Adolf Hitler Biography

N O V E M B E R 2 0 1 3 ✯ A R M C H A I R G E N E R A L ✯ 25

Adolf Hitler used the creation of the

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht to

complete his subjugation of the

German General Staff. This move

put much of the decision making in

his hands and eventually led to the

defeat of the German army.

26 ✯ A R M C H A I R G E N E R A L ✯ N O V E M B E R 2 0 1 3

However, it was not a lack of nationalist ardor that prevented Min-

ister of War Werner von Blomberg, a serving field marshal of the Gen-

eral Staff, to oppose Hitler’s ambitions; rather, it was Blomberg’s

concern that the German army was far from prepared for war. Simi-

larly, Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath and Commander in

Chief of the Army Colonel General Werner von Fritsch advised caution

until the German military machine could be made fully ready. But

within months all three men would be purged. In early 1938, what be-

came known as the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair erupted. Both high-rank-

ing officers were exposed to public humiliation when Blomberg’s new

wife was revealed as a former prostitute and Heinrich Himmler’s SS

created false claims that Fritsch had a hidden homosexual past. Hitler

cynically used the Blomberg-Fritsch scandals to manipulate the resig-

nations of both officers. In effect, Hitler accomplished a coup that re-

moved from the military the two most prominent stumbling blocks to

his aggressive plans.

Hitler made the most of this opportunity by creating the Oberkom-

mando der Wehrmacht (OKW) – a new supreme command of Ger-

many’s armed forces – and placing a reliable lackey, General Wilhelm

Keitel, at its head. Throughout 1938, a clean sweep of generals opposed

to Hitler’s plans occurred (at least 70 were removed from command

or transferred) and effectively the General Staff was “Nazified.” The

effect of these actions was to concentrate huge decision-making power

in Hitler’s hands. Battlefield initiative, within the parameters of overall

objectives, had been the key to German successes since 1870. But in a

stroke Hitler’s actions in 1938 killed one of the most important attrib-

utes of the German army – its ability to function effectively without

excessive centralization.

There still remained a few generals, such as Chief of the General

Staff Ludwig Beck, who opposed Hitler’s plans; yet their main objec-

tion at that time continued to be that the German military needed a

much longer preparation period before fighting a general war. Beck

attributed Hitler’s aggressive plans to poor military advice caused by

the General Staff ’s eroding influence, and he likened the High Com-

mand situation Hitler had created to “anarchy.” In 1938, Beck warned:

“If the current anarchy becomes a permanent condition, then the fu-

ture destiny of the Wehrmacht in peace and war, indeed the destiny of

Germany in a future war, must be painted in the blackest of colors.”

Beck resigned in August 1938 and spent the next two years contem-

plating a coup against Hitler. However, Hitler’s string of bloodless tri-

umphs had made him so popular that any plan to overthrow him and

the Nazi regime at that time was unrealistic. (See “Hitler’s Bloodless

Triumphs, 1935-39,” p. 27.)

When general war in Europe did break out as a result of Hitler’s

decision to invade Poland in September 1939, the German military’s

rapid defeats of Poland, Norway, Denmark,

France, Belgium and the Low Countries only fur-

ther convinced Hitler that he, not the General

Staff, could best command. However, even the

stunning May-June 1940 campaign that defeated

French, British and Belgian armies was marred

by Hitler’s command decision, the effect of

which was to keep Britain in the war.

DUNKIRK

The invasion of France and Belgium, follow-

ing General Erich von Manstein’s masterful plan

that lured British and French armies into Belgium

and then cut them off with a panzer-tipped

“sickle cut” through the Ardennes, saw the Gen-

eral Staff and Hitler fully concordant with one

another. Here was an example of the military

thinking in which Hitler had a real interest: bold

tactical maneuvers that were a far cry from the

static trench warfare he had endured in World

War I. Yet in the May 27-June 4, 1940, Dunkirk

evacuation, 200,000 British Expeditionary Force

(BEF) troops and 140,000 French soldiers es-

caped across the English Channel to Britain as a

direct result of one of Hitler’s most fateful military decisions of the war.

