778, - aarclibrary.orgaarclibrary.org/.../uploads/2017/08/August-18-2017-releas… · Web viewThe...

Approved for Release: 2017/08/17 C02573160

(CIA records released in AARC v. CIA, C.A. No. 17-160 (Hitler Plots Lawsuit) on Aug. 18, 2017)

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

18 August 2017

James H. Lesar, Esq.

XXXXXXXXX, XXXXX

XXXXXX, XXXXXXXX

Reference: F-2012-02068; Civil Action No. 17-cv-00160

Dear Mr. Lesar:

This is a final response to your 25 August 2012 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), submitted on behalf of the Assassination Archives and Research Center, for:

• All records on or pertaining to any plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler, including, but not limited to, all records in any way reflecting or referencing the CIA's study in 1963 of plots to assassinate Adolf Hitler.

• All records on or pertaining to communications by Allen Dulles Regarding plots to assassinate Adolf Hitler during his service in the Office of Policy Coordination, Office of Strategic Services, or the Central Intelligence Agency.

• All index entries or other records reflecting the search for records responsive to this request in its original or amended fonn, including all search times used with each of the components involved.

We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 50 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, as amended.

With regard to item 1, we located one (1) responsive document. It has been determined that the document can be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(l) and (b)(3). The proper withholding statute with regard to CIA's assertion of FOIA exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 102A(i)( I) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. 3024, noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct."

With regard to item 2, we did not locate any records responsive to your request.

With regard to item 3, we located five (5) responsive documents. It has been determined that five documents can be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(3), (b)(5), and (b)(6). The proper withholding statute with regard to CIA's assertion of FOIA exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 102A(i)(l) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 302(i)(l) and Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, 50 U.S.C. (formerly codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403)(g).

Sincerely,

Allison Fong

Information and Privacy Coordinator


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#140 4 May 1964

Briefly NotedPropagandist's Guide to Communist Dissensions#27, 11-24 April 1967[uncl. Chronology in Eng., Fr., and Span.]

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'-"778, SEA.TO Council Rejects Neutralization

of South Vietnam

·--·

779 AF,FE,NE,G. "Bandung" Afro-Asian ConferenceScheduled for Africa 1965

780. 20 July 1964: Twentieth Anniversary of the Anti-Hitler Plot*

781 AF,FE,NE,WH. Firm Government Action DefeatsCommunist Subversion*

782 AF,G. Dictatorship in Ghana*

*unclassified attachment(s)

CIA records released in AARC v. CIA, C.A. No. 17-160 (Hitler Plots Lawsuit) on Aug. 18, 2017

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C02573160• a Approved for Release: 2017/08/17 C02573160• (CIA records released in AARC v. CIA, C.A. No. 17-160 (Hitler Plots Lawsuit) on Aug. 18, 2017)

S E C R E T 4 May 1964

Briefly Noted

Majority of Brazilians Approve of Goulart Ouster:

A recent poll of 500 Brazilians, from all walks of life and economic levels, reveals that very heavy majorities, ranging from 55 to 85 percent of persons polled, favored the ouster ofGoula t from the Presidency (1 April 1964)and subsequent anti Conmiunist policies of the new government. For example, the most

·popular action taken by the Supreme Military Revolutionary Com mand was the removal of Communists from p blic office. In Rio, 85% favored the action, 8% opposed it, and 7% bad no opinion.

The attached article from Washin on News, 21 April, by Scripps-Howard staff writer Hal"1-!endrx, "Brazilian Voters H2.d no Confidence," forwarded with Spanish translation, can be re published or used as the basis of appropriate commentary on this encouraging development. Other democratic governments, plauged by Communist subversion, will find comfort in this poll. Com-

,_,. m ists are well organized and noisy, but their real strength is never so formidable as that of the great body of decent, democratically-minded citizens. Government leaders should base their counter-subversive action upon this assumption.

Swedish Press Freedom Curtailed to Shield Khrushchev

The atmosphere of terror which surrounds Soviet dictators is felt at times beyond the borders of the Soviet Bloc. Prior to an earlier Khrushchev visit to France and at the demand of Khrushchev's Security Police,. the French Government arrested hundreds of selected French citizens for the duration of the visit. More recently the Swedish Government has proposed a curious press law under which the criticism of any foreign government official would be punishable as a serious crime a gainst Swedish security. Since Swedish law already prohibits the defamation of foreign Heads of State, which Khrushchev tech nicallf is not, it is clear that in this peculiar proposal the Swedish Government aims at muzzling the mounting and well founded reseptment in the Swedish free press of Khrushchev's impending visit to Scandinavia in the guise of eace apostle.The massive Soviet-sponsored espionage against Allied military defenses, for which S\vedish Col. Wennerstrom now stands indicted, ma. es the resentment especially keen. And the recent discovery that Khrushchevts Ambassador· to Sweden, Nikolai Balochvostikov, is an officer of tbe KGB, a


professional spy, was almost more than the Swedish public could stomach. Popular Swedish disa proval of the proposed press ban was evident when the Swedes promptly began calling it "Lex !li!tita." Press media elsewhere have continued to deride Moscow's peaceful pretensions, whilea deafening silence on the subject emanates from the Stocl:holm dailies.

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(CIA records released in AARC v. CIA, C.A. No. 17-160 (Hitler Plots Lawsuit) on Aug. 18, 2017)

S:SOR:S'f 4 .May 1964

Assets in Scandinavia and other Free World areas shouldtal a note that this repression of the free press does violence to Scandinavian democratic traditions and illustrates that Tiho ever deals with the Comuunists risks bein3 contamioated by Com munist nethods to some extent, if only out of self-protection.

--

S B O R E 'f (Briefly Iifoted)


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26 May

23

May

June

5 June

..,, 11 June

l.l.l June

15

June

17

June

17 June


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Khrushchev arrives Belgrade, blames 1948 break on Beria. 1955.

Conf. for European Relaxation of Tensions and Security,(TTPC - supported), May 28-29. Salzburg Austria.

Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, Preparatory Meeting, Djakarta, 1964--full conference in late 1964 or early 1965.

Secretary George Marshall proposes the European Re covery rogram ("Marshall Plan") in Harvard speech. (Soviets prevent Poland and Czechoslovaltia frou parti cipatine). 1947

Marshal Tukhachevsky and 7 other top Red Army Generals arrested, tried secretly and executed. 1937,

China-Russia sign second "Unequal Treaty,"·Tientsin,1858.

USSR occupies Lithuania 15 June 1940, Estonia and Latvia 17 June 1940

German Day of Unity (West Germany) commemorating East German riots of worlters/youths 16-17 June 1953 quellec! by Soviet troops.

Hungary announces trial, execution of Imre Nagy, 1950.

... 19 June

29

June

l

July

10 July

10 July

13 July

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Tibet:

Internationa

l Commission of Jur

ists charges Chicoms with genocide, 1980•

Ruthenia (formerly part of Czechoslovakia) ceded to USSR, 1945)

Communist Party of China founded. 1921

Korea ceasefire negotiations begin 1951. (Armistice signed by UN, North Itorea and cotununist China 27 July

Arrest of Lavrenti Beria for treason announced.1953.

(Secretly tried and shot lS-23 Dec. 1953).

President Urrutia, in TV address, charges Communism endangers Cuban revolution. 1959.

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#27


S B e R B 'F

PROgAGANDlST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

11-24 April 1964

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. Political and propaganda activity throughout the Communist world was greatly intansified durine this period. Developments directly tied to the counter-offensive efforts launched by the CPSU ag inst the Chinese on April 3 included CC plenary sessions in many parties, official statements of position, editorials and commentaries in party and state organs, speeches by leaders, and the Gomulka-led_Polish delegation's visit to Moscow. The Sino Sovietbragl also fifflli"ed prominently in the commemorations of two major anniversaries, Khrushchev's 70th on the 17th and the 94th of Lenin's birth on the 22nd.

2. The Gomulka visit brought -- at a Soviet-Polish friend ship rally on the 15th -- Khrushchev's strongest, frankest and most colorful language yet in denouncing and ridiculing the Chinese, -- but he failed to call for any action beyond such coimnonplaces as "struge;ling for unity" and "defending the general line." Gomulka also v,ant further than befo:ra in laudinff and swearing fealty to the CPSU, -- but he held to his reservations about a conference unless it could give promise of bringinff unity.

3. IOlrushchav's birthdai caused a flood of messages and speeches ranging from poiem cal support of the CPSU and denuncie tion of the Chinese in some -- led by the East Germans and Bulgarians -- to non-colilmittal congratulations.

Surprise was a 50)-word telegram signed by top Chinese which acknowledged dif ferences and lacl:: of unitl_ but expressed conviction that "allthis la onit temtErart." In the evant of crisis, wa "will un doubtedly sand oget er." Within the USSR, th

birthday served to bring massive tribute and affirmation of devotion, although t.ba adulation was carefully limited to avoid the excesses ofStalin's 70th.

4. The CPSU made broad use o:f the Lenin anniversary :to reassert its line as the true Leninism, and keynote speaker Andropov pointed to the "insincere character" of the Chinese birthday telefrnm, "calculated to mislead," and to throw doubt on the vaiidi y of its confident forecast of the two standing toeether in time of crisis.

Other parties treated the event as might be expected -- except for the Chinese who seemed to slight it.

5. In addition· Soviet media continued their widespread


cam paign to ·-suppoJrt a: counter-offensive, using "statements of sul):port" by p rties throughout the world, domestic meetings, rallies, editorials, articles, letters, the belated May Day slogans, - and two more "heretofore· unpublished documents" deriving support

SB e RB (Commentary Cont.)

1



(Commentary Cont.) BE CR ET

from th dea masters, one.more from Lenin and one from Marx and Engels! Soviet sources are no·t openly pushing for a world conference, but about half of the statements of other parties reported by Soviet media include such a call .

6. Meanwhile, there as no reaction to the So iet campaign from the Chinese camp unti1 the 19th, when the North Korean daily Nodong· Sinmun published a harsh editorial attack which reverses aii of Suslov's charges and sounds a call to action in fighting aga'inst 'this "rampage." It concludes by saying "we deeo:(=t necessai-y to convene an fnternational meeting," -- but calls for "full preparations" first and depicts a conference in which the "true ,Aa;'l"x:l.st-Leninist" would "safeguard unity" by smashing the revisionists! The Chinese inally countered a week later (after the end.of our period), publishing on the 26th the full text of this.)todong·s1nmun editorial and on the 27th the texts of the 3 Sovie£ documents from April 3 ravda with an editorial note derisively abusing Xlirushchev and the CYSU leadership, - and tlu-e-tetjing to blish material proving K's former Trotskyite leanings! On the 26th, the Chinese also published Chou En-lai's report of his visit to 14 countries, which included a denuncia tion of K's·proposa'l. for renouncing force in territorial disputeo and "the third volume of anti-China materials from the Sovietpress." ·

7. On.th 26 h, tb Rumanians released the ma!terials from

their secret April 15-22 pienun: the suprise is an urgent call for a meeting of. the Soviet and Chinese leaders to agree to a 3-party meeting --'with the Rumanians as mediators.

8. Me nwhile, press!·re• ports. (Addendum, April I25) said that the CCP had:tinally replied -- negatively -- to the CPSU letter of March 7 which had proposed a May, June/July, and October time table for bilateral talks', preparatory committee me.eting andw ld conference, respectively. The Chinese are said to have been curt -snuobing tbe Soviet plan but agreeing to bilateral tallts on thelr own·terms -- in October in Peking. The same re port forecast_that.Khrushchev would accept the Peking suggestion, however reluctantly, because of the pressure being exerted by other parties not to force a split.

9. 'l'ha l!lillions of words exchanged during this period.in cludes some formulations worthy 0£ special note:

. .

-- Italia n dP.b oss'.Togliatt:l said 11we must have coiirage to tell the chine$e1 that "revisio n i s what we want," i:f by

that we mean ths<>rt·of·c:reative development and growth which "we"

and


the CP U have been·engaging in. {Cbrono, April ll and continuin5

---Polish qss, Gomulkawent a step further in whitewashing the term: Len was the greatest revisionist of all time, as he "enriched Marxism and all Marxist theory." (chrono, April 13- 13.)

2

S :ii C R. B 'F (Commentary Cont.)


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-- Gomulka (in the same speech) franl:ly admitted:"there.is no

such revolutionary situation today, not in a single imper alist country, especially not in the United States." Ee also asked the Chinese bluntly a number of piercing questions intended to throw doubt on whether they even believe their own line.

-- Khrushchev on the same occasion dropped some frank revelations. Be ac!qiq iedsed that CPSU de-emphasis of revolution in favor of peaceful coexistence is not the result of any change in desire but in practical factors--r'if it depended only on our aesire to malte a revolution ••••"). Then, in deriding the Chinese ezj,erienca with "communes vs. human nature," he is in essence acknowledgine that·:communism ii:;self can only be e pected in the dim, distant future because of the same sort of problems with human nature.

Sieyn.ificance:

Despite the nwnerous tumultuous eveots and pronouncements of this period, there is no clearer picture of probable Soviet plans and capabilities to meet the Chinese threat than before. An unconfirme d newspaper report "froa qualified sources" de... scribed in paragraph 8 above says the Chinese have finally re pliet1 neeatively to

the timetabie pro_posed by the Cl?SU letter of March 7 and countered only with a proposed bilateral meetine 111 Pelting in October -- which K is raportecUy expected to accept reluctantly. Pending further confirmation or clarification however, we can be sure that -- with both sides now openly bent on "exposine;" the other -- the polemical war will ow eviar hott::: and rou her, with potentially increasing damage to

he entire Oonnunist movement.

i

This period alone has brought new acltnowledger.tent of the de.uage already done, -- and a number of frank new disclosures (such as those described in para. 9 above) which will undoubted!: serve -- or can be made to serve -- to disillusion and discourar3·syn1pathizers still further. ·

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a EC P. B (Commentary Cont.)

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manifestation of bourgeois workers movement wfiereas revisionsm oi

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#127


CHRONOLOGY -- COMMIDUST DISS:i!:NSIONS

11-24 April 1964I

April 7 (delayed) - The Albanian ]?arty daily Zeri I Popullit features a 13,0oJO-word editorial "The Modern Revisionists on the Path of Social Democratic Degeneration and of a Merger with Social Democracy" with some new, extreme formulations .

"•••the modern revisionists never relaxed their efforts to find other allies as well••••They turned•••to their 'brothers• in treason - the leaders of the social democratic right, be cause present-day revisionism and social demo cracy are two manifestations of the same bourgeois ideology. Social democract is a

hemani

festa ion bourgeois ideology in the Communist movement."

After castigatin the Italian and French Party leaderships 'as well as Khrushchev end Tito -- the Albanians call out:

Modern tevisionism•••is"It is time f or each party to react••jthe•trojan horse * of imperialism within tlie"'socialist CBJ:lp e nd the icM .if

And the "troika· of Troy, " say the Albanians, is none other'than "the M. Khrushchev group, the Tito clique, and the revisionist leadersliip of the 1tai1an CP?'

April 11 and continuing - Soviet and pro-Soviet media continue to reflect support of the CPSU efforts at counter-offensive launched April 3. Some of it specifically endorses the call for an international conference, some expresses reservations or opposition to same, and some fail to mention it. We shall men tion only the most significant among those very numerous items.-- A "40-page special number" of the Italian CP journal Renascitn on the 11th is devoted to latest developments, with a front-page editorial by Toffliatti, plus a 12-page resume of the Suslov re port and a 3,oO -word extract of the 31 March Chinese joint article. Togliatti (also published in L'Unita and Paesa Sera on the 10th) scathingly denouncas the "sheer iunacy" of the Ch1nese "carapaign of subversion and disunity within the socialist ca.mp, making the filmsiest and silliest of charges against the Breat est and first of the socialist countries, the Soviet Union." Togliatti speaks plainly:

· 7e must have the courage to tell the Chinese leaders that fail their tallt about revisionism means theaevelopment of ou doc trlne and our action unaer conditions radically different from those of the past, and there fore its 'ffiowtb into patterDS and forms and meaningsat could never have been foreseen 50 or 20 or even 10 years ago,

then revisionis what we wnnt ••••"

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However, Togliatti has nothing to say about concrete action

counter the Chinese, except for general phrases such as •,1e

must do our best to see that the Chinese leaders are forced to give not mere lip service, but diplomatic and political support, to the unremitting, necessary, and aii-out struggle for easing tensions and for peace."

-- Pravda on 12th SUiiliilll,rizes statement of support by the Haitian National Unity Party CC and reprints article from Beirut news paper Al Akhbar by Spian Muhammed Rashid Ashraf on Arab support.

-- ravda on 13th publishes summary of resolution of 18th Con gress of Canadian CP condemning CCP splitting activities and urg in international conference as soon as possible. -

-- East German Party daily Neues Deutschland on the 15th carries ful!-paee statement of SJID/cc dated 14th which surpasses all previous SED output (and possibly all other on the Soviet side) in the harshness of its anti-Chinese invective and its emphatic support of the CPSU. It specifically reiterates Sm> support for the CPSU time-table (set forth in CPSU letter of March 7) for preparing an ail-Party meeting in fall 1964. (Lengthy summary published in Pravda on 24th.)

-- ravda on 15th publishes summary of article from the Burmese "progressive newspaper Botataung" by its editor U Thein Pe Myint, "prominent leader.of the na.tio11al liberation movement," attaclt ine; "the provocative disruptina activities" of the Chinese at the Algiers AAPSO session.

-- ravda on 19th features an article by Chilean Communist Pablo:Hei·uda affirming the support of "the Communist movement in 1ny country." China's errors, he states, "stem from one source - the personality cult••••Mao Tse-tung has become a living B uddha, separated from the people by court bonzes who interpret Marxisa and modern history according to his wishes•••'! He also condemns the CCP propaganda campaign in Latin America:

"•••Every day the mail brings me and thousands of other Chilean citizens letters, pamphlets, and all kinds of reports on one and the sametopic -- dogmati·c understanc1ing of a very problem atical truth. Hundreds of esta.blish!itents in capitals of the Latin American continent a.re preparing this material which is harsh, erroneous, and biased, and all this is being done to prove that the Chinese are not mistaken. And it isagainst this pa,er am,, which is on the move day and night, hat I address my words."

••._I l- . : i

-- On the same day Pravda reports a new resolution by the Australian c , published in Guardian, denouncing the Chinese splittine activities which led to the foundation

by E.F. Eill of the so-called CPA (M-L)• Andreports:that a Danish. I

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CP plenum adopted a statement suppo:rtin the CPSU and "deems it neoessary to call a new meeting of representatives of the Com munist p rties"; -- and that the CC of the CP of Argentina did l ke\"lise,_ also "d e nfi " a world 1-:teetine 11necesas ry ."-- Pravd on'·the 20th reprints from the UrUgu.ayan newspaper !! PQpulat a statement by the CP of Ecuador denouncing the Ecuadorean "splinter group headed by RE.feel Echeverria, Carlos Rodriauez, and Jorge Arellano, who "actine; from without, with support of anythine but the fraternal parties f{ghtins for the unity of the world Communist movement," promote the "Chinese l:!11e11 and use "every opportunity to smeer, distort, and slander the positions of the C)?SU and the CPE," and also "encroach on the uni y of each party separately and all parties of La.tin America. and the entire WCH."

