55 - Archive of European Integrationaei.pitt.edu/69672/1/pw_55_ang_late_putin_net.pdf · an...
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55
Marek Menkiszak (ed.)
Late Putinthe end of growth, the end of stability
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NUMBER 55WARSAWOCTOBER 2015
Late PutinThE ENd Of gROWTh, ThE ENd Of STABiliTy
Text prepared by the Russian department of OSW under the direction of Marek Menkiszak
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© Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies
Content editorsOlaf Osica, Adam Eberhardt
EditorKatarzyna Kazimierska
Co-operationhalina Kowalczyk, Anna Łabuszewska
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Contents
SUMMARy /5
iNTROdUCTiON /8
I. PUTiNiSM: SUCCESSivE STAgES Of AUThORiTARiANiSM /11
II. A SOCiETy Of OBSERvERS – ThE fACTOR ThAT KEEPS ThE REgiME TOgEThER /23
III. ThE OUTlOOK fOR ThE fUTURE – ChANgE Of ThE lEAdERShiP OR ThE SySTEM? /31
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Summary
• SinceVladimirPutinreturnedtotheKremlinasPresidentinMay2012,theRussiansystemofpowerhasbecomeincreasing-lyauthoritarian,andhasevolvedtowardsamodelofextremelypersonalised rule thatderives its legitimacy fromaggressivedecisions in internal and foreign policy, escalates the use offorce,andinterferesincreasinglyassertivelyinthespheresofpolitics,history,ideologyandevenpublicmorals.Theeventsofrecentyears–theannexationandoccupationofCrimea,mili-tary operations in eastern Ukraine and the assassination ofBorisNemtsov–alltestifytothescaleoftheRussianpoliticalregime’sevolution;andatthesametimetheyhavebeenpush-ingtheregimetowardsfurtherradicalisationandpreventingareturntotheearlierpragmaticpolicyofreconcilingtheinter-estsofvariousgroupsintheeliteandthepublic.
• The nature of the regime’s internal operation has alsochanged.Putin’spowernowrestsoncharismatic legitimacytoamuchgreaterextentthanitdidduringhisfirsttwopresi-dentialterms;currentlythePresidentispresentednotonlyasaneffective leader,butalsoas thesoleguarantorofRussia’sstabilityandintegrity.Hisinnercircleofpeopleinfluencingthedecision-makingprocesshasbecomeevennarrower,andisdominatedbymembersofthesecretserviceswhosharethepresident’sworldviewandhis visionof the threats facedbyRussia.Other,moremoderategroups, suchasbusinessmen,economists and lawyers, have been marginalised. The en-tiremechanismwherebytheKremlinmanages theelitehasalsochanged,aspositive instruments (distributionofassetsandpromotions,guaranteesof immunity)havebeen largelyreplacedbynegative instruments(demonstrationsofpower,disciplinarymeasuresandselectivepunishments).
• After 15 years of Putin’s rule, Russia’s economic modelbasedonrevenuefromenergyresourceshasexhaustedits
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potential,andthecountryhasnonewmodelthatcoulden-surecontinuedgrowthfortheeconomy.ThemainreasonsforthisarethestructuralfactorsthatstemfromthegeneralphilosophyunderlyingthePutinistsystem,i.e.theprimacyof control over development. This priority has preventeda diversification of the Russian economy, promoted thecentralisation of decision-making processes, exacerbatedtheweaknessof institutions (including the judiciary)andguaranteesofpropertyrights,curbedcompetitionandfur-therunderminedtheinvestmentclimate.Ithasalsoledtoanegativeselectionofstatecadres(wherebythosewhoareloyalandpassivewerepromoted,andthosewhoareactiveand creative facedblocks topromotionanddevelopment).Asaresultofthis,standardsofgovernancehavebeendete-riorating,capitalhasbeenf leeinginrecordlevels,andRus-siahasbeenexperiencingabraindrainandanintellectualdegradation.
• Theoriginalsocialcontracthasalsoreachedthelimitsofitspotential;withtheeconomydeteriorating,theRussianleader-shipisnolongerabletoguaranteesteadilyimprovingstand-ards of living,which have hitherto provided the leadershipwithundiminishedpopularity.However,thegovernmenthasbeenabletoeffectivelymakeupforthesacrificesthatpeoplehavehad tomake over the course of the last year, using anauthoritarian consolidation fuelled by an actively promotedsense of threat from the ‘hostile’West andpride inRussia’sterritorialconquests.TheattitudesofRussiansocietyatlargearehelpful inmaintainingthecurrentauthoritarianmodel,which is being held together by social apathy, atomisation,mutualdistrustandthelackofhorizontalsocialrelationsthatcouldgiverisetolastingcivilsocietystructures.Thetraumaof the SovietUnion’s collapse,which is still alive in Russia,makes peoplemore susceptible to the government’s imperi-alistic stratagems, suchas theannexationofCrimea,whichevokedsocialeuphoria.
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• ThePutinistsystemofpowerisstartingtoshowsymptomsofagony–ithasbeenunabletogeneratenewdevelopmentpro-jects,andhasbeencompensatingforitsongoingdegradationbyescalating repressionand theuseof force.However, thisdeclineisnotequivalenttothesystem’simminentcollapse,astherulingteamhaveinstrumentsattheirdisposaltoextendthepresentstateforyears,evenifdegradationcontinues.Ontheotherhand,theriskofdestabilisationisinscribedintheverynatureofthissystem;thelackofanyformalorinstitu-tionalguarantees forpoliticalactorsmakes it impossible forthemtocedepowervoluntarily,asdoingsowouldmeanrisk-ingtheirpositions,possessionsoreventheirpersonalsecuri-ty.Thisinturnmakesapeacefulsuccessionofpowerunlikelyand imposes the logicofaconstantextensionof the leader’srule.As the last 15yearsofRussia’shistoryhaveshown, themosteffectivewaytoconsolidatepowerandboostthepopu-larity of the leader is to resort to ‘extraordinarymeasures’,andespeciallymilitarysuccesses.Thismeansthatthepossi-blefurthererosionofpowermakesitextremelylikelythattheRussianleadershipwillescalatetheuseofsuchmethods.
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IntroductIon
Whilethelast15yearsoftheRussianpoliticalregimeshouldbeviewedintermsofcontinuity,thecountry’spoliticalsystemhasnonethelessundergoneaconsiderableevolutionwithinthatperi-od.Asaresultofthepolicyofcentralisation,therelativelyplural-istmodelofthelast1990shasgraduallytransformedintoaclearlyauthoritarian,monocentricandpersonalisedmodel. In itsmostrecentphase,i.e.sincePutin’sreturntotheKremlinin2012,thissystemhasestablishedtightcontrolnotonlyoverpoliticsandtheeconomy,butalsothespheresofideologyandpublicmorals,andhassteppeduprepressionandescalatedthepolicyofmilitaryex-pansionism.
ThecomprehensiveanalysisofVladimirPutin’s15yearsinpow-er showsapersistent legacy of authoritarian rule,whichhasbeentherealityforRussiathroughoutalmosttheentirehistoryofitsstatehood.Thatlegacyensuresthattheauthoritarianmodelisabletoreproduce itselfaftereachcrisisorattemptedreform.At itscore is thepoliticalcultureof thegenerationcurrently inpower,i.e.thehabitsoftakingauthoritarian,top-downactions,takingarbitrarydecisionsbehind thescenes,andstymying thedevelopmentofanytoolsofsocialcontrolofgovernment.DuringPutin’srulethesecretservices,themostrepressiveinstitutionoftheSovietstate,havebeenthepillarofthepresident’spower.Theworldviews,mentalityandinterestsofthesecretservicehaveleftamarkonRussia’spolicy,bothdomesticallyandinternationally.Theauthoritariancultureofgovernancehasalsobeensupportedbythelegislation:theRussianconstitutionvestsnearlyfullpow-erinthestateinthepresident’shands.Andfinally,thismodelhasbeenkept togetherby theattitudesof themajorityofRussians,whoseworldviewsandpoliticalculturehavebeenshapedbythelegacyofauthoritarianism.
