98032168 Kant s ethical thought.pdf

8/13/2019 98032168 Kant s ethical thought.pdf

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KAN T S E TH I C AL TH O U G H T

ALLEN W. WO O D

Yale University


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PU BLI SHED BY TH E P RESS SYNDIC ATE O F TH E U NIVERSITY OF C AMBRID G E

The P itt Building, Trumpingto n Street, Cambridge, Un ited Kingdom

CAMBRI DG E U NIVERSITY PRESS

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10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia

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Allen W. Woo d 1999

This book is in copyright. Subject to statu tory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,no repro duction o f any part ma y take place withou t

the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First pub lished 1999

Printed in the U nited States of America

TypefaceNew Ba skerville 10.25 /13 pt . SystemQuarkXPress 4.0 [ag]

A catalog record for this book is avai lable from the Briti sh L ibrar y.

L ibrar y of Congress Cataloging in Publi cation Data

Woo d, Allen W.

Kants eth ical th ough t / Allen W. Wood.

p. cm. (Modern European philosophy)

isbn 0-521-64056-3 (hc.). isbn 0-521-64836-x (pbk.)

1. Kant, Immanuel, 17241804 Contributions in ethics. I . Title.

II . Series.

B2799.E8W59 1999

170'.92 dc21 98-32168

CIP

isbn 0 521 64056 3 hardback

isbn 0 521 64836 x paperback


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C ONT ENT S

Preface page xiii

Abbreviations xvii

Citations xvii

Formulas and propositions xx

Table of duties of virtue xxiv

Introduction 1

1 An Enlightenment mora list 1

2 H uman eq uality 53 Morality and human n ature 8

4 Kants ethical writings 11

5 The structure of this book 13

i me t ap h y s ic a l f o u n d a t i o n s

1 Common rationa l moral cognition 17

1 G rounding ethical theory 17

2 The good will 213 Acting from duty 26

4 Moral worth and maxims 40

5 Respect fo r law 42

2 Rationa l will and imperatives 50

1 The will 50

2 A prioripractical principles 55

3 H ypothetical imperatives 60

4 Assertor ic impera tives 65

5 Categorical impera tives 70

ix


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3 The formula of universal law 76

1 Objective practical principles 76

2 The d erivation of FUL a nd FLN 78

3 Applying FLN: suicide 824 False promises and converted deposits 87

5 Rusting t alents 90

6 Refusing to help 91

7 The problems with FUL 97

8 Exceptional behavior an d self-preference 107

4 The formula of h uman ity as end in itself 111

1 Ends and determining grounds of the will 111

2 Ends in themselves and existent end s 1143 H umanity and persona lity 118

4 Things an d person s 122

5 Kants derivation of FH 124

6 The equal worth of all rational beings 132

7 Applying FH 139

8 The structure o f argumen ts from FH 150

5 The formula of a utonomy and the realm of ends 156

1 The ground of o bligation 1562 FA as a moral principle 163

3 The realm of end s 165

4 Freedom an d the moral law 171

5 Formulating the moral law 182

i i a n t h r opo l og ic a l a ppl i c a t ion s

6 The study of human n ature 193

1 Practical an thropology 193

2 The difficulty of self-knowledge 196

3 Pragmatic anth ropology 202

4 H uman history as a na tural phenomeno n 207

5 Natural teleology 215

7 The h istory of human nature 226

1 H erder vs. Kant 226

2 H istorical conjectures 2333 The first free choice 235

4 The origin of mora lity 238

5 Kant s historical ma terialism 244

x co n t en t s


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8 H uman inclinations and a ffections 250

1 Natural desire 250

2 Natural passions 253

3 Social passions 2594 Desire and deception 265

5 Sympathy, love, and charity 269

6 Friendship 275

9 The historical vocation of morality 283

1 The ra dical evil in h uman na ture 283

2 Nature and culture 291

3 Reason, commun ication, an d en lightenmen t 300

4 The ethical community 309

Conclusion 321

1 The fina l form of Kants ethical theory 321

2 The sphere of right 322

3 Ethics as a system of duties 323

4 Ethics as a system of end s 325

5 Eth ics as virtue 329

6 What is Kantian ethics about? 333

Notes 337

Index 419

co n t en t s xi


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I N T R O D U C T I O N

1. An Enlightenment moralist

Kants ethical thought is perhaps both the finest and the most charac-

teristic prod uct of the Enlightenment (Aufklrung, clai rcissement). This

was an intellectual movement, and to some extent also a social and po-

litical movement. In its original form it accompanied, reflected, and

contributed to the European bourgeoisies growing economic, social,

and political power and influence. But the Enlightenment was never

committed to th e interests of a single social class, na tion, o r segmen t of

humanity. The Enlightenment still exists today, since many peoplethroughout the world still struggle for the expansion of liberty in hu-