-- ia$s on the 21st reports from Athens that the paper AVYI has pub"Ii's'ned a cecision of "the April plennn of the Greelt C" denouncing the Chinese and supporting the C?SU, including "the speedi st possible convening of a conference••••"

- The extant of Soviet internal mobilization in support of the campaign was demonstrated by a section of Literaturnay Gazeta on the 14th containine articles by "Soviet poets and artists, who rite of their full support of the CPSU line and denounce the Chinese leaders• statements••••" Tass bulletins on the 18th reveal that the Qain editorial ana two major siened articles(by Konstantinov and Tolkunov) in the new Komm:unist treat variouc aspects o1 the dispute.

-- And finally, further efforts were made to rally the dead to support the CPSU in its great trial. In our iast installment (Addendm, April 11), ue referred to the publication in Izvestiya of another "hitherto unpublished Lenin document" interpreted as supporting the Xlirushcliev line. ,ravaa (which carries same on the 12th) publishes on the 22nd "for tlie first time, Lenin's 'Amendments to and Comments on'" the foregoint.J "draft stateiaent."!t further spells out Lenin's support of peaceful coexistence, quotin : "•••we undoubtedly consider it to be our duty to sup port by all means any attempts for a peaceful settlement of disputes." And the April issue (No. 4) of Problems of Peace and· Socialism goes all the way back to the fountainhead, publishing "a. new docUlllent" of Mar:n: and Engels from. 1872, "discovered by the Ins titute of Marx1s -teninism in Moscow." Devoted to ruleschanges in the First International, it infers that if alive todayMarx and Eniels would agree with Moscow and exclude Pekincr from·


the movemen • ·

A ril 12-19 - The hieh-level Japanese CP delegation led by. Eakamada which has been visitins the uSSrt, China and North Korea (see -Cbrono, April 3 and continuing) flew from Canton on the 12th to Mortb Vietnam. Hanoi on the 19th reports the.t the delegation 111eftHanoi for home on 19 April after a seven-day friendship visit to the mtV."

3 (Chronology Cont.)

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April l.3-18 - The "friendship visit" to Moscow of the top level. Polish deJegation led t-y Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz (see Chrono, April 9, and Addendum, Apri.l 13 for earlier referencetD featured a "friendship rally" on the 15th, where I(hrushchev (after announcing the extension of the mutual aid and friend ship treaty for another 20 years) used some of the stronges , frankest, and most colorful language yet in denouncing an ridiculing the Chinese (some of which came in extemporaneous-digressions from his text which were toned down or deleted in eported versions of the speech.

"There is no longer any doul:-t that the Chinese leaders are trying to split the Communist movem«;,nt, ••• the socialist camp .•.. to :f.mpose their hegemony ."

"The Chinese leaders are criticizing (us) for concentrating on economic construction, for trying to improve the e onomy and the well-teing of the people...• How wou:tC, our Party, our ceop'.Je, have taken it had we convened a Party congress and decided•••(to) produce Jess so as not to growfat and thus prevent our

egeneration, a ourgeois degeneration?•• Is this the inspiration for our people to march ahead? Whither ahead? Into the grave? •..

"Put let us talk to the Chinese workers, the Chinese peasants•••. What do they want now, war or rice? Yet sometody or some group of peoplehave had a worm go up the wrong way, you understand, and it wriggles and turns; and he thinks, so to speak, that it is he who in reality directs world development. M.fe will show. There was TrotskY;;

- where is he now ? Rotting.•.•

"••• If it d!!J!en ed only on our desire t.o make a revolution, comrades, I guarantee you that the would have oone everything to see that the Eourgeois world was no more and that thered flag flew over the whole worJ.d . tut, comradeslet •_s not indulge . In fantasies afout this, t,ut a.ct lilte peov:te at-le to think realistically. The desire Y itself is Jittle ••.. One cannot "'ji'fiy at revolutions. Lenin put it very well :

revo'.'lution cannot l:'e exporte<! ..•.

"Only quite recentJy -the CCP leaders were


stressing the im1:>orfance 01' rleveloping t:heir economy to show the superiority of socialismin economic rivalry with capitalism. They have

(Chronology Cont)

4

me

that

coursa,n ! na that is really so, comrades,

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now for§otten this ••••Mao Tse-tung said: 'This year we have proauced 5.2 million tons of steel. In five years' time, there will be 10-15 million tons of steel; after five more years' -- you see how he said -- 'there will be 20-25 million tons and in the following five years 25-40 million tons.• And why not?•••This is from one who neversmelted steel and does not knov, how to smelt it. He thinks; you know, one waits a little at the hearth and all at once steel comes tumbline out, you understand, out of open-hearth furnaces••••

"Chinese propa.gandaasserted at that tiE:1e that China would set an example for all for the entry into Comr.mnism ahead ol sabedule••••Thus,for example, it was plinned wltli the aid of s allsc&le metallurgy, the 'backyard furnaces• or smelt ine; metal, to increase the year's s-teel outputfrom 5.3 million tons to 20 million. Ue learned that Sun Yat-sen•s widow also built a metal works under her u!naow, some sort of small stove, tha£ 1$••••Some meta"tlurgists! Well, comrades, miracles don't happen••••

"Free :food and equal distribution of :foodstuffs were introduced iti people's coiilDlunas••••But they did not calcu late the amount of food available, ohiJtoffi t&f people to loosen their baits, and they did!

Thay ate, and they ate it all up ?

· I remember Zasyad!to went to China at ChouEn-lai's invitation {in 1958 or even in 1959)••••He told after\'1ards about a conversation he d.4ad:with Chou. 'I said to him, listen, where a your'hens? ·There are no eggs, there is nothing in the· country. You used to have all tliese tblnes!•••Ana what did Chou say?•••"Our hens, of· have' not "flarrn a\'lay. We have eaien theti all, and ther.e e.ra none to lay eggswe oursel.ves know. A peasant is invited tojoin the cor.unune,¥ and you kno\'7 how the peasant goes to· the couun .· If he has his own chicken, he_ says: 'let's eat it, and then we will bee tt1;1.¢ Connn:unist chickens in the commune.

Andev ry·p aeiiit bas done·this; onch ate his chicl::eris; · they· arrived at the commune without ciilckens, . and fl here are the chickens to comefroia? Af:ter all they do not grow out of worms••••"

· . ; 1 . . 1 .

IC. says he·warn d M o during his 1958 visit tb Pekin5. "I said; it is your affair, but we are not goin to do it. To begin with, this is not new to us; we have

already done it;•••we ate the chickens once already! -



We

CcP

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K. then launches on a new criticism of the Chinese:

''When the Chinese leaders failed in their great leap forward and people's cot1r.1.unes policies; they adogted yet another extreme and in essance abandoned the industriaiization of the country.This, too, fs erroneous and incorrect.Of coursethis is their internal affair••••But this new mista!te•••cannot be passed over in silence, since· they are trying to depict abandoning the in dustrialization of the country as a kind of alaw necessarily valid for atbsocialist -. states••••

"•••The Chinese leaders are attack:in with particul.ar fury the decisions of the 20th con gress, which exposed the cult of personality•••• The timGs of !µ"eat and small cults have,passed irrevocably,•••

"Our CC receives uith profound anxiety the reports from China that the Pekini leaders have, for some years now,•••beenryins sow and grow feelings of distrust and enmity toward tfie Soviet people and the peoples of other socialist countries are becominff in creasingly convinced that a petty-bourgeois nationalist trend alien to the spirit of M-L has

gained an upper hand agoncr the CCP leaders.The Chinese splitters would like to become leaders and mentors of the evolutionary movement in Asia , Africa and Latin Aiiieric!• They maliciously oppose the national libe ation struggle of the peoples · of these continents to he workers movement in the countries of socialism. They try even there to introduce a schism, distrust, and aliena on Their reactionary idea that allegedly the white Poople will never understand the black and the yellow people, that allegedly their interestsare different, serves the sruae purpose••••Thisis the sllam.e£ul role the Chinese leaders are playin8' now •••• "

Gomulka's res onse, while restrained in comparison, is

strongest statemen to date. He stated inter!!!!,:"One can not drown concrete reality in a

£lood of revolutionary sloea,ns••••It must be said in all honesty that there is no such

re volutionary situation toda!i not in a single im perialist country especia y not in the United States••••If theleaders appraise the situa tion and the revolutionary forces in these coun-· tries as ripe and capable of independently over throwing illlperialism, they are making·a profound

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.•..-_ - - .

rich d. and.all Marxist theory to anun-

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(Chronology CQ t )

' learned

formula -

1fJ,'J.le p1?$-u:1eaders , especia.lly.Colill"ada IChru shchev, are 6-et"ng called (by the Chinese) tha t wat,:a.t rev.i.s,j.onists. in the history of theWO lter f:lOV Iilei:,.t.t I think that they are aista en. J C9DSider that at least as great ifnot a at r. •revisionist' was Lenin, who en

usuai,.exient •••• 11 . · i. ' '. . ; l

G. concludes by saying "we would consider" a conference de

si:rca.ble -- "if it w ul bria us nearer to" the goal of' unlty•April 14 - The Chinese press publishes a long.summary (full page:I.ii t'eoi!e•s Daily} ora Chinese-flavored article on "The :?resent day 1-fo:c!onal Liberation Question° froc the March issue of the North Vietnamese Party journal !22, Tap.

· Moscow•s Ua.y D:::.y slogans -- published almost a. we !.: later than last year -- re:liec=f' Ue development of the conflict in subtle changes. A lon8'-standine; reference to the"como.onwealth" of bloc states is deleted. A new slogan hailing "the working cla.$s of the entire T1- or l d11 emphasizes their courage bus strum:le "for the socialist transforraa.tion of society." The SJ).ogan for. Japan calls for friendly soviet-Ja anese relation replacing a ra:f ere nee to the Japanese quest £or friendship viith "neiehborin.g states."

April 15 - In an interviaw with American correspondents in Bong Xone, ttie leader of a. eroup of 125 Russian refugees just arrived from Sin!tiang, Gre5ory MicheIUo, sa1d t'Eiif in 195!-62 the Soviet Consulate in"'!tuldja had clandestinely distributed thousands of Soviet passports to Mosle s in Sin!:Iang wlio presented them to Chinese border authorities demanding exit visas, thus precipitat ing the riot of may 29, 1$521 suppressed by Chinese troops withachine gun fire, and cons quent closing of Soviet Consulate.Michen o said Mosleas still bate Chinese, long to cross into USSR and frequently listen to prohibited and highly inflammatory Soviet broadcasts in native languages.

An "editorial manifesto" in the new issue of tho pro-Chinese maeazine Revolution reportedly attacks the pro-Soviet Thorez leadership ol the French CP vio1en£1y-for ''multiple betras,als"of the masses, appeals openly to the eQbersio overthrow the leadership, and announces that a conference of the pro-Chinese elemants will oe held at the ena of tfiis year. The same issue contains article by Briiish a1ssiaent connunlst A.H. Evans attac1:ine; IChrushchev's agricultural policy and a swnmary of

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7Ainril 16-19con ess

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speech by chief editor Jacques V rges assertin that K. has declared a O-year truce in the revolutionary struggle merely in order that the Soviet Union mi ht overta!!:e the U.S.A. in industrial production. \April 15-22 - The Rumanian Party CC plenum took place in completesecrecy. (See Addend , Aprit 26, for publication of matarials.l

- The old-line, Soviet-aliened C? of Ceylon held its in Coloobo , with guest speeches by 11representaitves

of Comunist a d workers parties of more than 30 countries," in clu11ng the CPSU and 4 Mosco -followinB ruling parties 0£ Eastern Europe (excluding Poland and Rumania) and Mongolia. (See Chrono, Jan. 19-21, for raport of rump "7th Congress" held by pro-Chinese<S.:tssidents, and March 9 for report of "Soviet recapture" of trade union ovement.) Congress resolution condemns CCP leadershipand comes out for callin a meeting fraternal parties -- asreported by Tass. ', · \

April 17 - ICbrushc.hev•s 70th birthday celebration gathered in Moscow the party chiefs of a11 European Communist bloc countries except Albania -- and Rumania. The laUiar had an ostensible ex cuse in the continuing CC plenur.i, and sent l">rettier Maurer and CC Secretary Stoica to participate. Ho special emissaries from Castro or Tito. Speeches at ceremonies and messages trom around the world provided £urthe clues to the posture of parties in the conflict, with Chinese attac ed directly in oessaees and speeches of at least 91 led by 3ast Gere.ans. wn ast, most sycophantic defense of !{hrushchev a ainst Chicom cr1ticiso. ( ith out naming Chinese} was by Bulgarian Zhi ov. Surprisinzly,Goniull;a on the 16th hailecl X. with rarely used term Y1hicI1 was stanciarcl for Stalin, "veliltiy vozhd," ("great leader") and calleii hio "vozhd" a.gain on the 17th. Shortest and coolest was from Japanese C'.? chairman:

"Congratulations on your 70th birthday, Sanzo Nose.ka." The CCP sent a 500-word Jllessage siened by Mao, Chou I!:n-lai, Liu Shao-chi and Chu Te vhich said: "Although at present there are differences between you and us on a number o questions of principle concerning M-L and there is lack of unityp we are deeply convinced that all this Is9only temporary. In tho event of a aajor orld crisis, the two partiesp our two countries and our two peoples, will undoubte ly stand together against our comm.on eneoy." The messaee :from Indonesian CP boss Aidit seemed to reflect advance coordination with eki as he referred also to "the situation .characterized by differences of opinion" which Indonesian Communists thinl: of as "of' a. temporary nature," - although no otaer Chinese-aligned Asian party ttade any mention of differences. The frankly hostile Albanians, on the other band, observed tho occasion by llolding a meeting of the T rana?.aople's Council to "revise its decision o:f 30 May 1969" which awarded tlle-title o;f "l:zonora.ry Citizen of Tirana" to K. and to withdraw the title!

Domestically, the Soviet rnedia devoted a majority of space on tne 11th and ! th to the anniversary,· including messa5es,

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portraits, and award of 4th Order of Lenin. Military leaders Malinovsky and Grech!:o emphasi e K. rcle as supre e commander in-chief. Content considered by Western observers as not ex cessively adulatory, certainly not in comparison with Stalin's 70th.

At the aTTarQ cere3ony, K. limited hir:lSelf to indirect ata s on the Chinese aud, apparently aeain tryine to reassure foreian parties, said: · Te must not burn our boats in our relations with those ,·,tth '7hom we are not at the no:nent in. full , ..uµity." Tha visiting Party leaders disbanded immediately after t e celebration; uith no evidence that a political meetine had been held.

April 19 - The first acimoTTledeciEmt in the Chinese camp of· the Soviet move towarcl a counter-offensive came w!tli a 5,ooo-word ecHtorfai in tile fto:rth Korean '.?arty daily Nodong Siimun which attac!ts :lt harshly -- without naming the cui.prits:

"those \'/ho have created the. present situa tion•••should repent and i!.UUediately stop the open violation of the revolutionary principles· of the declaration end statement and their big- 29wer chauvinistic acts underminin solidarity••••However, their anti-Chin c2.!!lpaien,•••in ane frenzy, and their noisy clacor about 'collec- ti.ve aeasuras,' show that they are sinkinff deopar into spiittiss••••To isolate China, comprising tcro thirds of the o uiaElon of tEe socialist caap, 1aeans o orea.i.t up

.a.e camp••••

After runnine; through their extensive indict.aent, the lTo:;:-thKoreans sound the call to action:

"Such evil doines in the :ranks of the Com. nunist move ent cannot be permitted but must b e elioinated ••••The world communists anatlie international working class have before them the sacred tas of launching vigorous action to defena unity for the victory of the ICM•••• The socialist camp and the ICM are not a playtbin of any individual or any individual party. The ra page of certain people can be chec ed when an lncreasin number of Coz.munist pa.rt!es anc Cotmtunists fight acainst it. If all the parties and all Communists who want unity -Dool their streneth and fieht, the splitting machin& ilons will aeet fiasco••••

In order to defend the purity o:f M-L and strengthen the genu ne unity of the socialist camp and the ICM, sincere criticise should be extensively unfolded within the ram.ts of the Cormunist movanient ••••Uhen extensive criticism is conducted, it vill be maifa clear for ail who

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of Srot r par'ties for the solution of

.

April

is in the ri,ht and who 1s in the 1/ron ,the,.\7}t'O?I wl r go bankrupt and the puritythe ran of the :tcth.iiFbe preservea ••• '

that thel chance to avert a split

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(Chronology ont.)arid

ofle

deem it necessai! to convene an internationaln1eetinf ·

," ·

-- but they foll0T1 this with a 400-word conclusion which make$ it elear that the conferenca should come only after "full pre parations" are made and that it will be a conference in wh:Lch·.,the Marxist-Leninist parties and the true Communists" will" ateguard unity" by "shattering the splitting maneuvers" of the wild revisionists.

Also on the 19th, the East German cultural weekly sbnntag publishes a long article atfac!dng the revisionist viaws (a "direct attack on socialist state powerh) expressed 6y Austrian CP leader Ernst Fischer·1n lecture at t"rague University and published in Nos. 17 and 20 of the Geman-lane;uage Czech news·paper Aufbau and lrrieden.

.

fr11 20 - Speaking in Uarsaw on the 19th anniversary of the· ovle!f-!'olish mutual a1.d and friendship treaty, Gomull:.a quotas fro the Chinese message·to Khrushchev the passaee about the difference§- Seine oniy i temporary manifestation and adds:

"It ·would be extreme ly useful if the Chinese colDl'ades would besin as quickly as possi6!e fo be guided b this attitude. The near future will s&sw w ether their words cor respond with the C 's practical activity."

• • I

April 20-23 - The Buliarian Cliairman of the Presid:lallof' thG Mat!ona1 sse bly til u1ar chief of state), Dimitur Ganev died. He had also been a Politburo member of the BCP. On the 23rd, the r?ational Assembly "approved" the "nomination" by BC? boss Zhivkov of Georgi Trayl:ov to succeed GF.nev: he 1s DOlilinally not a Communist, but "secretary and most eminent wor!:er" of tlieNational A81"arian Union, an organization which in the "Fathe:r land l:!""Tont" "bas develoned as a militant assistant of the BCl? in the construction of the new life."

