A Concept for the Tactical Employment of Light Infantry in Central Europe

7/30/2019 A Concept for the Tactical Employment of Light Infantry in Central Europe

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S December 1986

A ppr oved for p u b l i c r el ease, d l a t r i b u t l a n 1 3 u n l l a l t e d .8 7 - 2 0 8 4


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School of Adv anc e d Mi l i t a r y S t u d i e sMo n o g r a p h Ap p r o v a l

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Di r e c t o r . School ofCo l o ne l Ri c ha r d Har t S i nn r e i c h . M. A. Advanced M i l i t . n r yS t u d i e s

Di r ec t o r . Gr a dua t eDe g r e e P r o g r a ms


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A CONCEPT F OR T H E T A CT I C AL E I I P L OY XENT OF L I GHT I NF A NT R Y I N C E NT R ALEUROPE by HAJ Gr e go r y C. Ga r d ne r , USA , 52 p ag es .T he r e h a s r e c e nt l y b e en muc h di s c u s s i o n i n we at e r n mi l i t a r y. ] our nal s c on c er n i n g t h e us e of l i g h t i n f a n t r y f o r c e s i n Ce n t r a l

E ur o pe . Ma ny a ut h or s h av e i nd i c a t e d t h at d ef e ns e of r e s t r i c t e dt e r r a i n a nd ur b a n a r e a s a r e t h e mo at s u i t a bl e m ssi ons f o r L i g h tI n f a n t r y Di v i s i o ns i n t h a t t h e at e r . T h i s mo no gr a ph a r g ue s t h a tt h o s e mi s s i o ns a r e no t a ppr o pr i a t e . I n a h i gh i nt enkl t y c o n f l i c t .l i ght i n f ant r y u n i t s mus t b e e mp l o ye d o f f e ns i v el y i n a c c or d a nc ewi t h a t a c t i c a l s t y l e mo r e s u i t e d t o t h e i r t r a i n i n a ando r ga n i z e t i o n.

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T h U r i n i t i a l l y des y , r i bes t h e t a c t i c a l s t v l e of l i qhti n f a n t r y f o r c e s i n ge ne r a l . I t t h e n f a y , u e s o n t h e Ar my s L i ghtI n f a nt r y Di v i s i o n s a nd e x ami n e s h o w a nd wh y t h ey h av e a do pt e d t h a tmet hod o f i g h t i ng . A c r i t i c a l s t ud y t h e n d+, ai l s t h e use a n dmi s u s e of l i gh t f or c es s i n c e t h e be gi nn i ng of Wor l d War 1 1.Leaaons f r om t h at a na l y s i s a r e us e d t o d e ve l o p a c o n c e p t f o r t h ee mp l o yme nt o f l i gh t i n f a nt r y i n Ce nt r a l Eur ope .T h e p r i ma r y c onc l us . i on ; of t h i s mo no gr a ph i s t h a t our L i gh tI n f ant r y Di v i s i o ns mu s t o pe r a t e i n E ur o pe i n t h e s a me wa y t h a t t h eyi n t e n d t o f i g h t i n a l ow i n t e n s i t y c on f l i c t . T ha t i s . t h@y mus t heOf f e n s i v el y o r i e nt e d a nd f i g h t i n a n un c on v en t i o na l s t y l e t h atf o c us e s o n d i s r u p t i n g r a t h er t h an d e s t r o y i n g t h e e ne my . Ourd o c t r i n e mus t r e f l e c t t h a t l i g h t i n f a n t r y f o r c e s o p e r a t e i n t h i smanner . A s e c on d a r y c o nc l u s i o n c on c er n s o ur l a c k of i n f a n t r y l nEu r o pe . S i n c e d e f e ns i v e m ssi ons i n h i gh i n t ens i t y wa r f a r e r e qu i r ec o nv e nt i o na l d i s mo un t e d i n f a nt r y , t h e Ar my s h ou l d b r i ng mo r er e g u l a r i n f a n t r y di v i s i o n s ba c k i n t o t h e f o r c e s t r u c t u r e .


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T ab l e of Co nt e nt s P a geI . I n t r o du c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . 111. The Na t u r e o f L i g h t I n f a n t r y . . . . . . 4111. E mp l o yme nt Co ns i d e r a t i o ns f o r L i q h t I n f a n t r y Un i t s 12I V . Hi e t o r i c a l P e r s p ec t i v e . . . . . . . . 1 7V . A Co nc e p t f o r T a c t r c a l E mp l o y me nt . . . . . 213VI . Do c t r i na l I mp l i c a t i o n s . . . . . . . . 32V I I . Co nc l u a i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Appendi x : Co mp a r a t i v e Ch ar a c t e r i s t i c s o f I n f a nt r y F o r c e s 37E n dn o t e a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Bi b l i o g r a phy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46


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The i n t e r e s t e d s o l d i e r n e e d n o t l ook f a r t o d a y t o f i n dc o mme n t a r y o n t h e o r g a ni z a t i o n a nd e mp l o y me n t of some s o r t of l i ght i n f a n t r y un i t . I t seems t h a t h a r d l y a n i s s u e of t h el e a d i n g mi l i t a r y ~ o u r n a l s s p u b l i s he d wi t h o u t a t l e a s t o n e a r t i c l eo n t h e s u b J e c t . Un f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e i n c on s i s t e n t a n d c o n f i i c t i n qn a t u r e of t h es e s o u r c e s s e e ms t o h a v e c l o ud ed t h e i . s sue. T hus , t way e a r s a f t e r Ge ne r a l Wl c k ha m p u b l i s h e d h i s Wh i t e P ap e r t h er e i ss t i l l muc h d i s c u s s i o n o n t h e e mp l o y me nt o f t h e new Ame r i c a n L i g htI n f a n t r y Di v i s i o n s .

I f we n a r r o w t h e f o c u s > Ce nt r q E ur o pe . h o we v e r . w e f i n d .ag r o wi n g c o n s e na us t h a t l i g h t f o r c e s h a v e s t r a t e g i c u t i i i t y i n t h a tt h e a t e r . ( 1 ) Un f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e r e i s t r e me nd ou s v ar i a t i o n : np r o p o s e d me t h o ds f o r t h e a c t u al o r g an i z a t i o n a nd e mp l o y me nt o f n on -me c ha ni z e d u n i t s i n NAT O. T h e o p t i o n s seem t o r a ng e f r om a s s i g n i n gi n d i v i d u a l i n f a n t r y me n a s f i l l e r s f o r he av y u n i t s t o c ommi t t i n g Rd i v i s i o n t o a n o n - c r i t i c a l d e f e n s i v e s e c t o r . S a d l y , t h ePeer s f i onel sCocep_t f o r t h e l i g h t i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s s he d s no h g h ton d e t a i l s of emp l oy men t i n m d t o h i gh i n t e ns i t y c ombat . ( 2 ) Thi sp a p e r wi l l d e f i n e t h e t a c t i c a l mi s s i o n s s u i t a b l e f or 3 i i ghti n f a nt r y d i v i s i o n i n a Ce nt r a l E ur o pe a n e nv i r o nme nt .

I f w o a c c ep t t ha t t h e r e i s s t r a t egi c : and ops r a t i nna : u t i l i t yf o r t h e l i g h t i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n i n Eur o pe . w e mu s t t h e n d e v el o p Rc l e ar c on c e p t f o r i t s t a c t i c a l e mp i o y me n t . F ur t h e r mo r e , t h i sc o n c e p t mu s t b e a d v e n t a g e o us t o t h e T he a t e r a nd C o r p s Co mma nd er .

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That i s, t he commander shoul d not have t o change hi s scheme ofmaneuver j us t t o accommodat e a l i ght unl t whi ch has been t hr ustupon hi m That means pr eser vi ng t he i nt egr i t y of bot h heavy andl i ght f or ces. The pr obl em t hus becomes, " How can an Amer i can CorpsCommander i n Eur ope use l i ght i nf ant r y f or ces wi t hout augment i ngt hem wi t h di r ect f i r e suppor t f r om hi s heavy uni t s?" The pr em seof t hi s paper i s t hat t her e i s a l i m t ed number of val i d t ac t i calm ss i ons f or l i ght i nf ant r y i n Eur ope because l i ght uni t s must beempl oyed i n a manner f or whi ch t hey have been or gani zed andt ra i ned. That i mpl i es a t ac t i cal s t y l e t hat i s of f ens i ve i n nat ur eand does not i ncl ude t er r ai n hol di ng or economy of f or ce m ssi ons.

The met hodol ogy f or def endi ng t hi s t hes i s must. begi n wi t h .Idef i ni t i on of l i ght i nf ant r y and an exam nat i on of t he nat ur e oft he Army' s L i ght I nf ant r y Di vi s i ons. Thi s wi l l be f ol l owed by J .di scuss i on of sever al l i m t i ng argument s whi ch addr ess not onl y t nemanner i n whi ch t he uni t i s or gani zed and suppor t ed but al so t heway i n whi ch t he f or ces of t he War saw Pact woui d at t ack West er nEur ope.

Once t hese pai nt s ar e est abl i shed. t he combat per f or mance ofl i ght f or ces i n sel ect ed oper at i ons s i nce t h e t egi nni nq of i Jor?ciWar I 1 can be exam ned. Thi s anal ys i s i nc l udes not on l y oi f ens i vrand def enai ve oper at i ons, but al so oper at i ona i n t ho ' t act i calrear' of bot h enemy and f r i endl y f r ont l i ne t r oops. The r esul t ss how t hat l i ght i nf ant r y has l i t t l e ut i l i t y at t he f or war d edge oft he bat t l e area and t hat i t i s f ar mor e ef f ect i ve when i t i sempl oyed t o di sr upt r at her t han dest r oy t he enemy.

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T h e r e s ul t s of t h i s h i s t o r i c al r e v i e w wi l l l ead t o t h ed e v e l o p me n t of a c o nc e pt f o r t h e u s e of t h e l i g h t i n f a nt r y i n a m dt o h i g h i n t e n s i t y war . Thi s c o nc e pt wi l l c o n s i s t o f g en e r a lp r i n c i p l e s wh i c h d e l i n e at e a p p r o p r i a t e mi s s i o n s f o r l i gh t f o r c es .T h e k ey p o i nt i s t h a t l i g h t u n i t s mu s t u s e t a c t l c s f o r wh i c h t h e i ro r g an i z a t i o n a nd t r a i n i n g h av e p r e pa r e d t he m.

The a na l y s i s c o nt i n u e s wi t h a n e x ami n a t i o n of t h e d u c t r i n a li mp l i c a t i n n s of t h i s c o n c e p t f o r t h e e mp l o y me nt of L i gh t f o r c es .F i n a l l y , c o n c l u s i o ns ar i s i n g f r o m t h i s d i s c us s i o n a r e pr e s e nt ed .

A n i mp o r t a nt p oi n t mu s t b e ma de a t t h i s ~u n c t u r e . Whend ev e l o p i n g a c o n c e p t of l i ght i n f a n t r y mi s s i o n s , i t i s d e c e p t i v e l ye as y t o be c o me en amo r e d wi t h a v i s i o n of t h e l i g h t s o l d i e r a s . a ne l i t e f i g h t e r who c an o v e r c o me t h e f i r e po we r o f a we l l - e qu i p p e de ne my wi t h c u nn i n g a nd g ui l e . W e mu at n ot f o r g et t h a t ma ny of t h em ss i ons p r o p o s e d i n t h i s pe p e r a r e ver y d i f f i c u l t a n d r e q u i r ewe l l - t r a i n e d s o l d i e r s wi t h a hi gh r e s i s t a nc e t o t h e p s y c ho l o qi c a ip r e s s u r e s of wa r a nd a n un u s u a l t o l e r a nc e f o r p h y s i c a l ha r ds h i p .L i g h t i n f a nt r y u n i t s may b e e f f e c t i v e , bu t t h e i r l os s r a t e s coul db e h i gh. T he r e f o r e , t h e k ey qu es t i o n may n o t b e whet . her or n o tt h e r e e r e mi s s i o n s f o r t h e l i g h t i n f a n t r y i n Europe, Dut r a t h er - i %t h e Ame r i c a n Ar my p r e pe r e d t o pa y t h e p r i c e i n t r a i n i n g or i nc o mb at c a s u a l t i e s t o c o mmi t a L i g h t I n f a n t r y Di v i s i o n t u h i q hi n t e ns i t y c o mb at ? T he r e ad e r s ho ul d k e e p t h i s i n m nd a 5 hac o nt i n u es t h r o uq h t h i s p aper .

