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When "No" Means "Yes to Revolution": Electoral Politics in Bolivarian VenezuelaAuthor(s): Daniel HellingerSource: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 3, Venezuelan Exceptionalism Revisited: NewPerspectives on Politics and Society (May, 2005), pp. 8-32Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040240

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When "No" Means "Yesto Revolution"ElectoralPolitics in BolivarianVenezuelabyDaniel Hellinger

The lessons of historysuggestthatpluralist onstitutional tructures re-sent myriadways for opponents o block radicaloverhaulof social and eco-nomic structures.Antimajoritarianhecks andbalancesmakeredistributionof wealth and changes in propertyregimes difficult to implement.Whenthese mechanisms ail, the capitalist lass seems willing andableto abandonconstitutional oliticsand all backupon he state'snight-watchman,he mil-itary. n dependentnations, he weight andresourcesof the hegemoncan bebrought o bearto influencethe outcome.Often,however, nstitutional ndextraconstitutionalools of reactionare unnecessary n polyarchies.'Elec-tionsthemselves eemto suck he ife bloodoutof revolutionarymovements.The Venezuelan ecallelectionof August 15, 2004, evidentlyacceleratedrather hanretarded evolutionarymomentum.OnthatdayVenezuelanswentto the polls in extraordinary umbers o vote on an oppositionpetition torevoke hence,revocatorio)PresidentHugoChivez's electoralmandate woyears before he was to complete his term. To achieve this objective andthereby terminate he BolivarianRevolution, he opposition CoordinadorDemocritica CD) needed o win morevotes than he president adreceivedin his second electoralvictory of July 2000 (following the adoptionof thenew constitution).Not only did the CD fail to exceed thatnumberbutthe Nooption triumphedwith 59 percentof the vote. The majority aid yes to theChavista evolutionary roject.This articlewill examine he ways in whichelectoralpoliticsanddefenseof a revolutionaryegimeweremadecompatible n Venezuela.Aftera reviewof some theoreticalperspectives n elections and social change,a compari-son of the Venezuelan ase withearlier pisodesof electoralpolitics n a rev-olutionary ontext (Nicaragua nd Chile), and a review of the politicalandconstitutionalssues thathad o be resolved o allowthe recallelection o takeDaniel Hellinger s a professorof politicalscience at WebsterUniversity St. Louis), a coeditor(with SteveEllner)of Venezuelan olitics n the ChdvezEra (2003), president f the VenezuelanStudies Sectionof the LatinAmericanStudiesAssociation,and a participating ditorof LatinAmericanPerspectives.LATIN MERICANERSPECTIVES,ssue142,Vol. 2 No. 3, May2005 8-32DOI: 10.1177/0094582X05275530 2005LatinAmericanerspectives8

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Hellinger ELECTORAL OLITICS N BOLIVARIANVENEZUELA 9

place, we will examine polling data that demonstrate he class-polarizednatureof the vote. We will also assess the sustainability f the Chavista uc-cess storyby comparingaggregate esultsfor the recall and the subsequentregionalelections of October31. Despite the sweepingvictory of Chavistacandidatesn theseelections, he evel of mobilization f progovernmentot-ers fell significantly.Although this can be attributed n part to electoralfatigue,I argue hat t also reflects he incomplete nstitutionalizationf theparticipatory,protagonist"emocracy ften posedby Chaivez s an alterna-tive to representative emocracy.Failure o advanceon this frontmay makeChavismovulnerable o defeat n futureelections andreferendums.My contention s not thatelectionsand iberalregimesarepoliticallyneu-tralandopen to all democratic utcomes, ncludingrevolutionary nes. Thekey to harnessingan electoralprocess to a revolutionary rocess in Vene-zuela was the organic inkageof electoralmobilizationwith otherforms ofsocial class mobilization.Chivez has yet to solve the problemof institution-alizing he relationship etween hepopulardemocratic orcesthat ormed ndefense of his presidency and the Movimiento Quinta Repiblica (FifthRepublicMovement-MVR), the Chavistaparty.The participation f theformer s needed o preventChavismo romdegeneratingnto familiar ormsof clientelismandpopulism,buta party s needed o organizeChavista orceson the electoralbattlefield.The recallandregionalelectionsrevealdifficultyin reconciling hese two elementsof Chavismo.

ELECTIONS AND REVOLUTIONARYCHANGEElections are as much mechanisms or state control of citizens as vice

versa.Drawingon de TocquevilleandFoucault,BenjaminGinsbergargued,"Theelectionand heprison,alongwithmasseducation nd he factory,werethe great nstitutions f social control ntroducedn the eighteenthandnine-teenthcenturies o deal with the entry of the masses onto the political andeconomic stage. Since the nineteenth century, governmentshave ruledthrough lectoralmechanisms venwhentheyhavesometimesbeen ruledbythem" 1982: 2). An analogycanbe drawn, ddedGinsberg, o anautomobilefor which a single pedal controlsboth the brakeand the accelerator: Theprincipalmechanismby which citizens attempt o control he state simulta-neouslyhelps bothto limit popular nterventionn the governmental rocessand to increase he state'sauthority nd power" 1982: 3).Electionsusually ocus the attention f political eaderson thetaskof win-ning or holdingonto office, not social transformation. oliticalactivists endto put aside other mobilization strategies in favor of generating votes.

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10 LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES

Candidates, ctingas politicalentrepreneurs,ie with one another or nomi-nations,encouragingdivisivenessas activists side with different orces ordebate among themselvesthe wisdom of engaging in electoralpolitics. Independentnations,elections provideopeningsfor imperialistactors n theworld system to influencethe struggle or power."It s clear thatthe elec-toral front is not the most favourable ield for the revolution o advance,"wrote wo Marxist ournalists overing he Venezuelan ampaign.Althoughthey expected Chavez to win, they warned, "Here the vote of the mostactive elements, who participatedirectly in marches, assemblies, meet-ings, andtradeunions,countsas muchas the vote of the politically nactivelayersmore subject o the propaganda f the bourgeoismedia" Martin ndSanabria, 004).LatinAmerican xperienceprovidesamplereason o be cynicalabout herevolutionary otentialof electoralprocessesand pluralistpolitics. Nicara-gua s a case in point.WilliamRobinsondescribed he 1990electiondefeatofthe Sandinistas y the U.S.-supportedUni6n NacionalOpositora NationalOppositionUnion-UNO) coalitionas nothing ess thanan electoralcoup.He did not conclude from this, however,that elections were hopeless orunnecessaryn a revolutionary rocess."Whatmakes heNicaraguan xperi-ence importantor othercountriesand peoples is not that he FSLN [FrenteSandinistade Liberaci6nNacional] ost elections but that massive foreigninterference ompletelydistortedan endogenouspolitical process and un-dermined he abilityof the electionsto be a free choice regardinghe destinyof the country.U.S. intervention ndercut he Nicaraguan eople's righttoexercise self-determination"1992: 150).Because t was a plebiscite, he Venezuelan ecallelectionposedthe ques-tion of powermorestarkly han n Nicaragua r, beforethat, n Chile duringthe Unidad Popularexperience (1970-1973). The key electoral contests(1972 and 1973) in Chile were (respectively)municipaland congressionalelections, and the 1990 contest in Nicaraguawas a presidential lection.However, herewereways in whichtheseearlier lectionswerealso plebisci-tary.In both cases, the partiesand the electoratehad clearlypolarized ntocoalitions n support f andopposition o the government nd ts revolution-ary agenda, ust as in contemporaryVenezuela.The two elections in Chilewere watched closely to determinewhetherthe governmentof SalvadorAllendecouldwin a plebiscite o overhaul he constitution,whichwas essen-tial to its conceptionof a "Chileanway to socialism." n Nicaragua, he 1990electionpresented oterswith a clearoption: o continuewith or terminaterevolutionaryproject that, however sapped of momentum,was clearlydefinedby the UnitedStatesand nternal ppositionas a threat o the domi-nant capitalistmodel. The Nicaraguan ase is especially relevant o Vene-

