A BRIEF HISTORY OF FIELD ARTILLERY ROCKETS, MISSILES, AND THE

THREAT

Dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 heralded

the beginning of the atomic age, often called the nuclear age. Initially, the American

defense establishment made strategic atomic weapons and airpower its number one priority

to deter aggression and relegated the ground forces to a distant second. The Soviet

acquisition of the atomic bomb in 1949, the fall of China to the communists in 1949, and

the Korean War of the early 1950s, however, energized the Army to develop tactical atomic

field artillery rockets and guided missiles to augment a conventional atomic cannon and to

complement strategic atomic weapons. After the Korean War and through the 1980s, the

Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat motivated the Army and the Field Artillery to continue

modernizing and expanding their tactical nuclear weapons arsenal. With the collapse of

the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact in the 1990s, the need for tactical nuclear weapons

disappeared. This emboldened the President of the United States, George H.W. Bush, to

eliminate country’s tactical nuclear weapons and forced Army and the Field Artillery to

rely upon long-range conventional rockets and missiles to counter international threats to

national security.

FIRST GENERATION OF NUCLEAR ROCKETS AND MISSILES

Following World War Two, the American military community concluded that an

air-delivered atomic bomb (a fission bomb in which the atom nucleus was split to generate

energy) represented the ultimate weapon. President Harry Truman and the American

defense community relied upon the threat of the atomic bomb as the nation’s first line of

defense to deter and even halt an invasion of West Europe by the numerically superior

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Soviet army. As the War Department Equipment Board of 1946, headed by General Joseph

W. Stilwell, pointed out, this required developing atomic bombs and long-range bombers

as the nation’s number one priority and warning potential threats that an unprovoked attack

on American interests would cause the United States to counter with atomic weapons. The

Army Air Force would drop atomic bombs on enemy industrial areas, military bases, and

naval ports, to name a few targets, in response to an attack. To make this a reality, the Air

Force, created by the National Defense Act of 1947, acquired the B-36 “Peacemaker”

bomber, a piston-engine aircraft with a range of 9,000 miles and a speed of 435 miles per

hour in 1949, and the B-47 bomber, a jet engine aircraft with a range of 4,600 miles without

bombs and speed of 587 miles per hour in 1951. Both had the ability to deliver the atomic

bomb.1

While dropping atomic bombs dominated the defense community’s thinking and

determined priorities, military strategists still recognized the supporting role of the ground

forces in this new age. They would occupy the hostile territory after the bomb had been

dropped and mop up any enemy military forces that might have survived the blast. In view

of this, the Stilwell Board predicted a prominent role for ground based long-range field

artillery rockets and guided missiles to strike deep into enemy territory and antiaircraft

artillery to protect the ground forces from enemy aircraft. Sometime in the future, these

rockets and missiles would augment the light caliber, multiple rocket launchers with ranges

of 5,000 yards that had been employed during World War Two to saturate a target with

rockets and to complement cannon (tube) artillery. The Stilwell Board even envisioned

using rockets and guided missiles to deliver an atomic warhead.2

3

Upon reviewing Army equipment requirements in light of the progress in rocket

and guided missile technology since 1946, the Army Equipment Board of March 1950

under Lieutenant General John R. Hodge supported obtaining atomic bombs as the top

priority as advocated by the Stilwell Board, promoted modernizing the ground force’s

equipment, and urged the Army to develop surface-to-surface and surface-to-air rockets

and guided missiles. The latter would defend the country and overseas military

installations against air threats, while the former would carry conventional or atomic

warheads to support fast-moving, highly mobile combat units. However, with World War

Two over and no major conflict in sight at the beginning of 1950, the defense budget of

fiscal year 1950 restricted military spending; and the Department of Defense prioritized

its efforts on acquiring aircraft to deliver the atomic bomb.3

Unanticipated events prompted the Army to step up the pace of acquiring rockets

and missiles. Late in 1949, the Soviets detonated their own atomic bomb to end the

American monopoly of the bomb. According to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1950

the American monopoly had discouraged the Soviets from invading West Europe. Armed

with their own atomic bomb, they now would be emboldened to attack. This meant that

the nation’s ground forces had to be modernized. In 1949 China fell to the communists

under Mao Tse Tung. Subsequently, North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950,

reaffirming to American leaders the Soviet Union’s hostility and willingness to support a

client state’s assault on American interests. The invasion also heightened American fears

about Communist aggression and a potential attack on West Europe. Later in 1951, the

Central Intelligence Agency predicted that the Soviets would have 200 atomic bombs by

1954 and would employ them to strike cities and military targets in West Europe. These

4

series of events provided the existential national security crisis for the United States. This

prompted President Dwight D. Eisenhower to decide that the United States needed to be

equipped with the most modern weapons to deter Soviet aggression and to sign National

Security Council Memorandum 162/2 in October 1953. This memorandum encouraged

maintaining and even expanding the country’s nuclear arsenal and played importantly in

the formulation of a doctrine of massive retaliation under the rubric of “the New Look,”

declaring that the United States would respond to communist aggression by employing

nuclear weapons. In harmony with this, the country developed a nuclear bomb (a fusion

bomb in which a fission bomb was used to compress and heat fusion fuel to generate much

greater energy) to be dropped by an aircraft and a nuclear warhead to be delivered by an

intercontinental missile to stay ahead of the Soviets and to discourage Soviet and Chinese

aggression. Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy of relying on nuclear weapons and the

subsequent spurt of military technological innovation aimed to compensate for the Soviet

conventional forces’ numerical superiority and has often been called “the first offset” by

some historians and political scientists. Basically, the United States planned to rely on

nuclear weapons to counteract the Soviet numerical superiority in conventional military

forces. At the time the Soviets could assemble around 175 active divisions and had 125

reserve divisions. In comparison, the United States had 29 Army and Marine divisions

with seven in the reserve and could not afford to expand its conventional forces.4

Simultaneously, Soviet acquisition of an atomic bomb forced the Army to

accelerate development of tactical atomic weapons. Fearing that West Europe would now

be vulnerable to a Soviet attack with conventional and atomic weapons, the Army initiated

work in May 1950 to acquire an atomic cannon. Rushed into production, the M-65 280-

5

mm. cannon, called Atomic Annie, fired an atomic warhead for the first time on 25 May

1953 at Frenchman Flats, Nevada. The warhead had a yield of 15-kilotons, which was

equal to the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945. Weighing 88 tons, the

ungainly cannon required two tractor trucks to move it – one on its front and one on its

rear. The cannon lacked the range (maximum range was 30 kilometers or 20 miles) and

flexibility of aircraft-delivered munitions; but it could provide atomic fire support to

ground forces in all weather and at night whereas aircraft had difficulties providing support

in inclement weather and during hours of darkness.5

Concurrently, the Army rushed the Honest John rocket through development by

using as much off-the-shelf equipment and parts as possible because it promised to provide

the requisite conventional and atomic firepower for the Army. The Army hoped to deploy

the rocket to Korea as an interim rocket until it could be replaced by a better one. Fielded

in 1954 after the Korean War armistice had been signed in 1953, the M31 Honest John was

a free-flight, fin-stabilized, solid propellant rocket. It was fired from a rail-type launcher,

received no guidance in flight, and followed a ballistic trajectory similar to a cannon

projectile. It carried a 1,500-pound conventional or atomic warhead, had a range of 5.7 to

15.7 miles (9.2 to 25.26 kilometers), could hit within 300 yards (274 meters) of the target,

could be transported on highways or cross country with ease, and was less expensive than

a guided missile. Even armed with a conventional warhead, it furnished more fire power

than heavy cannon field artillery. The rocket also provided responsive fire support for the

division and could engage targets beyond the enemy’s forward line of troops and out of

range of conventional cannon artillery.6

6

Atomic Annie, an 8-inch nuclear projectile introduced in 1955, and Honest John

gave the Army the capability to discourage and even thwart a massive Soviet armor strike

through the Fulda Gap into West Germany that would easily overwhelm the West’s

numerically inferior forces. By the mid-1950s, these nuclear weapons along with strategic

nuclear weapons served as the primary means of defending West Europe and prompted the

Army to develop its pentomic division of five battle groups by 1957 to function on the

atomic battlefield. Just as important, nuclear cannon and rocket artillery gave the Army a

place in the Eisenhower administration’s massive retaliation strategy.7

Major General Earle G. Wheeler, Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of

Staff for Military Operations, U.S. Army, explained Honest John’s significance in an

article published in Artillery Trends, a publication of the Artillery and Guided Missile

School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in December 1956.8 “The atomic threat that Honest John

presents to a hostile force is so great that such [Honest John] units are certain to be prime

enemy targets…, he wrote.9 He added, “the ability to go into position, fire, and move out,

is a matter of vital importance, since Honest John will be firing from forward positions

where it is more prone to detection by the enemy as compared with long-range missiles

well to the rear.”10 Fortunately, the rocket’s supersonic speed would protect it from any

known countermeasures once it had been fired. Given this and the capability of carrying

an atomic warhead and the tactical requirement for the rocket, the contractor, Douglas

Aircraft, produced almost 8,000 M31 Honest John rockets for the Army between 1952 and

1960.11

Recognizing the limitations of this hastily developed rocket, the Army upgraded it.