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env i r onment . L i g ht i nf ant r y o pe r a t e s mos t ef f ec t i v el y at ni ght . i ta da pt s we l l t o unc o nv ent i o na l o per a t i o ns . a nd ha s a s t r o n go f f ens i v e o r i ent a t i on . T he gr e a t Br i t i s h s t r a t eg i s t , B. H.L i dde l l - Har t , s a w t h e l i ght i n f ant r y man as a s t a l k er , a t h l e t e , andmar k sman. He s h ou l d b e a s o l d i e r no t onl y l i ght o f f o ot but a l s o qui c k of t ho ught . ( 9) Th u s , i n t h e Eur opea n v i ew, l i ght i n f a nt r yi s f i r s t o f a l l a s t a t e o f m nd and s ec ondl y a pr o duc t o fe n v i r on me n t . Some e x a mp l e s o f u ni t s wh i c h embo di e d t h i s v i e w o fl i ght i n f a nt r y i n Wo r l d War I 1 we r e t h e Amer i c a n Ra nger Ba t t a l i o nsand t h e Ca na di a n- Ame r i c a n F i r s t Spe c i a l Se r v i c e F or c e. ( 6 )

T he Eur o pea n v i e w o f l i ght i nf ant r y i s c l ea r l y t h e model f o rt h e L i ght I nf a nt r y Di v i s i o ns . Se ve r a l pr o po nent s , a mo ng t hem t h eAr my s Ch i e f o f S t a f f . ha ve ur ged t h e U. S. Ar my t o d ep ar t f r o m i t st r a di t i ona l vi ew of l i ght i nf ant r y and de v el o p a f o r c e l i ght i nt ac t i c a l s t y l e a s wel l a s equi pment . ( 7 ) Whi l e t h e L i ght I nf ant r yDi v i s i o ns Ge ne r a l W c k ha m c r e at ed ar e c er t a i n l y s t r a t eg i c al l ymobi l e , t hey t r a i n and o pe r a t e i n t h e c l a s s i c Eur o pe an sense.T he Ch i e f o f S t a f f ha s s t a t e d t ha t t h e l i ght i nf ant r y wi l l beo f f ens i v el y o r i e nt e d a nd wi l l t r a i n a l o ng Ra nge r - Co mma nd o l i ne s sot ha t t he y b ec o me t o ug he ne d phy s i c a l l y , t ho r o ug hl y gr o und ed i n a l li nf ant r y s k i l l s . and pr e par e d t o f i ght aggr es s i v el y at ni ght . ( 8 )Th e Command Gu i dance i s sued b y t h e 9 t h I nf ant r y Req i ment o f t h e 7tmI n f a nt r y Di v i s i o n ( L i ght ) and c o mme nt s f r om s e ve r a l of t h eDi v i s i on s o f f i c e r s c onf i r m t hat our l i ght l nf ant r y i s i n de ed b ei n qt r a i ned t o o pe r a t e i n t h i s ma nne r . ( 9) We n ow mu s t c l a r i f y h owf o r c es ope r a t i ng i n t h i s s t y l e d i f f e r f r om o t he r t y pe s ofdi s mo unt ed i nf a nt r y .

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A us ef ul mode l whi c h f unc t i ona l l y i de nt i f i e s t y pe s ofi n f a nt r y h a s b e en p r o po s e d b y Co l o n el Hu ba Wa e s d e Cz e g e. ( 10)He po i nt s o u t - t h a t wi t h t h e a r r i v a l o f t h e Br adl ey F i ght i ng Veh i c l eand t h e ne w l i g ht i nf ant r y or ga ni z a t i o ns , we c a n mo r e c l e ar l y seec er t a i n d i s t i n c t i o n s on t h e s pec t r um o f i n f ant r y . m s s i ons . T hr e et y pe s o f i n f a n t r y - a r mo r e d, r egul ar . and l i ght - b e c o me e v i d e nt .Whi l e i t i s o bv i o us t ha t a l l i n f ant r y un i t s a r e phys i c al l y c apab l eo f pe r f o r m ng a wi d e v ar i e t y of t a sks . t hey wi l l onl y do wel l t h os emi s s i o ns f o r wh i c h t he y h av e be en o r g a ni z e d and t r a i n ed.

Ar mor ed i nf ant r y o r i e nt s o n t h e a dv an ce and pr o t e c t i o n oft h e mai n ba t t l e t ank . T hi s t y pe o f i nf ant r y i s mount ed i n a f i ght i ng vehi c l e , s uc h a s t h e M 2 Br adl ey , t h at h as mobi l i t y e qua lt o t h at of t h e t ank . Ar mo r e d i n f a nt r y c o n d u c t s mo un t e d ordi s mount ed o pe r a t i o ns t o enha nc e t h e c apa bi l i t i e s o f a r mor ed uni t s .Co l o ne l Wa s s d e Cz e g e i nd i c at e s t ha t ar mor ed i nf a nt r y s u ppo r t so f f e ns i v e o pe r a t i o ns by a c co mpa ny i ng t ank a, s u ppr e es i ng i nf ant r yweapons . a nd d i s mo un t i n g t o c l e ar o be t a c l e e. I n t h e de f e na e,a l t hough a r mor e d i n f ant r y d oe s di g i n, i t a l s o pr ov i des c l o s e i ns uppo r t f o r t a nk s i n s t a t i c pos i t i ons , c ompl e ment s t h e f i r e s oft a n k g u n s an d e mp l a c e s o bs t a c l e s . Wh i l e a r mo r e d c o mb a t may b e mo r ef l u i d t h an Co l o ne l Wa s s d e Cz e g e s e e ms t o s ug ge s t , h i s f unc t i ona lpo i nt t h at a r mo r e d i nf ant r y s u ppo r t s t a nk s i s v a l i d . ( 1 1 )

A hi s t or i c a l e xa mpl e o f a r mor e d i nf ant r y i n ac t i on d i u r i n gWor l d War I 1 c a n b e f o un d i n t h e T hi r d Ar my s L orr ai l l r C a r n p a l q n .P a t t o n us e d h i s i nf ant r y t o f o r c e c r o s s i ngs of t h e Meuse and reduceo bs t a c l e s t h us f ac i l i t a t i ng t h e advanc e o f h i s ar mor ed u n i t s . (:?!Re po r t s f r o m t h e Na t i o na l T r a i n i ng Ce nt e r s h ow t hat . our c u r r e n t


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a r mo r e d i nf a nt r y i s c a pa bl e of a v ar i e t y of d i s mo u nt e d m ss i ons t oi nc l ude i nf i l t r a t i on at t a c ks and c oun t e r r ec onna i s s anc e. ( 13) T h epo i nt r ema i ns , however , t hat a r mor e d i nf ant r y , es pec i a l l y wi t h t heBr adl ey s l i m t ed number o f d i s mo un t a b l e i nf a nt r y me n, pe r f o r msmi s e i o ns i n t ac t i c al s uppo r t o f t h e ar mor . I t s f o c us i s obv i ous l yo n m d t o hi gh i nt ens i t y war f a r e .

Requl a r i nf ant r y , i n c ont r a s t , i s s u pp or t e d b y t a nk s at t h et a ct i c a l l eve l . When de f end i ng , r egu l a r i nf ant r y ho l ds keyt e r r a i n. I n Eur o pe , t h i s m ght me an de f e nd i nq a t o wn wr ho l d i ng ac r i t i c al p i ec e o f gr o und. Dur i ng o f f ens i v e oper a t i ons . i egr i i ari nf ant r y t a s k s m ght i nc l ude r e duc i ng by pas s ed poc ket s ofr e s i s t a nc e, k ee pi ng ope n l i n es o f c o mmu ni c a t i o n, or hol di ng t hes h ou l d er s o f a penet r at i on. The Nov embe r 1944 Bat t l e o f S chm dt .i n whi c h t h e 112t h I nf a nt r y Re gi me nt wa s s u pp or t a d. S y t he t ank a ofCompa ny A . 707 T an k Bat t a l i on, i s a n ex ampl e o f t h i s t y pe ofi nf ant r y i n ac t i on. ( 1 4 ) Re gu l a r i n f a nt r y t r a v e l s mo un t e d, I dea: : .yi n M113s . t o i nc r e as e i t s t ac t i c al mob i l i t y a nd t o c ar r y t h e heavye qu i p me nt i t n ee ds t o d o i t s l ob. But what ev er t h e m s si on.r egu l a r i nf ant r y a l wa y s f i g ht s d i s mount ed . I t i s r s p e c ~a l l yd i s t i ngu i s hed by i t s ab i l i t y t o qui c k l y oc cupy a p i ec e of gr oundand t ur n i t i nt o a f or t r es s . ( 1 5 )

Al t h ough Co l o ne l Wa s s d e Cz e q e d es c r i b es a i r b or n e d n d a i ra s s au l t i nf ant r y a s l i ght , ( 16) t he i r t ac t i c al s t y l e onc e t hey geto n t h e g r o un d i s mor e s i m l a r t o t ha t o f t h e r egul a r i nf ant r y . Ofc our s e. t he s e d i v i s i o ns do hav e c er t a i n s t r a t e g i c and oper a t i ona lc a pa bi l i t i e s whi c h s e t t hem a pa r t f r o m o t h er t y pe s of r egulari nf ant r y .

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Regul ar i nf ant r y i s al s o opt i m z ed f or Q mi d t o hi ghi nt ens i t y envi r onment . I t oper at es i n much t he same way t hat t he9 t h I nf ant r y Di v i s i o n di d bef or e i t became t he Hi gh Technol ogyTest bed. ( 17) I t i s i mpor t ant t o not e t hat wi t h t he except i on oft he 2 d I nf ant r y Di vi s i on. wh i c h ha s a pec ul i ar m s s i on. t her e a r eno r egul ar i nf ant r y di vi s i ons l ef t i n t he ac t i ve f or c e s t r uc t ur e.Accor di ngl y . t he L i ght I nf ant r y Di v i s i ons may be cal l ed u p o n t oper f or m m ssi ons f or wh i c h r egul ar i nf ant r y woul d be bet t er sui t ed.Thi s may be espec i al l y t r ue i n hi gh i nt ens i t y combat . Mar e on t h i sl at er .

Li ght i nf ant r y i s di f f er e nt . Col onel Was.5 de C z n q ades cr i bes i t l i ke t hi s :

( Li ght i nf ant r y) i . s s pec i al i z ed f or r api d a i rt r ans por t abi l i t y. c l andes t i ne i ns er t i on. n i g h toper at i ons , i nf i l t r at i on. r ai ds , and ambushes :i t gi ves of f onl y s mal l t ac t i c al s i gnat ur es .L i ght i nf ant r y compl ement s ot her f or ces ats t r at egi c . oper at i onal , and t ac t i c al l evel s . ( 18,

He goes on t o . say t hat l i ght i nf ant r y i s di f f i c ul t t o f i nd on t hebat t l e f i e l d but once det ect ed i t muat compl et e i t s t as k s qui c kl yand vi ol ent l y or i t wi l l be def eat ed. The det a i l s of t hei nf i l t r at i on and ambus h s t y l e o f t he l i ght i nf ant r y c. 3n be seiln i ct he act i on f ought by t he F i f t h Ranger Bat t al i on at Z a r ? , ~Gr rrnncv . .nFebr uar y 1945. ( 19)

Whi l e l i ght i nf ant r y i s mor e adept t han ot her t ypes ofi nf ant r y at i nf i l t r at i on and mobi l e oper at i ons at ni qht i t >di f f i c ul t t er r ai n, i t c an not di g i n, hol d gr ound or assau i t , I ?wal l a s r e gul ar i nf ant r y. ( 2 0 ) Accor di ngl y . l i g h t l n f dn r r y muat

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f ocus on l ow i nt ens i t y conf l i ct or . at l east, t he l ow i nt ens i t ypor t i on of mor e l et hal bat t l ef i el ds . ( 21) The s i m l ar i t y bet weent hi s des cr i pt i on of l i ght i nf ant r y and t he c l ass i c Eur opean vi ew i sobvi ous.

Al t hough t he Waes de Czeqe model gi ves us .I I ni r l y cl eari dea of t he nat ur e of l i ght i nf ant r y, i t i s not compl et e. T h e r ear e ot her aspect s whi ch must al so be consi der ed.

