliarmaterialsthatservetoholdandpresentthisstuff,andhaveastructurethatenablesthem,dayinanddayout,towithstandradiationatcourtroomintensity.

However,itwouldbeverysurprisingifphilosophycouldlearnonlyfromthelesscontroversialpartsoflegalargumentanddoctrine,anditisitselfsignificantthatsomeconceptsconstantlycausetroubleinthelawandprovideafocusforreinterpretationandcontroversysuchastherobustandpersistentdebateoverthesuperiorityoffault(negligence)orstrictliabilityforaccidentallycausedharm.AsIhavealreadysuggested,thisisnotonly,orprimarily,becauseitprovidesanopportunityforphilosophytocometothelawsrescue.Itmay,inacertainsense,givephilosophyoccasiontocometotheconceptsrescue.Butifso,thiswillonlybebecausephilosophycanlearnsomethingaboutthenatureoftheconceptsfromtheirsufferingsundertheconditionsofthelaw.

VI.ResponsibilityandtheVoluntaryThisisnotablysowithideasofthevoluntaryandwithnotionsofresponsibilitythatinvariouswaysarecloselyrelatedtoit.Therearetwotruthsinparticularthatthelawmayhelpphilosophyseeabouttheseideas.11One,whichemergesfromtheexperienceofboththecriminallawandthelawoftorts,isthatgraveproblemsariseforthenotionofthevoluntarywhenweseektodeepenit,tomove,forinstance,fromissuesofwhatonagivenoccasionanagentsoughttobringaboutandofwhatstateofmindhewasimmediatelyin(andthosequestionscanbehardenough),toquestionsofhowfarsuchstatesofmindwerenormal,ornormaltohim,andoftheextenttowhichheisresponsibleforbeingapersonwhowouldcommittheactinthatstateofmind.Suchlinesofthought,asweallknow,mayrapidlyleadintoswampsofskepticism,someofthemmarkedbyrustingsignsbearingthelegendFreeWill.

(p.495) Theothertruth,onethatemergesunequivocallyfromthelawoftorts,isthatresponsibilityinthesenseofadutytocompensateinevitablyrunsbeyondresponsibilityfortheoutcomeinthesenseofanintentionorevenadesiretobringitabout.Disputesaboutfaultandtheabsenceofjustification,suchasarediscussedinthechaptersofTonyHonorandDavidOwen,12areconcernedtoaskwhethertheremustatanyratebeagrainof(somethinglike)thevoluntaryonwhichtogrowtheelaboratecrystalofliability;butno-one,certainly,deniesthatthecrystalmayvastlyoutgrowitsseed.

Thereisatemptationtothinkthatsomehowtherecanbedefinedanotionofthevoluntarywhichisbothdeepandadequate;andthat,evenifliabilityinunintentionaltortcould,inprinciple,neverbemadesimplycommensuratewithwhattheagentinthatsensevoluntarilydid,atleastthenotionwouldprovideafoundationforthinkingcorrectly


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aboutthewaysinwhichliabilitymustinevitablyextendbeyondit.Thetendencytothinkinthesetermscanfigureinthetheoryofthelawitself.Oneimportantwayinwhichitisdisplayedisbynegation,intheideathatnotionsofthevoluntaryandofresponsibilitycloselyalliedtothevoluntaryrequireadeepaccount,andsincenosuchaccountistobehad,thelawhadbetterdowithoutsuchnotionsaltogether.

