A Phantom Menace: Proliferation by North Korea and Cases ... · Proliferation by North Korea and...

A Phantom Menace: Proliferation by North Korea and Cases Againstthe PSI

Gerald Geunwook Lee

Abstract

North Korea has been pursuing a nuclear program for more than a decade andthe world has been watching the expansion of its ambitions, with a major focus onpossible nuclear trafficking to terror groups. However, Pyongyang’s nuclear activities—its choices of delayed nuclear test, self-claimed nuclear status, and most of all itssequence of nuclear test and nuclear announcement—testify that North Korea cannotattract terror groups, even though it is interested in selling the nuclear devices. Withits nuclear sequence—a nuclear announcement comes first and the nuclear test follows—no terrorist organization would pay cash for a made-in-Pyongyang nucleardevice. With the nuclear announcements since October 2002 and February 2005,North Korea has been under close watch by the Americans, which repels most terroristgroups. However, the United States has been concerned about Pyongyang’s nuclearconnections with terror groups, which ironically contributes to North Korea’sbargaining position over its mysterious ambition. Therefore, Washington shouldchange its current policy toward Pyongyang, which is not only ineffective but alsocounterproductive.

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 51–71.

Today, the United States is a power of overwhelming militarysuperiority, outstanding productive capacity, and the paramount influ-ence in world affairs. No power can directly challenge the UnitedStates. It has the world’s largest economy and is responsible for morethan a quarter of global production of goods and services combined. Itis responsible for 55 percent of the world’s military expenditure, morethan the rest of the world combined.1 At the beginning of the new millen-nium, it can afford to pursue the policy of primacy or hegemony overother countries: the U.S. conventional power guarantees command ofthe commons—command of the sea, space, and air; the Americannuclear forces surpass other powers to acquire nuclear supremacy.2

Therefore, an “American Empire” has been a favorite topic of discus-sion.3

However, this superiority does not guarantee complete safety tothe Americans; instead, they have come to live under the potentialthreat from terror groups, foreign as well as domestic.4 For example,Timothy McVeigh truck-bombed the Oklahoma Federal Building andkilled 168 people in April 1995, while letters were mailed containinganthrax bacteria, costing five lives in mid-September, 2001. Mostimportantly of all, Al-Qaeda destroyed the World Trade Center andinflicted almost 3,000 deaths on September 11, 2001. The attack was thegreatest strike on the United States, ever, and shattered America’s con-fidence in its security after the Cold War.5

52 A Phantom Menace: Proliferation by North Korea and Cases Against the PSI

1 Data are from CIA World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publi-cations/factbook/index.html.

2 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S.Hegemony,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5–46; KeirA. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension ofU.S. Primacy,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Spring 2006), pp. 7–44.

3 For example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Har-vard University Press, 2001); Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realitiesand Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,2004); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: ThePenguin Press, 2004).

4 A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America’s Achilles’Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge,MA: The MIT Press, 1998).

5 Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor killed 2,403 Americans—2,335 military, 68 civilians

Since then, the United States has been determined not to repeat a9/11, particularly on a nuclear scale. In September 2006, the NationalSecurity Council announced that one of the four short-term priorities isto deny Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to “rogue” states andterrorist allies, with special emphasis on blocking nuclear trafficking toterror groups.6 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is the mainglobal policy tool proposed by President Bush in March 2003. Sincethen, several dozen countries have agreed to participate in the efforts tostop WMD proliferation into the hands of terror groups.7 Though theWMD also covers biological and chemical weapons, America’s maintarget is certainly the nuclear weapons and a prevention of nuclear ter-rorism in its homeland. Also, building on the “success of the PSI,” theUnited States is trying to lead international efforts to shut down WMDtrafficking by targeting key maritime and air transportation and trans-shipment routes, and by cutting off proliferators from financialresources that support their activities.8

Under the current situation, the prime suspect is North Korea.Pyongyang has sold everything it can and is ranked a third potentialproliferator, following Russia and Pakistan.9 North Korea has chal-lenged various established norms that most countries accept and inter-nalize. Millions have starved and at least a million died of hunger, butits leaders enjoy lives of great luxury. This is not a country of integrity,political effectiveness, and economic stability. And, most of all, it has

Gerald Geunwook Lee 53

and 1,178 wounded, comprising 1,143 military and 35 civilians. In other words,the 9/11 terror attacks by Al-Qaeda inflicted more deaths than the 12/7 con-ventional attack by the Japanese.

6 U.S. National Security Council, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Wash-ington, DC: White House, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf.

7 In Aug. 2005, a multinational force of 2000 personnel with 10 ships and six air-craft conducted the first PSI drill—“Exercise Deep Sabre”—in the South ChinaSea. For details about the exercise, available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/163251/1/.html.

8 U.S. National Security Council, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC:White House, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf.

