After Copenhagen

public�policy�research�–�December�2009-February�2010210

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The truth of what happenedin the final hours of theCopenhagen climate changesummit may never beknown. The Danes may not

have been able chairs; the Chinese may wellhave proven tougher in negotiations thanexpected; the United States’s overtures werealmost certainly too sotto voce – and the UNsurely misjudged how to deal with morethan 100 leaders arriving to ‘seal the deal’.

While there are many fascinating aspectsto the unexpected drama that unfoldedinvolving Messrs Obama, Wen and Singh,captivating the world’s media as the two-week-long summit drew to a close, the finaloutcome points to one clear conclusion. Inthe countries in which action on climatechange matters, the necessary political con-ditions for what campaigners termed a ‘fair,adequate and binding’ agreement do notyet exist.

The Chinese have been on the receivingend of criticism in much of the post-Copenhagen analysis. Environmentalist andNew Statesman columnist Mark Lynas, whoas an adviser to the Government of theMaldives, and was ‘in the room’ during thefinal, heads of state negotiations, arguesChina was the wrecking crew. He suggestsPremier Wen Jiabao openly snubbedPresident Obama by not attending the ses-sion himself but sending lower ranking offi-cials into the room in his stead.

Others reject this account and haveargued that the US’s position underminedany chance of substantive agreement atCopenhagen. Walden Bello, the renownedMalaysian globalisation commentator, says

the meeting in which Lynas took part wasonly one of several, which resembled WorldTrade Organisation ‘green room’ style nego-tiations designed to confound and excludeall but the large powers (Bello 2010).

The Copenhagen Accord – the threepage document that emerged as a result ofthe meeting of premiers and prime minis-ters – is without doubt a curate’s egg of anagreement (Copenhagen Accord 2009).Whether it is the beginning of a new waveof climate talks or a ripple of political expe-diency that will gently die away remains tobe seen (Lash 2009).

Staunch believers in a fair, ambitious andbinding – ‘FAB’ – agreement have reactedangrily. Bill McKibben, a veteran US envi-ronmental campaigner and founder of350.org, argues that a ‘cartel [US, India,China, South Africa] of serious coal-burnerslaid out the most minimal of frameworks’.For McKibben and many others in the sci-ence-driven climate activist community, theoutcome of Copenhagen was nothing morethan a charade and a failure of politicalleadership.

But how useful is the blame game,whether directed at an inflexible China, anunambitious US or a new, high emitters’cartel? Equally, how useful is a pragmaticpush to make the best of the Accordprocess?

A better approach to climate changepost-Copenhagen would begin with a thor-ough understanding of the underlying poli-tics and would have as its goal a new, cli-mate-compatible political economy as theprecursor to an agreement rather than theother way around.

After�CopenhagenWhatever�the�assessment�of�what�happened�at�theCopenhagen�climate�talks,�we�now�need�a�new�goal�fora�climate-compatible�political�economy�as�the�precursorto�an�agreement�rather�than�the�other�way�around,�saysAndrew�Pendleton�

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public�policy�research�–�December�2009-February�2010 211

What�happened�inCopenhagen?Copenhagen’s fate was sealed some weeksbefore it began, although the politics of cli-mate change determined that failure waslikely long before this. US President Obamatravelled to Singapore in November 2009for a summit of Asia Pacific EconomicCooperation (APEC) leaders who collec-tively decided that a legally-binding agree-ment in Copenhagen was no longer possi-ble and that the aim should be a ‘politically-binding’ deal.

There was some degree of backtrackingon this later as both Obama and Chineseleaders who had also taken part in theAPEC meeting sought to undo their undo-ing of Copenhagen. But the phrase ‘politi-cally-binding’ stuck and became widelyrecognised in the weeks before the summitbegan.

Of more significance, though, was theannouncement immediately prior toCopenhagen of the US offer – of a 17 percent reduction in emissions by 2020 relativeto 2005 levels – and of China’s 2020 carbonintensity targets – an improvement ofbetween 40 and 45 per cent also comparedto 2005 levels. Having the world’s twobiggest emitters make what are in bothcases highly conservative statements imme-diately prior to COP15 effectively restrictednegotiating space; the US and China low-balled the negotiations and thus set thebenchmark for Copenhagen.

The legal structure of the UN talks – dat-ing back to 1992 when the FrameworkConvention was first signed – is another factor

that restricts negotiating space and had aprofound impact in Copenhagen.

