30. Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future

30. Bipolarity, Multipolarity,and the Future

Richard N. RoSeCranCe is Professor of Political Science at theUniversity of California, Berkeley. A leading student of international systems andthe dynamics that sustain and transform them, he has authored Action andReaction in World Politics (1963) and Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in theNuclear Epoch (1967), as well as edited The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons (1966).In this selection Professor Rosecrance traces a structure of the global internationalsystem that falls midway between the contrasting structures identified in thetwo previous selections. His invigorating analysis should press the reader toreassess again the prevailing structure and stability of world politics in the nuclearage. [Reprinted from The Journal of Conflict Resolution, X (1966) 314-27, bypermission of the author and the publisher. Copyright 1966 by the University ofMichigan.]

In April 1961 Dr. Stanley Hoffmann of HarvardUniversity reminded us that it was no longersufficient to design ideal schemes for the preserva-tion of peace on earth (Hoffmann, 1961). Worldgovernment might be completely desirable, but itwas also unattainable. In the future our projectedUtopias should also be "relevant." Various writershave since taken up Hoffmann's challenge, and weare now told that "bipolarity" on the one hand or"multipolarity" on the other are practical answersto major current difficulties (see Waltz, 1964;Deutsch and Singer, 1964). The purpose of thepresent essay is to examine these proposed "relevantUtopias" and to offer an alternative view. In the endwe will discover that neither bipolarity nor multi-polarity provides general solutions to basic conflictsin the contemporary international system.

I. Bipolarity

The argument for bipolarity is dual: it is allegedlydesirable, as opposed, say, to a multipolar inter-

national order; it is also a continuing state of affairs.Four reasons are given to persuade us that a bipolarorder will reduce international violence. First,"with only two world powers there are no peripher-ies" (Waltz, 1964, p. 882). This juxtaposition entailsa vital interest and involvement in all the outcomesof world politics. Both the Soviets and the Americansmust be concerned with happenings in widelyseparated areas of the globe—Korea, Cuba, Vietnam,Eastern Europe, to name but a few. Far from leadingto violence, however, the commitment on oppositesides has led to a solid and determinate balance.No expansion could be decisively successful;counterpressure is always applied. The very existenceof serial confrontation renders the balance morestable. Each counterposition of power discouragesthe next. There are no realms open to aggrandize-ment.

Second, not only is the competition extensive,but its intensity has increased. The space race,economic growth, military preparedness, the pro-paganda struggle, and domestic issues of all sorts

325

326 Theories of Balance and Imbalance

have assumed significance in international relations."Policy proceeds by imitation, with occasionalattempts to outflank" (Waltz, 1964, p. 883). Nothingescapes calculation in terms of the internationalbalance. By asserting the interests of the two greatpowers in even minor equilibrations of the balance,the bipolar international system keeps on an evenkeel; nice adjustments do not pass unnoticed. Athird stabilizing factor is the "nearly constantpresence of pressure and the recurrence of crises"(Waltz, 1964, p. 883). Crises are natural and evendesirable in a condition of conflict. If crises do notoccur, it means that one side or the other is neglectingits own interests. Maintenance of the balance willthen require small or large wars waged later on. Aslong as there are only two major protagonists, therecan be no question of the impact caused by a favor-able change in the position of one; there also,presumably, can be no uncertainty of an "equal andopposite reaction." "When possible enemies areseveral in number [however] unity of action amongstates is difficult to secure." Under bipolar conditions,moreover, "caution, moderation, and the manage-ment of crisis come to be of great. . . importance"(Waltz, 1964, p. 884). One pushes to the limit, butnot beyond.

Fourth, and finally, the preponderant power ofthe two superstates means that minor shifts in thebalance are not of decisive significance. The U.S."lost" China in 1949, the Soviet Union "lost" it in1962, but neither change drastically altered theRussian-American equipoise. The two states wereso strong they could accommodate change. Whiledefection of a major Western European state wouldbe significant, "a five per cent growth rate sustainedfor three years would add to the American grossnational product an amount greater than the entiregross national product of Britain or France or WestGermany" (Waltz, 1964, p. 903). Rearmament,economic growth, scientific education—all thesewere means of internal compensation for inter-national shifts in the balance. The U.S. and theU.S.S.R. confronted each other over each proximateissue, but few of the issues were of decisive impor-tance.