: ". • : . • I

22 • The 94th annivorsary of Lenin's birth brin s a new spate of ?:lB.terials reflecting the current stage of the conflict. Keynotespeaker in'lloscow is cc Secretary for Relations with B1oc Parties Andro2¥v - He devotes the last qu ter of his 7500-word speech to ·theroubles with the Chinese, '\"1ho, "in the struggle for he emonyt Ire· increasingly and openly replacing Leninism -r1i tr-_ Mao Tse-tuni1sm.·11 ttacently they "have quite opan!y proclaimed

in the Cormu.nist movement consists ih•••unconditlona1 capituiation, and

accepting the line of the CCP leadership••••As for the hioc which the CCP leaders are QOW fev,ishly trzing to knock together OD

unprincipled

1

tiie d1 :ferences

grounds, it s doomed to failure••••" ·Andropov refers to the Chinese birthda\ messaee to K.:

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"All who read it could not but notice the insincere character of that document••••Bou to understand the activities of the Chinese leaders who, ha.vine sent the conffl'atulations, at the sa. e time, on that very day, publishedin the Chinese press foul anti-Soviet materials?•••Was not the telegram calculated to mislead the Soviet and world public, to create the im pression among the Chinese peopla•••that the CCP leaders really care about strengthening Soviet Chinese friendship?

By the way, cora rades, the telegrG expresses the confidence that if serious major events occur in the world, as they write, the CCP and the CPSU, then and the USSR, will fight together (telegr&Jasaid "stand together") against a comnon eneoy. This is, of course,. an. importeJlt sta.teuent, but htrQ11$. it to be reconciled with the slanderous assortions oi Chinese propaganda that.allegedly our country has joined a plot with the imperial ists,has concluded '\'11th them some sort of al liance?"

However, Andropov keeps the-olive- branch·in..sight: ''While openly exposing the spli ting

cours of the CCP leadership and fightin against it, our arty at the saae ti. e does not refuse to continue, as in the past, to lookfor ways to noraalize relations with the CCP•••• There are people t1ho allege that the CPSU is striving to expel China frot1 the socialist ca.tip. This is2 of course, nonsense ••••" ·

Pravda pu,blt$hes the text of an ,ooo- ord editoriai

'

froo

the nev, issue of Parti Life on the occasion, most of which is a defense of the curren concept of "the transformation of the C:?S'U into a party of all the people" and the USSR into an "all people's state." Hew Tim.es also features the anniversary withan editorial vrhicli stresses the "reality of the socialist societ:·in 0110 country" which serves as "an e ple :forthe peoples ofall states."

The Chinese,on the other liand, almost sli ht the occasion: eo le's Daily mar!u; it only with a 5th-page article of routine con ent by an unknown Kuan Ya-sing, and the Horth Korean and North VietnWilese·articles are of a routine nature.· The Albanians-- aJ.So In a "routine" Zeri I Popul1it editorial -- denounce themodern revisionists who are "mutilatine Lenin."

' j

- I11 (Chronoloey)



c5

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Addend"W'J. to Chronoloe;--

#27 Post-deadline items

April 25 - Mevis re:;,orts from London cite "qualified sources" asthat the Chinese had replied neeatively to the C

SU's letter proposing clirec Sino-Soviet tallis in filay, a preparatory mee-=tini of selected parties in June and a uorld confersnce in October. "China's reply -i,1as reported to lla.ve been curt, snubbinc; the Soviet plan but agreeine to bilateral ideological talks onits o'\=ln teras -- in October and in Pelting." The press also reported: " -uthorito:tiva informants believe Xhrushchev Tlill ap prove the Peli:ine; sueeesticn, however reluctantly. " Eol'-reve:r, 11co ns! ae l:a.61e pressu!·e is '6eine exerted on the Kremlin a8a.inst a Sl.llil. it shcudown with China from satellite and other ranking Coa--:iunist leaders."

April 2G - The Rumanian Party daily Scinteia publishes thema e1' .a1s of th Si '.;\,l ,!5...."!J;!?, pl nnn, consis=f':tng of a "stP..tement"a.nd- a 11po'iicy-i i'laJ:y;mi1 "i·umiinff-tomore than 12,000 acco ding7::oprass""repc-Fts -- but the text is not available here etthe time this 5oes to press. The feature is an urgent call fora meetin of the Soviet and Chinese leaders -- with the Rnn nianE ns med!a@ors -- t·o IJa:ke 2,reparations for a worlcl-wicle oeetine;o2 leaders. The statenent also says that the Boviet8 have "agreed in gGn ral" to the plan but that the Chinese had thus far failecl to heed it.

In Pell:in5 on the smile day, J?e,:,ple 1 s Daily publishes the full text (sllimilary j_n other paperi)-of "E.:i.e 1t<iFth Korean IJodo 3 Cinnun editorial of April 19 striking baclt at the new Sovie initiative, and all papers feature under banner headlines Chou En-lai1s report on his visit to 14 countries -- which includeo a denunciation of Illirushchev's cnll for ae;reeoent to renounce the uoe of force in settlement of territorial disputes as "a nev, fxaud." NCMA also announces' ths.t the "third volu::ne of-anti-China aaterials from the Soviet press" went on sale throueh-out China. · '

; iApril 27 - People's Daily devotes 5 pages to the full texts of the 3 Soviet docu ents published in April 3 Pravda: tue Suslov plenwn report, the plerium·aecision and Pravda's editorial, - together with a 1,000-word editor's note ,1lilch reaches nlS\I aJd:remes in derisive abuse of Khrushchev and the C SU leadership. It itiplies that X. hadonce been :forced "to L1alte self-criticis-.lll for coraraittinf tlie erro1"' of Trotskyism" and declares that "we a=e·preparedo publish the reiavant materials hen necessary." (Fuller com.tents wlli be included in next installment.}


(Addendum.)


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118. $EA'l"O Council Rejects lleutralization of Soutb Vietnam (b)(1)7(b)(3) NatSecAct

I BACKGROUMD: At the mid-April SEATO meeting in Manila,

French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville again advocated a "political solution" to Communist insurgency against the South Vietnamese govarnraent. SEATO's Council of Ministers rejected their French colleague's proposal unanimously, endorsing instead the new military and political program of the South Vietnmaese government.The SEATO communique says:

"The Council agreed that defeat of the Com munist campaign. is essential not only to the securi ty of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of South east Asia. It will also be convincing proof that Communist expansion by such tactics will not be permitte'1."

The SEATO treaty specifically provides that members of the alliance guarantee the security of South Vietnam, and in this context the communique says:

"The Council a.greed that members of SEATO should emain prepared if necessary to take further concrete steps within their respective capabilitiesin £ulfilhnent of their obligations under the treaty."

Other sections of the communique charged North Vietnam with directing, supplying, and supporting tbe Viet Cong 81J.errillas. · The communique was signed by Australia, Great Britain, New Zea land, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States. The French delegate concurred in general with the communique, includine those portions dealing with Communist aggression and subversion in Southeast Asia, but abstained from the section aea1- ing with South Vietnam.

Most delegates and observers at the SEATO meeting aereed that France had suffered a diplomatic set-back, not so much for the failure to persuade other delegations to support their neu tralization policy as for the unwillingness or inability of the French delegation to produce any practical plan for their grand concept.

l"li·esident De Gaulle referred to such a conception as long ago as last summer and prier to his 31 January 1964 press conference it was widely anticipated


that he would on that oc casion offer the world the particulars of his plan. However, his remarks at that time were no less vague than they had been before. The delegates thought that by the time of the SEATO conference, more specific and concrete planning might have been done and their F ench colleagues might bring forth dramatically specific proposals -- and perhaps even some indication that the

S E C R B 41 (778 Cont.)

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(778 Cont.)

Cbicoms would accept real neutralization of Southeast Asia. Such was not the case. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville limited hir.iself to nothing more concrete than describing the neutralization concept as "a long-range proposal."

Thailand's Foreign Minister Tbanat Xhoman described the French proposal as "tantaaount to the delivery of the country, bound hand and foot, to the northern aggTessors."

Other dele gates were equally firm and sharp in their rejection of the French proposals. Most of the delegates, in calling the on cept "utopian," "visionary," etc., referred to neighboring Laos as an exaraple of a failure of neutrality to brinff peace. That country had been "neutralized" by greement among 1 countries and yet tha Communist Pathet Lao had consistently and at will violated the neutrality agreements. They had, at the behest of Pelting and Ea.noi, frustrated all the attempts of the Interna.tion: Contl"ol Commussion (ICC) to police the neutrality and gua_rantee the Laotians freedom froa outside interference and assault. The "neutralization" of Laos has peraitted Hanoi and !?eking to sup ply, support and reinforce the Communist Pathet Lao's subversive attempts to expand their control over the country and has also ma.de possible the continued use of the "Ro Chi Minh trail" to send men and material to sustain the Viet Conff insurgents in South Vietnam.

The real problem, in fact the traeedy, of vague and inane tall: of a "political solution" or "neutralization" in Southeast Asia is that it is cruelly deceptive for those very people who are willine to fight to defend their freedom. Such tall;: has two effects on the South Vietnatiese people, many of whom are under-· stanclably war-wear» both equally pernicious and defeatist: li'irs·: it encouraees the more naive eleaents in South Vietnam to believ, that if the Inlanh government were overthrown, the successor eoverm4ent could end the war by a "political solution" and re!ila.L1-:free from domination by Hanoi and :?elcine-; second, such misa-uidad efforts by those \7ho fall for the "neutrality" siren sone forces the Khanh government to vithhold part of its strength

roa the strug le against the Viet Cong in order to immunize itself againc coup attempts by elements foolish enoue;b to conclude that a "po litical solution" is available if only it is sought. The facts do not support sucb·a conclusion.

The facts, however., are not al\7ays known or easy to !mow, particularly when they are not even accurately reported. The French Press Agency (All'l?) for example distorted smATO Secretary General Konthi's remarks on Vietnam to suit the interests of French eovermuent policy and has on several occasions slanted it reporting on South Vietnam to cause con:fusio11 and misunderstandinc..

(b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct

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in

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8ECRE'f 4May 1954

779 AF,FE, "Bandung" Afro-Asian Conference Schedulec1 forIm,g. A:lrica l9G5 (See also BPG #135, item 748, dated

-------=2 4'--=F e b i§ S t= >._ _

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"'!!iiar.

(b)(1)1(b)(3) NatSecAct

I BACKGROUND: The outcome of the ministerial-level pre

paratory meeting for a Second Afro-Asian (Bandun ) conference, held Djakarta from 10-15 April, ought to have been a disap pointment for the Chicoms and the Indonesians. Nonetheless,l-TC11A term.eel the Conference a "great successn (as seems ncm standard Communist oractice no matter how the Sino-Soviet con flict raees at international front and other gatherines -- sea BPG ,1139, item 722, dated 20 April 1964) and quoted Indonesian Cl? chairman Aidit as terming it a "total victory" which smashed tha "mperialist plot" against Afro-Asian unity. The importance attributed to the preparatory conference by the Chicoms became evident with the dispatch of Foreign Minister'Chen Yi as the head of a lar e, senior delegation. While the results of the meeting undoubtedly did not fulfill Chicom expectations, the meeting did provide -- as will the main Conference -- an impor tant arena for the ChicotlS to further break out of isolation.

'!\vanty-two nationsl were represented at the meetinff. It is important to note that the Chicoms were not scheduled to participate and ended up as co-sponsors of the meeting. Thef came to Djali::arta late., kept in the backsround "on a stand-by basis," asked for and

accepted Indonesia's invitation -- after most major participants had arrived or were firmly aomraittea to participation.

The three major areas on which the Chicoms and Indonesians ere forced to concede or to compromise were:

l. The Date and Site of Conference. Following India's motion, supportedlly pressures from African and non-African Arab countries, the meeting decided to hold the Conference in Africa beeinning 10 March 1965 with the actual Conference site likely to be decided by the Organization of African Unity {OaU). Cnicoms and Indonesians had treated the Conference matter as "urgent" and persistently pressed for an early conference date, aiming no doubt at a Conference before the secoocl Iilon aliffned (Bel5rade) Conf'erence (scheduled to be held in Cairoin the first wee of October 1954). More surprisinff than the late d&te, hooever, is the decision to hold the Conference in Africa. Indonesia's approach over many months implied that a second Bandung Con£erence would take place in Indonesia, where


1A

fghanistan,Al eria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ceylon, the CPR, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, ritorocco, ?Tepal, i?aidstan, the Philippines, Syria, TanganyiI a , Tur!:.ey, the UAR.

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Sukarno with Chicom euidanca and support would have set .the sta e. An African site will most likely diii\inish Chicom/.'Indonesian influence in this Conference, ana assert African in terests in the overall Afro.Asian framework at the expense of the farmer's "leadership," be it on governmental or non-govern-.mental (AAPSO) levels. According to best indications available, the Indonesians appear to want to save face by accepting the decision on the Conference site in good grace, acquiescing to the validity of African and Arab demands.

2. Soviet admission. The USSR's participation, suggested by India and strongly supported by Ceylon, led to major debates and conflicts of opinion. No agreement was reached on whether the USSR should attend, or whether the question of admission should be submitted at the Conference. in other words, the Chicoms apparently did not succeed in having the Soviets exclude( According to an AP report of 25 April, PRAVDA leveled an angry 2,500-word blast at the Chicoms for blocking an immediate Soviet invitation to the Conference. The article accuses the Chicoms of shameless slander and cheating and charges them with trying to isolate the Soviet Union from the nations of Asia and Africa.

India had pleaded the case for Soviet admission on the basis of the Soviet presence in many Afro-Asian non-governmental bodies, the geographic position of some Soviet provinces, and the consistent Soviet backing of Afro-Asian actions and aspirations. India's move £or Soviet participation was interpreted by op ponents of the proposal as a deliberate attempt to obstruct the proceedings.

The proposal to have the Soviets included drew fire from Chen Yi and was also strongly opposed by Pakistan. Chen Yi and others argued that the seat of the Soviet Government is in Europe; the CPR had o posed Soviet participation in the first Bandung Conference when there was no dispute between the two countries; and the CPR's opposition had nothing to do with the present ideological conflict. Grounds for rejecting.the pro posal also rested on the fact that if the Soviet Union were in cluded in this Afro-Asian regional conference., there would be no basis for rejecting the participation of others, e.g. the United States with its negro population, (the states of Hawaiior Alaska), Albania which has a Moslem population, or Spain whichbas relations with African countries, etc.

3. Malaysian admission. India was also responsible for the submission of the proposal for. Malaysia's admission.

The comlitunique issued at the end of the meeting ambiguously stated that 0 it was hoped that the obstacles which prevented reachine; an agreement on tbe invitation would be eliminated,11 in which case "an invitation shoulc1 'be extended as soon as possible." - Indonesia had led the opposition to Malaysia's admission and was s'1pported by the CPR, Pakistan, and tlle Philippines. Some ofhe countries which recognize Malaysia maintained that

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Composition of Conference. The meeting resolved to invite the following categories of countries to the Conference: All the 2S countries which participated in the Bandung conference; all members of the Or anization of African Unity; Afro-Asian coun tries which will attain independence bet\7een now and the conven ing of the conference• as well as Mongolia., North Korea., SouthKorea, Cyprus, Kuwait, est Sainoa, and the provisional government of Arigola. Additionally, representatives of all national move ments from nonself•go erning territories in Asia, and those in Africa which are recognized by the Oreanization of African Unity, may attend with the right to be heard -- a provision specifically to apply to South Africa, Southern Rbedesia, Oman, Aden, and Palestine.

Conference agenda. The communique contains a 10-point provisionr.. agenda for the conference, including the heading "world peaceand. disarmament" under which is listed "nondissemination of nu:}lear and the1"t10nuolear weapons," as ,vell a.s strict internatione.7. control, prohibition of all types of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, creation of nuclear-free zones, and complete prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons.

Another heading on the aBenda, which is also listed in the communique as one of the con ference objectives, is "the peaceful settlement of disput s and the renunciation of the threat or use of force in international relations." In addition to such subjects as peaceful coexistenc.::: and the anti-imperialist struggle, the agenda includes items on the strengthening of the United Nations and the desirability of estaolishing a perwanent secretariat to faci11tate cooperation

among Afro-Asian nations.


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S B O R E 'f 4 Ma,y 1964

780. 20 July· 1954: · .'l\1entieth Annivarf:Je..ry of the ti-Bitler Plot

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I BACKGROUND: [Mote. The Communists were never anti Fascist in the sense of being against oppress va totalitarianism. They were anci are against every thing, includin3 free democratic ideologies, that might thwart their in1position of their own brand of totalitarianism. They indifferently support any thing or attack anything in maneuvering toward their own goal of eventual domination. It would be dif ficult to present evidence proving conclusivelythat the Communists, as a tactic to insure their ov,n takeover in Gen1any after her defeat in WW II, intentionally informed the Gestapo of the conspiracy against Hitler in June 1944. It would be simpler to prove that the German Communists, due to their own lack of security precautions, ere penetratedby the Gestapo. However, established writers have made statements in their published works which at least implicate the Communists in exposing this last plot to kill Hitler.

These statements canbe used to seriously damage the self-image the Com munists try to create of being the saviors of those threatened by as ism.J

"Fascist resurgence and Nazi revanchism" is a dead horse which Cor.Jmunist propa8andists have flog ed ad nauseam since mvII. The twentieth anniversary of the attempt to assassinate Hitler on July 20th offers good occasion for a public reminder that Eitler and Fascism could never have come to power without the support of Stalin and the German Communist Party, actin under direction froa Moscow. Different writers have suggested that the Communists actually saved Hitler in 1944 by deliberately betrayin3 the assassination plot to the Gestapo. (See unclassi fied attachment). The failure of the assassination attempt led to the near obliteration of what moral fiber remained in German officialdom, while causing incalculable and needless additional hWimn suffering.

Numerous eminent or high ranking personages in Nazi Gerraanl· were convinced that Hitler must be killed and were fully prepare to do so personally.

Elaborate plots and active attempts were made by different groups from 193S onward, all of which were thwarted by mischance or the fantastic security measures surrounC ing Hitler's person. Spurred to new efforts by the success of the Allied invasion in mid-1944, a conspiratorial group centered around Dr. Karl Friedrich Goerdler began to take desperate meas ures to assassinate Bitler and depose his Mazi retinue. This conspiracy included. all of the numerous anti-Nazi elements in Germany except the illegal German Communist

Party (ItPD), theApproved20'f7/08/17(780

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remnants of which bad been driven underground. On 22 June 1944 the conspirators reluctantly broke a long-standing resolve by taltinff into their confidence two surviving members of the KPD, hoping that the latter could at lea.st be counted on to cooperate-against the Mazis. Two Social Democrats among the conspirators, Raichwein and Leber. met with KPD representatives Saefkow and Jacob, who brought with-them a third man.introduced as "awn.bow." P..auibow ·turned out to be

a Gestapo informer, and.ReichWein .and Leber were arrested by the -Gestapo on July 4th and 5th. This. forced precipitate action. and Count Claus von Stauffenber was nominated to personally plant a brief-case bomb under the staff conference table during the 20 July visit by Hitler to hisr tenburg field Headquarters in East Prussia. Owing perhaps to the haste of the preparations, Bitler survived the blast without serio s injury. His revenge was a fratrici al purge which involved 1.000 arrests and 5 1 0 0 0 deaths, eliminatin5 the potential for - any £urther ·an:ti-Na.zi .mo'V'eiilent -·within.Germany. Dur-ing the winter of J.944-45 wba.t emailled ...<>£ ·the spiritual elite

._ of Germany was behind bars.0 .Those ·who remained alive in April 1945 were, so far as possible,.sbot out of hand by the s.s. lest they survive the war and play the part that would.naturally have been theirs in post-war Germany.

