THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN THE MARITIME INDUSTRY

The international shipping industry is responsible for the carriage of around 90% of world

trade. Shipping is the lifeblood of the global economy. Without shipping, intercontinental

trade, the bulk transport of raw materials, and the import/export of affordable food and

manufactured goods would simply not be possible. However, the global shipping industry is

also a dangerous place. Every day, it loses two ships, pays out US$4 million in claims and

radically changes the lives of hundreds of people forever. Human behavior is the source of

virtually all such loss. Significantly, it is also the reason why the loss is not greater1.

It is important to note that there is a widespread perception of a “human error problem.”

“Human error” is often cited as a major contributing factor or “cause” of incidents and

accidents. Many people accept the term “human error” as one category of potential causes

for unsatisfactory activities or outcomes. A belief is that the human element is unreliable and

that solutions to the “human error problem” reside in changing the people or their role in the

system2.

What exactly is the human element?

It can be defined as the complex multi-dimensional issue that affects maritime safety and

marine environmental protection. Going further, we can summarise the human element as

one involving the entire spectrum of human activities performed by ships' crews, shore-based

management, regulatory bodies, recognized organizations, shipyards, legislators, and other

relevant parties, all of whom need to co-operate to address human element issues effectively.

However, the same may well have numerous interwoven relationships, albeit in a complex

manner.

One way to discover this complexity is to make a shift from what we call the “first story,”

where human error is the cause, to a second, deeper story, in which the normal, predictable

actions and assessments (which some call “human error” after the fact) are the product of

systematic processes inside of the cognitive, operational and organizational world in which

people work. Second stories show that doing things safely – in the course of meeting other

goals – is always part of people’s operational practice. People, in their different roles, are

aware of potential paths to failure and develop failure sensitive strategies to forestall these

possibilities. People are a source of adaptability required to cope with the variation inherent

in a field of activity. Another result of the Second Story is the idea that complex systems have

a sharp end and a blunt end. At the sharp end, practitioners directly interact with the

hazardous process. At the blunt end, regulators, administrators, economic policymakers, and

technology suppliers control the resources, constraints, and multiple incentives and demand

that sharp end practitioners must integrate and balance. The story of both success and failure

consists of how sharp-end practice adapts to cope with the complexities of the processes they

monitor, manage and control, and how the strategies of the people at the sharp end are

shaped by the resources and constraints provided by the blunt end of the system. Failure,

then, represents breakdowns in adaptations directed at coping with complexity. Indeed, the

enemy of safety is not the human: it is complexity. Stories of how people succeed and

sometimes fail in their pursuit of success reveal different sources of complexity as the

mischief makers – cognitive, organizational, technological3.

The shipping industry is run by people, for people. People design ships, build them, own them,

crew them, maintain them, repair them and salvage them. People regulate them, survey

them, underwrite them and investigate them when things go wrong4. While these people vary

in all sorts of ways, they are all, nevertheless, people – with the same basic set of capabilities

and vulnerabilities. The ‘human element’ is misnamed. It implies something that happens at

the side-lines – a piece of the picture that is hopefully being dealt with by some specialist or

other. Or else it implies that it’s ‘just one of those things’ – a bit of a mystery about which we

can do little more than shrugging our shoulders and hoping for the best. But humans are not

simply an element like the weather. They are at the very center of the shipping enterprise.

They are the secret of its successes and the victims of its failures. It is human nature that

drives what happens every day at work – from the routine tasks of a ship’s rating, right

through to the policy decisions of the IMO. Fortunately, there is a lot that is known about

human nature – and a lot of practical things that can be done to ensure people play to their

strengths – while avoiding the pitfalls5.

The attitude forms an important part of an individual’s competency since it determines as to

how much of his knowledge and skills, which form an important part of his competency too,

he (or she) can apply into actual practice to get the desired results. An individual’s attitude

can be probably defined as the feeling or a way of thinking which is reflected in the individual’s

behavior. It forms as the most underlying cause of the effectiveness of the individual as well

as that of the team, which he is a part of, thereby establishing its efficacy to be successful in

meeting its challenges. At an individual level, the behavior may be a reflection of one’s

attitude, in turn, will be continuously honed integrated with the following skills:

1. Situation Awareness (attention to the work environment)

2. Decision-Making

3. Communication

4. Teamwork

5. Leadership

6. Managing Stress

7. Coping with Fatigue.

This skills approach provides a set of established constructs and a common vocabulary for

learning about the important behaviors that influence safe and efficient task execution6.

any or all of the following aspects It in turn affects and shapes the situation awareness-

another important aspect of the human element- which impacts safety – and thereby

complacency which tends to set in when involved with routine and repetitive jobs.