TheauthoritariannatureofthePutinistsystemhasnotbeenaf-fectedbythefewattemptsatmodernising it (albeit toa limited
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extent), i.e. the liberal economic reforms initiated after Putincametopowerin2000,orthe liberalmodernisationrhetoricofDmitryMedvedev’spresidency (2008–2012).Theeffectsof thoseeffortswere limitedand short-livedbecausemanyof themeas-urestakenweremerelyillusory(e.g.Medvedev’smodernisationrhetoric),orstumbledonafundamentalobstaclestemmingfromtheverynatureofthesystem,i.e.the primacy of control over development. TheKremlin’s imperativehas invariably been tokeepandconsolidatepower,andreformsweretreatedmerelyasameanstoenhancetheefficacyofthestatestructuresorimprovetheirimage.Moreover,theliberaleconomicreformsinitiatedbyPutincoincidedwithastrongtendencytowardscentralisationinthepoliticalandsocialspheres,whichsoughttorestorethepresi-dentialteam’scontroloverpoliticalactors(regionalgovernmentsandpoliticalparties)aswellastheeconomy,andreinforcedthe‘manualcontrol’modeofgovernanceattheexpenseofinstitution-almechanisms.Likewise,themodernisationeffortsundertakenduringDmitryMedvedev’sshortpresidencyweresuperficial,andexpectationsofgenuineliberalisation,whichsomegroupsinthepoliticaleliteandthewiderpublichadstartedtocherishatthattime,weresuppressedbythecounter-reformsinitiatedafterPu-tinreturnedtotheKremlin.
Putin’spolicywasareactiontothefermentwithwhichsomepartsoftheeliteandthepublicrespondedtotheprospectofhisreturntopower,aprospecttheyassociatedwithstagnationandthelackofany lastingguaranteesof rightsandproperty.TheKremlin’spolicyofconsolidatingpower,mobilisingsupportandpersecut-ingopponentsreacheditsclimaxaftertherevolutionintheKyivMaidaninearly2014andtheescapeoftheUkrainianpresidentViktorYanukovych,developmentswhichtheKremlininterpret-edas foreshadowingabottom-updestabilisationthatcouldalsoaffectRussia. This consolidated the authoritariannature of theRussianstate,butatthesametimemadetheleadershiphostagetoitsownpolicy,especiallythedecisiontoannexCrimea,whichhad far-reaching geopolitical, internal political and economic
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consequences.AnanalysisoftheRussianelite’spresentcondition–the‘latePutin’period–leadstotheconclusionthattherulingteamisunabletodeviseorimplementinternalreforms.Itseemsdoomedinertlytocontinueitscurrentpolicy,whichcontributesto Russia’s further economic and social degradation, and limitsthe set of instruments available to the leadership to repressionandmilitaryaction,includingabroad.
Thepurposeof thepresentpaper isnotsomuchtocomprehen-sivelydiscussthesystemofpowerinRussiaastopresentitscur-rent condition after 15 years of Vladimir Putin’s rule. The firstchapterdescribes themain featuresof the systemofpower, itsmainactorsanddecision-makingprocesses,aswellasthechal-lenges generated by its internal specificity. The second chaptercharacterisesRussiansocietyand itsrole inholdingthesystemofpowertogether.Thefinalchapterattemptstooutlinethepros-pectsofthesystem’sfurtherdevelopment(orinfactdegradation),andthepotentialconsequencesofacrisisinthePutinistsystemofpower.
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I. PutInISm: SucceSSIve StageS of authorItarIanISm
From the start, terminology associatedwith authoritarian sys-tems has been applied in describing Vladimir Putin’s rule, al-thoughthenotionsusedhaverangedfrommilderonesreferringtoso-called‘democracywithadjectives’(controlledorfaçadede-mocracy) to terms directly referring to authoritarianism (e.g.electoralauthoritarianism,1denotinganauthoritariansystemofpowerthatderivesitslegitimacyfromasham,controlledelectoralprocessthatdoesnotleadtoachangeofgovernment).ThePutinistsystemofgovernmenthasfromitsbeginningbeencharacterisedbyacentralisationandpersonalisationofpower,restrictionsonpoliticalpluralismandeconomiccompetition,selectedrepressionandtheuseofforcebothinRussiaandabroad,aswellasideologi-calandhistoricalmanipulationsforpoliticalpurposes.
Inrecentyears,however,thesystemofpowerhasgrownincreas-ingly more authoritarian and repressive. This evolution isindicativeoftheKremlin’sstrategicchoicemadeinthewakeofthe political experiment - DmitryMedvedev’s presidency. Dur-ingthistime,themainfeaturesofthePutinistregimecontinuedbutthestyleofgovernancechanged,VladimirPutin’spollshow-ingsdeclined,andgroupsformedwithinthepoliticaleliteandinthegeneralpublicwhichvoicedtheirexpectationsofliberalisa-tion.That‘hardline’,whichwasadoptedinordertoremedytheweakening ofVladimir Putin’s legitimacy as the leader, provedthattheKremlinhadchosenthepathofauthoritarianconsolida-tion;thatis,ithaddecidedonceagaintoconcentratetheformaldecision-makingmechanismsinthehandsof thepresidentandpursueapolicyofrestrictionstowardsthoseactorswhodidnotunconditionallysupportthisline.Thiswaschoseninsteadofopt-ing for an evolutionary variant, i.e. Medvedev’s re-election, as
1 Seeinter aliaGrigoryGolosov,Электоральный авторитаризм в России,Pro et Contra,January-February2008.
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aresultofwhichtheoriginalmodelwouldhavestayedinplace,butpowerwouldbedecentralisedandsplitamongthedifferentgroupswithintheeliteinacontrolledandgradualmanner.Theprocess of authoritarian mobilisation gained momentum inthewakeoftheKyivMaidaninwinter2014,Russia’sannexationofCrimea,theconflictineasternUkraineandtheconfrontationwiththeWest.
One of the main symptoms of the system’s evolution concernsthesubstitutionofthemainsource of the russian leader’s le-gitimacy–thedevaluationoflegal(electoral)legitimacy,whichwasdominantduringPutin’sfirsttwotermsaspresident,infa-vouroftheincreasinglydominantcharismatic legitimacy.Thepresident,whoactedasthekeydecisionmakerevenbeforehand,andwhocouldnothavebeenchallengedattheballotboxbyanyotherpolitician,iscurrentlyrepresentedasthesoleguarantorofRussia’sstabilityandintegrity,andasapoliticianendowedwithnearlysuperhumanpowers.2
Anotherstage in theevolutionofhowtheRussianpolitical re-gimederivesitslegitimacyconcernsitsprogressing ideologisa-tion.Previously,theregimeusedtobepragmaticandideological-lyeclectic,whichreflectedtherelativepluralismoftheRussianelite.However, sincePutin’sreturn in2012, theRussian leader-shiphassteppedupefforts todevelopa state ideologybasedonaspecificversionofconservatismrootedin‘traditional’Orthodoxvalues.3TheKremlin’s conservatism is supposed to serveas theregime’sideologicalfoundationandjustifythepreservationofthe
2 Airedonpublictelevisionon26April2015,thedocumentaryThe President. 15 years of new RussiacreatesanimageofPutinasapoliticianwhohassavedRussiafrompoverty,chaosandtheterroristthreatofthe1990s,whosingle-handedlytakesallthekeydecisions,andwhoisendowedwithpoliticalge-niusandotherexceptionalvirtues.
3 Formoreinformation,seeWitoldRodkiewicz,JadwigaRogoża,Potemkinconservatism.AnideologicaltooloftheKremlin,Point of View,3February2015,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2015-02-03/potem-kin-conservatism-ideological-tool-kremlin
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‘traditional’ (buteffectivelyauthoritarian)modelofgovernanceinRussia.Thishasbeenpresentedasanalternativetotheliberalideologywhich, in theKremlin’sview, is incompatiblewith theRussianreality,andasajustificationforthepolicyofconfronta-tionwith theWesternworld,which is presented as a source of‘alien’ values and an aggressor inRussia’s sphere of vital inter-ests. For theneedsof the state ideology, theRussian leadershipand its loyal experts have also constructed a specific histori-cal policy, wherein the interpretations of history are adjustedtocurrentpoliticalneeds.Forinstance,thevictoryoverfascisminWorldWar II is juxtaposedwith thepresentRussianaggres-sioninUkrainewhereRussiaisallegedlyfightinganewvarietyoffascism,andamanipulatedversionofthe19th-centuryRussianWorld(Russkiy Mir)conceptissupposedtojustifytheculturalandpolitical dominance of Russia over Ukraine and Belarus.4 Thispolicyalsogeneratesjustificationsforauthoritarianandtotalitar-ianrule,5whileavoidinganyre-evaluationsofthetragicorcon-troversialchaptersofRussia’shistory.