According to all logic of motive, betrayal of the anti Hitler group to the

Gestapo, was consistent with and typical of Moscow's methods- before, during and after the war. While undermining and betraying its "allies" and "enemies" of the moment with fine impartiality, Moscow managed to build for it self a popular image of heroic anti-Fascist struggle. The falsi ty of this image has been extensively docwnented, as reflectedin Prop Note 19 (B), 5 June 63, with its accompanying unclassi fied publication and bibliography, "Com1unist Nazi Relations: The Myth of Communist Anti-Fascist Resistance in vm II" (e.g. after two years of outright Soviet-Nazi cooperation at the start of 'flVI II, all

Communist Parties folloved tlle Soviet lead in at tacking Germany and Fascism after Hitler attacked the USSR; CP's in all countries involved in the war, joined the resistancemove ents which they had denounced and fought while Hitler was attacking only non-Communist cou ries.)

This study affords a broad perspective of the grievous human tra edy which has been inflicted by Moscow throughout the lengtb and breadth of Eurasia in times of peace as well as in war.

Mounting difficulties, foreien and domestic, have beset the Soviet re ime in recent years. The perennial agricultural and economic problems at home have not yielded to Marxist Leninist theorists. The European satellites have grmvn more in dependent and restive, uhile the Sino-Soviet schism threatens to destroy what remains of the Kremlin's monolithic power posture. riloscow badly needs a period of "peaceful co-existence" and help

from abroad to cope vith its internal problems and re-assert its

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lipping controls. As is usual with Communists in trouble, the Kremlin is radiating comparative sweetness and reason. And ouch of· the l?ree Worl::.i is reacting withe. wave of wisMul speculation that the Soviets m.ay be chaneing their strip_es.


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S B e R B 'f 4 May 1964

782 AF,g Dictatorship in Ghana


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BACKGROUND; "To build a Socialist society, Ghana marches on, guided by immutable prtncipl_es of Marxism LeniniS111.

Long live Itwame Mltrumah, founder of Gh1;.na! Long 11ve the Central Committee of the ravoluti-onary Convention Peoples Party!0

(Ghan:-_ Evening News, February 19, 1954.)

As Ghana is being rapidly turned into an authoritarian society, she is just as rapidly adding a number of Communist features. A completely controlled party-state structure is President Nkrumah's evident aim; radical leftist advisors are infusing public media and institutions with Scviet-style concept and are apparently gaining influence in the conduct of Ghanaian· affairs and in Mltrumah's councils as well. Whatever the moti vations, the facts are incontestable. The following development are a measure of the Soviet style totalitarian trends in Ghana:

1. The Soviet Eresence in Ghana is rising . Military and technical teams arrive in Ghana in large nm1bers. In addition, pGrsistant rumors say that Nkrumah has had at least one Soviet bodyguard in constant attendance since the most recent assassi nation attempt.A reported switch from British to Soviet arms sources would undoubtedly increase both the numbers of Soviets in Ghana and the numbers of Ghanaians going to the USSR for military training.

2. Ghana is receiving Communist bloc support fo r Nkrumah's pan-African organizational schemes. The Gfianaian Vice resident of tlie Ail-African Trade Union Federation, J. Tettegah, 1s·the leading advocate of a Communist-backed scheme for African trade union organizations to disaffiliate from either the CoEliilunist Vlorld Federation of Trade Unions (\VFTU) or the free world Inter national Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Hidden Communist ties and influences could then exploit labor organiza tions more easily. The new Secretary General of the Accra-based Pan African Union of Journalists is the former editor of Ghana's eJ:tremist paper, Spar!t, modelled after Lenin's Is!u-a, which has the same meaning.The Communist International Organization of Journalists assisted Ghana in organizing the conference.

3. Opposition has been stifled. All political parties except the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) have bean outlawed, opposition press has bGen banned, the principle and practice of an independent judiciary have been abandoned, opposition leaders jailed or exiled.

4. Popular referen dum was rigged. Improper threats and pressures, failure to prov1ae a "no" ballot

box, and irregular

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ballot counting procedures were all used to obtain a patently false approval for l .!rumah's party-controlled state.

5. Personality cult is increasing. The press deifies l'Ila'utu1h, calls him "osagyefo'F°(redeemer), "messianic dedication" and "Great One." ''And so let the word go forth that indeed Tie

· do have a miracle called Kvame Nkrumah who walks the face of Africa today." Ghanaian Times, Jan 11, 1962.

6. A deterioratinf economic situation receives little. attention. Playing poi tics with the economic sector and fail ing to sliow concern for the worsening plight oftbepeople have brought the once active Ghanaian economy to a deplorable state. Howavar, the serious depletion of the treasury has not cancelled eJtpcmd:imres for subversive activities in other African countries or for prestiije developments at home.

7. Propaganda attacks against non-Communist countries are increasing. Despite the desperate need for capital investmen£ and despite developmental assistance given Ghana by the West, tirades against the US and UK are frequent occurences. The government-controlled press often couches the attacks in familiar Conm1unist terminology and berates the usual sins of the -non Communists.

n. Key areas of press, labor and youth are now directed by extremists with Communist bloc ties (see attached, unclassi fied Biographic sketches).

9. Moderating influences have all but disappeared from the governme nt.

Purges have removed independent, aoderate elements from police and civil service, leaving the extreaists as lf rumah's only source of advice and so-called information. He is said to believe, for instance, that the 99$ vote hich approved restrictive constitutional amendments accurately reflects the will of his people and his own undiminished popularity.

10. Ghana bas declared a class war. The middle class of merchants, professional men and civlI servants is to be deprived of its role in developing the country. The farmer and worker are now extolled as builders of the £uture; a movo unsuited to Ghana's needs but necessary to "scientific socialism."

References:

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S i C R :S 'f 4 May 1964

in1 Government Action Defeats Communist subversion


._ __. jBACKGROUND: (This guidance has three unclassified

attach ments: - zerox copy of an article by Eudocio Ravines, "Apt'.ciguamiento y Tharmidor en Bolivia," which appeared in Estey Oe$te, 1-15 March 1964, Year II, No. 40, a summary in Jmgl'isliailcra summary in Spanish of the article_.J

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There is general agreement that Communist-led violence will thrive wherevGr conditions of poverty and underdevelop ment impell the masses of the people to take dasperate measures. It is equally true that it is not always among the poverty stricken societies that the proli'Iem of Communism is the most serious. However, even where serious economic problems exist, judicious firmness by the governina authorities in resisting pressure- and in handling individual cases of illegal Communist subversion will have a more im?:1ediate effect than the best ef forts to improve the economic iot of-tne people. The material conditions of the poorer nations of the world are not improving fast anou h to give much hope for the present generation and the gap between the wealthy and the poor nations is ,1idening instea,:-; of narrowing.

This does not mean that Communist subversion shoulde

considered purely a police problem. As pointed out inn previon n e;uida.nce [Stability in Free World Governments,! (b)(1)=-:J

I Jtliemasies must be g1ven some hope througl:tb)f3) NatSecAct gible reforms an an expandin8 economy. Mexico is an outst'ai iu example of a country whose goverlliilent has been for many years responsive to the needs o the masses, and while Communists see influence throughout the society, Communism is not an important

issue, especially when compared with most other underdeveJnnad countries. (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct

But Communists, particularly in Latin America, are more and more resorting to illegal actions -- subversion, agaTession, intimidation -- in efforts to force their way into power. Dur ing the last yea two governments -- Venezuela and Bolivia - successfully resisted extreme cases of barbarian Communist as saults and maintained stability in their countries.

The attached article by the well-Imown Peruvian author and former Communist, Eudocio Ravines, touches upon Cot1111unist attempts to prev-eut the Venezuelan election but is mainly con cerned with the crisis that shook Bolivia for ten days lnst

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December and ultimately vindicated government firmness in the face of Comm1L ist threats. The strikine miners of the Bolivian sierra had kidnappad 21 foreigners, including four Americans, and were using them as hostages to force resident Victor Paz Zstenssoro to release three Communists then being tried for common crimes. Paz Estenssoro refused to negotiate: be took a calculated risk of. civil war and won a complete victory.

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Sele ted Referenceson

Anti-Hitler Plots and the Communists

BOVERI, rlargret

Treason In The Twentieth Century, Putnam, N.Y. 1963

(German Title: Der Verrat im 20. Jahrhundert)

p. 281. "Leber and Reichwein were the two who made the ill-fated contact with the Communists in the early summer of 1944. Leber did this in the full knowledge of the dangerous aspects of an alliance with the Communists and of the possibility of Com.. unist penetration· of the Kreisau movement·. Wilhelm Leuscbner, the grand old man of the SPD, opposed Leber's intention strongly on the grounds that the formation of Communist cells precludes ex act knowledge of the individuals included, and that therefore Leber might in effect be inviting Nazi spies already ensconed in

- the Communist groups into the Kreisau movement. In retrospect, one must say that both were right. Leber was certainly on the right track in his over-all conception of an aroused Volk, a state of agitation in the people only to be achieved by complete cooperation of all the resistance groups. Leuschner was un happily all too prescient of the immediate consequences. In fact a Gestapo agent was present at Leber's meeting with the Communists which led directly to Reichwein's arrest on the 4th of July and Leber1s on the 5th. These arrests in their turn forced Stau:ffenberg's hand••••"

FITZGIBBON, Constantine

20 July (British· edition: The Shirt of Nessus).Norton, Nevr

York 1956.

p. 143. "No\'1, however, the relationship between the conspirators and the Communists assumed a new and disastrous importance. Adolf Reichwein•••had retained a link with what remained of the Cor.miunist underground within Germany••••Such contact was approved by Julius Leber, though on different grounds.

According to FrauLeber, her husband had no intention of collaborating with the _ Communists. But, she has told the author, be said that the con-' spirators must find out what those people are doing behind our bacli::s and what line they proposed to follow if the assassinatiqn were successfully accomplished·•••

p. 144: "The first meeting took place on June 22nd in eastern Berlin, with Reichwein and Leber representing the Social Democrats, Saefkow, Jacob and a third man by the name of Rambow being the Communists present. Rambow was unltnown to Reichwein and Leber. The Communists seem to have been already far too well informed· about the conspiracy. They demanded a further meeting, particu larly with the military leaders, which was provisionally fixedfor July 4th••••Rambow was an informer. Reichwein

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attended the second meeting and was there arrested with Saefkow and Jacob.Leber was picked up by the Gestapo on the following morning••••

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It has never been established whether the informer committed his act of Judas solely in the role of Nazi stool pigeon or whether he was simultaneously acting as a Communist agent••••n

GISEVIUS, Bans Bernd

To the Bitter End. Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1947. (llso in German)

p. 504: "The day_before yesterday his (i.e. Stauffenberg's) in termediaries, Leber and.Professor Reichwein, together with three leading Communists, had been arrested, just as they were on the point of arranging a meeting between Stauffenberg and the Com munists. Goerdeler did not yet know that one of the three Com t1unists had been a Gestapo spy, but he was outraged••••"

HELLWIG, Joachim and OLEY, Bans:

Der 20. Juli 1944 und der Fall Heusinger

-· Verlag Der Nation, Berlin (East). 1959. Pictures and Text.

cow.mrrr:TJ1s glossy propaganda book serves two purposes: to impress_ readers with the role of the Communists in war-time German re sistance and to blame Beus1nger for having betrayed the 20th July conspirators and for having cooperated with Hitler again afterwards.

NITZSCHE, GerhardII

Dia SAEFKOW-JACOB-BASTLEIN Gruppe. Dolmmente und Materialien des illegalen antifaschistischen Kampfes.

(Institut fur Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der Sm>). Dietz, East Berlin 1957.

COMMENT:

This official Communist document is particularly interesting be cause of what it does not say: it does not connect the arrest and execution of S.Ai!;FKo\'rwith the 20 July conspiracy and does not mention any date for meetings with Leber and Reichwein later tlii'n October 1943 (p.69). It condemns the conspiracy as a whole as reactionary, militaristic, etc. (pp. 65-68). It does not identify the informer who betrayed the entire group -- unlike FITZGIBBON (q.v.).

PECm:L, Rudolf

Deutscher Widerstand. Eugen nentsch Verlag, Zurich 1947

p. 94: · Then Saefkow and Jacob•••held meetings with the Social Democrats Dr. Leber and Prof. Reichwein, both of whom belonged to the Kreisauer circle, tba Gestapo succeeded in

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smuggling an in former :ln who participated in o.,.ne of these

meetings••••"



Second International Conference on the History of the Resistance Milano, 26-29 March 1961 (reproduced from typewritten copy)

"The German l=tasistance and the Allies during the Second Vlorld Vkr" by Prof. Dr. Walter Bartel

p. 17: "On 22 June 1944 Anton Saefkow and Franz Jacob and the representatives of the Social Democratic Party, Leber and Ueichwein, members of the Xreisauer circle, met. Agreement was reached for future collaboration in the common fight against Hitler. This collaboration was never effected because on 4 July 194 the Gestapo arrested all participants. Existing documents lead to conclude that a provocateur ha.d introduced himself into the XCreisauer circle and the Gestapo bad knowledge of that meet ing••••(reference: Otto WINZER, Zwolf Jahre Kampf gegen iaschismus und Krieg, Berlin 1955, p. 227). ·

SHlli.ER, William L.

The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Simon & Schuster, New '-'" Yorlt 1960.

p. 1043: "From the beginning tµe Becrt-Goerdeler-Hassell qircle had declined to have anything to do with the Communist under ground, and vice versa. To the Co ununists the plotters were as reactionary as the Nazis and their very success mieht ·prevent a Communist Germany from succeeding a Nationa1 Socialist one. Beck and his friends were well aware of this Communist line, and they knew also that the Communist underground was oirected fromMoscow and served chiefly as an espionage source for the Russians

p .. 1044: "Reluctantly he (i.e. Stauffenberg) agreed to Leber and Reichwein meeting with the underground Communist leaders on June 22. But he warned them that the Communists should be told as little as possible. The meeting took place in East Berlin between Leber ana Reichwein, representing the Socialists, and two individuals amed Franz Jacob and Anton Saefltow who claimed to be -- and perhaps were -- the leaders of the Communist under e-rou.nd. They were accompanied by a third comrade whom they in troduced as "Rambo\'1." The Communists turned out to know quitea bit about the plot against Hitler and wanted to ltnow more. They asked for a meeting with its military leaders on July 4. Stauffenberg refused, but Reichwein was authorized to represent him at a further meeting on that date.

When he arrived at it,he, along with Jacob and Saefltow,v.,are promptly arrested.

"Ram.bow,'it turned out, was a Gestapo stool pigeon••••"

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20. J'uli 1944

Herausgegeben von der Budeszentrale fur Eeimatdienst, Bonn 1960.

p. 239: "Julius Leber was arrested on 5 July 1G44. ile was the victim of an informant who had gained entrance into the highest

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leadership of the illegal It.OD with whom Leber had established contact with all due si!curity measures••••"

WEI ENBOBN, Gunther, ed:

Der Lautlose Aufstand

Rowohlt Verlag, Hamburg 1954

p. 175: "One of the largest organizations of the German re sistance movement was undoubtedly the SAEFKOW group••••In July1 44, a GESTAPO informant succeeded to penetrate into its ranks and soon the largest part of this organization was arrested. Saefkow with almost 100 activists of his group was executed in Brandenburg•••""

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APACIGUAMIEN'l'O O FIRMEZA FREN'lE A LA SUBVERSION COMUNISTA(Resumen del articulo, "Apaciguemiento y Thermidor en Bolivia," de Eudocio Ravines. Este y Oeste, 1-15 de marzo de l96lf..,Ano II, N! 40.) -

En toda.s pa.rtes, los nuevos gobiernos democr4t1cos ban sentido la necesida.d de diferencia.rse de los reg!menes dictatoriaJ.es· que los·a.nte cedieron. Pa:ra. a.centua.r la diferencia, ban querido da.r a la -pr ctica. de la demoaracia un ca.r cter tal de tolera.ncia que beneficia a. los agentes

. del. comunismo interJJaCional. En muches casos, los comunistas· actl1an ba.jo la sombre. de la 1mpunidad que lea otorga la toJ.era.ncia democrttica para lleye.r adelante su labor de propaganda., penetrac16n y subversi6n. A veces los gobiernos dejan de aplica.r la epresidn necesa.ria per temor a una resistencia. me.siva del pueblo. Recientemente, dos gobiernos ha.n demostrado que la firmeza page. bueoos dividendos, que all! donde los · comunista.s pierden su impunida.d, suelen hacer una retirada ctica.

En Venezuela, las eJ.ecciones del mes de diciembre pr6ximo pa.sado cerra.ron un a.!lo entero de violencia y sa.botaje sin pa.ralelo en la.rice. Latina. El gabierno de R6mulo Betancourt se ha.bia

esforzada conscienzudamente en abservar las libertades civil.es, y se vaticii:la.ba en muchos luge.res que la subversion Comunista llega.r!a a tal punto de violencia coma pa.l"a :Lmpedir las elecciones o precipitar una. revoluc16n. Pero el gobierno hizo un despl.iegue de fuerza y determ:Lnac16n, y la jorna.da electoral resultd tan tranquilo como cuaJ.quier dia corriente.

Un ejemplo aun m4s aJ.ecc onador es la manera. en que el· gobierno

de Bolivia trat6 el c lebre ca.so de los m:l.neros en huelga y sus veintidn rehenes.

Este incidente ten:!a sus ra!ces en el conflicto entre el presidente Victor Paz Estenssoro y su vice-presidente :f'il.ocomunista, Juan Lech:Cn Oquendo. Este ten:!a. ambiciones presidenciales pero no ten:ra el res-

.,_,. paldo de los eJ.ementos maderados del Movimiento Naciona.l Revoluciona.ria (MNR -- EJ. partido of'iciaJ.ista)• Cuando Paz Estenssoro regres6 de una. visita a. Washington, donde se entrevist6 con el. Presidente KeDD.edy, los comunistas le acusa.ron de a.ctuar como "agente del imperialism yanqui," como "entreguista, 11 y come reaJ.izador de una 11operaci6nthermidoria.na.11

Entretanto, el gobierno procesa.ba. a tres miembros de la. Federaci6n Sindica.l de !lxabaja.dores Mineros, Irineo Pimentel, Federico Escobar, y J rge Ya.ral., todos comunistas conocidos. Los dos primeros era.n acusados de haber asesinado a un dirigente sindicaJ. oponente. El tercero era culpable de maJ.vers16n de :f'ondos destinados a 1a·construcci6n de vivendas para los mineros. Los comunista.s, sobretodo los :f'idelistas


y trotzkistas, ve:!a.n este proveso come un desa.f:[o a au posicidn dentro del MNR, y exi.gieron la liberaci6n de las prisioneros. El gobierno se mantuvo inamovible.