Edwar d Lut t wak poi nt s out t hat t he sal i ent di f f er encebet ween l i ght and what he cal l s r equl ar i nf ant r y, l i es i n t!i ei rr espect i ve modes of combat r at her t han t hei r equi pment . .Regul ar i nf ant r y f i ght s i n a l i near f r ont mode as pdr C of a w i d c rar r ay of f or ces . I t cooper at es wi t h ar t i l l er y and ar mor n t t het ac t i c al l evel . L i ght i nf ant r y nor mal l y f i ght s i n a non-::nacJ r anr!t act i cal l y i ndependent manner . I t s act i ons ar e coor di nat ed u:ithot her f or ces a t t he oper at i onal l evel . ( 2 2 ) Thi s ~mpor t antdi st i nct i on may be a key t o t he empl oyment of l i ght i nf ant r y u n i t . ~i n hi gh i nt ensi t y war f ar e. Lut t wak adds t hat i f t hese u n i t s beconei nvol ved i n at t r i t i on war f ar e t hey wi l l b e dest r oyed. ( 2 3 )

St even Canby descr i bes i i ght i nf ant r y n s an ad'unct o:einen':t o compl ement and suppl ement t he combi ned arms team. K.:c ,-unslc!e?.:l i ght i nf ant r y a separ ar e ar m To i ~ i m , 1 5 i s an i nf ant ? ' /qual i t at i vel y di f f er ent f r om t he 82a Ai r bor ne or t he new H qi iTechnol o9y 9t h Di v i s i o n . L i ght i nf ant r y i s a s u r ~r i : ~end t.err3:r.dependent f or ce. These f ac to r s pr ot ect i t f r om t anks a n d ar*:l:ieivand mask i t s movement s. (24)

I n summar y, l i ght i nf ant r y i s unl i ke ot her ' . . y ! ~ e 4 of

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i nf ant r y. I t has i t 6 own t act i cal s t y l e. Appended t o t hi s paperi s a t abl e t hat hi ghl i ght s t he di s t i nc t i ve di f f er enc es bet weenconvent i onal di smount ed Lnf ant r y and l i ght i nf ant r y. ( 2 5 ) Thet abl e i s t ai l or ed. f or t he pur pos es of t hi s paper , t o mi d and hi ghi nt e. nsi t y combat . The headi ng Oper at i ons descr i bescons i der at i ons f or t he empl oyment o f l i ght i nf ant r y uni t o i nconj unct i on wi t h ot her combat ar ms uni t s , whi l e t act i cs crscr rba: j :t he way i n whi ch l i ght uni t s f i ght . Al t hough some of t h e poi nt smay be open t o debat e, t he compar i son ser ves i ts pur pose. i tc r eat es a gener al pi c t ur e of t he uni que f eat ur es of l i ght I nf ant r y.

Let u s now f ocus spec i f i cal l y on t he U. S. Ar my s Li ghtI nf ant r y Di vi s i ons . We have seen t hat t hese uni t s i nt end t o f i ght .i n t he t ac t i c al s t yl e of t he l i ght i nf ant r y. Cr Lt i c s m ght of f ert hat t hi a i s wr ong. They woul d say t hat t he L i ght I nf ant r yDi vi s i ona shoul d be opt i m zed f or a mor e convent i onal s t y l e ofwarf are. Thi s woul d al l ow t he uni t s t o devel op pr of i c i ency i nt r adi t i onal r egul ar i nf ant r y m s s i ons , l i ke def ens e, and t.husi nc rease t hei r ut i l i t y i n a m d t o hi gh i nt ens i t y envi r onment .Such cr i t i c i sm f ai l s t o appr ec i at e t he Ar my s concept f o r theempl oyment of t hese di vi s i ons .

The m ss i on of t he L i ght I nf ant r y Di vi s i on& cL-?dr::/r equi r es t hem t o t r ai n as l i ght i nf ant r y. These uni t . * ar f ? . . nt endn~pr i mar i l y f o r empl oyment i n :ow i nt ens i t y conf l i c t . They hovesome ut i l i t y i n m d t o hi gh i nt ens i t y war f ar e. ( 2 7 ) Thi sunambi guous m ssi on st at ement r equi r es t hese uni t e fis t. . x i npr i mar i l y f or an unconvent i onal s t y l e of war f ar e. Low i nt ensi t yconf l i ct i s char act er i zed by const r ai nt s on weapons, t act i cs , and

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t he l evel of vi ol ence. ( 2 8 ) nor e s peci f i cal l y, t hi s t ype ofwar f ar e r equi r es combat f or ces t o f i ght us i ng t he t ype ofdecent r al i zed t act i cs most of t en associ at ed wi t h Ranger operat i ons- r ai ds, ambushes, and pat r ol s. (29) The Chi ef of St af f has not edt hat :

I n l ow i nt ens i t y c onf l i c t , t hey ( l i ght i nf ant r yuni t s) wi l l be abl e t o sear ch out and dest r oy t.heenemy on hi s t er r ai n us i ng i ni t i at i ve, s t eal t h,and s ur pr i s e. At t ac ks by i nf i l t r at i on, ai r assaui t ,ambush, and r ai d wi l l be t he nor m ( 30)

Thi s t ype of f i ght i ng f i t s t he t r adi t i onal t act i cal s t yl e ( j f t hel i ght i nf ant r y that we di scussed ear l i er .

Si nce Amer i can l i ght i nf ant r y uni t s ar e pr i mar i l y or i ent - edon l ow i nt ensi t y conf l i ct , commander s must use t hat m ssi on t odevel op and pr i or i t i ze t he t asks f or whi ch t hey must t r ai n. T h i sm s si on es sent i al t as k l i s t dr i ves t hei r t r ai ni nq pr i or i t - es .L i m t ed r esour ces al l ow uni t s t o t r ai n f or onl y a l i m t ed number t:rft asks. To do t hi s wel l , t hose t asks must f i t wi t h a cer t ai n s t y i cof f i ght i ng, and t hat i s t he l i ght i nf ant r y s t yl e. Addi ng ot hert asks whi ch do not f i t t he pr i mar y m ssi on causes conf usi on andr educes t r ai ni ng qual i t y. ( 31) We must car ef ul l y avoL d c reat i ng ahybr l d uni t t hat i s t heor et i cal l y capabl e of per f or mr nq a l ldi smount ed i nf ant r y m ssi ons but act ual l y capabl e of none. ( 32:

The poi nt i s , i f t he Li ght I nf ancry Di vi s i ons ar e depl oyedt o Eur ope, t hey must f i ght i n t he same way i n whi ch t hey wo u l df i ght a l ow i nt ens i t y conf l i ct . Ther ef or e. we must devel op aconcept of empl oyment i n t hat t heat er t h8t w l l capi t al i ze on t hei runi que capabi l i t i es .

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Ther e ar e a number of f ac to r s , bes i des uni t c apabi l i t y,whi ch i nf l uence t he empl oyment of l i ght f or ces i n Cent r al Eur ope.Ar gument s have been made by ot her aut hor s concer ni ng t he s i ze,composi t i on, and suppor t of l i ght f or c es i n t hi s t heat er . Thepur pose of t he f ol l owi ng paragr aphs i s t o pr esent t. hi s aut hor ' svi ews on sever al of t hese s ub~ec t a or t he pur pose nf f ur t aerl i m t i ng hi s ar gument concer ni ng t he m ss i ons f or l i ght 1nf ant . r ~uni t s i n Eur ope.

The L i ght I nf ant r y Bat t al i on i s t he bas i c Dul l di ng bl ockf or l i ght f or ce depl oyment . Whi l e br i gades of t he L i ght I nf ant r yDi vi s i on may be empl oyed separat el y i f t he m ssi on r equi r es, th ei nt egr i t y of t he bat t al i on must never be vi ol at ed. Ther e I S l l t t i edoubt t hat we ar e i nf ant r y poor i n Eur ope, (33) but i t seemswast ef ul t o s pl i t up wel l t r ai ned l i ght i nf ant r y un i ' l s t o pr ovl dcf i l l er s f or heavy uni t s a s some have suggest ed. ( 34) On t he ot her .hand, r ecal l t hat as Lut t wak poi nt ed out . l i ght i nf ant r y dons notwor k wi t h ar mor and ar t i l l er y at t he t act i cal l evel . So, ~i ni i ket he ar mor ed or r egul ar i nf ant r y, t he L i ght I nf ant r y Bei t t al i oni s not t r ai ned or equi pped t o cr oss at t ach uni t s . I t s mai nr ol e is as t he pr i mar y cont r ol headquar t er s f or t he cleceritral? OCoper at i ons t hat char ac t er i ze l i ght i nf ant ry t acr i c s. ( 3 s )

The L i ght I nf ant r y Br i gade i s t he l owost l eve; uni t whi ch canpr oper l y accept at t achment s f r om out s i de t he Di vi s i on. A l i h ouyhbat t al r ons wi l l obvi ousl y have some combat oi i pport uni t s. such a3t he FI ST and an engi neer pl at oon, t he br i gade i s t he f i r s t l e v e lwi t h t he command and cont r ol f ac i l i t i es t o coor di nat e support ing

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ai r and ar t i l l er y a66et 6 and sequence t hei r e f f ect s wi t h gr oundmaneuver f orces. The Li ght I nf ant r y Br i gade can al so maneuverar mor , ar mor ed i nf ant r y, or r egul ar i nf ant r y uni t s al t hough i t i sonl y abl e t o pr ovi de t hem wi t h l i m t ed l ogi s t i c suppor t . (36)

These capabi l i t i es make t he L i ght I nf ant r y Br i gaee t he mostappr opr i at e uni t f or empl oyment i n t he Eur opean t heat er . Ther e 18no doubt t hat i n l ow i nt ensi t y oper at i ons t he di v i s i on base must D Epr esent t o coor di nat e i nt el l i gence and l ogi s t i c suppor t . ( 37) I nNATO, however , t hose suppor t i ng syst ems ar e al r eady est abl i shed.The nat ur e of t he t heat er and t he decent r al i zed s t y l e of t he l i q h ti nf ant r y l i m t t he poss i bi l i t i es f or t he empl oyment of t he di vi s i onas a whol e. On t he ot her hand, t her e ar e a number of uses : f or aL i ght I nf ant r y Br i gade or Br i gade Task For ce at t ached t o ei t her uCor ps or Di vi s i on. ( 38) The L i ght I nf ant r y Di v i s i on r st abLi nhmentmuat be r et ai ned si nce t he pr i mar y m ssi on f or t he un1. t is i n l owi nt enei t y conf l Lct . Al t hough much more st udy i s werr antacl l . t her ear e some i ndi cat i ons f r om war gam ng t hat i n a Europeni i . 5


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L i ght i nf ant ry uni t s wi l l not oper at e i n i sol at . i on i n Eur ope.They wi l l al ways compl ement or suppl ement t he act i ons of heavyf or ces. Much has been wr i t t en on t he subj ect of heavy/ ; i ghtoper at i ons. Many of t hese ar t i cl es have r ecommended t he cr ossat t achment of heavy di r ect f i r e sys t ems t o l i qht uni t s . ( 4 0 )Ther e ar e t hr ee pr obl ems wi t h t hat ar gument . F i r s t , i t f ai l s t.oappr ec i at e t he t ac t i c al s t yl e of l i qht i nf ant r y uni t s . Second. i tdoes not cons i der t he nat ur e of t he r ei nf or c i ng m ss i on i n Eur ope.And f i nal l y, i t i gnor es t he f ac t t hat unl ess uni t s t r ai n t oget herand devel op a mut ual oper at i ng concept , t hei r war t i me per f or mancei s of t en poor . ( 41) Li ght i nf ant r y and heavy f or ce oper at i ons aresynchr oni zed at t he oper at i onal not at t he t act i cal l evel . Forexampl e, a L i ght I nf ant r y Br i gade m qht i nf i l t r at e an enemydi vi s i on t o di s r upt and conf use t hat uni t so t hat a cor pscount er at t ack wi l l be mor e successf ul . That i s =he cor r ect concap- .Si nc e l i ght uni t s or e a di sr upt i ng, no a dest r oyi ng f or ce, theymust wor k i n con] unct i on wi t h heavy f or ces t o def eat t he enemy.

L i ght i nf ant r y uni t s r equi r e i ndi r ec t f i r e and ai r s uppor t t naccompl i sh most m ssi ons. The exper i ences of r he Amer i can ?angerbat t al i ons and t he Ger man mount ai n di vi si ons i n Wo r l c Wir T icl ear l y show t hat t hese uni t s wer e most success f ul whr:i =hey ha:!t he suppor t of a s i gni f i cant amount of i ndi r ect f ; re . (4:; Ar .i mpor t ant poi nt concer ni ng ar t i l l er y i s t hat i n ~a p~r e r ~. 3 r i c n t h cl i m t ed l ogi st i cal capabi l i t i es of t he L igh: Di v r s i ~n . he l i g h tf or ce shoul d cont r ol o n l y t he ef f ec t s of t he f i r es . not L h e f i r i ni juni t . The TACFI RE and AFATADS syst ems shou'? f aci l i t at e t h i s t ypeof suppor t .


