6 Capitalist Class Relations, The State, And New Deal Foreign Trade Policy

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DOI: 10.1163/156916303322591121 2003 29: 393Crit Sociol

Tim WoodsCapitalist Class Relations, the State, and New Deal Foreign Trade Policy

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by Pepe Portillo on August 7, 2014crs.sagepub.comDownloaded from by Pepe Portillo on August 7, 2014crs.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Capitalist Class Relations, the State,and New Deal Foreign Trade

Policy *

TIM WOODS(Trinity College)

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I focus on the political influence of classforces surrounding the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act(RTAA). The RTAA was instrumental because it shifted muchof the trade-policy process from Congress to the ExecutiveBranch. I find that capitalist class relations had a greatimpact on the development and passage of the RTAA. Despitethe concerns of capitalists from the nationalist segment overtheir ability to influence Executive Branch policy making, thenationalist segment unified with capitalists from the increasinglypowerful internationalist segment and were successful in theircombined efforts to change the institutional arena within whichtrade policy was formulated. This research bolsters supportfor the class embeddedness perspective of trade policy asportrayed in the works of Domhoff (1990), Prechel (1990),and Dreiling (2000). Further, it contributes to this work byexplaining the historical foundation for the class embeddednessof contemporary foreign trade policy debate as established bycapitalist class relations and changes in state organizationalstructures during the New Deal.

* The author would like to thank G. William Domhoff, Theresa Morris, MartyOppenheimer, and Harland Prechel, for their comments and suggestions on this paper.

Critical Sociology, Volume 29, issue 3 also available online 2003 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden www.brill.nl

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394 Woods

Introduction

While social scientists are increasingly interested in contemporary tradepolicy processes such as the North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA) and the influence of trade policy on business, labor, andenvironmental groups (e.g. Conforti 1995; Russell 1995; Dreiling 2000),there is little sociological research examining the historical evolution ofthe state institutional structures governing contemporary trade policy. Ifbusiness dominates contemporary trade policy through facilitative statestructures (Dreiling 2000:41-2), what are the historical organizationalprocesses leading to the class embeddedness of these state structures? Inthis paper, I find that the foundation of class embeddedness surroundingcurrent trade policy is explained by changes in the organizationalrelations of trade policy during the New Deal era. Thus, I focus on thepolitical influence of class forces surrounding the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Act (RTAA).

Most scholars agree that the New Deal period marked a majorrestructuring of the state-society relationship regarding domestic policy. Asa result, sociologists have written much about the 1930s economic crisisand subsequent attempts to resolve the crisis through domestic industrialand welfare policy. While providing important theoretical and empiricalinsights into this historical period, most sociological research on the NewDeal is limited to domestic policy to the exclusion or limitation of foreignpolicy (e.g., Levine 1988; Finegold and Skocpol 1995). Less well known orunderstood, but just as important, the New Deal included legislation thatdramatically altered the states organization of foreign trade and investmentpolicy and, as a result, affected the relationship between state managersand social movement organizations in the foreign policy arena. Becauseof the lack of research into this topic, we know little about the nature ofNew Deal organizational changes on trade policy and even less about theeconomic and political forces that produced them.

Of the limited research addressing foreign policy components of theNew Deal, most scholars pursue a statist objective that leads them to ignoreclass forces (e.g., Haggard 1988; Goldstein 1993). By producing a detailedanalysis of the political origins of the RTAA, I hope to shed light onthe political-organizational origins of contemporary class embedded tradepolicy. I examine the political struggles leading to the 1934 ReciprocalTrade Agreements Act and analyze the effects of class forces in thatstruggle.

The RTAA is a pivotal act in the history of U.S. trade policy.In fact, most trade analysts identify the shift in trade policy powerfrom Congress to the executive branch [occurring during the NewDeal] as the single most important change in the institutional history


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of U.S. trade policy (Rhodes 1993:53). American financial capitalistsand some members of the Roosevelt administration viewed trade policyexpansion as the most important New Deal legislation and the key todomestic (and world) economic recovery. Influenced by the internationaleconomic crisis of the Great Depression and the increasing power ofinternationally oriented American financial capitalists, the RTAA alteredthe organizational structure of the state by rationalizing decision makingover trade policy. New Deal trade policy is an important research topic tosociologists given the above issue and for at least two other reasons. First,organizational changes contained in New Deal policy changed the tradepolicy process, thus affecting the nature of the state-society relationship forthe rest of the century. In response to shifting relations among capitalistsegments and the economic crisis of the Great Depression, this Act createdmajor changes in the organization of trade policy within the state. Withits passage of the RTAA, Congress relinquished control over trade policyto the Executive Branch. Originally proposed and passed as a temporarymeasure to aid the state in dealing with the economic crisis, ExecutiveBranch authority over trade policy continued after the New Deal andbecame the dominant institutional structure characterizing the relationshipbetween capital segments and the state in the post-WWII trade policyarena. Thus, any sociological understanding of current politics of domestictrade policy (e.g., Dreiling 2000) relies on an historical awareness of thepolitics of trade during the New Deal period.

Second, it was partly through this policy that the internationalistbusiness segment established its hegemony within the U.S. state and globaleconomy. While not unconstrained, the institutional relationship betweenthe internationalist business segment and the Executive Branch establishedby the RTAA played an important role in the creation of the GeneralAgreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the overall expansion ofU.S. foreign policy during the post-WWII era.

In this research, I analyze archival documents in order to examinethe role that capitalist groups played in the creation of New Deal tradepolicy. First, I examine the historical environment preceding the New Dealera. Specifically, I discuss the growth of an internationalist segment ofAmerican capital oriented toward foreign trade expansion, alongside acongressionally entrenched and powerful nationalist segment. Second, Iexamine the evolution of foreign trade policy as a major New Deal policyaimed at ending the capital accumulation crisis of the Great Depression.I trace the early development of foreign trade policy initiatives to capitalistswithin the internationalist segment and examine the relationship betweenthis segment and state managers within the Executive Branch. Third,I focus on the role of the powerful nationalist segment in limiting New Deal


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trade policy and the effects of this segment, especially within Congress, onthe policy process. Lastly, I examine the trade policy outcome (i.e., RTAA)as an attempt by the state to mediate the conflict over foreign trade policybetween the internationalist and nationalist capitalist segments.