Despu s de mucha a.g:Ltacidn, los mineros de Cata.vi, azuzados por

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las comunietas, se la.nza.ron, el 6 de diciembre, contra un gru:po de extranjeros que estaban de pa.so en la zona minera y secuestraron a 21 de ellos como rehenes. cuatro de las victima.s eran norteamericanos: elagregado obrero de ia Embajada Narteamericano de La. Paz, un miembro delCuerpo de Paz, y dos funciona.rios del Servicio perioclistico de Infor niaci6n (USIS).

Desde el comienzo, Juan Lech.in daba su respal.do complete a las mineros, quienes habian declare.do la huelga., y recla.ma.ba la libertad de los tres crimina.les comunistas coma rescate de los 21. rehenes. El 9 de diciembre, Lec:hin emitia un comunicado sobre la situaci6n, en el que a.severabs. que los rehenes estaban sanes. Al mismo tiempo, ca.rga.ba toda la. responsa.bilidad de los hechos sabre Paz Estenssoro.

A esta a.J..tura, los rehenes hab:f'.an sido llevados a la Mina Siglo Veinte, donde estaban rodes.dos por 6,000 mineros armados, y estre chamente guardados por las mujeres de los mineroe, provistas de ca.rgas de din.a.mi-ta con sus respectivos fulm:Lnantes.

Llegaron las protestas y las s plicas de muchas fuentes: de la Cruz Roja, del Arzobispo de La Paz, y sabre todo del gobierno de Los Estados Unidos.

Para. toda. contestaci6n a. Lech:!n y- J.os comunistas, Pa.z Estenssoro con toda. premedita.ci6n ordend que las tropas pusieran cerco a los mineros rebeldes.

Simultd.neamente, el MNR orden6 la mobiliza.cion de las -Milicia.s CampesiDB.s del Depa.rtamento de Cochabamba. El 14 de diciembre, mientre.s las tropa.s y las Milicias converg:(an sobre la zona miners., Juan Lech:!n bab16 por radio y ofrec:Ca libera.r a los rehenes ba.jo dos condiciones: a) que los tres prisioneros comunista.s fueran process.dos en La Paz en ves de en Potos:C, y b) g,ue las tropas se retiraran de la regi6n minera. Una vez mz!s, el gobierno qued6 inamovible, negmidose a a.ceptar las condiciones.

Dos d:!as mas ta.rile, el 16 de diciembre, los rehenes fueron liberados sanos y- sa.lvos. Ninguna de las condiciones de Lechi'.n.hab:Ca side aceptada, no hubo derrame de sa.ngre, y la. firmeza del gobierno hab!a. resultado en un gol]?8 tremendo contra el :prestig:I.o del movimiento comunista de Bolivia. ·

La crisis g,ue estremeci6 a Bolivia durante diez d:!as llenos de suspense ha venido a demostrar tres verdades pol!ticas conclµyentes:

a) Los gobiernos la.tinoa.merica.nos que toma.n una. f'uerte pos1ci6n anticomunista. no deben temer las cr tica.s en el sentido de que su independencia o su sobera.nia ha.ya amaiDB.do. Aunque el gobierno de los Estados Unidos di6 pleno respe.ldo a.l procedimiento

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de Paz Estenssoro., esta crisis fue resuel.ta. :por el gobierno boliviamy con los medios que l ten:!a. a. ma.no.

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....,. b) No es s6lo la miseria, sino tambi n la impunidad la que i'a.vorece la subversidn comunista. La. falta de firmeza de pa.rte de los comunistas como instrumentos pol:r:ticos y electorales son las fuerzas que est4n ayuda.ndo al comunismo en la Am6rica. Latina.

c) La. divisi6n entre las dos facciones del movimiento comunista es ms aparente que real. A veces simul.a.n marcha.r separadamente, pero la. hora de la accidn, que es la hora de la verclad, los encuentra.combatiendo juntos. En la crisis bolivia.na., el ministro del interior,Antonio Arze Murillo, ten!a pruebas documenta.l.es de la existencia de una :f'rente popular ad hoc compuesto del al.a izquierda del MNR, los comunistas de f'ilia.ci6n moscovita, y los trotzkistas.

La. "be.tall.a. de Ca.ta.vi" la. gan6 especta.cu1armente el Presidente Paz Estenssoro, y los comunistas sufrieron una severs. derrota. Sin embargo, no hay que olvidar que los comun:tsta.s de Bolivia. ha.n perdido scSlo una. bata.1.la: sus i'uerzas perma.necen numdricemente intactas.Aunque la.a condiciones pa.ra 1.a campa!la electoral del mes de junio no sean n:!. mejores n:!.·peores que antes, lo que s! es au ntico es que la crisis ha. servido para definir posiciones·y esclarecer a.ctitudes.

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C02.5-73160


A PEASEME.1.l'T OR FIRi\fi'ifBSS AGAINST COMrfilJiiIST SUJBVERSION

(Sumraary of an article:"Apaciguamiento yThermidor en Bolivia," by Eudoc:!.o Ravines.

-Est-ey-Oest-e, 1-15 March 1354, Year II,No.40)

Everywhere in Latin America, new democratic governments have felt a special obligation to be different from the oppres sive regimes which they replaced. And in order to accentuate this difference, they have sought to give to the practice of damocracy a tolerance which only benefits the agents of inter national Communism. In all too many cases, Communists operate under the cloak of democratic tolerance in order to carry for ward their propaganda, penetration, and subversion. Sometimes governn1ents refrain from taking the necessary repressive meas ures for fear of massive resistance from the populace. Two governments have recently demonstrated that firmness pays; that·· where Communists are deprived of their impunity, they make a tactical retraat.

The Venezuelan elections last December climaxed a whole year of Communist-led violence and sabotage without parallelin Latin America. The government of Romulo Betancourt had leaned over bacl 1ards in observing civil liberties, and it was widely predicted that Communist subversion might reach a climax on1 December and prevent the elections or precipitate a revolution. But th government made a determined show of force, ana election day turned out to be quieter than the average for the year.

An even more eloquent example is the manner in which the Bolivian government handled the now-famous case of the striking miners and their twenty-one kidnap victims.

This incident had its roots in the conflict between Presi dent Victor Paz Estenssoro and his pro-Com. unist vice-president Juan Lechin Oquendo, whose presidential ambitions were opposed by the more moderate elements in the Movimiento Nacional n.evolucionario (MNR, the government party). When Paz Estenssoro returned from a visit to Washington, where he interviewed Presi dent Kennedy, the Communists accused him of being an agent of "Yanitee ir:iperialism" and of having tried to instituta a "thermi dorean operation" within the Bolivian revolution.

Meanwhile, the sovernment was prosecuting three members of the Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros:

Irineo Pementel, Federico Escobar, and Jor3e Zaral, all well-known Com munists. The first two were accused of murdering an opposition labor leader, and the third, of misappropriation of:ftlnds des

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tined for the construction of miners' dwellings. The Communists, especially the Castroite and Trotskyist factions, considered the trial a challenge to their position within the labor movement, and demanded release of the prisoners.

The government refused.After considerable agitation, the miners in the Catavi reeion vere induced, on 6 December 1963, to seize as hostages 21 of a eroup of foreigners who happened to be in the mining zone. Of

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s.

u. s.

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these, four were Americans:the labor attache of the u. s. Embassy in La Paz, a member of the Peace Corps, and two officers of the U.S. Information Service.

From the beginning, Juan Lechin supported the miners, who had now declared a strike, and called for the release of the three Communist prisoners in exchange for the 21 hostages. Ina comm.unique dated 9 December, he reported on their physical con dition and assumed full responsibility for the action.

By now, the hostages had been removed to the Siglo Veinte mine, were surrounded by 6,000 armed miners, and closely guarded by miners' wives equipped with dynamite charges, caps, and fuseso Protests and pleas came to the miners from many sources: the Red Cross, the Boliviai1 Church Hierarchy, and especially from the U. Government.

In answer to Lechin and the Co:mmunists, Paz Estenssoro daliberately ran the risk of a civil war by ordering troops tosurround the strikine miners. At the same time, the MNR high

-...,. co01aand ordered the peasant militia in the department o:f Cochabamba to be mobilized. on 14 December, as the troops ana militia were conver ing on the mining region, Juan Lechin spoke on radio and agreed to release the hosta as on two conaitions:a) that the prisoners should be tried in La Paz insteaa of in Potosi, ano b) that the troops should be withdrawn from the min ing recrion. The government refused to caet either of these con ditions.

1\10 days later, 10 December, the 21 hostages were freed from their captivity unharmed. Lechin9s conditions had not been met, no blood had been slled, and the 6'0Vernment's firmness had resulted in a serious blow to the prestige of the Communist move ment in Bolivia.

Three important truths can be derived from this crisis thatshook Bolivia for ten suspenseful days:

a) Latin American govermients that ssswae a strong anti-Conn. unist attitude need not £ear criti cism to the ef£ect that national pride, independence, or sovereignty have suffered in the slightest. Al though the

Government fully supported Paz Estenssoro's position, this crisis was solved bythe Bolivian government and with the means it had at hand.

b) It is not poverty alone that favors Com munist subversion

impunity is also to blame. Lack of firmness on the part of governments, political corruption, and the utilization 0£ Communists as political and electoral instruments are the £orces that help Com.. unism in La.tin America.

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C02573160 Approved for Release: 20-1=7/-0,8./.1,,7...C..0..2.."57"31"60!'!"" '!"----------

c) Tha division bat\7een the tv,o major factions of the Comr.1W1ist movement is more formal than real. They sometimes pretend to march separately, but the mocent of action, which is the moment of truth, finds them fighting side by side. In the Bolivian crisis, the minister of the interior, Antonio Arze Murillo, had documentary proof of the existence of an ad hoc popular front composed o

the left uing of tn'e71lR, the Moscow Communists, the Trotskyists, plus two rieht wing factions:

The "battle of Cata.vi" resulted in a victory for President Paz Estenssoro and a severo defeat for the Communists. Never th-sless, it must be ramembered that the Communist forces inBolivia have lost only a battle: they remain numerically intacts Although the conditions that baar upon the fortbcomine June olections may be neither better nor worse than before, the crisis has served to define positions and clarify attitudes.

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n..J-vt)..../ f

(mm,


C02573160Approve,J for Release: 2017/08/17 C02573160/#--1 {, ij --

APP.EASEMENT QR FIRMN'ESS AGAINST CO?mMUST SUBVERS i.01!.J_ 1/ /)-(Summary of an article: "Apaci amiento y 7 /Thermidor en Bolivia," by Eudocio Ravinas.

Oeste, 1-15 March 1S64, Year II,No.40) ";;?f--

Everywhere in Latin America, new democratic governments have felt a special obligation to be different from the oppres sive regimes which they replaced. And in order to accentuate this di£ference, they have sought to give to the practice of de ocracy a tolerance which only benefits the a ents of inter national Communism. In all too many casas, Communists operate under the cloak of democratic tolerance in order to carry for uard their propaganda, penetration, and subversion. Sometimes governments refrain from taking the necessary repressive meas ures for fear of massive resistance from the populace. Twogovernments have recently demonstrated that firmness pays; that where Communists are deprived of their impunity, they make a tactical retreat.

The Venezuelan elections last December climaxed a whole year of Communist-led violence and sabotage without parallelin Latin America. The government of Romulo Betancourt had leanec over bacl.twards in observing civil liberties, and it was widely predicted that Communist subversion might reach a climax onl December and prevent the elections or precipitate a revolution. But the government made a determined show of force, and election day tu ned out to be quieter than the average for the year.

An even more eloquent example is the manner in which the Bolivian government handled the now-famous case of the stri ing miners and their twenty-one kidnap victims.

This incident had its roots in the conflict between Presi dent Victor Paz Estenssoro and his pro-Communist vice-president

-· Juan Lechin Oquendo, whose presidential ambitions were oppased by the more moderate elements in the Movimiento Nacional n.evolucionariothe government party). When Paz Este.nssoro returned £rom a visit to Washington, where he interviewed P-cesi dant Kennedy, the Communists accused him of being an agent of ""ianltee imperialism" and of having tried to institute a "thermi dorean operation" within the Bolivian revolution.

Meanwhile, the government uas prosecuting three cembersof the Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros: Irineo ementel, Federico Escobar, and Jor e Zaral, all well-known Com munists. The first two were accused of murdering an opposition labor leader, and the third, of misappropriation of:flmds des tined for the construction of miners' dwellings. The Co1111i1unists, especially the Castroite

_,


and Trotskyist :factions, considere.d the trial a challenge to their position within the labor movement, and d anded release of the prisoners. The government refused.After considerable agitation, the mine s in the Catavi region wera induced, on 6 December 1gas, to seize as hostages 21 of a group 0£

forei ners who happened to be in the mining zone. Of

1


.

u.s.

u.

C0257..3160 Approved for Release: 2017/08/17 C02573160

these, four were Americans: the labor attache of the u. s. Embassy in La Paz, a m mber of the Peace Corps, and two officers of the Information Service.

From the beginning, Juan Lechin supported the miners, who had now declared a strilte, and called for the release of the three Communist prisoners in exchange for the 21 hostages. Ina communique dated S December, he reported on their physical con dition and assumed full responsibility for the action.

By now, the hostages had been removed to the Siglo Veinte mine, were surrounded by 6,000 armed miners, and closely guarded by miners' wives equipped with dynamite charges, caps, and fuses. Protests and pleas came to the miners from mflllY sources: the Red Cross, the Bolivian Church Hierarchy, and especially fromthe U. s. Goverlliilent.

In answer to lLechin and the Communists, Paz Estenssoro deliberately ran the risk of a civil war by ordering troops to surround the striking miners. At the same time, the lllilffl. high cor.uaand ordered the peasant militia in the department of Cochabamba to be mobilized. On 14 December, as the troops and militia were conver ing on the mining region, Juan Lechin spoke on radio and agreecl to release the hostages on two conditions:a) that the prisoners should be tried in La. Paz instead of in Potosi, and b) that the troops should be withdrami from the min ing region. The overnment refused to meet either of these con ditions.

Two days later, 10 December, the 21 hostages were freed from their captivity unharmed. Lechin's conditions had not been met, no blood had been shed, and the government's firmness had resulted in a serious blo to the prestige of the Communist move ment in Bolivia.

Three important truths can be derived from this crisis that siloolt Bolivia for ten suspenseful days:

a) Latin American governments that ssswae a strong anti-Communist attitude need not fear criti ciStl to the e fect that national pride, independence, or sovereignty have suffered in the slightest. Al though the

Government fully supported Paz Estenssoro's position, this crisis was solved bythe Bolivian government and with the means it bada.t hand.

b) It is not poverty alone that favors Com munist subversion:

impunity is also to blame. Lack of firmness on the part of governments,

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political oorru,tion, and the utilization of Communists as political and electoral instruments are the forces that help Communism in Latin America.

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c) The division between the two major factions of the Comm11.& ist movement is more formal than real. They sometimes pretend to march separately, but the moment of action, which is the moment of truth, finds them fighting side by side. In the Bolivian crisis, the minister of the inte ior, Antonio Arze Murillo, had documentary proof of the existence of an ad hoc popular front composed of the left win8 of ine7m'l:.i, the Moscow Communists, the Trotskyists, plus two right wing factions!

The "battle of Cata.vi" resulted in a victory for President Paz Estenssoro and a severe defeat for the Communists. Never thaless, it must be remembered that the Communist forces in Bolivia have lost only a battle: they remain numerically intact3 Although th

conditions that bear upon the forthcoming June elections may be neither bettar nor worse than before, the crisis has served to defi·ne positions and clarify attitudes.


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1 - 15 MARZO 1964 QUINCENAL A'RO U - N9 40

BEDAOOION:

8 BOULEVARD HA 88MAN l'AJUS 8V (FBANOIAI

· AD1IUNISTBAOJON1

A.PAB.'.fADO DEL ESTE 11.ua OA.:BAOAS (VENEZUELA)

EDICION ESPECIAL PAWl AllIE.RICA LATINA DEL BOLETJN DE LA ASOCJACION DE ESTUDIOS E INFOB!IJACIONES l'OLl'l'lCA.8 lNTll.BNACIO.NAJ,ES IB.E,J.P.J,) DE l'AJUS

Apa·ciguomiento y Thermidor en BoliviaCARACTERISTICA de la politica do

mestica de las republicas de America La tina en la etapa presente, ha sido el mar cada apaciguamienta empleado por tos gobiernos frente a los comunistas.

LA TESIS def detenninismo econ6mico, fabricada por los intelectuales y periodistas de Washington, ha servido para arrojar toda la responsabilidad de la subversi6n sabre la pobreza, la miseria y las condiciones de sub desarrollo. Y asimismo para acordar en muchos campos, a la sombra de esa filosofia, una creciente y progresiva impunidad a las accio nes de todo g nero emprendidas por los co munistas.

En todas partes, los nuevo,s gobiernos ban scntido la necesidad de diferenciarse de los dictadores que les antecedieron. Para acen tuar la diferencia, ban querido dar a la prac tica de la democracia un caracter tal de to lerancia, que beneficia a los agentes de Rusia, China, Cuba y Yugoslavia.

La politica de apaciguamiento tiene, ademas, m6viles mas inmediatos e intereses mas directos, para los gobiernos latinoamericanos. Ante todo, esta politica de toJerancia favorece Jos intereses electorates del bando en ascenso. y ejerce influencia en la intrigante politica do mestica. De otro !ado, suministra las dosis

de chantage adecuadas para presionar a Was hington. Y pone en manos de las gobiernos el instrumento agresivo que consiente en de jarse utilizar contra los opositores del gobierno. ·

Los cambios recientes que ban intervenido en Washington, asi como la necesidad de afrontar procesos electorales decisivos, han determinado cambios que pueden tornarse reacciones saludables a condici6n de extenderse y de ser consecuentes.

Dos gobiernos, el de Venezuela · y el de Bolivia, se han vista forzados a emplear una politica de firmeza frente a la subversion co munista, demostrando que, por sobre todo, tal clase de plaga en este lado d_el mundo, es el engendro de la impunidad qu'e los gobiernos otorgan a los comunistas. Tan pronto como la tolerancia cesa y la impunidad disminuye, el peligro amaina, la subversi6n y sus capi tostes pierden la cara, Ia insurgencia de las masas entra en quiebra.

Las elecciones del mes de diciembre de 1963, obligaron al gobierno de Venezuela a desplegar la fuerza para someter al terroris mo que asolaba el pais y que P.roclam6 su vo luntad de impedir la realizac16n de las elec ciones. El despliegue de fuerza del gobierno bast6 para que el apocalipsis comunista se transformase espectacularmente en farsa. Durante la jornada electoral hubo menos victimas que en cualquier dia corriente de terrorismo.