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Logi s t i c suppor t f or l i ght i nf ant r y uni t s i n Europe is not amaj or pr obl em Tr anspor t t o posi t i on l i ght f or ces can be pr ovi dedby t he host nat i on. ( 43) Based on equi pment and st r engt hf i gur es , t he uni t wi l l consume f ar l ess f uel , ammunl t l on and spar epar t s t han an ar mor ed or r egul ar i nf ant ry uni t of t he same s i ze.

Fi nal l y, we must addr ess t he way we see t he war bei ng f ougnti n Cent r al Eur ope. A number of sour ces poi nt out t hat l i ghti nf ant r y uni t s can def end i n cl ose t er r ai n, euc h as t he Hohe Rhon,or i n bui l t up ar eas. Ot hers have euggast ed t hat t hi s t ype ofeconomy of f or ce def ense coul d f r ee an ar mor ed uni t. f or of f ensi veact i on. ( 4 4 ) Thi s pr esumes not onl y t hat t he l i aht uni t has t.hrsame capabi l i t i es as t he uni t i t r epl ac@s. whi ch i t d o e 5 noc. bu ral so t hat t he Sovi et s woul d not make thei r mai n ef f ort i n t hi sar ea. We must be car ef ul her e. ?he Sovi et s may wel l choose 5 sf ocus t he br unt of t hei r at t ack i n what we consi der r eszr i ct edt er r ai n. Gener al Radzi evsky. f or mer Commandant of :he Fr unzeM l i t ar y Academy, has made t he 5o::owng comment s about Ger man dr :e. J apanese def enses dur i ng Wor l d War 11:

The weakest spot s ar e. . . al so sect or s aef enceuby t r oops of l ow f i ght i ng capaci t y. We al sor egar ded as weak spot s i n t he enemy s def encest hose sect or s whi ch he consi der ed t o be d- f f i cxl tof access f r om a t act i cal poi nt of vi ew. An a t t - t c kon such a sect or was a compl et e sur pr i se t o :h eenemy: . . our f or ces gai ned t r emendous acvai ; :agesdespi t e t he f act t hat t hey wer e at t acki ng nvrrdi f f i cul t t er r ai n. ( 45)Colonel Gl ant z ampl i f i es t hese comment s when hc Aet . 3: ; ~ tl:.?

1945 Sovi et at t ack i nt o Manchur i a acr oss gr ound consi der edi mpass abl e by t he J apanese. ( 46) The pur ?ose of t he :3e ~zcmmr nt aL Yt o emphasi ze t hat our concept f o r t he uae of l i ght i nf ant r y i n

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Eur o po mus t i nc l ude an ac c u r a t e appr e ci a t i o n of t he wuy i n whl c ht h e enemy wi l l f i ght . T hi s unde r s t andi ng mus t n ot b e l i m t ed t ot h e ec hel onment t a c t i c s of t h e S ov i e t a t t a c k bu t mus t a l s o emb r a c eo pe r a t i o na l c o ns i de r a t i o ns . De f e ns e a nd e c on omy of f or c e m s s i onsi n t er r ai n t hat appear s t a ct i c al l y r e s t r i c t i ve c oul d doom a l i ghti nf ant r y f o r c e t o des t r uc t i on by a ma s s i v e So vi e t a t r ac k .

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Now t hat w e have exam ned t he char act er i s t i cs of t he l i ghti nf ant r y and t he L i ght I nf ant r y Di vi s i ons i n par t i cul ar , we canl ook at t he combat per f or mance of t hi s t ype of uni t s i nce t he s t ar tof Wor l d War 11. The obj ect wi l l be t o f i nd consi st ent l essons i nt hei r per f or mance. The exampl es used i n t hi s sect i on have beenchosen because t hey f i t t he t ype of hi gh i nt ensi t y envi r onment wecan expect t o f i nd i n Eur ope. The speci f i c geogr aphi c ar eas var ywi del y. Si m l ar l y, none of t he subj ec t uni t s wer e spec i f i cal l ydesi gnat ed as l i ght i nf ant r y . Thei r t act i cal st yl e. however .def i ni t el y f i t s t he model we have devel oped. We wi l l anai yzeof f ensi ve. def ensi ve. and t hen r ear oper at i ons. The sect i 13n wi l lconcl ude wi t h comment s on act i ons i n whi ch t he l i gri t i nf ant r y w a sused i mpr oper l y. Thi s anal ysi s wi l l al l ow u s t o deve?op a val i oconcept f or t he empl oyment of l i ght i nf ant r y i n Eur ope.

The act i on f ought by t he 5 t h Ranger Bat t al i on above Z e r f .Ger many dur i ng 23- 27 Febr uary 1945 was one of t he most succeusf diRanger oper at i ons of Wor l d War 11. I t i s al s o an excel l ent exam2l . eof l i ght i nf ant r y wor ki ng i n con~unct i onwi t h a heavy f or ce at t h eoper at i onal l ev e l .

The Ranger s wer e at zached t o YaJ or Sener a? j la?tcn L dd12


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k(ImNd(IK04

.-IWLIIrnlKI01Um.

~amY .0 HIC, H

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of F e b r u ar y an d r e ac h e d i t s o bj e c t i v e by 0600 o n t h e 25 t h . At t h ntt i me , t h e Ge r ma n s we r e u n awa r e of t h e Ra ng e r s l o c at i o n or mi s a l o n.B y t h e a f t e r n o on , h owe v er , t hey r e al i z e d t h ei r p r e di c a me nt a nd ma des e v e r a l s t r o ng a t t a c k s a ga i n s t t h e Ame r i c an p e r i me t e r . No ne we r es uc c es s f u l .

Ke an wh i l e , X X Co r p s wa s c o nt i n ui n g i t s a t t a c k t o t h e e a s tf o r c i n g t h e Ge r ma n de f e nd er s t o wi t h dr a w t o wa r d t h e Ra ng er s .T h r o u g h t h e n i g h t o f t h e 2 5 t h t h e Ra n g e r s di r e c t e d a r t i l i e r y f i r eo n t h e I r s c h - Ze r f r o a d , d e n y i n g i t s u s e t o t h e e ne my . Theb at t a l i o n wa s c o nt a c t e d by A me r i c a n u ni t s on t h e 26 t h a n d wa sf i n a l l y r e l i e v ed o n t h e 2 7 t h a f t e r a mb u s h i n g a pa r t y of 200 Ger man2i n t h e mo r n i n g mi s t s a nd t a k i ng 1 4 5 pr i s o ne r s . ( 47)

T hi s a c t i o n i s a n e x c e l l e n t e x amp l e of t h e e mp l o y me n r o f al i g h t i n f ant r y un i t i n c on l u n c t i o n wi t h a heav y f o r c e i n ap.o p e r a t i o na l l y o f f e ns i v e bu t t a c t i c a l l y d e f e n s i v e ma nner . T heRa n g e r s e f f e c t i v el y i n f i l t r a t e d i n t o p o s i t i o n a n d d l s r u pr e d t h ec o h e s i o n o f t h e Ge r ma n d e f e n s e by f o r c l n g t h e Ge r ma n s t o a t t a c kt h em. T h e Ra n ge r o ma d e e x c e i l e n t u s e of t h e i r e r t l l l c r v s u p po r t t . 3i nt . er d i c t Ge r ma n mo v eme nt a nd d e f e a t c o u nt e r a t t a c k s .

T he r e a r e o t h e r h i s t o r i c a l e xa mp l e s o f s u c c es s f u li n f i l t r a t i o n s by L i qht i n f a n t r y f o r c e s . Dur inq We r i d War ::. ~ i l t ,Ru s e i a n s b ec a me e x pe r t a t i t . T h e y wo u l d s l r p t h r o ug h ?. he e x r e n d r ? ?Ge r ma n l i n e s i n s ma l l u n i t s an d t h en l l nk up i n t h e s wa mp s or d e n s ewo ods . I n F e br u ar y 19 42 , f o r ex a mp l e . t h e 3us ai anc . ~n i i l r r o r e c ~ ~ T !s t r o ng p o i n t s o f t h e Ge r ma n 2 6 9t h I n f a nt r y Di v i s i on . On c fe s t a b l i s he d i n t h e r e a r of t h e Di v i s i o n . t h e R u s s i d n r i woul d L t y i . , . , ~d u r i n g t h e d ay a n d c o me t o l i f e at n i gh t t o sow mi n e s o n l l nos n.f

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communi cat i ons, nsoaul t r esuppl y col umns and at t ack command post s.These di s r upt i ve act i v i t i aa wer e coor di nat ed wi t h convent i onalat t acks a l onqt he f r ont whi ch event ual l y br oke t he Ger man i i ne. ( 431

i n Sept ember 1981. I r an empl oyed ni ght i nf i l t r at i on r echni quest o di s r upt t he I r aqi def ense of Abadan. ( 49) Whi l e t he det ai l s oft hi s bat t l e ar e unc l ear , i t appear s thar I r an made qooa iuse ofi nf i l t r a t i on and ni ght a t t acks by l i ght i nf ant r y uni t s over a brooaarea t o f i nd weak s pot s i n t he I r aqi def ense end t o pi n d c w n


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a t r u c k ba c k u s i n g ni ght a t t a c k s a nd mnt t i or e n v e l o p me n tt a c t i c s . ( 53) T h e de f e nd er s b l o c k ed t h e r o ad i n f r o n t of a ndb e t we en t h e t wo d i v i s i o ns an d t h en b e qa n t o s y s t e ma t i c a l l y de s t r o yt he m ( Se e Map 2 ) One wa y t h ey d i d t h i s wa s b y s e pa r a t i n g t h ei n f a n t r y f r o m t h e t a nk s wi t h s ur p r i s e f l a n k a t t a c k s a nd ar t i l l e r yf i r e s . ( 54) Bu t mo r e n o t a b l e wa s t h e ma n ne r i n wh i c h t h e F i n nsa vo i d ed t h e e ne my s s t r e ng t h a nd f o c us e d t h e i r u n r e l e nt i n g a t t a c k son t h e Ru s s i a n k i t c h en s a nd wa r mi n g f i r e s . ( 5 5 ) By 9 J a nu a r y . t h e1 63 d Di v i s i o n h ad be en br o k en an d t h e 4 4t h Di v i s i o n ha d c e as e d t oe x i s t a s a n o r g an i z e d un i t .

T hi s b at t l e d e mo ns t r a t e s t h e v a l u e of t a c t i c a l i y o f f e n s i v ea c t i o ns by l i g h t i n f a n t r y un i t s wi t h i n t h e c on t e x t of a no p e r a t i o na l d e f e ns e . I t a l s o s h o ws h o w l i g h t i n f a n t r y c a n be v e r ye f f e c t i v e wh e n i t i nd i r e c t l y a t t a c k s t h e enemy s we ak ne s s , i n t h i sc as e , h i s a b i l i t y t o s u s t a i n h i s s oi d i e r s , a n d a l l o wr n q herf o r c es , l i k e t h e F i n n i s h wi n t e r , t o c omp l e t e t h e d e s t r u c t i o n ofe ne my s s t r e ng t h . A b r i g a de of t h e 7 t h I n f a n t r y Di v i s i o n ( L i q h t )r e c en t l y c o nd uc t e d a s i mi l a r o pe r a t i o n a ga i n s t a n o pp os i n g ar mo r e dc o l u mn a t Fo r t Hu n t e r - L i g g e t t . T h e u n i t s l i g h r ; ni anc _ r yi n f i l t r a t e d t o c on t r o l a k ey c h ok e po i nt a nd e l i mi n a t e s up p o r t i n gi n f a n t r y wh i l e at t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s a nd ar t i l l e r y des t r o yec i :he ,ar?i,:>rv eh i c l e s t h a t c o ul d no t ma ne u v er i n t h e c l o s e t e r r a i n . < 5 G , 1 T hesuccess of t h i s mi s s s on i n d i c a t e s t h5 t the c o nc e uc r ex. i I ns v d ~ i . 3 : ..

Ma ny a u t h o r s h av e p o i n t e d out t h a t wi t h t h e i n c r e a s e i n u r b a ns p r a wl i n We s t e r n Eu r o pe . L i g h t i n f a n t r y wi l l b e able T Oe f f e c t i v el y d ef e nd ur b an a r eas . ( 5 7 ) A br i e f h i s t o r i c a i cr i i ai i eof t h i s a s s er t i o n i s i n o r de r .

