1

99Dualism and its Dualism and its

ProblemsProblems

2

The Distinct Substances ProblemThe Distinct Substances Problem

The fact that an individual is composed by The fact that an individual is composed by two distinct substances runs against all two distinct substances runs against all contemporary neuroscience and cognitive contemporary neuroscience and cognitive sciences. sciences.

It is hard to accept the non-corporeality of It is hard to accept the non-corporeality of the mind.the mind.

3

The Causality and Interaction ProblemThe Causality and Interaction Problem

How can a non-bodily substance cause bodily How can a non-bodily substance cause bodily movements? movements?

How can our thoughts/desires/… (How can our thoughts/desires/… (quaqua non- non-extended substance) cause bodily extended substance) cause bodily movements? movements?

Since the mind is space-less how can it Since the mind is space-less how can it influence the body? influence the body?

Descartes’ answer is that the soul is Descartes’ answer is that the soul is unitedunited with the body. Hence the mind/body unison with the body. Hence the mind/body unison problem.problem.

4

I think that I have clearly established that the part of the I think that I have clearly established that the part of the body in which the soul directly exercises its functions is body in which the soul directly exercises its functions is not the heart at all, or the whole brain. It is rather the not the heart at all, or the whole brain. It is rather the innermost part of the brain, which is a certain very small innermost part of the brain, which is a certain very small gland in the middle of the brain’s substance and above gland in the middle of the brain’s substance and above the passage the passage through which the spirits in the brain’s through which the spirits in the brain’s anterior cavities communicateanterior cavities communicate with those in its with those in its posterior cavities. (posterior cavities. (Passions 1Passions 1; ; CSM ICSM I: 340): 340)

A phantom limb shows, according to Descartes, A phantom limb shows, according to Descartes, that a nerve is agitated and goes to the brain that a nerve is agitated and goes to the brain producing in the soul residing in the brain a producing in the soul residing in the brain a pain sensation.pain sensation.

5

The Mental-or-Physical DilemmaThe Mental-or-Physical Dilemma

Either we are dealing with purely physical Either we are dealing with purely physical (mechanical) or purely mental events, i.e. (mechanical) or purely mental events, i.e. the perception of an incorporeal spirit.the perception of an incorporeal spirit.

What about psycho-neural phenomena What about psycho-neural phenomena such as vision which seems to be neither such as vision which seems to be neither purely physical nor purely mental?purely physical nor purely mental?

6

Imagination Imagination vs.vs. Perception Perception

They are They are special modes of thinkingspecial modes of thinking (as such (as such they differ from thinking, willing, doubting, …) they differ from thinking, willing, doubting, …) insofar as they requires physiological activity.insofar as they requires physiological activity.

The difference between sense-perception and The difference between sense-perception and imagination is really just this, that imagination is really just this, that in sense-in sense-perception the images are imprinted on the brain perception the images are imprinted on the brain by external objects which are actually present, by external objects which are actually present, while in the case of imagination the images are while in the case of imagination the images are imprinted by the mind without any external imprinted by the mind without any external objectobject, and with the windows shut, as it were. , and with the windows shut, as it were. ((Descartes Conversation with BurmanDescartes Conversation with Burman: 27): 27)

7

Problem:Problem:

Sensations such as imagination and Sensations such as imagination and perception cannot be captured by perception cannot be captured by Descartes’ dualism insofar as they are Descartes’ dualism insofar as they are neither purely physical nor mental.neither purely physical nor mental.

They’re somewhat between the mental They’re somewhat between the mental and the physical.and the physical.

8

‘‘Trialism’Trialism’

Descartes recognises tree primitive Descartes recognises tree primitive categories in terms of what we think about categories in terms of what we think about the world: the the world: the res cogitansres cogitans, the , the res extensares extensa and the psycho-physical interaction (e.g. and the psycho-physical interaction (e.g. sensations and passions). sensations and passions).

The latter is somewhat derivative of the The latter is somewhat derivative of the former but it is nonetheless primitive insofar former but it is nonetheless primitive insofar as it cannot be classified either as purely as it cannot be classified either as purely mental or purely physical mental or purely physical

Cf. the analogy of the mule which derives Cf. the analogy of the mule which derives from a horse and a donkey and yet it cannot from a horse and a donkey and yet it cannot be classified as either equine or asinine.be classified as either equine or asinine.