man though t and action, equa lity in the social, political, and economic

spheres, and toleran ce regarding religious and cultural d iversity. The

tho ughts of th e movements eighteenth-century foun ders are still the

dr iving forces behind most of these struggles, at least to the d egree that

they occur in cultures influenced by European thought.

The Enlightenment was never a monolithic movement. Its underly-

ing principles have always been subject to change, reinterpretation , andcontinuing dispute. Any attempt to define it is both a th eoretical exer-

cise and a part of a n ongo ing praxis tha t aims at supporting, opposing,

or transforming the movement itself. The struggle over the identity of

the Enlightenment had already begun in Kants time. From the begin-

ning, its conservative enemies have held it responsible for what they

perceive as the moral chaos and spiritual decline of mod ern society. En-

emies arising from within its own ran ks attempted to use its own values

against it, just as tod ay self-styled critics of mod ernity under take to de-construct Enlightenment thinking as part of their attempts to reconfig-

ure intellectual and social options and alliances. If we read eighteenth-

century Enlightenment thinkers with sensibilities trained under the

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influence of such opponents, we are apt to blame those thinkers for n ot

being a lready what they, more th an anything else, have mad e us to be.

Because the Enlightenment still influences the course of things,

Kan ts ethical thought is the (direct or ind irect) source of much that isnow standa rd in normative theories in eth ics, political philosophy, an d

public policy. Many think of Kants ethical theory (in John Rawlss apt

words) not a s a morality of austere command but a n ethic of mutual

respect and self-esteem.1 Kantian ethics is grounded on the d ignity of

ration al na ture. It requires no t only respect for ind ividual rights an d th e

equa l worth o f huma n beings, but also the idea of a cosmopolitan com-

munity in which the ends of all rationa l beings must form a un ity to be

pursued collectively.

For the same reason, h owever, Kants ethical thought is also a focus

of controversy, often an object of strong aversion. Many regard it as a

metaphysical system of mind less rule-following, gro und ed on an inef-

fable moral comman d. For them, to be a Kantian a bout an y ethical is-

sue is to be irrationa lly inflexible about it and irresponsibly heedless of

the con sequences of ones actions.

The detractors find support for their views in some of Kants moral

opinions about particular topics, some of which seem to them exces-

sively strict to the point of inhumanity. Kant infamously maintains thatit is wrong to lie even to a would-be murderer in order to protect h is in-

tended victim (MS 6:429431; Ak 8:425430). He maintains that sui-

cide violates a strict duty to oneself because to annihilate the subject of

morality in ones own person is to root out the existence of morality it-

self from the world, as far as one can ( MS 6:423). For the crime of mur-

der Kan t thinks the punishment o f dea th is so strictly req uired th at even

if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its members

. . . , the last murderer remaining in prison would first have to be exe-cuted, so that . . . blood guilt do es no t cling to th e people (MS 6:333).

Kants views about sex are repugnan t to nearly everyone toda y (just

as they were to many in h is own t ime). H e th inks sexual intercourse is

a degrada tion of huma nity because it is an act in which people make

themselves into a n object of en joyment, a nd hence into a thing (VE 27 :

346). He regards sex as permissible only within marriage, and even

there it is in itself a merely an imal union (MS 6:425). U nnatural sex-

ual pra ctices, such a s masturba tion, are still viler than suicide and turna h uman being into a loath esome object, lower than a beast (VE 27 :