The UNFCCC (United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change)obliges all signatory countries (known asParties in UN-speak) to implement measuresto avoid dangerous climate change. However,the incremental costs of developing countryactions and their access to climate-friendlytechnology is the responsibility of industri-alised countries. Thus, actions by developingcountry parties are only obligatory whenpaid for or supported with technology byindustrialised country parties.

Going in to Copenhagen and drivenvery much by domestic public opinion, theUS position was that it would only makenew, binding commitments if the rapidlyemerging economies – principally China –also made concrete and comparable com-mitments. This would have involved a will-ingness on the part of China, India andother rapidly growing (and yet still relative-ly impoverished) countries to step over fromthe developing to the industrialised coun-tries’ side of the UNFCCC legal dividingline and thus accept cost liability. Thechances of them doing this at Copenhagenwere virtually nil and remain so at least inrelation to the UN negotiations.1

The corollary of the US’s demand ofdeveloping countries was the future of theKyoto Protocol. The Protocol is a permanentamendment to the UNFCCC but its impor-tance is that it adds quantified targets for rati-fying industrialised countries. The current setare due to expire in 2012 and developingcountries were keen in Copenhagen to see anew set of Kyoto targets agreed for the periodpost-2012 before considering taking on anyform of commitment themselves. Indeed,throughout the pre-Copenhagen negotia-tions, the Group of 77 (G77) developing coun-tries and China clearly signalled theProtocol’s importance, saying, for instance: ‘Inits work, the G77 and China does not consid-er options which are not based on the contin-ued legal existence and effectiveness of theKyoto Protocol’ (G77 and China 2009: 7).

Leaders�collectively�decidedthat�a�legally-bindingagreement�in�Copenhagenwas�no�longer�possible�andthat�the�aim�should�be�a‘politically-binding’�deal�

1 Although at their 24 January meeting, ministers from Brazil, China, India and South Africa did discuss setting up a cli-mate fund of their own to help poor, Least Developed Countries. See Mukherjee (2010).

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However, Kyoto is, in all but negotiatingrhetoric, doomed because the US has notratified it and almost certainly will not doso. Other industrialised countries are inpractice unlikely to want to commit to fur-ther Kyoto targets without the US’s involve-ment. The irreconcilability of the positionof developing countries wanting to see firmtargets in a second phase of Kyoto on theone hand and on the other the unwillingessof industrialised countries to continue witha legal instrument that does not include theUS, took up much of the first week of talksin Copenhagen.

The resulting impasse in negotiationsmeant civil servants manifestly and perhapsinevitably failed in their task to prepare aworkable text for leaders to sign off; UNmeetings invariably overrun but leaders’diaries do not. This left President Obama,Premier Wen Jiabao, India’s ManmohanSingh, Lula of Brazil and South Africa’sJacob Zuma to fashion an agreement on thehoof before departing on time (for adetailed and balanced account of how theAccord was written see Evans and Steven2010).

The Accord they left behind did notwin full consent in COP15’s final plenaryand so is not a part of the set of ‘decisions’agreed as an outcome. It is, as many havewritten since, merely ‘noted’. Significantly,while 56 countries gave the UNFCCC sec-retariat notice of their planned domesticcommitments before the 31 January 2010deadline written into the Accord, Indiaand China do not mention the Accorditself in their communications.2 Insteadthey preferred to stress the voluntarynature of their plans – as did Brazil andSouth Africa – and point to Article 4.7 ofthe UNFCCC which requires developingcountry actions to be financed by devel-oped countries.

The�dawning�of�a�newgeopoliticsIn Copenhagen, two aspects of changinggeopolitics are particularly worthy of note:the potency of the US–China axis and theimpotence of Europe.3 In the two years ofnegotiation that preceded the meeting inDenmark, the EU tried to establish itself asthe global leader and threw down thegauntlet of a conditional emissions reduc-tion offer in addition to its already adopted20 per cent reduction by 2020. And yetEurope was neither an author nor an earlysponsor of the Copenhagen Accord.

As one analysis of the outcome ofCopenhagen observes, ‘Copenhagentherefore may have been a glimpse into anew world order in which internationaldiplomacy will increasingly be shaped bycooperation between the United Statesand emerging powers, most notably China’(Egenhofer and Georgiev 2009). Or, toquote another, ‘Copenhagen, in fact, maymark the real beginning of the 21stCentury, in approximately the sense that1914, and the start of WWI, is commonlytaken to mark the real beginning of the20th’ (Athanasiou 2010).