Thesocial contract between the leader and the publichasalsochanged.As the economic situationhas beendeteriorating, theKremlinisnolongerabletoensuresteadilyimprovingstandardsoflivingforthepeople,whichusedtobeitswayofwinningthepublic’ssupportandloyalty.Thecurrentsocialcontractcouldbephrasedintermsof‘sacrificesinreturnforheroismandasenseofdignity’.Theleadershiphasbeentryingtooffsetthesacrificeswhich theRussianshavebeen forced tomakeasa resultof the
4 SeeMarekMenkiszak,ThePutindoctrine:TheformationofaconceptualframeworkforRussiandominanceinthepost-Sovietarea,OSW Commen-tary, 27 March 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-com-mentary/2014-03-27/putin-doctrine-formation-a-conceptual-framework-russian
5 EventhoughPutinhasformallycondemnedStalinasacriminal,therecentyearshavewitnessedanapologiaforJosefStalin(toleratedbythegovern-ment):historianswithcloselinkstotheleadershiphavebeenpresentinghimasan‘effectivemanager’,andinMay2015amonumenttoStalinwaserectedinthetownofLipetskattheinitiativeoftheCommunists.
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sanctionsandeconomicstagnationbyresortingtoanauthoritar-ianmobilisation fuelledbyasenseof threat fromthe ‘eternallyhostileWest’andthrivingonasenseofprideinsuchachievementsasthe‘regainingofCrimea’.Themostvisibleelementofthismo-bilisationisthemassivewaveofaggressive media propagandawhichisextremelybiased,exploitshatespeechandresortstodis-informationtechniques,ofwhichthemostglaringexamplescanbeobservedinconnectionwiththecrisisinUkraine.6Despitetheobjectivefactthatthepeople’sstandardsoflivingandpurchasingpowerhavedeclined,atthepresentstagethatpropagandaisca-pableofgeneratingthedesiredoutcomesfortheKremlin,boost-ingthepresident’spopularityevenmoreandfanningtheaversiontowardstheWest.7
the evolution of the leader’s position in the system of power has been accompanied in recent years by changes in the presi-dent’s inner circle.Originallyconsistingofseveralmutuallybal-ancedgroupswithdiversebackgroundsandinterests,ithasnowbecomeentirelydominatedbyrepresentativesofthesecretser-viceswhosharePutin’sworldviewandvisionofthethreatsfacedbyRussia.Thenarrowgroupinchargeofstrategicdecisions,suchastheannexationofCrimeaandthepoliciestowardsUkraine,theCommonwealthofIndependentStatesandtheWest(forexample,thecounter-sanctionsagainstthestateswhichhaveimposedeco-nomic sanctionsonRussiaorbannedRussianofficials) consists
6 The extremely aggressive and emotionalmediatisation of storieswhichwouldthenturnouttobeuntrue,suchasthereportagebroadcastbythemainTVstation,1Kanal,on12July2014,showingthestoryofaboyfromSlavyanskreportedtohavebeencrucifiedbytheUkrainianmilitary,orthepracticeofillustratingreportsabouttheUkrainianarmy’sallegedatrocitieswithmaterialsdocumentingotherconflicts,etc.
7 Thepresident’spopularityreached89%inJune2015(accordingtotheLevadaCentrepollof24June2015).AccordingtootherpollsbytheLevadaCentre,62%ofRussiansbelievethatRussia’srelationswiththeWest“willalwaysbebasedonmutualdistrust”(26June2015);66%ofrespondentsbelievethattheobjectiveoftheWesternsanctionsisto“weakenandhumiliateRussia”,and70%believethatRussiashouldnotpayheedtothesanctionsandcontinuewithitsownpolicy(29June2015).
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almostexclusivelyofmembersofthesecretservices.Intheafter-mathofaseriesofreshuffles in thePresident’sAdministration,thesecretserviceshavebecomethemain,oreventhesolepro-viderofinformationtothepresident,andhavebeenreinforcingPutin’svisionoftheworld(e.g.withregardtotheWest’shostilepolicytowardsRussia)whileatthesametimeshapinghiscurrentorientationinkeepingwiththeirownsectorialinterests.Thishasmadethe maindecision maker increasingly isolated in terms of access to information, as the services have been providingthepresidentwithaselectiveviewoftheworldlargelydrivenbywishfulthinking.Thesecretservices’monopolyoninformationreinforces theKremlin’svisionand its geopoliticalprioritiesbyrepresenting theWesternworld as an eternal enemy intent onunderminingorevendestroyingRussia.8Thoseperceptionshaveovershadowedanyeconomiccalculations,alsowithregardtode-cisionswhoseconsequencesaffecttheconditionoftheentirestate(sincetheannexationofCrimea,theRussianeconomyhaspracti-callybeenhostagetogeopoliticaldecisions).Thedecision-makingprocesseshabituallyentailnegativeside-effects,whichinthem-selvesrequirethedevelopmentofremedialstrategies.Thesecretserviceshavealsobeenmanningthepresident’smainorganisa-tional staff, fullycontrollinghisdaily functioning,personalre-lationsandphysicalsecurity.Thishas left thepresident largelyahostage to the security service people around him,quiteincontrasttotheimpressionofone-manleadershipthathehasbeenostensiblymaking,and theundisputed fact that themaindeci-sion-makingmechanismsareconcentratedinhishands.
Atthesametime,thepresidenthasbeenincreasinglyalienatedfrom the broader political and business elites. Putinhasbeenemphasising the single-handed nature of important decisionsever more frequently, often confronting his own political and
8 NikolaiPatrushev,secretaryoftheSecurityCounciloftheRussianFedera-tion,saidthattheUnitedStates“wishedRussiatoceasetoexistasastate”.Interview for theKommersant daily, 22 June2015,www.kommersant.ru/doc/2752246
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businessbasewithaccomplishedfactsandinsomecasestakingdecisionsthathaveadverselyaffectedtheinterestsofthatbase.9Theelitegroups inquestion, i.e.membersof thestateadminis-tration, business and expert and research communities, havelost their influence on the decision-making processes concern-ing strategic issues ormatters affecting their ownposition andwell-being.10Mostpeopleinthesegroups(includingtheSberbankCEOGermanGref,theeconomicadvisorandformerdeputyprimeministerAlexeiKudrin,andtheCentralBankgovernorElviraNa-byullina)havekepttheirjobs,buttheirroleiscurrentlylimitedtoexecutingtheKremlin’spoliticaldirectivesanddevelopingtacticsto implementstrategies thathavealreadybeendecided.This il-lustrates the change thathasoccurred in thegeneralnatureoftheKremlin’s relations with the broader elites –wherebyposi-tiveinstruments(distributionofassetsandpromotions,guaran-tees of immunity) have been replaced by negative instruments(demonstrationsofpower,discipliningmeasures,selectivepun-ishments).ModeratemembersoftheelitewhodonotsupporttheKremlin’saggressivepolicyunconditionallyhavebeendismissedasa ‘sixth column’11whose loyalty toRussiahasallegedlybeen
9 Thepolicyofso-called‘nationalisationofelites’mayserveasanexamplehere;thisaimstostepuptheKremlin’scontrolofthepropertyandprivatelivesofmembersoftheadministrationandbusiness,forexamplebyprohib-itingofficialsandemployeesofstate-ownedcorporationsfromholdingfor-eignbankingaccounts;imposingstricterrequirementsconcerningpersonalpropertydeclarations;thecreationwithinthePresident’sAdministrationofaregisterofassetsheldbytheeliteandfinancialflowstoothercountries,etc.Formoreinformation,seeJadwigaRogoża,Thenationalisationoftheelite:Kremlintrackingofficials’foreignassets,OSW Analysis,10April2013,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-04-10/nationalisation-elite-kremlin-tracking-officials-foreign-assets
10 TheelitehassufferedvariousnegativeconsequencesofthedecisiontoannexCrimea,whichhitatitseconomicinterestandpositionintheWest,wheremostoftheelitemembershavebeeninvestingtheircapital,wheretheirfamilieshavebeenlivingandwheretheirchildrenhavebeengoingtoschool.
11 ThistermwascoinedbyAlexanderDugin,theideologuewithcloselinkstotheKremlin,whosaidthatthe“sixthcolumn”consistedof“thosemembersoftheRussianleadershipwhosupportPutinbutatthesametimecallforalib-eral,pro-Western,modernisedandWesternisedRussia,forglobalisation,integrationwiththeWesternworldandEuropeanvaluesandinstitutions,
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erodedbyitsextensiveeconomictieswiththeWest.Allthishasaffectedtheattitudesoftheseelitesandthequalityoftheirsup-portforthestateleader.Overthelastthreeyears(andespeciallysincetheannexationofCrimea)manyrepresentativesofthiselitehaveopenlyvoicedconcernovertheKremlin’s increasinglyun-predictablepolicyanditsharmfuleffectsontheconditionoftheRussian economy– andon their ownpersonal interests.12OnceVladimir Putin’s convinced and ardent supporters, they havegraduallybecomehostagestotheevolvingregimewhich–whilestillrewardingthemwithprofits–hasbecomeincreasinglypre-carious.