9 Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: the Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (NewYork: Times Books, 2004), pp. 61–86.

tested a nuclear weapon, although the test result was only “partiallysuccessful.” Pyongyang defied all of its neighbors—allies and foestogether—and just proceeded to detonate the bomb of its own choice.North Korea’s hunger for hard currency is simply presumed truebeyond reasonable doubt. Since it is a regime of criminals, Pyongyangwould show no hesitation in delivering nuclear warheads in exchangefor cash.10

The Deputy Secretary of State, Robert B. Zoellick, called NorthKorea a “criminal state” that has engaged in nuclear activities. Somepolicy analysts discuss “North Korea’s New Cash Crop” and its threatto the United States.11 A few days before Pyongyang’s test, U.S. Secre-tary of Defense, Donald S. Rumsfeld revealed the typical concern thatNorth Korea would sell the nuclear technology to the highest bidder.12

President Bush announced on the day after Pyongyang’s nuclear test:“The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to statesor non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the UnitedStates.”13 It has become America’s top priority to stop North Koreafrom proliferating its new “cash crop” rather than any other WMD.

Plausible this argument might be, but a critical question stillremains to be explored. What is the most important motive behindNorth Korea’s nuclear program? Is Pyongyang cash-starved enough todeliver nuclear warheads in exchange for nine-digit figures in KimJong Il’s bank account? This is the question to be addressed in this paper.If North Korea is pursuing the nuclear program for making money outof the international nuclear black market, the U.S. multilateral and uni-


10 However, it does not deny the possibility that North Korea would sell biologicaland chemical weapons to any highest bidder. At a reasonable price, Pyongyangwould sell them to anybody with cash. However, it is evident that the nuclearweapon is the most “popular” product.

11 Glenn Kessler, “Zoellick Details Discussions with China on Future of the KoreanPeninsula,” Washington Post, Sept. 7, 2005, A22; Andrew J. Coe, “North Korea’sNew Cash Crop,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer 2005), pp.73–84.

12 David E. Sanger, “North Korea Plans Its First Nuclear Test,” New York Times,Oct. 3, 2006; Bruce Wallace and Julian E. Barnes, “N. Korea Plans a NuclearTest,” Los Angeles Times, Oct. 4, 2006.

13 Michael Abramowitz and Colum Lynch, “U.S. Urges Sanctions on NorthKorea,” Washington Post, Oct. 10, 2006.

lateral efforts would and should be desired. If not—if Pyongyang ismotivated by security or prestige—the current policy framework of theBush administration will not be effective.

Whatever North Korea has said about its nuclear program,Pyongyang’s actual behavior—particulary its nuclear sequence—illustrates that the nuclear program is not for sale. Therefore, the PSI isaiming at a wrong target. In addition, the PSI is not a good policyinstrument, mainly because Pyongyang does not try to make moneyfrom nuclear sale on the black market, making the concern for the“new cash crop” irrelevant. Furthermore, North Korea, if forced not tosell nuclear material, will demand something more, rendering it morecomplicated and difficult to handle the issue of North Korea’s nuclearprogram.

How to Figure Out North Korea’s Motives?

Thus, it is critical to identify why North Korea pursues a nuclearprogram. It is not easy, however, to identify the most important nuclearmotive. First, sources of nuclear ambition are mixed: three, not a single,kinds of nuclear ambition are proposed in the literature.14 States buildthe bomb in order to enhance their security. The Soviet Union pursuedthe program because the United States had already built and used thebomb.15 On the other hand, France tested a nuclear device not because


14 Peter Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” SecurityStudies, Vol. 2, No. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 192–212; Bradley Thayer,“The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonprolif-eration Regime,” Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463–519; ScottSagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of aBomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 54–86;William C. Potter, “The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons,” in Emily O. Goldmanand Leslie C. Eliason, eds., The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 146–78. For a critical review, see SonaliSingh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: AQuantitative Test,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6 (December 2004),pp. 859–85.

15 David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).

it felt threatened, but because it needed to restore its glory. By joiningthe nuclear club, Paris could boost its prestige and pride as a “greatpower.” India is in a third category of nuclear ambition; with no securi-ty in danger or prestige lost, New Delhi spent precious resources on theprogram for domestic scientists and their parochial interests.16

In addition, North Korea is the most secretive country in the world;no outsider can penetrate it and understand its true policy-decisiondynamics. Lawrence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb acknowledgedin their report to the President, “We still know disturbingly little aboutthe weapons programs and even less about the intentions of many ofour most dangerous adversaries.” It is true in the case of North Korea.17

“We believe a lot,” a participant in a war game by Atlantic Monthlysaid, but “we actually know very little” about North Korea.18 The lackof information makes competing possibilities over Pyongyang’snuclear behavior.

Moreover, Pyongyang has intentionally deceived the world; NorthKorean negotiators—including the late leader Kim Il Sung—lied to theworld about the nuclear program. Kim pounded the table in front ofan American congressman—Stephen Solarz—and denied the veryexistence of the nuclear program in December 1992: “We have nonuclear reprocessing facility!”19 Nor does it seem to be telling the truthtoday. Therefore, we cannot and should not trust what Pyongyangsays. Fifty years ago, America’s chief negotiator over the Korean WarArmistice Treaty stated: “Never trust communist promises, howevergiven; trust communist deeds.”20 Then, what are these deeds of North


16 John Lewis Gaddis, Phillip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg,eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1999).

