9 Dualism and Its Problems

8/3/2019 9 Dualism and Its Problems

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99Dualism and itsDualism and its

ProblemsProblems


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The Distinct Substances ProblemThe Distinct Substances Problem

The fact that an individual is composed byThe fact that an individual is composed by

two distinct substances runs against alltwo distinct substances runs against allcontemporary neuroscience and cognitivecontemporary neuroscience and cognitive

sciences.sciences.

It is hard to accept the non-corporeality ofIt is hard to accept the non-corporeality of

the mind.the mind.


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The Causality and InteractionThe Causality and InteractionProblemProblem

How can a non-bodily substance causeHow can a non-bodily substance causebodily movements?bodily movements?

How can our thoughts/desires/ (How can our thoughts/desires/ (quaqua non-non-extended substance) cause bodilyextended substance) cause bodilymovements?movements?

Since the mind is space-less how can itSince the mind is space-less how can itinfluence the body?influence the body?

Descartes answer is that the soul isDescartes answer is that the soul is

unitedunited with the body. Hence thewith the body. Hence the


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I think that I have clearly established that the partI think that I have clearly established that the partof the body in which the soul directly exercises itsof the body in which the soul directly exercises its

functions is not the heart at all, or the whole brain.functions is not the heart at all, or the whole brain.

It is rather the innermost part of the brain, which isIt is rather the innermost part of the brain, which is

a certain very small gland in the middle of thea certain very small gland in the middle of thebrains substance and above the passagebrains substance and above the passage throughthrough

which the spirits in the brains anteriorwhich the spirits in the brains anterior

cavities communicatecavities communicate with those in its posteriorwith those in its posterior

cavities. (cavities. (Passions 1Passions 1;; CSM ICSM I: 340): 340)

A phantom limb shows, according toA phantom limb shows, according to

Descartes, that a nerve is agitated andDescartes, that a nerve is agitated and

goes to the brain producing in the soulgoes to the brain producing in the soul


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The Mental-or-Physical DilemmaThe Mental-or-Physical Dilemma

Either we are dealing with purely physicalEither we are dealing with purely physical(mechanical) or purely mental events, i.e.(mechanical) or purely mental events, i.e.the perception of an incorporeal spirit.the perception of an incorporeal spirit.

What about psycho-neural phenomenaWhat about psycho-neural phenomenasuch as vision which seems to be neithersuch as vision which seems to be neither

purely physical nor purely mental?purely physical nor purely mental?


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ImaginationImagination vs.vs. PerceptionPerception

They areThey are special modes of thinkingspecial modes of thinking (as(assuch they differ from thinking, willing,such they differ from thinking, willing,

doubting, ) insofar as they requiresdoubting, ) insofar as they requiresphysiological activity.physiological activity.

The difference between sense-perception andThe difference between sense-perception and

imagination is really just this, thatimagination is really just this, that in sense-in sense-perception the images are imprinted on theperception the images are imprinted on thebrain by external objects which are actuallybrain by external objects which are actuallypresent, while in the case of imagination thepresent, while in the case of imagination theimages are imprinted by the mind withoutimages are imprinted by the mind without

any external objectany external object, and with the windows shut,, and with the windows shut,


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Problem:Problem:

Sensations such as imagination andSensations such as imagination and

perception cannot be captured byperception cannot be captured byDescartes dualism insofar as they areDescartes dualism insofar as they are

neither purely physical nor mental.neither purely physical nor mental.

Theyre somewhat between the mentalTheyre somewhat between the mental

and the physical.and the physical.


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TrialismTrialism

Descartes recognises tree primitiveDescartes recognises tree primitivecategories in terms of what we think aboutcategories in terms of what we think aboutthe world: thethe world: the res cogitansres cogitans, the, the resresextensaextensa and the psycho-physicaland the psycho-physical

interaction (e.g. sensations and passions).interaction (e.g. sensations and passions).