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zuela because, similar o Chivez's conceptionof "protagonist emocracy,"the Sandinistas' onceptionof democracy ombined epresentative ndpar-ticipatorynotions.2An "electoral oup" s also a good way of describing heintentions of the Venezuelanversion of UNO, the CoordinadoraDemo-cratica CD), and ts supportersn Washington.

THE RECALLThe CD is a coalition of oppositionparties,business groups, and otherorganizations.t includesa number f labor eadersassociatedwiththe PuntoFijoregimeendedby Chivez's victory n the presidential lectionof Decem-ber 1998.Ironically, he egalbasisfor ts effort o recallPresidentChavez s aprovisionof the new "BolivarianConstitution" f 1999. The constitution sbasedon an uneasymixtureof pluralist ndparticipatory rovisions.Repre-sentatives chosen through a pluralist electoral process are supposed toengage in a high degree of consultationwith organizationsn civil society.The possibilityof recallingelectedofficials s one of the most mportant ro-visions designed o lend a protagonist ole to the masspublic-what Chavez

calls el soberano(the sovereign).AlthoughChavez s undeniablya charismatic igure,mass allegiance othe BolivarianConstitutionranscends is personalpopularity. he constitu-tion itself was subject o considerable nput from civil society (PastorandMartinezDalmau,2001) andafterwardwas mass-distributed. haivez evertired of talking about its provisions in his national speeches and A16Presidente,his weekly talk program.The mass uprising that contributedmightily to his restoration o power afterthe short-lived oup of April 11,2002, was as mucha defenseof the constitution s a defense of the presidenthimself. The abrogation f much of the charterby the junta nstalledby therevolt urnedmanyof its initialsupportersespecially n the military)againstthe new regime.Therecallprocesswas not the opposition's irstattempt o removeChavezfromoffice. Others ncluded he48-hourAprilcoup,a two-month ivic strikeand sabotageof the vital oil industry egun n Decemberof thatyear,and heguarimbaof February 7 to March2, 2004, whena campaign f civil disobe-diencebroughtaboutdisruptions, ometimesviolent,throughouthe easternhalf of Caracas. n eachcase, supporters f the president ountermobilizedomeet opposition hreats.Althoughkept relatively n check, streetviolenceanddeaths,especiallyduring he events eading o the Aprilcoup, raised hespecterof civil war,whichprobably erved o some degree o encourage ev-eral elite compromises hatpavedthe way for the recall.

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Giventhe degreeof polarization,t is not surprisinghata high degreeofmistrust haracterizedhe entireprocess.A bitter ight overthe compositionof the ConsejoNacionalElectoral NationalElectoralCouncil-CNE) wasresolved n 2001, when t was agreed hat t wouldbe composedof two mem-bers identifiedwith each side and a chairmanknown to be a supporter fChavezbut respectedas a jurist.3When on May 29, 2003, the governmentand he CD signedan agreement ccepting he idea of a referendum n Presi-dent Chivez's mandateas permittedby Article 72 of the constitution, heCNE was facedwith the formidable askof refereeing herecallpetitionpro-cess. UnderArticle72 the oppositionneeded o submitpetitionswith signa-tures amounting o more than 20 percentof registeredvoters, in this case2,451,821. The opposition gatheredand submitted ts petitions with over3,000,000 signatures n November2003.TheCNEacceptedonly 1,900,000signatures s valid,halfa millionshort.Over 800,000 of the rejectednamesappeared n petitionson which a singleperson appeared o have filled out all but the signatures.According o theCNE's rules, published n September2003, petitions were to include the"name, ast name, dentitycardnumber,date of birth,nameof organizationor voterregistry,originalsignatureby handand digitalfingerprint, f eachpetitioner f the recallreferendum,n legible form."Furthermore,Thepeti-tion for a referendum s a very personalact, which is why authorizationsto sign on behalf of anothervoter will not be permitted."4 hese provi-sions do not expressly prohibit organizersfrom filling out parts of peti-tions, but the CNE chose to interpret he rules broadly. n highly polarizedVenezuela,finding one's name on a petitionawaitingonly a signaturewassurely intimidating.The oppositionaccused he CNE majorityof being a pawn of Chaivez,charge argelyechoed n the internationalmedia.The CD carried he disputeinto the courts,and this elicited legal countermaneuveringrom the MVR.The case landedon the docketof two different hambers f the highlypoliti-cized SupremeCourt.The two chambers ssuedconflictingrulings,sendingthe matter o a hearingbefore he full court.Fortunatelyor the dividedcourt,the CD and he government, purred y international ressure ndmediation,signeda compromise greement o allow a "repair" rocess reparos) o takeplace. Many Chavistaswere angeredand claimed that the CNE's rules ofSeptemberdid not provide for such a widespread,systematicfollow-up.However,Article31 of theserulesdid envision he possibilityof a process oallow votersto verify or withdraw ignatures.5On the weekendof May 28-30, 2004, voterswere permitted o withdrawor reconfirm1,200,000 contestedsignatures.The hurdlewas made higherby a countermobilization y the Chavistas,an operationcalled Comando

