Africa's Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transitions

8/3/2019 Africa's Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transitions

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AfricA Security Brief

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politics remains widespread across the continent.

This is prominently in view in Egypt where, in

the midst o political transition, the military is

attempting to maintain a privileged role or it-

sel despite the widespread demands or genuine

democratic reorm.

A spate o military coups rom 2008 to 2010

in Mauritania, Guinea, Niger, and Madagascar

raised the specter o a return to military rule in

Arica. While the subsequent resumption o civil-

ian government in Guinea and Niger has reduced

these concerns, evidence o military inluence in

War is too important to be let to the generals.

Georges Clemenceau, ormer prime minister o France

It is a difcult period or everybody, but we believe that it is a political thing. We are not politicians. We

are military proessionals and we are determined to remain so. Nobody, no matter what, no matter the eort, will

drag us into it.

Nigerian Army Chie o Sta Lieutenant General Abdulrahman Dambazzau in May 2010 shortly

ater the oce and authorities o the Nigerian presidency were transerred to Vice President

Goodluck Jonathan by the National Assembly ollowing the death o President Umaru YarAdua


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In Cte dIvoire, Togo, Guinea Bissau, Ethiopia,

the Central Arican Republic, Chad, Sudan, Angola,

Rwanda, and many other Arican states, democrati-

zation or the consolidation o political reorms has

been severely inhibited by armed orces that regu-

larly intervene in political and economic matters. In

Uganda, or instance, the military is permitted to se-

lect 10 ocers to serve as members o parliament. In

some cases, the armed orces operate autonomously

and even maintain commercial interests outside the

military budget. In Rwanda, the military grows, buys,

processes, and exports commercial crops through a

military-owned company.1 Military ocers in An-

gola participate in contract negotiations with oreign

companies, sit on corporate boards, and are majority

shareholders in telecommunications rms.2

Such practices are not only counterproductive

to democratic governance, but also undermine stabil-

ity, economic development, and even the interests o

the militaries themselves. In cases where militaries

have assumed total control over government, the re-

sults have usually been disastrous. Annual economic

growth rates in Nigeria and Mali, or example, have

been on average a ull 3 percentage points lower dur-

ing periods o military versus civilian rule. While

lauded or their discipline and quick decisionmak-

ing, militaries have little background in job creation,

macroeconomic policy, public health, or the many

other complex challenges o governing. More gener-

ally, military decisionmaking is rigidly hierarchical

and beyond appeal, whereas in the public domain,

policy implementation tends to be more eective

when built through a consultative, transparent, and

deliberative process.

Beyond the blunt military putsch, increasingly

prevalent and sinister developments in Arica are the

emergence o democratic and creeping coups. In

the ormer, a military coup is staged, ollowed by atactical withdrawal to hold elections that are won

by a recently retired military ocerto the acco-

lades o both regional and international organiza-

tions. Such was the case ollowing the 2008 coup in

Mauritania by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz.

In creeping coups, civilian leaders will slowly erode

the powers and authorities o legislatures, judiciaries,

civil society groups, and other potential sources o

opposition. This was the pattern ollowed by the now

deposed President Mamadou Tandja in Niger and is,

arguably, the process under way currently in Djibouti

and Malawi, among other places. Co-opting security

leaders or counterbalancing the military with special

presidential security units is key to the success o such

extra-constitutional exercises o authority.

The level o such co-optation is extensive in

some countries. The use o orce against peaceul

demonstrations in recent years by security units in

the Democratic Republic o the Congo, Ethiopia,

Uganda, Malawi, and Cameroon, among others, is

case in point. The shooting o unarmed civilians

clearly indicates that some security sector leaders

in Arica continue to see their role as deending

the regime in power rather than the constitution

contravening even basic codes o military conduct

and emerging democratic norms on the continent.

Upcoming elections in Zimbabwe, Senegal, Burkina

Faso, and Kenya may pose similar dilemmas or these

countries military and police leadership.

Even where legitimate civilian rule predomi-

nates, civil-military relations remain strained in

much o Arica. Given its unique institutional dy-

namics, responsibilities, and standard procedures,

the military can nd it challenging to interact withparliament, civil society organizations, or other ci-

vilian entities. Likewise, most Arican civilian o-

cials lack a deep understanding o security issues

and institutions. Productive engagement, coopera-

tion, and mutual respect are elusive and rustration

is common.