Theory

State Autonomy Approach

The dominant model of American foreign policy is one of an autonomousstate. While social scientists tend to characterize the American state asa relatively weak state in other policy arenas, they point to foreignpolicy as the one exception (Krasner 1978:75). For example, Feingold andSkocpol have argued that while the US bureaucracy tends to be weak,this generalization does not fit American foreign policy branches that arecharacterized by persistent traditions of independent and effective action.(1995:53).

The autonomy of American foreign policy vis--vis domestic policy isrooted in the organization of decision making across state structures (Kras-ner 1978:55-90). State autonomy research contends that Congressional de-cision making is more open to and dependent on the influence of specificsocietal groups. In contrast, decisions within the Executive Branch reflectthe lack of dependency of this branch on specific societal groups (Krasner1978:75, 86). With the autonomy that the Executive Branch instills fromspecific societal groups, Executive Branch officials are able to overcomeforeign policy disagreements between businesses (or other conflict groups)in order to arrive at policies that reflect the collective interests of the nation(i.e., national interest).

Further, most state-centered researchers view the New Deal as animportant juncture in the rationalization of trade-policy decision-making.State-centered researchers argue that Congress was increasingly burdenedby the complexity of the international and domestic economic environmentduring the New Deal. As a result, state managers developed a programto rationalize foreign policy decision-making by shifting the locus of theconceptualization of trade policy to the bureaucratic structures of theExecutive branch. Proponents of New Deal trade policy rationalizationargued that, like other forms of bureaucratization (see Beetham 1987:60),shifting decision making to the Executive Branch would increase thestates ability to coordinate action over a large geographic area andwould lead to a continuity of operations within foreign policy. Mostimportantly, rationalization of trade policy would end the influence ofspecific businesses or business sectors because the Executive Branch wouldoperate autonomously from these demands.



Feingold and Skocpol (1995:53) argue that state autonomy oftenemerges in the circumstances of particularly critical periods. This holdsspecific significance for my present study because state-centered researchersoften look to the economic crisis of the Great Depression and the resultingpolitical crisis of the New Deal as historical evidence of increasing stateautonomy. Along these lines, Krasner (1978:87) uses the 1934 ReciprocalTrade Agreement as his primary example of the shift toward stateautonomy during the New Deal. Krasner argues that as a result of theGreat Depression, political leaders developed new visions concerningforeign policy and the national interest (1978:87). These new visions ledto changes in the organization of foreign policy decision-making and tochanges in the relative influence of political groups in the trade policyprocess (Krasner 1978:87). Under Congressional decision-making, foreigntrade policy reflected the multiple and contradictory demands of specificindustries and businesses. Following the 1934 RTAA, however, foreigntrade policy was established by the Executive Branch and, thus, reflectedthe national interests.

State-centered research provides much insight into the sociology ofNew Deal trade policy by focusing on individual state managers andorganizational structures within the state and their impact on decisionmaking. However, this research tends to overlook evidence pointing to theinfluence of business and other groups in state policy making during thetime period.

Class Dominance Approach

While recent sociological research (Dreiling 2000) has shed light on theclass-embedded nature of contemporary trade policies such as the NAFTA,there exists little research into the precise nature of class conflict andbusiness influence over New Deal trade policy. While hypothesizing thatclass forces played an important role in New Deal trade policy, classdominance theorists have stopped short of documenting this influence(e.g., Domhoff 1990:210; Freiden 1988). As Domhoff (1990:210) has noted,Although there is no detailed study of the involvement of private groupsin the creation of the Reciprocal Trade Act, there is evidence thatinternationalist business leaders enthusiastically supported the Act.

Recent improvements in the class dominance approach may provide amore detailed and complete understanding of trade policy by focusing onthe intersection of state institutions and business power. This class embed-dedness model of political sociology focuses on the precise relationshipsbetween actors and organizational structures within the state and power-ful non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attempting to influence statepolicy. The class embeddedness model (see Domhoff 1990; Prechel 1990;


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Akard 1996; Skidmore & Glasberg 1996; Dreiling 2000) moves beyond thestate-society dichotomy by focusing specifically on the processes throughwhich class relations become embedded in state organizational structures.

Thus, while the state-centered model explains New Deal trade policyas a reflection of political-organizational forces within the state, the class-embeddedness model shows that organizational structures within the stateare important not because they ensure state autonomy as state-centeredarguments suggest (Skocpol 1980, 1985), but rather because they providethe means for . . . class segment[s] to exercise control over the state(Prechel 1990:664). The present study expands upon this later point byfocusing on the historical convergence of class forces and their role in thecreation of state structures that facilitate business interest in trade policy.

Domestic Trade Politics: Historical Background

Between World War I and World War II a new class segment emergedamong American capitalists (Freiden 1988). This class segment, aligned to-ward international trade and investment, significantly altered the domesticpolitics of trade policy. Trade-policy politics became characterized by con-flict between two capitalist class segments: (1) an internationalist segmentoriented toward expanding foreign trade and investment and (2) a nation-alist segment that, while not expressly opposed to foreign trade, desired toprotect the U.S. market from foreign products when these products threat-ened domestic industry (Domhoff 1970). It is within this environment ofemerging class conflict between capitalist segments that major trade pol-icy changes were formulated and eventually implemented within the U.S.state. These changes in trade policy represent one component in a largereffort by both business and the state to expand capital accumulation duringthe New Deal period (see Levine 1988).

World War I marked the beginning of the United States as the worldskey supplier of foreign capital. 1 While European bankers had dominatedforeign financial markets before the war, WWI eroded their ability toprovide investment capital both to their domestic industries and to foreignnations. As a result, while some U.S. companies were heavily involvedin foreign markets before this period, foreign dependency on U.S. capitalgreatly expanded during and following WWI (Block 1977a:12-31; Arrighi

1 Although an internationalist segment had existed among American capitalists since thebeginning of the nation, it was not until World War I that this group consolidated its powerover foreign markets and, thus, increased its political power over the state. Before the war,European capital dominated international investment markets mostly through a system ofcolonial rule. The hegemony of European capital thus limited the ability of Americancapital investments to expand before World War I.



et al. 1999). The most prominent organization assembled by Americancapitalists to expand U.S. financial interest abroad was the AmericanInternational Corporation (AIC). National City Bank founded the AIC in1915 and controlled the organization through fifty-percent stock ownership.However, many prominent American businesses were also involved inproviding capital for and directing the organization, including GeneralElectric, Great Northern Railway, W.R. Grace & Co., International Nickel,the Rockefeller family, Westinghouse Electric, and AT&T, among others. 2

In founding the AIC, Frank Vanderlip, President of National City Bank,declared, We have the opportunity now to become the wellspring ofcapital for the world. Anxious hands are reaching towards the U.S. fromevery corner (cited in Scheiber 1969:500).