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Ayacuchoheadedby leadersdrawn romthe MVR andthe four smallerpar-ties that make up the government oalition. Ayacucho'sgoal was to find200,000 citizenswilling to claimthat heirsignatureswere fraudulent, ut nthe end only 74,112 peopledenied hat heir ignatures adbeen freely given.On June4 the CNEverified hat he oppositionhadconfirmed 14,968 of thecontested ignatures,15,738 morethanneeded.Ayacuchowas also chargedwith gatheringenough signatures o recall 20 opposition egislators,but itsubmitted nough o putonly 9 CD legislators njeopardy.6 ertainly,he CDhad reason o be optimistic.To revoke PresidentChivez's mandate, he opposition needed to winmoreYes votes than he presidenthadreceived n the July 2000 presidentialelections. The triggernumberwas 3,757,773. To win, then, the oppositionwould haveto mobilizenot only the 2,500,000 who hadvoted for othercan-didates n 2000 but also another1,200,000 from the ranksof disillusionedChaivez upporters, bstainers, nd new voters.The CD's optimismsprangfrompolls throughout 003 showing hat hepresident's pproval atingshadfallen below 40 percent.The low approval atings eemedto reflectpopulardiscontentwith an economy thatcontinued o staggerand social insecurity.In addition, he CD could counton support rom he UnitedStates,especiallyfrom the NationalEndowment or Democracy NED), which funneledoverUS$1 million to oppositiongroups n 2003.The failuresof Ayacucho nducedChaivezo reorganize is forces for therecallbattle,giving birth o ComandoMaisanta,named or Chivez's grand-father,a nationalist uerrilla ighter. n a brilliantuse of historicaldiscourse,Chavez equatedthe No campaignwith the Battle of Santa Inds of 1859,which took place near the president'shometownof Barinas.In this battleGeneralEzequielZamora, he populistcaudilloand martyr, tilizedtacticalretreats o drawhis conservative nemies into a deadly strategic rap.TheChavez retreat o the electoralbattlefieldwas probably mprovised,but itproved o be no less a masterstroke.Chavez took direct control of the effort and drew more heavily uponthe ranks of his mass base. His supporterswere to organize themselvesinto neighborhood-level lectoralplatoonswith ten memberseach, in turngrouped into electoral battle units. However, even in Maisanta thereremained ensions between base committeesand midlevel "commanders."ManyMaisanta ommanderswere artists, ntellectuals,and communicatorsof goodwill but limitedpoliticalexperience.Some were politicianswith thesame deficienciesas the Ayacucho eaders.In Caracas,a swearing-in ere-mony for midlevelMaisanta ommanderswas canceledbecause of discon-tent in severalmilitantpoor barrios Harnecker, 004; Martinand Sanabria,2004).

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After some difficultnegotiationsand interventions y Chivez himself,Maisantawas able to take root and gain momentum, ven where the localleadershipwas not always up to the task. Spontaneously, ften organizingwherepeople worked ather hanwhere hey ived, going door o doorratherthanfollowing electoral ists, a grassrootsmovement ormed n response othepresident's all to action.As MartaHarnecker2004:43) has described t,the electoralbattleunits"allowedhundreds f thousands f supporters f theprocess to join together o carryout a concretepolitical ask independently,regardless f the qualityor lack of party eadership n their ocale."Herewas thekey to victory n the recall, he way so manynew votersweremobilized orelectoral ombat. n walking trongholds f Chavismo n Cara-cas andothercities, one couldnot help butbe impressedby the high levels ofenthusiasm ndpoliticization f ordinaryVenezuelans.MostpoorVenezue-lans were animatedby the same spirit hathad movedthemto descend romthebarrios o Miraflores n April 11, 2002, andafter16 monthsof ambitious,visible, andpalpable ocial programs hey hadmaterial nterests o reinforcetheir upport or a presidentwho seemed o havecome from heirownranks.In contrast o the Sandinistas,who turnedaway from mass organizingtowardmore raditional ampaign actics n the 1991election,Chaivezwiselyadopteda more participatory trategy.This strategywas available o himbecause, unlike the Sandinistas,he was willing and able to accelerate co-nomic andsocial programs ften at oddswith neoliberal rthodoxy, schew-ing the impositionof sacrificesupon his core, mass constituency.Of courseVenezuela had something that Nicaragua acked: oil rents, enhancedbyfavorableglobal market onditions.However, his was not entirelya matterof luck.Chaivez hapedmarket onditions hroughhis leadershipn revitaliz-ing the Organization f PetroleumExportingCountries OPEC), and hereversed he generous ermsoffered oreigncapital n the last PuntoFijo era(the aperturapetrolera; ee Mommer,2003).Maisantadeliveredan overwhelming ictorybecause t madean extraor-dinary ffort o mobilize he citizenry.Almost 10 millionVenezuelans oted,3 millionmore han n the national lectionof July2000 and70 percentof theeligible population.Hundredsof thousandsof Venezuelans,mostly drawnfrom the ranksof the poor,were persuaded o obtainor replace ost identitycards.Colombianswho had migrated n the boom yearsbefore 1990 finallysoughtcitizenshipand were eligible to cast theirvotes. On both sides, votereducation ampaigns nstructed itizenson how to makesure hey were reg-istered, ocate the correctpolling place, andprevent raud.According o fig-ures fromthe CNE (http://www.cne.gov.veaccessedDecember22, 2004]),the numberof registeredvoters increased romjust below 12.2 million inNovember2003 to over 14 million nine months ater.

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Campaignpropaganda ppearedacross the country.In Caracas,"No"signs were most prominentn the west, fluttering romranchos n the barrioshugging the hillsides and n huge housingblocks such as the militant23 deenero. In the more affluenteastern suburbs,especially where the capitalimperceptibly prawlsacross the borderdividingthe FederalDistrictfromthe neighboring tateof Miranda, Si' signs weremorevisible, reflecting heclass-polarizednatureof the contest. Venezuelans iving overseas, mostlyYes voters,traveledby air to consulates o vote. On election day, voters onboth sides, awakenedby bugle calls and knocks on the door by organizers,turnedout in massive numbers o line up at the polls before dawn. Manywaited seven or eight hours in the tropical sun, giving the world imagesresembling he lengthy,windingqueuesthatwere indeliblystampedon ourmemorieswhen SouthAfricansvoted for the firsttime after he collapse ofapartheid.Political polarization ormed aroundrace, not just class. Venezuelansocial structures ave long been fluid. Pardos (people of partiallyAfricandescent)andmestizoshavefound heirway into the ranksof the elite, butthevisible face of the opposition s strikinglywhite. Chavez, n contrast,has theface of Venezuelapopular,Afro-Indianas much as European.Race is ofcourse as much a social construction s a biological given. Chavistascon-ceive themselvesas the inheritors f a deeply mbedded radition f populistcaudillism emblematic of the bloody nineteenth-century ederalistWar.There s little doubtthatChivez's slogan "iNo volverdn " voked in manyVenezuelans esistance o a return o powerof a discredited ulingclass thatnot only lived differentlybut in theirminds' eye lookeddifferent.

ELECTORAL OBSERVATION,LEGITIMACY,AND INSTITUTIONALAUTONOMYThe agreement etween heCD and he governmentn May 2003 to utilizethe recall provisionsof the constitutionand the compromise o allow the"repair" f signatures uled nvalidby the CNE were both fosteredby pres-sure and mediation from (among others) the Organizationof AmericanStates(OAS) and he CarterCenter.Thesetwo organizations lso took on animportant esponsibilityas the key international bservers.Their role innegotiating ompromisesand undertaking erification f the fairnessof thevote was bitterlycriticizedby some Chavistas thoughnot by Chaivez im-self). Some well-known nternationaleftist intellectuals ontended hat heOAS and the CarterCenter were preparing he ground for supportingachargeof fraud n the event of a Chavezvictory.