The latter is somewhat derivative of theThe latter is somewhat derivative of theformer but it is nonetheless primitiveformer but it is nonetheless primitive

insofar as it cannot be classified either asinsofar as it cannot be classified either aspurely mental or purely physicalpurely mental or purely physical

Cf. the analogy of the mule which derivesCf. the analogy of the mule which derives

from a horse and a donkey and yet itfrom a horse and a donkey and yet itcannot be classified as either e uine orcannot be classified as either e uine or


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E.g. hunger has tree aspects:E.g. hunger has tree aspects:

1.1. the purely physical events such as thethe purely physical events such as theshortage ofshortage of nourishment (this would alsonourishment (this would alsoappear in a zombie orappear in a zombie or a comatosea comatoseindividual);individual);

2.2. the purely mental events such as thethe purely mental events such as thequalia-lessqualia-less judgement such as my bodyjudgement such as my bodyneeds food andneeds food and

3.3. the feeling of hunger (thethe feeling of hunger (the qualiaqualia).).

Sense-perception is the property of anSense-perception is the property of anembodied being: thus a non-corporealembodied being: thus a non-corporealbeing (e.g.: God, angels) lacks it.being (e.g.: God, angels) lacks it.


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Even if physicalism is correct, it remainsEven if physicalism is correct, it remains

that there are three distinct ways tothat there are three distinct ways tocharacterise a human being:characterise a human being:

1.1. There are his bodily/physical eventsThere are his bodily/physical events

which do notwhich do not require any form ofrequire any form ofconsciousness;consciousness;

2.2. There are the thinking events peculiarThere are the thinking events peculiarof language-of language- user beings (e.g. belief,user beings (e.g. belief,desires, ).desires, ).

3.3. There are theThere are the qualiaqualia which arewhich areconditions/conditions/ sensations of the bodysensations of the body

produced by effect of theproduced by effect of the externalexternal


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Perception and RealityPerception and Reality

While reason can tells us about ourselvesWhile reason can tells us about ourselvesand our experiences, our experience doesand our experiences, our experience doesnot teach us much about reality. Sensory-not teach us much about reality. Sensory-

experience does not teach us what reallyexperience does not teach us what reallyexists in the things themselves. That is,exists in the things themselves. That is,the sensory-qualities such as color, taste,the sensory-qualities such as color, taste,etc. (theetc. (the qualiaqualia) are silent on what) are silent on what

external bodies are like in themselves.external bodies are like in themselves.

But in all these thereBut in all these there need be no resemblanceneed be no resemblancebetween the idea which the soul conceivesbetween the idea which the soul conceives

and the movement which causes these ideasand the movement which causes these ideas..((OpticsOptics;; CSM 1CSM 1: 167): 167)


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Descartes takes our ideas of sensoryDescartes takes our ideas of sensoryqualities to be like internal sensationsqualities to be like internal sensationssuch as the sensation of pain.such as the sensation of pain.

While it makes sense to say that aWhile it makes sense to say that asensation of pain is not in the objectsensation of pain is not in the objectcausing it (e.g. is not in the bullet hittingcausing it (e.g. is not in the bullet hittingones leg), it is more difficult to claim thatones leg), it is more difficult to claim that

redness or heat is not in the objectredness or heat is not in the objectcausing it.causing it.


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We attribute redness to roses and heat toWe attribute redness to roses and heat toreal objects, (e.g. roses and radiators).real objects, (e.g. roses and radiators).

Descartes rules out this view because ofDescartes rules out this view because ofhis conception of causation (thehis conception of causation (the CausalCausalSimilarity PrincipleSimilarity Principle) that there is nothing in) that there is nothing inthe effect that is not in the cause, i.e. thethe effect that is not in the cause, i.e. thecause is like the effect.cause is like the effect.

If this is the case a quality like rednessIf this is the case a quality like redness(which is in a rose) could not cause my(which is in a rose) could not cause mysensation of redness since the latter (thesensation of redness since the latter (the

qualiaqualia

) is so different from the former.) is so different from the former.


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The creator, God, has chosen that someThe creator, God, has chosen that someevents are marked in the mind in aevents are marked in the mind in a

specific way, but God could have chose tospecific way, but God could have chose to

mark them in a completely different waymark them in a completely different way

((qualiaqualia are arbitraryare arbitrary).).