Besides banking, large American industrial corporations also expandedtheir foreign investments during the 1920s. 3 By 1929, American miningand petroleum producers had nearly eighteen percent of their fixed capitalinvestments in the form of foreign direct investment. Similarly, automobileproducers held almost fifteen percent of their assets in foreign directinvestments (Freiden 1988:65).

The expansion of American overseas investment and loans during WWIgreatly influenced the trade policy process. Conflict over trade policybetween capitalist segments dramatically increased. Because of their loansand investments in Europe, U.S. international financiers desired expandedforeign trade. In order for foreign countries to gain the dollars they neededto repay their loans to U.S. investors, foreign corporations would needincreased exports to the U.S. market. As a result, capitalists within theAmerican financial segment were more concerned with lowering Americantariffs on imports from foreign countries than they were with loweringforeign tariffs on American produced goods. As Dwight Morrow of J.P.Morgan & Company explained:

I believe that the exports from the United States to Europe must graduallydiminish and the imports from Europe must increase. . . At a time when weare complaining of the high cost of living we should welcome an increase ofour imports of those things that Europe can make for US better than we can

2 Other individuals, corporations, and/or organizations supporting or investing inthe AIC include: U.S. Steel; National Foreign Trade Council; Berwind-White MiningCompany; Secretary of Commerce, William Redfield; Herbert Hoover, Director Generalof Relief for Europe; Assistant Secretary of Treasury, Norman Davis, bankers Otto Kahnand Paul M. Warburg, among others (Wilson 1971).

3 One factor, among many, in the expansion of foreign direct investment by Americanmultinational industrial-sector corporations was the ability to circumvent existing tariffbarriers by locating production facilities overseas (Freiden 1988:65).


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make them for ourselves. (New York Times Oct. 24, 1919, cited in Abrahams1969:580).

However, the expansion into foreign markets was not equally distributedacross all industries. By the end of this historical period (i.e., 1914-1929),most American companies had little or no stake in the internationaleconomy. With the exception of automobile, electrical appliance, rubberand chemical producers, most American manufacturers produced only forthe domestic market (see Freiden 1988). Because of their limited foreigninvestments, the nationalist segment of American capital pressured thestate to restrict foreign trade, especially during economic recessions whenincreasing European competition with American goods were pointed to asthe cause of stagnation for domestic industrial producers.

The end result of the expansion of U.S. loans, foreign direct invest-ments, and trade to foreign countries between the WWI and 1929 periodwas a strengthened gap between a newly formed internationalist segmentand an established and powerful nationalist segment of American business.Composed of American based multinational manufacturing and financialcorporations supplying capital to foreign countries, the internationalist seg-ment pressed for the liberalization of U.S. foreign policy in order to pro-tect and/or expand their interests abroad. Alternatively, those domesticbusiness organizations without significant international operations or thosedependent on domestic markets (e.g., steel, foodstuffs, and rubber) desiredforeign policy designed to protect their interests from foreign competition.These two groups defined the political debate over trade policy during the1930s.

The Smoot-Hawley Act

What began as a political move in Congress to aid weakened domesticagricultural producers in the mid-1920s quickly expanded to encompassmost business segments, as capital accumulation diminished following thestock market crash of 1929. One of the first responses of capitalists withinthe nationalist segment was to propose an expansion of the protectionistagricultural tariff policy to other economic sectors as an effort to shoreup the increasingly volatile domestic economy. Because Congress hadbeen revising tariff policy for agriculture, Congressional representativesand nationalist business organizations saw the evolving tariff policy as achance to tack on relief for their industries as well. Thus, what began as arather minor policy goal aimed at promoting capital accumulation in onesegment (i.e., agriculture) evolved into the most infamous trade policy inU.S. history, the Smoot-Hawley Act. The policy process encompassing thepassage of this act is referred to as a favorite case in pressure-politics (seeSchattschneider 1935).



Capitalists from across the nationalist segment mobilized in support oftariff increases, and many participated directly in Congressional hearingson the Smoot-Hawley Act. In contrast, the internationalist segmentopposed the Smoot-Hawley Act because, as they explained, tariff barriersat home did not accord with Americas postwar creditor position, wouldnot facilitate repayment of debts owed the United States, and did notencourage the expansion of foreign markets (Wilson 1971:80). However,despite their growing power in international markets after WWI, at thishistorical juncture the internationalist segment was still relatively weakin comparison to domestic industry composing the nationalist segment(Freiden 1988).

Through the concerted political efforts of individual corporations andtrade organizations in the nationalist segment (e.g., American TariffLeague), the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill amended tariff rates on overtwenty thousand items, almost all of them increases (Pastor 1980:77-78). Despite protests from domestic importers, American corporations withforeign interests, and the American banking industry, Congress passedthe Smoot-Hawley Bill in June 1930. Following the same foreign policyprescriptions as the Smoot-Hawley Act (and somewhat in reaction to thepolicy), other nations enacted similar protectionist trade policy provisions.International trade restrictions combined with world economic declines tosharply reduce trade flows in the early 1930s. U.S. exports declined from$5.4 billion in 1929 to $1.6 billion in 1932 (Ratner 1972:54). The Leagueof Nations reported that the total volume of goods exchanged between[world] countries has diminished by about thirty percent in comparisonwith 1929 (Ratner 1972:54). Whether seen as a cause or consequence,foreign trade policy played an important role in the economic crisis of theGreat Depression.