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( T h i s map i s t ak en f r o m Es pi s i t o . wgs& _P_oigtAt l as o f Amer i cang g c s r Vo lume J J , Wor l d War 11. map 9.HAP 2

F i n n i s h ' Mot t i ' T ac t i c s a t Suomuss a l m


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A qood exampl e of a successf ul i nf ant r y def ense of a bui l t . u?ar ea i s t he Egypt i an act i on i n Suez Ci t y at t he end of t he 1973war . The I sr ael i s f el t t hat t hey coul d t ake Suez by combi ni ng anar mor ed br eak- i n wi t h a sust ai ned ar t i l l er y bar r age. They di d notknow t he s i t uat i on i n t he t own, but f e l t t hat t he f ew demor al i zedEgypt i ans i n Suez woul d put up onl y l i ght r esi st ance. The m ssi onwoul d be compl et ed i n shor t or der . ( 5 8 ) The I sr ael i s wer e wr ong.St r ong r esi st ance by Eqypt i an i nf ant r y f or ces caught t hem bysur pr i se, des t r oyed a s i gni f i cant por t i on of t hei r ar mor and f or cedt hem t o wi t hdr aw. Gener al W ckham has ci t ed t hi s engagement as anexampl e of t he def ens i ve capabi l i t i es of l i qht i nf ant r y f or c es i nbui l t up ar eas. ( 59)

I n t hi s i nst ance, t he Chi ef of St af f i s pr obabl y r i ght . I nSuez Ci t y t he Egypt i ans f ought i n a l i ght ~nf ont r y t yl e. Theyused r oadbl ocks and coor di nat ed t ank ambushes t o hal t t he I sr seJ . : .s.Once t he def ender s had execut ed t hei r ambushes they wer e able ' ;omel t i nt o t he dept h of t he ci t y and avoi d d e t ec t r , 3 n . 3ut- whatwoul d have happened i f t he I sr ael i s had expect ed t he E g y p L i a r .def ense and at t acked mor e pr udent i y?

I n si t uat i ons wher e t he at t acker knows t hat a t o r n L Adef ended, t hi ngs ar e qui t e di f f er ent . The at t acker ?h?r, ha.5 t h ei ni t i at i ve and can bypass t he ar ea. i nvest i t , or s i n p l y t ac k r.55and al l ow ar t i l l er y t o r educe t he def ense. The elr ii ai!l..% : , i thi-112t h I nf ant r y t hat had t aken Schm dt and Kommer shr i dt . %. i f feredt hat f at e at t he hands of t he Ger mans. ( 60) On Zxr r ci se 5, ; t: LantKni ght . a bat t al i on of t he 7t h I nf ant r y Di vi s i on (L .1gh-j cr f ended Jcr i t i c al t own. The uni t had an abundance of b a r r i ~ r materiol %nd

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sever al days t o f or t i f y t he ar ea. Al t houqh t he bat t al i onconst r uct ed an excel l ent def ense and f ought ext r emel y wel l , i t wasevent ual l y wi ped out once t he at t acki ng ar mor ed uni t was abi e t of i x i t s pos i t i on. ( 61)

The l esson i s t hat ur ban def ense i s not a mi s s i o n f or t hel i ght i nf ant ry . L i ght f or c es ar e ef f ec t i ve i n bui l t up ar c as oni yi f t hey can r et ai n t hei r f r eedom of maneuver t o surpr j , . %? a~ c l i nbu:s::t he enemy. But l i ght uni t s ar e sever el y handi capped i f t . hey ar ef or ced t o abandon t hei r t act i cal st y l e and execut e a convent i onaldef ense. L S known t o hol d a ci t y o r t own can b ef i xed and dest r oyed by a mor e mobi l e and mor e heav: l y ar med enemy.L i ght i nf ant ry i s si mpl y not t r ai ned or or gani zed fcir iiri;ondef ense: t hat i s a j ob f or r egul ar i nf ant r y. ( 6 2 )

A l i ght uni t t hat

The f i nal ar ea we wi l l exam ne i s r ear oper at i ons. Themost det ai l ed anal ysi s of t hi s par t of t he batt : ef ; e:d i s Lf 5r r edby Ot t o Hei l br unn. consi der ed one of t he f or emost hi st ur l ons ofpar t i san war f ar e. ( 63) He di vi des t he dept h of t he de,fensc. i nt ot he i mmedi at e. near , and f ar r ear ar eas. (64)

The act ual dept h of eech of t hese ar eas wi l l vary w~t ht er r ai n, enemy, and ot her f act or s. Th e i mmedi at e real' i r. c:Ludes, Ch , ?r ear of f r ont l i ne t act i cai uni t s . The i nt . ensi ty . : :>m56!: r n ' : I I :.ar ea r anges f r om medi um t o hi gh. T h e near rear i s acnu;>ir c! l.iy +.P.L?combat suppor t and combat ser vi ce suppor t asset s whi ch !jack LI!? I:-,+combat uni t s. The bat t l e' s i nt ensi t y t her e vari er; i r Gm I t i2w t r jmedi um F i nal l y , t he f ar rear i s t he ar ea i n w!i i ch i i i i i i r a r yoper at i ons have oper at i onal or st r at egi c i mpl i cat . i on% ( 135)

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Of f ens i vel y. l i sht i nf ant r y f or ces - Ranger s or Commandos t oHei l br unn - oper at e i n t he near r ear t o sei ze key poi nt s andr educe enemy def enses i n conl unct i on wi t h maj or of f ensi veoper at i ons. ( 66) Hei l br unn env i s i ons t hews f or ces f ol l owi nq t het enet s of L i ddel l - Har t s I ndi r ec t Appr oach t o di s rupt . anddi sor gani ze t he enemy by s epar at i ng h i s f orces, endanqer i nq h i 4s uppl i es , or menaci ng hi s r out es of r et r eat . ( 67) *!>ere 1; not; l . i r :qnew her e. The of f ensi ve exampl es of f er ed ear l i er I I I t 7 :d 3e c t i . onf i t ni cel y i nt o t hi s c ons t r uc t .

Hei l br unn does br eak new gr ound, however , when he di sc uss est he use of l i ght f or ces t o def end r ear areas . He notes t hat i nRussi a t he Ger mans ef f ect i vel y deal t wi t h par t i san2 by f or mr nq J agdkommandos . Thes e company or pl at oon si zed u n i t s fcught; i nt he t act i cal s t yl e of t he l i qht i nf ant r y. They wer e ar med wi t haut omat i c weapons and wer e expect ed t o Li ve f or an exzendec! per;ocwi t hout addi t i onal suppl i es . The agdkommando: 3 u s e dunconvent i onal t act i cs t o def eat t he Russian par t i san. % T he i rm ssi on was to see t o i c t hat t he par t i san bands never g a t an yr est . J agdkommandos woul d mar ch at ni qht and h i d e a n d r estdur i ng t he day. They woul d r ai d and ambush t he parinans at t?vr.::.yopport uni t y. ( 68)

The poi nt her e i s t hat al t hough l i qht i nf ant r y w o i i : * i 581.r el at i vel y i nef f ect i ve agai nst Sovi et mechani zed foi-cc.5 oper at i n. ,i n t he r ear because of t hei r l ack of ant i ar mor we. spon3 a ~ c ! rq;inict r anspor t . t hey can be t he best def ense agai nst t h e Sy~:znd:< L!:,.?twi l l al mos t cer t ai nl y oper at e i n NATO s r ear ar eas i i oar ( comes 2 7Eur ope. ( 69)


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The f i nal hi s t or i cal exampl ee wi l l deal wi t h t wo cuses i nwhi ch l i ght i nf ant r y was m sused. The f i r s t i s t he Ranger at t acka t Ci s t er na, I t al y.

Ranger For ce, composed of t hr ee Ranger bat t al i ons. wasat t ached t o 3d I nf ant r y Di v i s i on i n t he Anzi o beachhead. Thedi vi s i on commander , Mal or Gener al Luci an Tr uscot t , chose t he For cet o spear head t he Di vi s i on' s at t ack t owar d Ci st er na. Thei r nt.isaion .was t o sei ze and hol d t he t own unt i l r el i eved. The Hanyer s cr ossedt he l i ne of depar t ur e at Ol 0Q 30 J anuar y 1944. The uni t e, howeve! ,had a number of new r epl acement s and t he movement becamedi sor gani zed. By dawn t he Ranger s wer e s t i l l not :n Ci s t e r ~aandt he bat t al i ons wer e out of cont act wi t h each ot her . T h a r w whent he ' Her mann Geor i ng' Panzer Di vi s i on f el l on t he i ao; at ed uni t s.A l l r el i ef at t empt s f ai l ed and by ni yht f al i t wo t hi r ds of ?angerFor ce had been dest r oyed. Onl y 6 of t he 767 men who hadl ef t f or Ci st er na made t hei r way back t o f r i endl y l ~n e s . 7C j

Thr ee l essons emer ge i r om t hi s di sast er . Fi r s t , I i qhci nf ant r y does not have t he f i r epower t o conduct convent l or i aloper at i ons agai nst an ar mor ed enemy. Second, l i ght f or ces cannotoper at e i ndependenzl y i n a hi gh i nt ensi t y env: r onment . : h e y nitr3:be comm t t ed i n conj unct i on wi t h heavy uni t s. Fi nu: Ly. t hedecent r al i zed nat ur e of l i qht i nf ant r y m ssi ons raqi i i ra :nLi v: ,


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wel l t r ai ned uni t , t he 2d Bat t al i on, 28t h I nf ant r y Reqi ment , 7t hI nf ant r y Di vi s i on of t he I mper i al J apanese Ar my. f oughtcour ageous l y us i ng a l i ght i nf ant r y t act l cal s t y l e agai ns t t het anks of t he Red Ar my. Thi s act i on al so shows t hat i ndi vi dualbr aver y and l eader shi p cannot over come doct r i nal and mat er i aldef i c i enci es . The J apanese suf f er ed 86%c as ual t i es and f ai l ed t ost op t he Sovi et s. ( 71)

The l esson f rom t hi s set of engagement s i s t hac i n hi ghi nt ensi t y conf l i ct . l i ght i nf ant r y cannot f i ght at t r i t i on bat t l eswi t h armor ed f or ces. Ll ght i nf ant r y must av oi d t he m o s t i nt ense

par t s of t he bat t l ef i el d end f ocus on di sr upt i ng t he enemy w h i l eheavy f or ces dest r oy h i m.

Thi s sect i on has r evi ewed a number of act i ons f ought S y l i ghti nf ant r y f or ces si nce Wor i d War 11. Let US t ake t . h r l cssons f r o mt hi s revi ew and appl y t hem t o our L i ght I nf ant ry 3ivi!3ion:3.

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8 Z


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a n a r mo r e d c o un t e r a t t a c k . T h e Ra ng er mi s s i o n a t Z e r f i s t h eh i s t o r i c a l p r a c e d e n t f o r t h i s t y p e of o pe r a t i o n.

Wh a t l i g h t i n f a nt r y un i t s ~ s n n g t o i s d e f e nd a s t a t i cp o s i t i o n i n e i t h e r a r u r a l o r ur b an e nv i r o nme nt . T he y d on ot h av e t h e e qu i p me nt , a nt i a r mo r we ap o ns , t r a ns p o r t , or t r a i n i n gt o ac c o mp l i s h t h at mi s s i o n . I f l i g h t u n i t s c a n b e f i x e d t h ey wi l lb e de s t r o y ed l i k e t h e J a p an e s e we r e a t No mo nha n.

L i g h t i n f a n t r y mi s s i o ns a i m a t t h e d i s r u p t i o n o f t h e e ne my ,n o t h i s d e s t r u c t i o n . A s t h e F i n n s de mo ns t r a t e d , t h i s i se f f e c t i v e l y a p s y c ho l o g i c a l f oc us . o n e i n t e n d e d t o d i s t r a c t th e

ene my s a t t e nt i o n f r o m t h e ma i n e f f o r t . T h i s p r i n c i p l e e mp h as i s e st h e f a c t t h a t l i g h t u n i t s a l wa ys o pe r a t e i n c o n j u n c t i o n wi t h ah e a v y f or c e. Di s r u p t i o n i mp l i e s s ho r t . v i o l e nt c nnr . nct : j wi t h !.heo pp o s i t i o n. Ra i d s a nd a mb us h e s f i t t h e b i l i a s d o mi s s i o ns i r:wh i c h l i g h t i n f a n t r y p r o v i d e s t a r q e t i n g d a t a f o r s u p p o r t i n ga r t i l l e r y . Di s r u p t i o n al ao i mp l i e s t h e t i n a h i g h i n t e n s i t ye n v i r o n me n t , l i g h t i n f a n t r y mi s s i o ns a r e of s h o r t d ur d t i o n L iqht.f o r c e s s i mp l y d o n o t h a ve t h e f i r e po we r , p r o t e c t i o n or moo i i t v t or e ma i n i n c o n t a c t f or e x t e nd ed pe r i o do o f t i me .