347, MS 6:425). Paedera sty ( like rape) sho uld be pun ished with cas-

tration, while bestiality deserves permanent expulsion from human

society (MS 6:363).2

2 in t r o d u c t io n


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Nor can any enlightened person tod ay approve Kan ts opinions about

race and gender. Kant distinguishes four races: (1) White, (2) Yellow

Indian, (3) Negro, and (4) copper-red American . H e ran ks the char-

acteristics of these respective races in d escend ing ord er as regards theirinborn talent for perfecting h uman nature, and con jectures that h ence-

forth human progress is to be expected solely from the white race (VPG

9:316, VA 25 :11871188; cf. BM 8:9394).3 Kant thinks that although

women are rational beings, they are n ot suited by temperament or in-

tellectual endowment to be treated as full adults in the public sphere.4

Kant holds that it is always unjust to rebel against the existing gov-

ernment or depose a head of state, no matter how unjust the rulers

themselves might be. O ne must, on the con trary, obey all the comman ds

of the a uthorities (except when they comman d us to do something th at

it is in itself wrong, such as bear false witness aga inst an inno cent per-

son) (TP 8:297303, MS 6:317323, 370372; cf . KpV 5:30, 155156).

Kan ts views may often strike us as politically conservative in o ther ways,

too . For example, while advocating representa tive political institutions

(such as did not exist at all in his own nation) Kant accepts the prop-

erty and occupational restrictions on political participation that pre-

vailed where th ere were such institutions. These restrictions relegate all

wage laborers, servan ts, and peasants (an d, of course, all women) to thestatus of passive citizens: they have civil rights, but take no part in the

legislation or government of civil society (MS 6:314315; cf. TP

8:295).5

To Kants detractors, such views are on ly what we sho uld expect from

a th eory that accords mora l worth only to actions don e from d uty, treats

our entire emotional nature as worthless, and places moral principles

ah ead of human happiness at every turn . Kan ts high-mind ed ta lk abo ut

duty and personality is an empty formalism that can easily become apretext for any sort o f tyranny or manipulation.6 Kants admiration for

good will is an unh ealthy ind ividua lism focusing o n th e agen ts inner

intent ions rather than their social setting. Those who see Kant th is way

regard it as entirely suitable to the inhumanity of his ethical doctrine

tha t he locates his goo d will entirely outside n ature, in an un knowable

noumenal world.

To correct such utterly erroneous images of Kan ts ethical th ough t, wemust begin by asking why we should study the history of ethics at all.

Our chief purpose is one that belongs squarely within the Enlighten-

ment tradition: to improve our understanding of ethical issues so that

we may justify, criticize, an d correct our opinions about them. For this

a n en l ig h t en men t mo r a l i s t 3


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we need knowledge of th e historical roo ts of th ese issues, and of th e the-

ories tha t ad dress them. A critical und erstanding of the h istory of ethics

is ind ispensable for our ethical th inking.

To rea d h istor ical philosoph ers critically is to read them with intel-lectual sympathy, but it is never to trea t them as oracles whose pro-

nouncements on any subject we should accept blindly on trust. The

point is no t piously to a dmire their wisdo m and virtue, which, since they

are human and bound by the limitations of their age, are always far from

perfect. Such piety teaches us nothing, and that approach only sets us

up for unedifying disillusionment. The point is instead to further our

own ph ilosophical thinking, by understan ding the history of the issues

we now face. We often learn most from past philosoph ers when we

come to un derstand why we think their opinions should be rejected.

We need to respect the un ity of a philosophers thought because we

can learn most from a set of doctrines by seeing how some depend on

others in ways that are not obvious. But respecting the unity of Kants

thought is not only compatible with but even requires distinguishing

the teachings that are central to it from th ose that are peripheral, and

separa ting th e conclusions tha t actua lly follow from h is principles from

the conclusions he may have drawn but do not follow. Such respect is

utterly incompatible with treating a philosophers thought as a mono-lith, or using Kants deplorable views about race and gender as some

sort of hidd en key to the real mean ing o f his principle tha t all beings

are possessed of equal dignity.

The sole measure o f what might deserve to be called Kan ts great-

ness is how far it is possible for us to lea rn about philosophyfrom study-

ing his writings (wha tever might be the final mix of our agreement and

disagreement with wha t they say). It is a sad form of intellectual bigotry

to treat our first, emotional reaction to a philosophers isolated opin-ions as if it were a reliable gauge of that potential. When we let that

reaction shape a n invidious image whose main function is to keep us at

a d istance, we succeed on ly in depriving ourselves of wha tever we might

ha ve learned by studying Kant.