Class Politics and the Making of New Deal Trade Policy

Nationalists Continue to Press for Protection

Throughout the Depression, nationalist organizations with long-standingpolitical power within Congress continued their pressure on state officialsfor trade protection. The same businesses had played an instrumental rolein the establishment of the protective Smoot-Hawley Act. The increasingseverity of the Great Depression only increased this segments resolve toprotect its industries from foreign competition. The nationalist segmentcontinued its political pressure against free trade by mobilizing throughcollective organizations such as the National Association of Manufacturers(NAM). At this time, the members of both the U.S. Chamber of Commerceand the NAM were wrestling over the internationalist/nationalist conflict


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(Wilson 1971:75-6). However, with their membership historically tied toindustrial corporations (Levine 1988) these organizations continued tooppose global trade expansion at this historical juncture. H.L. Derby,chair of the tariff committee of the NAM, responded to the internationalistsegments demand for trade expansion by explaining that the NAM wasunilaterally opposed to any renewal of tariff tinkering in Congress (NewYork Times, May 11, 1931:36). The NAM explained:

In the past a high tariff has not prevented the importation of foreign goods,but a protective tariff does have the result of raising the standard of livingof American workmen and the resulting purchasing power in turn alwaysresults in increased importation. The flexible provisions of the 1930 TariffAct constitute a forward step in tariff administration which the nation cannotsurrender without setting the industrial progress of the nation back many years.(Letter reprinted in the New York Times, May 11, 1931:36)

In December of 1931, the NAM came out again openly opposed to tariffreductions. The organization attacked proposals for tariff reductions asabsurd and unthinkable (New York Times, Dec. 7, 1931).

The Internationalist Segment and the New Deal

By the early 1930s, the political effectiveness of the internationalist segmentbegan to increase at the same time that their ties to the state werefurther entrenched. These events, coupled with Roosevelts appointmentof outspoken free-trader Cordell Hull as Secretary of State, became crucialfactors affecting trade policy during the New Deal period. While manycapitalists originally argued that the economic downturns were temporaryand required little, if any, state intervention, by 1931 business organizationsbegan pressuring the state to develop policies to restore conditions to ensurean adequate rate of capital accumulation.

In May of 1931, capitalists from the internationalist segment mobilizedpolitically in an effort to cut tariffs and stimulate capital accumulation.The Council for Tariff Reductions was formed by a group of prominentmanufacturers, economists and lawyers in an effort to politically mobilizethe capitalist class toward trade expansion (New York Times, May 7,1931:1). Further, both the National Association of American Importers andExporters and the American Importers and Exporters Association calledfor Congress to hold a special session wholly devoted to tariff cuts (NewYork Times, May 31, 1931:Sect II, p. 11).

In December of 1931, the American Exporters and Importers Associ-ation drew up their proposal for trade expansion. Their plan was basedon the expansion of domestic capital accumulation through the absorptionof surplus production by expanding foreign markets. The group proposedthat the quickest and safest way to advance this policy was to move the



trade policy process from Congress to the Executive Branch. Only in theExecutive Branch could foreign policy operate in the national interest,as the President would be isolated from the influence of special interestgroups plaguing Congressional policy making. Joseph Allen, representativeof the association, explained:

It is useless to expect any remedial action through . . . [Congress]. The minutesuch a move is started groups representing special interests will wheel intoaction. A long-drawn-out battle with no conclusive results will ensue. On theother hand, a bill authorizing the President to negotiate special tariff treaties,subject to ratification by Congress, stands a good chance of passing. Someplan must be worked out quickly if huge surpluses, proving important factorsin blocking resumption of normal business, are to be sold in internationalmarkets. [The surplus production] must be sold abroad in the near future ifbusiness is to revive. It cant be marketed now because most nations incensedat our tariff policy, have erected trade barriers against us. (New York Times,December 20, 1931:19)

The National Foreign Trade Council, the National Automobile Chamberof Commerce, the American Manufacturers Export Association, andthe Foreign Commerce Club of New York each issued statements ofsupport for the reciprocal tariff policy (New York Times, July 27, 31 andOct 20, 1932). Organized in 1914, the National Foreign Trade Council(NFTC) was one of the most important organizations influencing theExecutive Branchs New Deal monetary and trade policy. During theWilson Administration, the NFTCs close connections to Secretary ofCommerce William Redfield had made it the nations most influentialassociation for trade promotion (Kaufman 1971:350). 4

Internationalist Influence and the Roosevelt Administration

In response to pressure from the internationalist segment, the ExecutiveBranch began exploring ways to stimulate capital accumulation whilemediating conflict over trade policy between the internationalist andnationalist segments of capital. The Roosevelt Administration concentratedinitially on domestic policy responses to the economy. Early on, theconflict over national versus international interests was embedded withinthe Administration. During the First One Hundred Days, the RooseveltAdministrations solution to the Great Depression came in the formof the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the AgricultureAdjustment Act (AAA). Both of these acts were aimed at improvingthe domestic economy by means of strict state control over domestic

4 Prior to serving as Secretary of Commerce for Wilson, Redfield was the past presidentof the American Manufacturers Export Association (Whoss Who in America 1932:1910).


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production. Neither act reflected the interests of internationalist businessgroups. However, as the internationalist segment increased pressure on thestate to expand trade, the network of relationships between the Rooseveltadministration and important capitalists within the internationalist segmentbecame increasingly evident, and President Roosevelt himself gravitatedtoward his Secretary of State for trade policy provisions. 5

Prior to entering office, Roosevelt selected Senator Cordell Hull to bethe administrations Secretary of State. As a Congressional representativefrom Tennessee and as a Democratic Party official, Hull had been anoutspoken opponent of the Smoot-Hawley Act and believed that the actwas the primary factor leading to Americas economic crises. He hadlong rallied Congress for the expansion of free trade and believed thatits expansion would lead to both economic prosperity and internationalpeace. 6 The Democratic Party had long proposed trade expansion.However, outgunned by the economic and political strength of domesticindustrialists, Democrats were limited in their efforts by the ties of domesticindustrialist to the Republican Party. For this reason, US trade policyveered toward sector specific protection, especially during periods ofcontractions in capital accumulation (e.g., Smoot-Hawley Act).

The political strength of Democrats changed during the New Dealperiod not only because domestic industrialists lost political power overthe state as their profits declined (Block 1977b), but also because ofthe important links that the Roosevelt Administration (and especiallyHull) forged with the increasingly powerful financial capitalists. As aDemocratic Senator from the rural South and Chair of the DemocraticNational Committee, Hull epitomized the Democratic Partys stancetoward expanded world trade. However, Hulls stance in support of freetrade went well beyond his personal convictions. Also important was theSecretary of States strong personal ties to members of the increasinglypowerful internationalist segment of American business.