The political tentacles of US-Chinaentwine every matter that is of signifi-cance and indeed, because China’s foreignexchange reserves are largely deposited inUS Treasuries, the countries’ entangle-ment is fundamental.4 Thus, if climatechange is not in itself a complex enoughissue then the use of Copenhagen as astage on which to play out the re-orderingof the globe added layers of intrigue.Indeed, it is arguable that COP15 will beremembered more for having been seizedin its final hours by US-China politics andthe emergence of China in particular thanfor its substance on climate change. Infuture global forums, it will be hard to

2 The submissions received by the UNFCCC in advance of the 31 January 2010 deadline are listed on its website athttp://unfccc.int/home/items/5262.php

3 There is currently a shortage of in-depth reflection on the shape of the new world order, but see for a flavour of the debateaWashington Post article of 20 December, in which there is also further, unattributed reporting of the interplay betweenObama and Wen in Copenhagen (Faiola et al 2010).

4 By some estimates, China holds almost $1 trillion of US debt. While this would seem to imperil the US and make it reliant onChina, it is equally difficult to see where else China would invest its massive and accumulating surplus. See FT Alphavilleblog at http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/02/10/145956/chinas-punishment-treasuries-pain/ for a recent report of the issue.


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escape the significance of the ‘G2’(Brzezinski 2009) or ‘Chimerica’ (Ferguson2007).

China is new to the role of global hege-mon and chose to surround itself with sig-nificant others and Copenhagen also sawthe emergence of the ‘BASIC’ countries(Brazil, South Africa, India and China)5

(Climate Group 2010). There is the poten-tial for significant tensions within thisgrouping, not least between India andChina who are old adversaries, but for thetime being, BASIC suits the interests of allconcerned, principally because collectivelyBASIC represents a big blocking con-stituency.

The environment ministers of thesecountries were summoned to Beijing inadvance of Copenhagen and, perhaps as aresult, held their collective nerve through-out the summit. BBC journalist and long-time analyst of the UNFCCC processRichard Black recently asked whether thisand the BASIC countries’ plan to hold fourmeetings per year puts them in the drivingseat of global climate policy.6

The�global�year�of�climatechange�fails�in�the�pollAside from the shakeout through the cli-mate talks of the new world order, what isperhaps most remarkable is the apparentlymuted impact the Copenhagen effort hadon politics. Despite the huge amounts oftime, campaigning energy and policyanalysis and large sums of taxpayers’ andprivate foundation money being pouredinto securing the ‘global deal’, climatechange as an issue ended the year eitherunchanged or marginally less significant inthe minds of many voters. A plethora ofpolls – especially focusing on the US – illus-trate this point.

When people are asked to rate the rela-tive importance of different issues theyalmost invariably put climate change or,more broadly, the environment low downor even last.7 This has remained the case inspite of 2009’s relentless focus on climate. Ifanything, due latterly to sustained coverageof the ‘climategate’ email debacle (followingan alleged hacking of a server at theClimatic Research Unit of the University ofEast Anglia) and the errors in theIntergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange’s Fourth Assessment Report of2007, the politics of climate change areworsening (BBC/Populus 2010).8

In climate-specific polls, the picture isalso of little change. According to a recentBrookings Institution survey in the US (anannual endeavour), the proportion whothink there is no solid evidence for warmingincreased marginally by 3 percentage pointsover the previous year and a good two-thirds – roughly the same as before – acceptclimate science.

The Brookings study also shows strongsupport for policies expanding renewableenergy (74 per cent) and nuclear power (70per cent), and mandating fuel-efficiency stan-dards for cars (72 per cent). However, envi-ronmental taxes are still and often have beenless popular, especially (not surprisingly)higher taxes on petrol. This applies equallyto cap-and-trade, underlining why legislationhas proved so difficult to steer throughCongress. 74 per cent in the survey said theywould oppose a carbon tax that would raiseenergy costs by $50 a month, with 56 percent strongly opposed. 72 per cent wereagainst a cap-and-trade scheme that wouldlead to a $50 hit, with 54 per cent stronglyopposed (Rabe and Borick 2010).