Thepresident’sprogressingalienationhasbeenaccompaniedbyadrasticnarrowingof the limitsof thatpolitical and social ac-tivitythatremainsuncontrolledbytheKremlin.Theregimehas increasingly been penalising any opposition or independent social and political activity,startingfromthecondemnationofopponentsasa ‘fifthcolumn’or ‘foreignagents’,13 topersecutionand repression (a largernumberof custodial sentences, includ-ing for participation in oppositiondemonstrations), all thewayuptopoliticalassassinations(themurderofBorisNemtsovbytheKremlinwallinFebruary2015,perpetratedbypeoplewithlinkstotheChechenleaderRamzanKadyrov).Thelimitsofthefreedomofspeechhavenarroweddowndrastically,especiallyinrelation
andwhowantRussiatobecomeaprosperingcorporationinaworldinwhichtherulesaresetbytheglobalWest”.SeeA.Dugin,Шестая колонна,http://vz.ru/opinions/2014/4/29/684247.html.
12 TheSberbankCEOGermanGref,theeconomyministerAlexeiUlyukayev,CEOsofprivatecorporationsandevenlobbyistsinfriendlyrelationswithPutin,suchasGennadyTimchenko.EvenlobbyistscloselyassociatedwithPutin,whohavebeenbeneficiariesoftheKremlin’sdecisionsformanyyears,havenowbeenpushedintosubordinatepositions(YuriKovalchuk,ArkadyRotenberg,VladimirYakunin,andevenIgorSechin);theKremlinkeepssup-portingthemfinancially,butthepresidentevermorefrequentlyreprimandsthempubliclyinordertoremindthemoftheir‘vassal’status.
13 Theterms‘fifthcolumn’and‘traitorsofthenation’wereusedbyPresidentPutinhimselfinhisaddresstotheFederalAssemblyon18March2014;http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603
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to thesphereofonline information,whichhadpreviouslybeenunfettered.14 Inaddition tocurbingpoliticalandcivil freedoms,theregimehasalsostartedtosystematicallyrestrain individual freedoms and encroach on the sphere of public morals.15
Asthesystemhasbeenevolving,soitsmodus operandihasbeenchanging. The leadership has increasingly resorted to ‘manual control’ mode(whichhadexistedsincethestartofPutin’srule)instategovernance.ThecentralisationofpowerandtheKrem-lin’sdrivetocontrolthemainaspectsofpubliclifehasledtoiner-tiaintheinstitutionsresponsibleforthefunctioningofthestate,which have become ‘service providers’ to the Kremlin. Againstthisbackdrop,thepresidentialteam(andthePresident’sAdmin-istrationintheinstitutionaldimension)appearstoberelativelyeffective,16althoughitalsotendstobecomechaoticincrisissitua-tions(suchasthecurrencycrisisinDecember2014),whilemanypresidential decrees are implemented in a dilatory manner orevenobstructed.Asaresult, theKremlinneeds to intervene ineveryimportantcaseinordertoensurethatitsdecisionsareim-plemented.This ‘achievement’oftheRussianpowersystem,i.e.thefactthattheKremlinnowcontrolsalltheimportantactorsofpubliclife,isatthesametimeoneofitsmaindisadvantages:with-
14 Bloggersarenowlegallyrequiredtorevealtheirpersonaldataandcomplywithasetofrestrictivelaws.StructureswithcloselinkstotheKremlinhavetakenovercontrolofRussia’slargestsocialnetworkVkontakte,andmanypopularportalshavebeenforcedtochangetheireditorialpolicies(Gazeta.ru,Lenta.ruandothers).TheindependentonlinetelevisionDozhdhasfacedpersecution,andanumberofpopularoppositionportals(Grani.ru,Ej.ru,Kasparov.ru,AlexeiNavalny’sblog)havebeenblockedbythegovernmentalRoskomnadzorservice.
15 Thelawnowrequireseveryonetodeclaredualcitizenshipsandregistertheirresidence.Notonlyoppositionactivistsbutalsoordinarycitizensareper-secutedforexpressingcriticalopinionsofthegovernmentortakingpartinprotests.Finally,sexualminoritieshavealsofacedpersecutioninstigatedbytheauthorities.
16 VladimirPutinhimselftriestostrengthenthisimpression;forinstanceintheTVdocumentaryCrimea. The road to the homelandbroadcastontheanni-versaryofthepeninsula’sannexation,heexplainedthesuccessofthatopera-tionbythefactthathehadpersonallycontrolledeverystepoftheprocess.
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outtheleader’sinvolvementthesystemerodesandbecomesinert,whiletheweakness,orperceivedweakness,oftheleaderbecomesafatalsignalfortheentiresystem,demonstratinghowfragilethe‘stability’underPutinis.17Thefactthatthesystemisbasedonin-formal rules not grounded in law and on personal relations and arrangements has likewisebeenadouble-edgedswordforthe ruling team. Itmeans that there areno reliableguaranteesoftherightsofcitizens,politicalactorsandeconomicoperators,andtheinstitutionsappointedtodefendthoserightsareamerefacade.ThishasenabledtheKremlintoarbitrarily‘manage’thoseguaranteesbecause,intheabsenceofdefinitivelegalguaranteesof theoligarchs’propertyrights, theyremaindependentonthepolitical leadership, and the recurrent ‘redistributions’ of theirassetsremindthemofthisdependence.18However,suchasystemdoesnotofferanyreliableguaranteestothemembersofthenar-rowrulingelite, either.For them,givinguppowermeans risk-ingtheirassets,sometimestheirfreedom,andinextremecaseseventheirlives.Thissituationhasaffectedthecruciallyimpor-tantprocessofthesuccession of power,whichinthisparadigmisperceivedasariskfactor.AsthereactivepolicythatfollowedDmitry Medvedev’s short presidency demonstrated, even ‘con-trolled succession’ is seen as a risk; the potential emancipationof thenewpresidentwouldhaveentailedpainful losses for thegroup cedingpower.As anatural consequenceof this, those inpowerseektostaythereusinganymeansavailable,whichover
17 Inthiscontext,theten-daypauseinthepresident’spublicappearancesinMarch2015triggeredawaveofspeculationsandunderminedthesenseofstabilityintherulingcamp.SeealsoLiliaShevtsova,HastheRussianSys-tem’sAgonyBegun?,The National Interest,17March2015,http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/03/17/has-russias-agony-begun
18 Forexamplethetakeovers,underlegalpretexts,ofthebusinessempiresownedbyVladimirGusinsky(2000),MikhailKhodorkovsky(after2003)ormorerecently,VladimirYevtushenkov(2014).VladislavInozemtsevhastermedthePutiniststabilisation‘thestabilityofthetime-limited’(«cтабиль-ность временщиков»)becauseithascreatedagroupofpeopleinpowerandaclassofpropertyholders,buthasfailedtocreatemechanismstoguaran-teetheirpropertyrights.W. Inozemtsev,Распад стабильности,snob.ru,10March2015.
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timedegradesthequalityofgovernanceandleadstheregimetoevolvetowardsdictatorship.
Intheeconomicdimension,thePutinistsystem–withitscentral-isationofdecision-making,thepoliticisationoftheeconomyandthe suppressionof competition–has led toa situation iswhichthe economic model based on revenues from energy resources has reached the limits of its potential, whilenonewmodelthatcouldreplaceitandensurefurthergrowthfortheRussianecon-omyhasbeenproposed.Foraroundadecade,theRussianecono-mygrewdynamicallyowingtothehighandconstantlyrisingoilprices.19Thismodelstartedtocrumblearound2012,withoilpric-esstillpeaking(ayearlyaverageofUS$100perbarrel)butgrowthslowlydecreasing.In2012theRussianGDPgrewby3.4%(downfrom4.3%in2011),by1.3%in2013,andby0.6%in2014,andRussiaisexpectedtoclose2015withitsGDPsmallerbyseveralpercent.Thisslowdownismainlyduetomany years of structural ne-glect:thefailuretodiversifytheeconomy(sincethestartofPu-tin’srule,theRussianeconomy’sdependenceontherawmaterialssectorshas increasedconsiderably20), thesupportandsubsidiesprovided to many unprofitable enterprises; a poor investmentclimate; the weakness of institutions (including the judiciary);thelackofpropertyrightguarantees,whichhasweighedonthedevelopmentofentrepreneurship;andfinally, the technologicalbackwardnesswhichhasexacerbatedtheunprofitabilityandun-competitiveness of production inmany sectors of the economyandmadethemmoredependentonimports.