Perhaps the most indicative and politically important of the extensivenetwork between internationalists and the Roosevelt Administration wasHulls connection to Norman H. Davis, the influential New York bankerand soon-to-be President of the Council on Foreign Relations. In fact, itwas Norman H. Davis who urged Hull to take the Secretary of State post

5 For accounts of the national/international split within the early Roosevelt adminis-tration and the processes through which the internationalists became entrenched, see thepersonal accounts of Secretary of State, Hull (Memoirs), and the AAA administrator, GeorgePeek (1936).

6 Interestingly, Cordell Hulls free-trade philosophy was spurred partially by his readingof the works of the famous sociologist William Graham Sumner (Hull 1948:147).



after being offered it by Roosevelt (Hull 1948:157). 7 Norman Davis wasa fellow Tennessean and Secretary of State Hull counted him as one ofhis closest friends (Hull 1948:157). He reports that Norman Davis hadfrequent and thorough access to and influence over the Administrationsforeign policy agendas and meetings. In fact, the Administration sentDavis as a U.S. representative to the organizing committee of the LondonEconomic Conference in 1933, where he and Hull, with the Presidentsconcurrence, proposed a temporary tariff truce among all member nations(Hull 1948:249). More than any other single capitalist, it appears thatNorman Davis had significant influence over the Administrations tradepolicy proposals. In his Memoirs, Hull explains that,

He [Norman Davis] would come in on any conference I was having . . . andshed some light upon it. He came and went in that fashion. He would pushthe door open, see whether I was engaged, and in ordinary proceedings wouldalways come in. He occupied a unique position, was a great help, never foran instant gave away a secret, and could be sent anywhere. (Hull 1948:224)

Borrowing heavily from the recommendations of the American Importersand Exporters Association and the National Foreign Trade Council, inJune of 1932, Hull publicly announced that trade expansion was a goal ofthe Presidents New Deal program. However, he explained that this goalcould only take place if the Executive Branch was given authority fromCongress on trade issues. Hull expressed the idea that once the ExecutiveBranch had such authority,

[t]he New Congress and the President would then cooperate within theirrespective functions in the combined task of lowering customs duties andestablishing liberal commercial policy. The President on his part wouldnegotiate tentative reciprocal or bargaining arrangements or agreements fortariff concessions or reductions, both general and special. (New York Times,June 2, 1931:27)

Under the U.S. Constitution, American foreign-trade policy was originallystructured such that Congress would authorize custom duties and theExecutive Branch would make foreign treaties with the advice andconsent of Congress (Eckes 1995). Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution

7 Norman H. Davis had a long history of ties to the state and was, perhaps, the mostimportant financial capitalist with ties to the state in the post-war Era. After organizingand serving as President of The Trust Co. of Cuba, in 1917 he became advisor to theTreasury Department. He later served in the Wilson Administration as Financial Advisor,Under-Secretary of State, Delegate to the League of Nations, and a Delegate to the 1927and 1932 Economic and Disarmament Conferences in Geneva, Switzerland (Whos Who inAmerica 1932:666).


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grants Congress direct responsibility over the content of bilateral andmultilateral trade agreements (Audley 1997:25). Any treaty negotiated bythe Executive Branch would have to be approved by the Senate, and onlyCongress could adjust tariff rates (Eckes 1995:10).

Prior to New Deal legislation, the Executive-Congressional relationshipon trade policy was conducted as set out in the Constitution. The Presidentcould (and often did) make recommendations to Congress and could meetwith other nations regarding foreign trade. However, exchanges betweenbusiness organizations and the state took place through Congressionalrepresentatives and public hearings by Congressional committees, asexemplified by the Smoot-Hawley Act. In the end, all tariff changes camedown to a final vote in the House and Senate.

At their national meeting on April 27, 1933, the National Foreign TradeCouncil developed a report entitled Essential Principles and Mechanisms fora Reciprocal Tariff Program. The thrust of this framework included majorchanges to be made in the organization of trade policy. The Councilproposed that Congress grant to the Executive Branch the authority tomake trade policy decisions and that these decisions become law withoutthe prior ratification of Congress. Further, the Council proposed that theExecutive Branch trade policy be based on both the most favored nationrule and take place as reciprocal agreements between two or more nations.As the Councils report explained:

History shows very few cases of successful outcome when reciprocal tarifftreaties required Congressional ratification. Moreover, with such powerdefinitely delegated to the executive branch of government, the President orhis representatives would be in a much stronger position in negotiations withforeign governments. . . Finally, this method would avoid the frequent openingup of the tariff issue in Congress with every reciprocal treaty negotiated andthe danger of conflict of local tariff interests submerging the broader nationalinterests by which the executive branch of the government would presumablybe guided in its treaty negotiation. (New York Times, April 16, 1933, Sec2:15)

Thus, the National Foreign Trade Council wished to promote internationaltrade as a remedy to the depression and pressured the state towards thisagenda. Further, the organization promoted the idea that, in order foreffective trade expansion to take place, a reorganization of the trade policyprocesses was required. The trade policy process should be shifted fromCongress to the Executive Branch, wherein the broader national interestswould be considered.

While there had been numerous business organizations pressuring thestate for trade expansion in the early 1930s, there was no overarchingorganization to unify the internationalist segment. In September of 1933,capitalists from the internationalist segment combined their political efforts



towards trade expansion into one policy formation organization. GardnerHarding, secretary of the National Foreign Trade Council announced thatbeginning October 1, 1933, the Organization of the National Federation ofForeign Trade Associations (National Federation) would begin functioning.This new organization would unite existing organizations in order tomore effectively unify the internationalist segment around the trade agendaestablished by the National Foreign Trade Council (New York Times, Sept.11, 1933:32). One of the first actions of the National Federation wasto petition the State Department for the negotiation of reciprocal tradeagreements and the reduction of tariffs and secondary levies on U.S.exports abroad (New York Times, Oct. 15, 1933, II:15).

Business pressure on the Administration combined with Secretary ofState Hulls trade agenda to move the administration toward advancing thepace of the trade policy agenda within the state. In response, on November11, 1933, President Roosevelt appointed an Executive Committee onCommercial Policy to write a new tariff bill. The committees proposedmeasures represent one of the most important historical turning pointsin U.S. trade policy. Reflecting on the policy process that led tothe protectionist Smoot-Hawley Act, capitalists from the internationalistsegment combined efforts with Secretary of State Hull and others withinthe Roosevelt administration to identify the organization of trade-policydecision making as the most important block standing in the way of freetrade.