Cases of colorCases of color qualia-inversionqualia-inversion could becould be

invoked in favour of this idea. It would beinvoked in favour of this idea. It would beharder to think of pain-sensation asharder to think of pain-sensation as

arbitrary, though, for natural selectionarbitrary, though, for natural selection

would not help one who does not feel painwould not help one who does not feel pain

the way we actually do (e.g. if sex wasthe way we actually do (e.g. if sex was


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EssenceEssence vsvs. appearance. appearance

Descartes distinguishes between the worldDescartes distinguishes between the world

as it is (in itself, i.e. as God does perceivesas it is (in itself, i.e. as God does perceives

it) and the world as it appears to us.it) and the world as it appears to us.

This rests on the very idea that there is aThis rests on the very idea that there is a

subjectivity involved in our perception ofsubjectivity involved in our perception ofreality. Since God implanted in us thereality. Since God implanted in us the

seeds of truth about the universe, in ourseeds of truth about the universe, in our

abstract, mathematical concepts we canabstract, mathematical concepts we can

take Gods viewpoint and perceive thetake Gods viewpoint and perceive the


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Chomsky on the Mind/BodyChomsky on the Mind/Body

ProblemProblem

ChomskyChomsky vs.vs. DescartesDescartes

Chomskys Cartesianism does not meanChomskys Cartesianism does not mean

that he accepts all the Cartesian views.that he accepts all the Cartesian views.

ChomskyChomsky rejects Descartes viewrejects Descartes view

concerning the privilege access of ourconcerning the privilege access of our

own mindown mind. No scientific study of the mind. No scientific study of the mind

could accept this thesis (cf. linguistics).could accept this thesis (cf. linguistics).


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In rejecting Descartes mechanismIn rejecting Descartes mechanismChomsky rejects the idea that in order toChomsky rejects the idea that in order to

act one upon each other, things must be inact one upon each other, things must be in

contact (a dead horse since Newtons lawcontact (a dead horse since Newtons law

of gravitation).of gravitation).

This parallels the rejection of DescartesThis parallels the rejection of Descartes

view of matter or substance.view of matter or substance.

This in turn entails the rejection ofThis in turn entails the rejection of

Descartes mind/body substance dualism.Descartes mind/body substance dualism.


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Once forces such as gravitation (whichOnce forces such as gravitation (whichDescartes would have characterized asDescartes would have characterized asmysterious) enter the real world there ismysterious) enter the real world there isno reason to exclude mental features fromno reason to exclude mental features fromthe physical realm.the physical realm.

Hence there is also no reason to make aHence there is also no reason to make a

coherent distinction between the physicalcoherent distinction between the physicaland the mental.and the mental.

The mind-body problem should no longerThe mind-body problem should no longer

be taken seriously.be taken seriously.


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The Cartesians observed that certain phenomenaThe Cartesians observed that certain phenomenaof nature (notably, the normal use of language)of nature (notably, the normal use of language)did not seem to fall within the mechanicaldid not seem to fall within the mechanicalphilosophyphilosophy, postulating a new principle to, postulating a new principle toaccount for them.account for them. Given their metaphysics,Given their metaphysics,they postulated a second substance (they postulated a second substance (resrescogitanscogitans, mind),, mind), for other reasons as well.for other reasons as well.Implementation aside,Implementation aside, the move was notthe move was not

unreasonableunreasonable, in fact, not unlike Newtons, in fact, not unlike Newtonsreasoning when he discovered the inadequacy ofreasoning when he discovered the inadequacy ofthe mechanical philosophy.the mechanical philosophy. Postulating ofPostulating ofsomething that lies beyond the mechanicalsomething that lies beyond the mechanicalphilosophy gives rise to two tasks: tophilosophy gives rise to two tasks: todevelop the theory and to solve thedevelop the theory and to solve theunification problemunification problem; in the Cartesian case, the; in the Cartesian case, themind-body problem. All of this is normal science;mind-body problem. All of this is normal science;wrong, but that is also the norm. (Chomsky 2000:wrong, but that is also the norm. (Chomsky 2000:83-4)83-4)

The mind-body problem made sense in termsThe mind-body problem made sense in terms


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Biological RationalismBiological Rationalism

No place for a mechanism called No place for a mechanism called reasonreasondoing reasoning.doing reasoning.