An improvement program in 1958 streamlined the rocket from nose to tail to make it more

7

aerodynamic and simplified firing preparations to make it more responsive and less

vulnerable to enemy counterbattery fire. Designated the M50, the improved Honest John

had a range of 10 to 22 miles (16 to 35 kilometers), had a tighter delivery area of 250 yards

(230 meters), and could carry a nuclear warhead that was more powerful than the M31’s

atomic warhead. It also offered greater mobility than the 280-mm. atomic cannon and

provided general support and reinforcing fires to the division, corps, or field army.

Approximately 7,000 M50’s were produced.12

Although some in the Army wanted to employ the M31 and M50 Honest John to

support airborne units, they lacked sufficient mobility for such duty, causing the Army to

develop the smaller and less capable M51 Little John nuclear rocket. The solid-propellant

Little John had a range of 3,000 to 20,400 meters (3,280 to 22,309 yards), was transportable

by helicopter, weighed about 800 pounds, and delivered a 260-pound conventional or

nuclear warhead. The first operational unit was fielded in 1961. The Army limited

production to 67 rockets because they were designed to provide general support and

reinforcing fires for the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division. With

the introduction of the 155-mm. nuclear projectile in 1963, the Army ultimately declared

the Little John obsolete in 1969.13

Meanwhile, the Army explored adopting long-range guided missiles for general

support that led to fielding the Corporal missile. As early as 1936, a small group of rocket

enthusiasts at the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory at the California Institute of

Technology (GALCIT, later called the Jet Propulsion Laboratory), Pasadena, California,

received permission to organize the GALCIT Research Project to investigate rocketry.

Beginning in May 1944, the GALCIT Research Project developed a succession of rocket

8

test vehicles – the Corporal E, the Private A, the Private F, the WAC Corporal A and B,

the Bumper WAC, and the WAC Corporal – with the goal of obtaining long-range, surface-

to-surface guided missiles. According to the director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory

director William H. Pickering (1954-1976), the “WAC” preface was in honor of the

Women’s’ Army Corps, since these rockets were spinoffs from the larger Corporal missile

and called “the little sisters.” The WAC Corporal missile, the country’s first two-stage

guided missile, paved the way for the Corporal missile of the 1950s.14

The M2 Corporal missile, the Army’s first surface-to-surface guided missile, was

the product of a crash program to develop an interim missile to meet the operational needs

of the Korean War until the more sophisticated Hermes (pronounced air’ mez) A3 and

Redstone missiles could be developed. Acquired to provide the Army with an atomic

delivery system, to extend the range of field artillery, to supplement cannon artillery, and

to give the ground forces a readily available means of all-weather, heavy fire support, the

Corporal could deliver a 20-kiloton nuclear warhead or a conventional warhead, had a

maximum range of 90 miles (145 kilometers), was lighter and offered greater mobility than

the 280-mm. cannon, and furnished all-weather heavy fire support to the division, corps,

or theater army. However, the missile’s failure prone and complex guidance and control

system made the Corporal inaccurate when compared to the accuracy of heavy artillery and

made it poorly suited for nonnuclear employment. The ability to deliver a nuclear warhead

provided the missile with its reason for being and caused the Army to organize 12 Corporal

battalions beginning in 1955, with eight of them in Europe, and to field 358 missiles by

1957.15

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Corporal’s deficiencies that led to an improvement program. As a liquid-propelled

missile, Corporal required many items of specialized ground equipment and a large number

of people for the crew. Because the multi-component liquid fuel was volatile, unstable,

and dangerous, the mixing and fueling processes were detailed and lengthy, and had to be

conducted just before firing, making response time after receiving a target assignment too

long. An upgraded Corporal that eliminated these defects and enhanced reliability and

maintainability went into production in 1957, and remained operational through 1964 when

the solid-propellant Sergeant guided missile replaced it.16

Concurrently, the Army fielded the Lacrosse guided missile. In 1947, based on

World War Two Pacific Theater experience, the Marine Corps developed a requirement

for a conventional and atomic close support weapon to destroy concrete pill boxes, timber-

reinforced, sandbagged bunkers, and other pinpoint targets and area targets up to 30,000

meters (32,808 yards) in range. Following a March 1950 Joint Chiefs of Staff policy giving

the Army control of all surface-to-surface guided missiles, on 31 August 1950 the Navy

transferred the Lacrosse program to the Army, which had the same requirement. The

Army started fielding the Lacrosse in 1959, deploying the missile to Europe and to Korea

the next year. The Lacrosse was a solid propellant, guided missile capable of carrying a

conventional or nuclear warhead up to 12 miles (19 kilometers) in support of the corps and

the division. However, the system’s guidance system could be easily jammed by electronic

countermeasures. This, other technical problems, and the introduction of the 155-mm.

nuclear projectile in 1963 prompted the Army to declare the Lacrosse obsolete and remove

it from its arsenal in 1964.17

10

Assessing the significance of fielded rockets and guided missiles and those

scheduled to be introduced in the near future, the Army cautioned as early as 1956 that they

did not replace cannon artillery but supplemented it by providing unprecedented ranges

and firepower. Together, conventional and nuclear cannon artillery, rockets, and guided

missiles gave the Army flexibility to apply the right amount of firepower as the situation

warranted and to offset the numerical superiority of the Soviet threat in Europe, stood as a

deterrent to Soviet aggression, and provided long-range fires to engage targets far behind

enemy lines.18

Meanwhile in November 1944, the Army signed a contract with General Electric

for the Hermes project to develop technical information on guided missile design and to

acquire surface-to-surface and surface-to-air guided missiles that eventually led to fielding

the Redstone missile, another first generation nuclear missile to complement the Lacrosse,

the Corporal, and the Honest John. In 1946 the Army’s Ordnance Department signed a

contract with General Electric for the Hermes project. The project combined German A4

missile technology with American innovations and led to a feasibility study in 1950 for

surface-to-surface guided missiles – the Hermes A1, an antiaircraft missile that never left

the planning stage; the Hermes A2, a surface-to-surface missile; and the Hermes A3, a

tactical missile intended to deliver a 450-kiloton warhead. The Army also planned to

develop the high-performance Hermes C1 with a 3,200-kilometer (1,988-mile) range.

Severe budget cuts forced cancellation of the Hermes A1 and A2; and constantly changing

specifications generated by the rapid development of nuclear weapons and Army nuclear

doctrine prevented development of the Hermes A3. This left just the Hermes C1. As the

Korean War dragged on, Hermes C1 increased in importance with the hopes that it would

11

be operational for employment in Korea to help defeat a numerically superior threat. The

Chief of Ordnance found work on the missile to be valuable, ordered further work, but did

not authorize active development of Hermes C1. Instead, the Army asked Werner von

Braun’s team that had just moved to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, in October 1950, to

pursue development of a single-engine, single-stage tactical ballistic missile known as

Hermes C. Although General Electric Hermes project did not field any missiles, it

provided valuable experience in handling and firing large missiles and pioneered missile

development.19

The Army subsequently transferred responsibility for rocket and guided missile

development from General Electric to the Army’s Guided Missile Center at Redstone

Arsenal, Alabama, in 1951. At that time the Army directed developing the Corporal and

Hermes C as top priorities. The Corporal would have a range of 5.7 to 40.2 miles (9.17 to

64.7 kilometers), while the Hermes C would have a range of 172 to 863 miles (277 to 1,389

kilometers) to provide theater support.20

In 1952 the Army renamed the Hermes C the Redstone after the Redstone Arsenal.

To speed up development and to make it mobile, the Army and Chrysler, the contractor,

reduced the Redstone’s range to 58 to 200 miles (93 to 322 kilometers). Following the first

successful flight in August 1953, Chrysler began full production in 1955 with 120 missiles

being manufactured between 1955 and 1960 with the first operational Redstone battalion

being activated in 1956. Two years later in 1958, the Army deployed a Redstone battalion

to West Germany to become the Army’s first large guided missile deployed overseas. In

fact, the Redstone was the Army’s largest and longest range tactical weapon at the time

until Pershing I with a 430 miles range (692 kilometers) and Pershing II with a 1,000 mile

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range (1,609 kilometers) were introduced in the 1960s and even served to launch America’s

first satellite into space in 1958.21

A liquid-propellant missile, the Redstone provided mixed blessings. While it could

deliver a nuclear warhead within 1,000 feet of the aim point to unprecedented ranges in

support of the field army and represented a distinct improvement over the Corporal with

its ability to engage targets deep in enemy territory, it required 20 heavy vehicles to move

a battalion and upon reaching a launch site required eight hours to set up the missile for

firing, to solve the gunnery problem, and to fire. Upon receiving the launch order, fueling

required another 15 minutes before the Redstone could be launched.22

Although they were cumbersome, the Redstone and other nuclear rockets and

missiles not only expanded the Army’s firepower exponentially to meet Cold War

requirements but also forced the Army to write tactical doctrine for nuclear weapons.