In accordance with the administrations New Deal framing of the tradeproblem, most historical sources describe the policy process surroundingthe Smoot-Hawley Act as exemplified by organizational inefficiency in theCongressional decision-making structure (see Schattschneider 1935). Thecollegial organization of Congress and the fact that business groups wereeasily able to use ties with Congressional representatives in their districts topressure them for trade protection led to the logrolling of Congressionaltrade policy. Once one corporation or industrial group received protection,other corporations pressured for their own protection, as illustrated by theSmoot-Hawley Bill.

The Roosevelt administration thus followed the rhetoric of the inter-nationalist segment by proposing that the aim of changes in the tradepolicy process was to overcome the inefficiencies in Congressional decision-making in order to ensure the national interests. From the internationalistsegment and the Administrations viewpoint, the only way to accomplishthis goal was to rationalize the organization of trade policy decision mak-ing. As was stated in the NFTCs report to the administration, this was theway that all other nations were advancing their economic interests, and itwas the only way for the United States to do the same.


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The Roosevelt proposal asked Congress to shift the trade-policy processto the Executive Branch (U.S. Congress, House 1934a). The administrationoutlined several reasons that Executive Branch authority was needed intrade policy (U.S. Congress, House 1934a). First, the decline in world tradesince 1929 was a major factor in the decline of the domestic economy. Thecontraction of world trade has meant idle hands, still machinery, shipstied to their docks, despairing farm households, and hungry industrialfamilies. Equally clear is the fact that a full and permanent domestic recoverydepends in part upon a revived and strengthened international trade (U.S. Congress,House 1934a:1, emphasis added). Second, the Administration argued thatAmerica risked being shut out of world markets if it did not quickly adoptreciprocal trade agreements. Other nations were increasing their shareof international trade through reciprocal trade agreements, and, withoutsimilar policies in the US, the government could not adequately protectUS economic interests (U.S. Congress, House 1934a).

Roosevelts trade policy proposal was responsive to the interests of theinternationalist capital segment. It was written to convey the sense thatthis shift in the organization of trade policy was meant as an emergencymeasure. Further, it was to be seen as one part of the larger recoveryprogram. The proposal stated that this was an emergency programnecessitated by the economic crisis and that in the execution of thisprogram the Executive must pay due heed to the requirements ofother branches of our recovery program, such as the National IndustrialRecovery Act (U.S. Congress, House 1934a). On March 2, 1934,President Roosevelt sent the proposal to Congress. With it, he explainedthat, [f]or this reason any smaller degree of authority in the handsof the Executive would be ineffective. The executive branches of allother important trading countries already possess some such power (U.S.Congress, House 1934a).

In summary, the Roosevelt administration was convinced by membersof the internationalist capital segment and the State Department that for-eign trade policy was directly linked to domestic economic recovery. Inter-nationalist business organizations had been pressuring the administrationtoward foreign-trade expansion prior to Roosevelts election. Further, theadministrations proposal to shift the trade-policy process to the Execu-tive Branch mirrored earlier proposals sent to the administration by theorganizations representing the internationalist segment. However, the ad-ministrations proposal for trade-negotiation authority was dependent uponCongressional ratification, and a powerful nationalist segment of Americanbusiness opposed such measures in Congress.



Congressional Mediation and the Relinquishment of TradeAuthority

The Congressional hearings surrounding the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Act differed dramatically from the Smoot-Hawley hearingsconducted only a few years earlier. First, far fewer business organizationsdirectly participated in the 1934 Congressional hearings. Further, theCongressional interaction with business groups included only two scheduledhearings, the first before the House Ways and Means Committee (March8-24, 1934) and the second before the Senate Finance Committee (April26-May 1, 1934).

During these limited Congressional hearings, the internationalist seg-ment combined with members of the Roosevelt administration (particularlySecretary of State Hull) to pressure Congress to support the RTAA. Themajor point articulated by the internationalist segment and the Adminis-tration was that the act was an emergency measure needed to stimulatedomestic capital accumulation. State Department officials combined withthe internationalist business segment to promote foreign trade as the keycause of the world wide economic downturn. Internationalist organizationsthus argued that by passing the Smoot-Hawley Act, Congress had con-strained foreign trade to such a limit that economic depression resulted.Therefore, if the contraction of foreign trade was a cause of the depres-sion, it followed that the expansion of foreign trade was a key factor instimulating domestic, as well as world, economic production.

In this way, the economic crisis of the Depression provided internation-alist business organizations with an opportunity to advance their economicinterests. Finding lack of foreign trade as the key factor in the domestic eco-nomic downturn allowed these groups to argue that their business interestswere aligned with the national interests. Further, aligning their interestswith the national interests allowed them to argue for a change in thetrade-policy procedures from Congress to the Executive Branch. As theyargued, it was the Congressional policy-making process that was the rootproblem and cause of the protectionist policies under the Smoot-HawleyAct. Thus, not only did the internationalist segment and the ExecutiveBranch assert that foreign trade expansion was needed for domestic eco-nomic recovery, they also asserted that a change in the location of thepolicy-making process from Congress to the Executive Branch was theonly method of politically ensuring foreign trade expansion.

Emergency Measures

Noting the severity of the Depression, Congress had already taken stepsto relegate to the President emergency controls over domestic and foreigneconomic policy provisions. Passed by Congress in June 1933, Section 3(e)


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of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) provided the Presidentwith the authority to control imports in an attempt to insulate the domesticeconomy from external markets. Following this logic, the Executive Branchas well as capitalists from the internationalist segment pressured Congressto provide the administration with the same emergency powers over alltrade policy provisions. Their strategy in gaining Executive authority wasto convince Congress that foreign trade policy was central to the recoveryof the domestic economy. Thus, Harry Tipper, Executive Vice Presidentof the American Manufacturers Export Association (AMEA), testified:

We [the AMEA] believe that it is of the utmost importance to this country,the final key to the recovery of our prosperity, and that it should be handledfor all the citizens of the country, examined from its capacity to produceemployment and income for the citizens. We believe that the Presidentand his advisors are in a particularly favorable position to deal with thesubject from this standpoint. . . [Further,] we believe that these matters canbe handled only when the executive is granted this authority. . . The supremeimportance of developing our foreign trade, to establish the recovery byproviding employment to our citizens, calls for the immediate action andwe, therefore, respectfully urge . . . the desirability of providing the Presidentwith these powers, so that he can proceed immediately with the completion ofnegotiations with other nations. (U.S. Congress, House 1934a:267)

Administrative officials and internationalist business organizations beforethe Senate Finance Committee hearings echoed the same sentiment. Forexample, the National Council of American Importers supported foreigntrade as emergency legislation aimed at ensuring domestic economicrecovery (U.S. Congress, Senate 1934:300).