Enlightenment, as Kan t understood it, is a grad ual process through

which not only individuals but even an entire public attains maturity

an d increases its self-und erstan ding through critical reflection and

open communication. If this is what enlightenment is, then it wouldspeak bad ly for th e Enlightenment if two hundred years later the move-

ments heirs ha d not been a ble to make some importan t corrections in

Kants own beliefs about morality, society, and politics. It would speak



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well both for th e movement a nd for Kants principles if such corrections

followed a trajectory marked out by those principles. And in fact they

do. Kants views about gender and race offend us not merely because

we now see them as false (for no t all errors of past ages are morally offen-sive to us), but rather because we see them as demean ing to th e human

dignityof women and nonwhites. Likewise, we object to a morality of

stern duty and rigid rules because we think moral rules are grounded

on the values human beings place on themselves, their feelings an d d e-

sires, and their capacity to direct their own lives. The most influential

philosophical articulation of these values is Kan ts theory of mo ral au-

tonomy, grounded on the d ignity of human ity as an end in itself.

A proper understanding of Kants ethical thought also requires the

correction o f errors about it which a re still unfor tuna tely commo n even

among Kants sympathizers. These include not only its supposed indi-

vidualism and its alleged unconcern with the history and social con-

text of morality, but also the exaggerated emphasis usually placed on

the Formula of U niversal Law in expound ing Kants approa ch to moral

reason ing. We shall see in the early chapters of this book tha t this for-

mula is only a stepping stone on the argumentative path leading to a

more a deq uate, concrete, and systematic formulation of th e principle

in the Second Section of th e Groundwork.7

2. Human equality

We have found it easy to be o ffend ed by some of th e opinions expressed

in Kants writings. On oth er subjects, however, Kan t expressed far more

creditable opinions having a far more direct and demon strable affinity

with his basic principles. A frequently quoted passage from Kants early

reflection s acknowledges the influen ce of Jean-Jacq ues Rousseau in

shaping h is mora l outlook:

I am an inquirer by inclination. I feel a consuming thirst for knowledge,

the un rest which goes with the desire to progress in it, and satisfaction at

every advance in it. There was a time when I believed this constituted the

honor of humanity, and I despised the people, who know nothing.

Rousseau set me righ t about th is. This blinding prejudice disappeared . I

learned to honor human beings, and I would find myself more useless

than the commo n laborer if I did no t believe that th is attitude of mine can

give worth to a ll others in establishing th e righ ts of human ity. (Ak 20 :44)

People tend to judge themselves better than others on various

grounds: birth, wealth, honor, power, or (in Kants case) learning.

h u ma n eq u a l i t y 5


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These judgments, Kan t ho lds, wha tever their basis, are n ever more than

false opinions based on self-conceited illusions. The opinion of in-

equality makes people unequal. Only the teaching of M. R[ousseau]

can bring it about that even the most learned philosopher with hisknowledge holds himself, uprightly an d without th e help of religion , no

better than the common h uman being (Ak 20:176 ).

Kan ts commitment to the equa l worth of a ll human beings pervad es

his ethical thought. For this reason alone, by no reasonable standard

could he be con sidered conservative in relation to the issues of his day.

Certainly not in politics; living under an absolute monarchy, he openly

subscribed to republicanism, calling a republican con stitution the on ly

one consistent with the idea of right (EF 8:349350). Nor in religion,

where his defense of liberty and toleration and his support of th e En-

lightenment earned him a royal reproof and a stern command not to

teach or write on religious topics unless he a ltered h is opinions (SF 7:6).

Nor in education, where he was an early supporter of the liberalizing in-

novations of the Philanthropin academy (Ak 2:445452). What looks

like conservatism is often only an expression of Kants conviction that

the human race still has very far to go on the path toward a free and

cosmopolitan realm of ends. Our social life is thoroughly corrupt and

in need of radical reform, but even our grip on the institutions tha t pro-mote progress is still so precarious that it may put all our hopes at risk

if we call too much into q uestion a ll at on ce.