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zSolo dos personas, en todo el pais, fucron vie-·timas de .:ictos de terror.

El fe116meno politico vi::nezolano acaba de recibir cons.: r.'.lcl()n Jzistorica en Joii oaluartcs. comunistas ue Bolivia. La prision de tres de lincucntes Cl)munistas y la captura y libera ci6n par los comuuistas, de los rchencs ex-'. tranjeros, al propio ti<!mpo quc la rirmeza'. de 1a politica de1 gobicrno de Bolivia, han demostrado lo que la impunidad signi,ica en todo el sinicstro juego politico de 1a actual etapa latinoamericana.

BOLIVIA se encuentra en la vispera de una contienda electoral. Ella ha puesto nente · a frente a las dos protagonistas de la revo lucion boliviana de 1952: Victor Paz Esten-· soro, actual Presidcnte de la l{epublica, y Juan :

· Lechh1 Oquendo, Vice-Presidente. A estas horas, cada uno de estos personajes comanda un ala de! Movimiento Nacionalista Revo1uciona- ' rio, la organizacion politica. promotora y reali- . zadora de la Revoluci6ri. El conflicto es emi nentemente ideol6gico: mientras Pu Esten soro retorna a los caminos del nacional-refor mismo y a las vias capitalistas, Juan Lechin opera como el jefe de la facci6n det MNR.. protundamente iniiltrada por los comunlstas de Moscu, y mucho mas energicamente como acaban de probarlo hechos maci;;os--- por los fidelistas y comunistas de la obediencia de Fekin y de La Habana.

Esta ya a mas de dace aiios de distancia el dia en que Juan Lech!n, con la anuencia de Paz E.stensoro y en su beneficio, ncgoci6 e\ pacto de tmi6n entre el Movimiento Nacion.a lista Revol!Jcionario, la federacion Sindical deTrabajadores Mineros de Bolivia y el Partido Comunista boliviano. El compromiso, negoci.a do en abrH de 1951, const6 de once puntos y fue firmado el 3 de mayo de 1951 por Jose Fellman Velarde -actual Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores-- por el M.N.R.; Juan Le chin Oquendo firtn6 en representaci6n de la federac16n de .Mineros y Jorge Quiroga Vargas como rcprese:1ta::ite autorizado del Partido Comunista de Bolivia.. Bajo las mas variadas circunstancias y a pe sar de todos los avatares politicos de Bolivia, la alianza de 1951 se ha mantenido. A traves de mas de doce anos, el M.N.R. uti1i26 al Partido Comunista para golpear despiadadamente a sus opositores de toda clase. A cam bio de tales servicios, e{ comunismo ha disfru tado en Bolivia de 1odas Jas libertades que elpacto de! 3 de mayo de 195I le concedia, incluyendo la de organizar las Milicias Obreras y Campesinas. Estas milicias son las que han intentado presentar combate en la crisis que ha tenido una resonancia internacional en el mes de diciembre.' La situaci6n conflictiva creada por las elec ciones de junio pr6ximo, alcanz6 aguda ten si6n despues de la visita· que el Presidente Pu Estensoro realizara a Washington, ai. ii-

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l · 15 M A R Z O 1964

nalizar el mes de octubre. El jefe de la revo1uci6n boliviana y actual Prcsidente de su

pais, rccibi6 honort:s espcciales y cl Presiden te Kennedy, en discurso oficial, seiial6 a Bo livia

como cl ejt:mplo que debia scr imitado por las di:miis n.'.lcionc:s uc la America Latina.

A su rctomo de Washington, Paz .E.sten soro fue acusado por los comunistas de la obediencia de Pekin, de actuar como "agente del impcrialismo yanqui'', como "entrtguista" y como realizador de una "operaci6n thermido riana".

Al mismo ticmpo se h.izo evidentc para to dos que el. Presidcnte Paz Estensoro y el sector del M.N.R. que le sigue, no apoyana la can didatura a la Presidencia. de Juan Lechin, en las elecciones pr6ximas.

La circunstanc1a critica y la atm6sfcra de Ia crisis quedaron asl creadas. Hubo ruido de escudos en las minas de Catavi, baluarte del comunismo y del Vice-Presidente Juan Lecnin. La propaganda comunista contra Paz Estensoro se hizo mas violenta en el tono y mas Aspera en el contenido.

El Presidente Paz Estensoro reorganiz6 su Gabinete Ministerial el 6 de diciembre, r<!nov.ando solamente tres carteras: Minas, Asuntos Campesinos Agricultura. En Jos dos pri mcros, coloc a dos jefes militares retirados. Hay que considerar que estas tres carteras son fundamentales en la circunstancia actual boli viana.

ENTRE TANTO, el Poder Judicial venfa conociendo las procesos seguidos, por homic.idio y por robo, contra las dirigentes sindica les Irineo Pimentel, Federico Escobar y .Jorge Zara!. Los dos primeros estaban acusados de haber asesinado o hecho asesinar a un dirigen te sindical oponente. El tercero era culpable de apropiaci6n !licita de fondos destinados a [a construcci6n de viviendas para los mineros precisamente. El Fiscal gue conocia la causa habia dispuesto la prisi6n de Jos tres acusa dos, quicnes eran tres conspicuos dirigentes co munistas. Su prisi6n determin6 el esta!lido de la crisis que ·conmovi6 a B.:fa,i.1. ;' ·: ' .1..,::.-S

rica Latina durante diez dias con sus ,,..:...•:: .:;;;.Pimentel y Escobar eran dos comunistas

de Ia intimidad de Juan Lechin. Su prisi6n fue estimada coma un reto, circunstanc1a que fue aprovechada por los comunistas de tendencia fidelista y trotzkista, para organizai:- las re presalias.

Tras una v_igorosa propaganda anti-yanqui, que acus6 a Paz Estensoro de "traicionar a la revoluci6n" y de "venderla al imperialismo yan qui", los comunistas lograron lanzar a Jos mi neros armadas contra un grupo de extranjeros, algunos de ellos cliplomaticos, que se encontraban en la zona mioera. Veintiun personas tueron apresadas como rehenes, exigiendo acamblo de su libertad la de los tres presos comunistas, Pimentel, Escobar y Zara!.



l - 15 M A R Z O 1964

Entre los rehenes se encontraban cuatro norteamericanos. Uno de ellos, Agregado Obrc- 1·0 de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos, un miembro del "Cuerpo de Paz", una de las creaciones de la Alianza para el Progreso, y . dos funcionarios del Servicio Periodistico de lnformaci6n de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos. Ademas, les acompaiiaban tres cana dienses, un ingles naturalizado, un aleman y un holandes. Todos ellos estaban destinadosa ser canjeados por los tres presos comunistas, acusados por la justicia boliviana de delitos comunes.

La exigencia comunista coloc6 ante el mu ro al gobierno de Paz Estcnsoro. La circunstancia obligaba a Bolivia a decidir la alterna tiva que los mineros armados, acaudillados por los comunistas, planteaban. Y Paz Estensoro acogi6 el desado, lo enfrent6 y cancel6 Ia po Utica de apaciguamiento de que ha sido cam pe6n el gobierno de Bolivia.

El Ministro del Interior Antonio Arze .Mu rillo, proclam6 Ia decisi6n del gobierno de re chazar cualquiera ·negociaci6n sobre canje, afirmando la exigencia de liberacl6n inmedia ta de los rehenes, sin condiciones. Al propio tiempo ante los periodistas, en conferencia de prensa, el Ministro exhibi6 documentos que probaban la formaci6n de un "frente" cons tituido por el ala izquierda del M.N.R. opues ta a la politica del gobierno, por el Partido Comunista,. por Jos Trotzkistas, por el Partido Revolucionario Autentico y por la Falange Socialista Boliviana. lndependientemente de la validez de los documentos exhibidos, el Mi nistro estaba trazando la linea divisoria que separaba dos polfticas : la que favorecia a los comunistas y la que se comenzaba a oponer frontalmente a ellos.

EI Gobierno de Estados Unidos anunci6 que ofreda "Asistencia Plena" al Gobierno de Bolivia para que impusiese la autoridad de la ley y Iiberase a los rehenes, sin condiciones. EI Gobierno de La Paz, ordenaba la moviliza ci6n de tropas sobre la ciudad de Oruro, a las 6rdenes, del General Alfredo Ovando, Jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas de Bolivia. Por su parte, la Federaci6n de Mineros, que comanda Juan Lechfn Oquendo, decret6 la realizaci6n de huelgas escalonadas y la movilizaci6n general de sus milicias. Convocaba al mismo tiem1>0 a las Milicias Campesinas de la regi6n de Oruro a ponerse en pie de guerra y dar apoyo a los mineros.

Juan Lechfn, en su caracter de Vice-presidente de la Reptiblica, otor 6 pleno apoyo a los mineros y exigi6 el can1e de los tres co munistas presos por la veintena de rehenes, que fueron trasladados para mayor seguridad, a las Minas Siglo XX. .

En esta forma se cancelaba la alianza que fuera sellada en mayo de 195l . La presi6n de los comunistas de. obediencia castrista y pekinesa se habia impuesto de manera total. Los comunistas de obediencia moscovita se sumaban a los insurgentes y acataban las direct!-

3

vas que venian de Catavi. El 9 de diciembre, Juan Lechin emitia un comunicado oficial sa bre la situaci6n, en el que aseveraba que los rchcnes cstaban sanos, aunque prisioneros en cspcra de! canje exigi<lo. Lechin cargaba toda la rcsponsabilidad de Ios hechos sobre la ac titud asumida por Paz Estensoro.

ANTE Ia exigencia de Lechin y de los comunistas, el Gobierno de la Paz reaccion6 ordenando a las tropas de Oruro poner cerco a Catavi. Simulta.neamente, el Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario teal ordenaba Ia movilizaci6n de las Milicias Campesinas de! De partamento de Cochabamba, ordenandoles que marcharan sobre Catavi y las minas.

Bolivia se convirti6 en el escenario de una movilizaci6n espectacular de personalidades. El Vicario de la Iglesia, Monsefior Andrew Ken nedy y el Arzobispo de La Paz, Embajadores de casi todos Ios palses americanos y altos dirlgentes de la Cruz Roja, dirigentes estu diantiles y emisarios sindicales, se desplazaron a la regi6n minera para obtener Ia liberaci6n de los reheneif. El Gobierno de La Paz se man tenfa firme en su posici6n de no negociar. No podia haber canje de gente honrada, captura da con infracci6n de toda norma juridica, con delincuentes comunes, responsables de delitos ante la justicia.

El 10 de diciembre por la maiiana, los mi ncros francamente sublevados contra el gobierno de La Paz, daban un ultimatum. Exi gian Ia libertad inmediata de Pimentel, Esco bar y Zara!, dentro de las 24 horas. En caso de negativa, la declaraci6n oficial sentenciaba que "e\ gobierno cargaria con las consecucB cias".

Los funcionarios del Dcpartamento de Estado de Washington multiplicaban las notas de protesta. Renovaban los ofrecimientos de "Ayuda Plena" del Presldente Johnson y re1- teraban las notas conminatorias pidiendo la liberaci6n de los rehenes norteamericanos.

El Embajador ·de los Estados Unidos, Dou glas Henderson, envi6 un mensaje telegrafico a Juan Lechfn, haciendole responsable de lo que Jes pudiese ocurrir a las cuatro.·rehenes norteamericanos. En aspera replica, Lechfn respondi6 que los rehenes norteamericanos no obtendrfan su libertad mientras el gobierno de La Paz no liberase a los tres sindicalistas_dctenidos por orden judicial.

Lechfn asever6 a traves de la prensa y de la radio, que sus tres amigos habian sido re ducidos a prisi6n arbitrariamente por el Mimstro del Interior. Que el Agregado Obrero de la Embajada de los Estados Unidoa, habia sido capturado por Jos mineros a causa de haberse entrometido en la politica interna de Bolivia, pretendiendo formar una organizacion t.indical cllstinta de Ia que dirigia Lecbfn. Rei

3 ter6 su exlgencia de Iibertad inmediata de los




4 1 - 15 M A R Z O 1964

hes comunistas presos y anunci6 que seis mil miucros, con las armas en la mano, sc cncon t,aban en csc momento en pie de guerra.

La pcrspectiva de gucm1 civil se abri6 ante Bolivia dramaticamente. El Prcsidentc Paz Es tensoro mantuvo su posici6n primitiva y ordcn6 rcforzar la guarnici6n militar de Orw·o, elevando a seis m:J el numero de soldados.

El 11 de dicicmbre, se produjo un duelo tclegrafico entre Juan Lechin y el Embajadur de los Estaclos Onidos. El Embajador le tc legrafi6 dircctamente a Lechin, d1cicndole:

"El crimcn de secuestro es vista con ho rror y rcpugnancia en el mundo entero."

Juan Lechin, .!R su respuesta se limit6 a reiterar su decisi6n de mantener presos a los rehenes mientras Paz Estensoro no aceptase

las condiciones planteadas por los comumstas. Mientras tanto, Dean Rusk, Secretario di.!

Estado de Washington, Teodoro .Moscoso, de la Alianza para el Progreso, Pierre Salinger, Jtie de Prensa de la Casa Blanca, Walcer Reuter, dirigente_ sindical de los obreros del automovil de los Estados Unidos y otras pe1- sonalidades, se dirigieron a Juan Lechin, conmmandole a ordcnar la liberaci6n de los rehenes.

Los comunistas y Lechin se mantenian en su posici6n, mientras los rehenes prisioneros sc.. apiiiabari en una habitaci6n de cuatro me tros par seis. Sobre el suelo estaban extendidos colchones, en cada uno de los cuales reposaban mas de dos priskmeros. La guardia la realiza ban las mujeres de las mineros, provistas de cargas de dinamita, y con sus respectivos ful minantes.

A esta hara de la crisis, todos las comu nistas se habian unificado: los que obedecian a Pekin tanto coma las fidelistas, las trotzkis tas y los de obediencia moscovita. La unidad era total: las discrepancias habian quedado reducidas a literatura sabre temas internac:ionales. En Catavi no existian discrepancias. Las que existfan tres dias atras, solamente, habian dcsaparecido.

LOS PARTIDARIOS de Juan Lechin y Ios comunistas, convocaron a una ran manifesta cion en La Paz, con la finahdad de ejercer presi6n sabre el ·gobierno y obligarle a ceder. Los comunistas de las diversas observancias se mostraron activos. Pero, al fin, Ia manifestaci6n no Iogr6 movilizar a tres mil manifes tantes. Ningun sector importante del trabajo fue paralizado en la capital de! pais. Los comunistas desfilaron · al grito de "Paz Esten-. soro . .- . al pared6n. . . Juan Lechin, al Po·

. ·der .•. ".Ante el fracaso de la manifestaci6n de ma·

·sas de La Paz, el Ministerio de! Trabajo dict6 una serie de amenazas contra los mineros huel guistas. La Corporaci6n Minera de Bolivia, la empresa nacionalizada, suspenderia sus operaciones en las minas de Catavi y Siglo XX.

Esto implicaba un "lock-out" contra sietc mil m1bajauorcs, a guicnes se cortaria el sumi nistro <.le abastcc1micntos. Se suprimiria, ade· mas, el pago dcl aguinaldo de Navidad y el de los salarius por los dias no trabajados.

En aqucl mismo momento, lei Justicia iniciaba un proceso contra las quince pri11cipales dirigcntcs <le l.:i opcraci6n comunista que ha bia capturado a los rehencs en la zona mi nera.

La ofcnsiva dcl gobierno caus6 impacto profundo en las filas comunistas. La actitud desafiantc fuc abandonada. Los gritos dcstemplados contra <:I imperialismo yanqui fueron cambiados en rccriminaciones al gobierno par su '·actitud testaruda, antirrevolucionaria, antiobrcra ... ". Y la propaganda se hizo calurosa sobre la actitud gcnerosa y benevolente de las mineros, quc "trataban a los rehcnes coma a hermanos ... ", "sin hacerles daiio alguno y trat,mdo solamentc de canjearlos ... ".

Juan Lechin Oquendo presento nuevas condiciones. El mismo, renunciaria a su cargo y a la investidura de Vicepresidente de la Re publica de Bolivia. Se someteria a proceso penal ante los Tribunales de Justicia, rcemplazando a las trcs dirigentes sindicales pre sos. Tan pronto como esta nueva proposici6n hubiese sido aceptada por el gobierno de La Paz, las rehenes serian puestos en Jibertad.

Paz Estensoro rechaz6 fulminantemente la nueva proposici6n. Respondi6 exigiendo la Jibertad inmediata y sin condiciones de las re henes. Notiiic6 que los tres dirigentes sindi cales qucdarian presos y sometidos al proceso judicial quc sc !es habia iniciado. Anunci6 que los dirigcntes de Catavi que habian dirigido la operaci611 de captura de los rehenes serian procesados. .- Micntras tanto, las tropas de Oruro avan

zaron sabre Catavi y las Milicias Campesinas, que habfan partido de la localidad de Ucurena, a las 6rdcnes de! Coronel Osinaga, mar· chaban sabre la zona minera. Los mineros iban a ser tratados como rebeldes.

Un avion de reconocimiento se estrel16 en 1a zona mincra y sus dos ocupantes perecieron,

siendo las tinicas victimas de toda la crisis. El Cuerpo Diplomatico acreditado en La Paz se

moviliz6 rumbo a la regi6n de Catavi; los dignatarios de la I lesia, los dirigentes es

tudiantilcs, los jefes smdicales y politicos in· tentaron realizar la misi6n de mediadores. Juan Lechin respondi6 a todas las gestiones afirmando

que todo dependia de la resoluci6ndel gobicrno y de Paz Estensoro.

Subitamente y en forma dramatica, un abo-. gado norteamericano, hermano de uno de Jos

rehenes prisioneros, dio a la publicidad una carta en la que Irineo Pimentel y Federico Es· cobar, dos de Jos comunistas presos,· acusados de homicidio, pedfan a sus camaradas mineros poner en libcrtad a los rehenes, sin condicioncs, par cl bien de Bolivia y de las trabajado res. En un fragmento, la carta decia, textual mente:

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1 - 15 M A R Z O 1964Approved for Release: 2017/08/17 C02573160

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.._,,.

"Estando en duro trance de sacrificio los mineros de Catavi y Siglo XX, y ante el des plazamiento de tropas del Ejercito y queriendo evitar una masacre roja, deponiendo toda ac titud sectaria y pensando en los trabajadores, . llamamos y rogamos, para dar una lecci6n a Los bdrbaros, poner en libertad a. los rehenes, exigiendo al propio tiempo la normalizacion de las labores en las minas, el pago de los haberes por los dias de huelga y que el go bierno atienda a las demandas de mejoras sin dicales . . . 11

•

La carta fue tacpada de ap6crifa por los comunistas. Desde Washington, Edwin M. Martin, alto funcionario de! Departamento de Estado, telegrafiaba a Juan Lechin pidiendole que diera fe a las mineros de la autenticidad de tal carta, certificando que ella habia sido

. firmada por Pimentel y Escobar libremente y sin coacci6n.