17 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States RegardingWeapons of Mass Destruction, March 31, 2005, available at http://www.wmd.gov/report.

18 Scott Stossel, “North Korea: The War Game,” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 296, No. 1(July/August 2005), pp. 97–108. The war game was conducted by AtlanticMonthly, and not by the government.

19 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2001). Fifteen years later, North Korea announced its withdrawal fromthe Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Korea and what kinds of information do such deeds tell us about itsnuclear motives? This would be the next critical question.

Sherlock Holmes—“the greatest detective of all time”—in one ofhis most famous cases, draws attention to the fact that a dog did notbark, and the reasons why the horse thief must have been the masterof the dog. In the story, Gregory—the detective from Scotland Yard—asks Holmes: “Is there any other point to which you would wish to drawmy attention?” Inspector Holmes says, “To the curious incident of thedog in the night-time.” Gregory replies: “The dog did nothing in thenight-time.” Holmes responds: “That was the curious incident.”21

Inspector Holmes found the valuable clue from the observed actions ofa dog—whether it barked or not.

So, I will address choices that North Korea has made over thenuclear program, however eccentric. Since there is little informationavailable about North Korea, this paper will put the information undera high level of energy from international relations theory and let itreveal itself, as a chemist does in the spectroscopic analysis. In particu-lar, the paper will focus on the sequence that North Korea has shownover the alleged nuclear test. And it will continue by exploring whyPyongyang announced the possession of the nuclear weapons and itsplan to test the nuclear weapons, even before it conducted an actualnuclear test. The “dog” of Pyongyang’s nuclear sequence barked whenit had not to and did not bark when it had to. This is a “truly curiousincident” that Inspector Holmes might have noticed.

North Korea’s Eccentric Behavior in its Nuclear Program

Until now, there had been seven “confirmed” nuclear powers: theUnited States, the Soviet Union/Russia, Britain, France, China, India,and Pakistan. They declared their nuclear status and tested their nucleardevices. Israel must have a nuclear arsenal, but has not acknowledgedits nuclear forces and still denies being the “ninth” nuclear power.22


20 C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (New York: The Macmillan Com.,1955), p. 136.

21 Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of Silver Blaze (1892).

Four states used to have the bomb, but chose to “denuclearize” them-selves. South Africa used to have nuclear weapons, but it dismantledthe devices in 1990–91. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, leavingthousands of warheads in the hand of its successors: Belarus, Kaza-khstan, and Ukraine were “born nuclear,” but they joined the NPT andsurrendered them all to Russia by 1996.

On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test andbecame a ninth member, but its nuclear path is quite eccentric. Theeccentricities center over the nuclear sequence: the nuclear publicityeven before a test and the ineffective—probably unsuccessful—nucleartest. Pyongyang has resisted the usual straightforward way that mostnuclear powers trod before: instead, North Korea chose to claim itsnuclear status before an actual test. In January 2003, North Korea pro-claimed its complete withdrawal from the NPT and acquired a nucleardeterrent capacity.23 Two years later, February 2005, Pyongyang madean official announcement that it had equipped the nuclear weapon.24

North Korea had announced that it would conduct a nuclear test onOctober 3, 2006—a week before the actual test. Such a prematureannouncement was unprecedented; no state had ever made priorannouncements about its first nuclear test. In other words, the “dog”


22 Israel has denied the very existence of its nuclear arsenal; however, manybelieve that Israel had actually conducted a nuclear test in the Indian Ocean.The flash of an atmospheric nuclear explosion was detected in September 1979by a U.S. spy satellite, but no official nuclear powers came out to claim theresponsibility. There has been no official confirmation, but it is suspected thatIsrael conducted a nuclear test, probably in collaboration with South Africa.Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American ForeignPolicy (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 271–83.

23 Seth Mydans, “Threats and Response: Nuclear Standoff, North Korea Says It isWithdrawing from Arms Treaty,” New York Times, Jan. 10, 2003.

24 James Brooke and David E. Sanger, “North Koreans Say They Hold NuclearArms,” New York Times, Feb. 11, 2005. Before the announcement, North Koreanofficials had talked about their nuclear arsenals on various occasions; theywere, however, “informal talks” rather than formal acknowledgements. Thiswas the very first formal and official claim that the North Korean government(the Foreign Ministry) made to possess the nuclear weapons. Also, Pyongyangstated that it possesses the nuclear “weapons” rather than a nuclear “deter-rent”—the choice of word that it had used previously.

barked at a wrong moment. This is the sort of “curious incident” thatHolmes would notice. Since North Korea was already out of the NPT,the announcement was not necessary. However, Pyongyang chose tomake the announcement.