19 Russia’sGDP grewby 10% in 2000 (with the average annual oil price atUS$23.9perbarrel),5.1%in2001(US$20.8),4.7%in2002(US$21.02),7.3%in2003(US$23.81),7.2%in2004(US$31),6.4%in2005(US$45.2),8.5%in2007(US$64.3). Intheyears2012–2013thepriceofoilwasaboveUS$100.www.cbr.ru/statistics/credit_statistics/print.aspx?file=crude_oil.htm
20 DuringPutin’srule,theshareofrevenuefromoilandgasexportsintheRussianbudgetexpandedfrom18%in1999to54.5%in2011;accordingtotheMinistryofEnergy,in2014itwas52%.
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UnderlyingthoseproblemsisthefundamentalprincipleonwhichthePutinistsystemrests,i.e.theprimacy of control over devel-opment.Since2000,theKremlinhasconsistentlycentralisedthedecision-makingprocesses,andlimitedcompetitionandtheauton-omyofotheractors(whetherpolitical,businessorsocial),whileatthesametimepromotingattitudesofpassiveloyaltywithout ‘ex-cessive’initiative.Manyyearsofsuchnegativeselectionofthestatecadreshaveresultedinapoorlevelofgovernanceatthefederalandregional levels,and inertiaand incompetence in theadministra-tion.Thishasloweredthequalityofmanystrategicdecisions,andderailedeventhoserareattemptsatreformormodernisationthattheRussian leadershipundertook in the last 15years.Activeandinnovative groups have been denied promotions and opportuni-tiestodevelop,whichhasresultedinapermanentflightofcapital(whichreachedrecordlevelsin2014)andabraindrain,deprivingthesystemofitsmostcreativemembers.21Thishasledtoagradualintellectual degradation of the system,whichhasbeentakingadvantageofthefavourableeconomicsituation,buthasceasedtogeneratethenewideasandtechnologieswhichdeterminetheposi-tionofstatesontheglobalstagetoday.Sincemid-2014thoselong-terminternalproblemshavebeenexacerbatedbyadverseexternalfactors,includingfallingglobaloilprices,therelateddepreciationoftherouble,andtheimpactofWesternsanctions,whichhaveex-posedthefragilityoftheRussianeconomyanditsdependenceonthefluctuationsoftheeconomicsituation.
Thecollapseofthewelfare state model inRussia,whichusedtobepresentedintheKremlin’spropagandaasoneofRussia’sgreat-estachievementsthroughoutPutin’srule,marksanothersociallypainful failure of the Putinist system, and runs counter to thetriumphalist propaganda of ‘Russia rising from its knees’. Ris-ingstandardsofliving(andmorebroadly,economic,politicaland
21 TheflightofcapitalfromRussiain2014increasedtwoandahalftimescom-paredto2013asitsvolumeexceededUS$150billion(figuresfromtheCentralBank;US$61billionin2013);emigrationhasalsoreachedrecordlevels.
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socialstability)werethecornerstonesoftheRussiansocialcontractsinceVladimirPutincametopower.Drasticallylowinthe1990s,thosestandardsoflivingthenimprovedconsiderably;duringthefirstdecadeofPutin’sruleGDPper capita increasedfourfold,andthepeople’srealincomesgrewyearonyear.22Despitethat,Russiacontinuestostrugglewiththeinefficiencyofthestateinstitutionsin charge of providing social services, i.e. healthcare, educationandresearch,andmunicipalinfrastructures,whichareindeplor-ablecondition,especiallyoutsidethelargecities.23Thescaleoftheunsolved problems reveals itself, for instance, in the president’sannualtelevisedconferenceswiththeinhabitantsoftheRussianregions, which despite the television programmers’ censorshippresentapictureofasocietystrugglingwithbasicsocialandin-frastructuralproblemsthathavenotchangedforyears,andwiththecorruptionand lawlessnessofstateofficialsand lawenforce-mentfunctionaries.Thoseproblemsare largelyaconsequenceoftheKremlin’sstrategicdecisions,suchasthe2001financialreformwhichtransferredaconsiderableportionoftherevenuesofregion-albudgets(responsibleformanagingthesocialinfrastructure)tothecentralbudget,thetoleranceofcorruption,andtheincompe-tenceofthoseincharge.Socialspending(oneducation,healthcare,culture) in the central budget has also been cut in recent years,which stands in contrast to the constant growth of security and defence spending (whichaccounted for40%of totalbudgetspendingin2015,comparedto30%forsocialspending)24.
22 NominalGDPper capitaincreasedfromUS$5914in1999toUS$24,083in2012(andbasedonpurchasingpowerparity,fromUS$4200in1999toUS$18,000in2012),whileaveragenominalincomeper capitaincreasedfrom2281roublesin2000to38,340roublesin2013.
23 Lastyear,thenumbersofhealthcareestablishmentsinseveraldozenRus-sianregionswerereducedaspartofan‘optimisation’operationthatsparkedanoutcryinRussia.Formoreinformation,seehttp://www.gazeta.ru/so-cial/2013/02/22/4978173.shtml
24 EwaFischer,AmendmenttotheRussianbudgetfor2015:anattempttomain-tainthestatusquo,OSW Analysis,18March2015,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-03-18/amendment-to-russian-budget-2015-at-tempt-to-maintain-status-quo
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II. a SocIety of obServerS – the factor that KeePS the regIme together
The specific nature of the Russian society, and especially theweaknessofcivicinstitutions,isoneofthemainpillarssustainingtheviabilityofthecurrentregime.Civilsocietyinstitutionsthatcouldprovideacounterbalancetothestateandsupervisethoseinpowerhavenotdeveloped inpost-SovietRussia,despite severalattemptstocreatethem.Thisisalegacyofthemanycenturiesofauthoritarianstatemodelsinwhichsocietywasreducedtoamereobject,anditspublicactivitywasusuallylimitedtouncontrolledanddestructiveoutbreaksofangerthatfailedtoimproveitsover-allsituation.25Uptothepresentday,theRussianleadershiphasanextensivesetofinstrumentsatitsdisposaltoinfluenceandma-nipulatethepublic.Firstly,theyholdthesystemicandeconomictools,includingtheexistenceofanextensivepublicsector26;thestate is the largestemployer inRussia,whichmakesiteasiertoco-ordinateandcontrolthepoliticalbehaviourofalargesegmentofthepublic(andpublicsectoremployeesareindeedconsideredtobeabastionoftherulinggroup).Secondly,theRussianleader-shiphaseffectivepropagandainstrumentsatitsdisposal,includ-ingthestate-controlledmedia,especiallytelevision,27whichfeedthepeoplebothpoliticalpropagandaandsensational&entertain-mentcontentthat‘hypnotises’theaudienceandreinforcesitsat-titudeaspassiveobserversofevents.28
25 AlexanderPushkinhadalreadydefineditaccuratelyinthenineteenthcen-tury:“GodsaveusfromseeingaRussianrevolt–senselessandmerciless”.
26 TheRussianpublicsectoremploys14.5millionpeople(morethan20%oftheentireworkingpopulation),ofwhich3.3millionpeopleworkinthefederalinstitutions(2014,novainfo.ru/archive/24/sovershenstvovanie-oplaty-tru-da).Thenumbersareevenbiggerifweincludetherelatedsectorsthatbenefitfrompublicfunding.
27 Televisionis themainsourceof informationaboutRussiaandtheworldfor90%ofRussians(accordingtoaLevadapoll,June2014).Thispercentageshowedadownwardtrendintheyears2010-2013,butincreasedagainaftertheannexationofCrimea.
28 Thediagnosiswasformulatedin2001bytheleadingRussiansociologistsDmitryGudkovandBorisDubinoftheLevadaCentre,intheirpaperentitled
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The Russian public’s great susceptibility to the Kremlin’s ma-nipulation,asobservedinthecourseoflastyear,stemsfromthestillextantpost-imperial complexandthetraumaoftheSovietUnion’scollapse,whichformanyRussiansmeanta lossof iden-tityandtheirsenseofsecurity,andwhichPutinoncedescribedasthegreatestgeopoliticalcatastropheofthetwentiethcentury.TheSovietmentalitycanbeeasilyreanimated,asdemonstratedbytheRussianleadership’ssuccessinrevivingtheattitudes,prac-ticesandevenaestheticstypicaloftheSovietperiod.Thedevelop-mentofademocraticstatemodelhasalsobeen impededby thefactthatWesternvalues,suchasdemocracyandthemarketecon-omy,werediscreditedintheeyesofthepublicduringthe1990s.Theactivitiesofthethen-leadersofRussia,whoinvokeddemoc-racybutinfactoversawtheprivatisationofthestatebytheeliteandgroupsassociatedwithit,createdacaricatureofdemocracy,whichmostRussiansstillassociatewithpoverty,chaos,corrup-tionandtheunbridleddevelopmentofcriminalstructures,andwiththestate’sfailuretodeliveronitsbasicsocialcommitments.TheKremlinhasbeenskilfullytakingadvantageofthosepercep-tionsbyemphasisingtheharmfulnessof‘transplanting’Westernmodels to Russia, and championing a specifically Russian pathofdevelopment.TheRussian leadership’smainpostulate inthiscontexthasconcerned theneed topreservetraditionally rus-sian social and political values,amoveintendedindirectlytolegitimisethetraditionalist,authoritarianmodelofgovernment.