Los comunistas plantearon una nueva condici6n. Se pondrfa. en libertad a los rehenes, pero los presos comunistas no serfan juzgados en La Paz, donde "no tenian garantias", sino en Potosi, donde sf las tenlan. El gobierno de La Paz, rechaz6 categ6ricamente la nueva condici6n y exigi6 la inmediata libertad de los rehenes.

EN LA MADRUOADA del sabado 14 de diciembre, el cerco militar en torno a Catavi, cerraba sus tenazas. El General Ovando asu mia el mando de las tropas y una operaci6n de caracter militar iba a comenzar objetiva mente. Lechin se convenci6 que el gobierno de Paz Estensoro estaba resuelto a imponer autoridad sin consentirle siquiera salvar la cara. Al atardecer, la radio dejaba escuchar la voz conmovida de Juan Lechin:

"El pueblo ha ganado la batalla. . . En co nocimiento de que las tropas se encuentran, en estos momentos, a escasos kilometros de Cata vi y Siglo XX, con las tragicas consecuencias que son previsibles para los tiabajadores bolivianos y para los tecnicos extranjeros y los diplomdticos norteamericanos, con el fin de evitar derramamiento de sangre y horas trcigicas, la Federacion de Trabajadores Mineros, acepta la propuesta del gobierno . . .".

"Los rehenes prisioneros -aii.adio Lechinserdn entregados a Monseffor Abel Antezana, Arzobispo de La Paz, quien habia venido actuando como mediador."

Las condiciones del arreglo fueron :• Liberacl6n incondicional de las rehenes.• Proceso a ·10s tres dirigentes comunistas

glas Henderson y el Vicepresidente Juan Lechin.

-"lC6mo permiti6 usted que se enviaran tropas contra los mineros ... ?" -increp6 Le chin al Embajador.

-"Yo no he venido a este pais para man-· dar", replic6 Henderson.

Horas mas tarde, los rehenes cran libera dos, sin que ninguna de las condiciones comu nistas hubiesen sido aceptadas. I-labia prevalecido la firme actitud del gobierno y la ba talla la habia ganado rotundamente Victor Paz Estensoro.

LA CRISIS boliviana del mes de diciem bre ha venido a demostrar tres verdades po liticas concluyentes:• Cuando el gobierno de Washington "da Apoyo Pleno" a la acci6n contra el comunis mo, los gobiernos de America Latina se de ciden, varlan su posici6n apacisuadora, cambian sus actitudes de tolerancia mteresada. No por esto, ni a causa de esto, llega a sufrir un rasguiio la soberania, ni la independencia, ni el orgullo nacional..• No es la miseria sino la impunidad lo que favorece la subversi6n comunista. La falta de firmeza de los gobiernos, la actitud democratica claudicante, la corrupci6n: politica, la utilizaci6n de los comunistas coijlo instrumentos electorales y como ingredientes de la intriga palaciega, constituyen las fuerzas que estan ayudando al cornunismo en America Latina. La infiltraci6n y la subversi6i;t prosperan, no alli donde hay mas miseria, si o donde mayor es la tolerancia y donde mas altos grados al- canza la impunidad. . _• La divisi6n entre las com nistas que obe decen a Moscti, las que obedecen a Pekin y los que siguen a La Habana:, es meramente formal. En Bolivia se ha hecho claro a traves de esta crisis que los fidelistas, los trotzkistas y las obedientes a Pekin no estan separados par ningtin desacuerdo real. La oposici6n de las que obedecen a Moscu se enardece en las palabras, estalla en palabreria traducida del ruso, para acallarse totalmente a la hara de la acci6n, que es la hara de la verdad. Tanto en Bolivia, coma en Venezuela, los comunistas de las diversas corrientes dejan una experiencia probada: simulan estar separados o marchan efectivamente separados, pero 'en la hora de la - acci6n, el combate los encuentra juntas.

La batalla de Catavi la gan6, de manera campal, Victor Paz Estensoro y la corriente delM.N.R. acusada de "Thermidoriana" por las comunistas. Esta lucha ha demostrado que elcomunismo en Bolivia, y en America Latina, ·

.-

....en La Paz, no en Potosi.

• Retiro de las tropas de lay Siglo XX.

zona de Cataviha sufrido una severa derrota; pero esta pro bado asimismo que el comunismo no ha sido vencido. Ni en Venezuela, ni1 en Bolivia. En


Incidentalmente y partiendo hacia la zona minera, se encontraron en el aeropuerto de LaPaz el Embajador de los Estados Unidos, Dou- S

Catavi se le ha permitido replegarse en ordeny realizar una retirada que bien puede ser con-

( Pasa a la p_dg. siguiente)


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(Viene de la pag. anterior)siderada como estrategica. Las fuerzas del co munismo en Bolivia pcrmanecen intactas numericamente.

Las condiciones para la campaifa electoral de! mes de junio, quiza no son mejores ni peo res que aqtes de la crisis. Lo que si es auten tico es que la crisis ha· servido para definir posiciones, para delimitar fronteras y esclarecer actitudes. En las elecciones de junio no habra alianza intima entre el M.N.R. y el Partido Comunista. Cualesquicra que fueren las maniobras quc realicen los comunistas de obe diencia moscovita, la corriente fidelista y pe kinesa Jes arrastrara a posiciones que no son de coexistcncia pacffica, sino de aspera opo sici6n al gobierno acusado de "thermidoriano".

. EUDOCIO RAVINES

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I - 15 MARZO 1964 QUINCENAL A O U-NII 40

BEDAOOION:

8 BOVLEVABD HAVSSMANl'ABIS 89 (FBANOIA)

ADMINISTBAOION1

&PABTADO DEL ES'l'E 11.zuC A B A O .& S ( V B' N E Z V .E L Al

EDICION ESPECIAL PARA A31EIDCA LATINA DEL BOLETJN DE LA ASOCIACION DB ES'l'1JDI08E INFOBlllACIONES POLl'J:ICAS IN'l'BlfflACIONA.LES (B.E.I.P.I.) DE PABl8

........ Apo·ciguomiento y Thermidor en BoliviaCARACTERISTICA de la politica do

mestica de las republicas de America La tina en la etapa presente, ha sido el mar cado apaciguamiento empleado por los gobiernos frente a Los comunistas.

LA TESIS del determinismo econ6mico, fabricada por los intelectuales y periodistas de Washington, ha servido para arrojar toda la responsabilidad de la subversi6n sobre la pobreza, la miseria y las condiciones de sub desarrollo. Y asimismo para acordar en mu chos campos, a la sombra de esa filosofia, una creciente y progresiva impunidad a las accio-

. nes de todo genero emprendidas por los co munistas.

En todas partes, los nuevo gobiernos han sentido la necesidad de diferenciarse de los dictadores que les antecedieron. Para acen tuar la diferencia, ban querido dar a la prac tica de la democracia un caracter tal de to lerancia, que beneficia a los agentes de Rusia, China, Cuba y Yugoslavia.

La politica de apaciguamiento tiene, ade mas, m6viles mas inmediatos e intereses mas directos, para los gobiernos latinoamericanos. Ante todo, esta pofitica de tolerancia favorece los intereses electorales del bando en ascenso. y ejerce influencia en la intrigante politica do mestica. De otro lado, suministra las dosis

de chantage adecuadas para presionar a Was hington. Y pone en manos de los gobiernos el instrumento agresivo que consiente en de jarse utilizar contra los opositores del go bierno.

Los cambios recientes que ban intervenido en Washington, asi como la' necesidad de afrontar procesos electorales decisivos, han determinado cambios que pueden tornarse reacciones saludables a condici6n. de extenderse y de ser consecuentes.

Dos gobiernos, el de Ven zuela · y el de Bolivia, se han visto forzados: a empfear una polftica de firmeza frente a la subversi6n co munista, demostrando que, por, sobre todo, tal clase de plaga en este )ado del mundo, es el engendro de la impunidad que los gobiernos otorgan a los comunistas. Tap pronto como la tolerancia cesa y la impunidad disminuye, el peligro amaina, la subversion y sus capi tostes pierden la cara, la ins1,1.rgencia de las masas entra en quiebra.

Las elecciones del mes de diciembre de 1963, obligaron al gobierno de Venezuela a desplegar la fuerza para someter al terroris mo que asolaba el pais y que P.roclam6 su vo luntad de impedir la realizac16n de las elec,. cicmes. El despliegue de fuerza del gobierno bast6 para que el apocalipsis comunista se transfonnase espectacularmente en farsa. Durante la jomada electoral bubo menos victimas que en cualquier dia corriente de terrorismo.

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2 1 - 15 M A R Z O 1964

S6lo dos personas, en todo el pals, fucron vic timas de ctos de terror.

El fe116mcno politico vcnczolano acaba de recibir cons.::;;rac1011 hist6rica en los baluartes comunistas ac Bolivia. La prision de tres de lincuentes c0munistas y la captura y libera ci6n por los comuuistas, de los rehencs extl'anjeros, al propio ticmpo que la rirmcza de la polilica de! gobierno ctc Bolivia, han demostrado lo que 1a impunidad signhica en todo el sinicstro juego politico de la actual etapa latinoamcricana.

BOLIVIA se encuentra en la vispera de una contienda electoral. Ella ha puesto uente a frente a los dos protagonistas de la revo luci6n boliviana de 1952: Victor Paz. Esten soro, actual 1-'residente de la Hcpublica, y Juan

. Lechin Oquendo, Vice-Presideme. A cstas horas, cada uno de estos personajes comanda un ala de! Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, la organizaci6n politica promotora y reali zadora de la Revoluci6n. El conflicto es emi nentemente ideol6gico: mientras Paz Esten soro retorna a los caminos del nacional-refor-

. mismo y a las vias capitalistas, Juan Lechin opera como el jefe de la facci6n de! MNR. proiundamente iniiltrada por los comunistas de MoscLi, y mucho mas energicamente -:eomo acaban de probarlo hechos macizos-- por los fidelistas v comunistas de la obediencia de Fekin y cie La Habana.

Esta ya a mas de doce aiios de distancia el dia en c;ue Juan Lechin, con la anuencia de Paz Estensoro y en su beneficio, negoci6 el pacto de union entre el Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, la Federaci6n Sindical de Trabajadores M.ineros de Bolivia y el Partido Comunista boliviano. El compromise, negociado en abril de 1951, const6 de once puntos y fue firmado el 3 de mayo de 1951 por Jose Fellman Velarde -actual Ministro de Rela ciones Exteriores- por el M.N.R.; Juan Le chin Oquendo firm6 en representacion de la Federaci6n de Mineros y Jorge Quiroga Vargas como rcprese:itante autorizado de! Partido Comunista de Bolivia.

Bajo las mas variadas circunstancias ya pesar de todos los avatares politicos de Bolivia, la alianza de 1951 se ha mantenido. A traves de mas de doce aiios, el M.N.R. utiliz6 al Partido Comunista para golpear despiadadamente a sus opositores de toda clase. A cam bio de tales scrvicios, el comunismo ha disfru tado en Bolivia de todas las Iibertades que el pacto del 3 de mayo de 1951 le concedia, in cluyendo la de organizar las Milicias Obreras'I Campesinas. Estas milicias son las que hanmtentado presentar combate en la crisis que ha tenido una resonancia internacional en el mes ·de diciembre.

' La situaci6n conflictiva creada por las elec ciones de junio pr6ximo, alcanz6 aguda tensi6n despues de la visita que el Presidente Paz Estensoro realizara a Washington, al fi-

nalizar cl mes de octubre. El jefe de la revoluci6n boliviana y actual Presidente de su

pais, rccibio. honorcs cspccialcs y cl Prcsidente Kennedy, en discurso oficial, sefial6 a Bolivia como cl cjc:mplo que debia ser imitado

por las dcma.s n:icioncs de la America Latina. A su rctorno de Washington, Paz Estcn soro fuc acusado por los comunistas de la obe dicncia de Pekin, de actuar como ·'agcnte del imperialismo yanqui", como "entrcguista" y coma realizador

de una "operaci6n thermidoriana".

Al mismo ticmpo se hizo evidente para to dos que cl Presidcntc Paz Estensoro y el sector de! M.N.R. que le sigue, no apoyana la candidatura a la Presictencia · de Juan Lechin, en las elccciones pr6ximas.

La circunstancia crftica y la atm6sfcra de la crisis quedaron asi creadas. Hubo ruido de escudos en las minas de Catavi, baluarte del comunismo y de! Vice-Presidente Juan Lechin. La propaganda comunista contra Paz Estensoro se hizo mas violenta en el tono y mas aspera en el contenido.

El Presidcnte Paz Estensoro rcorganiz6 su Gabinete Ministerial el 6 de diciembre, renovando solamente tres carteras: Minas, Asuntos Campesinos y Agricultura. En los dos primeros, coloc6 a dos jefes militares retirados. Hay que considerar que estas tres cartcras son fundamcntales en la circunstancia actual boliviana.

ENTRE TANTO, el Peder Judicial venia conociendo los procesos seguidos, par homi c.idio y por robo, contra Ios dirigentes sindicales Irineo Pimentel, Federico Escobar y .Jorge Zara!. Los dos primeros estaban acusados de haber asesinado o hecho asesinar a un dirigen te sindical oponente. EI tercero era culpable de apropiaci6n ilicita de fondos destinados a la construcci6n de viviendas para los mineros precisamentc. El Fiscal que conocia la causa habfa dispuesto la prisi6n de los tres acusados, quienes eran tres conspicuos dirigentes comunistas. Su prisi6n determin6 el esta!lido de

Ia crisis que conmovi6 a E.:!:vi.1. ? .-_ ':- : ·:: rica Latina durante diez dias con su:1 .. -:...::·. .;;;,

Pimentel y Escobar eran dos comui istas de la intimidad de Juan Lechln. Su prisi6n fue cstimada como un reto, circunstancia que fue aprovechada por los comunistas de tendencia fidelista y trotzkista, para organi:zar las represalias.

Tras una vigorosa propaganda anti-yanqui, que acus6 a Paz Estensoro de "traicionar a la revoluci6n" y de "venderla al imperialismo yan qui", los comunistas lograron Ianzar a los mi neros armadas contra un grupo de extranjeros, algunos de ellos diplomaticos, que se encontraban en la zona minera. VeintiLin personas fueron apresadas como rehenes, exigiendo a cambio de su libertad la de los tres presos co munistas, Pimentel, Escobar y Zaral.

2


C025731601 • 15 M A R Z O 1964


Entre los rel1enes se encontraban cuatro norteamericanos. Uno de ellos, Agregado Obre- 1·0 de la Embajada de las Estados llnidos, un miembro del "Cuerpo de Paz", una de las creaciones de la Alianza para el Progreso, y dos funcionarios del Servicio Periodistico de lnformaci6n de la Embajada de las Estados Unidos. Ademas, les acompaiiaban tres canadienses, un ingles naturalizado, un aleman y un holandes. Todos ellos estaban destinados a ser canjeados par las tres presos comunis-

vas que venf an de Catavi. El 9 de diciembre, Juan Lechin emitla un comunicado oficial sa bre la situaci6n, en el que aseveraba que los rchcnes estaban sanos, aunque prisioneros en cspera del canje exigido. Lechin cargaba toda la responsabilidad de los hechos sabre la ac titud asumida por Paz Estensoro.

tas, acusados por la justicia bo!iviana de de- ANTE la exigencia de Lechin y de las lilos comunes. comunistas, el Gobierno de la Paz reaccion6

La exigencia comunista coloc6 ante el mu- ordenando a las tropas de Oruro poner cercoro al gobierno de Paz Estcnsoro. La circuns- a Catavi. Simultaneamente, el Movimiento Na- tancia obligaba a Bolivia a decidir la alterna- cionalista Revolucionario leal 01:denaba la mo- tiva que los mineros armadas, acaudillados por vilizaci6n de las Milicias Campesinas del De- los comunistas, planteaban. Y Paz Estensoro partamento de Cochabamba, ordenandoles que acogi6 el desado, lo enfrent6 y cancel6 la po- marcharan sabre Catavi y las minas.litica de apacig1:1amiento de que ha sido cam- Bolivia se convirti6 en el escenario de una

pe6n el gobierno de Bolivia. movilizaci6n espectacular de personalidades. El Ministro del Interior Antonio Arze Mu- El Vicario de la Iglesia, Monseiior Andrew Ken- rillo, proclam6 la decisi6n del gobierno de re- nedy y el Arzobispo de La Paz, Embajadores chazar cualquiera ·negociaci6n sabre canje, de casi todos los pafses americanos y altos afirmando la exigencia de liberaci6n inmedia- dirigentes de la Cruz Roja, dirigentes estu- ta de los rehenes, sin condiciones. Al propio diantiles y emisarios sindicales, se desplazaron tiempo ante Jos periodistas, en conferencia de a la regi6n minera para obtener la liberaci6n prensa, el Ministro exhibi6 documentos que de los rehenes. El Gobiemo de La Paz se man- probaban la formaci6n de un "frente" cons- tcnia firme en su posici6n de no negociar. No tituido por el ala izquierda del M.N.R. opues;. pod[a haber canje de gente honrada, captura- ta a la politica del gobierno, por el Partido da con infracci6n de toda norma juridica, con Comunista, por los Trotzkistas, por el Partido delincuentes comunes, responsables de delitosRevolucionario Autentico y por la Falange So- ante la justicia.cialista Boliviana. lndependientemente de la El 10 de diciembre por la mafiana, los mi- validez de los documentos exhibidos, el Mi.. ncros francamente sublevados contra el go- nistro estaba trazando la linea divisoria que bierno de La Paz, daban un ultimatum. Exi- separaba dos politicas: la quc favorecia a los gian la libertad inmediata de Pimentel, Esco- comunistas y la que se comenzaba a oponer bar y Zaral, dentro de las 24 horas. En caso frontalmente a ellos. de negativa, la declaraci6n oficiaJ: sentenciaba

El Gobierno de Estados Unidos anunci6 que "el gobierno cargaria con las consecucn-que ofrecfa "Asistencia Plena" al Gobierno cias".de Bolivia para que impusiese la autoridad de Los funcionarios del Dcpartamento de Es- la ley y liberase a los rehenes, sin condiciones. tado de Washington multiplicaban las notas El Gobierno de La Paz, ordenaba la moviliza- de protesta Renovaban las ofrecimientos de ci6n de tropas sobre la ciudad de Oruro, a las "Ayuda Plena" de! Presidente Johnson y_ re1- 6rdenes, del General Alfredo Ovando, Jefe de teraban las notas conminatorias pidiendo la las Fuerzas Armadas de Bolivia. Por su parte, liberaci6n de los rehenes norteamericanos.la Federaci6n de Mineros, que comanda Juan El Embajador de los Estados Unidos, Dou- Lechin Oquendo, decret6 la realizaci6n de glas Henderson, envi6 un mensaje telegrafico huelgas escalonadas y la movilizaci6n general a Juan Lechfn, haciendole responsable de lo de sus milicias. Convocaba al mismo tiempo a que les pudiese ocurrir a los cuatro:rehenes las Milicias Campesinas de la regi6n de Oru- norteamericanos. En aspera replica, Lechin res- ro a ponerse en pie de guerra y dar apoyo a pondi6 que Ios rehenes norteamericanos no los mineros. olJtendrlan su libertad mientras el gobierno

Juan Lechin, en su caracter de Vice-presi- de La Paz no liberase a los tres sindic-alistasdente de la Republica, otorg6 pleno apoyo a dctenidos por orden judicial.los mineros y exigi6 el canJe de los tres co- Lechin asever6 a traves de la prensa y de munistas presos por la veintena de rehenes, la radio, que sus tres amigos hab1an sido re- que fueron trasladados para mayor seguridad, ducidos. a prision arbitrariamente· por el Mi- a las Minas Siglo XX. · nistro del Interior. Que el Agregado Obrero

En esta forma se cancelaba la alianza que de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos, habiafuera sellada en mayo de 1951. La presi6n de sido capturado por las mineros a causa de

las comunistas de obed_iencia castnsta y pe- haberse entrometido en la politica; interna de kinesa se habfa impuesto de manera total. Los Bolivia, pretendiendo formar una organizaci6n comunistas de obediencia moscovita se suma- &indical distinta de la gue dirigia Lechfn. Rei- ban a las insurgentes y acataban las directi- 3 ter6 su exigencia de lioertad inmediata de las

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4 1 - 15 M A R Z O 1964

ties comunistas presos y anunci6 que seis mil mineros, con las armas en la mano, sc cncon t1aban en ese momento en pie de guerra.