North Korea’s Failed Nuclear Test

After the claim about its nuclear status and the announcementabout its nuclear test, North Korea finally—21 months later—conducteda nuclear test. However, the test seems to be a failure at best or a fabri-cated claim at worst, which is a second eccentricity.25 First and most ofall, the yield was not large enough: the estimate (550 to 800 tons of highexplosives) is too small to be a full yield from a successful nuclear test.For example, the first nuclear weapons that the United States usedagainst Hiroshima and Nagasaki generated yields of 12.5 kton and 22kton respectively. The estimates are simply 4 percent to 2.5 percent ofthe Hiroshima “Little Boy” bomb, while 6.4 percent to 3.1 percent of theNagasaki “Fat Man” bomb.26

Second, underground nuclear tests can contain much of the radia-tion and fallout, but not completely. Such a high level of radioactiveseal is too expensive and technologically too challenging. Only weeksafter the presumed test, South Korea and the United States finallydetected radioactive gases such as xenon and krypton, which corrobo-rated North Korea’s claim of a nuclear test. Third, the spy satellites havenot taken pictures of a subsidence crater at the site of the presumedtest. An explosion releases extremely high levels of energy—mostlyblast and thermal radiation—and makes a “cavity,” which leads to ahole or depression on the surface. Sometimes, the surface depresses somuch that the consequential “sink” may generate an explosion cham-ber and a chimney, which is exposed atmospherically to the surface.


25 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Small Blast, or ‘Big Deal’? U.S. ExpertsLook for Clues,” New York Times, Oct. 11, 2006.

26 The first numbers (4% and 6.4%) in each pair are the ratios of 550 ton yield tothe Hiroshima bomb, while the second numbers (2.5% and 3.1) are those of 800tons to the Nagasaki bomb.

It is extremely unlikely that North Korea aimed to test a highlyadvanced nuclear device—small in size and yield, and therefore deliv-erable on the tip of ballistic missiles—and the test was a complete suc-cess to generate the expected yield of 550–800 ton. However, it is by farmore likely that Pyongyang has not mastered the technological sophis-tication and that North Korea’s nuclear test was a failure.27 The aimedyield might be 15 to 20 kton rather than 550–800 ton, but the engineer-ing problem, probably in orchestrating implosion charges and coordi-nating the level of energy, might have led to an inefficient implosionprocess.28 Therefore, North Korea’s first nuclear device yielded only 2.5to 4% of America’s first nuclear weapons.

Generating Hypotheses: Putting Pyongyang’s Choices Under the

High Level of Energy From IR Theory

Spectroscopic analysis makes a small amount of matter reveal itsidentity under the high level of energy. It emits or absorbs spectrumsabout itself, which a researcher can use to compare with a known list ofspectrum reactions and find out the identity. Each element has its origi-nal pattern of emission and absorption spectrum, which provides theprecious clue. For example, sodium emits yellow spectrum, while lithi-um and strontium have similar but different red line spectrums in


27 Pyongyang’s design must have been an implosion type that the United Statesbuilt with plutonium in 1945. The implosion type is highly effective: the U.S.implosion bomb—the “Fat Man”—converted 14% of its plutonium into nuclearenergy, while the gun-type bomb—the “Little Boy”—had 1.4% of its uraniumactually fission and generate nuclear blast. In other words, the implosion bomb is10 times more efficient than the gun-type device. The greater efficiency requiresthe greater technological sophistication, which is more likely to malfunction incase of attempted detonation.

28 The implosion technology is challenging because it requires all of the explosivecharges to generate the exactly identical level of energy and the extremely well-orchestrated directions in order to pressurize the plutonium core into an over-critical stage. Otherwise, the plutonium begins to fission in a premature stage,which wastes much of its potential yield. For details, see Richard Rhodes, TheMaking of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); Robert Serber,The Los Alamos Primer: the First Lectures on How to Build an Atomic Bomb (Berkeley,CA: University of California Press, 1992).

monochromator measurements. Therefore, it is essential to build thelist of possible elements—in other words, hypotheses about NorthKorea’s nuclear program—in order to apply a spectroscopic approachto Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition.

The first element would be the guarantee that the bomb wouldexplode. Terror groups would not care about their own lives, but theywant to make sure the bomb should “work properly”—inflict enor-mous damage.29 Since smuggling a nuclear device is not an easy task,terrorists might have no second chance; a single chance is all they have,if unbelievably lucky. A working and reliable nuclear device is essentialfor an attack. If an operative pushes the button, the device must blowup, taking hundreds of thousands of human lives and destroying bil-lions of dollars in economic property. Terrorist organizations would notpay cash only for a nuclear device of questionable quality; they willbuy devices of proven destruction.30 In this respect, it is possible todeduce the following hypotheses:

Test Hypothesis: If North Korea is to sell its nuclear devices, itshould conduct a successful nuclear test and prove the mechanical reli-ability to potential buyers.