Kants egalitarianism shows itself in h is conviction tha t the republican

form o f government is the on ly one that accords with the idea of right

because it respects the freedom, equality, and independence of its citi-

zens (EF 8:349351; cf. TP 8:290296, MS 6:311318). Living under a

government tha t was never more than a h arsh military despotism, Kant

was a con sistent a nd impassioned defend er of freedo m of belief andexpression (WA 8:3542, KrV A738757/B 766785, O 8:143146).

Kants essay Toward perpetual peacewas the first, and is still the most sig-

nifican t, attempt by a major figure in the h istory of ph ilosophy to artic-

ulate principles aimed at achieving a condition of just and permanent

peace between nations, and end ing the a rms race which (h e believed)

poses the greatest lasting danger to the moral, political, and material

progress of the h uman species. Despite his principled opposition to civil

insurrection, and his pessimistic assessment o f the pra ctical prospects ofthe French Revolution, he continued to feel (and express) a wishful

participation that borders closely on enthusiasm for the idealsof the

Revolution, even after the terrifying deeds of the revolutionaries had

turned many younger enthusiasts against these ideals (SF 7:85).



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Another notable consequence of Kants egalitarian principles is

that he conspicuously declines to infer from the racialist beliefs we

no ted ear lier tha t there is an y difference in the human rightspossessed

by different peoples. His attitude toward European colonialism istherefore one of strong and unqualified disapproval. European na-

tions, he says, invad e and con q uer no n-European s as though the in-

habitants of other parts of the earth had no claim on their land and

even no rights as human beings (EF 8 :357359 ; MS 6:352353 ; see

also Chapter 9 2.4). Though he thinks Europeans more civilized

than oth er peoples, Kan t regards their civilization itself as directly un -

fitting them for their gra tuitously self-appointed task of civilizing oth ers.

Perha ps the best testimony on this point comes from n ineteenth- an d

ear ly twentieth-century critics, who accused Kant of fa iling a deq uately

to a ppreciate the d iversity of ra ces an d cultures, and consequen tly the

incapacity of non -European peoples to relate to Europea ns on eq ual

terms.8

Kant agrees with Rousseau that the social inequalities of honor,

power, and wealth are fundamentally unjust, even when they result

from transactions consistent with principles of right. Hence he agrees

that the civil equality of citizens required for a legitimate form of

government is consistent with large disparities of wealth (TP 8:291 ).Nevertheless this inequality constitutes a general injustice through-

out society. Because this injustice arises not from individual acts of

wrong but from the en tire social system, those who benefit from it gen-

erally turn a blind eye toward it, and ascribe to their own merit what-

ever pitiful steps they may take to remedy it.

In accord ance with [benevolence], people are merciful to others and show

beneficence to them after th ey have earlier taken from them, even though

they are conscious of no in justice to anyone. But on e can participate in the

general injustice, even if one does no injustice according to the civil laws

and institutions. Now if one shows beneficence to a wretch, then one has

not given h im anything gra tuitously, but has given h im only what one h ad

earlier helped to take from him through the general injustice. For if no

one took more of the goods of life than ano ther, then th ere would be no

rich an d no poor. Accordingly, even a cts of gen erosity are acts of duty and

indebtedn ess, which arise from th e rights of oth ers. (VE 27 :416)

In our present condition, when general injustice is firmly entrenched,the n atura l rights of the lowly cease. They are th erefore only debtors, the

superior owe them n oth ing. Therefore, these superiors are called gra -

cious lords. But he who need s no thing from th em but justice can ho ld

them to th eir debts and does no t need to be submissive. (Ak 20 :140141)

h u ma n eq u a l i t y 7


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The general injustice prevailing in society produces a systematic de-

ception in rega rd to peoples benevolent feelings. It leads them perni-

ciously to exaggerate th e mora l importan ce of feelings of sympathy and

generosity, which permits them systema tically to misinterpret as volun-tary beneficence what they really owe the poor by right:

Many people take pleasure in doing good actions but consequently do

no t want to stan d un der ob ligation s toward o thers. If one on ly comes to

them submissively, they will do everything: they do not want to subject

themselves to the righ ts of people, but to view them simply as objects of

magnanimity. It is not all one under what title I get something. What

properly belongs to me must not be a ccorded to me m erely as someth ing

I beg for. (Ak 19 :145)