Published in 1951, Field Manual 100-31, Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons, reminded

officers that atomic weapons would not end conflicts by themselves but had to be integrated

into tactical operations and basically described atomic weapons as weapons with greater

firepower than conventional cannon, rocket, and guided missile artillery. At this point in

time, the Army and the Field Artillery envisioned an atomic field artillery weapon as just

another powerful weapon at their disposal.23

By the end of the 1950s, doctrine for employing nuclear artillery began to crystalize

as the number of tactical nuclear weapons grew. Department of the Army Pamphlet 39-3,

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (May 1957), furnished information on the primary effects

of a nuclear detonation and covered the fission process, the fusion process, blast effects,

thermal radiation, and nuclear radiation. Department of the Army Pamphlet 39-1, Atomic

13

Weapons Employment (June 1956), outlined suitable targets, damage estimation charts,

troop safety, and other information concerning employment. As Lieutenant Colonel David

E. Wright, Jr. of the Department of Tactics and Combined Arms at the U.S. Army Artillery

and Missile School, Fort Sill clarified in 1960, proper employment required a full

appreciation of blast, thermal, and nuclear radiation effects. While conventional weapons

caused a selective effect on a target, nuclear weapons destroyed the desired target and

everything in the vicinity and created deadly radiation. In view of this, commanders had

to have a general plan for the employment of nuclear weapons that considered the desired

results, the undesired effects, and the acceptable risks to friendly troops, and could not use

them casually or indiscriminately as they might a conventional rocket, missile, or cannon.24

As it moved into the 1960s, the Army had the weapons to fight a tactical nuclear

war or conventional war and concluded that nuclear warfare was the most rapidly

employable means to influence action but brought with it the danger of extensive damage,

including radiological contamination. As a result, the Army taught commanders to employ

the smallest available weapon that produced the desired effect. For example, nuclear

cannon projectiles, rockets, and guided missiles would be the preferred means of

conducting counterbattery work where heavy concentrations of fire were required and

where the risk of contaminating friendly forces was low. In fact, the Army considered a

single nuclear round to be more effective against enemy indirect fire systems than fire from

hundreds of conventional field artillery pieces. Although conventional firepower remained

critical for defeating forward enemy positions, nuclear firepower would annihilate the

enemy, permit the maneuver arms to seize and hold ground, and provide the decisive

element of an attack or defense. Commanders had the flexibility to employ conventional

14

field artillery against appropriate targets, reserving nuclear field artillery, rockets, and

missiles for targets where greater effects were required. Nuclear weapons were not seen

as the first resort; and thoughtful consideration was required before launching nuclear

weapons.25

Interestingly, nuclear field artillery rockets and guided missiles along with the 280-

mm. atomic cannon and nuclear 8-inch projectile brought the Army and the Field Artillery

back into relevance in the nuclear age. In the aftermath of dropping the atomic bomb on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the Air Force occupied the focal point in the country’s

national security posture, with the atomic bomb deterring enemy aggression. In the worst

case scenario the Air Force would drop nuclear bombs on the aggressor if the United States

were attacked or threatened. As Brian M. Linn argued in The Echo of Battle: The Army’s

Way of War, this thinking made developing nuclear bombs and delivery systems paramount

for defending the country and left the Army and the Field Artillery in a quandary about

their role in the nuclear age.

When the Soviets exploded their atomic bomb in 1949, the United States lost its

monopoly of atomic weapons and their effectiveness as a deterrence to a Soviet invasion

of West Europe. With a Soviet attack now possible as clearly demonstrated by its client

state of North Korea, the Army, the Field Artillery, and North Atlantic Organization Treaty

concluded that ground forces armed only with conventional weapons would have to retreat

in the face of an assault from a numerically superior opponent, allowing the Soviets to

overrun the West. Fielding the 280-mm. atomic cannon, 8-inch nuclear projectile, and

nuclear rockets and missiles in the 1950s dramatically altered this scenario. These tactical

nuclear weapons gave the Army and the Field Artillery the capability of unleashing

15

unprecedented lethality to counter a Soviet invasion and offset Soviet numerical superiority

in conventional forces and to make it relevant in the nuclear age; but employing tactical

nuclear weapons would cause extensive destruction and radiation that would produce

unimaginable collateral damage to civilian infrastructure and friendly troops that tried to

cross the ground where the nuclear warhead had impacted.

SECOND GENERATION NUCLEAR ROCKETS AND MISSILES

With the signing of the armistice to end the Korean War in 1953, the Army turned

its attention once again to the Soviet threat in Europe. As the Soviets improved their

tactical nuclear field artillery rockets and missile systems and made them a vital part of

their offensive operations, the Army faced the imperative of improving its tactical nuclear

rocket and missiles systems. This led to developing the second generation of Army nuclear

rockets and guided missiles – Sergeant, Pershing, and Lance – even as the first generation

– Honest John, Little John, Corporal, Lacrosse and Redstone – was being fielded.26

The genesis of the Sergeant guided missile that replaced the Corporal began in 1948

when the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Thiokol began examining new solid-propellant

rocket designs for the Army under the name of Sergeant. This Sergeant effort lasted

through 1951 but failed to produce an acceptable solid-propellant motor for tactical missile

applications. Subsequently, General Electric initiated a test program for Hermes A2 that

proved the feasibility of solid-propellant motors. However, funding cutbacks caused

Hermes A2 to be cancelled in 1953. Aware of the Soviet advancements in rocketry and

guided missiles and the existence of a numerically superior Soviet military force in East

Europe, the Army Field Forces in October 1954 advised developing the Sergeant missile

immediately as a counterpoise. Shortly after, the Army requested proposals from several

16

companies to develop the solid-propellant Sergeant guided missile. After seven years of

development, the Army deployed the first Sergeant missile for general support of the army

or corps or reinforcing nuclear fires to the corps when it activated two Sergeant battalions

in 1962. Over the next two years, the Army deployed seven more Sergeant battalions with

one going to the Strategic Army Corps, five to Europe, and one to Korea.27

Even before the Sergeant became operational, the Ordnance Missile Command at

Redstone Arsenal explained the major advantages that the missile had over the Corporal.

The Corporal required 11 vehicles and 10 trailers of various sizes to transport it, while the

Sergeant used five trailers towed by their prime movers. The solid propellant fuel was less

volatile than liquid propellant. Due to the solid-propellant, the Sergeant could be fired

every 30 minutes from a given launcher, whereas the liquid-propellant Corporal could be

fired at a rate of one every two hours from a given launcher. The Sergeant was also less

complex to maintain and was more resistant to countermeasures. Last, the Sergeant

required 30,000 pounds of support equipment compared to the 300,000 pounds for the

Corporal, giving it more mobility.28

Subsequent to the deployment of Sergeant in 1962, an article in December 1964

Artillery Trends explained succinctly its significance. “It [Sergeant] was the beginning of

the end of the era of liquid-fueled, complex-oriented missile systems,” the article

explained.29 The key improvements gave Sergeant all-weather, all-terrain operation

capabilities, while the solid-propellant motor gave quick reaction and rapid emplacement

and displacement. The Sergeant remained in service through 1977 until it was replaced by

the Lance guided missile.30

17

The Pershing and Lance missiles represented the epitome of the second generation

of nuclear missiles. The Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the fear of further Soviet

aggression, and Sputnik I that was launched by the Soviets in 1957 cast doubt on the United

States’ capability to defend West Europe as a part of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization and its claim to technological superiority. In view of this, President Dwight

D. Eisenhower directed that the United States needed to be equipped with the most modern

weapons to deter Soviet aggression and offset Soviet numerical superiority. This caused

the Department of Defense in January 1958 to direct the Army’s Ballistic Missile Agency

at Redstone Arsenal to develop a new solid-propellant nuclear missile to replace the aging,

liquid-propellant Redstone missile. The new missile required a range of 575 to 850 miles

(925 to 1,368 kilometers), had to be transportable by helicopter and fixed wing aircraft,

and had to be capable of being fired at a moment’s notice. This led to the development of

the Pershing missile named after General of the Armies of the United States John J.