9

E.g. hunger has tree aspects:E.g. hunger has tree aspects:

1.1. the purely physical events such as the the purely physical events such as the shortage of shortage of nourishment (this would also nourishment (this would also appear in a zombie or appear in a zombie or a comatose a comatose individual); individual);

2.2. the purely mental events such as the the purely mental events such as the qualia-lessqualia-less judgement such as “my body judgement such as “my body needs food” and needs food” and

3.3. the feeling of hunger (the the feeling of hunger (the qualiaqualia).).

Sense-perception is the property of an Sense-perception is the property of an embodied being: thus a non-corporeal being embodied being: thus a non-corporeal being (e.g.: God, angels) lacks it.(e.g.: God, angels) lacks it.

10

Even if physicalism is correct, it remains that Even if physicalism is correct, it remains that there are three distinct ways to characterise there are three distinct ways to characterise a human being: a human being:

1.1. There are his bodily/physical events There are his bodily/physical events which do not which do not require any form of require any form of consciousness; consciousness;

2.2. There are the thinking events peculiar of There are the thinking events peculiar of language-language- user beings (e.g. belief, desires, …). user beings (e.g. belief, desires, …).

3.3. There are the There are the qualiaqualia which are which are conditions/ conditions/ sensations of the body sensations of the body produced by effect of the produced by effect of the external world external world and cannot be fully described in and cannot be fully described in language.language.

11

Perception and RealityPerception and Reality

While reason can tells us about ourselves and While reason can tells us about ourselves and our experiences, our experience does not our experiences, our experience does not teach us much about reality. Sensory-teach us much about reality. Sensory-experience does not teach us what really experience does not teach us what really exists in the things themselves. That is, the exists in the things themselves. That is, the sensory-qualities such as color, taste, etc. (the sensory-qualities such as color, taste, etc. (the qualiaqualia) are silent on what external bodies are ) are silent on what external bodies are like in themselves.like in themselves.

But in all these there But in all these there need be no resemblance need be no resemblance between the idea which the soul conceives and between the idea which the soul conceives and the movement which causes these ideasthe movement which causes these ideas. (. (OpticsOptics; ; CSM 1CSM 1: 167): 167)

12

Descartes takes our ideas of sensory Descartes takes our ideas of sensory qualities to be like internal sensations qualities to be like internal sensations such as the sensation of pain. such as the sensation of pain.

While it makes sense to say that a While it makes sense to say that a sensation of pain is not in the object sensation of pain is not in the object causing it (e.g. is not in the bullet hitting causing it (e.g. is not in the bullet hitting one’s leg), it is more difficult to claim that one’s leg), it is more difficult to claim that redness or heat is not in the object redness or heat is not in the object causing it. causing it.

13

We attribute redness to roses and heat to We attribute redness to roses and heat to real objects, (e.g. roses and radiators). real objects, (e.g. roses and radiators).

Descartes rules out this view because of his Descartes rules out this view because of his conception of causation (the conception of causation (the Causal Causal Similarity PrincipleSimilarity Principle) that there is nothing in ) that there is nothing in the effect that is not in the cause, i.e. the the effect that is not in the cause, i.e. the cause is like the effect.cause is like the effect.

If this is the case a quality like redness If this is the case a quality like redness (which is in a rose) could not cause my (which is in a rose) could not cause my sensation of redness since the latter (the sensation of redness since the latter (the qualiaqualia) is so different from the former. ) is so different from the former.

14

The creator, God, has chosen that some events The creator, God, has chosen that some events are “marked” in the mind in a specific way, but are “marked” in the mind in a specific way, but God could have chose to mark them in a God could have chose to mark them in a completely different way (completely different way (qualiaqualia are are arbitraryarbitrary).).

Cases of color Cases of color qualia-inversionqualia-inversion could be invoked could be invoked in favour of this idea. It would be harder to in favour of this idea. It would be harder to think of pain-sensation as arbitrary, though, for think of pain-sensation as arbitrary, though, for natural selection would not help one who does natural selection would not help one who does not feel pain the way we actually do (e.g. if sex not feel pain the way we actually do (e.g. if sex was painful, reproduction and thus the survival was painful, reproduction and thus the survival of the species would be endangered).of the species would be endangered).