La pcrspcctiva cle gucrra civil se abri6 ante Bolivia dram:iticamentc. El Presidentc Paz Estensoro mantuvo su posici6n primitiva y or dcn6 reforzar la guarnici6n militar de Oruro, elevando a seis mil el ntimero de soldados.

El 11 clc diciembre, se produjo un duelo tclegrafico entre Juan Lechin y el Embajador de los Estaclos Unidos. El Embajador le te legrafi6 dir, ctamcme a Lechin, d1cicndole:

"El crir.icn de secuestro es v1sto con ho nor y rcpugnancia en el mundo entero."

Juan Lechin, en su respuesta se Jimit6 a reiterar su decision de mautener presos a los rehenes mientras Paz Estensoro no aceptase

Jai; condiciones planteadas por los comumstas. Mientras tanto, Dean Rusk, Secretario de

Estado de Washington, Teodoro 1'\,\oscoso, de la Alianza para el Progreso, Pierre Salinger,

Jtie de Prensa de la Casa Blanca, Walter Reuter, dirigente sindical de los obreros de!

autom6vil de los Estados Unidos y otras pe1- sonalidades, se dirigieron a Juan Lechin, con

mmandole a ordenar la liberaci6n de los rehenes.

Los comunistas y Lechin se mantcnian en su posici6n, micntras los rehenes prisioneros sc. apiiiaban en una habitaci6n de cuatro metros por seis. Sabre el suelo estaban extendidos colchones, en cada uno de los cuales reposaban mas de dos prisioneros. La guardia la realiza ban las mujeres de los mineros, provistas de cargas de dinamita, y con sus respectivos ful minantes.

A esta hora de la crisis, todos los comunistas se habian unificado: los que obedec1an a Pekin tar,to coma los fidelistas, Ios trotzkis tas y los de obediencia moscovita. La unidad era total: las discrepancias habian quedado reducidas a literatura sabre temas internaciouales. En Catavi no existian discrepancias. Las que existian tres dias atras, solamente, habian dcsaparecido.

LOS PARTIDARIOS de Juan Lechin y los comunistas, convocaron a una gran manifesta ci6n en La Paz, con la finalidad de ejercer presi6n sobre el gobierno y obligarle a ceder. Los comunistas de las diversas observancias se mostraron actives. Pero, al fin, la manifes taci6n no logr6 movilizar a tres mil manHestantes. Ningun sector importante del trabajo

· fue paralizado en la capital de! pais. Los comunistas desfilaron al grito de "Paz Esten soro . .-. al pared6n. . . Juan Lechin, al Po

.·der ... ".Ante el fracaso de la manifestaci6n de ma

·sas de La Paz, el Ministerio del Trabajo dict6 una serie de amenazas contra los mineros huel guistas. La Corporaci6n Minera de Bolivia, la empresa nacionalizada, suspenderia sus operaciones en las minas de Catavi y Siglo XX.

Esto implicaba un "lock-out" contra sietc mil trabajauorcs, a quicncs sc cortaria el sumi nistro lie. abastccimicntos. Se suprimiria, ademas, cl pago del aguinaklo de Navidad y el de los salariQs por !us dias no trabajados.

En aqucl mismo momenta, la justicia ini ciaba un proccso contra los quince principalcs dirigcntcs de: la opcraci6n comunista que ha bia capturado a los rehcnes en la zona mi nera.

La ofcnsiva dcl gobierno caus6 impacto profundo en las filas comunistas. La actitud clcsafiante fuc abandonada. Los gritos destemplados contra cl imperialismo yanqui fueron cambiados en recriminaciones al obierno por su '·actitucl testaruda, antirrevoluc1onaria, antiobrcra ... ". Y la propaganda se hizo calurosa sobre la actitud gencrosa y benevolente de los mineros, que "trataban a los rehenes coma a hermanos ... ", "sin hacerles daiio alguno y trat.:ntlo solamentc de canjearlos ... ".

Juan Lechin Oquendo present6 nuevas condiciones. El mismo, rcnunciaria a su cargo y a la investidura de Vicepresiden te de la Re publica de Bolivia. Se someteria a proceso penal ante los Tribunales de Justicia, reem plazando a los tres dirigentes sindicales pre sos. Tan pronto como esta nueva proposici6n hubiese sido aceptada por el gobierno de La Paz, los rehcnes serian puestos en libertad.

Paz Estensoro rechaz6 fulminantemente la nueva proposici6n. Respondi6 exigiendo la libertad inmediata y sin condiciones de los re hcnes. Notiiic6 que los tres dirigentes sindicales quedarian presos y sometidos al proceso judicial quc se Jes habia iniciado. Anunci6 que los dirigcntes de Catavi que habian dirigido Ia operaci6n de captura de los rehenes serian procesados. .. Mientras tanto, las tropas de Oruro avan

zaron sobre Catavi y las Milicias Campesinas, que habian partido de la localidad de Ucurena, a las 6rdenes del Coronel Osinaga, mar chaban sollre la zona minera. Los mineros iban a ser tratados como rebeldes.

Un avi6n de reconocimiento se estrell6 en la zona minera y sus dos ocupantes perecieron, siendo las tinicas victimas de toda la crisis. El Cuerpo Diplomatico acreditado en La Paz

se moviliz6 rumba a la regi6n de Catavi; los dignatarios de la I lesia, los dirigentes es

tudiantiles, los jefes smdicales y politicos intentaron realiza.r la misi6n de mediadores. Juan Lechin respondi6 a todas las gestiones afirmando

que todo dependia de la resoluci6ndel gobicrno y .de Paz Estensoro.. Subitamente y en forma dramatica, un abo-

. gado norteamericano, hermano de uno de los rehenes prisioncros, dio a la publicidad una carta en la que Irineo Pimentel y Federico Es cobar, dos de los comunistas presos,· acusados de homicidio, pedian a sus camaradas mineros poner en libertad a Ios rehenes, sin condicio nes, por el bien de Bolivia y de los trabajado res. En un fragrnento, la carta decfa, textual mente:

4

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•



l - 15 M A R Z O 1964 s

._. "Estando en duro trance de sacrif icio los mineros de Catavi Siglo XX, y ante el des plazamiento de tropas del Ejercito y queriendoevitar una masacre roja, deponiendo toda ac titud sectaria .v pensando en los trabajadores, . llamamos ,v rogamos, para dar una leccion alos bdrbaros, pone, en libertad a los rehenes, exigiendo al propio tiempo la normalizacion de las labores en las minas, el pago de los haberes por Los dias de huelga y que el go bierno atienda a las demandas de mejoras sin dicales . . .".

La carta fue tacpada de ap6crifa por los comunistas. Desde Washington, Edwin M. Martin, alto funcionario del Departamento de Estado, telegrafiaba a Juan Lechin pidiendole que diera fe a los mineros de la autenticidad de tal carta, certificando que ella habia sido firmada por Pimentel y Escobar libremente y sin coacci6n.

Los comunistas plantearon una nueva condici6n. Se pondrla. en libertad a los rehenes, pero los presos comunistas no serfan juzgados en La Paz, donde "no tenfan garantfas", sino en Potosi, donde sf las tenian. El gobierno de La Paz, rechaz6 categ6ricamente la nueva condici6n y exigi6 la inmediata libertad de los rehenes.

EN LA MADRUGADA del sabado 14 de diciembre, el- cerco rnilitar en torno a Catavi, cerraba sus tenazas. El General Ovando asu mia el mando de las tropas y una operaci6n de caracter militar iba a comenzar objetiva mente. Lechin se convenci6 que el gobierno de Paz Estensoro estaba resuelto a imponer auto ridad sin consentirle siquiera salvar la cara. Al atardecer, la radio dejaba escuchar la voz conmovida de Juan Lechin:

"El pueblo ha ganado la batalla. . . En co nocimiento de que las tropas se encuentran, en estos momentos, a escasos kilometros de Cata vi y Siglo XX, con las trcigicas consecuencias que son previsibles para los tfobajadores bolivianos y para los tecnicos extranjeros y los diplomciticos norteamericanos; con el fin de evitar derramamiento de sangre y horas trci gicas, la Federacion de Trabajadores Mineros, acepfa la propuesta del gobierno . . . ".

"Los rehenes prisioneros -aiiadio Lechinserdn entregados a Monsenor Abel Antezana, Arzobispo de La Paz, quien habia venido ac tuando como mediador."

Las condiciones del arreglo fueron:

glas Henderson y el Vicepresidente Juan Le chfn.

-"cC6mo permiti6 usted que se enviaran tropas contra Jos mineros ... ?" -increp6 Lechin al Embajador.

-"Yo no he venido a este pais para mandar", replic6 Henderson.

Horas mas tarde, los rehenes eran libera dos, sin que ninguna de las condiciones comu nistas hubiesen sido aceptadas. Habia prevalecido la firme actitud del gobierno y la batalla Ia habia ganado rotundamente Victor Paz Estensoro.

LA CRISIS boliviana del ines de diciem bre ha venido a demostrar tres verdades po liticas concluyentes:• Cuando el gobierno de Washington "da Apoyo Pleno" a la acci6n contra el comunis mo, los gobiernos de America Latina se de ciden, varian su posici6n apaci uadora, cam bian sus actitudes de tolerancia mteresada. No por esto, ni a causa de esto, llega a sufrir un rasguiio la soberanfa, ni la independencia, ni el orgullo nacional.• No es la miseria sino la impunidad lo que favorece la subversi6n comunista. La falta de firmeza de los gobiernos, la actitud democra tica claudicante, la corrupci6n politica, la uti lizaci6n de los comunistas como instrumentos electorales y como ingredientes de la intriga palaciega, constituyen las fuerzas que estan ayudando al comunismo en America Latina. La infiltraci6n y la subversi6n prosperan, no alli donde hay mas miseria, sino donde mayor es la tolerancia y donde mas altos grados al canza la impunidad.• La divisi6n entre los comqnistas que obe decen a Moscu, los que obedecen a Pekin y los que siguen a La Habana, es meramente formal. En Bolivia se ha hecho claro a traves de esta crisis que los fidelistas, los trotzkistas y los obedientes a Pekin no estan separados por ningun desacuerdo real. La oposici6n de los que obedecen a Moscu se enardece en las pala6ras, estalla en palabreria traducida del ruso, para acallarse totalment a la hora de la acci6n, que es la hora de la verdad. Tanto en Bolivia, como en Venezuela, los comunistas de las diversas corrientes dejan una experiencia probada: simulan estar separados o marchancfectivamente separados, pero en la hora de la · acci6n, el combate los encuentra juntas.

La batalla de Catavi la gan6, de manera campal, Victor Paz Estensoro y la corriente delM.N.R. acusada de "Thermidoriana" por los

• Liberaci6n incondicional de los rehenes. Proceso a ·10s tres dirigentes comunistas en La Paz, no en Potosi.Retiro de las tropas de la zona de Catavi y Siglo XX.Incidentalmente y partiendo hacia la zona

comunistas. Esta lucha ha demostrado que el comunismo en Bolivia, y en ·America Latina, ha sufrldo una severa derrota, pero esta pro bado asimismo que el comunismo no ha sido vencido. Ni en Venezuela, ni en Bolivia. En Catavi se le ha permitido replegarse en orden

minera, se encontraron en el aeropuerto de La Paz el Embajador de los Estados

•


Unidos, Dou- S y realizar una retirad_a que bien puede ser con-( Pasa a la pdg. siguiente)



(Viene de la ptig. anterior)siderada como estratcgica. Las fucrzas del co munismo en Bolivia pcrmanccen intactas numericamentc.· Las condiciones para la campaiia electoral del mes de junio, quiza no son mejores ni peo rcs que a1Jtes de la crisis: Lo que si es auten tico es que la crisis ha scrvido para definir posiciones, para delimitar fronteras y esclare cer actitudcs. En las elecciones de junio no habra alianza intima entre el M.N.R. y el Par tido Comunistn. Cualesquicra que fueren las maniobras que realicen los comunistas de obediencia moscO\·ita, la corriente fidelista y pe kinesa Jes arrastrara a posiciones que no son de coexistencia pacffica, sino de aspera opo sici6ri al gobierno acusado de "thermidoriano".

· EUDOCIO RAVINES

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CO25 7 316 o- - - - - - - - p-pr-ov-c=-t7-eto=-;Rr::.-ele ase: 2017/08/17 C0257316-01

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C0257316Q- Approved for Release: 2017/08/17 C02573160


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Approved for Release: 2017/08/17 C02573160 (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct

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C06702183Approved for Release: 2017/08/17 C06702183 Date of Report 08/17/2017

Task Information

Task ID: 5224666 Case ID: F-2012-02068 Phase: Initial

Case Manager: Requester Name: LESAR, JAMES (b)(3) CIAActSpecial Handling:

From: PIPD

Ext Agency:

To: DO

(b)(6)

case Action:

send Date:

Search

10/01/2012

Task Type:

Due Date:

Search Topic:

Return Date: 10/02/2012

Grant Code: Sub Code: (b)(5)

Subject:

Instructions:

CIA'S STUDY IN 1963 OF PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE ADOLPH HITLER

Please conduct a search for "all records on or pertaining to the CIA's study in 1963 of plots to assassinate Adolph Hitler."We have made a reasonable effort to make a preliminary search for previously released material responsive to this request and our results are below. Nonetheless, the integrity of the Agency's search process and reliability of the results depends upon independent replication. Your office should not rely on our preliminary results but should consider it only a starting point for your own search to verify or expand upon what we have found. Your efforts ...,;11 helpensure that the Agency complies ....;th its legal obligation to undertake reasonable searches for responsive records. (b)(3)No previous releases; Fees-Waived ---- CIAActShould you have any questions, please contact! Thanks.

Response: ,------.: __:

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Task Information

Task ID: 5230B49

Case Manager:

Special Handling:

From: PIPD

case Action: Search

Send Date: 11/26/2012

Grant Code: C=:J

Case ID: F-2012-02068 Phase: Appeal

Requester Name: LESAR, JAMES (b)(3) CIAAct(b)(6)

Ext Agency:

To: DO

Task Type: Search Topic:

Due Date: Return Date: 05/01/2013

Sub Code: (b)(5)

Subject: CIA'S STUDY IN 1963 OF PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE ADOLPH HITLER

Instructions: This is an appeal. At the initial level the NCSIIRO located no records responsive to Item 1 ("all records on or pertaining to the CIA's study in 1963 of plots to assassinate Adolph Hitler.j of this request Please search at the appellate level and advise of your determination.

Response:

....Please portion mark your response if necessary

T_h a nks_M u ch I--- ------------------------(b)(3)CIAAct

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4118113 (b)(3) CIAAct(b)(6)

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C06702185Approved for Release: 2017/08/17 C0670 2185 Date of Report 08/17/2017

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Task ID: 5247863 Case ID: F-2013-00195 Phase: Initial

Case Manager:

Special Handling:

Requester Name:

Ext.Agency:

LESAR, JAMES (b)(3) CIAAct(b)(6)

From: DCI To: Action staff

Case Action: Search Task Type: Search Topic:Send Date: Due Date: Retum Date: 05/1412015

Grant Code: Sub Code:

Subject: STUDY OF HITLER PLOTS

Instructions:

Response:Please conduct a search for records on or pertaining to communications by Allen Dulles regarding plots to assassinate Adolph Hitler.

(b)(5)

UNCLASSIFIED


Page 1 of2


UNCLASSIFIED

any relevant material Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions.

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Instructions:

Response:

Please conduct a search on the following:Item 2-Records pertaining to communications by Allen Dulles regarding plots to assassinate Adolph Hitler during his service in the CIA (during his time as DDCI, 23 August1951-26 February 1953 and DCI, 26 February 1953-29 November 1961)

Fees-v.aivedShoul d you hav e an y questions , pleas e conlac --- - IThanks. (b)(3) CIAAct

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Date

05/14/2015

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Task ID: 5232901 case ID: F-2013-00195 Phase: Initial

Case Manager:

Special Handling:

Requester Name:

Ext Agency:

LESAR, JAMES

From: PIPD To: DCI

case Action: Search Task Type: Search Topic:send Date: 12/10/2012 Due Date: Return Date: 05/14/2015


UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED


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C:=!

C06702187UNCLASSIFIED Date of Report 08/17/2017

Task Information

Task ID: 5232900

Case Manager:

Special Handling:

From: PIPD

Case Action: Search

Send Date: 12/10/2012

Grant Code:


Case ID: F-2013-00195 Phase: Initial

Requester Name: LESAR, JAMES (b)(3) CIAAct(b)(6)

Ext. Agency:

To: DO

Task Type: Search Topic:

Due Date: Return Date: 12/28/2012

Sub Code: (b)(5)

Instructions: Please conduct a search for documents on the following:Item1-Records pertaining to any plot to assassinate Adolph HitlerItem 2-Communications by Allen Dulles regarding plots to assassinate Adolph Hitler during his seivice in the CIA (during his time as Deputy Director of Plans 4 January-23 August 1951)Item3-AII index entries or other records reflecting the search for records responsive to this request in its original or amended form (F-2012-02068), including all search terms used with each of the components searched.

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