Thetendencytothinkinthiswayis,Ithink,misguided.Thisisaplaceatwhich,asIputitearlierinthischapter,commonsensecanbeinconspiracywithlaworatleastwithcertaintheoristsoflawtoforcetheissue,inthiscasetoforcethepsychologicalandmetaphysicalissuesbeyondthesuperficialphenomena.Bothcommonsenseandthetheoryoflawhavesomereasontosustainanideaofthevoluntaryasadeepnotion,whichhas,ifonlywecouldfindit,adeepaccount.Infact,asIhavesuggestedelsewhere,13theideaofthevoluntaryisanessentiallysuperficialnotion,whichworksonconditionthatonedoesnottrytodeepenit.Thistruth,itseemstome,canberecoveredfromstudyingthelawinpractice,asopposedtothenormativeaccountthatsometheoristsgiveofit,andexaminingtheevasions,approximations,andmisadventureswhichtheideaofthevoluntaryregularlyencountersthere.Thepressuresthatthelawappliescaninthiscasehelpphilosophytoseewhatcommonsensemoralityandphilosophysownargumentsonthesesubjectscanhelpittooverlook,thattheconceptofthevoluntaryaddsuptonotmuchmorethanweareofferedbyitssurfacecriteria,bywhichavoluntaryactis,roughly,anintentionalaspectofanactdoneinanormalstateofmind.Thereisastorytobetoldofhow(p.496) suchaconcept,limitedasitis,hasvaluableworktodo,inparticularinthecriminallaw.Butthatstorydoesneedtobetold;thisisoneofthepointsatwhichphilosophyhastolearnnotonlyfromwhatthelawdoesbutfromatheoryofwhatthelawshouldbetryingtodo,theorytowhich,asIhavealreadysaid,philosophy(aboveall,politicalphilosophy)willhavealreadycontributed.

Inthematterofliabilityintort,thesituationisslightlydifferent.Here,onceagain,themanifestpracticeofthelaw,itsstruggleswithconceptsoffaultandjustification,canconcentratephilosophersmindsontherealityofsituationsinwhichpeoplecan(andthoseinwhichtheycannot)befairlytreatedasanswerableforoutcomeswhichtheydidnotintendandcouldnothaveforeseen.Thesecanremindusofthemanywaysinwhichwedothinkintermsofoutcomeresponsibility,inHonorisphrase.Inthiscase,itmightbethatfurtherpoliticalreflectioncouldsuggestthatthiswasnotthebestwayforthelawtotrytodealwiththeallocationofcosts;itiscertainlypossiblethatthestrugglesofthelawwithoutcomeresponsibilitycouldencourageustothinkthatthelawitselfmightdobetterbyshiftingtheemphasistootherschemes.Ihavenoideawhether,ortowhatextent,thismightturnouttobethecase(whereastheargumentforthecriminallawsinvestmentinarelativelyundemandingconceptofthevoluntaryis,Ithink,fairlyunproblematic.)

However,evenifoutcomeresponsibilitywerenotultimatelythebestconceptualinstrumentforthelawoftorts,thiswouldnotcanceltheenlightenmentthatphilosophycangainbylookingatthelawsdealingswiththisconcept.Wewouldstillhavecometosee,underthelawsextremeconditions,howsuchaconceptworks,andwhatmayseem


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reasonableorunreasonableapplicationsofit.Weshallhaveseenalottoremindusthattheconceptisnotperfectible,andthatitisprobablynotreplaceablebyaconceptofmoralresponsibilitythatwilleliminateresponsibilityforeverythingexceptwhatisintheimmediatecontroloftheagentswill.Theseremaintruthsaboutresponsibility,andevenifthelawoftortsweretodecideonthebasisofanimprovedpoliticaltheorythatitwouldbetosomesubstantialextentbetteroutoftheresponsibilitybusiness,theexperienceofthelaw,andtheconsiderationsspecialtothelawthatwouldbemobilizedbythepoliticaltheory,wouldstillgivehelpinunderstandingwhatwecanreasonablyexpectofanideaofresponsibilityinthoseareasofourliveswheresuchanideawill,unremovably,continuetohaveauthority.

VII.ConclusionThePicturewithwhichIstartedhassometruthinit.Importantly,itisnotjustthesuccessofourconceptsundertheextremeconditionsofthelaw(p.497) thathassomethingtotellphilosophy,butalsotheiroccasionalfailuretosurvivethatexposure.Philosophywillbeabletolearntherightlessons,however,onlyifthereisanadequatetheory(inpartprovidedbypoliticalphilosophyitself)aboutwhatfeaturesoftheconcepts,andwhatspecialfeaturesofthelaw,havecontributedtothosesuccessesandfailures.(p.498)

Notes:(1)SomephilosophersofAustinstendencymayhavethoughtthatcommonsensewasconsistent,self-validating,andfreeofideology.Thepresentdiscussionmakesnosuchassumptions.

