Access to Land & Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan

25 March 2015Paul Fishstein

www.areu.org.af

19951996

19971998

19992000

20012002

20032004

20052006

20072008

20092010

20112012

2013 -

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

UNODCUSG

Year

Hect

ares

Taliban ban, 2000-01

Total area cultivated with opium poppy, 1995-2013

2013: 209,500 ha,

5,500 MT

1996-2001: Taliban govt.

1978-96: “war” years.

– Arable land: ~ 12% of total area, of which 40% irrigated

– Increasing stress due to population growth (2.8%)

– > 50% of land holdings less than 0.8 ha, with wheat self-sufficiency for average household requiring ~ 2 ha

– Small holdings + low productivity reliance on non-farm income (> 50% of farm HHs: non-farm wages largest source

Land in Afghanistan: under stress

– Land ownership murky: • Ownership based on tax receipts

• Layers of documents by successive governments

• Weak institutions

– Post-2001 urban & rural land grabbing: reflects & increases power, source of patronage

Photo: David Mansfield

– Land: ownership, lease, sharecropping – all with local variations

– Land not just factor of production -- tied to rural social relations (inputs, credit)

– Expansion of opium poppy cultivation to larger holdings opportunities for landless and land poor

– Sharecroppers: % of output, determined by negotiation: tradition, experience, knowledge, possession of inputs

– High opium prices landowners won’t agree to lower value crops

Land ownership & access

Helmand Province & Central Helmand

Source: David Mansfield, “All Bets are off! Prospects for (B)reaching agreements and drug control in Helmand and Nangarhar in the run up to transition.” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2013.

Source: Afghan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office and Afghanistan Information Management Services

Helmand Food Zone: Overview- Introduced by new governor Gulab Mangal in 2008 in

response to pressure to reduce opium cultivation & trade- Elements:

- Defined area: Boghra Canal zone - “Alternative development”: provision of inputs (mainly wheat

seed + fertilizer) to cushion impact of opium poppy ban- Farmers signed written agreement not to grow opium poppy

- Public information campaign & eradication

- Concludes in 2012

Opium Poppy Cultivation, Helmand Province & Helmand Food Zone, 2001-13 (ha)

Helmand Food Zone: Outcomes- Additional factors at play

- Rise in international food prices from mid-2007 terms of trade shifted to favor wheat rather than opium

- Increased presence of Afghan & international security forces

- Infusion of intl. spending employment in/around urban areas

Variation in response by area (simplified)Zone 1 Zone 2

| Former desert

Dasht

Landholdings 1-2 ha 1-4 ha 1-2 ha 1-6 ha

Proximity to urban areas

Close to urban areas Not close to urban areas Mixed Far

Irrigation Canal Canal Deep or shallow well or pump from drainage

Deep well

Response to ban

Crop diversification, including off-season vegetables & perennials

Little crop diversification, continued low-risk, low-return crops

Little crop diversification, continued low-risk, low-return crops

Intensive poppy, with some wheat

Non-farm income

Opportunities in trade, transport, construction, & salaried employment

Limited opportunities; some employment with Afghan Local Police; some wage income from poppy harvest elsewhere

Limited opportunities; some employment with Afghan Local Police; some wage income from poppy harvest elsewhere

Very few opportunities; some trade in weekly markets on Boghra Canal

Opportunities for landless & land-poor

Very limited in absence of poppy; share 1/5 rather than previous 1/3

Very limited in absence of poppy; share 1/5 rather than previous 1/3

None Extensive opportunities to sharecrop or lease, but smaller share of output than in canal area

PoppyCultivation

None, & little interest in resuming

Small amounts cultivate inside compounds, economic pressure to resume

Economic pressure to resume

Intensive cultivation, with small amounts of wheat after two years of low opium poppy yield

Adapted from David Mansfield, “A State Built on Sand: How Drugs & Drugs Policy Undermined Afghanistan,” forthcoming

Changes in cultivation, Dasht-e Aynak, 2008-12

Source: David Mansfield, A State Built on Sand: How Drugs & Drugs Policy Undermined Afghanistan.” Forthcoming.

Expansion in area under production north of Boghra Canal, 1999-2010

Source: David Mansfield, “Between a rock and a hard place: Counter-narcotics efforts and their effects in the 2010-11 growing season.” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2011.

Enforcement of ban

Substitution of less labor-intensive crops (wheat)

Reduced demand for labor

Landowners able to farm fields with household labor

Sharecroppers: less land available

Migration to desert (non-state space) to get access to land

Casual labor: less work available

Helmand Food Zone: Dynamics

Economics of cultivation in the dasht- High establishment (fixed) & input (variable) costs

- Example: returns per jerib: - Sharecropper in dasht: $ 686- Landowner in dasht: $ 835- Landowner in canal area: $ 4,980

More intensive cultivation or even mono-cropping of opium poppy

- The lack of state presence made opium poppy cultivation possible, while the harsh economics made it necessary.

Adoption of new technology: water pump, solar, chemicals

Photo: David Mansfield Photo: Alcis, Ltd.

In sum- In advantaged areas, households transitioned from poppy - However: The rapid expansion of land under cultivation in the

former desert lands north of the Boghra Canal, much of it under poppy, is a direct result of the imposition of a ban on opium production in the canal command area & the continued high price of opium. (David Mansfield, “A State Built on Sand”)

- Expansion of poppy cultivation to non-state desert:- Lack of state presence- High prices for opium poppy increased value of land- Pressure on livelihoods due to poppy ban within FZ- Productivity-raising advances in agricultural technology- Mobile and trained labor force

- Ban affected landless & land-poor disproportionately

Final observations (if time)- Challenge of reducing/eliminating opium economy

under conflict conditions- Transition can happen in the right areas- Possible long-term consequences of expansion to

desert areas: - Land depletion (due to mono-cropping)- Lowering of water table (due to deep-well drilling)- Future conflict over land ownership (due to lack of formal

institutions)