15

Essence Essence vsvs. appearance. appearance

Descartes distinguishes between the world as Descartes distinguishes between the world as it is (in itself, i.e. as God does perceives it) and it is (in itself, i.e. as God does perceives it) and the world as it appears to us.the world as it appears to us.

This rests on the very idea that there is a This rests on the very idea that there is a subjectivity involved in our perception of subjectivity involved in our perception of reality. Since God implanted in us the seeds of reality. Since God implanted in us the seeds of truth about the universe, in our abstract, truth about the universe, in our abstract, mathematical concepts we can take God’s mathematical concepts we can take God’s viewpoint and perceive the universe as it is.viewpoint and perceive the universe as it is.

16

Chomsky on the Mind/Body Chomsky on the Mind/Body ProblemProblem

Chomsky Chomsky vs.vs. Descartes Descartes

Chomsky’s Cartesianism does not mean that Chomsky’s Cartesianism does not mean that he accepts all the Cartesian views. he accepts all the Cartesian views.

Chomsky Chomsky rejects Descartes view rejects Descartes view concerning the privilege access of our concerning the privilege access of our own mindown mind. No scientific study of the mind . No scientific study of the mind could accept this thesis (cf. linguistics).could accept this thesis (cf. linguistics).

17

In rejecting Descartes’ mechanism In rejecting Descartes’ mechanism Chomsky rejects the idea that in order to Chomsky rejects the idea that in order to act one upon each other, things must be act one upon each other, things must be in contact (a dead horse since Newton’s in contact (a dead horse since Newton’s law of gravitation). law of gravitation).

This parallels the rejection of Descartes’ This parallels the rejection of Descartes’ view of matter or substance. view of matter or substance.

This in turn entails the rejection of This in turn entails the rejection of Descartes’ mind/body substance dualism. Descartes’ mind/body substance dualism.

18

Once forces such as gravitation (which Once forces such as gravitation (which Descartes would have characterized as Descartes would have characterized as mysterious) enter the real world there is no mysterious) enter the real world there is no reason to exclude mental features from the reason to exclude mental features from the physical realm.physical realm.

Hence there is also no reason to make a Hence there is also no reason to make a coherent distinction between the physical and coherent distinction between the physical and the mental. the mental.

The mind-body problem should no longer be The mind-body problem should no longer be taken seriously.taken seriously.

19

The Cartesians observed that certain phenomena of The Cartesians observed that certain phenomena of nature (notably, the normal use of language) nature (notably, the normal use of language) did not did not seem to fall within the mechanical philosophyseem to fall within the mechanical philosophy, , postulating a new principle to account for them. postulating a new principle to account for them. Given Given their metaphysics, they postulated a second their metaphysics, they postulated a second substance (substance (res cogitansres cogitans, mind),, mind), for other reasons as for other reasons as well. Implementation aside, well. Implementation aside, the move was not the move was not unreasonableunreasonable, in fact, not unlike Newton’s reasoning , in fact, not unlike Newton’s reasoning when he discovered the inadequacy of the mechanical when he discovered the inadequacy of the mechanical philosophy. philosophy. Postulating of something that lies Postulating of something that lies beyond the mechanical philosophy gives rise to beyond the mechanical philosophy gives rise to two tasks: to develop the theory and to solve the two tasks: to develop the theory and to solve the unification problemunification problem; in the Cartesian case, the “mind-; in the Cartesian case, the “mind-body problem.” All of this is normal science; wrong, but body problem.” All of this is normal science; wrong, but that is also the norm. (Chomsky 2000: 83-4)that is also the norm. (Chomsky 2000: 83-4)

The mind-body problem made sense in terms of The mind-body problem made sense in terms of the mechanical philosophythe mechanical philosophy that Newton undermined, that Newton undermined, and has not been coherently posed since. (Chomsky and has not been coherently posed since. (Chomsky 2000: 86)2000: 86)

20

Biological RationalismBiological Rationalism

No place for a mechanism called “No place for a mechanism called “reasonreason” ” doing reasoning.doing reasoning.