“Bluster” is the term historian Ian Kershaw ascribes to the claim

Hitler later made that he had purposely spared the BEF by approving

a “halt order” stopping German panzers from advancing and annihi-

lating the trapped Allied armies. However, the halt order had little to

do with Hitler’s good will, and instead should be seen as a product of

his last-minute vacillation and overall lack of certainty about how best

to press home an advantage. Although Army Group A commander

General Gerd von Rundstedt and 4th Army commander General Gün-

ther von Kluge had cautioned Hitler that the unexpectedly rapid Ger-

man advance across France had exhausted the troops and that the

terrain before Dunkirk was unsuitable for tanks, Hitler held the final

authority. He approved the fateful halt order on May 24.

Another factor influencing Hitler’s decision to approve the halt

order was that Luftwaffe chief Göring had promised that the BEF

could be destroyed on the beaches from the air. The Luftwaffe’s sub-

sequent inability to destroy the BEF was due to greater than expected NAT

ION

AL A

RC

HIV

ES

Hitler’s offensive in the East not only began the greatest clash of arms [

Hitler (seated, far left), pictured here with fellow German soldiers during World War I, served in

Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 16 on the Western Front and was twice decorated for

service. His experiences in the trenches cast a shadow over his future military decisions.


resistance from the Royal Air Force and Göring’s

lack of thorough preparation. Yet this was a per-

fect example of the looming crisis that would en-

gulf Hitler’s command of the war: the hasty and

ill-judged replacement of General Staff planning

by the Nazi ideology-inspired musings of enthu-

siastic amateurs. Göring would time and again

make exaggerated promises about the efficacy of

German airpower over Britain and Russia; but

by the time the shortcomings in the Luftwaffe’s

capability were revealed, it was too late.

When Hitler returned to Berlin following the

defeat of France, the ecstatic response from the

German people and his near universal popularity

was a clear signal to his generals that his position

was unassailable. To Hitler it was also a clear val-

idation of his role as the embodiment of the Ger-

man people’s “will” and as a historic figure

touched by providence. With Hitler already

supremely assured of his own military vision, his

risk-taking command style took its most decisive

leap forward after the fall of France. However, the

1940 French campaign can hardly be thought of

as Hitler’s personal triumph, but rather as

Manstein’s brilliant plan vigorously executed by

bold operational commanders. Indeed, Hitler’s

intervention prevented the victory from being

decisive by allowing the BEF to escape and

Britain to fight on.

Hitler’s next fateful command decision – to

invade the Soviet Union – raised his risk-taking

to the highest level yet and demonstrated the

final eclipse of strategy by ideology.

BARBAROSSA

Hitler toyed with launching Operation Bar-

barossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, in late

1940 but was persuaded by the General Staff to

postpone it until summer 1941. His offensive in

the East not only began the greatest clash of

arms in history, but also led to his final victory over the General Staff.

Although the late 1930s had been a crucial period in Hitler’s efforts

to dominate the General Staff, he decisively won that struggle in the

winter of 1941 with the German army at the gates of Moscow.

The invasion began on June 22, 1941, and although huge areas of

the western Soviet Union were overrun, by late autumn Barbarossa

had failed to achieve most of its key objectives. Foremost among these

failures was the inability to defeat the Red Army completely. Despite

crushing successes, it had not destroyed all Soviet field armies and

many more were being created from the USSR’s seemingly inex-

haustible manpower reserves – and as long as Soviet forces remained

to fight on, Barbarossa’s ultimate success was in jeopardy. The back-

bone of the Soviet state had not collapsed as Hitler had confidently

predicted, and the Nazi extermination of Soviet Jews, previously an

afterthought, suddenly took center stage.