Pershing. To keep pace with Soviet rocket and missile developments, the Army traded off

requirements, particularly range, in order to accelerate the development of the Pershing

missile and to get it operational sooner. Within two years after development began, the

Pershing debuted at the Atlantic Missile Range in 1960. The 32-foot Pershing was smaller

and lighter than the 69-foot Redstone and employed a solid-propellant engine to reduce

weight and to improve mobility. The solid propellant also reduced response time because

the missile did not have to be fueled at the firing point and eliminated the need for heavy

and cumbersome propellant generating and transporting equipment associated with liquid-

propellant missiles. The missile was immune to electronic jamming devices of the time,

was capable of carrying a 60-, 200-, or 400-kiloton nuclear warhead, and could to engage

18

targets up to 430 miles (692 kilometers) from the launch point. It was sufficiently mobile

to go anywhere the field army deployed and transportable overland and by helicopter or

fixed wing aircraft. This combination gave the commander an unprecedented increase in

firepower. In June 1962 the Army formed the first Pershing battery. Two years later in

1964, the Army assigned the first Pershing units to West Germany where they replaced the

Redstone to provide nuclear fires in support of special employment or in general support

of the field army or independent corps. By 1965 the Army had three Pershing battalions

of eight launchers each in Europe. According to Lieutenant General John P. Daley,

Commanding General, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, the combination of

nuclear warheads and guided missiles, especially the Pershing missile, revolutionized

firepower, and contributed to the Army’s nuclear strike capability in Europe.31

In 1965, after a study found the Pershing superior to tactical aircraft in the theater

quick reaction alert mission, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara directed Pershing

to assume the theater quick reaction alert mission. Beginning in 1965, this became the

Pershing’s primary mission while support to the field army became a secondary

responsibility to be undertaken once the quick reaction alert task had been accomplished.

Supporting the field army as a surface-to-surface missile, the Pershing had refire

capabilities, but the new quick reaction alert mission required getting as many missiles as

possible in the air at once, which was not considered when developing the missile. Pending

materiel improvements, the Army changed tactics to meet the quick reaction alert mission.

A portion of each Pershing unit was to maintain the highest level of combat readiness and

be ready to fire at a moment’s notice. The Army placed two of the four Pershing batteries

in each battalion on constant alert at prepared firing sites. The third battery would be on

19

alert at its home station, while the fourth battery would be at home station in a maintenance

status. As Lieutenant General Austin W. Betts, Chief of Army Research and Development

explained, the objective of having three batteries ready to fire almost instantaneously

centered on getting as many missiles launched in the shortest possible time. Basically, the

quick reaction alert mission involved providing short notice nuclear fire support on high-

priority targets assigned by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.32

In 1965 the Army started upgrading the Pershing, now Pershing I, to become the

Pershing IA to meet the new mission requirements. The contractor replaced Pershing

tracked vehicles with wheeled vehicles for better movement over paved roads, improved

the transporter-erector launcher, and added a trailer to carry the missile’s warhead. This

allowed for faster deployment and permitted the missile to serve the quick reaction alert

mission more effectively. Pershing IA replaced the Pershing I by 1970.33

During the 1970s, Soviet and American activities in Europe dramatically altered

the balance of power on the continent and influenced moves to limit intermediate-range

nuclear forces – the Pershing missile and the Ground-Launched Cruise Missile. At the

beginning of the decade, United States’ strategic guarantees and North Atlantic Treaty

Organization medium-range bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and tactical

nuclear weapons had sufficient power to deter Soviet aggression. To counter these

weapons the Soviets deployed their SS-20 missile that had a longer range, greater mobility,

a triple warhead, and superior accuracy over its predecessors, the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles,

by the middle of the 1970s. This action nullified the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s

nuclear superiority and threatened its security. Fearing this shift in nuclear superiority,

West Germany pushed to modernize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s theater

20

nuclear weapons by opening discussions with other West European nations over the

preferable means of offsetting Soviet SS-20 missiles. As a part of this effort to readdress

the imbalance, in 1973 the Army began developing the sophisticated Pershing II missile

with a range of 1,000 miles (1,609 kilometers) to replace the aging Pershing IA missile

with a range of 400 miles (644 kilometers).34

Although Western European countries envisioned the number of Pershing IIs being

reduced from the original number as a result of American efforts to limit intermediate-

range nuclear forces in Europe, the Soviets still considered the missile to be provocative.

Viewing the missile’s lethality, mobility, survivability, and range, the Soviets pointed out

that it could reach western portions of the Soviet Union from West European launch sites

in six minutes and was a first-strike weapon, but they overlooked that their SS-20

threatened virtually all of the West. Hoping to avert deployment, the Soviets staged a

monumental propaganda campaign in West Germany, which generated heated debates in

the West German legislature and caused the West German public to demonstrate against

deployment. Despite this opposition, the United States started activating Pershing II units

in West Germany in December 1983.35

Pershing II gave commanders unmatched capabilities. The missile could rapidly

strike deep into the enemy’s rear operational area with sufficient striking force to

desynchronize the forward movement of rear echelons, while the missile’s accuracy

permitted surgically destroying hardened point targets with its nuclear warhead that could

penetrate deep into the earth before exploding and obliterating the target with minimal

collateral damage. As experts noted, such devastating precision nuclear strikes would

21

cause forward movement to grind to a halt with the Pershing II annihilating units and

disrupting logistics and communications.36

Prodded by the specter of nuclear war in Europe, the Soviet Union and the United

States entered negotiations to reduce their intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe.

After lengthy discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, President

Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-

Range Nuclear Force Treaty in December 1987 to eliminate their countries’ intermediate-

range (1,000-5,000 kilometer) and shorter-range (500-1,000 kilometer) missiles to lessen

the risk of nuclear war and to promote international peace, security, and strategic stability.

Article III of the treaty declared the Pershing II to be an intermediate-range missile that

was subject to the treaty and that along with its launchers and all support structures would

be removed from the United States’ arsenal within three years after the effective date of

the treaty. Equally important, the treaty permitted each country to inspect the other one to

ensure compliance with this provision. The treaty covered 234 Pershing IIs, the most

formidable weapon ever fielded by the Army, and 169 Pershing IA missiles. Army

contractors destroyed Pershing IA missiles by July 1989 and Pershing II missiles by May

1991. After almost three decades of service, the Pershing missile’s service to the country

ended.37

With the phasing out of the nuclear-capable Pershing missile, the Army had only

Lance missile to serve as a nuclear deterrent to complement 8-inch and 155-mm. nuclear

projectiles. The Lance missile originated in the mid-1950s when the Army established its

concept of a family of surface-to-surface missiles for 1965-1970 to replace the Honest John

rocket fielded in 1954 and the Sergeant deployed in 1962. In 1973 the Army began

22

converting Sergeant and Honest John battalions in Europe to Lance battalions. This

conversion gave the Army a more flexible and versatile missile than ever before in Europe.

The new missile was mobile in all types of terrain, capable of being fired from its own

carrier, provided nuclear and nonnuclear fires, and was simple to operate and maintain. In

fact, the missile was so simple to operate that an observer would note little difference

between occupation of position by the Lance and occupation of position by a single self-

propelled howitzer. It also could be air dropped by a fixed wing aircraft, moved by

helicopter, and could survive by effectively hiding and delivering ordnance when and

where needed to a range of 90 kilometers (56 miles). The Lance’s primary targets

included enemy missile firing positions, airfields, transportation centers, command and

logistic installations, critical terrain features, such as bridges and supply routes, and large

troop concentrations in support of the corps or reinforcing the division. This latter mission

meant taking away the corps commander’s long-range artillery. According to Lieutenant

Colonel Wilson A. Shoffner, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 79th Field Artillery

Regiment (Lance), in 1976, Lance’s reason for being was to provide the corps with a

capacity to deal with a major enemy attack and achieve a quick, decisive reversal of that

attack. However, the weapon’s high cost and limited numbers forced the corps commander

to employ the missile selectively in concert with cannon artillery and tactical air support.38

Recognizing that the Lance missile represented 1960s technology, the Army took

action in the 1980s to replace it. Initially, the Army hoped to use the Joint Tactical Missile

System, renamed the Army Tactical Missile System, in 1985 as a corps artillery weapon to

deliver a conventional or nuclear warhead. However, congressional legislation limited the

Army Tactical Missile System to carrying conventional munitions. This forced the Army

23

to develop a program to extend the Lance’s life through 1995. The Army found this to be

prohibitive and opted to replace the Lance with a weapon with greater accuracy and range.

The Follow-on-To Lance missile would carry a conventional or nuclear warhead, be

launched from a multiple rocket launcher, and be a corps weapon. In December 1988 the

Secretary of Defense approved fielding the nuclear Follow-on-To Lance for employment

against high priority targets beyond the line of contact that had a direct impact on the corps-

level battle.39

Optimism about the missile quickly changed. As political relations between the

West Germany and East Germany became more amicable and as the threat of a Soviet-

Warsaw Pact invasion faded, the rationale for nuclear weapons precipitously declined.