Unlike the syntactic process involved in Unlike the syntactic process involved in language production, reason is not a language production, reason is not a mechanism with fixed operations.mechanism with fixed operations.

As such reason cannot be the subject As such reason cannot be the subject matter of science and cannot have a place matter of science and cannot have a place in a scientific rationalist study of the in a scientific rationalist study of the mind. mind.

21

Reason can be seen as a human attribute Reason can be seen as a human attribute provided by provided by common sense common sense understandingunderstanding. .

As such it can be seen as something As such it can be seen as something guiding our (scientific) enterprise; it cannot guiding our (scientific) enterprise; it cannot be the subject of scientific inquiry. be the subject of scientific inquiry.

Reason is a kind of Reason is a kind of social practicesocial practice, hence , hence quite different from linguistics which is quite different from linguistics which is more closed to chemistry and physics.more closed to chemistry and physics.

22

ReasoningReasoning

It is a normative process carried out by It is a normative process carried out by persons. It is not confined to a dedicated part persons. It is not confined to a dedicated part of one’s mind/brain. of one’s mind/brain.

Reason rests on the domain of human freedom, Reason rests on the domain of human freedom, while the language faculty does not. The former while the language faculty does not. The former is normative, the latter, like vision, is not. is normative, the latter, like vision, is not.

Linguistic processes and vision, unlike Linguistic processes and vision, unlike reasoning, are unconscious and cannot be reasoning, are unconscious and cannot be modified by the community. They are innately modified by the community. They are innately configured faculties which operate configured faculties which operate automatically and blindly.automatically and blindly.

23

Philosophical challengePhilosophical challenge

No science can eliminate persons and No science can eliminate persons and their mental life.their mental life.

No science can eliminate intentionality. No science can eliminate intentionality.

Any correct description and explanation of Any correct description and explanation of the human species and what happens in the human species and what happens in their head must deal with persons and their head must deal with persons and their intentions.their intentions.

24

Chomsky has a dismissive answer. Chomsky has a dismissive answer.

He does not deny that our understanding of He does not deny that our understanding of persons relies upon common sense concepts persons relies upon common sense concepts or that these understanding can be or that these understanding can be dismissed.dismissed.

E.g.: we learn more about people from arts E.g.: we learn more about people from arts and poetry than from psychology or and poetry than from psychology or philosophy. philosophy.

25

If the concept of person is found in the If the concept of person is found in the domain of common sense it can be inquired domain of common sense it can be inquired trough arts and history. trough arts and history.

From the common sense viewpoint this From the common sense viewpoint this inquiry is more fruitful than an enterprise, inquiry is more fruitful than an enterprise, such as linguistics or biology, committed to a such as linguistics or biology, committed to a formal description. formal description.

Science is not suited to the way in which the Science is not suited to the way in which the concept of a person is dealt with in common concept of a person is dealt with in common sense understanding.sense understanding.

26

Anti-Eliminationism/ReductionismAnti-Eliminationism/Reductionism

Common sense concepts have been useful Common sense concepts have been useful for millennia and there is no reason they for millennia and there is no reason they should be eliminated by a scientific study should be eliminated by a scientific study of the mind/brain. of the mind/brain.

We have different explanations serving We have different explanations serving different purposes. different purposes.

We cannot make science continuous with We cannot make science continuous with common sense. They are different common sense. They are different universes which do not intrude each other.universes which do not intrude each other.

27

Suppose I say, “the rock drop from the skies, Suppose I say, “the rock drop from the skies, rolled down the hill, and hit the ground.” rolled down the hill, and hit the ground.” The The statement cannot be translated into the statement cannot be translated into the theories that have been developed to theories that have been developed to describe and explain the worlddescribe and explain the world, nor is there , nor is there any interesting weaker relation; the terms belong any interesting weaker relation; the terms belong to to different intellectual universesdifferent intellectual universes. But no one . But no one takes this to constitute a body-body problem. Nor takes this to constitute a body-body problem. Nor do the natural sciences aspire to distinguish this do the natural sciences aspire to distinguish this description from the statement that the rock fell description from the statement that the rock fell down a crevice, which could be the same event down a crevice, which could be the same event viewed from a different perspective. (Chomsky viewed from a different perspective. (Chomsky 2000: 88)2000: 88)

28

Common Sense Concept of the WorldCommon Sense Concept of the World

A scientific conception of the world A scientific conception of the world cannot play a role when we come to cannot play a role when we come to apprehend the real world. apprehend the real world.