The folly of Hitler’s risky strategy of launching the war in the East

was exposed by the stiff resistance and surprising resilience of the Red

Army, the vast distances and huge area the German army had to con-

quer, and the severe Russian elements (the immobilizing quagmire

from autumn rains followed by savage winter conditions). By the be-

ginning of December 1941, a deadly combination of factors had led

inexorably to a collapse of German military capability on the very out-

skirts of the Soviet capital: Barbarossa’s delayed start (moved from

mid-May to June 22); Hitler’s disinterest in swiftly moving on Moscow

in the campaign’s crucial opening weeks; overextended supply lines;

and exhausted troops and worn-out panzers.

The unexpected Soviet counteroffensive launched on December 5

and led by Red Army divisions transferred from Siberia and the Far

East demonstrated a huge failing in German intelligence and resulted

in a decisive battlefield setback for German forces. Yet Hitler used hisLEF

T: U

LLST

EIN

BIL

D/T

HE

GR

ANG

ER

CO

LLEC

TIO

N, N

.Y.��R

IGH

T: N

ATIO

NAL

AR

CH

IVE

S

in history, but also led to his final victory over the General Staff. ]Hitler’s Bloodless Triumphs, 1935-39

A string of unopposed victories sent Adolf Hitler’s popularity soaring with the Ger-

man public and stifled opposition within the military:

MARCH 1935 – Institution of compulsory military conscription and creation of Luft-

waffe (air force), Kriegsmarine (navy) and army panzer divisions (all violations of

the 1919 Versailles Treaty).

MARCH 1936 – Remilitarization of the Rhineland.

MARCH 1938 – “Anschluss” (annexation) of Austria.

OCTOBER 1938 – Occupation of Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland (result of the Septem-

ber 1938 Munich Agreement).

MARCH 1939 – Seizure of remainder of Czechoslovakia.

LEFT: This 1930s German political poster features images of President Paul von Hindenburg and

Adolf Hitler along with the slogan “The Marshal and the Corporal ... Fight With Us For Peace

and Equality.” Hindenburg appointed Hitler chancellor of Germany in January 1933.

RIGHT: Hitler appointed Gen. Wilhelm Keitel, one of his trusted lackeys, as head of the newly

created Oberkommando der Wehrmacht in 1938.

February 1943. Adolf Hitler (second

from right) and a few of his generals

look at maps during a briefing at the

headquarters of Army Group South

near Saporoshje, Ukraine. Hitler’s

ideological beliefs combined with

his weakening of the General Staff

proved to be a recipe for disaster

during World War II. Pictured with

Hitler are Field Marshal Erich von

Manstein (third from left), Gen.

Theodor Busse (behind Hitler),

and Gen. Kurt Zeitzler (far right).


WAL

TER

FR

EN

TZ/U

LLST

EIN

BIL

D/T

HE

GR

ANG

ER

CO

LLEC

TIO

N, N

.Y.

HitlerÕs disastrous command of the German military had destroyed [


the initiative-based, decentralized decision-making apparatus. ]


generals’ reaction to the Soviet counteroffensive to complete his total

victory over the General Staff. When Chief of the General Staff Franz

Halder and 4th Army commander Field Marshal Günther von Kluge

began an unauthorized withdrawal of German forces in the face of

surging Soviet armies, Hitler was outraged. The idea of a withdrawal

was alien to the seasoned trench fighter. He understood war from the

perspective of a corporal and demanded martyrdom, heroic self-sac-

rifice and suicidal patriotism from the German soldier in the interests

of the wider goals of National Socialism.

Hitler was convinced that ideological zeal alone could win the day

and that the real source of weakness stemmed from generals who

lacked the commitment to or belief in Nazi political doctrine. He dis-

missed several senior officers, notably Field Marshal Walther von Brau-

chitsch, commander of the German army. Hitler forbade all

withdrawals of German units on December 20, 1941, and insisted that

the German army fight to the last man if necessary. He later argued

that his “no retreat” order prevented a full-scale rout by the Soviets.