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Alexander Cockburn, in The Nation (July 12, 2004), accused the OAS andformer U.S. President Jimmy Carter of acting on behalf of the opposition toexert "enormous pressure on the country's independent National ElectoralCouncil during the signature-gathering and verification process," describingtheir actions as part of a plan to "save the rich." James Petras, writing inCounterPunch (July 8, 2004), argued, "Behind the simple and humanefacade, Carter has a strategy to reverse progressive regimes and undermineinsurgent democrats. Carter and his 'team' from his Center probe and locateweaknesses among insecure democrats, particularly those under threat byUS-backed opponents and thus vulnerable to Carter's appeals to be 'prag-matic' and 'realistic'-meaning his barely disguised arguments to acceptfraudulent electoral results and gross US electoral intervention."

Despite these fears and warnings, the OAS and Carter confirmed thevalidity of the results, as a consequence attracting bitter criticism now fromthe CD. The lesson to be drawn is not that election monitoring or support for"civil society" by such organizations is always benign or is unrelated to theexercise of imperial hegemony. I would suggest that their role exemplifies atypical characteristic of a liberal, capitalist political order, its reliance uponthe "relative autonomy" (Poulantzas, 1980) of political authority. This rela-tive autonomy of liberal politics sometimes opens space for counterimperial-ist projects. It was the ability of Chavez to take advantage of contradictions inthe capitalist world order that allowed Bolivarianism to triumph over theobstacles posed by outside intervention and the limits of the electoral pro-cess. It would be mistaken to believe that such space always exists, but in thiscase Chavez recognized the opportunity and articulated t to his supportersbyusing the analogy to the Battle of Santa Inds.

Many critics charge that Chaivezwon the election the old-fashioned popu-list way--by buying votes with massive social spending made possible by anew oil boom. Part of the new oil policy was the creation of a lucrative socialfund by which Petr61leosde Venezuela (PDVSA) directly provided money tosubsidize popular markets and to support "missions" aimed at improvinghealth care and education services in the barrios. Patients were given leafletsand pro-Chavez T-shirts at the health clinics set up in poor areas by the BarrioAdentro program, which deploys mostly Cuban medical personnel to pro-vide health services. However, access to services was not made dependent onallegiance to Chaivezas is typical under personalist clientelism. The opposi-tion, lacking any program of its own, found itself promising not to dismantlethese programs in the future, a proposition that was hardly credible given itsshrill attacks on "Cubanization."

The ability of the Chaivezgovernment to deliver services in the barrios wascrucial to gaining support from the poorest sectors of the population,

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especially the informal sectors. Paul Oquist argues that the inability of theSandinistas to incorporate this sector, which expanded considerably in thecontext of war and economic privation imposed on Nicaragua by the UnitedStates, significantly contributed to their defeat in 1990. In Managua this fast-growing sector came to be known as the "apron bourgeoisie" because itenjoyed a relative boom due to profitable trading in the black and gray mar-kets, which in turn often expanded because of official price controls (1992:18-20). In Caracas, tensions between Freddy Bernal, the Chavista mayor ofthe municipality of Libertador, and ambulant street vendors (buhoneros)have sometimes escalated into street violence. This tendency has been coun-teracted to some degree by other factors, including Chivez's insistence thatthe street vendors are part of el soberano, the extension of citizenship to themany Colombian immigrants working in this sector, and the extensionof neighborhood services. This combination of factors may explain whyBernal, despite several tense incidents of conflict with Bolivarian grassrootsgroups, managed to get reelected with 70 percent of the vote in October.

If the government campaign abused the privileges of incumbency, itsadvantage was offset by the opposition's overwhelming support from the pri-vate media. Venezuela's four private television networks and most presti-gious newspapers went beyond mere support of the opposition; with thecomplete collapse of the old parties, the media themselves became the mostinstitutionalized force of opposition. Not merely biased, they actively orga-nized efforts to oust Chavez via coup, work stoppages, and recall. Certainly,such a prejudiced information system is incompatible with the basic princi-ple of democracy even in its weak pluralist form.

The international media devoted much attention to the opposition claim ofbias on the part of the CNE and neglected the Chavistas' claims of wide-spread fraudulent practices by the CD, including manufacturing of identitycards and pressure from employers. Chavez made many concessions thatwere questioned by his more militant supporters. For example, to ensure thata victory for Yes would result in a new election, the original date was movedfrom August 19 to August 15. Otherwise, Vice President Jose Vicente Rangelwould have finished the term.

All of the compromises, observation teams, and civic involvement did notprevent the opposition from claiming fraud after August 15. Perhaps no otheroutcome could have been expected. One the CD's most influential members,Sumate ("Join Up"), a middle-class organization funded by the NED, hadorganized an exit poll that purportedly showed a Yes victory. Few indepen-dent observers put much credence in the Sumate results, which were verylikely skewed by overrepresentation of voters in areas where volunteers werewilling to conduct their interviews. Even polls conducted by U.S. public

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relationscompaniesand by firms linked to the opposition,many of whichhadshown ow levels of approvalor thepresident hroughout 003 andearly2004, were in the final weeks of the recall campaignpredictingdefeat forthe CD.7Having thoroughly outed he opposition,PresidentChaivez aced diffi-cultchoices on how to proceed.He proclaimed imselfopento dialoguewiththe oppositionbutmade t clear hatnegotiationswerecontingent n recogni-tion of the legitimacyof the recall results.Against all empiricalevidence,some sectors of the opposition, ncludingHenry Ramos Allup, the leaderof Acci6n Democritica (DemocraticAction-AD), persisted n chargingfraud. Some influentialVenezuelan ntellectuals, ncludingMoisds Naim,editorof ForeignPolicy,echoed hesecharges e.g., Naim,2004). The argestbusiness confederation, he Federacion de Cimaras y Asociaci6nes deComercioy Producci6n Federation f Chambers ndAssociationsof Com-merceandProduction-FEDECAMARAS), ecognizing hefruitlessness fthis approach, eemed readyto deal with the new situationmore pragmati-cally. Ramos found himself forced to participate n the OctoberelectionswhenAD's labor eadershipmade t clear hat t was not nclined o desert heelectoralbattlefield.

CLASS POLARIZATIONIN THE RECALL ANDREGIONAL ELECTIONSIn Venezuela, he abstention ate n elections s vested with considerablesignificance or egitimacy. n thefirst ourelectionsafter he nauguration fthe PuntoFijo era n 1958, abstention emained elow 8 percent,a major ac-

tor n the defeatof the leftistguerrilla nsurgency f the 1960s.Whenabsten-tion rose to 18.1 percent n the 1988 election,manyobservers elt that t sig-naled a seriousdeterioration f regime egitimacy,and indeedthe Caracazoriots of 1989 seemed to confirmthat udgment.The abstention ate in therecallexceeded he ow ratesof theearlydecadesof thePuntoFijoera,but hecircumstanceswere somewhatdifferent.ManyVenezuelans addropped utof the system n the interim.The countryhadexperiencedmassivemigrationfromrural o urbanareas.New migrantswere separated romtheirpreviouspoliticalmoorings n the countryside;hey and theirdescendants n the bar-rios were neveras fully integratednto the PuntoFijo partysystem as werethe workingandthe middleclass (Myers,2004; Canache,2004). Manybar-rio residents acked he necessary dentitycardsor hadnot voted n a decade.Survey evidence also suggests that abstention n the 1990s rose in partbecauseof Chivez's call for voters o stayaway rom hepolls and o "imbed-