The second element is double secrecy about the bomb activities.On the one hand, Terror groups would like to keep their nuclear trans-actions completely hidden. They might be willing to sacrifice their ownlives, but they care about the political cause and its attainment. Terror-ists will not engage in any nuclear business under serious surveillance,which might put their cause at risk. Approaching suppliers under theclose watch of the world police is doubly dangerous: it leads to getting


29 With regard to suicide terrorism, see Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure ofSuicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Diego Gambetta,ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005);Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York:Random House, 2005).

30 Terror groups can build their own bombs. It is technically possible, but the pro-ject requires enormous start-up investment—i.e. nuclear reactor and facilitiesto reprocess or enrich the nuclear material—which is not easy even for a stateto hide. Therefore, terrorists will purchase rather than build the nuclear device.Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1999).

caught prior to attacks or inviting retaliation afterwards.31 Thus, it ispossible to deduce a second hypothesis.

Secrecy Hypothesis: If North Korea is to sell its nuclear devices, itshould keep silent about the nuclear activities and make no nuclearclaim.

An analogy to drug addicts would provide an insightful help infiguring out strategic incentives and interactions between terror groupsand Pyongyang. Nobody will buy drugs from a dealer—even if qualityitems are available—when the police are watching. It is too dangerous.Also, no addicts would pay when they are not sure if the dealer actuallyprovides good items. It can be a con game. They do not want to wastemoney on a bag of sugar. Just like drug addicts on the street, terrorgroups will take extreme care not to get detected and not to get cheated.

To figure out Pyongyang’s nuclear motive, I will present a question ofgreat importance under the high level of logic and previous hypotheses:Is North Korea a good place where terrorist organizations can purchasenuclear devices? Then, I will let them absorb or emit important infor-mation about the motive. By comparing the hypotheses with the con-firmed and observed behavior that North Korea has made, each testwill provide more insights into North Korea’s motive behind its treach-erous nuclear projects and eccentric behavioral patterns.

First Test: Pyongyang’s Delayed and Failed Nuclear Test

A simple question: Is North Korea a good “store” where terrorgroups can buy nuclear devices? Inspector Holmes would say that theanswer is no. North Korea has not conducted a successful nuclear test.Terror groups would be extremely resolute and will not compromisein their purchase. They will demand a successful test: no success, nopayment.

The presumed failure ruins North Korea’s hypothetical nuclear


31 Deterring terror attacks is theoretical possible and empirical feasible. It ispreferable to the use of military force, if information is available about thestructure of terror groups and their objectives. Robert T. Trager and DessislavaP. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” International Security,Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 87–123.

business. This test revealed that Pyongyang has not mastered thenuclear engineering yet and its nuclear devices are of highly question-able reliability. Such devices may malfunction at the critical moment,i.e. when the button is pushed. Nobody would pay for a bomb withpossible defects. Only after the problem is detected and fixed up, andonly after the bomb passes the test to explode and generate good yield,would potential buyers show their interest and open their purses.

And, North Korea is not a country of engineering ingenuity. The testreinforced the critical estimates about Pyongyang’s nuclear “products”and their quality, which leads to a second disaster in North Korea’snuclear business. All of the potential customers—other “rogue” statesand terror groups—would demand that Pyongyang should detonatemore warheads in a series of successful tests. They would pressure NorthKorea to conduct a series of successful nuclear tests, not just a singleand second successful test, and to convince them of technical reliabilityof Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons. However, it would be an enormousburden for North Korea, which already conducted a test with an unsat-isfactory result and “disappointed” most of its potential customers.

Moreover, it increases the possibility that Pyongyang might cheatpotential buyers and terror groups. Once paid, North Korea coulddeliver a metal box full of scraps for hundreds of millions dollars; therecent test implies that Pyongyang would not be able to manufacture aworking nuclear device, but North Korea might trick terror groups forits greed of money. It prints counterfeit dollars; so why might it notdeliver counterfeit nuclear weapons?

Thus, nobody will trust North Korea until they are provided clearand convincing evidence. The best proof is clearly a successful nucleartest with a bigger bang; otherwise, they will refuse to hand over cash.Terrorists might be willing to die to kill, but they are not willing to trustthe Communists in Pyongyang and pay cash unconditionally. Terrorgroups will not engage in nuclear transactions with Pyongyang; notbecause they are loath to talking with the last Stalinist regime on earth,but because they cannot be sure of the quality of Pyongyang’s nucleardevices. What terror groups want are good nuclear weapons—in thatthey explode and generate 10 to 20 kton yields—rather than advanced,less than 1 kton yield, nuclear warheads.

The outcome is harsh for North Korea: terrorists will not approach


Pyongyang and make a purchase of nuclear devices until it has con-ducted a successful nuclear test. From a drug dealing analogy, it is likea new dealer showing up on the street and whispering about drugs.But, the drug is of poor quality. Drug addicts approach the dealer, butthey demand proof to deliver “good stuff” next time—i.e. at leastshowing the “good stuff”—before handing over hundreds of bucks. Ifthe dealer fails to provide the proof, the addicts would refuse to pay inadvance and try to find different dealers on the street. They would notwaste their precious money.