L i g h t i n f a nt r y u n i t s d o n o t e ng aq e t h e e ne my s s t r e na t h . I fl i gh t f o r c e s me et a me c h a n i z e d e ne my i n d a y l i g h t or a ~ e n e r r n i nt h e y wi l l a l mo s t c e r t a i n l y be de s t r o ye d a s wa s t-he R nnger For ce a tCi s t e r n a . Aq a i n , l i gh t u n i t s ~ u s t o n o t h a v e t h e c o mb a t p o we r t os l u g i t o u t wi t h a he a v y f o r c e. L i g h t i n f a n t r y mus t c ap i t a l i z e o!?i t s ab i l i t y t o r e ma i n hi d d e n f r o m t h e e ne my u nt i l i C 1.3 r e ad y L os t r i k e .

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L i ght i nf ant r y uni t s f i ght unc onvent i onal l y i n a hi ghi nt ens i t y envi r onment . Thei r t r ai ni ng i n l o w i nt ens i t y war f ar e i sappl i ed t o t he Eur opean bat t l ef i el a. Thei r unconvnnt i onal s t y l er evol ves around t he decent r al i zed execut i on of Ranger t ypem s si ons , s uc h as i nf i l t r at i on, pat rol l i ng. ambushes and r ai dn, t odi sr upt and di st r act t he enemy as L i ddel l - Har t advocat ed.

The nat ur e of t hese oper at i ons d i c t at es t har i n o ? 3 t l ~q h ti nf ant r y m s s i ons wi l l be conduct ed i n t he hour s of dar kness.Ni ght pr ot ect s t he f or ce and i ncr eases i t s abi l i t y t o sur pr i se anaconf use t he enemy.

The ef f ect s of decent r al i zed l i qht i nf ant ry m ss i onsar e synchr oni zed by bat t al i on and br i gade headquar t er s t o achl cvet he desi r ed r esul t . An exampl e of a l i ght i nf anr r y uni t f i ght i ngunconvent i onal l y woul d be t he br i gade whi c h i nf i l t r at ea i nt e t heenemy' s r ear by pl at oon. hi d dur i ng t he day, and conduct ed ni qhtr ai ds and ambushes agai nst par t i cul ar t ar get s i n accor dance wl t h aspec i f i c pl an t o di s r upt t he coher ence of t he enemy' s def ense.

The concept f or t he empl oyment of i i qht i nf ant r y i n Eur ope.t hen, r evol ves ar ound t he f orce' s capabi l i t i es and l i m t at i ons .Ther e i s , however , an addi t i onal consi der at i on. The Li ghtsol di er must be psychol ogi cal l y pr epar ed f or combat i n Zurope.I t i s obvi ous t hat l i ght i nf snzr ymen must be wel l " r ai ned. But A Swe have seen, l i ght i nf ant r y f or ces opt i m zed f or l ow Lnt enai t yconf l i ct t r ai n f or combat i n whi ch l evel s of vi ol ence arc.) r educeci .Accor di ngl y, l i ght i nf ant r y sol di er s ar e ment al l y pr epar ed f or adi f f er ent ki nd of war t han we expect t o f i nd i n Eur ope. The.?concept f or t he empl oyment of l i ght i nf ant r y i n NATO must

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appr ec i at e th i s f ac t and f ocus t he l i ght i nf ant r y m s si on i n a l owt o m d i nt ens i t y por t i on of t he combat zone. I f l i ght f or cesoper at e i n an unconvent i onal manner and ar e gi ven m s3i ons wh l c havoi d t he enemy s st r engt h, t hey wi l l f i nd t hemsel ves on t he par t sof t he bat t l ef i el d wher e t he i nt ensi t - y of combat i s l owest . Thati s wher e t hey wi l l be most at home and wi l l oper at e mostef f ect i vel y.

T h i s concept f or t he empl oyment i s l i ght f or c es i n Eur opei nvol ves an of f enoi vei y or i ent ed, unconvent i onal s t yl e of war f ar e.I t i s f ocused on di sr upt i ng t he coher ence of t he enemy f o rce . n;,ton i t s des t r uc t i on.

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Cor r ect empl oyment of t he l i ght i nf ant r y i n Eur ope mustmaxi m ze t he capabi l i t i es of t he uni t whi l e gi vi ng t he commanderf r eedom t o gai n t he i ni t i at i ve. We must r emember t hat t he pr i mar yr ol e of t he l i ght di vi s i on i s t o r espond t o cont i nqency m ssi ons I nsuppor t of vi t al nat i onal i nt er es t s . Addi t i onal l y, t he di vi s i on sf ocus i s on def eat i ng l i ght enemy f or ces i n l ow i nt ens i t y conf l i ct .The Eur opean r ei nf or cement m ssi on i s t hus secondar y and mustr ecei ve secondar y emphasi s. Based on t hese consi der at i ons andot her f act or s such as t ac t i cal s ty l e, l i m t ed t rai ni n? resour ces .and depl oyment t i me, l i ght i nf ant r y i s best empl oyed i n Eur opewi t hout di r ec t f i r e suppor t a t t he t ac t i cal l evel .

Gi ven t hat , l et u s r evi ew how i i ght i nf ant r y wi l l oper at e.The l i ght di vi s i on must t r ai n f or l ow i nt ensi t y c onf - i c t f i r s t . I ndoi ng so i t wi l l devel op a t act i cal s t y l e wi t h whi ch i t w : l f iqt:i n any t heat er . Whi l e a l i ght di vi si on may appear capabl e ofof f ens i ve or def ens i ve act i on at t he t act i cal l evel . i r i s onl yef f ect i ve when used as an of f ens i ve f or ce. Def ens i ve ac~i vi t i est l e t he uni t down, cause i t t o f i ght a bat t l e of atrr i : ; on, n i i di ncr ease t he chances t hat t he f or ce wi l l be f i x e a and dest r oyer . .Of f ens i ve act i ons whi ch i ncor por at e r ai ds, ambushes. p a r r o i l i n q .l~rc:r econnai ssance maxi m ze t he capabI : i t i ea of t he 1.inht di vi z i cn.

L i ght i nf ant r y oper at es ad smal l uni t s t o di sr upt t he enemy.Li ght uni t s do t hi s i n t wo ways. ~y act i nq as a ~r r i k e or ce and o yaddi ng dept h t o t he bat t l ef i el d.

As a s t r i ke f or ce. l i qht uni t 3 i nf i l t r at e or ai r a.s s . 3~1C t o

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obj ec t i ves i n t he enemy s r ear t o f ac i l i t at e the uc t i ons of heavyuni t s .

L i ght f or ces add dept h t o t he bat t l ef i el d by i nf i l t r at l ng orac t i ng as bypss sed f or ces and at t acki ng t he command an@ suppl yf unc t i ons of t he enemy. Thus. t he enemy i s f or ced t o di ver: hl . 3at t ent i on f r om t he c l os e bat t l e. ( 73)

Thi s met hod of empl oyment l eads t o a number of s peci f i cm ss i ons f or whi ch t he L i qht I nf ant r y Di vi s i on i s sui t ed. They ar el i s ted bel ow i n pr i or i t y:

- i nf i l t r at e and at t ack enemy pos i t i ons t o asai s t th ecount er at t ack of a heavy f or ce.

- d ee p at t ack t o secur e vi t al t er r ai n whi ch ass i s t s :ne a : ra c kof a heavy f or ce.

- pr ov i de t ar get acqui s i t i on and t er m nal gui dance f orar t i l l er y, mul t i pi e l aunch r ocket syst ems. ai r . and ot >er deepat t ack asset s .

- f i x and r aduc9 bypassed pocket s of r es i s t ance w::h ar:iL ;.3=\and ai r assets .

- conduct r ear oper at i ons agai nst l i ght enemy f or eas.Conver sel y, t her e ar e many ot her Eur opean m ssi ons f or wni cb. cneLi ght Di vi s i ons ar e . qui t s c. l aar l y grit_ sui t ed. Spec:f :cai ly. : ! l eyi ncl ude:

- t he convant , i onal daf enae of f r ont L i ne pos i - . i ?ns i r ! h - . h ??enand rest r i c t ed t er r ai n.

- def ense of ur ban ar eas.- convent i onal day or ni qht at t ack agai nst an s r m~r edeneny.- r ear ar ea def ense agai nst. ar mor ed f or ces.

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A det ai l ed st udy of s peci f i c l i ght i nf ant r y m s si ons i n a hi ghi nt ensi t y envi r onment i s r equi r ed. The ai m shoul d be t o c l ear l yar t i cul at e bot h m ss i ons and pl anni ng cons i der at i ons i n F?I 7- 13,L i ght h f g n % g y g3t&g& ig~ and B ~i g a d eQpnr ; t agnn. Tho key poi nt t nr emember , however . i s t hat t he Eur opean commander who r ecei ves al i ght i nf ant r y uni t c an i nc r eas e hi s t act i cal f l exi bi l i t y by us i ngi t i magi nat i vel y wi t hi n an of f ens i ve, unconvent i onal conco?: ofempl oyment .

Ther e ar e t wo ot her i mpl i cat i ons t hat accompany t h e adopt i onof t hi s concept f or l i ght i nf ant r y empl oyment i n Eur ope. : neyi nvol ve bot h doct r i nal l i t er at ur e and f or ce s t r uct ur e.

Our doc t r i nal publ i cat i ons . espec i al l y, FC 71- 101, TTe ;&grit-nf ant r y---- - _ D r y i s & s n , must omphasi ze t he of f ens i ve nat ur e .?ndunconvent i onal t act i cs of t he l i ght di vi s i ons . L i qh: inf .2nr.ryuni t s ar e not gener al pur pose f or ces. Addi t i onal l y , t hesedocument s must st r ess t hat l i ght and heavy f or c3s ~ n t e r n c r t th;;.oper at i onal not t he t act i cal l evel . Fi nal l y, t hey must make i tc l ear t hat l i ght uni t s cannot def end o r per f or m economy oz. f or c em ssi ons i n Eur ope.

On t he f or ce st r uct ur e s i de, we absol ut el y musz r ecr i f y ozr. Lack of r egul ar i nf ant r y. We cur r ent i y have no uni t s :n cnt? 3c:i vff or ce whi ch ar e desi gned t o ho l d gr ound or conducz convenzi ona:di smount ed i nf ant r y oper at i ons. A s t hi s paper has shown. the a a eof l i ght i nf ant r y t o do t hese m sai ons f r equent l y r e a u i r s I I I 5ig:icasual t i es and of t en t he dest r uct i on of t he uni t .

I t i s appar ent t hat we need mor e i nf ant r y i n Eur ope. But we

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nee d r e gu l a r i n f a nt r y , n ot l i gh t i n f a nt r y . T h e Ar my s h o ul d a c c e pta r e l a t i v e r e du c t i o n i n s t r a t e g i c mo b i l i t y an d ma i n t a i n s e ve r a lr e gu l a r i n f a n t r y di v i s i o n s i n t h e f o r c e s t r u c t u r e . T h e s e u n i t ss h o ul d be or g a ni z e d a n d eq u i p p e d t o f i g h t i n t h e t a c t i c a l s t y i e o ft h e r e g u l a r i n f a n t r y .

T he L i g h t I n f a n t r y Di v i s i o n s h o ul d r e ma i n our b a s i c l i g h ri n f a nt r y un i t . Wh i l e l i g h t br i g e de s a r e t h e mo r e a p p r o pr i a t es t r u c t u r e f o r E u r o pe an e mp l o yme nt , t h e p r i ma r y mi s s i o n f o r l i g a tf o r c e s i s i n l o w i n t e ns i t y o p e r a t i o n s . T ha t r e qu i r e s a un i t w1t.hs i g n i f i c an t l o g i s t i c al a n d i n t e l l i g e n c e q o t h e r i n q c op o b i i i t i e o .On l y a Di v i s i o n h as t h e a a s e t s t o pe r f o r m t h o s e f u n c t i o ns .

On a mo r e s p ec i f i c no t e , a l t h ou gh hi s s t y l e i s t o a v oi ca t t r i t i o n b a t t l e s wi t h h e a v y f o r c e s , t h e l i g h t i n i a n c r y ma n wi L 1a l wa y s ne ed a n e f f e c t i v e l i g h t a nt i a r mo r we ap o n t h a t H:: a l i o w hi mt o d es t r o y bo t h t a n k s an d a r mo r e d pe r s o nn e l c a r r i e r s f r o m a mb u s h .An t i a r mo r t e c h no l o gy mu s t k e e p p ac e wi t h ar mo r e d v e hi c l ed e v e l o p me n t i f t h e l i g h t i n f a n t r y ma n i s t o h a v e a n y ut i l i t y on th em d t o h i g h i n t e n s i t y b a t t l e f i e l d .