This caused Europeans and Americans to question the need for nuclear weapons and even

to accept reducing their numbers. With this as a backdrop, President George H.W. Bush

announced in May 1990 that the United States would not modernize its short-range, land-

based nuclear missiles. This terminated the Follow-on-To Lance.40

The Lance and 8-inch and 155-mm. nuclear projectiles all met a similar fate. In

September 1991 President Bush announced that the United States would destroy its

stockpile of surface-to-surface, tactical nuclear weapons. This ended the Army’s and the

Field Artillery’s nuclear delivery mission and caused the active Army and Army reserve

components to turn in their equipment that supported the nuclear mission. One month later

in October 1991, President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev announced a cut in

Soviet tactical nuclear weapons. Although the Soviet Union fell shortly thereafter, the

United States signed a nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and

Ukraine in May 1992. With this the Army inactivated Lance units with the final one being

24

stood down at Fort Sill on 30 June 1992 and relegated the excess missiles to serve as

targets.41

The deactivation of the Lance and the demise of the Follow-on-To Lance brought

an era to a close. For almost 40 years, the Field Artillery had nuclear rockets and missiles

to complement nuclear cannon artillery. These weapons possessed the ability to wreak

unprecedented havoc on the battlefield and provided unparalleled range for a field artillery

weapon. Though never fired in anger, rockets and missiles stood poised to respond to a

Soviet-Warsaw Pact invasion of the West that never came, successfully serving their

mission as deterrents to stop Soviet aggression towards the West. Today, rather than

pointed against the Soviet-Warsaw Pact that had dissolved in the 1990s, these rockets and

missiles could be found in the Field Artillery Museum’s Artillery Park, Fort Sill, as a stark

reminder of a dangerous past where a small incident could have triggered a nuclear war in

Europe.

A NEW ERA

Just as the Cold War provided the rationale for developing and acquiring tactical

nuclear rockets and missiles, it also justified adopting the Multiple Launch Rocket System

and the Army Tactical Missile System during the last decades of the 20th Century. While

the United States was fighting in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviet Union

modernized its nuclear and conventional ground forces. Noting the numerically superior

Soviet-Warsaw Pact military force with its modernized weapons and equipment and the

effectiveness of air defenses in the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, the Army launched

an aggressive modernization effort to replace aging weapons with new ones by investing

in extended-range precision munitions; stealth aircraft; and new intelligence, surveillance,

25

and reconnaissance platforms. As a part of this modernization effort, the Army and the

Field Artillery adopted the Multiple Launch Rocket System and the Army Tactical Missile

System that gave the Field Artillery precision capabilities, among other weapons.42

The Army’s experience with multiple rocket launchers dated back to World War

Two. Although they were inaccurate and possessed only 5,000-yard (4,572-meter) ranges,

the rockets provided incomparable firepower and the ability to destroy area targets.

However, the Army’s development of more glamorous tactical nuclear rockets and guided

missiles in the 1950s and 1960s to deter a Soviet invasion of the West caused it to ignore

modernizing its multiple rocket launchers. By the 1970s the Army’s arsenal of multiple

rocket launchers was obsolete.43

Several factors revived the Army’s interest in multiple rocket launchers in the

1970s. First, numerous studies raised the necessity of a multiple rocket launcher to offset

the Soviet-Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in Europe and simultaneously outlined the

requirement for an all-weather conventional area fire support weapon system. Second,

aggressive Arab air defense systems wreaked havoc with the Israeli aircraft in the Israeli-

Arab War of October 1973. To neutralize such effective Arab air defenses, the Israelis

turned to multiple rocket launchers to suppress them so that their aircraft could attack

targets behind Arab lines. Third, the Soviet-Warsaw Pact was introducing new long-range

multiple rocket launchers to enhance its conventional firepower.44

As convincing as these reasons were for modernizing its multiple rocket launcher

inventory, only after a rigorous debate within the Army did the Field Artillery School push

acquiring the General Support Rocket System multiple rocket launcher, later called the

Multiple Launch Rocket System. As outlined by the school in March 1974, the system’s

26

rockets would suppress enemy indirect fire and air defense systems by delivering a

tremendous volume of fire at long ranges. From the perspective of the Commandant of the

Field Artillery School, Major General Donald R. Keith (1976-1977), the Multiple Launch

Rocket System’s chief attraction was its capability of saturating a target with rocket fire.45

Recognizing this, the Army fielded the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System

launcher that fired 12 rockets and formed its first operational battery of nine M270

launchers in March 1983. Shortly thereafter in September 1983, the Army deployed a

battery to West Germany and fielded an average of three batteries a year between 1983 and

1987 to give it 25 batteries. The system provided the Army with a conventional, all-

weather, indirect fire, and an area fire support system to engage indirect fire systems, air

defense systems, lightly armored formations, and soft stationary targets out to 30

kilometers. Its primary mission focused on the suppression, neutralization, and destruction

of threat fire support systems and forward area air defense sites.46

Even though Operation Desert Storm validated the effectiveness of the M270

launcher and rockets, combat operations highlighted critical deficiencies. Combat taxed

the launcher’s aging fire control system, and underscored the need to reduce the time to

aim and load the launcher to decrease the system’s reaction time on battlefields that

promised to become even more mobile and chaotic in the future. Improving the fire control

system and decreasing the system’s reaction time during the 1990s created the M270A1

Multiple Launch Rocket System launcher that fired 12 rockets. Operation Desert Storm

also revealed the proliferation of long-range rocket and cannon artillery. To counter this

and to engage more targets, the Army adopted the Extended Range Multiple Launch

Rocket System rocket with a range of 45 kilometers early in the 1990s and later the Guided

27

Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket with a range of 60 kilometers to provide precision

capabilities. Operation Desert Storm also encouraged the Army to introduce the M142

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System in 2005. The M142 fired six rockets from a

wheeled platform that was lighter than the tracked M270A1 and furnished greater strategic

mobility.47

Another critical deficiency involved the Multiple Launch Rocket System’s Dual-

Purpose Improved Conventional Munition. A carrier shell, the Dual-Purpose Improved

Conventional Munition, commonly known as a cluster munition, dispensed anti-

personnel/anti-material submunitions (bomblets) that carpeted an entire grid square,

causing Iraqi soldiers in Operation Desert Storm of 1991 to call them “Steel Rain.” The

submunitions often failed to detonate upon impact when fired in soft terrain like the sand

of Iraq and left dangerous duds on the battlefield that might explode unexpectedly,

prompting the Army to reduce the dud rate. The Extended Range Multiple Launch Rocket

System Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition delivered anti-personnel/anti-

material submunitions. Subsequently, the Army introduced the Guided Multiple Launch

Rocket System Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition that also carried anti-

personnel/anti-material submunitions. Both had longer ranges and lower dud rates than

their Operation Desert Storm predecessor and engaged soft and lightly armored combat

vehicles, multiple rocket launchers, towed artillery, air defense units, and command,

control, and communication sites.48

Over the years, cluster munitions, such as the Dual-Purpose Improved

Conventional Munition, generated controversy. Armies first used them in World War Two,

and at least 21 countries have employed them since. While the United States employed

28

them in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets utilized them in Afghanistan in

the 1970s and 1980s; and the British employed them in the Falkland Islands in the 1980s.

Subsequently, the United States used cluster munitions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first

decade of the 21st Century.49

Seizing on media coverage of the Israeli use of cluster munitions with their

collateral damage in urban areas of Lebanon in 2006, a group of nations led by Norway

reached an agreement on 30 May 2008, called the Dublin Accord, to ban them. In

December 2008 94 countries signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, or Oslo

Convention, that clearly defined and prohibited the development, production, acquisition,

transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions. The United States, Russia, China, Israel,

Egypt, India, and Pakistan, however, did not participate in the talks that led to the

agreement or sign the convention. By December 2009 103 states had signed the

convention.50

Although it recognized cluster munitions as a legitimate weapon with clear military

utility and did not support banning them, the Department of Defense in the meantime

officially announced in June 2008 a moratorium on the production and use of cluster

munitions that would leave more than one percent submunition duds and subsequently

approved an effort in October 2008 to develop a viable alternative to the Guided Multiple

Launch Rocket System Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition. This led to

fielding the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead in 2016. The

munition dispensed non-explosive submunitions and engaged the same targets as the

cluster munition did without the lingering effect of unexploded ordinance. The Alternative

Warhead complemented the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary that was a

29

single, high-explosive warhead, could be launched from both the M270A1 and M142

launchers, could hit point targets with minimal collateral damage, and complemented the

M982 155-mm. Excalibur precision guided munition and the M1156 Precision Guided Kit

that turned conventional unguided cannon munition into precision and near precision

munitions, respectively.51

Meanwhile, the Army replaced the Lance with the Army Tactical Missile System.

The Army Tactical Missile System missile could be launched from the M270, M270A1,

and the M142 launcher and had a longer range than the Lance to permit hitting second and

third echelon forces. The Army Tactical Missile System was introduced in two blocks.