The last two pa ssages I h ave q uoted belong to some of Kan ts earliest

reflections on morality, when the influence o f Rousseaus ethical writ-

ings was both strong and fresh. Kant retained these convictions to the

end of his life, however, and expressed them even in his final ethical

work, the Metaphysics of morals, written nearly th irty-five years later :

Having the resources to practice such beneficence as depends on the

goods of fortune is, for the most part, a result of certain human beings

being favored through the injustice of the government, which introd uces

an ineq uality of wealth that makes others need th eir beneficence. U nd er

such circumstances, do es a rich ma ns help to th e needy, on which he so

readily prides himself as something meritorious, really deserve to be

called beneficence at all? (MS 6:454)

3. Morality and human nature

The passages just quoted assert that all human beings are equal andough t to treat one an oth er as such. They also contain ano ther message,

perhaps less obvious but just as important for Kants ethical thought,

not about h ow human beings ought to treat one an other but about how

they in facttend to treat one another and why. Though people are of

equal worth , this equa lity is someth ing th ey are d isposed to den y as

Kant himself admits he did when he thought his learning constituted

the hono r of humanity and made him better than the ignoran t; or as

the gracious lords do when they think their noble birth or wealthentitles them to look down on those who lack these privileges. The

deepest theme of the preceding passages is therefore not that people

are equal, but that peoples equal worth must be vindicated against a



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powerful propensity in hum an na ture to claim for oneself an imagined

worth greater than th at of others.

It was also from Rousseau that Kant d erived th e idea that human be-

ings in the social cond ition inevitably acq uire the illusion of inequality.For Rousseau this deception is the ugly secret of all civilization, rais-

ing troubling questions about the trajectory of human history. If the

progress of culture only makes us more unequal, deceptive, and evil,

does it make sense to wan t to improve the human lot in h istory? Can we

believe in a purposiveness in th e natural h istory of our species or a di-

vine providence cooperating with our rational efforts to improve our-

selves and our condition? (This set of problems about ourselves as ra-

tional, social, and historical beings preoccupied the greatest thinkers

of th e eighteenth century; it might be called Mandevilles dilemma.9)

In the mid-1760s, Kant apparently decided that Rousseau also had

satisfactory answers to these questions: Rousseau was the first who dis-

covered, ben eath the manifoldness of the forms assumed by the human

being, his deeply hidden nature and the concealed law according to

which d estiny is justified by his observations. . . . Accord ing to Newton

and Rousseau, God is justified (Ak 20:5859). Throughout his life

Kant struggled with Rousseaus conception of human nature, attempt-

ing to provide an interpretation of it that justifies both the quest for ana tura l purposiveness in h istory and a fa ith in providence as governing

that history. Kants ethical thought can be properly appreciated only

when it is seen in relation to th is prob lematic.

The composition of Kan ts first ma ture eth ical work, the Groundwork

of the metaphysics of morals(1785), coincides with his study of an alter-

native interpretation o f Rousseau developed by Johann G ottfried H erder

(who had been Kants own student in th e 1760s while he was discover-

ing the social thought of Rousseau). It was in this context that Kantwrote h is first two important essays on the philosophy of history: Idea to-

ward a universal history with a cosmopoli tan aim (1784) and Conjectural be-

ginn ing of human history (1786). Kants continuing interest in the phi-

losoph y of history is displayed in a number o f later works, including the

Cri ti que of the power of judgment(1790), the essay on theory and practice

(1793), Religion within the boundaries of mere reason(1794), Toward per-

petual peace(1795), the Confl ict of the facul ti es(1798), and Anthropology

from a pragmatic standpoint(1798).The fact that Kants empirical conception of our human n ature an d

his philosoph y of h istory play a significant role in h is ethical thought

often comes as a surprise to those who know his ethical theory only

mo r a l i t y a n d h u ma n n a t u r e 9


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Only the a priorimotive of duty is capable of prod ucing goo d actions re-

liably(G 4:390 , 411 ).

These are not claims about the epistemic status of the moral law.