Unlike the syntactic process involved inUnlike the syntactic process involved inlanguage production, reason is not alanguage production, reason is not amechanism with fixed operations.mechanism with fixed operations.

As such reason cannot be the subjectAs such reason cannot be the subjectmatter of science and cannot have a placematter of science and cannot have a placein a scientific rationalist study of the mind.in a scientific rationalist study of the mind.


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Reason can be seen as a human attributeReason can be seen as a human attributeprovided byprovided by common sensecommon senseunderstandingunderstanding..

As such it can be seen as somethingAs such it can be seen as somethingguiding our (scientific) enterprise; itguiding our (scientific) enterprise; itcannot be the subject of scientific inquiry.cannot be the subject of scientific inquiry.

Reason is a kind ofReason is a kind ofsocial practicesocial practice, hence, hencequite different from linguistics which isquite different from linguistics which ismore closed to chemistry and physics.more closed to chemistry and physics.


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ReasoningReasoning

It is a normative process carried out byIt is a normative process carried out bypersons. It is not confined to a dedicatedpersons. It is not confined to a dedicatedpart of ones mind/brain.part of ones mind/brain.

Reason rests on the domain of humanReason rests on the domain of humanfreedom, while the language faculty doesfreedom, while the language faculty doesnot. The former is normative, the latter,not. The former is normative, the latter,

like vision, is not.like vision, is not.

Linguistic processes and vision, unlikeLinguistic processes and vision, unlikereasoning, are unconscious and cannot bereasoning, are unconscious and cannot be

modified by the community. They aremodified by the community. They are


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Philosophical challengePhilosophical challenge

No science can eliminate persons and theirNo science can eliminate persons and theirmental life.mental life.

No science can eliminate intentionality.No science can eliminate intentionality.

Any correct description and explanation ofAny correct description and explanation ofthe human species and what happens inthe human species and what happens intheir head must deal with persons andtheir head must deal with persons andtheir intentions.their intentions.


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Chomsky has a dismissive answer.Chomsky has a dismissive answer.

He does not deny that our understandingHe does not deny that our understanding

of persons relies upon common senseof persons relies upon common senseconcepts or that these understanding canconcepts or that these understanding canbe dismissed.be dismissed.

E.g.: we learn more about people from artsE.g.: we learn more about people from artsand poetry than from psychology orand poetry than from psychology orphilosophy.philosophy.


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If the concept of person is found in theIf the concept of person is found in thedomain of common sense it can bedomain of common sense it can beinquired trough arts and history.inquired trough arts and history.

From the common sense viewpoint thisFrom the common sense viewpoint thisinquiry is more fruitful than an enterprise,inquiry is more fruitful than an enterprise,such as linguistics or biology, committedsuch as linguistics or biology, committed

to a formal description.to a formal description.

Science is not suited to the way in whichScience is not suited to the way in whichthe concept of a person is dealt with inthe concept of a person is dealt with in

common sense understanding.common sense understanding.


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Anti-Eliminationism/ReductionismAnti-Eliminationism/Reductionism

Common sense concepts have been usefulCommon sense concepts have been usefulfor millennia and there is no reason theyfor millennia and there is no reason theyshould be eliminated by a scientific studyshould be eliminated by a scientific study

of the mind/brain.of the mind/brain.

We have different explanations servingWe have different explanations servingdifferent purposes.different purposes.

We cannot make science continuous withWe cannot make science continuous withcommon sense. They are differentcommon sense. They are differentuniverses which do not intrude each other.universes which do not intrude each other.


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Suppose I say, the rock drop from the skies, rolledSuppose I say, the rock drop from the skies, rolleddown the hill, and hit the ground.down the hill, and hit the ground. TheThestatement cannot be translated into thestatement cannot be translated into thetheories that have been developed totheories that have been developed to

describe and explain the worlddescribe and explain the world, nor is there, nor is thereany interesting weaker relation; the terms belongany interesting weaker relation; the terms belongtoto different intellectual universesdifferent intellectual universes. But no one. But no onetakes this to constitute a body-body problem. Nortakes this to constitute a body-body problem. Nordo the natural sciences aspire to distinguish thisdo the natural sciences aspire to distinguish thisdescription from the statement that the rock felldescription from the statement that the rock fell

down a crevice, which could be the same eventdown a crevice, which could be the same eventviewed from a different perspective. (Chomskyviewed from a different perspective. (Chomsky2000: 88)2000: 88)


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Common Sense Concept of the WorldCommon Sense Concept of the World

A scientific conception of the world cannotA scientific conception of the world cannot

play a role when we come to apprehendplay a role when we come to apprehendthe real world.the real world.