Otherfactorsthathavecontributedtothepersistenceoftheau-thoritarianmodel in Russia concern the negative attitudes andbehaviourpatternsrootedinRussiansociety, i.e. thepassivity, atomisation, mutual distrust and the lack of horizontal so-cial ties thatcouldgiverisetolastingcivilsocietystructures.29
Asocietyoftelevisionviewers,http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/197/991/1219/05gudkov-31-45.pdf.
29 Seeinter aliaAlexeiLevinson,Боюсь не успеть,Неприкосновенный Запас6/2014.
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Thistragiclegacyderivesatleastfromtheeventsofthetwentiethcenturyanditsrepressionsandwars,whichhavebroughtaboutanegativesocialselection,cuttingpeopleofffromtheirrootsandinstillingasenseofhelplessnessinthefaceofhistory,reinforcedbytheviolenthistoricalupheavalswhichnearlyeverygenerationexperienced.MostRussiansdisplaylowpoliticalawarenessandpassivenessinthepoliticalandprofessionalspheres,helplessnessanddisbelief that their endeavours could be successful (‘I can’tchangeanything’),anddonothavetheskills to takegrassrootsactionandco-operatewithotherpeoplewithsimilarinterestsorproblems.This ‘silent majority’ inRussia isapillarofthegov-ernment’spower.Infact,whatkeepsthesystemtogetherisnotsomuchpeople’sactive,enthusiasticsupportfortheleadership,asapathyandlackofsocialinvolvementinanyprocessesbeyondtheprivatesphere.Thisattitudehasenabledthegovernmenttoshapepolicyonitsown.30ThissocialapathyhasalsodampeddowntheRussians’genuinefrustrationwiththeproblemstheyfaceineve-rydaylife:thelowqualityofhealthcare,socialsecurityandedu-cation,theconditionoftheinfrastructureandotherissues.Thisfrustrationhasnottranslatedintomassprotestsorgrassrootsac-tionforchange;rather,ithaspromptedtheRussianstoseekindi-vidualandad hocwaysofdealingwiththeproblems.Therefore,theclaimsthatsocialunrestcoulderuptinRussiaiftheeconomicsituationdeterioratesaredisputable,asdemonstratedbythewaythepreviouseconomiccrisisintheyears2008–2009unfolded.Atthattime,despitetheeconomicdeclinethatleftlargeindustrialplants introuble,only isolatedsocialprotests tookplace (e.g. inthetownofPikalyovo),whichtheauthoritieswereeasilyabletodealwith.
Inthiscontext,itshouldnotbeoverlookedthatsocialapathyalsoentails some negative consequences for the government.WhilethepopularityshowingsoftheRussianleadershipandespecially
30 SeeVladislavInozemtsev,Секрет путинского консенсуса,snob.ru,11Febru-ary2015.
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the president are high, thequality of the people’s support is questionable;itisusuallypassive,anddoesnotmobilisepeopleinto getting actively involved in pro-Kremlin initiatives, so thestatestructureshavetomakeamajorefforteachtimetheyneedsuchinvolvement.31 IntheeventofmajorproblemsoracrisisintheKremlin,VladimirPutin’srecordpopularityshowingsofover80%will not translate into tangible support fromhis backers.32Russiansocietyhasalsodemonstratedatendencytoeasilydivertits sympathies topoliticiansor groups that appear tobe strongandprojectself-confidenceatagivenmoment,whichalsoappliedtooppositionforcesatthosetimeswhentheyseemedtobegain-ingpower.33Whiletherecentwaveofrepressionagainsttheop-positionhassucceededinrestoringtheimpressionoftheKrem-lin’sstrength,andinattractingpeoplebacktotherulingcamp,thisveryfactprovesthatsocialsympathiesarelikelytofollowthecourseofdevelopments,ratherthanshapethem.
AstudyofthemoreactivegroupsofRussiansocietywithhighersocialcapitaland intellectualpotentialalso leads to theconclu-sionthattheexpectationsofpoliticalandsystemicchangewithinthemarevery limited.Thesegroups,whichcouldbedefinedin
31 Forinstance,atthepeakoftheanti-Kremlinprotestsin2011-2012theau-thoritiesfacedconsiderabledifficultyinorganisingcounter-demonstrationstoexpresssupportforVladimirPutin;participantsinpro-Putinactionshadtobebroughttotheralliesinbusesandpaidtoparticipate,andtheirbehav-iourattherallieswaspassive.
32 AsLiliaShevtsovanoted,Putin’sten-daydisappearanceinMarch2015causedmuchconcerninthestateadministrationandexpertcommunitiesbutdidnottriggeranymajorreactionamongthewiderpublic,whichmaymeanthatthepublicwillbehaveinasimilarwayintheeventthepresident’spositionweakensorfalters.See:HastheRussianSystem’sAgonyBegun?,ibidem.
33 In2011,asthepro-Kremlinpoliticalforceswerelosingtheirsupport(espe-ciallytheUnitedRussiaparty),andtheanti-Kremlinprotests,whosepartici-pantsweremostlyyoungpeople,weregainingmomentum,thepublicsenti-mentsstartedtoturntowardstheopposition;around40%ofpeoplesupportedtheprotesters (seehttp://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2012/12/13_a_4889485.shtml).Anotherevidenceofthisis.AlexeiNavalny’sresultinthe2013elec-tionsformayorofMoscow:afteradynamicandcharismaticcampaign,Na-valnymanagedtogarnernearly30%ofvotes(hisrealshowingwasprobablyevenbetter).
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simplified termsasurban middle class andwhich account foraround 15–18% of the population,34 formed the core of the anti-Kremlinprotestsin2011–2012.ThoseprotestsshowedthatthereweregroupsinRussiansocietywhichhadadoptedattitudesandvaluestypicalofmodernsocieties,whichinturnwarrantedabe-lief that themiddle classes could be the vectors of a new, non-Sovietawarenessandpoliticalculture,andcouldbethesubjectsofmodernisation.35However, a closer look at the values and at-titudesoftheRussianmiddleclassrevealedthatitsexpectationsconcerningchangewereverylimited,andreformofthepoliticalsphereplayedonlyaminorrole in them.Themiddleclass isasdiverseintermsofvaluesasRussiansocietyisasawhole.Valuestypical ofmodern societies (self-reliance, individualism, enter-prise,rationality,respectforprivateproperty)coexistwithvaluesfoundintraditionalistandpatriarchalsocieties,suchastheneedforastrongstateandanequaldistributionofgoods.ThepoliticalnormsandvaluesheldbytheRussianmiddleclassdifferconsid-erablyfromthoseheldintheWest(forinstance,researchershavepointedtolegalnihilisminRussia,amongotherfactors),andeventheideaofrapprochementwiththeWestisnotapriority.36
34 TheRussianmiddleclassonthemost-desireddirectionofthestate’sdevelop-ment:researchprojectbySvetlanaMareyeva,InstituteofSociology,RussianAcademyofSciences,http://www.opec.ru/1813805.html.Theclassificationmethodologywas based on four criteria: education, professional status,wealthandself-identification.
35 Seeinter aliaNataliaTikhonova,InstituteofSociology,RussianAcademyofSciences,ThemiddleclassasthesubjectofRussia’smodernisation,www.lawinrussia.ru/srednii-klass-kak-subekt-modernizatsii-rossi
36 Tikhonova,Mareyeva,op. cit.Mareyeva:ThereisgeneralagreementinRus-siansocietythattheWesternmodelofdevelopmentcannotautomaticallybeappliedinRussia.ThoseadvocatingtheWesternmodelofdevelopmentcur-rentlyaccountfor33%ofthemiddleclass(23%onaverageinothersegmentsofsociety),afigurewhichhasdroppedbyaround10percentoverthelastdecade(from43%in2003).Membersofthemiddleclassarealsoconvincedthatthenormsandinstitutionswhichplaytheirroleseffectivelyindevel-opedWesternsocietieswouldnotproducethesameoutcomesinRussia.Themiddleclass’sattitudetowardstheprincipleoftheruleoflawisalsoambigu-ous:itsmembersbelievethatoneshouldabidebythelawonlyifmembersofthestatebodiesalsoabidebyit(theresultsintheothersegmentsofsocietywerepracticallyidentical).