Not only is bipolarity desirable—its proponentsclaim that it will continue indefinitely; it is a con-dition to which we must adjust. Patterns of economicgrowth indicate that the Soviet Union and the

United States will have economic systems morethan twice as large as any conceivable competitoruntil past the year 2000. Nor has the spread ofnuclear weapons appreciably influenced the amountof power middle-ranking states can dispose. Britain'snuclear program, so it is argued, is dependent on theU.S., and while France may gain an independentcapability, she is likely to find it vulnerable or uselessin a crisis. If independent capabilities began to besignificant militarily, the nuclear giants wouldmerely increase their offensive or defensive postures(Waltz, 1964, pp. 894-95). As a result of modestexertions, the bipolar world would be restored.

II. Bipolarity: A Critique

There are, in rejoinder, three arguments againstbipolarity as a desirable (or even as the best attain-able) international system. The first is that bipolaritycomprehends only one of the impulsions to expansionor aggression. While it may be true that internationalpolarization helps to prevent successful expansionby either side, since it calls forth counterpressure bythe opposing camp, it does not reduce motivationsfor expansion and may even increase them. Since thecompetition between poles is both intensive andextensive, each action by one will be viewed as astrategic gambit by the other. Even actions whichmay not be intended to have international referencewill be seen in terms of the bipolar competition. Thisin turn must accentuate the political hostility betweencamps. The antagonism generated on one side byaction of the other will be reciprocated, and the tempoof discord will increase. Since the competition is akinto that of a zero-sum game (see Waltz, 1964, p. 882),this is a quite natural outcome. Any advance in theposition of one must take place at the expense of hisadversary; hence the slightest improvement in theposition of one must provoke the other to newexertions. The respective concern to advance ormaintain one's position is realistic in the frameworkof a two-power competition. The psychologicalclimate in which such a struggle takes place, more-over, is likely to be one of growing ill-will. At somepoint in this degenerative process one side may thinknot only of the risks consequent upon striking hisopponent, but also of the risks he may suffer if hedecides not to strike. Eventually reciprocal fears ofsurprise attack may grow to such a point that they

[30] Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future 327

cannot be endured. Preventive war may be seen tobe preferable to war at the opponent's initiative.

A second disadvantage of the case for bipolarityis that two quite different notions of the term appearto be employed. According to one, the Soviet Unionand the United States are engaged in a duel for worldsupremacy or, at minimum, in a struggle to maintaintheir relative positions. An action by one directlyaffects the position of the other; all internationalchanges are of vital significance in that they affectthe balance between the two. According to the othernotion of bipolarity, however, substantial territorialand/or political changes can take place in internation-al relations without impinging on the overarchingstability. The U.S. can "gain" or "lose" China with-out appreciable impact on the balance. If the latteris true, it is because international politics is notanalogous to a two-person zero-sum game. Theincrement (or decrement) to the U.S. is not asimultaneous loss (or gain) to the U.S.S.R. The"gain" is not at the expense of previously Soviet-heldterritory; the "loss" is not at the expense of previouslyAmerican-held territory. China is an independentquantity in world politics, not merely a factor inSoviet or Western strength.' If this situation prevails,there can be important shifts in the internationalbalance which do not upset the basic relationbetween the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. That relation,however, is no longer bipolar. All changes are eithervital in that they directly affect the bipolar balance,or they are not vital in that they fail to do so.2

Thirdly, the prescription "peace by crisis" is adubious palliative. It seems equivalent to saying thatthe world's most peaceful place is on the brink ofwar. Pacific features may be present in one sense, inthat nations presumably try harder to avoid war whenthey are faced with it as an immediate prospect. Butif the will to avoid war is greater, the proximity of waris also greater. Cuban and Vietnamese crises maybe stabilizing in that they teach techniques of "crisismanagement," but they are destabilizing in that thereis always the possibility that the lessons will not be

1 It should be noted that it is not pertinent to arguethat the magnitude of bipolar power vis-d-vis Chinesepower is so great that a change in Chinese allegiance isinsignificant. If Chinese power is very slight comparedwith both bipolar powers, the balance between poles isnarrow enough to make a switch in alliance of greatimportance.

2 Waltz recognizes but does not assign due weightto this contradiction (see Waltz, 1964, p. 903).

learned. When one decides to fight fire with fire, heengages in a policy of calculated risks. At minimum,it is not unambiguously clear that serial crises are thebest means to peace.