Second Test: Pyongyang’s Nuclear Publicity

Once again, the same simple question: Is North Korea a good“store” where terror groups can purchase nuclear devices? The testsays the answer is also simple: No, with all due respect. Pyongyang hasproclaimed itself as a nuclear power, conducted a nuclear test whichwas unsuccessful, and is required to makes a second or probably aseries of following tests successful. Moreover, North Korea is challeng-ing the United States, betraying China, resisting the United Nations,and rattling its alleged nuclear weapons. All of its behavior would begreat for political publicity and domestic political consumption, butthis situation is a nightmare for potential nuclear buyers. For them, it issimply too dangerous to be seen.32

The self-claim of nuclear power status is great PR for the last Stal-inist regime and surely impresses potential buyers, but the world hadbegun to watch Pyongyang with greater suspicion since its eccentricnuclear announcement of February 2005 at the latest. Every approachto North Korea—even those with extreme caution—had been scruti-nized by the United States and its anti-terrorism allies in order to pre-


32 North Korea has exported the missile technologies to various countries, partic-ularly the Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Iraq in the 1980s. It waspossible because Pyongyang did not make its missile tests into internationalpublicity; Iranian and Iraqi agents could approach North Korea and purchasedthe technology. However, North Korea made a deliberate announcement aboutit nuclear possession, another announcement about its planned nuclear test,and then conducted a test. All of the steps escalated and boosted the event tothe something of highest profile at the beginning of the 21st century.

vent nuclear trafficking.The nuclear test of October 9, 2006, put Pyongyang on the top of

the world media and policy debates. The UN Security Council passed aseries of resolutions against North Korea. A public announcement afterthe test and sequential statements—filled with hostilities toward theoutside world—reinforce the international attention on this last Stalinistregime. Then, why did Pyongyang claim to have nuclear status? Wecan think of two possibilities. On one hand, it might be a simple mis-take. North Korea failed to foresee the response of the black marketand made the wrong decision. On the other hand, the self-claim is not amistake, but clear evidence that North Korea is not interested in sellingnuclear devices.

Whatever their motives are—a simple mistake or a calculatedchoice—the outcome is no different, once again: North Korea has beensince the nuclear announcement and test, is now, and will be underalmost constant surveillance by the United States. It is like a man ona street proclaiming that he is a drug dealer and beginning to showsome white powder—to return to my previous analogy. From the verymoment of the loud confession, he would be the focus of police attention.And, nobody would dare to approach him and buy drugs; all kinds offorces—the local police, the FBI, the DEA, and even the IRA—wouldsurely be watching the self-proclaimed drug dealer.33

Terror groups will stay away from Pyongyang; not because theyare loath to the very idea of buying a nuclear device from the Commu-nists, but because getting together with North Korea’s agents is simplytoo risky. No terrorists are willing to go in and buy nuclear deviceswhen their movement is surely under close watch by the Americans.Their operations may be detected, jeopardizing the whole terror opera-tion beforehand and the very survival of the group afterwards. This isanother case against North Korea’s nuclear connections with terroristgroups.


33 The American war in Afghanistan and Iraq kept Washington too busy to focuson Pyongyang’s nuclear activities enough; North Korea was given a breathingspace. However, Pyongyang had been under close surveillance by the intelligenceservice and North Korea’s illegal activities—for example, printing fake dollars—have been reported. Currently, the United States is trying various sanctionsagainst North Korea.

Judgement: Unnecessary Bargaining Leverage for Pyongyang

With all these clues, Detective Holmes would conclude that terrorgroups would not approach North Korea for nuclear purchases. WithPyongyang’s unsuccessful test, terror groups would require a series ofsuccessful tests before handing over cash. However, another round oftests would intensify the already high level of surveillance by theAmericans. This is too dangerous for terror groups to make contactwith the North Koreans. Moreover, the sequence of Pyongyang’snuclear behavior provides another important clue. The “dog” of anuclear claim “barked” before an actual deed of a nuclear test was con-ducted. This is a “curious incident,” as Holmes would comment. SincePyongyang has announced its nuclear status and then conducted a test,the detective would also reason that North Korea is not interested inthe underground nuclear business: it is interested in something else.

The problem is that the United States has persistently handled theissue from the perspective of stopping the nuclear terrorism, despiteHolmes’ reasoning. This is not only ineffective, but also counter-pro-ductive; the PSI framework unnecessarily strengthens Pyongyang’snegotiating position and makes North Korea more stubborn in thenuclear confrontation. The United States and its allies, most of all,should pay more for Washington’s unfounded concern about NorthKorea’s nuclear yard sale.