In Nigeria, or example, the President o

the Senate explained in a 2008 speech to ellow

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legislators that one o the countrys greatest national

security threats was a lack o amiliarity between ci-

vilian and military agencies that demanded a con-

sistent and coherent process o engagement with a

view to strengthening the security agencies work

vis--vis the legislature, particularly in the areas

o appropriation, constitutional reorms, oversight

unctions, oreign policy, and national security.3

Put simply, Aricas civilian and military leaders

barely know one another.

Despite noteworthy progress toward democracy

since the end o the Cold War, the infuence o the

security services in Arica continues to overshadow

democratic development on the continent. Compli-

cations resulting rom military overreach are not only

limited to Aricas ragile or autocratic countries but

also continue to be a challenge in the continents

better governed states. Military acceptance o civil-

ian authoritythe doctrine o civilian controlre-

mains a missing piece o Aricas democratic transi-

tion puzzle. For democracy to sink deep roots on the

continent, the security sector needs to be a willing

partner in the process o democratic consolidation.

inculcAting A doctrine of c iv il iAn,

democrAtic Authority

The legitimacy o the security sector is ultimate-

ly derived rom the authority vested in it by demo-

cratically elected civilian leaders under the rule o

law. This, in turn, helps ensure that the use o orce,

the most authoritative demonstration o national

power, is seen as justiied and thereore supported

by the general population. Recognizing the power o

this legitimacy is the basis o the doctrine o civilian

control o the military.

However, this doctrine is typically poorly un-

derstood or respected in Arica.4 This is a conse-

quence o many complex actors, including coloniallegacies, weak oversight, and corruption. Colonial

administrations typically structured and mandated

Arican security orces to protect executive oces

and strategic resources as well as to control and sup-

press Aricans perceived as threats to the status quo.

Remnants o these structures and outlooks still linger

in Arica. Persistent weak governance has also meant

that checks and balances to constrain public sector

agencies to their ocial remit are easily breeched.

Since they tend to be comparatively well unded and

are oten one o the biggest sectors o government in

Arica, the armed orces oten overstep their bounds

with little opposition.

To be clear, it is not always leaders o the armed

orces who attempt to seize power. Many civilian

authoritarians have intentionally used the security

services to weaken political opposition and protect

their authority and patronage networks.

Strengthening the doctrine o civilian control

o the military, then, requires institutional adjust-

ments on the part o both military and civilian au-

thorities. Such adjustments commence by aligning

the distinct but complementary core strengths o

civilian authorities and the armed orces. By con-

structively applying orce or the threat o orce, dis-

ciplined security orces are able to infuence, man-

age, or control events, the principal purpose being

to protect national security. Yet such actions only

have credibility to the extent that they are seen as

supporting a democratic leadership.

By contrast, a civilian government derives its

powers directly rom the governed. This generates

a political authority that can more eectively man-

age and sustain security, as well as economic and

social development. Legitimate governments are

inherently more stable because they have relatively

greater societal support to address internal prob-

lems, adapt to change, and navigate confict that

aects individual and collective well-being.5 Like-wise, coercion can be applied more credibly when

decisions to use orce are made by democratically

elected civilians. Thus, the armed orces and their

actions are deemed legitimate indirectly through

their deerence to legitimate civilian authorities

and civilian governing structures.

In a similar manner, the doctrine o civilian

control recognizes that the military, as a specialized

te amed fces ad teacts ae deemed letmate

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government agency with dened roles and responsi-

bilities, is supposed to implement rather thanormu-

late security policy. The military is but one instru-

ment with which to enhance security. Diplomacy,

socioeconomic policies, and various mediation tools

all aect the drivers o tensions and disputes. More-

over, broad strategic matters, such as the decision

to declare war, end confict, and procure advanced

armaments, have signicant impacts on all citizens.

Legitimate civilian leaders and institutions are in a

better position to balance the application o these

various instruments and considerations than coun-

terparts in the armed orces.

benefitS of c iv il iAn rule And

dAngerS of Polit ic izAtion

This distinction between policymaking and

policy implementation yields practical benets or

the security services. Excessive intererence ree

rom checks and balances has tended to erode ca-

pacity and proessionalism in the security sector as

well as the caliber o its leadership. For instance,

lack o legitimacy oten compels authoritarians to

rely on ethnically or geographically biased recruit-

ment to maintain allegiance. This tends to weaken

readiness and eectiveness. The security orces are

also more likely to be used as an employer o last

resort, resulting in large but poorly educated and

ill-trained military services. In Guinea Bissau, or

example, the ratio o troops to total population

is more than twice the average in West Arica.