Bipolarity also seems to have been confusedwith detente. Under conditions of detente crisesmay be manageable, and peace may be preserved.But detente is directly contrary to one of themajor formulations of bipolarity. Detente pre-sumes that the interests of two parties can be ad-vanced simultaneously. The zero-sum notion ofbipolarity requires that the interests of one can beadvanced only at the expense of those of the other.And if it is then maintained that the looser notion ofbipolarity is to be accepted in consequence, one mayrejoin that a loose bipolar system does not involvean absence of peripheries. The two poles may thenremain partially indifferent and unaffected by evensignificant changes in the distribution of internationalpower. Immediate countervailing pressures, then,are not called forth by each change in the status quo.Imbalance may emerge. In the result one mustchoose between two different international systems :a system in which change can be accommodatedwithout drastic action by the two major camps andin which, as a result, disequilibrium can occur; or asystem in which there is a taut balance maintainedby vigilant employment of counterpressure and inwhich the antagonism between camps is likely tobe very great. The first may permit detente but is notstrictly bipolar; the second offers stringent bipolaritybut rules out accommodation. The two notionsare not compatible, and the argument for one under-mines the contentions urged on behalf of the other.

III. Multipolarity

If bipolarity does not pass muster as a "relevantUtopia" for international relations, what of multi-polarity ? Does it have special advantages to offer ?Again a dual argument may be given. Multipolarity,it is maintained, not only meets the requirements ofa reasonable Utopia, but it can be approximatedin future international politics.3 Aside from the

3 Hedley Bull, for example, sees warrant for the viewthat in the next ten years "the system of polarization ofpower will cease to be recognizable; that other states willcount for so much in world politics that the two presentgreat powers will find it difficult, even when cooperating,to dominate them" (Bull, 1963, p. 21).


feasibility of multipolarity, however, three basicreasons commend it to our attention as a desirableinternational system. First, multipolarity affords agreater number of interaction opportunities (Deutschand Singer, 1964, pp. 392-96). The number ofpossible dyadic relationships in a multipolar systemis very great, and it rises in increasing proportion tothe number of states (poles). This plenitude of inter-acting partners means that there is a greatly reduceddanger of mutually reinforcing antagonism betweentwo states. Individual states will have associationswith a great variety of others; their cross-cuttingloyalties will tend to reduce hostility expressed towardone particular state or against one particular cause.Multipolarity, it is claimed, avoids the major dis-advantage of a bipolar international order. Sinceworld politics would not be a zero-sum game, actionby one nation would not require an offsetting responseby its single opponent. Instead of the mutual re-inforcement of hostility expressed in terms of "posi-tive feedback" there may be the dissipation ofhostility through "negative feedback" (Deutsch andSinger, 1964, p. 393). Multipolarity, then, providesthe basis for a stable social system; bipolarity cannotdo so. In addition, not only does the need for theexpression of augmented hostility fail to appear, butthe availability of alternative partners makes possiblea response other than direct challenge or militarythreat. If a state finds itself the object of hostility, itmay respond indirectly by firming its connectionswith other states. This in turn preserves the peacefulatmosphere.

A second argument offered on behalf of multi-polarity is that it diminishes the attention paid toother states (Deutsch and Singer, 1964, pp. 396-400);". . .as the number of independent actors in thesystem increases, the share of its attention that anynation can devote to any other must of necessitydecrease" (p. 396). Since a nation can only activelyattend to a certain maximum number of other statesat any given time, a large multipolar internationalsystem will mean that a number of national actionswill not reach the threshold of international signifi-cance. Conflicts may be limited in this manner. "It isperhaps not excessive to assume that the minimalattention ratio for an escalating conflict would haveto be i: 9, since it does not seem likely that anycountry could be provoked very far into an escalatingconflict with less than 10 per cent of the foreign

policy attention of its government devoted to thematter" (Deutsch and Singer, 1964, p. 399). Aneleven-state world (assuming relative equality ofpower) would, then, avoid serious conflict (p. 398).

Thirdly, it is contended that a multipolarsystem, in contrast to bipolarity, has a dampeningeffect upon arms races. If a state, A, is allocating halfof its military strength against B and half against Cand D together, and B begins to rearm, A's counter-vailing increment is only half of what it would be ifA and B were the only powers in the system. Thetypical bipolar model, involving an escalating armsrace between two opposed powers, then fails topredict the outcome. Multipolarity is responsiblefor limiting the arms competition.