A three year old apprehends the real A three year old apprehends the real world in much the same way as a tree world in much the same way as a tree year old Greek apprehended it thousands year old Greek apprehended it thousands years ago. years ago.

29

The empiricists cannot rely on science (a The empiricists cannot rely on science (a recent invention which is constantly recent invention which is constantly changing) to explain how we commonly changing) to explain how we commonly apprehend the world.apprehend the world.

The sole concept of the physical world that The sole concept of the physical world that we can possibly imagine to be we can possibly imagine to be unchangeable over time and/or cultures is unchangeable over time and/or cultures is the one understood in common sense (folk the one understood in common sense (folk physics).physics).

30

The rationalist explains our apprehension of the The rationalist explains our apprehension of the world claiming that the basic concepts used to world claiming that the basic concepts used to explain the physical world are innately specified, explain the physical world are innately specified, they are part of a fixed human nature. they are part of a fixed human nature.

The correct explanation of a fixed common The correct explanation of a fixed common sense (including folk physics and folk sense (including folk physics and folk psychology) does not rely, psychology) does not rely, pacepace the empiricist’s the empiricist’s credo, on scientific explanations, but in a fixed credo, on scientific explanations, but in a fixed human nature. human nature.

The relevant concepts are provided at birth and The relevant concepts are provided at birth and need only an experiential trigger to activate (see need only an experiential trigger to activate (see poverty of the stimulus argument).poverty of the stimulus argument).

31

Folk PsychologyFolk Psychology

It must be convenient across people and time. It must be convenient across people and time.

And for it to be so convenient we must posit a And for it to be so convenient we must posit a basic human nature with fixed concepts and basic human nature with fixed concepts and basic needs that makes the use of these basic needs that makes the use of these concepts convenient. concepts convenient.

Cf. The evolutionary psychology enterprise.Cf. The evolutionary psychology enterprise.

32

This is not an explanation that the empiricist This is not an explanation that the empiricist doctrine welcomes, for according to the latter doctrine welcomes, for according to the latter convenient concepts can change across time convenient concepts can change across time and cultures. And they must insofar as and cultures. And they must insofar as empiricists claim that they depend on empiricists claim that they depend on experience. experience.

In short, how can one explain folk psychology In short, how can one explain folk psychology stability without appealing to stable and stability without appealing to stable and universal concepts? universal concepts?

To posit the stability of folk psychology on the To posit the stability of folk psychology on the fact that there subsists a similarity across fact that there subsists a similarity across cultures would be a circular explanation.cultures would be a circular explanation.

33

Chomsky’s Anti-ReductionismChomsky’s Anti-Reductionism

There is no convincing reason to expect There is no convincing reason to expect that the mental can be reduced to the that the mental can be reduced to the physical as currently conceived. physical as currently conceived.

Physics keeps evolving and, thus any Physics keeps evolving and, thus any reduction the current/contemporary reduction the current/contemporary physics could propose would be physics could propose would be unsatisfactory regarding the physics as it unsatisfactory regarding the physics as it will be developed in the future (see Lycan will be developed in the future (see Lycan 2003. In 2003. In Chomsky and His CriticsChomsky and His Critics).).

34

I have not been concerned with the question of I have not been concerned with the question of “reduction of mind to matter,” and do not even “reduction of mind to matter,” and do not even understand what the question is. … I use the term understand what the question is. … I use the term “mind” with no ontological import: rather, as an “mind” with no ontological import: rather, as an informal way of referring to the “study of the informal way of referring to the “study of the body—specifically the brain—conductedbody—specifically the brain—conducted at a at a certain level of abstraction.certain level of abstraction. … I also see no reason … I also see no reason to question the general conclusion reached long ago to question the general conclusion reached long ago that thought is “a little agitation of the brain” (Hume) that thought is “a little agitation of the brain” (Hume) or “a secretion of the brain” that should be considered or “a secretion of the brain” that should be considered no “more wonderful than gravity, a property of matter” no “more wonderful than gravity, a property of matter” (Darwin) … From this point of view, there is no place (Darwin) … From this point of view, there is no place for Lycan’s problem about “reduction of mind to for Lycan’s problem about “reduction of mind to matter.” (Chomsky 2003. Reply to Lycan: 257-8)matter.” (Chomsky 2003. Reply to Lycan: 257-8)