The PSI is a policy of questionable effectiveness. Some nucleardevices are very small; for example, the Soviet RA-115 atomic demoli-tion munitions weigh 30 kilograms and yield 2 kiloton, while theAmerican Davy Crockett warheads are only 50 pounds and yielding0.25 kiloton.34 Such warheads are extremely difficult to detect; they canbe easily boxed and shipped in shipping containers. Given the numberof containers going in and out of ports worldwide, it would be a mis-sion impossible to detect the device. Also, radioactive core material forthe device is not heavy; the critical mass of a sphere of plutonium-239is about 11 kilogram (25 pounds) and its radius is only about 5 centime-ters (2 inches). It would be not difficult to transport a 5-centimeter and


34 They are the “suitcase bombs” to be contained in 60x40x20 briefcases. Allison,Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 19–42; Stern, Ultimate Terrorists, p. 90.

11 kilogram sphere without being caught.35

Furthermore, the Counter-Proliferation approach complicatesthings for Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Under the current frame-work, the United States demands North Korea not to sell the devices,even though the previous analysis suggests that it is not interested insuch business. In other words, Washington has put another agenda onthe table without getting more bargaining chips. Pyongyang is able tocash in its new chips and demand more in exchange for stoppingnuclear exports—something that it has not intended to, and cannotconduct due to its past record.

The United States ends up raising North Korea’s price for the aban-donment of the nuclear programs. It enables Pyongyang to consolidateits bargaining position and to extort more compensation—political aswell as financial—than it otherwise could. Every time Washingtonshows its concern about nukes falling into the hands of terror groups,Pyongyang will exaggerate its non-existing intention to sell nucleardevices and take advantage of the unfounded American concerns forfurther profits.

What North Korea Wants From a Nuclear Program

The nuclear sequence that Pyongyang chose is extremely eccentric.It differentiates from usual paths that other nuclear powers had treaded,which provides important clues about North Korea’s true motive. Onthe one hand, Pyongyang stated that it has built the nuclear weaponbecause the United States and South Korea have presented a criticalthreat to its national security. The nuclear deterrence is required, or sogoes Pyongyang’s official excuse, for the political survival of NorthKorea.36 On the other hand, Pyongyang is said to build the nuclear


35 Frank Barnaby, How to Build a Nuclear Bomb and Other Weapons of Mass Destruc-tion (New York: Nation Books, 2004), p. 18. The plutonium core of the firstnuclear bomb, “Fat Man,” was 6.2 kilograms.

36 Most of the proliferation literature focuses on security motivation over othermotives such as expansion or pride. However, as Sagan pointed out, it is possibleto think about non-security motivations behind nuclear proliferation as well asother military buildups.

arsenal in order to initiate another invasion of the South and destroySeoul’s flourishing democracy. North Korea would use the nuclearweapons in order to punch a hole in the conventional defense by theSouth Korean troops or to deter the United States from sending mili-tary reinforcements to its ally in the South.37

However, these arguments do not stand a logical scrutiny fromPyongyang’s nuclear sequence. A premature nuclear announcement isdangerous for a security-concerned North Korea. Washington andSeoul would have initiated a preventive attack on Pyongyang’s nuclearfacilities; in 1981, Israel struck the Osirak nuclear reactor—the corefacility of Iraq’s nuclear program and killed Baghdad’s nuclear ambi-tion in its infancy.38 A nuclear self-claim is the last choice that NorthKorea would have made if it had been truly concerned about its ownsecurity.

A premature nuclear announcement does not contribute toPyongyang’s expansionist aim. It steals the thunder and alarms thetarget country—South Korea—into readiness. The best choice must bekeeping its nuclear arsenals secret, detonating a successful test on theeve of an invasion or firing a bomb against South Korea’s conventionaldefense, and declaring to use more bombs in case of an American inter-vention. However, North Korea chose to announce that it had built anuclear weapon that it would conduct a nuclear test; then, it performeda test. This is not a sequence that an expansion-concerned state wouldfollow. South Korea might choose to build its own nuclear forces inorder to counter Pyongyang’s nuclear threat or accept the U.S. nucleararsenals that were retrieved through Seoul-Washington agreement in1991.39


37 For an excellent review of possible nuclear use and American responses in caseof a hypothetical nuclear Iraq, see Barry R. Posen, “U.S. Security Policy in aNuclear-Armed World, or What If Iraq Had Nuclear Weapons?” in Victor A.Utgoff, ed., The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), pp. 157–90.

38 Rodger W. Claire, Raid On the Sun: Inside Israel’s Secret Campaign That DeniedSaddam the Bomb (New York: Broadway Books, 2004).

39 Until 1991, the United States had deployed an unknown number of tacticalnuclear weapons in South Korea. However, Washington and Seoul agreed totransfer all the warheads out of the Korean peninsula in October and, two

The sequence suggests that North Korea built the bomb for itspolitical pride. The official state ideology of Juche—the spirit of self-reliance—does not heal the scarred ego, given the economic difficultiesand political failures in regime competition with South Korea. Everychallenge to the norm of nuclear proliferation bestows more prestige onPyongyang for its domestic political arena. It has successfully estab-lished its images as a small David in defiance with a massive Goliath.The more premature an announcement is, the better. North Koreacould restore its prestige with the nuclear self-claim in February 2005; itcould heal its pride by the announcement about its plan to conduct anuclear test in October 2006. The final performance of the test was sim-ply a chapter for its enormous ego. A normal sequence—a nuclear testfollowed by a nuclear announcement—does not work because it is tooeasy and it steals more chances to get pride boosted. The eccentricsequence is a perfect choice for Pyongyang.40

What Next, Then?