The proponents of multipolarity admit thatthere are circumstances under which an internationalsystem of many equivalent powers could becomeunstable. In present-day international politics thereare powers more reckless than the Soviet Union andthe United States. If these powers obtained a nuclearweapons capability they might use it in a disruptivefashion (Deutsch and Singer, 1964, p. 404). But "...if the spread of nuclear weapons could be slowed downor controlled, a transition from the bipolar inter-national system of the early 19505 to an increasinglymultipolar system in the 19603 might buy mankindsome valuable time to seek some more dependablebases for world order" (p. 406; authors' emphasis).It is also acknowledged that, while multipolarity ismost likely in the near future, in the long run thereseems to be a tendency for multipolar systems tobreak down. "If the probability of states' perishingis small, but larger than zero, and the probability ofsubstantial new powers' arising is zero. . . then themodel will predict a diminishing number of effectivecontenders, leading eventually to a two-powerworld or to the survival of a single power.. ."(p.405).Assuming restraint on the dispersion of nuclearweapons and imminent multipolarity in the immedi-ate future, however, one can look forward to a morepeaceful international environment.

IV. Multipolarity: A Critique

The case of multipolarity offers remedies for certainof the disadvantages of bipolarity mentioned above.There should be no cause under multipolarity fortotal international concentration on the reciprocally


reinforcing hostility between two states. Alternativeinterests, antagonisms, and connections shoulddistract attention from a focused bilateral struggle.If two-power arms races develop, they should beof much less consequence than under bipolarity. Atthe same time, multipolarity has its unique deficien-cies. At least three points may be raised against it.

First, it seems highly probable that a multipolarworld order will increase the number of internationalconflicts, though it may possibly reduce theirsignificance. A bipolar system can have but oneantagonism; multipolarity, on the other hand, mayhave virtually numberless frictions. While theattentions of international actors will be dispersedthroughout the system, the variety of national inter-ests expressed will multiply. Inevitably, nationalinterests are a complex amalgam of popular attitudes,tradition, geographic situation, economic and mili-tary strength, ideological orientation, and govern-mental structure. Since in a multipolar order a greatnumber of states will be significant actors in thesystem, a bewildering range of claims and interestsmust ensue. As the other writers have contended,conflict is partly a function of the degree of particu-larity in the international system (see Waltz, 1959).The greater the gamut of demands, the harder it mustbe to accommodate them. Thus multipolarity, byincreasing diversity, must also increase conflicts ofinterest.

This assessment may be countered by theargument that the results of multipolar conflict willbe much less catastrophic for the internationalsystem than the potential results of bipolar conflict;that:

Pbo x R*. > Pmo x R..

where Pbc and .Rbc are the probability and resultsof bipolar conflict and Pmc and /?mo are similarquantities for multipolar conflict. The expectationof bipolar conflict (probability times results) wouldbe greater than the expectation of multipolar conflict.This reformulation, however, is open to two difficul-ties. First, it shows that the advantages of the multi-polar system depend on the variable magnitudesassumed. If a multipolar order limits the conse-quences of conflict, it can scarcely diminish theirnumber. If a bipolar system involves a serious conflictbetween the two poles, it at least reduces or eliminatesconflict elsewhere in the system. The choice between

systems, then, depends upon the size of the respectivequantities in a given case. Second, if nuclear weaponsare widely disseminated in a multipolar environment,bipolarity must be seen to be the better alternative.In such circumstances the greater frequency ofmultipolar conflict would be accompanied by devas-tating or disastrous results, and the probability-times-results formula above would suggest that a bipolarsystem is preferable.

The second major criticism of the case formultipolarity flows directly from these considerations.If a multipolar international order is as harmoniousas its proponents claim, even widespread distributionof nuclear weapons should not destabilize the system.As new states enter, the ensuing diminution ofnational attention should reduce friction. If statesreally fail to pay attention to their fellows, whatdifferences should diffusion of nuclear weaponsmake ? That the dissemination of weapons is viewedas crucial, however, indicates that multipolar expo-nents recognize the latent conflict in a multistatesystem. States are reckless only if they are, or con-ceive themselves to be, embroiled in conflict. Thosefeatures of multipolarity with which we are familiar(in the nationalist, underdeveloped world) are notcharacterized by lack of interest or attention. Theyare marked by a highly political awareness of thepostures and attitudes of other states. And if somestates do not attend to one another, as might beassumed to be the case in the relations of—say—Thailand and Bolivia, this is by no means a generalfeature of underdeveloped politics. The occasionaldiscontinuities in communication in one part of thesystem are more than compensated by the range anddepth of contacts, both friendly and hostile, whichoccur in others. Since these contacts link states ofvery different national interests, they are bound toproduce antagonism. And atomic weapons super-imposed on antagonism are a recipe for instability.