35

Physical Physical vs.vs. Mental Mental

The distinction between mental and physical The distinction between mental and physical or material can have only a descriptive or material can have only a descriptive content. It cannot be scientifically sustained content. It cannot be scientifically sustained and it has no metaphysical import.and it has no metaphysical import.

What does “merely physical” mean? Are What does “merely physical” mean? Are “mental things” the only things that are not “mental things” the only things that are not “merely physical”? How about magnets? Stable “merely physical”? How about magnets? Stable molecules? Insects? What is the import of the molecules? Insects? What is the import of the word “things”?word “things”? (Chomsky 2003. Reply to Lycan: (Chomsky 2003. Reply to Lycan: 259)259)

36

There is an intrinsic error among materialists There is an intrinsic error among materialists who persist in talking about the difference who persist in talking about the difference between the mental and the physical: they between the mental and the physical: they perpetrate a kind of dualism they aim to perpetrate a kind of dualism they aim to reject (see Strawson 2003). reject (see Strawson 2003).

We should turn to We should turn to experiential experiential vsvs. non-. non-experiential terminologyexperiential terminology..

By “mind,” I mean the By “mind,” I mean the mental aspect of the worldmental aspect of the world, , with no concern for defining the notion more closely with no concern for defining the notion more closely and no expectation that we will find some interesting and no expectation that we will find some interesting kind of unity or boundaries, any more than kind of unity or boundaries, any more than elsewhere; elsewhere; no one cares to sharpen the no one cares to sharpen the boundaries of “the chemical.”boundaries of “the chemical.” (Chomsky 2000: 75) (Chomsky 2000: 75)

37

Since the brain, or elements of it, are critically Since the brain, or elements of it, are critically involved in linguistic and other mental involved in linguistic and other mental phenomena, phenomena, we may use the term “mind”—we may use the term “mind”—loosely but adequately—in speaking of the loosely but adequately—in speaking of the brain, viewed from a particular perspective brain, viewed from a particular perspective developed in the course of inquiry into developed in the course of inquiry into certain aspects of human nature and its certain aspects of human nature and its manifestationmanifestation. (Chomsky 2000: 76). (Chomsky 2000: 76)

38

Methodological NaturalismMethodological Naturalism

[A] “naturalistic approach” to the mind [A] “naturalistic approach” to the mind investigates investigates mental aspects of the worldmental aspects of the world … seeking to … seeking to construct intelligible explanatory theories, with the construct intelligible explanatory theories, with the hope of eventual integration with the “core” natural hope of eventual integration with the “core” natural sciences. Such “methodological naturalism” can be sciences. Such “methodological naturalism” can be counterposed to what might be called counterposed to what might be called “methodological dualism,” the view that we must “methodological dualism,” the view that we must abandon scientific rationality when we study humans abandon scientific rationality when we study humans “above the neck” (metaphorically speaking), “above the neck” (metaphorically speaking), becoming mystic in this unique domain, imposing becoming mystic in this unique domain, imposing arbitrary stipulations and arbitrary stipulations and a prioria priori demands of a sort demands of a sort that would never be contemplated in the sciences, or that would never be contemplated in the sciences, or in other ways departing from normal canons of in other ways departing from normal canons of inquiry. (Chomsky 2000: 76)inquiry. (Chomsky 2000: 76)

Naturalistic inquiries onto the mind yield Naturalistic inquiries onto the mind yield theories about the brain, its state and theories about the brain, its state and properties: UG, for exampleproperties: UG, for example. (Chomsky 2000: 103) . (Chomsky 2000: 103)

39

PhysicsPhysics

Epistemological characterisation: Epistemological characterisation: The domain of the physical is what we come The domain of the physical is what we come more or less to understand and hope to more or less to understand and hope to assimilate to the core natural sciences.assimilate to the core natural sciences.