The Army Tactical Missile System Block I was an unguided missile with a range of 35 to

165 kilometers (21 to 103 miles), and dispensed anti-personnel/anti-material submunitions

to engage lightly armored formations, infantry, command and control centers, and air

defense units; was introduced in 1990; and was fired in Operation Desert Storm. Six years

later, in 1996, the Army fielded the Army Tactical Missile System Block IA. It was a

guided missile which delivered a smaller payload of anti-personnel/anti-material

submunitions 70 to 300 kilometers (48 miles to 186 miles). Both missiles permitted

attacking high-payoff targets and disrupted the tempo and efficiency of the enemy’s

operations.52

In 2001 the Army introduced the M48 Army Tactical Missile System Quick

Reaction Unitary. Based on the Block 1A, it employed the Global Positioning System for

accuracy to attack high-payoff targets precisely at extended ranges as well as troops in

contact with minimal collateral damage, delivering a single 500-pound high-explosive

warhead out to 270 kilometers (168 miles).53

30

By 2014 the Army had four variants of the Army Tactical Missile System – the

M39 Block I Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition, the M39A1 Block IA, the

M48 Quick Reaction Unitary, and M57 Unitary – that possessed long-range, all-weather

capabilities and provided the joint task force and corps commander with the ability to

engage targets throughout the depths of the battlefield. The Block I and Block IA were

employed extensively and effectively early in the major combat portion of Operation Iraqi

Freedom of 2003; the Quick Reaction Unitary was used with great effectiveness in

Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.54

Army Tactical Missile System Block I and Block IA with anti-personnel/anti-

material submunitions did not comply with the 2008 Department of Defense policy on

cluster munitions, which precluded using them after 1 January 2018, and were scheduled

to be removed from the inventory by 2019 until the Department of Defense cluster

munition policy was revised on 30 November 2017. This revision, based on the renewed

threat of Russian aggression, re-emphasized the need for cluster munitions, retained current

stockpiles, delegated release authority down to combatant commanders, and directed the

services to pursue replacements to the meet the less than one percent unexploded ordnance

requirement of the 2008 policy.55

Over a period of years, the Army explored a service life extension program for the

Army Tactical Missile System. As of early 2014, the Army had service life extension

programs for Army Tactical Missile Systems I, IA, and Unitary. By refurbishing or

replacing propulsion and navigation systems and replacing the non-compliant cluster

munition warheads on the Army Tactical Missile System I and IA with the Unitary, the

service life extension program would provide time to complete the development of a

31

successor to the Army Tactical Missile System to satisfy the Long Range Precision Fires

Strategy.56

As much as tactical nuclear rockets and missiles revolutionized the Field Artillery

by giving it unprecedented destructive capabilities, the Multiple Launch Rocket System

and the Army Tactical Missile System also transformed the branch. These systems

furnished unmatched long-range, conventional firepower to neutralize threat indirect fire

systems, air defense systems, command posts, large bodies of enemy troops, and other

targets. Of the two, Army Tactical Missile System had the capability of engaging targets

at longer ranges than the Multiple Launch Rocket System. Perhaps, the most

transformative aspect involved the introduction of the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket

System Unitary and the Army Tactical Missile System Block IA, the Army Tactical Missile

System Quick Reaction Unitary, and the Army Tactical Missile System Unitary. These

missiles gave the Field Artillery precision capabilities to supplement the area fire

capabilities of field artillery cannon and rocket systems and the precision 155-mm.

Excalibur munition and near-precision cannon munitions fitted with the Precision

Guidance Kit. In so doing, they could be employed to hit a particular target with minimal

collateral damage.

Rockets and guided missiles dramatically changed the Field Artillery. The nuclear

capable systems developed in the 1950s and 1960s provided unprecedented firepower and

range, fortunately were never fired in anger, and kept the Army and the Field Artillery

relevant in the nuclear age. The M270, M270A1, and M142 launchers and their family of

rockets and missiles gave the Field Artillery tremendous firepower to destroy area targets

and the precision to attack pinpoint targets and made the branch relevant in urban warfare

32

and on the modern complex battlefield.

1Janice E. McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 1775-2003 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2007), p. 209; Mary T. Cagle, “History of the Basic (B31) Honest John Rocket System, 1950-1964,” Historical Monograph Project No. AMC 7M, Part 1, 7 Apr 1964, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, pp. 1, 4, Historical Research and Documents Collection (HRDC), U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Historian’s Office, Fort Sill, Ok; Richard Lingeman, The Noir Forties: The American People from Victory to Cold War (New York: Nation Books, 2012), p. 249. 2Cagle, “History of the Basic (B31) Honest John Rocket System, 1950-1964,” pp. 5-7, 12-14, 17; John W. Bullard, “History of the Redstone Missile System,” pp. 19-20, Army Missile Command, 15 Oct 1965, HRDC; MG Holger N. Toftoy, “Army Missile Development,” Army Information Digest, Dec 1956, pp. 10-34. 3McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, pp. 211-12; Cagle, “History of the Basic (B31) Honest John Rocket System, 1950-1964,” pp. 12-14; Bullard, “History of the Redstone Missile System,” p. 4, HRDC; Toftoy, “Army Missile Development,” pp. 10-34; MG J.P. Daley, “Missile Research and Development,” Army Information Digest, Dec 1956, pp. 45-51

4J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford, UK: The Military Press, 1989), p. 267; Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2015), pp. 13-14, 38; Donald A. Carter, The U.S. Army before Vietnam, 1953-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2015), p. 8; Zachary Keck, “A Tale of Two Offset Strategies,” The Diplomat, 18 Nov 2014, www.thediplomat.com; Peter Grier, “The First Offset,” Air Force Magazine, Jun 2016, pp. 56-60.

5Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 267; Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962, pp. 13-14, 38; Carter, The Army before Vietnam, p. 24.

61LT Leon Moore, “Honest John,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, pp. 49-51; Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., Training Text on Honest John, Sep 1954, p. 9, UL408.43 H5D6, Morris Swett Technical Library (MSTL), Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., Notes on Development Type Material for the Honest John (Model 1236F) Type II Large Caliber Field Rocket, Jan 1953, p. 2, UL 408.43 H5D61, SM-14681, MSTL; “Employment of the Honest John in a Conventional War,” Artillery Trends, Jan 1967, pp. 50-52; Field Manual 6-61, Field Artillery Battalion, Honest John, Apr 1966, p. 4; Maj Gen Earle G. Wheeler, “Missiles on the Firing Line,” Army Information Digest, Dec 1956, pp. 36, 42; Information Paper, Redstone Arsenal, subj: Honest John, undated, HRDC; Honest John Training Text, Douglas Aircraft, 1954, p. 1, UL408.43 H5D6, MSTL; Technical Manual 9-1340-202-12, Operator and Maintenance Manual: 762-mm. Rocket, Honest John, p. 1-2, UL408.43 H5U5, MSTL; Notes on Development Type Material for the Honest John, Type II, Large Caliber Field Rocket, Douglas Aircraft, 1953, p. 2, UL 408.43 H5D61, MSTL; “Employment of the Honest John in a Conventional War,” Artillery Trends, Jan 1967, pp. 50-52; Carter, Forging the Shield, pp. 13, 38-40, 212, 217, 247, 257-59, 270-74; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 267.