Thirdly, a multipolar international system,while reducing the significance of any single changeof alignment or military posture, inevitably com-pounds uncertainty. In a bipolar world, an adjust-ment in relative position of the two poles is importantfor the entire system. Changes, however, arerelatively simple to predict. In a multipower worlda single alteration in alliance combination or militaryprowess may not be decisive for the system as awhole, but its consequences are far more difficult to


calculate (see Burns, 1957). The number of tentativecombinations is astronomic; military dispositionsmay take myriad forms. Multipolarity, then, raisesthe difficulty of policy-making. Results may bealtogether unforeseen; choice becomes very complex.Since multipolarity raises incalculability, the systemfinds it more difficult to achieve stable results. Warmay occur, not through a failure of will, but througha failure of comprehension.4

V. Toward an Alternative System

The respective disadvantages of bipolarity andmultipolarity as monolithic images of future inter-national systems should not blind us to their attractivefeatures. Bipolarity provides for well-nigh automaticequilibration of the international balance; inaddition, while reinforcing conflict between the twopoles, it at least has the merit of preventing conflictelsewhere in the system. Multipolarity reduces thesignificance of major-power conflict by spreadingantagonism uniformly through the system. What weshould wish for a future relevant Utopia is to combinethe desirable facets of each without their attendantdisabilities. In practice, even the adherents of oneor the other find merit in a wider view. The devoteesof bipolarity seem implicitly to include the detente(which was a response of the United States and theSoviet Union to their position in a larger internationalsystem); the proponents of multipolarity draw backwhen it is proposed that nuclear weapons be part ofthe multipolar diffusion of power.

The objective can be accurately described,though it is difficult to give it an appropriate name.The relations between two major powers would bestrongly conditioned by the presence and activityof other states. This means that international politicswould not be a zero-sum competition between twosuperpowers. The resources of the internationalsystem would not be entirely divided up between thetwo major states with future outcomes dependentupon a bilateral competition between them. Rather,resources would remain to be appropriated, and therivalry between the two major protagonists wouldoccur in the external international environment aswell as in the national preserves of each. Because

4 It is possible that the origins of World War I owesomething to the inability to calculate policies of otherstates until it was too late to change them.

external avenues of possible expansion would exist,neither major state need presume that only a directconflict with its antagonist could decide the issue.The bilateral conflict might be adjusted or equilibrat-ed through actions in the external realm; gains byone power could be made up by countervailinggains by the other. Nor should serial appropriationdecide the ultimate fate of the external internationalworld. If the two great powers merely proceeded toapportion slices of the remaining international pie,they would in time be brought back to a strictbipolar confrontation, with all the horrendousconsequences which this might involve. The multi-polar features of the external sphere should preventsubstantial transfers of real estate and politicalallegiance. Neither hegemony would be acceptableto burgeoning power centers of the external area;changes of alignment or international dispositionwould not barter the fundamental independence ofexternal states. The bipolar powers would continueto seek advantages in the multipolar realm, but theywould fail to eliminate multipolar orientations.

This failure, in turn, might lead to disenchant-ment with equilibration via the external realm. Thebipolar powers might then seek direct advantages inan intensified struggle over the national position ofeach. If the multipolar challenge were sufficientlygreat, however, the bipolar states might reduce theirown competition for the purpose of making occasionalcommon cause in opposition to external claims.Ultimately, the bipolar states might seek a detentebased on mutual recognition of two rigidities: (i)the difficulty of achieving preponderance in directinternal competition; (2) the difficulty of makingmajor gains in the external environment. Confrontingexternal challenge, moreover, both might realizethat the international status quo was preferable topossible foreshadowed deterioration. Since coopera-tion in international relations tends to be reinforcedby conflict elsewhere in the system, resurgence of themultipolar region would produce a tendency towardbipolar agreement.