Yet we distinguish between physical things Yet we distinguish between physical things that represent the world from physical that represent the world from physical things that do not. things that do not.

We thus seem to rely to some distinctions We thus seem to rely to some distinctions between the mental and the physical.between the mental and the physical.

40

For naturalistic inquiry, there is no interest For naturalistic inquiry, there is no interest in taking “mental types” to be non-in taking “mental types” to be non-biologicalbiological … The computer analogy can be … The computer analogy can be useful as a stimulus to the imagination, much as useful as a stimulus to the imagination, much as mechanical automata were for seventeenth and mechanical automata were for seventeenth and eighteenth-century scientists. (Chomsky; Reply eighteenth-century scientists. (Chomsky; Reply to Lycan: 261)to Lycan: 261)

41

PhysicalismPhysicalism

The term “physical” has no definite content. The term “physical” has no definite content.

Thus physicalist thesis turn out to be Thus physicalist thesis turn out to be meaningless, they lack a definite content meaningless, they lack a definite content (and thus truth-value). (and thus truth-value).

They are not empirical hypothesis and They are not empirical hypothesis and cannot play a serious role in enquiry. cannot play a serious role in enquiry.

42

This rests on the fact that there is no This rests on the fact that there is no a prioria priori conception of the physical grounded in conception of the physical grounded in natural language, folk science or natural language, folk science or metaphysics, which provides the required metaphysics, which provides the required content. content.

Given the character of scientific inquiry (in Given the character of scientific inquiry (in particular in physics) physicalists cannot particular in physics) physicalists cannot hope to identify a definite meaning for the hope to identify a definite meaning for the term “physical” from a consideration of term “physical” from a consideration of physical theory.physical theory.

43

Problems Problems vs.vs. Mysteries Mysteries

Problems are questions that can be formulates Problems are questions that can be formulates in such a way that they allows us to proceed in such a way that they allows us to proceed with serious inquiry. with serious inquiry.

Mysteries are problems which cannot be Mysteries are problems which cannot be (scientifically) inquired, because they escape (scientifically) inquired, because they escape our capacities, i.e. because we are ill equipped our capacities, i.e. because we are ill equipped to solve them (e.g.: as a mouse is ill equipped to solve them (e.g.: as a mouse is ill equipped to deal with prime numbers). to deal with prime numbers).

This rests on the limits and power of the This rests on the limits and power of the human intellect/mind.human intellect/mind.

44

Descartes’s dualism was not abandoned because Descartes’s dualism was not abandoned because he could not solve “the interaction problem,” he could not solve “the interaction problem,” but because his problem could not be posedbut because his problem could not be posed; ; Functionalism did not repair a meaningful flaw in the Functionalism did not repair a meaningful flaw in the Identity Theory… Computational theories of Identity Theory… Computational theories of language, insect navigation, etc., require no Identity language, insect navigation, etc., require no Identity Theory. They are Theory. They are theories about the nature of the theories about the nature of the organism (mostly its brain) that have to be organism (mostly its brain) that have to be judged on their merits as explanatory theoriesjudged on their merits as explanatory theories, , like others. Prior to unification with core physics, like others. Prior to unification with core physics, chemistry needed no Identity Theory, surely not one chemistry needed no Identity Theory, surely not one that linked it to the physics of the day, which had to that linked it to the physics of the day, which had to be radically revised to be unified with chemistry … be radically revised to be unified with chemistry … these lesson apply to the study of the mental aspects these lesson apply to the study of the mental aspects of the world. (Chomsky; Reply to Lycan: 260-1)of the world. (Chomsky; Reply to Lycan: 260-1)

45

[I]t is unknown whether aspects of the [I]t is unknown whether aspects of the theory of mind—say, questions about theory of mind—say, questions about consciousness—are problems or mysteries consciousness—are problems or mysteries for humans, though in principle we could for humans, though in principle we could discover the answer, even discover that they discover the answer, even discover that they are mysteries.are mysteries. (Chomsky 2000: 83) (Chomsky 2000: 83)

46

DualismDualism

Many problems linked to philosophy of Many problems linked to philosophy of mind/language are driven by a dualist mind/language are driven by a dualist conception. It is often claimed that the conception. It is often claimed that the mental must be characterized in terms of mental must be characterized in terms of access to consciousness, awareness, and the access to consciousness, awareness, and the like. like.