Notwithstanding the impact of the ongoingdebates on the efficacy of the science, I drawtwo conclusions from the evidence. One is

5 In some people’s view, the emergence of BASIC signals the end of coherence among the wider G77 group of developingnations that has led the non-industrialised countries’ negotiations under the UNFCCC. See Jebaraj (2009).

6 See Richard Black’s Earthwatch at www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/richardblack/ 7 For a summary of some recent US examples see two posts on ‘politicalclimate’ blog –

http://politicalclimate.net/2010/01/25/more-evidence-on-climate-politics/ and http://politicalclimate.net/2010/01/27/state-of-the-climate-bill/

8 The cited poll was conducted in the UK only and perhaps reflects the media coverage of climate scepticism, which hasbeen particularly sustained in some UK media outlets.



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that people can want to see the developmentof modern, clean forms of energy withoutneeding to fear the impact of climate changeor even necessarily accept climate science. Arecent survey of more than 3,000 people in157 marginal constituencies in Britain foundthe highest levels of support for expandingrenewables (around 80 per cent) when thepolicy was framed in terms of increasing ener-gy security (which it will) and not tackling cli-mate change (ippr forthcoming).

The second conclusion is that whilethere is strong support for visible investmentin low carbon technologies (even at a cost),carbon pricing through taxes or cap-and-trade remains unpopular. The US data onopposition to increases in environmentaltaxes is similar to the UK data. Even withhypothecation (which does happen in theUS but almost certainly would not in theUK), these are not popular policies.

The�real�politics�of�climatechangeWhile the geopolitics matter, the domesticpolitics matter more. A significant part of thepolitical blockage outlined above is manifestin the so-called Giddens Paradox (Giddens2009), in which people are more concernedabout their immediate well-being than thelong-term threat of climate change and there-fore prioritise more pressing concerns.

Each major economy faces its own chal-lenges. In China, the political narrative con-cerns the continued control of disparate,dynamic social and political forces by theChinese Communist Party. This perhapsaccounts for why China appears conflictedon climate policy, pursuing many impres-

sive domestic measures where it sees futurecompetitive advantage on the one handand appearing obstructive to progress inter-nationally on the other. In India, the elec-tion of the Congress Party in early 2009underlined the importance of the deliveryof ambitious programmes to assist ruralcommunities. Indian climate policy must fitthis agenda.9

In the US, the climate cap and tradebill now appears unlikely to be enactedthis year and may indeed be refashionedinto an energy bill designed to placate cli-mate-sceptical Senators; it was this politicsthat undermined Obama’s ability to nego-tiate in Copenhagen. As the polls citedabove suggest, Americans are as yetunready for climate policy that starts bymaking existing energy sources more cost-ly as is the case with both cap and trade asenvisaged in the current Senate Bill andwith carbon taxation. This view has nodoubt been sharpened by the US’s recenteconomic difficulties and its high rate ofunemployment.

Through the lens of the real, nationalpolitics of climate change, the demandsplaced on Copenhagen – for a massiveincrease in the scale of legally-bindingemissions reduction commitments and forthe engagement of big, developingeconomies – appear absurd. Similarly,calls for greater leadership on climatechange are at odds with domestic priori-ties. These politics are embodied in theCopenhagen Accord; its very existencespeaks to the importance of the issueamong the global elite but also to theirevidence-based fear that anything close to‘fair, adequate and binding’ would beunpopular at home.

The next UN climate summit is sched-uled for Cancun, Mexico at the end ofNovember this year. Anyone proposing toturn this meeting into Copenhagen IIshould bear in mind the portent of the loca-tion, for it was in the very same Cancunconference centre that World Trade

9 The Congress Party was successful in marshalling rural votes, in part because of some ambitious programmes, such as theemployment guarantee scheme. This and other measures are likely to remain its priority in power and climate policy willbe important in as much as it helps their delivery. See Gentleman (2009).

Through�the�lens�of�the�real,national�politics�of�climatechange,�the�demands�placedon�Copenhagen�appear�absurd�


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Organisation talks, launched in 2001, hitstrikingly similar political buffers in 2003.That project has scarcely moved since.

Thus the politics demand that twoapproaches are brought to the centre of theclimate debate in order to align climateaction with people’s priorities. The first ofthese is reducing the cost of low-carbontechnology through a concerted, govern-ment-led focus on innovation and the sec-ond is maximising the payoffs – jobs, ener-gy security and economic growth – fromthe development of a low-carbon economy.Neither involves easy politics, but afterCopenhagen, the climate change lobbywould seem to have nowhere else to go.