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ded systemicdissatisfaction, ot lack of motivation o participate ue to con-fidence in the system" Gil Yepes, 2004: 244). ComandoMaisantabroughtmanypoorvotersback ntothe system,butnearly30 percentof the electorateabstained rom a remarkably olarized,high-stakescontest.At the same time, the turnoutdemonstrated mobilization apacity hathad been thrown nto doubtby low ratesof participationn earlierreferen-dums.In December2000 less than25 percentof votershadgone to the pollsin a referendumon reorganizing he union movement.Although a largemajorityhad voted for the reorganization,he resultsshowedthatmass sup-port or sweepingawayall aspectsof PuntoFijo, in this case the powerof theConfederaci6n e Trabajadores enezolanos Confederation f VenezuelanWorkers-CTV), was not unlimited.Throughout 002 and 2003, the presi-dent's falling approval atingsseemed evidence of populardisillusionmentand rustrationwithcontinued conomichardship ndhigh social insecurity.To some degree,this perceptionwas contradicted y the response rom thebarrios o the short-lived oup of April2002, but would el soberanorallytoChivez's defensewhenthe attempt o oust him was undertakenonstitution-ally? The failuresof ComandoAyacuchogave the CD reason o believe thatChivez was vulnerable.

Although he abstention atedid not match he lows achieved n the earlyyears of Punto Fijo, the turnout n the 1998, 2000, and 2004 electionsreversed secular ise overthe preceding25 years,and he 9.8 millionvoterswho went to the polls in August2004 represented n increaseof more than3.2 millionvotersover the 2000 contest.The rise in electoralparticipationseven moreremarkable henone considers hatprior o the recallmanyVene-zuelanshadneverbothered o registeror replace ost identitycards.The low-est rates of electoralparticipationwere typically found in the barrios, heareaswherePresidentChaivezended o achievehis highest evels of support,but the obstacles,sociological and legal, were also highest n these areas.The president's nalogy o the Battleof Santa ndsprovedapt.As we havealready een, theturnout ate n therecallwas nearly50 percenthigher han nthe "mega-elections" f July 2000; it was 3.5 times higher han n the laborreferendum f December2000. However, t shouldbe notedthat he opposi-tion also contributedo the higher urnout.Despitethe increased urnout, hepercentage of the nationalvote won by Chaivez n 2004 was only a littlehigher han hatachieved n 1998andverysimilar o thatachieved n 2000.The mobilizationof the electoratewas clearly spurredby a process ofclass struggle that manifested itself in surveys of voter intentions. Themost comprehensive nalysisof voterswas conductedon behalfof the CNEby the opinion research company IMEDIOPSA n late June 2004. TheIMEDIOPSA tudy ound heNo optionsignificantly head, n this case 52.5

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percent o 39.2 percent, f anything omewhatunderestimatinghe size of theeventualChavezvictory. n six largestates unfortunately,atawereunavail-able for Zulia, the largest state) of the coastal highlands plus Caracas(Libertador) nd he industrial tateof Bolivar,voters n the two poorestcate-gories (D andE) indicated heir ntention o vote No by largemajorities seeTable 1), quite in contrast o voters in the A, B, and C categories.While agood deal of attentionhas been focused upon the supportof the urbanpoor(e.g., Canache,2004), it is worthnoting hatChavez'sadvantage mongthepoorest voters was even more pronounced n eight predominantly uralstates.Althougha majority f Venezuelansive in the moreurbanized tates,the depth of support or Chavez in ruralareas may provide a reserve ofstrength n future,more contestedelections, especially if the governmentcontinues ts land reformpolicies. The exception here would be the threeAndean tates,whereclass is correlatedmoreweaklywithpreferences n therecall.This maybe a reflectionof themore raditional egional ulture,whichis more mestizo (European nd Indian)and less African-influenced.A first test of the capacity of the Bolivarians o sustaintheir electoralmobilization apacitycame in the October egionalelectionsto elect gover-norsandmayors.On the surface, he resultsseemedunambiguously ositivefor Chavez.Chavista andidateswon 21 of 23 governorships ndthe metro-politanCaracas overnment. rogovernmentandidateswon controlof over70 percentof city governments. he Chavistaswon in the statesof Carabobo8and Miranda, ppositionstrongholds.Mirandawas an especiallybitter ossfor the CD, as GovernorEnriqueMendoza,a possible futurepresidentialcandidate,was defeated.The oppositiondid retain ontrolof the mayoraltiesin some middle-classmunicipalities Chacao,El Hatillo,Baruta,Los Salias,El Paez) n Miranda, ut t lost fourmayoraltieshat t hadheld n municipali-ties thathad voted heavily No (see Tables2 and 3).Certainly nternaldivisionsanddemoralization urt he opposition; omesectors advocated abstention, while others, including AD and PrimeroJusticia,a middle-classneoliberalpartystrongest n metropolitanCaracas,participatedn the hope of establishing heircredentials s the leadinganti-Chavez orce.9However,divisionsandfrustration n the opposition ide donot account or the precipitousdecline in turnout.Rates of turnout n areasthat voted heavily No were unimpressive.A certain degree of electoralfatiguewas to be expected,buttherewere other actorsat work hatought ogive pause to anyone who would interpret he results as an unambiguousvictoryfor Chavismo.The discreditedComandoAyacuchohad designatednominees for theregional lections, n many nstances mposingcandidates n a resistant ocalbase. Despite appeals rom grassroots eaders,Chavezopted to go forward

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TABLE 1Voter Preferences for Recall Election by State Type, Gender, and Cl

ClassA-B C D E

Type of State andPreference n % n % n % n % nUrbanaNo 16 19 148 34 581 56 584 64 1,329Yes 62 75 256 58 365 35 223 24 906RuralbNo 19 50 220 44 691 64 752 71 1,681

Yes 56 69 229 46 294 27 237 22 816AndeancNo 15 50 74 46 183 50 185 54 457Yes 11 37 71 44 149 41 122 35 354Source:IMEDIOPSASurveyfor the ConsejoNacionalElectoral NationalElectoralCouncil-CNE), June 2Note: Percentagesdo not addup to 100 because"Undecided" nd "NotVoting" re not included.a.Anzoitegui,Aragua,Bolivar,Carabobo,Lara,Miranda,Vargas, lusMunicipalityofLibertadorcentralCarunavailable.b. Apure,Barinas,Cojedes,Falc6n, Gudrico,Monagas,Portuguesa, ucre,Yaracuy.c. Merida,Tichira,Trujillo.