Communication gaps, arising out of Intercultural differences, or even within the same culture

are other essential aspects which impact and shape the outcome because of the various

dynamics of the people at play. This has a direct bearing on the insufficient identification of

hazards, information exchange and consequently a divergence of goals. The same may be

compounded by a lack of motivation,in turn leading to possible shortcuts, arising out of

insufficient monitoring of delegated jobs coupled with either a lack of confidence or have a

disdain for safety if not both. Such a coming together of such factors will result in insufficient

teamwork and thereby an obvious absence of synergy in the final output. Such aspects

certainly increase the chances of having an undesirable incident or even an accident thereby

establishing a cause and an effect analogy to try and prevent such outcomes.

The performance triangle illustrates the interplay of the various aspects of the human

element, at different levels which results in the final action on board. This highlights the fact

that at the sharp end (i.e.eg- on board- seafarers) the actions as are visible and take place are

largely governed by certain dormant factors which shape them significantly. Such factors find

their genesis in the organizational culture which in turn largely determines the safety culture

both onshore as well as onboard each of the fleet vessels. Hence it will not be incorrect to

state that the root cause investigation of any incident should extend all the way down to this

aspect to identify it wholly and completely, to identify it and also to prevent its occurrence.

In the maritime context, the term human element embraces anything that influences the

interaction between a human and any other human or system or machine aboard ship. The

human element has been with us since time immemorial, but it is the humans, systems, and

machines that have changed, not only through the increase in technology but also because of

the need for operators to maintain the competitive edge by reducing running costs, which

has resulted in a reduction in manning scales and the employment of multi-national,

multicultural and multi-lingual crews. There is no such thing as ‘the perfect ship’ because the

end product is inevitably a compromise between what is needed to satisfy the regulations,

what is absolutely necessary to fulfill the operational role, and what is affordable. But, it must

be ‘fit for purpose.’ However, the global nature of the maritime business is such that not only

is the maritime workforce multinational and multicultural, but also there can be differing

interpretations of international guidelines and inconsistent standards in lifestyle, training, and

education.

The two aspects of management, crewing and technical, are the cornerstone of the

requirements of the ISM Code for an effective SMS to be followed at all levels. It should be

noted, however, that the fulfillment of the obligations under the Code is a joint operation

between the owner and the manager under the agreement and depends on what is delegated

to the manager. The owners themselves have an obligation to provide a clear line of

communication with the manager and define the extent of responsibilities and authority

delegated to others.

Risk exposure is a situation created by not taking prophylactic measures to guard against risks.

It results from neglect, or a failure to identify potential risks and evaluate their frequency,

probability of occurrence or recurrence, and their potential consequences. The consequences

may include criminal or civil liabilities resulting in financial losses, loss of reputation and

possibly criminal prosecution.

While as it would be impossible to enumerate all the situations of risk exposure, broadly, a

shipping company may be exposed to the following risks:

i. risks inherent in particular forms of corporate structures

ii. financial risks

iii. risks with regard to the operation of ships

iv. the ‘human element’ risks

v. risks of liabilities, for example, for loss of life or personal injury, damage

to property or the environment

vi. other liabilities to third parties, and

vii. criminal liabilities.

More specifically, risk exposure concerns exposure to risks that, if they are ignored, have

potential legal and financial consequences. However, not all kinds of risk can be identified or

assessed. Assessment invariably depends on the subjective perception of its assessors, or risk

may only become apparent with the benefit of hindsight. The way in which the safety

management system (SMS) of the ISM Code assists in this respect is that it imposes an

obligation upon the management of a company:

i. to have a system of recording incidents and the situations in which they

have occurred;

ii. to undertake conscious observation and graphic analysis of how they

occurred;

iii. to take action to prevent their recurrence; and

iv. to visualize unsuspected exposure.