Thus faculties like LAD (Language Thus faculties like LAD (Language Acquisition Device) or UG posited by the Acquisition Device) or UG posited by the Chomskian school cannot be characterized Chomskian school cannot be characterized as mental or psychological (see Nagel) as mental or psychological (see Nagel) insofar as they escape a subject awareness. insofar as they escape a subject awareness. They do not differ from physical properties. They do not differ from physical properties.

47

Some also claims (see Quine) that one cannot Some also claims (see Quine) that one cannot follow these rules; at best one’s action fits these follow these rules; at best one’s action fits these rules, for we can talk of rules guiding actions rules, for we can talk of rules guiding actions only insofar as they are consciously applied to only insofar as they are consciously applied to cause behaviour. cause behaviour.

All these “philosophical” worries rest on an All these “philosophical” worries rest on an implicit dualism at work. That is, on the implicit dualism at work. That is, on the distinction between the mind and the body and distinction between the mind and the body and the view that a naturalistic account remains the view that a naturalistic account remains silent on the nature of the former. silent on the nature of the former.

Thus while some philosophers engage Thus while some philosophers engage themselves in some form of reductionism and/or themselves in some form of reductionism and/or eliminativism, others accept a form of eliminativism, others accept a form of behaviourism.behaviourism.

48

Quine’s behaviorism is a variant of this form of Quine’s behaviorism is a variant of this form of dualismdualism. He argues that “the behaviorist approach . He argues that “the behaviorist approach is mandatory” (Quine 1990: 37) for the study of is mandatory” (Quine 1990: 37) for the study of language because, in acquiring language, “we language because, in acquiring language, “we depend strictly on overt behavior in observable depend strictly on overt behavior in observable situations (p. 38). By similar argument, the situations (p. 38). By similar argument, the nutritionist approach is mandatory in embryology nutritionist approach is mandatory in embryology because, in the passage from embryo to mature because, in the passage from embryo to mature state, the organism depends strictly on nutrition state, the organism depends strictly on nutrition provided from outside; provided from outside; just as linguists must be just as linguists must be behaviorists, so biologist must be nutritionistsbehaviorists, so biologist must be nutritionists, , restricting themselves to observation of nutritional restricting themselves to observation of nutritional inputs. The fallacy in the latter argument is inputs. The fallacy in the latter argument is apparent; the same fallacy undermines the former. apparent; the same fallacy undermines the former. Only radical dualist assumptions allow the Only radical dualist assumptions allow the matter even to be discussedmatter even to be discussed. (Chomsky 2000: 101). (Chomsky 2000: 101)

49

Cartesian Dualism and its CollapseCartesian Dualism and its Collapse

[T]he reasons for the collapse of Cartesian dualism [T]he reasons for the collapse of Cartesian dualism are somewhat misconstrued: as noted, are somewhat misconstrued: as noted, it was the it was the theory of body that was refuted, leaving no theory of body that was refuted, leaving no intelligible mind-body problem, no notion of intelligible mind-body problem, no notion of “physical,” etc“physical,” etc. In this realm, we have only the . In this realm, we have only the naturalistic approach: to construct explanatory naturalistic approach: to construct explanatory theory in whatever terms are appropriate, and to theory in whatever terms are appropriate, and to face the unification problem. Second, it is, for the face the unification problem. Second, it is, for the moment, only a hope that “neurological terms” are moment, only a hope that “neurological terms” are relevant for the unification problem. Finally, relevant for the unification problem. Finally, there there is no reason to try to define the “mental is no reason to try to define the “mental vocabulary” of ordinary discourse in a vocabulary” of ordinary discourse in a naturalistic framework, just as no one naturalistic framework, just as no one contemplates that for “physical vocabulary,” contemplates that for “physical vocabulary,” at least in the modern periodat least in the modern period. (Chomsky 2000: . (Chomsky 2000: 103)103)