21

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TABLE 2No Vote in the Recall and Vote for Governor in October Electionsby StateVote or No GubernatorialVote

Abstention Abstention GV/NoState n % (%) n % (%) VoteaNational 5,800,629 59.1Amazonasb 28,522 70.3Anzoategui 261,877 54.1Apure 103,642 67.6Aragua 413,174 68.0Barinas 186,901 69.2Bolivar 293,027 66.4Carabobo 435,244 56.8Cojedes 78,143 67.0D. Amacuro 35,446 70.4MetroCaracasc N.A. N.A.Falc6n 193,639 57.2Guarico 183,007 71.0Lara 424,394 64.8M6rida 176,438 53.8Miranda 542,095 50.9Monagas 186,763 61.0N. Espartad 81,887

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TABLE 4Sustaining Electoral Mobilization of the Chavista Vote from AugustRecall to the October 31 Mayoral Elections in Selected Municipalities

Vote or LeadingOppositionCandidateNo Vote in OctoberState and Abstention AbstentionMunicipality n % (%) n % (%) M / NoaZuliaCabimasb 58,250 56.0 27.2 33,095 42.3 43.1 56.8Col6nb 16,977 57.3 35.7 6,810 46.9 27.0 40.1Lagunillasb 28,325 44.3 30.9 11,542 25.9 50.8 40.7Marac 33,084 65.3 33.1 7,900 18.5 44.2 23.9Maracaibo 228,924 48.6 32.4 171,648 49.6 49.7 75.0San Francisco 69,528 59.9 36.3 24,529 26.8 49.7 35.3SantaRitab 10,389 49.0 27.5 6,904 35.4 35.5 66.5Sim6n Bolivarb 9,227 52.1 28.2 5,371 36.7 39.0 58.2ValmoreRodriguezb 10,373 48.5 30.4 5,170 43.8 45.1 49.8Bolivar

Caronic 150,751 68.2 31.2 55,081 49.4 62.8 36.5Heresd 65,946 40.1 34.0 21,414 35.5 61.4 32.5AnzoiteguiAnacob 19,661 54.3 36.1 12,882 44.7 47.7 65.5Freitesb 14,246 53.3 29.8 7,611 36.0 43.1 53.4MonagasMaturinb 96,356 60.7 28.3 75,208 59.8 42.3 78.1Piarb 11,624 64.8 25.4 10,492 68.8 35.9 90.3SantaBarbarab 3,175 64.2 22.9 2,697 59.6 28.9 84.9Source:Direcci6nde EstadisticasElectorales,ConsejoNacionalElectoral NationalElectoralCouncil-CNE).Note: Octoberelection dataarepreliminary esults.a. Percentage f the AugustNo vote obtainedby the leadingopposition andidaten the Octobermayoralelection.b. Municipalities ocatednearor in significant il fields.c. Industrial reas:petrochemicaln Mara,metallurgicaln Caroni.d. Capitalwith industrial reas.

cast No ballots six weeks earlier. In some cases, the opposition mobilized ahigher percentage of the Yes vote total for its mayoral candidates thanChavistas did with regard to the No total.

High abstention was notable in B61livar, he Capital District, and Vargas,all areas where there was significant conflict between grassroots activistsand Chavista politicians. In Vargas, the imposition of an MVR candidate

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generatedhighly visible resistance rom electoralbattleunits. The govern-ment alliancewon the gubernatoriallection,but it barelymustered 3 per-cent of the No vote total n this heavilyurban,poor coastalstate.In Sucre,avery poor agriculturaltate,the incumbentChavistagovernorwas a formerpuntofijista politician from the Movimiento al Socialismo (MovementTowardSocialism-MAS) with a reputationor corruption.He survived hevote largelybecauseof the president's ackingandbecausedivisionswithinthe oppositionwere greater hanthose withinChavismo.Not atypically,hewon comfortably ven thoughhe obtained nly two-thirds f the No vote. Inthe hotly contestedgovernors' aces in Miranda,Monagas,and Carabobo,oppositioncandidates etaineda higherproportion f the recall vote totalsthandidthegovernment andidates. n Miranda,wheredivisions n theoppo-sition were exceptionallybitter, he Chavistacandidatedefeatedhis oppo-nent (Mendoza)by the narrowest f margins.Mayoral aces n the Caracas reaalso showeda mixedpattern.Chavistaswrestedback controlof the metropolitanCaracas egionalgovernment ndretainedcontrol over Libertador Caracasproper),but overall abstentionsoaredpast 68 percent n the lattercase. Chavistavictorieswere sometimesdue to idiosyncratic actorssuch as dividedoppositioncandidacies. n onecase, MunicipioPiez, a dividedoppositiondefeated quallydividedgovern-ment forces. Only in a few cases did the MVR far surpass he opposition nholdingonto the recallvoterbase.Abstention ateswereveryhigh across heboard.Relatively ow ratesof abstention 29 to 33 percent) ouldbe found nboth opposition e.g., Carrizal nd El Hatillo)and government e.g., Sim6nBolivar and Plaza) strongholds.Conversely,high rates (over 50 percent)could be also found in strongholds n both sides.The opposition'smost mportant ictoryby farwas in Zulia, he mostpop-ulous state and largestoil producer,with a strongregional radition.Domi-nated by the oil industryand the site of intense conflict over land reform,Zulia was an uncertain attlegroundn the recall,but t ultimatelywent nar-rowly for No. In the regional elections, Chavistasheld onto the mayor'soffice in Maracaibo y a scant199 votes, andelectoralabstentionwas over49percent,up from32.4 percent n August.The Chavistashadfew otherhappyresults. The incumbentopposition governor, a former member of AD,Manuel Rosales, defeated a retiredgeneral, Alberto Gutidrrez, or whomChivez hadcampaigned eavily.Votes or Rosales otaledover91 percentofthe Yes total, while Gutierrez allied only 65 percentof the No vote.If we examineselectedmayoral aces, we see thatChavistahegemony sclearly weaker n Zulia than n any otherareaof the country, ven Miranda(see Table3 and4).10Although he No optionwon in severalZuliamunicipal-ities (e.g., Col6n,Sim6nBolivar,Cabimas),majoritieswere generallybelow

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national evels. In other oil towns (e.g., Santa Rita, Lagunillas,ValmoreRodriguez), he Yes option actuallywon. Wherethe No option triumphedhandilywas in more industrializedmunicipalities uch as Mara(65.3 per-cent), home of a majorpetrochemical omplex ust northof Maracaibo, ndin San Francisco 59.9 percent),a large poor suburb outhof the city.Undoubtedly, lections n theseregionswere affectedby fallout romthedefeatof the oil companywork stoppageof 2002-2003 and the subsequentdischargeof 18,000 PDVSA employees.Many of these employees,dispro-portionately rom the skilled and professionalsectors, were evicted fromhomes that PDVSA providedas a benefitof employmentand were bitterlyaligned against the president.Workerswho stayed on the job performedheroicfeats to restoreproduction ndwere deeplycommitted o Chivez, butpreciselybecause heyfought n suchfashion o defend he BolivarianRevo-lution, they could not be takenfor granted. n severalcases, rifts appearedbetween government-endorsedandidatesand those linked to the labormovement.In Col6n, San Francisco,Mara,Cabimas,SantaRita, ValmoreRodriguez,Sim6n Rodriguez,andLagunillas,government-endorsedandi-datesfor a varietyof reasons division,higher evels of abstention, oorcan-didates) egistered ar ess than50 percent f theNo vote total.Besides osingthe gubernatorialace,the forces of Chavismo ailed (outsideof Maracaibo)to carrymost municipalities earoil and gas fields.In the period priorto 1998, the labor sector was the site of significantmovements o democratizeVenezuelan ociety anddevelopan alternativeopuntofijismo Hellinger, 003). This fact has been obscuredoutsideof Vene-zuelaby the alignment f top leaders,notablyCarlosOrtegaof the old CTV,with the CD and ts involvement n the coup of April2002. Divisions withinCausaR, the politicalparty hatspearheadedhatmovement, ubmergedhisproject,butpartsof theNuevo Sindicalismo New Unionism)movement ur-vived. In addition, ignificantportionsof the CTVhavebeen ableto adapt onew circumstances Ellner,2003), and leaders of unions aligned with theBolivarianUni6n Nacional de TrabajadoresNationalWorkers'Union-UNT) have proven ar from passive in relationswith the government.One must be cautious about drawing conclusions about the behaviorof unionizedworkers.The Chavistas riumphed andily n the recall elec-tion in the easternoil-producing tates of Anzoitegui and Monagasand incentralstates associatedwith manufacturingn the past. Unfortunately,heIMEDIOPSA urveydataprovidedby the CNE omitteda breakdown f theZulia vote by social class. However, t is worthnotingthat, n the tablesweexamined arlier, he mostcontestedblock of voterseverywherewas in the Ccategory and that in general voters in the working-poor D) classification