Meanwhile, its swollen ranks are undisciplined,

its equipment dated and unusable, and interservice

strie acute.

Cte dIvoires security sector experienced a

similar dilution o proessionalism over the last de-

cade. Personnel tripled in size as ormer President

Laurent Gbagbo continually doled out state re-sources to purchase the support o key constituen-

cies. The gradual growth and politicization o the

security services was a major contributor to insta-

bility in the country, which culminated in a deadly

stando ollowing Gbagbos loss in the November

2010 presidential elections. The national deense

orces disregarded their obligations to uphold the

constitution and instead sided with Gbagbo in his

eort to overturn the electoral results. Thousands

died beore Gbagbo was captured. Having discred-

ited themselves and their uniorm, military leaders

were no longer able to command the respect o the

population or ulll their role in society. The coun-

trys new military leaders now ace the daunting

task o reorming and realigning security services

that were once a highly respected orce in Arica.

Such setbacks can be avoided i Arican militaries

adapt to and uphold expanding democratic reorms

on the continent.

Military and authoritarian governments will also

attempt to buy the loyalty o one component o the

armed orces at the expense o others to secure the

regimes continued rule. Such considerations may

lead to swings in budgetary support, avoring a spe-

ciic branch o the armed orces at the expense o

another, only to swing back in the other direction

some time later.

The presidential guard in Togo, or example,

is avored over other branches o the military and

staed predominantly by the ruling partys ethnic

kin, skewing promotions and training that limit the

militarys capabilities. The resentment generated

has contributed to multiple instances o mutiny in

the armed orces since the early 1990s. Meanwhile,

the military remains decient in its rapid reaction

capability, the small navy and air orce have been

sidelined, and general doctrine, strategy, and deense

structures are unclear.6

A study o the budgeting process in Ethiopia de-

termined that the centralization o spending decisions

has led to higher levels o interservice rivalry and sub-

optimal resource allocation.7 In Kenya, Uganda, and

South Arica, evidence suggests that procurements

o aulty or overpriced military equipment may have

concealed diversions o unds to political campaigns.8

Frequent shits, promotions, and demotions inRwandas security leadership have bred uncertainty

and instability in the ocer corps. For instance, Pres-

ident Paul Kagame suddenly announced the removal

o the head o national intelligence in July 2011. His

replacement was an army general who had been un-

der house arrest or most o 2010. Such manipulation

undercuts military proessionalism. The lack o con-

tinuity also severely constrains the security services


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ability to modernize, make strategic arms procure-

ments, and plan or the uture.

Civilian authority, then, should also be subject

to checks and balances, with the legislative branch

having a critical role in approving military budgets

and security policies. Without such accountability,

decisions are more liable to be based on political, in-

stitutional, or personal interest as opposed to the real

needs o the security services to protect the nation.

Studies o military expenditures and corruption

have ound that improvements in oversight should

increase resources available to the military.9 Addi-

tionally, eective oversight creates opportunities or

citizens and civil society to have a voice in security

policy and provision. Trusted, legitimate security

services, in turn, are able to more easily cooperate,

inorm, and interact with civilians.

In short, tangible benets accrue under the doc-

trine o civilian control. When decisions are made

and resources allocated through a process o account-

able and democratic governance, the outcomes are

more likely to serve the national interest.

bAlAnce through

PArliAmentAry overSi ght

Many Arican parliaments have recently become

more open and responsive to their electorates and

increasingly active in developing and approving leg-

islation. However, most have yet to ully incorporate

oversight as a core activity.

Even where parliamentarians have demon-

strated legislative aptitude and capacity, oversight

has not been prioritized. In Ghana, or example,

roughly 70 percent o Ghanaian members o parlia-

ment rate as poor the bodys perormance on over-

sight. Among parliamentary committees, deense

and security portolios are not very active. In Benin,

Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda, members o parliamentrarely ocus primarily on matters o national secu-

rity.10 Not a single bill was proposed in Ghanas De-

ense and Interior Parliamentary Committee rom

2007 through 2009.11

Auditing o the executive, the military budget,

and the security sector more generally is also weak.

The Democratic Republic o the Congo, Nigeria, An-

gola, Senegal, Niger, Chad, Malawi, and several other

Arican countries all rank near the bottom o indices

o deense budget transparency in part due to inre-

quent, incomplete, or nonexistent audits.12 When

released, many audits contain no inormation on mil-

itary procurements, which are deemed condential.13

However, studies have shown that actual expendi-

tures exceed deense budgets by approximately 20

percent annually in Mali, Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya,

and Nigeria.14 Even when parliament actively reviews

and approves military budgets, audits o subsequent

spending, delivery o procurements, and perormance

are still essential.