A company’s risk profile can be assessed by identifying and evaluating accidents or near

‘misses’ the company has experienced, or any losses that resulted from claims, or losses that

may be incurred; then considering the policy approach of the company to these situations

and what actions the company has taken to prevent the same in the future7.

Once a company has developed a programme for the identification, assessment, control, and

monitoring of these risks, an assessment of the company’s risk acceptability can be made for

the purpose of setting priorities as to which risks need to be monitored or controlled by taking

immediate action8.

The TMSA was the result of a realization by the oil companies that there were two classes of

ship operators: the ones who diligently applied the ISM and went beyond the minimum

requirements, and the ones who did the minimum possible just to fill the boxes in the forms9.

To illustrate this better, analyzing the Swiss cheese model may be helpful. The below figure

illustrates this quite clearly. accidents are usually caused by a sequence of flaws in an

organization’s defenses. These can be attributed to a combination of errors and violations by

the operational staff (active failures) and the latent unsafe conditions (‘resident pathogens’)

in the work system that are created by managers, designers, and others.

In fact, it also suggests as to why accidents DO NOT happen and what would be the outcome

even if one barrier was to be not bridged thereby proving its sufficiency to avoid an

“undesirable outcome.”

The number and the diameter of the holes above are a clear indication of the level of the risk

tolerance which the organizational culture can and would permit. A company with a good risk

profile will have the SMS integrated with other quality systems and will have established its

objectives and targets to take corrective action, communicate progress and develop action

plans for the individual responsibilities of its key people and staff.

The ISM Code requirement of teamwork, assisted by external advisers, is aimed to ensure

that a systematic risk assessment and evaluation are made, so that the subjective element of

risk assessment may be reduced, and risk awareness increased. In ship operations, however,

this criterion has now been overtaken by further developments, and more specific guidance

is to be found in the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers(COSWPMS),

providing for measures to be taken by a company for health and safety, and measures

applicable to different types of ship and situation, the adoption of which will enable

measuring the risk tolerance of a company.

Application of the above does pose a challenge though in actual practice. Since a company’s

first and foremost objective is to engage the ships in profitable markets, this, inevitably, puts

the company under commercial pressure notwithstanding other compelling external factors,

in the backdrop of the economic downturn, including freight fluctuations, overcapacity

creating more supply than demand, and also internal ones such as financial commitments to

the mortgagee, internal pressures from partners or shareholders, and staffing costs are all

factors that may affect risk tolerance. Such considerations may result in the management of

a company being influenced to be “more tolerant” of a certain level of risk, and, as a result,

the company may economize on the employment of high-quality, trained crew, or on the

maintenance of its ships. If a risk is insurable, there may be a tendency to take risks, as long

as the insurance contract is not prejudiced, and respond to a loss or liability incurred, in a

reactive, rather than a proactive one. Such a balancing of the risk tolerance with the possible

implications of noncompliance with ever increasing regulations needs to be completely

factored in before corners are going to be possibly cut in safety issues. This should also

improve the company’s position in terms of obtaining finance, its growth and future

expansion besides impacting the entire development of the fleet, sector and consequently

the industry10.

Coming back to the basic question, are the people on board only there to make mistakes? Or

are they the only link between an imperfect ship and the management system to make them

ultimately work in tandem? Seafarers are on board to conduct safe operations including

navigation, loading, and unloading of the cargo, operate and maintain the machinery and

above all act as the vital cog between the ships equipment and the processes with the external

world. This would then suffice to say that the decisions made at the front line by informed

staff will have an immediate impact. All other stakeholders have an ultimate responsibility to

contribute towards achieving the desired outcome, at all times, by not only recognizing but

also acknowledging the axiom “ Our People are our Biggest Strength.”

1 Maritime and Coast Guard Agency, United Kingdom.The Human Element: A Guide t Human Behaviour 2 Woods, David D.. Behind Human Error 3 Ibid 4 Supra 1 5 Ibid. 6 Flin, Rhona. Safety at the Sharp End: A Guide to Non-Technical Skills 7 Managing Risk and Liabilities, Modern Maritime Law- Volume 2 8 Ibid 9 Ibid 10 Ibid