Pyongyang has shown its cruel negotiation skills, mostly attribut-able to its eccentric dictatorship where domestic suffering does notcount seriously. And, North Korea has cheated the world thus far,deceives the international community now, and will continue to lieeven in the future. However, its deliberate decisions must have told thetruth and the politico-spectrographic analysis shows what North Korea


months later, President Roh Tae-Woo of South Korea announced that no nuclearweapons existed on the Peninsula and Seoul signed a Non-Nuclear Agreementwith Pyongyang.

40 The nuclear prestige is of enormous importance under the current political cir-cumstances within North Korea. The palace politics is extremely complicatedand delicate for the issue of succession. The current leader, Kim Jong Il, wasselected to be an official successor in 1974 when he was 33 years old and hisfather (Kim Il Sung) was 62. It is time for Kim Jong Il to designate the heir tohis crown since he is 65 years old, but the complicated politics in Pyongyanghave been blocking any significant choices. The new prestige will endow KimJong Il with the power to pass the inheritance to his kingdom to the selectedprince.

and potential buyers are truly interested in. Pyongyang’s unsuccessfultest makes potential buyers demand a series of successful tests, whichinevitably intensifies the level of surveillance over North Korea.

Nuclear publicity from the test and the premature announcementswere a serious blow to Pyongyang’s nuclear business. Unlike the missiletests that North Korea had conducted in the 1980s, the recent missileand nuclear tests were hottest news and gained enormous internationalnotice. It must have satisfied the eccentric pride of the last Stalinistregime in its domestic political as well as international arena, but repelpotential buyers. Even if it changes its mind and tries to sell the deviceson the black market, nobody would come under consequential surveil-lance and pay cash for a product of potentially questionable reliability.

Holmes would testify that North Korea is not trying to sell nucleardevices and that it will not attract any “customers.” The “dog” of suc-cessful nuclear testing did not “bark.” It nullifies the suspicion thatNorth Korea is building nuclear weapons for the international blackmarket. The “dog” of self-claim and nuclear publicity “barked.” It alsoworks against the suspicion, too. The announcement brings Pyongyangon the target board of the PSI and under the close surveillance of theUnited States; the alleged and unsuccessful test reinforced the surveil-lance. The choices that North Korea has made indicate that it hasrepelled, rather than attracted, potential buyers. In the previous analo-gy once again, a drug dealer cries out loud, “I have drugs,” but doesnot show good stuff. The police come to watch the self-claimed dealer.Nobody will come and buy drugs.

America’s concern about Pyongyang’s nuclear exports is unfound-ed. And, the PSI is not a good policy framework toward North Korea’snuclear program for its counterproductive effect. Pyongyang acquiresmore bargaining chips than it would do otherwise and it is the Ameri-can PSI framework that provides the chips to North Korea. Pyongyangwill exploit Washington’s unfounded obsession and demand more con-cessions. Thus, the United States should stop resorting to the PSIframework, at least with regard to North Korea.

This research tells less about what North Korea wants than whatNorth Korea can do. Since it is a kind of spectrographic analysis, a fulldose of Pyongyang’s intention has not been explored. Instead, in thispaper, I try to identify what is absent in North Korea’s nuclear ambi-


tion: making money from nuclear trafficking. It is a kind of mysteryand we do not know much about its true objectives. Pyongyang hasdemanded a security guarantee in various forms—e.g. a non-aggres-sion pact—but much of its argument does not make sense.41 However,we know what Pyongyang’s objective is not: it is not to sell nucleardevices. This is a piece of negative information. It only tells whatPyongyang does not and cannot aim to do.

This information is of great policy significance. It strongly suggeststhat the PSI is not only ineffective, but also irrelevant. Therefore, policy-makers should stop this approach and start to focus on more probableand realistic scenarios about Pyongyang; most of all, this informationcontributes to finding a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem.

It is time to think about the issue from a different perspective andchange the policy. The bottom line is that, whatever the new policyframework will be, the current framework of the PSI is not good andthus should be abandoned. This should be what the policymakers keepin mind with regard to North Korea. Because, as Holmes would com-ment, it is “elementary, my dear . . . . It is elementary.”


41 North Korea has blamed the U.S. aggressive policy toward itself and justifiedthe recent test as a way to security its safety. However, no formal measuressuch as a peace treaty to bring the Korean War to an official termination wouldbe an effective instrument to guarantee Pyongyang’s security. They are justscraps of paper that everybody can rip apart.

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