His claim has some merit, although it eventually proved to be but a

postponement of inevitable German defeat in the East.

The danger for the German army after December 1941 was that

without Brauchitsch the last barrier between it and direct operational

control by Hitler was gone – that month saw the final emasculation of

the General Staff. The disaster at Stalingrad a year later (August 1942-

February 1943) should be seen in this context. The largely unnecessary

destruction of German 6th Army on the Volga was a disaster almost

completely of Hitler’s making. The scale of the catastrophe and the

diminution of the General Staff are not coincidental; one is a product

of the other. Once again, Hitler allowed ideological priorities to take

precedence over sound strategic thinking.

Like Hitler, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin distrusted his military com-

manders. Unlike his Nazi counterpart, however, Stalin realized that he

would be far more likely to survive the war if he allowed his competent

commanders, such as Georgi Zhukov, Konstantin Rokossovsky and

Ivan Konev, to fight the war for which they had trained. Perhaps the

key difference between Hitler and Stalin when evaluating them as mil-

itary commanders is this: Hitler believed his generals to be fools and

mediocrities whom he dismissed and belittled, but whom he never sus-

pected might plot to assassinate him; Stalin realized his generals were

indeed very useful and very skilled, and he simply waited until the war

was won to arrest, dismiss or demote them (notably Zhukov, whom

Stalin considered “too popular”).

From December 1941 onward, Hitler’s enemies in the General Staff

as well as those in civilian and intelligence circles again began to discuss

the possibilities of removing the Nazi dictator. However, only after

mid-1944 did circumstances arise offering the plotters a credible

chance of successfully overthrowing him.

OVERLORD AND VALKYRIE

By 1944, Hitler’s personal command of Ger-

many’s armed forces had produced a series of

disasters on the Eastern Front when, on June 6,

the Western Allies opened a second front in

France with Operation Overlord, the invasion of

Normandy. Since Hitler’s disastrous command

of the German military had by then destroyed

the initiative-based, decentralized decision-

making apparatus, field commanders responsi-

ble for Atlantic Wall defenses in France lacked

the freedom of action necessary to react imme-

diately to throw Allied invaders back into the

sea. (See What Next, General? in the September

2013 issue of ACG.)

Moreover, Hitler’s centralization of intelli-

gence analysis greatly aided the effectiveness of

the Allies’ massive effort to deceive the Germans

(Operation Fortitude) as to the location and tim-

ing of the invasion. Hitler, who had insisted that he have an unprece-

dented role in interpreting signals decrypts, fell for the Allies’ deliberate

misdirection that the main invasion would land at Calais. His insis-

tence that a cross-Channel invasion would come at Calais blinded him

to other possibilities – and staff officers who disagreed were mindful

to keep their opinions to themselves. The success of D-Day, achieved

initially by a relatively vulnerable and comparatively small force of

156,000 Allied troops, was the result of German paralysis created by

Hitler’s ideological and egomaniacal personal command.

In the critical first weeks after the Allied landings, Hitler continued

to direct overall strategy from Germany, but with little understanding

of the realities of the fighting progressing in Normandy. The success

of Overlord, however, gave the anti-Hitler plotters a renewed sense of

urgency to strike before the dictator led Germany to total defeat. Op-

eration Valkyrie, the plan to assassinate Hitler and open negotiations

with the Allies to end the war, was put in motion. Key plotters included

Beck, General Henning von Tresckow, General Friedrich Olbricht and

Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg.