They are assertions about the effects on human cond uct (human naturebeing what it is) of presentingthe claims of morality in one way or the

other. They amount to the claim that none of our empirical desires is

na turally in harmony with th e demand s of mo rality, an d further, tha t

neither education no r habituation is capable of creating a depend able

accord between reason a nd inclina tion. Taken together they amo unt to

a high ly con troversial empirical thesis about human n ature: our na ture

does not permit of an inclinationto do what mo rality demand s of us, or

a likingto d o what duty deman ds, and therefore tha t such impossible

states are not suitable objects of moral admiration or striving; the

tho ught of them serves on ly the end s of sentimental self-delusion an d

enthusiastic self-conceit (KpV 5:8189).

Kants critics often call attention to the deep distrust of human na-

ture exhibited in his insistence on the opposition of reason and incli-

na tion and his reservation of moral esteem on ly to action s motivated by

duty.15 (Even in Kants own time, his ethical views were criticized on

these grounds, by men such as G arve, Rehberg, and Schiller.16) But the

critics display shortsighted ness when they cond escend to this feature o fKants ethical tho ught (a s by making snide references to h is personal-

ity quirks or pietistic upbring ing) . They overlook the fact tha t Kan ts

interpretation of the a priorimoral principle itself, as well as his con-

ception of its application to the human will, depend s on some q uite dis-

tinctive views about human nature and history. In Part II of this book

we will see that these views are worked out in his writings with a good

deal of theoretical sophistication and constitute a vital component of

his ethical outlook.17

4. Kants ethical writings

Kant did not begin as a moral philosopher. He was first drawn to phi-

losoph y in the 1740s thro ugh his interest in the na tura l sciences. Kan ts

earliest published reflections on mora l philosophy, in the early 1760s,

are governed less by his substan tive moral convictions than by con cerns

about the groun ding o f knowledge and the architectonic structure of asystem o f philosophy. His ear liest piece of writing to ad dress the role of

morality in such a system is the Inquiry concerning the disti nctness of the

principles of natural theology and morali ty (written in 1762, published in

ka n t s e t h ic a l wr i t in g s 11


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1764). H ere he d raws a d istinction between actions tha t are necessary

for an end (and whose good ness is therefore d emonstrable by reference

to that end) and actions that are immediately necessary in themselves

(and whose goodn ess is therefore indemonstrab le). On ly the latter, hesays, are truly obligatory(DG 2:298300). As he does in his lectures of

the same period, Kant toys with the moral sense theory of Francis

Hutcheson as a way of making in telligible the idea o f this uncond itional

moral necessity. About 1765 , Kant begins to project his own system of

mora l philosophy und er th e name metaphysics of morals. This is ev-

iden tly con ceived as a d ecisive rejection of mo ral sense theory in favor o f

a theory groun ding morality in ration al concepts. Yet Kan t do es no t be-

gin to work seriously on this project until several years after he revolu-

tionizes theoretical philosoph y in the Critique of pure reason(1781).

When we consider the course of Kants career as a philosopher, ho w-

ever, we cann ot h elp no ticing his increasing in terest in mora l questions,

the rising importance of the pra ctical (or moral) standpoint within h is

conception of ph ilosophy as a whole. Noth ing is more characteristic of

Kants critical system than the thesis that the metaphysical questions

with which human reason is most profoundly concerned questions

about the existence of G od , freedom o f the will, and immortality of the

soul cann ot be an swered by theoretical or speculative reason, but canbe ad dressed o nly from a practical (or moral) point o f view. Kan ts chief

enterpr ise in the last half of the 1780s was working out the fun da men-

tals of a practical philosophy (in the Groundworkand the Cri ti que of

practi cal reason) and bridging what he saw as a serious gulf between

theoretical and practical ph ilosophy (in the Cri ti que of the power of judg-

ment). Kants chief works in the 1790s all deal with the application of

practical philosophy to human life to religion , as in Reli gion within the

boundaries of mere reason(17931794) an d to po litics and internationa lrelations, and the human races vocation in history as in the essay on

theory and practice (1793) and Toward perpetual peace(1795) culmi-

nating in the completion (finally) of the Metaphysics of morals (1797

1798). Kants mature thought is at least as much a moral outlook on

the world as it is a position on questions of epistemology, natural sci-

ence or speculative metaphysics.