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This is largely due to the specificity and origins of theRussianmiddleclass,whichisaproduct of the period of oil-based pros-perity under Putin. Administration officials, including mem-bersoftheinstitutionsofforce,37accountforalargepartofthisgroup,whichalsoincludesaconsiderablenumberofpeoplewhoare formally private entrepreneurs or members of the liberalprofessionsbuthaveeconomiclinkswiththestate,thatis,theybenefitfrompublicprocurement,makemoneyoffprovidingser-vices to thepublic sector,etc.Thisgeneratescomplex identitiesandcomplicatedmotivations in relationswith the state; ononehand, representativesofmiddle class expectgradual liberalisa-tionthatwouldsecuretheirrights,butontheother,theyfearany‘revolutionary’changethatcouldcausedestabilisation.Theopin-ionsvoicedbymanyordinarymembersofthemiddleclassindi-catethatthosepeopledonotexpectathoroughreformofthestatemodel,butsimplywantitsmostrestrictiveaspectstoberemediedwhilepreservingtheinformal(pathological)rulesofwhichtheythemselves have also been beneficiaries.38 For amajority of theRussianmiddleclass,thecaseofUkraine(andespeciallytheca-pabilityof ‘thestreet’ tochangegovernments) is tantamount tothedestructionofthestate,whiletheirmostdesiredscenarioforRussiaseemstobetheruleofDmitryMedvedev,whoofferedmiti-gatedformofexercisingpowerwithoutconsiderablychangingitssubstance.
A‘politically motivated’ section of the middle class,whichbe-lievesthatadeeperreformofthesystemisnecessary,alsoexistsinRussia,but itcannotcreatethecriticalmassneededto influ-encethecourseofevents. Itsdevelopmenthasbeenarrestedbythewaveofrestrictionsitfacedintheaftermathoftheprotests
37 AccordingtoestimatesbyNataliaTikhonova(RussianAcademyofSciences),aroundhalfthemiddle-classpopulationareemployedinthepublicsectorandtheirincomesarenotregulatedbythemarket.Op. cit.
38 Membersofthemiddleclasscommonlyacceptcorruption,whichtheyseeasawayofresolvingsituationswhendealingwiththestatebodies,orwhenonehasviolatedthelaw.
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in2011–2012;aswellasbytheeconomicdecline,whichhashitthesectorswhereitsmembersmaketheirliving,i.e.theindependentmedia,non-governmentalorganisationsand theadvertising in-dustry.39Paradoxically,openbordershavenothelpedthisgroup’sgrowth;manyswornopponentsofthegovernmenthavedecidedtoleavethecountrybecauseofthelackofanyprospectsforde-mocratisation. Russia has experienced an unprecedented waveofemigrationinrecentyears,40whichmainlyinvolvedmembersofthemiddleclasses,andiscomparableintermsofscaletotheemigrationwaveofthe1990s.IthascontributedtothegrowthofRussiandiasporasinCentralEurope(especiallyinLatvia,withitsliberalresidencyrules,aswellasBulgariaandtheCzechRepub-lic)andinWesternEurope(London,Berlin)41.
ThephenomenonobservedinRussia, i.e.theperiodicpoliticalmo-bilisationsofsomeoppositionsocialgroups(theperestroikawaveinthemid-1980s,thefirsthalfofthe1990s,theturnof2012)couldbeseenascyclical social involvement.Thosewavesofactivismhavetriggered(orstrengthened)processesatthenational level,buttheyhavenot ledtotheformationof lastingandinfluentialcivilsocietystructuresthatcoulddefendcivilrightsinRussiaandstrive toestablishsocietyasapoliticalactor.While thegeneralpublicisanimportant(orevencrucial)factorinthegovernment’slegitimacy,atthesametimeitisbeingeffectivelymanipulatedbythegovernmentusingeconomicandpropagandamethods.How-ever,contrarytosomeopinions, thecurrentrulingteamseemsincapableofbuilding a neo-totalitarian system involving themobilisationofthepublicandmassrepression.Theobstaclesthatprevent such a course includeboth the lack of an effective and
39 TheSMEsectorhasshrunkbyaroundamillionpeople.Formoreinforma-tion,seeGeorgyStepanov, Российский средний класс расстается с амби-циями,Novyye Izvestia,30March215.
40 Morethan200,000peopleemigratedfromRussiapermanentlyin2014,andmanyothershaveleftRussiatemporarilyormovedtheirfamiliesabroad.
41 SeeJadwigaRogoża,Emigracjarozczarowanych[Emigrationofthedisillu-sioned],Nowa Europa Wschodnia [New Eastern Europe],6/2014.
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efficient state apparatus, and the lackof an inspiring and com-monlysharedideology,whichtogethercouldeffectivelymobilisethemasses,aswasthecaseintheStalinistperiod.
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III. the outlooK for the future – change of the leaderShIP or the SyStem?
ThePutinistmodelofstateisfacingtheprospectofdegradation and financial & organisational inefficiency.TheresourcesthattheRussianstatewillcommandinthecomingyearswillbe in-creasinglyinsufficienttocovertheinflatedbudgetspendinglev-elsoftherecentpast,andortomeettheneedsoftheunreformedandcapital-intensiveeconomy,aswellastheappetitesoftheelitesatalllevelsandtheextensivenetworkoflobbyistswhohavebeenfeedingoffthepublicfinanceinRussiaandexpecttobecontinu-allysupportedbythestate.Moreover,thequalityofthedecisionsbeingtakenbythestateauthoritieshasbeendeclining,as theyhabituallyentail side-effectswhich in themselvesoftenrequirecostlyremedialmeasures.Asmentionedabove,theannexationofCrimeahasledtoaspectacularconsolidationofVladimirPutin’spower,butitalsotriggeredaconfrontationwiththeWest(whichhasharmedtheinterestsofmanygroupsinRussia)andthesanc-tionswhichhavehittheRussianeconomy;itforcedRussiatostartfinancing both the newly-acquired region and the subsequentmilitaryoperationinDonbas;anditboostedthestate’srepressivenature,againstrikingattheinterestsoflargesectionsoftheRus-sianelite.ThepolicyofconfrontationwiththeWesthasalsoaf-fectedRussia’seconomicmodelbasedonexportingtheresources–ofwhichtheEuropeanUnionis,andwillforsometimeremain,themainconsumer–andtheabsorptionofrevenuebytheelite.42
StudiesoftheRussianstate’sconditionincreasinglyrefertoanag-ony of the system,43whichhasbeenunabletogeneratenewdevel-opmentprojects,andwhosereactiontotheprogressingdegrada-tionhasbeenlimitedtoescalatingrepressionandtheuseofforce.
42 AsLiliaShevtsovahassaid,theKremlinhaschangedRussiaintoafortressundersiege,whichcannotbereconciledwithanotherparadigm,thatofRus-siathepetrolstation.Своим возрождением Запад будет обязан Путину,colta.ru,14April2015.
43 SeeLiliaShevtsova,HastheRussianSystem’sAgonyBegun?,op. cit.
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However,thesymptomsofagonydonotautomaticallymeanthatthecollapseofthePutinistsystemisimminent.Thesystem’sagonymayturnouttobeaprotractedprocess,becausetherearemanyfactorsinRussiawhichincreasethe system’s potential to endure,even while it continues to degrade. The economic and systemicfactorsthatshouldbenamedinthiscontext includethe ‘manualcontrol’mechanismsintheeconomywhich,eventhoughtheyper-petuatethearchaicandinefficienteconomicmodel,maybehelpfulinpostponingcrises in individualbranchesof theeconomy,sus-tainingindividualstrategicallyimportantenterprises,orregulat-ingthepricesofstaplefoods,whichisvitallyimportantforthelessaffluentstrataofsociety.ApossibleimprovementinthemarketforRussia’sexportresourcesinthecomingyearsmayalsocontributetoextendingthelifeofRussia’sinefficienteconomicmodel.