One of the uncertainties in such a situationwould stem from reversals for either of the twomajor states in the multipolar realm. In order torecoup a lost position of strength, the bipolar statesmight be tempted to heighten the conflict betweenthemselves to reinsure for a multipolar client thevalue of past association or alignment. And at present


the United States has sought to reaffirm nuclearsolidarity with its NATO allies by proposing acounterforce strategy directed against the SovietUnion. If the commitment to Europe is underscoredin the one case, the detente with Russia is alsoaffected. The multilateral nuclear force, designed toreassure several West European states, also generatedSoviet opposition. On the other hand, Sovietattempts to reassure China and North Vietnam of thebenefits of the Russian alliance are bound to impingeon U.S. relations. Closer ties with China wouldinevitably weaken new-found bases of Westernaccord. In the short run, then, it seems likely that theU.S. will have to accept some erosion of its pastposition in Europe, while the Soviets will have toadjust to a diminished role in both Eastern Europeand the Far East. If they fail to do so, it will be at theexpense of cordiality at the bipolar level.

The maintenance of the detente is of fundamentalinternational significance, both theoretical andpractical. It is theoretically important because itavoids the antagonism of the zero-sum game instrict bipolar terms. It also obviates a general trendtoward multipolarity, with the loss of control andincrease in the frequency of conflict that this wouldinvolve. A modicum of bipolar cooperation dampenshostility in the external sphere; interventions may beat least partially designed for the purpose of prevent-ing multipolar conflict that could threaten centralbipolar stability. In practical terms the detenteis the means by which the spread of nuclear weaponsmay be channelled, controlled, or halted. It should beobserved that nuclear weapons do not affect thetheoretical questions of conflict and cooperation. Ameasure of bipolar agreement has been achieveddespite opposing nuclear weapons systems. The dis-persion of weapons is important not because of thenew conflicts which it creates, but because it sanctionsradical options in the waging of old conflicts. Inso doing it threatens the balance attained at thebipolar level. Nuclear weapons may also, over aconsiderable period of time, give the appearance oftransforming a bipolar-multipolar order into a systemof general multipolarity. This fundamental alterationwould be unlikely to occur in fact, but it is one of arange of possible future outcomes.

If the detente is desirable, it is possible to havetoo much of a good thing. A total bipolar rapproche-ment, an end to the Cold War, would be likely to

create a new bilateral tension between major powerand multipower spheres. In practical terms it wouldrepresent a conflict of rich countries and poorcountries, industrial states and agricultural states,European and colored races, northern and southernnations. This emergent bipolarity would demand arapid spread of nuclear weapons in previouslymultipolar areas. It would require a hasty amalgama-tion of economic systems and pooling of industrialresources: the multipolar area would transform itselfthrough a new political coordination. The zero-sumgame might be played once again.

A bipolar-multipolar system, on the other hand,would seek to avoid the extremes of either parentform. Enough bipolar control of multipolar realmswould take place to prevent extremes of conflict,or, if conflict could be averted, to dissociate bipolarinterests from outcomes in the area. At the same timebipolar competition would continue in multipolaras well as bipolar regions. The two major states wouldact as regulators for conflict in the external areas;but multipolar states would act as mediators andbuffers for conflict between the bipolar powers. Inneither case would conflict be eliminated, but itmight be held in check. Indeed, if hostilities weresuddenly eliminated in one realm but not the other,the result would be adverse to general stability. Ifconflict cannot be eradicated both generally andsimultaneously, its abolition in one part is deleteriousto the whole.

VI. Bi-multipolarityIt is now possible to list the characteristics of anintermediate international system, a system ofbi-multipolarity.

Relationship of Interests

The significant feature of interests in such a sys-tem is that they would be partially opposed and par-tially harmonious. The relation between the bipolarnations would be cooperative in that it would reflectmutual interests in restraining conflict or challengein the multipolar region. The relation between bipolarpowers would be competitive in that each would seekto prevent the other from attaining predominanceeither militarily or in connections with the multipolarworld. The multipolar states would have an equallyambivalent pattern of interests. In regard to oneanother there would be rivalries stemming from the


variety of national perspectives and positions; therewould also, however, be common interests in resistingthe ambitions of the bipolar powers. In regard to thebipolar states there might be individual interestssupporting military guarantees or economic assis-tance from one (or both) of the major powers. Therewould also be resistance to big-power encroachment.In no case, however, would the pattern of interestsresemble that of a zero- or constant-sum game.Bipolar powers would not directly confront oneanother; multipolar powers would not developirrevocable antagonisms among themselves; and themultipolar and bipolar worlds would not be complete-ly opposed. Conflict within each sphere and betweenspheres would be restrained.