_________________

33

__________________ 7See Footnote 6. 8Wheeler, “Missiles on the Firing Line,” p. 42.

9Ibid. 10Ibid. 11Ibid., p. 43; Information Paper, Redstone Arsenal, subj: Honest John, undated, HRDC; “Last Name: John, First Name: Honest; Occupation: Artillery Weapon,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, pp. 49-51. 12Cpt John Tanzer, “XM50,” Artillery Trends, Oct 1962, pp. 5-6; McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 1775-2003, pp. 212-13; Information Paper, Redstone Arsenal, subj: Honest John, undated, HRDC. 13Andreas Parsch, “Emerson Electric M47/M51/MGR-3 Little John,” undated, HRDC; Redstone Arsenal Fact Sheet, subj: Little John, undated, HRDC; Field Artillery Missile Units, Reference Data, 1962, pp. 1-3, UF 478.43 U5, MSTL; Ltr with atchs, Cdr, U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, to CG, U.S. Continental Army Command, 3 Sep 1959, UF 157.2 U61, MTSL; Field Manual 6-56, Field Artillery Battalion Little John, Jun 1956, pp. 3, 4, 31; Field Manual 6-61, Field Artillery Missile Battalion, Honest John Rocket, Self-Propelled, Dec 1959, pp. 2-3. After 1955 with the successful detonation of a nuclear bomb, the Army converted from atomic warheads to nuclear warheads on its rockets and missiles. 14McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 1775-2003, p. 214; Wheeler, “Missiles on the Firing Line,” p. 38; Field Manual 6-60, Field Artillery Missile Battalion, Corporal, Mar 1959, p. 4; Toftoy, “Army Missile Development,” pp. 10-34; Field Artillery Missile Units, Reference Data, 1962, pp. 25, 47, UF 478.43 U5, MSTL; James W. Bragg, “Development of the Corporal: The Embryo of the Army Missile Program,” Reports and Historical Branch Control Office, Army Ballistic Missile Agency, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, Apr 1961, pp. xiv, xii, xix, PDF copy in HRDC, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Andreas Parsch, “Chrysler SSM-A-14/M8/PGM-11 Redstone, 2002, HRDC. 15McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 1775-2003, p. 214; Wheeler, “Missiles on the Firing Line,” p. 38; Field Manual 6-60, Field Artillery Missile Battalion, Corporal, Mar 1959, p. 4; Toftoy, “Army Missile Development,” pp. 10-34; Field Artillery Missile Units, Reference Data, 1962, pp. 25, 47, UF 478.43 U5, MSTL; Bragg, “Development of the Corporal: The Embryo of the Army Missile Program,” pp. xiv, xix, Ltr, H.I. Gibson, General Manager, Guided Missile Division, The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, to Commanding General, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Al, 23 Sep 1957, in Corporal Planning Information, 23 Sep 1957, UL407.415 C5F4, MSTL; Corporal Planning Information, 23 Sep 1957, p. 3, UL407.415 C5F4, MSTL; Carter, The U.S. Army before Vietnam, p. 24. 16McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, p. 214. 17Redstone Arsenal Fact Sheet, subj: Lacrosse, undated, HRDC; Field Artillery Missile Units, Reference Data, 1962, pp. 36-38, UF 478.43 U5, MSTL; “Lacrosse: From Bunker Busting to General Support,” Artillery Trends, Dec 1959, pp. 7-17; Maj Michael L. Kirk, “Nuke: End of Mission, Out,” Field Artillery Magazine, Aug 1992, pp. 40-41; Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Lacrosse Final Report, Task I, Jun 1949-1950, pp. 1-4, UL407.415 L15 C72 Be-635 S-3, MSTL; Marine Corps Military Characteristics for a Helicopter Transportable General Support Field Artillery Guided Missile System

34

__________________ (Lacrosse), undated, p. 3, UL407.415 L15SM3, MSTL; Martin, U.S. Army Lacrosse, May 1957, p. 1, UL407.415 L15M21, MSTL. 18“Added Power for the Army’s Arsenal,” Army Information Digest, Dec 1956, p. 5. 19Bullard, “History of the Redstone Guided Missile,” pp. 7-16; Andreas Parsch, “JPL/Sperry SSM-A-27/M15/MGS-29 Sergeant,” 2001-2005, HRDC; Sergeant Design Release Review, 31 Mar-1-2 Apr 1959, p. 7, UL407.415 S3 U64, MSTL; General Electric, Final Report on Project Hermes V-2 Missile Program, Sep 1952, pp. 1-5, UL407.415 H3 G33, MSTL. 20Bullard, “History of the Redstone Guided Missile,” pp. 37-38; Toftoy, “Army Missile Development,” pp. 10-34. 21Andreas Parsch, “Chrysler SSM-A-14/M8/PGM-11 Redstone,” 2002, HRDC; Andrews J. LePage, “Old Reliable: The Story of the Redstone,” 2011, HRDC; “Army Missile Development,” pp. 10-35; U.S. Army, The Redstone Missile System, 1960, p. 1, UL 407.415 R29 U51, MTSL; Redstone Arsenal Fact Sheet, subj: Redstone, undated, HRDC. 22Parsch, “Chrysler SSM-A-14/M8/PGM-11 Redstone,” 2002, HRDC; Field Artillery Missile Units, Reference Data, 1962, pp. 72-73, UF 478.43 US, MSTL. 23Lt Col David E. Wright, “Nuclear Weapons Employment,” Artillery Trends, Jul 1960, pp. 3-8; 1st Lieutenant Rudolph S. Malooley, “USAFA Missile Training Command,” Artillery Trends, Jul 1958, pp. 43-47; History of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Vol III, 1945-1957, pp. 63, 64, 214, 217, 221, 268, 377, 379; History of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Vol IV, 1958-1967, p. 3; Kirk, “Nuke, End of Mission, Out,” pp. 40-41; Maj Karl R. Liewer, “The First Field Artillery Missile Brigade,” Artillery Trends, May 1960, pp. 66-69; “US Army Artillery and Missile Center Reorganized,” Artillery Trends, Dec 1959, 56-57; “1st Field Artillery Missile Brigade Activated,” Artillery Trends, Oct 1958, p. 63. Carter, Forging the Shield, pp. 55, 101-104, 212. Note: In 1955 the US military introduced a nuclear weapon to replace an atomic weapon.

24Cpt Powell H. Skipper, “Nuclear Weapons,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, pp. 19-20; Wright, “Nuclear Weapons Employment,” pp. 3-8; Field Manual, Staff, Nuclear Weapons Employment, Aug 1964, p. 4; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 271-72; “Employment of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons,” Artillery Trends, Dec 1968, pp. 80-82; Field Manual 101-31-1, Nuclear Weapons Employment, Feb 1963, pp. 4, 33. 25Cpt Powell H. Skipper, “Nuclear Weapons,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, pp. 19-20; Wright, “Nuclear Weapons Employment,” pp. 3-8; Field Manual, Staff, Nuclear Weapons Employment, Aug 1964, p. 4; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 271-72; “Employment of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons,” Artillery Trends, Dec 1968, pp. 80-82; Field Manual 101-31-1, Nuclear Weapons Employment, Feb 1963, pp. 4, 33. 26Chris Bellamy, Red God of War: Soviet Artillery and Rocket Forces (London: Brassy’s Defence Publishers, 1986) p. 157; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 267-68; Carter, Forging the Shield, pp. 336-39. 27Design Release Review, Final Edition, Sergeant, 31 March-1-2 April 1959, pp. 7, 11, 93, 189, 194, UL 407.415 S3 U64, MSTL; Parsch, “JPL/Sperry SSM-A-

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__________________ 27/M15/MGM-29 Sergeant,” 2001-2005, HRDC; Redstone Arsenal Fact Sheet, subj: Sergeant, undated, HRDC. 28Design Release Review, Final Edition, Sergeant, 31 March-1-2 April 1959, pp. 72-79, UL 407.415 S3 U64, MSTL; Parsch, “JPL/Sperry SSM-A-27/M15/MGM-29 Sergeant,” 2001-2005, HRDC; “A Picture of Sergeant,” Artillery Trends, Dec 1964, p. 19; Fact Sheet, AMRDEC, subj: Sergeant Missile, undated, HRDC. 29“A Picture of Sergeant,” p. 19. 30Ibid.; Army Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center Fact Sheet, subj: Sergeant Missile, undated, HRDC. 31Army Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center Fact Sheet, subj: Sergeant Missile, undated, HRDC; “The Pershing Missile: The Army’s ‘Blackjack,’” Artillery Trends, May 1960, pp. 30-34; Fact Sheet, Redstone Arsenal Historical Information, subj: Pershing, undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, Lockheed Martin, subj: The Pershing Missile: Peace Through Strength, undated, HRDC; Cpt Alan L. Moore, Jr., “A New Look of Pershing,” The Field Artilleryman, Apr 1969, pp. 49-57; Fact Sheet, subj: MGM-31 Pershing I, undated, HRDC; Maj John E. Bonner, “Pershing Ia,” The Field Artilleryman, Feb 1972, pp. 41-47; Col Myron F. Curtis, Col Thomas M. Brown, and Dr. John C. Hogan, “Pershing: It Gave Peace a Chance,” Field Artillery Magazine, Feb 1991, pp. 28-32; Kaylene Hughes, “The Army’s Precision ‘Sunday Punch’: The Pershing II and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,” Army History, Fall 1989, pp. 7-16; Martin Company, Pershing Weapon System, undated, p. 1, UL 407.415. p. 3. 32Bonner, “Pershing Ia,” pp. 41-47; Curtis, Brown, and Hogan, “Pershing,” pp. 28-32; Hughes, “The Army’s Precision ‘Sunday Punch,’” pp. 16; McKenney, The Organizational History of Field Artillery, 1775-2003, pp. 232-34; Cpt Alan L. Moore, “A New Look of Pershing,” The Field Artilleryman, Apr 1969, pp. 49-57. 33Moore, “A New Look of Pershing,” pp. 49-57; Andreas Parsch, “Martin Marietta M14/MGM-31 Pershing,” HRDC. 34Briefing, subj: 1987 INF Treaty and its Impact on Fort Sill and 3/9 FA, HRDC; 1987 USAFACFS Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 28-29; Luanne Aline Turrentine, “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Modernization and Soviet-West German Relations,” unpublished Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1984, pp. 8-12, MSTL. 35Ibid., pp. 4-5; Hughes, “The Army’s Precision ‘Sunday Punch,’” pp. 10-12. 36Curtis, Brown, and Hogan, “Pershing,” pp. 28-32. 37Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics of the Elimination of their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles, 1987, pp. 1-4, HRDC; Msg, HQDA to CINCUSAREUR, et al, subj: INF Treaty Implementation Plan Update 88-1, 122000Z Jan 88, HRDC; Fact Sheet, Redstone Arsenal Historical Information, undated, HRDC; Hughes, “The Army’s Precision ‘Sunday Punch,’’ pp. 7-16. 38Lt Col Wilson A. Shoffner, “The Time has Come,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1976, pp. 50; “Lance: Greater Fire Support,” Artillery Trends, Feb 1964, pp. 3-7; Fact Sheet, Redstone Arsenal Historical Information, subj: Lance, undated, HRDC; LTC Justin LaPorte, “Lance: Testing in the European Environment,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1976, pp. 44-45; “The School Speaks,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1979, pp. 41-43; Maj Jim Rabon, “Lance,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1974, pp. 8-10.