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VI I . cgtjcLgzg3NThe l i ght i nf ant ry i s a uni que br and of i nf ant r y. I t

def i ni t el y has i t s own t act i c al s t y l e. Ther e ar e m s si ons f orl i ght di vi si ons i n Eur ope and t hey ar e best accompl i shed by l i q h tuni t s oper at i ng wi t hout t he suppor t of heavy di r ect f i r e syst ems.

Li ght di vi si ons have a number of capabi l i t i es . They pr ovi det he Eur opean t heat er and cor ps commander s wi t h a f : exi hi ?i t y t neyhave never had bef or e. But, onl y i f t hese l i ght uni t s ar e empl oyedi n accordance wi t h an of f ensi ve concept wi l l t hey be ef f ect i ve.

The pur pose of t hi s paper has not been t o apol ogi ze ahead oit i me f or t he i nabi l i t y of l i ght i nf ant r y t o accompl i sh cer t ai nm ssi ons i n Eur ope. On t he cont r ary, t he i nt ent has Deen rnc l ear l y poi nt out. what t hese uni t s can and cannot do.

L i ght i nf ant r y m ss i ons requi r e a ver v hi qh i eve: oii ndi vi dual ski l l and conf i dence. Accor di ngl y, t he . l i ght sol di ermust be ver y wel i t r ai ned. But even t he best l r ght ~nf ant r vmanca! ?onl y be ef f ect i ve i n t he r i ght envi r onment . He i s nor an e i . i r ef i ght er whose t act i cal acumen 1. 3 such t hat h e can oe cA cu cn =~+n. ? l~:empl oyed agei nat a wel l equi pped f oe. We must br i ng our I c . c * . r : n c :i n l i ne wi t h t he c apabi l i t i es of t he l i ght i nf ant r y. I f w e z~e::si% :.i n our bel i ef t hat t he Li oht d i vi s i ons ar e ?list qener i i - pur ! ~09ef or ces w e may pay wi t h t he l i ves of our sol d;#?ra '3n -.:to =a:-:.:?z1:i.-.:iof t he f ut ur e.


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APPENDI X - Compar at i ve Char act er i st i cs of I nf ant r y For cesOPERAIION_S

cPnvanf l nnsl &nf s nt r rGener al pur pose f or ce

Equal l y sui t ed t o t heof f ense and def enseOper at es i n any t er r ai n

Li m t ed capabi l i t y f orunconvent i onal oper at i ons

V i e w s di f f i cul t t er r ai n asan obst acl e

Oper at es i n l ar ge f or mat i ons( eg. Br i gade and above)Habi t ual l y conduct s duyi i qhtoper at i ons, but can oper at e atni ght .Possesses bui l t - i n pr ot ect i onagai nst smal l ar m8 and i ndi r ectf i r es ( ar mored i nf ant r y ) or di qs - i nf or pr ot ect i on ( r egui ar i nf ant r y1Can r educe f or t i f i ed pos i t i ons

Oper at es as par t of a l nr qacombi ned ar ms f or mot . i on

Empl oys convent i onal t act i cs

M ass and f i r epower ar e th e pr i mar yt act i cal pr i nc i pl es

L l 3 b t L nfantrvUt i l i t y 1s l i m t ed t.os pec i f i c c ondi t i oneSt r ong of f ens i veor i ent at i onBest sui t ed f o r c i os rterra nAdapcs wo i l t r >unconvsn: ; ona;oper at i onsDom nat es t h e rr2rrcllnand uses i t :o i t 3advant aqeHost of r en oper at es . atSat t ai l on i ev r l .snnl owerOper at es m o s T ; f:-eo:ienz..vat n i qnt

Ach ev es n r 0 t ec 'I ont hroucrh c omouCL n~e n(:maneuver : r - l r e l y c d i g : 3 - j n

I l l - s ui t ed f,7r ac:ac;::3aga not f or t f . Ledpos i t i onsUsual l v o p e r n ? e s ~n dpure o r .semi->,xr ei nf anr . r v envi rcnmer . :

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Achi eves shock t hr ough m a s s

Fol l ows t he pat h of l eastr es i s t anc eEngages t he enemy at maxi mumr angesDef ends f r om t he f or war ds l ope ( 26)Normal l y emphasi ses f i r epowerover maneuverExcel l ent mobi l i t y i n open andm xed t er r ai nLow mobi l i t y i n c l os e t er r ai nFr equent l y conduct s f r ont alassaul t s

Pat r ol s t o mai nt ai n cont act

Tac t i c s conf or m t o a gener alpat t er nWeapons and equi pmentor i ent edAd3ust s t act i cs t o avai l abl et echnol oqy

Achi eves shock t hr oughsur pr i se. speed, andvi ol enceChooses t he pat h of1east ex pec t s t 13?Engages t he enemy atcl ose r angeDef ends f r om t,he r ever ses l opeEm? h a s ses n a neuY c'r ov el -f i r epowerCan be out maneuver ed i nopen ter r ai nExcei i ent mobi l i t y i ncl ose c e r r a i nI nf i l t r at es i n or der t cat t ack i h e enemv' s fl.31:::and r earPat r ol s rel entl ess' v i na l l s i t uat i onsTact i cs unpr edi c t abl e 1 2f o r m t i me , -snci s i x i c ePeopl e and cerralr:0 r L en edAdus t s t echnol oqv t oava 1ab: t 3: t 1c.3

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1. I n addi t i on t o t he Chi ef of St af f ' s @hiLeraper L M 2 : Lighth f a gt g y . ( Of f i ce of t he CSA . Washi ngt on, 16 Apr i l 1984) . t he mostcogent ar qument f or t he st r at egi c det er r ent val ue of t ha Li qhtI nf ant r y Di vi s i on i s made by Maj or D. H. Pet r eaus. ( "L i ght I nf ant r yi n Eur ope: St r at egi c F l exi bi l i t y and Convent i onal Det er r ence. "B i L i k c ~yRevi ew. December 1984, pp. 35- 55. > Edwar d Lut t uak al s ol ays out a s t r at egi c r at i onal e f or t he Army' s L i ght I nf ant r yDi vi s i ons on pages 15 and 16 of hi 6 st udy, " gtrafsg& clllility g fuLsI L i ght Di y&s&gns, 6 sy!st_emat&c y g l u g L r g n . " ( TR ADOC Cont r actNo. 60- 84- C- 0099.Oct ober 1985) . F i nel l y , F r anz Uhl e. Wot t l erar gues t hat f o r pol i t i cal , m l i t ar y. and econom c r ea~3ons . scronql i ght i nf ant r y uni t s woul d i mpr ove NATO' s def ense post ur e.(G5f9'ZbtefSid n & f f t n ~ e Y E P F R: GafSr dSE !!beC!iSchFL?L?F'J S3 ??Stsei. tbcaffnn. Muni ch: Ber nar d und Gr aef f , l 7. 90. D p . L ~ j 5 - L O 7 .Tr ansl at ed and r epubl i shed by CGSC. )2. The P ps g nf l gn ql SofisgpL g g c the I n fa_ntry p&y~h&gc !.=L?L!&>- ( ? 5. - ; ?,Mar ch 1984) onl y ment i ons t hat empi oyi nq t he Li qht I nf ant r yDi vi s i on i n a m d- hi gh i nt ens i t y envi r onment car r i es wi t h i t or equi r ement f or " augment at i on i n f or ces, weapons, and +!qL1ipinent. C:,per f or m a f u l l r ange of m ss i ons i n m xed or oven t e r r d~naqa.~nst -heavy f or ces. " p. 2. The best si ri gi e sour ce whi ch l a y s o u r t , h espect r um of poss i bl e l i ght - i ni ant ry m ss i ons i n Eurcl:.w :R *!F+ s%tof "Heavy- L i qht Connect i on" ar t i c l as i n h fan t _ r y ? iqoi;&n~. J u : v -August 1984, pp. 10- 22.3. The di st i nct i on bet ween t he Amer i can and Eur opean vi ews of liuthr.i nf ant r y have been speci f i cal l y not ed by at l east t hr ee aut.hors.Maj or Scot t McHi chael . uig& or isai I 'grspen&&yS on LIE^^ h f q n ' , ~ .' I nt r oduct i on' . ( Unpubl i shed Manuscr i pt ) . p:: Edwar c Lut+wa;: .

7. Eduard Lut t wak concl uded h i s TRADOC di r ect ed a:u::v , i f Ar ny .?c,':'a;by ur gi nq t he devel opment of a mul t i - di vi s i onal body cm v e r s a : 1 L t - : ,easi l y depl oyabl e and cont ext adapt abl e l i qht i nf nn- r v f orce. - , . ..tt& stor& cqi~Ioq iyssg . . . . n. 82. St even Canbv a l s o r ecornsanded tk , ,o tt h e U.S. adopt Eur opean st vl e l i qht i nf ant r y t acr i cs an;!or gani z at i on. I ; l esg&s Lisht_ I y ? f g n t ~ y . . F o r w n r c l . Pea?!? of thGz:est udi es pr ecedod t he Chi s f of St af f ' s Whi t s Paper.

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8 . Gener al J . A . W ckham Wh ~ t e apar 1@ 4. pp. 2.4 nnd ' L. i . qhtI nf ant r y i n t he Def ense of Europe' , N_A_T_O's5 Natigis. Speci alEdi t i on, J anuar y 1985, p . 107.9. Commcnd GuldnnGr? Esrr The 2t h Rs9ine!!t for 3c! end 3t!! 6t r EURG.( HQ, 9t h I nf ant r y Reqi ment . 7t h I nf ant r y Di vi s i on ( Li ght ) . For t Or dC A : 22 Apr i l 1986) . pp. 19- 23 end br i ef i ngs t o t he School ofAdvanced M l i t ar y St udi es by Maj or E. Thur man and Colonel H. Wassde Czege of t he 7t h Di vi si on on 10 and 14 Oct ober 1906.10. Col onel Huba Was5 de Czeqc. "Thr ee S ~n d a f 1nf ar. tr . y".LgfsgLky. ( J ul y- Augus t 1985) , up. 11- 13 and "More o n I nfantr:r".-nf ant r y._ -.. -. ( Sept ember - Oct ober 1986) . UD. 13- 15. C~: nne?. W a s : i ah?Czege i s cur r ent l y t h e commander of t he 1st 3riga,?e of t he 7 t hI nf ant r y Di vi s i on ( Li qht ) . He i s one of t he aut hors ot' t he ?.9fi:2and 1986 ver si ons of F M 100- 5 and a past di r ect or n f t h e School n fAdvanced Mi l i t ar y St udi es (SHMS).11 . ' b i d . " Thr ee Ki nds of I nf ant r y" , p . 11.12. Hush M. Col e, The L gr r ql ne ga~rn$ign. ( Of f i ce 02' I:hr ~ : n i . ? C ~ ; . fM l i t ar y Hi st or y Washi ngt on DC, 1981) . p. 605.13. Combi ned A r m s Tr a i ni ng Ac t i vi t y, N7-5 h g g n n s L r q c n e r . . ( l ?ambi ner ;Ar ms Cent er , For t Leavenwort h. i i unsas. 31 J unuar v 13e. E. J . ?p. 2- 3.14. Char l es B. MacDonal d and Si dney T. Mat haws. Three 9c ; f l ~z ;.4~~~4liis~ A l tg~zo, ~ c c : chmi.dt , . ( Of f i ce of t he Chi ef of M 11 i ~a1vHi st or y. Washi ngt on DC, 1952) . p . 295.15. Wass ae Czegc, "Thr ee Ki nds of I nf ant r y" , p. 12.