(2)J.L.AUSTIN,APleaforExcuses,inPHILOSOPHICALPAPERS(1961);Reginav.Finney,[1874]12Cox625.

(3)Muchofmyargumentwillbeatagenerallevel,wheredistinctionsbetweendifferentlegalareaswillnotbeveryrelevant,butthelawofnon-intentionaltortsiswhatIshallprincipallyhaveinmind,andthishassomesignificanceinrelationtoacontrastwiththecriminallaw.Seeinfranote5.

(4)Thisisoneofseveraldimensions(asherecognizes)inwhichtherearelimitationstoMichaelMooresprojectofgroundingthecriminallawsrequirementsoncriminalagencyinageneralmetaphysicsofaction:seeMICHAELS.MOORE,ACTANDCRIMETHEPHILOSOPHYOFACTIONANDITSIMPLICATIONSFORCRIMINALLAW(1993)andfordiscussion,thesymposium,ActandCrime,142U.PA.L.REV.1455(1994).Ontheparticularissueofsomnambulisticandothernon-standardstates,seemyTheActusReusofDr.Caligari,supra,at1661.

(5)Iamprimarilyconcernedherewithnon-intentionaltorts,seesupra,note1.Thedistinctionbetweenintentionaltortsandcrimeraisesfurtherissues.

(6)Iamnotclearwhetheranyonetakessuchanidealseriously.Anyonewhodiddosowouldhavetorecognizethatitimpliesconstraintsonwhatcancountasacrime.


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(7)RichardPosner,inthediscussionofhiswealthmaximizationconceptioninWealthMaximizationandTortLaw:APhilosophicalInquiry,thisvolume,drawsbyimplicationacontrastwithcrime,butIamnotclearwhatitis.Theutility(inthesenseusedbyutilitarians)toathiefofagoodthathecouldnotaffordtobuyhasnoethicalstatusorlegitimacyinwealthmaximization.Itisnotademandbackedbyanofferprice:id.atnote20.Onthefaceofit,thisseemstoreplacetheplatitudethatunjustsatisfactionshavenoclaiminjusticewiththefalsehoodthatifIcannotaffordtobidforanitemIcanhavenojustclaimtoit.

(8)RichardW.Wright,TheFoundationsofLegalResponsibility,thisvolume.

(9)BERNARDWILLIAMS,ETHICSANDTHELIMITSOFPHILOSOPHY(1985).

(10)Undersomeinterpretations,ofabroadlyNietzscheantype,moralityisalsodeeplyinvolvedintheapplicationofpower.Ihavesomesympathywiththoseinterpretations,andinsomeconnections,suchastraditionalsexualmorality,theclaimismanifestlytrue.Liberation,totheextentthatitmaybepossible,requiresanunderstandingofthosetruths,andhencetosomeextentatheoryofmoralityitself.Butitdoesnotrequireturningmoralityintoatheory,anditislikelytobeobstructedbytheprojectofdoingso;thatprojectitselftypicallyhelpstoconcealthosetruths.

(11)Ihavediscussedthesematters,withsomereferencebothtomodernlawandtoancientGreeklaw,inBERNARDWILLIAMS,SHAMEANDNECESSITY(1993),ch.3.

(12)TonyHonors,MoralityofTortLawQuestionsandAnswers,andDavidOwen,PhilosophicalFoundationsofFaultinTortLaw,bothinthisvolume.

(13)BernardWilliams,HowFreeDoestheWillNeedtoBe?,LindleyLectureattheUniversityofKansas(1985),andBernardWilliams,VoluntaryActsandResponsibleAgents,10OXFORDJ.LEGALSTUD.1(1990),bothreprintedinBERNARDWILLIAMS,MAKINGSENSEOFHUMANITY(1995).

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Afterword What Has Philosophy to Learn From Tort Law

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