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were slightly less likely to vote No than were the poorestVenezuelans. nBolivar,wherethe New Unionism s strongest,Chavista andidateswon thegovernorship nd most mayoral aces,butthey carriedonly one-third f theNo vote over o the ocal contests n the most ndustrialized ndurbanpartsofthe state (see Table4).The availabledatado not permitdefinitiveconclusionsabout he overalltendencyof employees n the formalsector,especiallyunionizedworkers. twould seem that hese workersgave PresidentChivez a conditionalvote ofconfidence n the recall, perhapsrecognizing t as a way of defendingtheBolivarianConstitution, lockingthe returnof the reactionaryorces of thepast, and continuing he materialbenefits delivered o their communities.However, ike the BolivarianCircles and some middle-classgroups, orga-nized workersremaindeeply suspicious of political parties, ncludingtheMVR. Such an interpretation ouldbe consistentwith SteveEllner'sobser-vations(2003: 176-178) thatthe surestsupporters f Chivez are the urbanpoor andthat"the abormovementposed moreof a challenge o the govern-ment handidthe politicalpartiesof the opposition" 2003:177). I wouldaddthatpoorVenezuelansn the hinterland,hough ess numerous, reevenmoresecurebastionsof Chavismo.

ELECTORAL POLITICS ANDREVOLUTIONARYCHANGE IN VENEZUELAIn her comparative tudy of the Nicaraguan xperience,Rose Spaldingenumeratedive characteristicshatmake t easier or a revolutionaryegime"to negotiatewith economic elites, even as it pursuesredistributiveeform"

(1994: 191): weak oligarchical ontrol,an organizational oid in the privatesector,relatively ow threatperceptions mong ocal propertied lasses, firmpoliticalconsolidationof the regime,and sustained conomic growth.Fourof these conditionsseem to exist in Venezuela,which perhaps xplainswhythe compromisesneeded o holdtherecallcouldtakeplace. Sevendecadesofoil-basedrentierpolitics certainly eft Venezuelawith a weak traditional li-garchy.The collapse of the PuntoFijo partysystem eft the private ector nan organizational oid, withoutan effective vehicle for contestingChavez.Besides servingto some degreeas a prophylactic gainstU.S. intervention,Venezuela's il exporteconomyprovided, f not sustained conomicgrowth,resources o undertake edistributive eform.Early on, outside of politicalelites from the PuntoFijo system, it is doubtful hatotherVenezuelan co-nomic elites fully perceivedthe threat o their interests.By the time that

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became evident, with the radical decree laws of November 2001, Chaivezhadalready swept aside many of the political structures through which theseelites had defended their interests before 1998.

With his victory in the recall, Chavez may have achieved the fifth ofSpalding's criteria, political consolidation, but that does not mean thatBolivarianism has achieved hegemony. Four of ten Venezuelans who votedopted for recall. Three in ten eligible voters abstained. Given the rates of pov-erty in Venezuela, these sectors must include large numbers of those poorVenezuelans called el soberano by the president. And within the Bolivarianmovement there are signs of opposition. Many of these activists are the oneswho ensured that the recall, as an election, would serve as an accelerator ofrather than a brake on revolution.

Some sectors of international and national capital have sought to negotiatewith the Chavez government. The oil, banking, and construction sectors allhad material reasons to repair relations with a government that advocatesincubating domestic petroleum-related businesses, funding massive housingconstruction, and absorbing excess liquidity by borrowing domestically.International investment firms such as Morgan Guaranty actually raised thenation's bond ratings. Oil consulting firms indicated that given the prevailinghigh prices and the prospect of improved political stability, the industry wasprepared to accept the new rules of the game (including royalty payments)and do business.

What this means is that Chaiveznow faces some important strategic deci-sions from a position of strength. A confrontational stance with capital riskseconomic and international isolation; too accommodating a stance risks sap-ping the revolution of its creativity and mass appeal. President Chaivezgivesindications that he interprets his victory as a mandate to "deepen" theBolivarian Revolution. For example, he has ordered the armed forces to carryout a survey of unused land as part of an ambitious effort to replace unpro-ductive latifundias with peasant cooperatives and resettled urban poor. Thisbold move risks violent confrontation with landowners and poses, as is thecase with any agrarian reform, extraordinary challenges. It is one thing toredistribute land, another to provide credit, infrastructure, and secure mar-kets in rural areas. High oil prices serve as a cushion in what will be a difficulttransitional period.

The opposition, as we have seen, also increased its capacity to mobilizevotes as a result of the recall. If it can sustain this capacity, it may be able totake advantage of the constitutional provisions allowing for repeal of legisla-tion through referendums and for initiatives to pass laws hostile to theBolivarian project. For example, one right-wing populist proposal is to dis-tribute shares of PDVSA to individual citizens, a proposal that might be made

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attractive to a population that continues to experience serious privation. Suchtactics are more promising for opponents to the extent to which Bolivarianelectoral mobilization declines toward the levels of 2000.

Politically, Chavez still faces the difficult task of consolidating an institu-tional vehicle for his revolutionary project. One legacy of Punto Fijo democ-racy is deeply rooted antiparty sentiment. Chavez won in 1998 and 2000 asthe candidate of the MVR in an alliance, the Polo Patri6tica (PP). For the firstthree years, he leaned heavily on the political sagacity of Luis Miquilena, aleftist skilled in the bargaining and tradeoffs of the clientelist Punto Fijo era.The MVR seemed then to have eclipsed the Movimiento Bolivariano Revo-lucionario (Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-MBR). But the MVRunder Miquilena became more a legislative faction than a vehicle for socialmobilization, so Chavez in 2001 sought to reinvigorate the MBR (promptingMiquilena's departure) and promoted the formation of Bolivarian Circles, aprocess aided by the mass response to the coup of April 11, 2002 (seeHansen, Hawkins, and Seawright, 2003). The formation of Maisanta was afurther step in that direction, but the tensions between mobilization politicsand electoral politics reasserted themselves in the regional elections of Octo-ber. They are likely to be visible in the legislative elections of 2005.