EquilibrationEquilibration, or the redressing of the inter-

national balance, will be a more difficult task in abipolar-multipolar structure than in a strictlybipolar world. Since in the latter system interestsare so clearly opposed, any advantage accruing toone evidently must be made up by the other. In abi-multipolar system where interests are cooperativeas well as conflictual, the consequences of a changein the position of one state will be harder to estimate.Since relationships will be more harmonious, on theother hand, the need for equilibration will be signifi-cantly reduced.

PredictabilityPolicy-making in a bi-multipolar system will be

more difficult than in a system of bipolarity. A fargreater range of separate national decisions must beconsidered. At the same time, since the bipolar stateswill exert an important influence on the trend ofevents in the multipolar fraction of the world, states-men would not be confronted by the sheer indeter-minacy of a strictly multipolar order. While shiftswould be harder to predict than under generalbipolarity, the momentousness of each shift wouldbe appreciably less.

Probability of Overt ConflictThe probability of war, whether local or

general, would be much smaller than in a multipolarsystem. Conflict would be mitigated on two scores:a multipolar buffer might help prevent the twonuclear giants from coming to blows; and the

-——9 Multipolarity

_Q.3ouPH

ResultsFigure 1. Probability and results of overt conflict in thethree different international systems.

restraining influence of the bipolar states might inturn prevent extreme conflict among multipolarpowers. While simple bipolarity would not exist, theinfluence of two superpowers would be crucial inlimiting the outcomes of the system.

Results of Overt ConflictThe results of war, whether local or general,

would be much more tolerable than in a bipolarsystem. Overt conflict would most generally take theform of wars among multipolar states, and whilecrises between bipolar states might not be ruled out,these would be tempered by recognition of significantmutual interests. As long as the detente continued,there would be few dangers of major nuclear war.

The probability and results of overt conflict inthe three different international systems would beroughly as shown in Fig. i. The area of the dottedrectangle under the system-point in each instanceindicates the amount of violence sustained by theinternational system. Bi-multipolarity does noteradicate violence, but it holds the prospect of limit-ing violence to far smaller proportions than doeseither bipolarity or multipolarity. If peace is theobjective, a system combining bipolar and multipolarfeatures may be a means of a reasonable approxima-tion thereto.

VII. Diffusion of Nuclear WeaponsThe situation depicted would change considerablyif nuclear weapons began to be diffused among


PD D

Prob

abili

ty

LT11i

Bi-multi polarity

"1 —Bipolarity |

i

.DPD

ResultsFigure 2. Probability and results of overt conflict before(line PD) and after (line D) nuclear weapons havebecome available to a large number of states.

quite a number of states. The impact would begreatest on a strictly multipolar system, for theincentives to acquisition would be substantial, and thedisincentives involved in having to keep up withnuclear superpowers would be absent. Restraintson acquisition by the larger powers also would belacking. In a bipolar world nuclear weapons wouldadd least to the dangers already confronted. Acataclysm between two halves of the world wouldbe dangerous enough, even without nuclear bombs,though they would clearly enhance the war's

destructive power. In an intermediate internationalenvironment, the process of nuclear diffusion wouldalso raise levels of violence, but bipolar influencewithin the system would either reduce the scope ofdiffusion or limit its disruptive impact.

The results would be roughly as shown inFig. 2. If PD charts the results of internationalconflict in a prediffusion era, line D describes theoutcomes after nuclear weapons have becomeavailable options for a large number of states.While bipolarity remains unattractive because of thedire consequences of conflict between the twoprotagonists, multipolarity has lost most of itsprevious advantages. Now the probability of conflictnot only remains high, but the disastrous results ofthat conflict are clearly portrayed. Relative to theextremes of bipolarity on the one hand and multi-polarity on the other, the intermediate systemretains great appeal.

VIII. Bi-multipolarity and thePresent International Scene

The system of bi-multipolarity should not be con-fused with the present international order. One of themajor characteristics of the contemporary inter-national scene resides in the difference in attitudeand position of the allies of the great powers andneutral states. Two factors seem to account for this.On the one hand, nonaligned nations have received

Allies

•d<tnD

Neutrals

USSR Aid USSR AidFigure 3. Differential treatment received by allies and neutrals in terms of economic aid from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.PN is a "penalize neutralism" curve, while NPN is a "not penalize neutralism" curve.