17. Comment made by Colonel Wass de Czeqs t o SANS on 1.4 O c C & e r1986. The 9t h I nf ant r y Di vi s i on. when i c was commanCe.1 b y Sener a.Cavasos, concent r at ed on q u l c k i y pr epar i ng sr r on9poi nv. s t hazi ncl uded wel l const r ucced bar r i er s and f i ght i ng pourc ionu w 1 L . hover head pr ot ect i on. The Di v i s i on f el t t hat t h i s r v ? e oi 4n?fens.?coul a adequat el y def end agai nst an ar mor ed enemy.19. Wass de Czege, " Thr ee Ki nds of' I nf ant ry" . p. 12.1' 3. Doct nr M chael J . Ki nq. Rqr_lgarsi zgl cc~ecj OTJ ~! . J oecn: ;nris ,r;' h r l c kcr 12. Leavenwor t h Paner Numbar 1; . ( I : ombnt 3t:icI :esI ns t i t ut e, For t Leavenwor t h, Kansas . J une 1985) . 3. 43.20. Wass de Czege. " Mor e on I nf ant r y". p. 13.21. MaJ or Edwar d Thur man. The L ~ g h f : n~an r r r lv i? ;~!? : ?!I9 g ~ ~ ~ & & ~ n p lgrco , ( School of Advanced M l i t ar y 5 t u d i ~ ~ .x - 7Leavenwor t h. Kansas. J une 1995) . p . 37. Maj or Thur man ~dr vei i ~pshe:l o w i nt ensi t y concept i n det ai l . He concl udes :hat i i r ~ht ~.:i fant.rYmust be empl oyed i n a l ow i nt ensi t y por t i on of t he Sat t . l ef i el dr egar dl ess of t he l evel of over al l conf l i ct .

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22.23.38.24.25. Thi s t abl e, wi t h some modi f i cat i on, i s t aken f r om McMi chael a,gigtglicai Fegeegt&ye GI L i gh t hf g! k : y L Chapt er 5.26. F H 71- 20, The Mechani zed ~ g g ~ ~ ~ g yas k Force di scusses t her ever se sl ope def ense on pages 4- 85 th ru 4 - 8 8 . I t c l ear l y s t at es ,however , t hat mechani zed f or ces do not usual l y def end on t her ever se sl ope and t hat such def enses ar e appr opr i at e onl y f orsmal l por t i ons of t he t ask f or ce. L i eut enant Col onel Ar cni eGal l oway has di scussed t he i mpor t ance of t he r ever se s l ope drfensi::t o l i ght f or ces i n hi s monoqr aph. L&gbt_ hf : sgt~)r n :.LIg &:f~._ncs.1( School of Advanced M l i t ar y St udi es, For t Leavenwor t h, Kansas.December 1985) .27. Al t houqh General W ckhnm st at es i n h i s h g g r t h t ; heLi ght I nf ant r y Di vi s i ons must be abl e t o f i ght anyt i me, enywher e.and agai nst any opponent ( p. l ) , i n anot her ar t i c l e he speci i i ca; ; ys t at es t hat t he Di v i s i ons ar e pr i mar i l y deei gnea for- use i n i owi nt ens i t y conf l i ct . ( Li ght I nf ant r y i n t he Def ense of Eu r o pe ,p. 100) . The Chi ef of St af f al so made t h i s poi nt i n a l et t er t oLi ght I nf ant r y Di vi si on Commander s i n Apr i l 1985. ( I nf or mat i onr ecei ved f r om Maj or Ben Har vey, Ar my Tr ai ni ng Boar d, 24 Oct - ober1986) . Addi t i onal l y, F C 71- 101, I..ght LfiggfiGgy gJy&srgn@e ~ q f & n n ~, pr escr i bes n l ow i nt ens i t y f ocus f or t he L i ght i nfan: . ryDi vi s i ons. ( p. 1 and p . 1- 2) .28. FC 100- 20. h t e p l t y ~ZnZfL lct. (CGSC. For t Loavenwor: n,Kansas, 16 J ul y 19%. p. v and p. Gl oss ar y- 2)29. Combi ned Ar ms Tr ai ni ng I nt egr at i on Di r ect or at e. ? ! rsgggedgLUl convent i pgg& Eight-ing f s g t b s L ighy, J nfsntt,y g&v&gaon, ( Combi nedAr ms Cent er , For t Leavenwor t h. Kansas, 9 J anuar y 1 334) . Thi s mexui ndi c at es that i n a l ow i nt ens i t y envi r onment , oper at i ons w i : h econduct ed by smal l l i ght i nf ant r y uni t s usi ng unconvenr . 1. onal .Ranger St yl e t act i cs. I t was prepar ed i n r esponse 50 . an i nqui r yf r om Maj or Gener al Davi d Pal mer , t hen Deput y Commdndi l i i : oi 5n.eCombi ned Ar ms Cent er , concer ni ng t ho empl oyment of L: g>z L l : v is : .>x : ji n l ow i nt ens i t y conf l i c t .30. W ckham Wh i t e P qp e~.D. 1.3:. The ef f or t s of t he 7 t h I nf ant ry Di vi s i on (Li9hz.l t i ;


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i ns t al l at i ons , t hey a11 have an of f ens i ve or i ent at i on, t hey al lr ecogni ze t he need t o def eat a l i m t ed ar mor t hr eat , and t hey ai lant i c i pat e ver y r es t r i c t i ve r ul es of engagement . O n a hi ghi nt ens i t y bat t l ef i el d. however , t he Di vi s i on ant i c i pat es t hat i tmust f i ght def ensi vel y agoi nst a mobi l e, armor heavy t hr eat wi t ht he hel p of a number of suppor t i ng f or ces . ( pp. 1 - 2 ) Thef r us t r at i on i nher ent i n pl anni ng f or m sai ons r equi r i ng di ver qenrt act i cal s t y l es i s obvi ous. The paper st at es, "Thi s Di v i s i on wass t r uc tur ed t o f i ght i n t he l ow end of t he conf l i c t s pec t r um Thever y nat ur e of t hi s t ype of c onf l i c t does not l end i t s el f t o t hedet ai l ed OPLANs char act er i s t i c of m d- hi gh i nt ens i t y scenar i os . "( p . 2 ) Thi s aut hor bel i eves t hat t he Di vi s i on c an r ec t i f y t h i sc onf l i c t by pl anni ng t o f i ght i n a hi gh i nt ens i t y c onf l i c t t he samet ype of decent r al i zed. of f ens i ve oper at i ons t hat i t pl ans t o pursuei n a l ow i nt ensi t y envi r onment .32. Was s de Czege. comment s t o SAXS 14 Oct ober 17t36.33. Maj or Gener al J ohn W Foss. "L i ght I nf ant r y llas a Pl ac e on *.heBat t l ef i el d" , filmy Tim_es, 24 Oct ober 1984, p. 21.34. Maj or Gener al Howar d G. Cr owel l , J r . and Li eut enant Coi nneiJ ar ed Bat es. " Heavy- Li ght Connect i on : Di vi s i on" . h c ~ g ; ~ y ,J u l v -August 1984) . p. 18.35. Col onel Wass de Czege has emphasi zed t hat i i ght i nf ant r y ar cnot hybr i ds and must pr eser ve t hei r i nt egr i t y. ( S A M5 di scuss i on. i . lOct ober 1986) . Li eut enant Gener al Sai nt has i ndi cat ed =ha= hef eel s L i ght I nf ant r y Di vi s i ons shoul d be f ought at ieonr dsbat t al i ons , and poss i bl y as br i gades or di v i s i ons t o pr eser ve uni ti nt egr i t y and f ac i l i t at e command and cont r ol .


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t o be an ef f ect i ve ro l e f or t ho haadquar t er s t o pl ay .40. See f o r exampl e Li eut enant Gener al J ohn R. Gal vi n, "Heavy- Li ght .For ces and t ho NATO M ssi on". I n f s gt r y , J ul y- August 1984, p.11.41. An excel l ent exampl e of what happens when heavy and : i qhtf or ces ar e t hr own t oget her ut t he t ac t i c al l evel c an be seen i n t heI s r ael i ac t i on at Suez Ci t y i n 1973. The l ack of oper at i onalcommonal i t y i n doct r i ne and t r ai ni ng bet ween Gener al Adan' s br i qadeand hi s at t ached par at r ooper s cont r i but ed s i gni f i cant l y t o t nef ai l ur e of t he m ssi on and t he hi gh number of casual t i es t he uni cr ecel ved. The subj ect of l i ght l nf ant r y i n ur ban combo: i sdevel oped i n det ai l by Hal or Donal d E. Ki r ki and i n h i s monoqr aph.I n f gnt r y Eqece. ( SAMS. For t Leavenwor t h, K a n s a s . 2 Lncamber i 985) .Al so see Avr aham Adan. e~ the Bgnks of Suez, ? res i ( i i o ?r ass,13L30). pp. 426- 430.4 2 . The f ounder and commander of a nurnDer of Ranger L I ?::.~. ' Cni cn;. :Dar by, was an advocat e of i ndi r ect f i r epower i n suppor t of Rangeroper at i ons. He f ound a s t he war pr oqr essed that. ~ n e' anger. s wer emor e successf ul when they had st r ong ar t i l i er y suppor t . ( Ki ng.Leavenwor t h Paper No. 1 1 , p. 41. ) The German Mc u n t a r n 5: v; s; onshad a si gni f i cant amount of or gani c ana suppor t i ng ar r r l i er y. Thef i r epower of t hese bat t eri es was ext r emel y i mpor t an: f o t hei r s 5yl sof f i ght i ng. The Ger mans al so r el i ed on t hei r ai r i or c es f orcr i t i cal support dur i nq mount ai n oper at i ons. ( ? I S P-?34. i?cuntainbJ gJ fgrrL ~ g ~ g ~ g sggcJ J I , 24 Febr uar y L350, pp. 49. 50, 179, aner VLi mhrj r :?.( Combat St udi es I nst i t ut e. CGSC. For = Lunvanwor t h. X.nn.3.3~: J uns1983) . f or war d.47. Ki nq. h,nqswsL z ei s ct * j C ? m g & ~pec?;!.nn.? . . . . z,rm . L . 2 7 : .48. DA Pam 20- 236. N&zh& Wmb g r . ( Depar %nen: of :h e A ~ I I V ,Act i ons, ( Depar t ment of t na Ar my. Washi nst on. UC, I?ar.;.n ~ Y J ~ S ) ,P .248- 254. Mal or Gaor qe D. Baxt ar , "Tact i cni I ni i l t r3: ; on" .-nf ant r y,----- ( Mar ch- Apr i l 1981) . p. 20.47. Ant hony H. Corde. mnan. " Les sons cf +he : I r an- - 1rnc i ~i - : 7r r T,dr>''.Armed_ ~g~~~~ J _o~~r_noL .J une 19R2) . p. 70.

Qf f nc s i y e g p e r g t i g n s UChI3Q E gr g ps i cw3g Z QE :ysayyl. !=il!ll

- .

Washi ngt on DC. . J une 1. 353) . pp. 22-24, 9.4 Pan ' O - L t ' .la. 223.;; zzi ;

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51. I bi d. . p. 73. and Maj or Donal d Zacher l . St ggt agi z 2nd---r aq kJ J g. MMAS Thesi s. ( CGSC. For t Leavenwor t h, Kansas, 1986) .p. 61.52. h s y c & n @ g n d i a f W~c l d i istzzy. pp. 1054- 1055.53. Edqar O' Bal ance. x h g E E ~ a y : 4 z ho g t H L g t o c y , (F'rneger. NewYor k. 1964) . p. 148. The F i nni sh t er m f or an ent r apped enemy i or c ei s a ' mott i ' , whi ch i s t hei r wor d f or a stacl c of f i r ewood pi l ed upt o be chopped. When t he F i nns l acked suf f i c i ent f i r epower t or educe st r ong ' mot t i n' t hey r el i ed on col d and hunger t o d e s r r o yt hei r enem es. Doct or Al l en F . Chew. Q s h t i n s t a g .lgg.sisnr, i !?grntsrl Three Cage St_gdjes. Leavenwor t h Paper Number 5. 1 C:S1 F ort.Leavenwor t h. Kansas. December 19811. p . 2 5 .54. Mal col m Macki nt osh, J u g g n ~n g g t r a f i i g + - ~ c y r S g _ v ~ ? t . izzse_ _ _ _ _ _orces, ( MacMi l l an, N ew Yor k. 1967) . p. 118.55. Chew, E i ght l a g thy? Eg6si an. s 15 k i n t a g . p . 3 0 .5 6 . Was 6 dw Czeqe, br i ef i nq t o SAMS, 14 Uct ober i'3eb.57. Thi s i s al s o one of t he conci usi ons r eached by t he Ar my Sci gnceBoard' s Ad Hoc Gr oup on ur ban war f are. Ar my Sci ence i ronre, c & g a &tng'lbl. ( Of f i ce of t he Ass i st ant Secr et ar y of t he , Ar my ( ! ? C A I .Washi ngt on DC, J anuar y 1' 379) . p. 11 .SA . Avr aham Adan, g= the_ B_a_nks_gf the z ~ e i - , . ( Pr es l di n P re ss , l ?&C 1 .pp. 426- 430.53. W ckham "Lrqht I nf ant r y

A Concept for the Tactical Employment of Light Infantry in Central Europe

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Transcript of A Concept for the Tactical Employment of Light Infantry in Central Europe