In response to critics who noted that U.S. exports included onlyaround eight to twelve percent of total national economic output,the American Manufacturers Export Association provided even strongerarguments for the role of foreign trade expansion in domestic recovery.The organizations representative recognized the general accuracy of theminimal dollar amount of exports compared to the total domestic output.However, he went on to argue that the official statistics did not accuratelyreflect the significant impact of foreign trade on the nations economicviability:

Foreign trade is an integral part of [the nations] economic fabric [and, assuch,] it cannot be segregated from the commercial life of the Nation as awhole . . . it is of vital importance to every economic segment. [In summary,]if the foreign trade of the United States does not develop, but diminishes, theeconomic structure will bleed seriously, with the resulting waste of purchasingpower and lower standards of living. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1934:301)



Arguing before the Senate hearings on the bill, Secretary of State Hullexplained that the bill was meant as an emergency measure. Its support[in Congress] is only urged as an emergency measure to deal with adangerous and threatening emergency situation. It should be acted uponin that light (U.S. Congress, Senate 1934:5).

Unifying Capitalist Segments

While capitalists from the nationalist and internationalist segments werein disagreement over foreign trade expansion, both segments supportedefforts to reorganize the trade negotiation process. Both segments unifiedaround policies to provide the Executive Branch with trade negotiatingpower, although they disagreed on the scope of that power. For example,the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) argued that any appealsfor tariff reductions be sent to the Executive Branch and not to Congress.As the groups representatives explained, the Executive Branch providesan orderly and scientific procedure while Congressional trade policy isa return to a method of tariff making discarded by all the leading countriesof the world (New York Times, Dec. 7, 1931:A27).

However, the nationalist segment supported the change in trade policyprocess only to the extent that safeguards be placed within the ExecutiveBranch structure to ensure that their interests be represented in ExecutiveBranch negotiations. The first organization representing the nationalistsegment to provide testimony in the House hearings was the TariffCommittee of the NAM. The NAMs strategy in the Congressionalhearings was to ensure the continued protection of domestic industry. Indoing so, the organization directly confronted the internationalist segmentsinterpretation of the Depression. The NAM asserted that the Depressionwas decidedly a domestic issue and, as such, the state should focus ondomestic policy and the protection of domestic industry as the key toeconomic recovery. The NAM, however, fell short of publicly disagreeingwith the internationalist segments agenda to expand foreign trade. In fact,the organization ensured Congress that it promoted the general ideals offree trade, but only so much as the nationalist segment was protectedfrom foreign competition. Summarizing the NAMs stance, Mr. Emerystated to the House that the organization asserts particularly at thepresent time the necessity of maintaining reasonable methods of protectionswhere demonstrable foreign competition adversely threatens Americanindustries and their capacity for employment. Our major depressional problemsare emphatically domestic, and should receive our major attention (U.S. Congress,House 1934b:395, emphasis added).

NAMs representative, James Emery, noted that the NAM tariff com-mittee had been engaged in the study of the bill since its inception (U.S.


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Congress, House 1934a:393). Mr. Emery expressed that the ExecutiveBranch could negotiate policies with foreign nations, but these negotia-tions should then go to Congress for final approval. Mr. Emery explained:

[The NAM] believes he [the president] should be authorized to negotiate anytrade agreement that may advance the foreign commerce of the U.S., . . . but itcan not believe, however, that the President should be authorized to concludeagreements as are here proposed and make them effective without referenceto Congress, (a) because it doubts it to be a valid exercise of what it believesis a treaty-making power and (b) because the industries affected should haveknowledge of proposals vitally affecting not only their employing capacity, butperhaps their very existence. (U.S. Congress, House 1934a:395)

The NAM insisted that any policy to shift trade authority to theExecutive Branch should (1) include provisions requiring Congressionalapproval (as outlined above); (2) be limited in time; and (3) ensurethe protection of domestic industry. Using the internationalist segmentsargument concerning the crisis condition of the domestic economy,capitalists from the nationalist segment argued that, because of the natureof the crisis, definite time limits should be placed on any trade treatiesmade during this crisis. They argued that the instability of world marketsrequired that the U.S. not make long-term commitments in trade policy.Rapid changes in the world economy may from time to time createcircumstances necessitating the termination of agreements upon due butfairly short notice (U.S. Congress, House 1934a).

The Chamber of Commerce (COC) also pressured Congress for theprotection of nationalist segments of capital. James Farrell, representingthe Foreign Commerce Committee of the COC, testified before the Waysand Means Committee and called upon Congress to adopt the presidentsproposal. Like the NAM, the COC wanted to convey the sense that itsupported the change in the trade process, while at the same time ensuringnationalist protection. Thus, in May of 1933, the COC voted in favor ofreciprocal trade agreements (U.S. Congress, House 1934b:505). However,in their approval of the RTAA, the COC insisted that the first principleof any U.S. trade policy should be reasonable protection for Americanindustries subject to destructive competition from abroad. . . This, we thinkshould be the first consideration. Reciprocal tariff negotiations should besecondary to it (U.S. Congress, House 1934b:507).

In light of these reservations, the COC asserted the importance ofCongress establishing detailed provisions defining the process of trade-policy formation within the Executive branch. The most importantprovision from the COCs perspective was for Congress to ensure thatnationalist industry always hold a role in the trade policy process. As Mr.Farrell, representative of the COC, stated:



A feature of the pending bill which will, I am sure, meet with opposition on thepart of American industry is the failure of the bill to provide ample opportunityfor hearings and investigation. It has long been recognized as fair playthat both the American producer and the foreign producer have a chance topresent facts bearing upon tariff changes. It is part of our procedure under theNational Recovery Act. I would recommend therefore that adequate provisionsbe made in this legislation for hearings and investigation in connection withcontemplated changes under reciprocal agreements. (U.S. Congress, House1934b:509)

In summary, the nationalist capital segment mobilized pressure onCongress to ensure that they would continue to be an active participant inthe formation of trade policies. Neither the COC nor the NAM directlyresisted the internationalist capital segments agenda to change the tradepolicy process to the Executive Branch. However, the nationalist segmentssupport for the RTAA was contingent upon ensuring that the ExecutiveBranch process offer continued protection from foreign competition fornationalist industry.