A three year old apprehends the real worldA three year old apprehends the real worldin much the same way as a tree year oldin much the same way as a tree year old

Greek apprehended it thousands yearsGreek apprehended it thousands years

ago.ago.


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The empiricists cannot rely on science (aThe empiricists cannot rely on science (a

recent invention which is constantlyrecent invention which is constantly

changing) to explain how we commonlychanging) to explain how we commonly

apprehend the world.apprehend the world.

The sole concept of the physical world thatThe sole concept of the physical world that

we can possibly imagine to bewe can possibly imagine to beunchangeable over time and/or cultures isunchangeable over time and/or cultures is

the one understood in common sense (folkthe one understood in common sense (folk

physics).physics).


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The rationalist explains our apprehensionThe rationalist explains our apprehensionof the world claiming that the basicof the world claiming that the basicconcepts used to explain the physicalconcepts used to explain the physicalworld are innately specified, they are partworld are innately specified, they are partof a fixed human nature.of a fixed human nature.

The correct explanation of a fixed commonThe correct explanation of a fixed commonsense (including folk physics and folksense (including folk physics and folkpsychology) does not rely,psychology) does not rely,pacepace thethe

empiricists credo, on scientificempiricists credo, on scientificexplanations, but in a fixed human nature.explanations, but in a fixed human nature.

The relevant concepts are provided atThe relevant concepts are provided at

birth and need only an experiential triggerbirth and need only an experiential triggerto activate (see poverty of the stimulusto activate (see poverty of the stimulus


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Folk PsychologyFolk Psychology

It must be convenient across people andIt must be convenient across people and

time.time.

And for it to be so convenient we mustAnd for it to be so convenient we mustposit a basic human nature with fixedposit a basic human nature with fixedconcepts and basic needs that makes theconcepts and basic needs that makes theuse of these concepts convenient.use of these concepts convenient.

Cf. The evolutionary psychologyCf. The evolutionary psychologyenterprise.enterprise.


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This is not an explanation that theThis is not an explanation that theempiricist doctrine welcomes, forempiricist doctrine welcomes, foraccording to the latter convenientaccording to the latter convenientconcepts can change across time andconcepts can change across time andcultures. And they must insofar ascultures. And they must insofar as

empiricists claim that they depend onempiricists claim that they depend onexperience.experience.

In short, how can one explain folkIn short, how can one explain folk

psychology stability without appealing topsychology stability without appealing tostable and universal concepts?stable and universal concepts?

To posit the stability of folk psychology onTo posit the stability of folk psychology on

the fact that there subsists a similaritythe fact that there subsists a similarityacross cultures would be a circularacross cultures would be a circular


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Chomskys Anti-ReductionismChomskys Anti-Reductionism

There is no convincing reason to expectThere is no convincing reason to expectthat the mental can be reduced to thethat the mental can be reduced to thephysical as currently conceived.physical as currently conceived.

Physics keeps evolving and, thus anyPhysics keeps evolving and, thus anyreduction the current/contemporaryreduction the current/contemporary

physics could propose would bephysics could propose would beunsatisfactory regarding the physics as itunsatisfactory regarding the physics as itwill be developed in the future (see Lycanwill be developed in the future (see Lycan2003. In2003. In Chomsky and His CriticsChomsky and His Critics).).