Despite its brevity, the Groundworkis on e of the grea test and most in-

fluential achievements in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, itmust be said that a d isproportiona te amount o f scholarly attention h as

been paid to it. For Kan t intend s this little book not as a complete ex-

position o f his ethical theory but only as an a ttempt to identify an d se-



18/19

cure the fundamental principle on which a system of ethics might be

based. Nor does acquaintance with the Cri ti que of practi cal reasondo

much to correct the on e-sided impressions created by the Groundwork,

for it, too, is conceived a s a found ation al work, a critical propad eutic toethical theory, and not a statement of Kants ethical theory itself. The

foun da tiona l works will mislead us unless we attend to th e Metaphysics

of morals. At the same time, the system o f duties presented in th at work

will be even harder to understand unless we already appreciate the

foundation on which it rests. Kants other writings on ethics, politics,

and religion, which also ma ke important contributions to our und er-

stand ing of his ethical thought, are equally depend ent on the found a-

tional writings but a re also importan t for th e proper interpretation o f

them. Since Kan ts empirical theory of human na ture (h is an thropo l-

ogy an d ph ilosophy of history) are just as crucial for an un derstan ding

of his ethical thought as his conception of the a priorifoundations of

morality, both the foundational writings and the resulting system of

duties in the Metaphysics of moralsmust also take them into a ccount.

The proper way to treat Kants ethical thought would be to begin

with (1) an exposition of its foundations in the Groundwork, supple-

mented by the Cri tique of practical reason, but a lso using the Metaphysics

of moralsand other writings as a clue to their interpreta tion. Then (2) wemust try to und erstand Kants theory of human na ture and its conse-

quences for th e application o f the found ational principles. Only then

are we in a position to provide (3) a systematic exposition of the Meta-

physics of moralsas the definitive form of Kants practical philosophy.

Tha t was the plan I inten ded to fo llow in writing this book, but it even-

tually became evident that the entire plan is too ambitious for any

single book. Therefore, although I will make significant reference to

the Metaphysics of moralsin the course of the book and provide a b riefexposition of it in the Con clusion, the full execution of stage (3) of the

plan must be deferred to a future occasion.

5. The structure o f th is book

The first three cha pters will dea l with themes far more familiar in th e

Kantian literature than the last six. Wha t I say about these themes is

intended to gain a hearing for the later parts of the book by showingtha t many of the con troversies tha t have surround ed the more familiar

themes are of less significance fo r Kantian ethics than is usually appre-

ciated.

t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h i s bo o k 13


19/19

Part I will deal with the metaphysical foundations of Kants ethical

theory. It will be structured as an exposition o f the Groundwork. Chap-

ter 1 will consider Kants famous appeal to common ra tiona l moral cog-

nition in the First Section of th e Groundwork. Chapter 2 will take up theSecond Sections philosoph ical accoun t of the will and ration al imper-

atives. Chapters 35 will be devoted (on e each) to Kants three main

formulations of the supreme principle of morality. Chapter 5 includes

Kants grounding o f the mora l law in th e practical presupposition of

freedom and Kants final conception of the moral law in the Ground-

work, as a system constituted by all three formulas.

Part II turns to Kants application o f the moral principle to huma n

nature. Chapter 6 discusses Kants conception of anthropology, the

study of human n ature, tracing h is method to its basis in his theory of

teleological judgment. Chapter 7 expounds Kants theory of history,

contrasting it with the views of Herder and showing how it anticipates

later views, especially the historical materialism of Marx. Chapter 8 ex-

plores Kants theory of natural feeling and desire, the social basis of

human passions, and Kants reasons for mistrusting sociable inclina-

tions as moral motives. The chapter ends by treating a badly neglected

topic: Kants theory of friendship. Chapter 9 discusses Kan ts account

of o ur mora l destiny in h istory.The Conclusion uses the contents of the nine chapters to indicate

certain notable features of the ethical theory with which Kant presents

us in the Metaphysics of morals. After briefly expoun ding the theory be-

hind Kants system o f duties, the Con clusion focuses atten tion on two

themes Kantian ethics has often been th ought to n eglect or mishand le:

na mely, mo ral endsand moral virtues.

Kants ethical thought is on e of the few prod ucts of the history of phi-losophy tha t exercises such a strong and continuing influence on us tha t

replacing commonly accepted ideas about it with more accurate and

less oversimplified ones might help to transform our con ception o f our

own h istory and of o urselves as heirs of the Enlighten ment. The aspi-

ration of th is boo k is to con tribute in some small way to th at revolution .


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