A numberofpoliticalandsocialfactorswillalsocontributetosus-tainingthe inefficient system.TheRussianpublicatlarge,whichassociatesanychangeofgovernmentwithdestabilisationandcha-os,haslenttherulingcampveryhigh(albeitpassive)support,andissusceptibletomanipulationbythegovernment.MeanwhilethatpartofRussiansocietywhoseattitudesandinterestsruncountertothegovernment’slineistooweakandsmalltobuildthecriticalmassneededtoinitiatechange.Theattitudeofthebroadlyunder-stoodelitesofRussia,i.e.business,thestateadministrationandtheintellectualandculturalcommunities,isevenmoresignificantforthepoliticalregime’sviability.Eventhoughmanygroupsintheelite(andbusinessinparticular)havebeensufferingconsiderablelossesasaresultoftheRussiangovernment’santi-Westernglobal-powerpoliticsandthelackofreliableguaranteesofpropertyrights,whattheyfearevenmoreisachangeofleadershipandthedestabilisa-tionitcouldentail.Thecurrentsystem,whilefarfromperfect,isstillregardedasalesserevilcomparedtotheprospectofchange.The dominant view, also outside Russia, is that Vladimir Putincould only be replaced by ‘someone evenworse’, such as amoreradicalmemberof the security servicesoranationalist.Thisat-titudetestifiestotheefficacyoftheKremlin’snarrative,whichhas
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beenbuildinganimageofPutinasthesoleguarantorofpoliticalandeconomicstability,thesole‘European’44andashieldtoprotecttheoligarchsandtheassetstheyacquiredforpeanutsinthe1990sfromthepeople’swrath.
At present, Putin’s inner circle, consisting of past and presentmembersofthesecretservices,hasthegreatestandmostdirectinfluence on the Russian leader’s position and continued rule.Only thisgroupseemsable toexert influencebothon thedeci-sionsofthepresidentandthedecisionsconcerningthepresident.Asstatedabove,thesepeoplesharePutin’sworldview,whilethepresidentisaguaranteethattheyretaintheirpositionandinflu-ence.However,thegreatestchallengetothesystem’sstabilityisposedbyitsownunderlyingfeature,i.e.thefactthatitisbasedoninformalrules,personallinks,sympathiesandrelationsoftrustthatarefarfromtransparentorpredictable.Insuchconditions,externalobserversfinditverydifficulttopreciselydiagnoseandidentify the relationswithin the system, the shifting interestsandambitionsofindividualactors.Asresearchersargue,intheevent of a ‘palace coup’, the criteria guiding the elitemembersconductingthecoupareveryfarfromwhatisconsideredaspub-lic policy criteria in democratic states. Thekey factors concernneitherthepopularityoftheleadertobetoppled,norlevelsofeco-nomicgrowth,butrather thearbitrary interestsandambitionsofthoseundertakingthecoup.45AtthisstageitcouldbesaidthatPutin’spolicyhasalsobeen triggeringsomemutedreactions inhisclosestcircle.Accordingtoresearchers,thevoiceofYevgenyPrimakov,therecentlydeceasedformerprimeministerandheadoftheForeignIntelligenceService,highlyrespectedinthesecret
44 ThisillustratesacertainhistoricalcontinuityinthethinkingoftheRussianeliteandintelligentsia,whosebiggestfearconcernsa‘revoltofthemasses’;inthiscontextoneoftenhearsthequotefromAlexanderPushkin:“Thegovern-mentisthesoleEuropeaninourcountry”.
45 SeeNaunihalSingh,Seizingpower:Thestrategiclogicofmilitarycoups,inYekaterinaShulman,Неокремлинология и ее пределы,Vedomosti, 2Febru-ary2015.
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servicecommunity,wasasignalof thiskind. Inhis statementsandpublications lastyear,Primakovexpressedcautious scepti-cismabouttheconflictwiththeWest,whichinhisviewhadgonetoofar,andthelossesithadgeneratedforRussia.46
Another challenge to the current personalised regime and Pu-tin’spositioncomesfromtheneedtoconstantlydemonstrate the leader’s strength, skill and vitality.Insuchasystemthepresi-dent’s image,andespeciallythewayhe isperceivedbyhisowncircle,isasimportantashisformalprerogatives.ThisisvisibleintheKremlin’spropaganda,whichhasbeenemphasisingthepresi-dent’spersonalroleinthepivotalmomentsofRussianhistory(thedocumentariesmentionedaboveattributeRussia’ssuccessesoverthelast15yearssolelytoPutin).Atthesametime,Putin’sindeci-sioninsomecrucialsituationshashadanadverseimpactonhisimage.Much criticismwas voiced after the president failed toadoptadecisivestanceintheaftermathofBorisNemtsov’sassas-sination,ortotakeanyvisiblemeasurestoresolvetheopencon-flictthatbrokeoutatthattimebetweenthesecretservices(theFSB and the Investigative Committee) and the Chechen leaderRamzanKadyrov.Thepresident’s imagewasalsomarredbyhispanickyreactionon‘BlackTuesday’(16December2014,whentheexchangerateoftheroubleagainstthedollarandtheeuroplum-meted),orhishelplessnessduringtheannualpressconferencesinDecember2014andApril2015,whenhewasunabletopresenta convincing strategy for solving Russia’s deepening economicproblems or offer a vision of Russia’s further development. Fi-nally,histen-daydisappearanceinMarch2015alsocreatedabadimpression,asittriggeredawaveofspeculationsabouthishealthand plastic surgery procedures that hewas allegedly undergo-ing. Such critiques,which are thepolitical norm indemocratic
46 ProfessorMarkGaleotti,whostudiestheRussianpowerelite,hascoinedtheterm‘seventhcolumn’todenotetheinfluentialsiloviksinPutin’sinnercirclewhoopposefurtherconfrontationwiththeWesternworldandmayposethegreatestchallengetoPutin’sposition.Seehttps://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2015/01/24/russias-intelligence-system-a-presentation
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countries,resonatewidelyintheextremelypersonalisedRussiansystem,andaprotracted,unexplainedabsenceoftheleadermayupsetthesystemasitreliesonthe‘manualcontrol’mode.
TheevolutionofthePutinistsystemdemonstratesthattheRus-sian leadershiphas followed thepathofundemocratic regimes,which often start by carrying out reforms in the spirit of ‘en-lightened absolutism’ and enduppreserving their powerusingevermoreradicalmethods.Suchsystemsrenderitimpossibleforthoseinpowertostepdownvoluntarily,becausedoingsowouldmeanlosingtheirposition,assets,andsometimeseventheirper-sonalsecurity.this makes a peaceful succession less likely to happen and imposes the logicofextendingthe leader’srule in-definitely,which can only be limited by a “human factor”. Theexperienceofthelast15yearsofRussia’shistoryshowsthat‘ex-traordinarymeans’,i.e.military successes and gains in foreign conflicts,arethemosteffectivewaytoconsolidatepower.Putin’spopularitypeakedin2000,attheheightoftheSecondChechenWar;in2008duringthearmedconflictwithGeorgia;andintheyears2014–2015,followingtheannexationofCrimeaandduringtheconflictineasternUkraine.Sucheventsareeffectiveinmak-ingthepublicforgetaboutinternalproblems,includingeconomicdifficulties.47 However, this mechanism may be double-edged,andoncetheforeignconflictisover,thesociety’sattentionshiftsbacktointernalissues,includingthevitalquestionofstandardsofliving(afterthe‘Georgianeuphoria’publicsentimentsquicklystartedtodeteriorateasaresultoftheeconomiccrisisintheyears2008–2009).The subsidence of popular euphoria oneyear aftertheannexationofCrimeaalsoprovesthattheeffectsoftheuseofforceandpropagandainevitablywearoff.That,inturn,makesitmorelikely,oreveninevitable,thattheuseofsuchmethodswillbeescalatedandthefieldsofconflictexpanded.
47 MikhailDmitriyev, Внешнеполитический конфликт как основа рейтинга президента, Vedomosti, 1March2015.
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EventhoughtheRussianleadershiphasinstrumentstoprolongthedurationofthecurrentsystem,itsinternalunpredictabilitymay result in the accumulationofnegative factors and, in con-sequence,anextensive crisis of the state.While it isprobablethat in the aftermath of such a crisis the country’s leadershipmaybereplaced,asystemic change leadingtotheformationofadecentralisedpolitical systembasedon institutions isamuchlessrealisticprospect.TheauthoritarianmodelofpowerrootedintheRussiantraditionseemssettooutlastthecurrentRussianleadership.Atthisstage,therearenomajorforcesinRussiathatcould offer a programme for a deep reform of the statemodel,evenamongtheopposition.Thepoliticalprojectsthatexist,suchasthoseofAlexeiNavalnyortheémigréMikhailKhodorkovsky,aregeneralanddonothavemanysupporters,whichmeansthatatthisstagetheyaresimplyutopian.Anewleadershipcouldonlybe‘ushered’intotheKremlinbymembersofthecurrentrulingelite,whoarelikelytooptforsystemicandpersonalcontinuity.
mareK menKISzaK (ed.)