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I have not been concerned with the question ofI have not been concerned with the question of

reduction of mind to matter, and do not evenreduction of mind to matter, and do not even

understand what the question is. I use the termunderstand what the question is. I use the term

mind with no ontological import: rather, asmind with no ontological import: rather, as

an informal way of referring to the study ofan informal way of referring to the study ofthe bodyspecifically the brainconductedthe bodyspecifically the brainconductedat a certain level of abstraction.at a certain level of abstraction. I also see I also see

no reason to question the general conclusionno reason to question the general conclusion

reached long ago that thought is a little agitationreached long ago that thought is a little agitationof the brain (Hume) or a secretion of the brainof the brain (Hume) or a secretion of the brain

that should be considered no more wonderfulthat should be considered no more wonderful

than gravity, a property of matter (Darwin) than gravity, a property of matter (Darwin)

From this point of view, there is no place forFrom this point of view, there is no place for

Lycans problem about reduction of mind toLycans problem about reduction of mind to


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PhysicalPhysical vs.vs. MentalMental

The distinction between mental andThe distinction between mental andphysical or material can have only aphysical or material can have only adescriptive content. It cannot bedescriptive content. It cannot bescientifically sustained and it has noscientifically sustained and it has nometaphysical import.metaphysical import.

What does merely physical mean? AreWhat does merely physical mean? Aremental things the only things that are notmental things the only things that are notmerely physical? How about magnets?merely physical? How about magnets?Stable molecules? Insects? What is theStable molecules? Insects? What is theimport of the word things?import of the word things? (Chomsky 2003.(Chomsky 2003.

Reply to Lycan: 259)Reply to Lycan: 259)


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There is an intrinsic error amongThere is an intrinsic error amongmaterialists who persist in talking aboutmaterialists who persist in talking aboutthe difference between the mental and thethe difference between the mental and thephysical: they perpetrate a kind of dualismphysical: they perpetrate a kind of dualismthey aim to reject (see Strawson 2003).they aim to reject (see Strawson 2003).

We should turn toWe should turn to experientialexperiential vsvs. non-. non-experiential terminologyexperiential terminology..

By mind, I mean theBy mind, I mean the mental aspect of themental aspect of theworldworld, with no concern for defining the notion, with no concern for defining the notionmore closely and no expectation that we will findmore closely and no expectation that we will findsome interesting kind of unity or boundaries, anysome interesting kind of unity or boundaries, anymore than elsewhere;more than elsewhere; no one cares to sharpenno one cares to sharpenthe boundaries of the chemical.the boundaries of the chemical. (Chomsky(Chomsky2000: 75)2000: 75)


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Since the brain, or elements of it, are criticallySince the brain, or elements of it, are critically

involved in linguistic and other mentalinvolved in linguistic and other mentalphenomena,phenomena, we may use the term mindwe may use the term mindloosely but adequatelyin speaking of theloosely but adequatelyin speaking of thebrain, viewed from a particular perspectivebrain, viewed from a particular perspectivedeveloped in the course of inquiry intodeveloped in the course of inquiry intocertain aspects of human nature and itscertain aspects of human nature and itsmanifestationmanifestation. (Chomsky 2000: 76). (Chomsky 2000: 76)


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Methodological NaturalismMethodological Naturalism

[A] naturalistic approach to the mind[A] naturalistic approach to the mindinvestigates mental aspects of the worldinvestigates mental aspects of the world seeking to construct intelligible explanatoryseeking to construct intelligible explanatorytheories, with the hope of eventual integrationtheories, with the hope of eventual integrationwith the core natural sciences. Suchwith the core natural sciences. Suchmethodological naturalism can be counterposedmethodological naturalism can be counterposed

to what might be called methodological dualism,to what might be called methodological dualism,the view that we must abandon scientificthe view that we must abandon scientificrationality when we study humans above therationality when we study humans above theneck (metaphorically speaking), becoming mysticneck (metaphorically speaking), becoming mysticin this unique domain, imposing arbitraryin this unique domain, imposing arbitrary

stipulations andstipulations and a prioria priori demands of a sort thatdemands of a sort thatwould never be contemplated in the sciences, or inwould never be contemplated in the sciences, or inother ways departing from normal canons ofother ways departing from normal canons ofinquiry. (Chomsky 2000: 76)inquiry. (Chomsky 2000: 76)

Naturalistic inquiries onto the mind yieldNaturalistic inquiries onto the mind yieldtheories about the brain, its state andtheories about the brain, its state and


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PhysicsPhysics

Epistemological characterisation:Epistemological characterisation:

The domain of the physical is what weThe domain of the physical is what we

come more or less to understand and hopecome more or less to understand and hopeto assimilate to the core natural sciences.to assimilate to the core natural sciences.