CO£>

Allies

.aeDCOD

PN

Neutrals

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USSR Umbrella USSR UmbrellaFigure 4. Differential treatment received by allies and neutrals in the nuclear "umbrella" guarantees of the U.S. and theU.S.S.R. As in Fig. 3, PN and NPN indicate policies of penalizing and not penalizing neutralism.

certain of the benefits of alliance protection andassistance without pledging political allegiance toeither bipolar camp. This continuing phenomenonhas occasioned some disaffection among the formalallies of the two major powers. It has, in a measure,devalued the currency of alliance. On the otherhand, the partial attempts at detente have madealliances seem less necessary. If a continuing ColdWar were not the order of the day, former clientpowers would have less reason to guard, via greatpower alliances, against a sudden unfavorable change.

At the moment we seem to be in a phase inwhich the two major powers are placing enhancedemphasis on their formal alliances. The SovietUnion has come back into Far Eastern internationalrelations, apparently striving to improve its ties withChina and to reassert its influence in North Vietnam.Until recently, at least, the United States seemedengaged in an effort to reestablish a strong positionwithin NATO. In both cases it remains unclearwhether maintenance of a strong alliance positionor an enduring atmosphere of detente and/or peaceful

Allies Neutrals

USSR Guarantees USSR GuaranteesFigure 5. A possible final equilibrium position for allies and neutrals with respect to economic and military guaranteesfrom the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.


coexistence is most important. The issue is a com-plicated one in practice because any disengagementof interests, justified on grounds of relaxation oftension, may be interpreted by a bipolar opponentas a sign of weakness and a signal for adventure.

In the longer run, however, there are potentiali-ties for the bipolar-multipolar world we have beendiscussing. It will probably involve treating non-aligned states somewhat less favorably and alignednations somewhat more favorably than has been thecase up to the present. It seems uncertain, however,that the two aligned camps will continue as presentlyorganized into the indefinite future. The reasonsfor this uncertainty can be seen in Fig. 3.' The twodiagrams show the differential treatment that alliesand neutrals have received in the aid-giving behaviorof the United States and the Soviet Union. Amongneutrals, roughly speaking, the NPN (not penalizeneutralism) curve has been followed, permitting arecipient country to receive sizable quantities ofassistance from the opposing bipolar power. Amongallies, on the other hand, the PN (penalize neutralism)curve has been followed, providing for substantialreductions of assistance as the ally in questiongains additional aid from the opposing camp. Ifallies suffered in comparison to neutrals in terms ofeconomic and other assistance, they had the com-pensation of participating in deterrence alliancesystems, the protection of which was presumablydenied to neutralist nations. As a result of thethreatened spread of nuclear weapons today, how-ever, it is no longer certain that allies alone mayenjoy the benefits of deterrent protection. India, inparticular, may be able to retain her nonalignment

5 I am indebted to Professor Albert O. Hirschmanof Columbia University for the basic notions of the figureswhich follow (Hirschman, 1964).

while participating in nuclear guarantees of the bigpowers. If this occurs generally in the neutralistworld, an equivalent disproportion in the treatmentof allies and neutrals might come to exist in themilitary sphere, as shown in Fig. 4. Such outcomeswould so disadvantage allies and reward neutralsthat a considerable movement toward greater neu-trality would have to be expected. A final equilibriummight be attained, covering both economic andmilitary guarantees in roughly the form shown inFig. 5-

In such a case, of course, there would no longerbe a difference between allies and neutrals. Thegrowth of multipolar sentiment would presumablyreinforce the detente between bipolar powers, andan important step in the direction of an intermediateinternational system would have been taken.

ReferencesBull, Hedley. "Atlantic Military Problems: A

Preliminary Essay," prepared for the Council onForeign Relations meeting of November 20, 1963,p. 21.

Burns, Arthur. "From Balance to Deterrence:A Theoretical Analysis," World Politics, X, 4 (July1957)-

Deutsch, Karl, and Singer, J. David. "MultipolarPower Systems and International Stability," WorldPolitics, XVI, 3 (April 1964), 390-406.

Hirschman, A. O. "The Stability of Neutralism :A Geometric Note," American Economic Review,LIV (1964), 94-100.

Hoffmann, Stanley. "International Relations—The Long Road to Theory," World Politics, XIII, 3(April 1961).

Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Stability of a BipolarWorld," Daedalus (Summer 1964).

———. Man, the State, and War. New York:Columbia, 1959.

30. Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future

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