Roberto Hernandez Montoya (2004), a writer and president of theR6mulo Gallegos Center of Latin American Studies, argues that Venezuela'sprocess has avoided the problem of "revolution degenerating into govern-ment": "We have overcome in Venezuela the dangers of Stalinism or the trag-edy of the so-called Democratic Kampuchea, led by Pol Pot. And also, on theother side of hubris, we have overcome the poltroonery of social democracy,as in Venezuela's Acci6n Democritica and [Spain's Social Democratic]Felipe Gonzilez." In other words, thus far Chavismo has not settled for thekind of reformism that eschews the deeper social and economic reformspromised by revolutionary movements.

Electoral politics have played a role in avoiding either unwanted result,but there is no guarantee that they will continue to forestall either tragedy ortorpor. Venezuela remains extraordinarily polarized, and authoritarian ten-dencies can be seen in both camps. Furthermore, there remains a danger thatelections could pull the revolution toward "poltroonery," hat is, that they willonce again become occasions for opportunist politicians to exercise clientel-ism and to co-opt mass democracy. One test for democracy in Venezuela willbe whether the politicians and bureaucrats of the MVR convert the missionsinto patronage vehicles to cement their own control. The Bolivarian concep-tion of protagonist democracy envisions an active civil society that is able toshape legislation and participate in choosing judges, human rights defenders,and ombudsmen. The institutional apparatus and legal structure for identify-

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ing authentic epresentatives f civil society will be difficult o create n away that avoids corporatismand demobilizes sectors drawn nto politicsthrough esistance o the April2002 coup anddefeatof the recall.It remainsto be seen whether he MVR or any otherpartycan transform tself into avehicle for popular ecruitment nd controlof candidates nd officials.

CONCLUSIONShould he vote of the engagedcountmorethan he vote of the morepas-sive elements, ncluding hose in whose namethe revolution s made?If the

hegemonyof a revolutionary roject s to be achieved, omehowthose whoare to be liberated n a revolutionary rocess must become engaged in itsdefenseat theballotbox, not ust in the streets. n this studywe haveseen thatthe recall election of August 15, 2004, in Venezuelawas extraordinarilyclass-polarized, specially around he dimensionof living conditionsanddistribution f wealth.The workingclass moretraditionally efined,whichremainsone centerof power in Venezuela, eems less uniformlyChavistathan the urban and rural poor. The triumph of Chivez shows that electionsneed not dampen revolutionary momentum. However, the results of the localelections that followed the recall indicate that maintaining this momentumdepends upon a continuing commitment to social justice and to the creationof political institutions that make protagonist democracy a reality.

NOTES1. The term"polyarchy" as coinedby RobertDahl (1971) to describe he structural har-acteristicsof pluralist olities.WilliamRobinson 1996) demonstrateshe U.S. predilection orthis type of weak democracywith applicationn particularo the cases of Chile, Nicaragua, he

Philippines,and Haiti.2. Thehistoricprogram f theFrenteSandinista e Liberaci6nNacional FSLN)envisioneda democracypredicated n combiningrepresentative emocracy, articipatory emocracy, ndindividual ights.Its program ncorporated n explicit commitment o "pluralism" s it broad-ened ts alliance n the final struggle or power. n thefirst ive yearsof the revolution, heseprin-ciples tookconcrete orm n thecreation f massorganizationshatwererepresentedn a Councilof State. n 1984,hoping o reinforce nternationalegitimacy, hegovernment eldnational lec-tions, which it won overwhelmingly.Vandenand Prevost 1992: 92-97) arguethat from thatpoint on the regimemovedsteadilyaway fromparticipatory rinciples owarda morepluralistformof democracy.The mass organizationswerepromiseddirectparticipationn the governingprocess, but by 1990 the FSLN had become a much more conventional olitical party.Aidedgreatlyby the NationalEndowmentor Democracy NED) andotherovertandcovertoperations

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by Washington,n the contextof warfatigue, he Uni6nNacionalOpositora NationalOpposi-tion Union-UNO) successfullyexploited he Sandinista ailures.3. The opposition's onfidence n the chairman, ranciscoCarrasquero,id not survive heprocess ntact.4. Regulations were reproduced by Venezuelanalisison its web site, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/docs.php?dno=1003accessedDecember20, 2004).5. See "De los reparos,"Article31, Normaspara regular os procesos de revocatoriosdemandatesde cargos de eleccidnpopular,http://www.cne.gov.ve/documentos/reg_eferenda0l.php (accessed September 5, 2003).

6. These recalls were still being disputedand had not been held by the end of 2004.7. Forexample, he Datospoll conducted y AntonioGil Yepes n lateJuneshowedChaivezwinning51 percentof the vote (see Sanchez,2004).8. Althoughno convincingdirectevidencehas surfaced, he oppositionhas the strongestcircumstantialase for electoral raud n the case of Carabobo,wherecandidates ssociatedwithSalasFeo swept irstposition n eachdistrict orthestateassemblybutSalasFeo himself ost.9. In this respect,PrimeroJusticiaclearlytrumpedAccion Democritica(AD) amongthemiddleclass of the Caracasarea,but it has yet to show that t can mobilize voters at the samenational cale as even a greatlyweakenedAD.

10. Oneexceptionmaybe the smallstateof NuevaEsparta, ependent n a devastatedouristindustryon Margaritaslandand traditionally n AD stronghold.

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2004 "Urban oor and politicalorder," p. 33-49 in J. McCoy and D. J. Myers (eds.), TheUnravelling f Representative emocracy n Venezuela. altimore: ohnsHopkinsUniver-sity Press.Dahl, RobertA.1971 Polyarchy:Participation nd Opposition.New Haven:Yale UniversityPress.Ellner,Steve2003 "Organizedabor and the challenge of Chavismo," p. 161-178 in S. Ellner and D.Hellinger eds.), Venezuelan olitics n the ChdvezEra. Boulder:LynneRienner.Gil Yepes,Jose Antonio2004 "Publicopinion,political socialization,and regime stabilization," p. 231-262 in J.McCoyandD. J. Myers(eds.), The Unravelling f Representative emocracy n Venezuela.Baltimore: ohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.Ginsberg,Benjamin1982 TheConsequences f Consent:Elections,CitizenControl, nd PopularAcquiescence.Reading,MA: Addison-Wesley.Hansen,David R., KirkA. Hawkins,andJasonSeawright2003 "Dependent ivil society: the circulosbolivarianos n Venezuela." aperprepared orthe 25th International ongressof the LatinAmericanStudiesAssociation,Las Vegas,NV,October7-9.Harnecker,Marta2004 "After he referendumVenezuela aces new challenges."MonthlyReview56 (Novem-ber): 34-48. http://www.monthlyreview.org/1104harnecker.htmaccessed December 20,2004).

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