The�new�politics�of�climatechangeThe Kyoto Protocol-style approach of pri-oritising emissions targets and using car-bon pricing as its principle policy tool isnow in a limbo state. Even a vague andinadequate global goal of halving emis-sions by 2050 was roundly rejected byBASIC countries and others in the G77because in their view it would ‘…pushthe burden of adjustment onto the devel-oping countries’ (Khor 2009). Until thedomestic political conditions in the highemitting countries change, it is hard to seea future for the targets-led debate.

The focus should therefore be on reduc-ing the cost of the transition through invest-ment in innovation; the challenge is largelyone of capital and thus defraying the costthrough use of debt will be an importantpart of the economic logic.

Government borrowing is a necessarycomponent of this approach, which is politi-cal gristle in the short term as indebtednesshas risen following recent economic turbu-lence; government budgets and capitalexpenditure are likely to be cut hard as aconsequence. However, according to Sir

Nicholas Stern, ‘if we were to ask futuregenerations: would you rather have a dese-crated earth or more debt, then the answerwould be they would like to have moredebt,’ (Stern 2009). It should also be notedthat while borrowing is currently high com-pared with recent years, debt as a propor-tion of GDP was more than 100 per centfrom 1918 to 1963 (see Purdy 2009 for a fur-ther discussion of public debt).

Governments need not go it alone. Apublic-private innovation financing part-nership with each accepting liability fordifferent aspects of the risk (LondonSchool of Economics 2009), may alreadyhave important supporters. A group ofsome of the world’s largest institutionalinvestors who recognise the long-term cli-mate liability backed a strong climateagreement prior to Copenhagen butincluded in their manifesto government-led support for technology.10

The transition to a low-carbon econ-omy will no doubt receive a helpinghand as oil prices seem certain to increasewhether due to a peak in supply or merelyinsatiable demand (UK Industry Taskforceon Peak Oil and Energy Security 2010).G20 countries have also agreed to phaseout subsidies to fossil fuels, although thismay prove more difficult in practice than intheory and may have unforeseen conse-quences for the poorest.11

In this respect, investment in a low-car-bon energy system also promises a tripledividend and should be seen as a publicgood in the same way as investment in edu-cation and healthcare. First, an improved,more efficient and more secure energy sys-tem is fundamental to future prosperity;second, such investment when flanked withthe right set of policies will yield skilled,good quality jobs (Global Climate Network2009) and growth; and third it will –although admittedly only if practised glob-ally – reduce the climate impacts that future

10 In advance of Copenhagen, 181 investors representing $13 trillion in assets under management signed a statement support-ing a strong agreement. As a result of the outcome of Copenhagen, some of what the statement calls for – a globallyagreed emissions reduction goal, for instance – is no longer relevant. However, several of the recommendations in thestatement are highly relevant still and relate to the need for government-led support for technology. See CERES (2009).

11 At their Pittsburgh summit of September 2009, G20 leaders agreed to phase out some $300 billion of annual fossil fuelsubsidies in the medium term as part of efforts to combat climate change. See Mason and Ennis (2009).



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generations have to deal with. It is goodvalue for money.

Evidence from ippr’s recent polling inthe UK suggests that there it is the first ofthese three dividends that voters find mostconvincing. However, in the US the creationof jobs has been a motif of PresidentObama’s first year in office and whileChina’s economy-wide emissions intensitytargets may be modest, its plans to developcompetitive low carbon industries are not.

The lesson of Copenhagen is that agree-ment internationally cannot precede consentat the national level and to win domesticpolitical support leaders will need to demon-strate that to serve the interests of energysecurity and economic opportunity, climatepolicy is in people’s more immediate inter-ests. They will also need to avoid placing theentire burden on the shoulders of currenttaxpayers and consumers. Thus, big, fast andambitious technological innovation must bepaid for, at least in part, with debt.

After Copenhagen, the shattered climatechange community should unite behind avision that is built not on the rhetoric of reduc-tion and limitation and abstract emissions tar-gets, but on a vision of innovation, progressand security and of investment in publicgoods that people will find less easy to dismiss.

Andrew Pendleton is a senior research fellow atippr and convenor of the Global Climate Network,www.globalclimatenetwork.info

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After Copenhagen

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