Yet we distinguish between physical thingsYet we distinguish between physical things

that represent the world from physicalthat represent the world from physicalthings that do not.things that do not.

We thus seem to rely to some distinctionsWe thus seem to rely to some distinctionsbetween the mental and the physical.between the mental and the physical.


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For naturalistic inquiry, there is no interestFor naturalistic inquiry, there is no interest

in taking mental types to be non-biologicalin taking mental types to be non-biological

The computer analogy can be useful as a The computer analogy can be useful as astimulus to the imagination, much as mechanicalstimulus to the imagination, much as mechanical

automata were for seventeenth and eighteenth-automata were for seventeenth and eighteenth-

century scientists. (Chomsky; Reply to Lycan: 261)century scientists. (Chomsky; Reply to Lycan: 261)


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PhysicalismPhysicalism

The term physical has no definiteThe term physical has no definite

content.content.

Thus physicalist thesis turn out to beThus physicalist thesis turn out to be

meaningless, they lack a definite contentmeaningless, they lack a definite content

(and thus truth-value).(and thus truth-value).

They are not empirical hypothesis andThey are not empirical hypothesis and

cannot play a serious role in enquiry.cannot play a serious role in enquiry.


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This rests on the fact that there is noThis rests on the fact that there is no aa

prioripriori conception of the physical groundedconception of the physical grounded

in natural language, folk science orin natural language, folk science or

metaphysics, which provides the requiredmetaphysics, which provides the requiredcontent.content.

Given the character of scientific inquiry (inGiven the character of scientific inquiry (in

particular in physics) physicalists cannotparticular in physics) physicalists cannot

hope to identify a definite meaning for thehope to identify a definite meaning for the

term physical from a consideration ofterm physical from a consideration of

physical theory.physical theory.


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ProblemsProblems vs.vs. MysteriesMysteries

Problems are questions that can beProblems are questions that can beformulates in such a way that they allowsformulates in such a way that they allows

us to proceed with serious inquiry.us to proceed with serious inquiry.

Mysteries are problems which cannot beMysteries are problems which cannot be(scientifically) inquired, because they(scientifically) inquired, because theyescape our capacities, i.e. because we areescape our capacities, i.e. because we areill equipped to solve them (e.g.: as aill equipped to solve them (e.g.: as amouse is ill equipped to deal with primemouse is ill equipped to deal with primenumbers).numbers).

This rests on the limits and power of theThis rests on the limits and power of the


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Descartess dualism was not abandonedDescartess dualism was not abandonedbecause he could not solve the interactionbecause he could not solve the interactionproblem, but because his problem could notproblem, but because his problem could notbe posedbe posed; Functionalism did not repair a; Functionalism did not repair ameaningful flaw in the Identity Theorymeaningful flaw in the Identity TheoryComputational theories of language, insectComputational theories of language, insectnavigation, etc., require no Identity Theory. Theynavigation, etc., require no Identity Theory. Theyareare theories about the nature of the organismtheories about the nature of the organism(mostly its brain) that have to be judged on(mostly its brain) that have to be judged on

their merits as explanatory theoriestheir merits as explanatory theories, like, likeothers. Prior to unification with core physics,others. Prior to unification with core physics,chemistry needed no Identity Theory, surely notchemistry needed no Identity Theory, surely notone that linked it to the physics of the day, whichone that linked it to the physics of the day, whichhad to be radically revised to be unified withhad to be radically revised to be unified withchemistry these lesson apply to the study of thechemistry these lesson apply to the study of themental aspects of the world. (Chomsky; Reply tomental aspects of the world. (Chomsky; Reply to


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[I]t is unknown whether aspects of the[I]t is unknown whether aspects of thetheory of mindsay, questions abouttheory of mindsay, questions aboutconsciousnessare problems or mysteriesconsciousnessare problems or mysteriesfor humans, though in principle we couldfor humans, though in principle we coulddiscover the answer, even discover that theydiscover the answer, even discover that theyare mysteries.are mysteries. (Chomsky 2000: 83)(Chomsky 2000: 83)


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DualismDualism

Many problems linked to philosophy ofMany problems linked to philosophy ofmind/language are driven by a dualistmind/language are driven by a dualistconception. It is often claimed that theconception. It is often claimed that the

mental must be characterized in terms ofmental must be characterized in terms ofaccess to consciousness, awareness, andaccess to consciousness, awareness, andthe like.the like.