Realistically, the hope that assassinating Hitler would lead to ne-

gotiations with the Allied Powers was the stuff of fantasy. Since U.S.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s announcement at the January 1943

Casablanca Conference that only unconditional surrender by the Axis

Powers would be accepted, there had been little chance of a negotiated

peace, with or without Hitler. Moreover, in 1943 the British and NAT

ION

AL A

RC

HIV

ES

Realistically, the hope that assassinating Hitler would lead to [

May 1940. British and French troops await evacuation by the Royal Navy at Dunkirk. Hitler’s

decision to approve a “halt order” on May 24, 1940, allowed the British Expeditionary Force

to escape and Britain to fight on.


Americans issued a joint statement promising punishment for all Ger-

mans involved in the mass murder of Europe’s Jews. That put senior

German officers and officials on notice that Allied retribution would

not be limited to Hitler alone and gave them a compelling incentive

to distance themselves from him.

Although on July 20, 1944, Stauffenberg successfully planted a bomb

near Hitler inside his East Prussia field headquarters, the resulting explo-

sion merely injured the dictator. After the failed coup, Hitler’s retribution

was swift and deadly. Thousands of military personnel and civilians were

arrested over the ensuing weeks and months, and nearly 5,000 were exe-

cuted (including Olbricht and Stauffenberg on July 20) or forced to com-

mit suicide (Beck on July 20 and, although apparently only peripherally

involved in the plot, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel on October 14). The

massive scope of Hitler’s retaliation effectively destroyed organized

resistance to his dictatorship for the remainder of the war.

The effect on Germany’s military leadership was that it further de-

graded battlefield effectiveness – a field commander’s fervid commit-

ment to Nazi ideology triumphed over military skill and professional

competence. The most egregious example is Hitler’s January 25, 1945,

appointment of SS chief Himmler – whose military experience con-

sisted of non-combat service in a World War I reserve battalion – as

commander of Army Group Vistula on the Eastern Front. Himmler’s

predictably incompetent military command proved too disastrous

even for Hitler to countenance, and he replaced Himmler with General

Gotthard Heinrici on March 20.

ENDGAME

Hitler’s victory over the General Staff ensured Germany’s defeat,

arguably as early as December 1941 when Operation Barbarossa failed

at the gates of Moscow. However, in December 1944 Hitler guaranteed

that the Third Reich’s days were numbered when he overruled the ad-

vice of the General Staff for the last time and launched the Ardennes

Offensive. Using most of Germany’s remaining mobile reserves of

troops and panzers in a desperate gamble through the Ardennes to

seize Antwerp, the Battle of the Bulge (December 16, 1944-January 25,

1945) epitomized Hitler’s personal command of military operations

– it achieved some tactical success, but from the outset was a strategic

dead end. Just over three months after the battle ended, Hitler was

dead by suicide in his Berlin bunker and Germany had surrendered

unconditionally to the victorious Allies.

Perhaps the most telling statement regarding Hitler’s effectiveness

as a military commander is the fate of Operation Foxley, a British Spe-

cial Operations Executive (SOE) covert plan to assassinate the Nazi

dictator. In 1944, SOE decided to abandon Foxley upon realizing that

a post-Hitler restoration of the German General Staff would present

the Allies once more with highly effective, professional battlefield lead-

ership. SOE judged that Hitler’s continued handling of the war was

one of the Allies’ most important advantages. ✯

Nick Shepley is a British writer and historian specializing in 20th-century con-

flict. He is the creator of the “Explaining History” series of e-books and regularly

writes at www.explaininghistory.com on a wide range of modern historical themes.

July 1944. Members of the German High Command, including Hermann Göring (in light-colored uniform) and Martin Bormann (left), survey the damage

at Hitler’s headquarters bunker, aka the Wolf’s Lair, where plotters detonated a bomb in a failed attempt to assassinate the Nazi dictator.

PIC

TUR

ES

INC.

/TIM

E &

LIF

E P

ICTU

RE

S/G

ETT

Y IM

AGE

S

negotiations with the Allied Powers was the stuff of fantasy.]

Adolf Hitler Biography

Documents

Transcript of Adolf Hitler Biography