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__________________ 39USAFAS and DCD, Program and Project Summary Sheets, 6 Jan 1989, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Cpt James Pearson, TRADOC System Manger (TSM) Rockets and Missiles (RAM), Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD), 3 Mar 1989, HRDC; Annex A, FOTL Operational and Organizational Plan, Mar 1989, HRDC; DA Follow-on To Lance Systems Concept Paper (S), paras 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, material used is unclassified, HRDC; Information Paper, FOTL, undated, HRDC. 40TSM RAM Input for CG’s Monthly Report, 16 Feb 1990, HRDC; TSM RAM Input for CG’s Monthly Report, 20 Mar 1990, HRDC; TSM RAM Input for CG’s Monthly Report, 16 Jan 1990, HRDC; “Lance Follow-on To Be Axed,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 5 May 1990, p. 836; “Filling the Gap Left by Lance,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 19 May 1990, pp. 954-55; TSM RAM Input to CG’s Monthly Report, 15 May 1990, HRDC; Memorandum for USAFAS Operations, subj: CG’s Monthly Report, 16 May 1990, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Maj Ken Roberts, TSM RAM, DCD, 4 Feb 1991, HRDC.

41Kirk, “Nuke: End of Mission, Out,” pp. 40-41; Sharon W. Lang, “SMDC History: Lance Missile Concludes Second Career,” 6 Aug 15, www.army.mil; “Lance,” https://history.redstone.army.mil. 42Briefing, Merritt, subj: Field Artillery Update, 18 Apr 1979, pp. 11-12, HRDC; Bruce Gudmundsson, “The Multiple Launch Rocket System: On Time and Under Budget,” Case Program, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1987, pp. 1-5,7, 10, in author’s possession; TRADOC System Manager, Fort Sill, Multiple Launch Rocket System Information Brochure, Mar 1982, p. 5, 33, HRDC; Ltr with encl, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery Board to See Distribution, subj: Draft Test Design Plan for Force Development Testing and Experimentation of the MLRS, 13 Apr 1982, MSTL; Keck, “A Tale of Two Offset Strategies,” The Diplomat, 18 Nov 2014. 43Lt Col Allan R. Stern, “Do We Need A Multiple Rocket Launcher,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1974, pp. 25-28; Comptroller General, Report to the Congress, The Army’s Multiple Launcher Rocket System is Progressing Well and Merits Continued Support, 5 Feb 1982, p. 1, HRDC; Jane’s Artillery and Armour, 1979-1980, pp. 528-29; Kenneth C. McDonald, “GSRS: More than the MRL,” Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1974, pp. 12-15. 44Mary Corrales, “MLRS: The Soldier’s System,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1980, p. 8; Col Charles J. Buel and Cpt Gary R. Miller, “GSRS Status Report,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1979, pp. 13-15; McDonald, “GSRS: More Than The MRL,” pp. 12-15; MLRS Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (S), 17 Apr 80, p. 10, material used is unclassified, HRDC; Bruce A. Brant, “Battlefield Air Interdiction in the 1973 Middle East War and its Significance on NATO Air Operations,” Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, US Command and General Staff College, 1986, p. 85, Defense Technical Information Center reprint. 45McDonald, “GSRS: More than the MRL?” pp. 12-15; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 309; Buel and Miller, “GSRS Status Report,” pp. 13-15. 46“Bigger Wallop from Army Heavy Hitting Artillery,” Army, Sep 1983, pp. 28-29; Briefing, Japan/US Staff Talks, subj: MLRS, 8 Nov 1989, HRDC; Ltr, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM FATDS Quarterly Report, 5 Oct 1985, HRDC; Ltr, Cdr, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM FATDS Quarterly Report, 7 Apr 1986, HRDC; “GSRS Contracts Awarded,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1977, p. 55; Buel and

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__________________ Miller, “GSRS: Status Report,” v pp. 13-15; Program Chart, subj: MLRS, undated, HRDC; Interview, Dr. Larry M. Kaplan, Assist Cmd Historian, with Maj John Nagle, Chief Writer, Rocket and Missile Division, Gunnery Department, 23 Jan 1990, HRDC; Directorate, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 1999 Annual Report, pp. 127-35, HRDC.

47Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOTE), FY 1999 Annual Report, pp. 128-35, HRDC; DOTE, FY 2000 Annual Report, pp. 85-88, HRDC; Memorandum for Director, Center of Lessons Learned, subj: Operation Desert Storm Emerging Observations, 10 Jul 1991, HRDC; 2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 117; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-44; Directorate of Test and Evaluation, FY 2000 Report, HRDC. 48DOTE, FY 1999 Annual Report, pp. 128-35, HRDC; DOTE, FY 2000 Annual Report, pp. 85-88, HRDC; Memorandum for Director, Center of Lessons Learned, subj: Operation Desert Storm Emerging Observations, 10 Jul 1991, HRDC; 2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 117; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44. 49Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 22 Dec 09, pp. 1-2, HRDC. 50Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” pp. 3-4. 51Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians, 19 Jun 08, HRDC; DOD News Release, Cluster Munitions Policy Released, 9 Jul 08, HRDC; Donna Miles, “New Cluster Bomb Policy Aims to Reduce Collateral Damage,” American Forces Press Service, 9 Jul 08, HRDC; DOTE, FY 2014 Annual Report, p. 109, HRDC; Lockheed Fact Sheet, subj: First Lockheed Martin GMLRS Alternative Warhead Rolls off Assembly Line, 12 Sep 2016, HRDC. 52Briefing, subj: ATACMS, 1987, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Maj Gregg Hutton, Chief, TSM RAMS, DCD, 11 Mar 1988, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Deep Fires, 28 Nov 1989, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Army TACMS (Extract)1989, HRDC; USAFAS Program and Project Summary Sheets, 20 Jan 1990, HRDC; TSM Rockets and Missiles, Input for CG’s Monthly Report, 12 Dec 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Army Tactical Missile System, 22 Feb 1989, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr 12, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Leighton Duitsman, TCM RAMS Dep Dir, 10 Feb 11, HRDC; Federal Register, Vol 78 Issue 3, 4 Jan 13, HRDC; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 10 Feb 14, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13, HRDC; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile System Product Office Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 9 Dec 14, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Rockets and Missiles, Update for AUSA 2013, Fall 2013, HRDC; Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, FY 2016 Historical Summary, HRDC.

532010 USAFAS AH, pp. 105-10. 54Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr

12, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Leighton Duitsman, 10 Feb 11, HRDC. Federal

38

__________________ Register, Vol 78 Issue 3, 4 Jan 13, HRDC; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 10 Feb 14, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13, HRDC; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile System Product Office Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 9 Dec 14, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Rockets and Missiles, Update for AUSA 2013, Fall 2013, HRDC; Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, FY 2016 Historical Summary, HRDC. See 2010 USAFAS AH for history of ATACMS from the early 1990s to 2009, pp. 105-10. 55Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr 12, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Duitsman, 10 Feb 11, HRDC; Federal Register, Vol 78 Issue 3, 4 Jan 13, HRDC; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 10 Feb 14, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13, HRDC; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile System Product Office Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 9 Dec 14, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Rockets and Missiles, Update for AUSA 2013, Fall 2013, HRDC; Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, FY 2016 Historical Summary, HRDC; Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Commanders of Combatant Commands, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, subj: DoD Policy on Cluster Munitions, 30 Nov 2017, HRDC. 56Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager – Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44; Charles Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 2014, pp. 22-23; Fires Division, Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Capabilities Development of Long-Range Precision Fires,” 16 May 2014, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 2016, HRDC; Program Executive Officer Missiles and Space FY 2015 Historical Summary, 25 October 2016, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 2017, HRDC; Program Executive Officer Missiles and Space, FY 2016 Historical Summary, HRDC.