Thus faculties like LAD (LanguageThus faculties like LAD (LanguageAcquisition Device) or UG posited by theAcquisition Device) or UG posited by theChomskian school cannot be characterizedChomskian school cannot be characterizedas mental or psychological (see Nagel)as mental or psychological (see Nagel)insofar as they escape a subjectinsofar as they escape a subject

awareness. They do not differ fromawareness. They do not differ from


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Some also claims (see Quine) that oneSome also claims (see Quine) that onecannot follow these rules; at best onescannot follow these rules; at best onesaction fits these rules, for we can talk ofaction fits these rules, for we can talk ofrules guiding actions only insofar as theyrules guiding actions only insofar as theyare consciously applied to causeare consciously applied to cause

behaviour.behaviour.

All these philosophical worries rest on anAll these philosophical worries rest on animplicit dualism at work. That is, on theimplicit dualism at work. That is, on thedistinction between the mind and the bodydistinction between the mind and the bodyand the view that a naturalistic accountand the view that a naturalistic accountremains silent on the nature of the former.remains silent on the nature of the former.

Thus while some philosophers engageThus while some philosophers engage

themselves in some form of reductionismthemselves in some form of reductionism


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Quines behaviorism is a variant of this formQuines behaviorism is a variant of this formof dualismof dualism. He argues that the behaviorist. He argues that the behavioristapproach is mandatory (Quine 1990: 37) for theapproach is mandatory (Quine 1990: 37) for thestudy of language because, in acquiring language,study of language because, in acquiring language,we depend strictly on overt behavior inwe depend strictly on overt behavior in

observable situations (p. 38). By similar argument,observable situations (p. 38). By similar argument,the nutritionist approach is mandatory inthe nutritionist approach is mandatory inembryology because, in the passage from embryoembryology because, in the passage from embryoto mature state, the organism depends strictly onto mature state, the organism depends strictly onnutrition provided from outside;nutrition provided from outside;just as linguistsjust as linguistsmust be behaviorists, so biologist must bemust be behaviorists, so biologist must benutritionistsnutritionists, restricting themselves to, restricting themselves toobservation of nutritional inputs. The fallacy in theobservation of nutritional inputs. The fallacy in thelatter argument is apparent; the same fallacylatter argument is apparent; the same fallacyundermines the former.undermines the former. Only radical dualistOnly radical dualistassumptions allow the matter even to beassumptions allow the matter even to be

discusseddiscussed. (Chomsky 2000: 101). (Chomsky 2000: 101)


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Cartesian Dualism and its CollapseCartesian Dualism and its Collapse

[T]he reasons for the collapse of Cartesian dualism[T]he reasons for the collapse of Cartesian dualismare somewhat misconstrued: as noted,are somewhat misconstrued: as noted, it was theit was thetheory of body that was refuted, leaving notheory of body that was refuted, leaving nointelligible mind-body problem, no notion ofintelligible mind-body problem, no notion of

physical, etcphysical, etc. In this realm, we have only the. In this realm, we have only thenaturalistic approach: to construct explanatorynaturalistic approach: to construct explanatorytheory in whatever terms are appropriate, and totheory in whatever terms are appropriate, and toface the unification problem. Second, it is, for theface the unification problem. Second, it is, for themoment, only a hope that neurological terms aremoment, only a hope that neurological terms are

relevant for the unification problem. Finally,relevant for the unification problem. Finally, therethereis no reason to try to define the mentalis no reason to try to define the mentalvocabulary of ordinary discourse in avocabulary of ordinary discourse in anaturalistic framework, just as no onenaturalistic framework, just as no onecontemplates that for physical vocabulary,contemplates that for physical vocabulary,at least in the modern periodat least in the modern period. (Chomsky 2000:. (Chomsky 2000:

9 Dualism and Its Problems

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