The Policy Process and the Mediation of Class Conflict

Both branches of Congress were persuaded by the demands of thenationalist segment that safeguards be placed within Executive-Branchpolicy making in order to ensure protection of domestic industry. Whileaccepting the internationalist segments proposal of Executive-Branchauthority, both the House and the Senate made important amendmentsto the final bill that reflected the nationalist segments demands (U.S.Congress, House 1934a,b; Senate 1934).

First, under the RTAA the authority of the President to enter intoforeign trade agreements . . . shall terminate on the expiration of three yearsfrom the date of the enactment (U.S. Congress, Senate 1934). Like otheraspects of New Deal economic planning, Congressional representativesoriginally viewed the RTAA as an emergency measure designed tostimulate economic expansion during the Great Depression and not along-term course of action. Second, the President would be restricted tonegotiations that would decrease existing tariff rates up to 50 percentof existing rates. Further, he could not transfer any article between thedutiable and free lists (U.S. Congress, Senate 1934). Third, the Presidentwould have to seek public advice as to any trade policy the administrationwould enter into. However, this rule was the least specific and left theExecutive Branch with great latitude concerning Congressionally mandatedpublic input into the negotiation process. In general, the rule requiredthe President before any foreign trade agreement is concluded providereasonable public notice . . . such that any interested person may have an


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opportunity to present his views to the Executive Branch (U.S. Congress,Senate 1934).

Thus, with the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement, the ExecutiveBranch and capitalists from the rising internationalist segment weresuccessful in their efforts to fundamentally alter the basis of the American-foreign-trade-policy process. Aware of the economic crisis of the Depressionand the impending political crisis of the state, Congress provided theExecutive Branch with the ability to negotiate expansionary trade policyagreements. However, the continued power of the nationalist segmentof American capital was apparent in Congressional attempts to curbExecutive Branch trade authority. From the wording of the bill, it isclear that Congress saw the RTAA as a temporary measure aimedat domestic economic recovery. In support of this conclusion Section350 of the final act states: This Act is for the purpose of expandingforeign markets for the products of the United States (as a means ofassisting in the present emergency in restoring the American standard ofliving, in overcoming domestic unemployment and the present economicdepression. . .) (U.S. Congress, Senate 1934). Congress approved theReciprocal Trade Agreements Act on June 12, 1934.

Discussion and Conclusions

Summarizing the debate over trade expansion during the New Deal, wefind the existence of a small but increasingly influential internationalistsegment of the capitalist class. The shifting capitalist class structurebrought about by the ascension of the internationalist business segmentopened up new areas of class conflict and affected political alliancesover trade policy. As the Great Depression persisted, the capitalist classincreased its pressure on the state to stimulate capital accumulation byestablishing new organizational arrangements to govern trade policy. Whilethe internationalist and nationalist segments disagreed over whether tradepolicy should be protectionist or expansionary, at this historical juncture,they agreed on the issue of changes in the trade policy decision makingstructure. Despite the concerns of the nationalist capital segment over theirability to influence Executive-Branch policy making, both segments of thecapitalist class were successful in their combined efforts to change theinstitutional arena within which trade policy was formulated from Congressto the Executive Branch.

This research bolsters support for the class embeddedness perspectiveof trade policy as portrayed in the works of Domhoff (1990), Prechel(1990) and Dreiling (2000). In opposition to studies that depict theAmerican foreign trade policy process as dominated by state institutionsand important state managers (e.g., Lake 1988, Goldstein 1993), class



embeddedness research indicates that powerful business groups have hadmajor influences on foreign trade policy. During the New Deal period,both internationalist and nationalist capital segments viewed foreign tradepolicy as a significant issue surrounding the economic crisis of the GreatDepression and pressured the state to change the trade policy process.State managers (e.g., Cordell Hull, Roosevelt) played an important role inits formulation. However, in contrast to studies that depict the RTAA assingularly constructed and pushed through Congress by Secretary of StateHull (e.g. Cohen 1994) or as caused by institutional constraints of the state,I find that political pressure from internationalist and nationalist businessorganizations (e.g., National Foreign Trade Council, National Associationof Manufacturers) as well as individual members of those class segments(e.g., Norman Davis) played a key role in the formulation and passage ofNew Deal trade policy.

While both nationalist and internationalist capital segments weredivided over trade expansion, in the end, the Congress mediated thesedifferences, and both segments supported moving the trade policy processto the Executive Branch. Nationalist support for these changes, however,was tied to Congressional oversight of Executive Branch policies, some ofwhich were included in the RTAA, although in a limited way. The tradepolicy outcome (i.e., the RTAA) mediated business conflict. Further, theRTAA provided legitimation for the organizational change in trade policy.State managers as well as nationalist and internationalist business segmentsportrayed the changes in the trade-policy process as ones reflectingincreased efficiency and rationality in decision making. In this way, thestate could ensure legitimacy by arguing that the changes in organizationalstructure of the state were meant to ensure that trade policy operates inthe national interests.

Most importantly, The 1934 RTAA changed the organization of tradepolicy within the state. While trade policy had historically (and according tothe Constitution) been the authority of Congress, with the RTAA, Congressconceded this authority to the Executive Branch. These changes are crucialfactors in understanding the politics of U.S. trade policy since the NewDeal. The contemporary class embeddedness surrounding the NAFTA andother recent trade policies has evolved historically from the class politicsand resulting emergency trade measures of the New Deal period. Oneneed only to look at the present debate over global trade expansion andfast-track trade promotion authority to recognize the historical significanceof the 1934 RTAA.

In conclusion, what sociologists can learn from an understandingof New Deal trade politics may play a vital role in explaining thehistorical processes through which trade policy became embedded with


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class interests. Further, these embedded class interests have an impacton the policy processes and economic effects of future trade policydevelopments, such as the NAFTA (Dreiling 2000) and other recent tradepolicy initiatives (e.g. Free Trade of the Americas).

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6 Capitalist Class Relations, The State, And New Deal Foreign Trade Policy

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