Public Accounts Committees (PACs) are anoth-

er particularly important oversight institution. Typi-

cally chaired by an opposition member o parliament

to ensure integrity, PACs are a common venue in

parliamentary systems or reviewing audits, assessing

government expenditures, holding hearings on policy

implementation, and identiying corrective measures

as necessary.15

In Ghana, the PAC has actively exercised its

investigative powers, holding many public meet-

ingssome are even televisedand has uncovered

misappropriation and raud.16 The Public Accounts

Committee o Ugandas Parliament has also been a

vital backstop to the Deence and Internal Aairs

Committee. Though their eectiveness remains

impeded by excessive classication o documents

and manipulation by the executive branch, misap-

propriation o unds has been exposed and ocials

have been penalized and imprisoned ollowing re-ports rom Ugandas Auditor General and hearings

by the PAC.17

As the ears and eyes o citizens, parliamentar-

ians must ensure that principles o good governance

and the rule o law apply to the deense and security

orces. Active parliamentary involvement makes the

dierence between civilian oversight and democratic

oversight. A state without parliamentary oversight o


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its security sector should at best be deemed an unn-

ished democracy.

the WAy forWArd

Democratic civilian control o the security sector

in Arica has been uneven during the past 20 years

o democratization experience. Still, Aricas institu-

tions o accountability have been gaining traction.18

To make urther progress, Arica will need to build

on this momentum.

As a starting point, parliamentary committees

should more thoroughly scrutinize security sector

leadership appointments put orth by the executive

branch. In those countries where parliament remains

excluded rom such approval processes, institutional-

izing it should be a priority. Without checks and bal-

ances, appointments are vulnerable to politicization.

Among those parliaments that are legally em-

powered to oversee such appointments, many lack

ully capable and available legislative sta that nor-

mally perorm such analysis. Addressing this is a

priority. Civil society actors and independent media

should also be encouraged to conduct and openly

share evidence-based assessments o the integrity and

merits o candidates.

Strengthening scrutiny o appointments achieves

multiple goals. Most importantly, it improves secu-

rity by identiying the most qualied appointees. It

also sends a signal to all in the military that capable

proessionals will be rewarded. Security sector lead-

ers who are appointed through a more accountable

process will likewise have more credibility and will

reduce the armed orces vulnerability to manipula-

tion by political actors. Parliamentary review o se-

nior military appointments can also help balance the

prevailing dominance o the executive branch over

national security.

Parliamentarians should also move to curtail theexcessive use o opaque budgeting to und the secu-

rity sector and clariy the standards o inormation

classication, which are oten abused to shield secu-

rity sector activity rom scrutiny. National security is

a priority or any state and merits adequate support.

Legislators should not be reticent in justiying these

outlays. At the same time, many Arican states need

to recalibrate their orce structures to meet contem-

porary security challenges. This includes scrutiny o

the role and cost o presidential guards.

To do so, parliamentarians must cultivate their

expertise in security sector issues. Civilian leaders

that are versed in the nuances and complexities o

military strategy, policing, intelligence, threat as-

sessment, and similar acets o national security will

gain the trust and respect o military leaders, as well

as more ably judge the qualities o policy options. A

growing number o Arican research institutes and

civil society organizations specialize in security issues.

Aricas parliaments should engage more with such

organizations and sponsor members participation in

their programs and exchanges.

Legislative agendas must also devote more at-

tention to national security matters. Members o

deense and security committees should hold more

public hearings with security experts and ocials on

emerging threats, civil-military relations, deploy-

ments and operations, and the nations long-term

goals or military modernization, among many other

topics. Promising initiatives and reorms emerging

rom these hearings should then inorm new bills

to be considered by these committees. Ombuds-

men, PACs, and special commissions have proven

to be critical elements o parliamentary oversight

and thereore should be provided stronger mandates

and unding.

Aricas Regional Economic Communities canalso play vital roles in improving democratic over-

sight o the armed orces. Various security-oriented

bodiessuch as the Economic Community o West

Arican States Committee o Chies o Deence,

Sta Council o Elders, the Deense and Security

Commission, and similar entities at other Regional

Economic Communitiesoer valuable venues to

identiy practical ways to institutionalize democratic

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practices in the security sector. For instance, to bet-

ter manage ormer military ocers roles in politics,

these committees and councils could devise guide-

lines or enhanced asset disclosures o military lead-

ers and moratoriums on running or oce once they

have retired rom active duty.

These and other criteria could even provide the

basis or a security sector peer review along the lines

o the Arican Peer Review Mechanism, a now 10-

year old initiative that publicizes multiple in-depth

assessments o a range o governance indicators in

Arican states.

More generally, Arican states also need to

ratiy the AU Charter on Democracy. Once rati-

ed by 15 members10 have done so thus ar

this will strengthen the legal ramework to prevent

unconstitutional actions and creeping coups on

the continent.

International partners must broaden their en-

gagement beyond narrow train and equip para-

digms o devising security assistance to meet opera-

tional needs and ocus more on overall governance

and accountability. Specically, security partner-

ships should avor those countries that are more

democratic and thereore more likely to contribute

to regional stability. Directing security assistance to

countries with more eective oversight mechanisms

will, likewise, better ensure that unds and transers

are used responsibly.

In the end, consolidating democracy requires

positive and productive civil-military relations.

Contrary to most assumptions, such changes can be

achieved to the mutual benet o civilian and mili-

tary communities. Democratic oversight o the secu-

rity services is dicult to realize, but the benets to

regional, national, and human security that accrue

rom it are substantial and long lasting.

noteS

1 James Karuhanga, RDF Expects Over 15,000 Tonnes o

Cassava Harvest,New Times (Rwanda), March 29, 2011.

2 Raael Marques de Morais, Angola: The Presidencythe

Epicentre o Corruption, Pambazuka News, August 5, 2010.

3 Stanley Nkwazema and Suuyan Ojeio, Mark Lists

Challenges o National Security, This Day (Nigeria), August

20, 2008.

4 Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, Guarding the Guardians:Civil-

Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Arica(Burlington,

VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010).

5 Bruce M. Russett and John R. ONeal, Triangulating Peace:

Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations(New

York: Norton, 2001).

6 Togo: Armed Forces,Janes Sentinel Security ReviewWest

Arica, IHS Global Insight, November 11, 2011.

7 Ethiopia Deence Spending Irrational, South Arican

Press Agency, May 1, 2005.

8 Ben Magahy, Dominic Scott, and Mark Pyman, Deence

Corruption Risk In Sub-Saharan Arica: An Analysis o Data Relat-

ing Corruption in Deence Establishments to Development Outcomes

(London: Transparency International, 2009), 32.

9 Ibid., 28.

10 Joel D. Barkan, Legislative Power in Emerging Arican

Democracies, in Legislative Power in Emerging Arican Democra-

cies, ed. Joel D. Barkan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009),

242.

11 Sarah Brierley, Ghana Country Report, Centre or Social

Science Research, University o Cape Town, 2010, 4, available at

.

12 Mariya Gorbanova and Leah Wawro,The Tranparency o

National Deence Budgets (London: Transparency International,

2011).

13 Wuyi Omitoogun, A Synthesis o Case Studies, in Bud-

geting or the Military Sector in Arica: The Processes and Mechanisms

o Control, ed. Wuyi Omitoogun and Eboe Hutchul (London: Ox-

ord University Press, 2006), 250251.

14 Magahy, Scott, and Pyman, 21.

15 Nthabiseng Ngozwana, Good Practice Guide or Public

Accounts Committees in SADC, Southern Arica Development

Community Organisation o Public Accounts Committees, August

2009, available at .

16 Staan I. Lindberg with Yongmei Zhou, Co-optation De-

spite Democratization in Ghana, in Legislative Power in Emerging

Arican Democracies, 158.

17 Country ReportUganda, Countries at the Crossroads

2006 (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2006).

18 Joseph Siegle et al.,Arica and the Arab Spring: A New

Era o Democratic Expectations, Arica Center or Strategic Studies

(ACSS) Special Report No. 1 (Washington, DC: ACSS, Novem-

ber 2011).


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AfricA center for

StrAtegic StudieS

Director: Ambassador William

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Deense University

300 Fith Avenue, Building 21Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202-685-7300

Web site: www.aricacenter.org

AfricA center

regionAl office

in dAkAr

Deputy Regional Manager:

Claude Toze

Phone: 221 33 869 61 60

Email: [email protected]

AfricA center

regionAl office

in AddiS AbAbARegional Manager:

Brad Anderson

Phone: 251 11 517 4000


AfricA Security briefS

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202-685-6808


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Africa's Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transitions

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