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PAIS Honours Coursework

Essay 2

Matthew Ryan

220086769

'The academic study of politics should be objective. The political scientist should not be distracted by ethical questions

about the nature of the good life.'

Words: 4477 ex. quotations

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'The academic study of politics should be objective. The political scientist should not be distracted by ethical

questions about the nature of the good life.'

Introduction

In order for a society to function, there is a necessity for a mechanism which

facilitates collective decision making. That mechanism is called 'politics'. As such,

'politics is concerned, almost by definition, with the construction and, ideally, the

realisation of a sense of the collective good' (Hay, 2007: 2). And yet the academic study

of politics is, in the opinion of some, best divorced from considerations of anything as

vague and subjective as the 'collective good'. Those same pundits would also argue

against allowing us to become entangled in the normative task of 'constructing' that

reality. There would seem to be a correlation – if not causation – between the popular

disillusionment with political praxis and the attempt to create an objective discipline,

one devoid of ethical ambiguities:

Politics denotes an activity about which many people today feel a combination of cynicism, scepticism and mistrust. It is experienced as something distant and remote from everyday life... The discipline of Politics does little, if anything, to dispel this image of politics... (Held & Leftwich, 1984: 139).

There is ongoing debate around the appropriate way to approach the academic

study of politics. Embedded in the dictum being discussed here is the perspective of a

particular faction within that debate – the predominantly North American school of

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'political science', which rose to intellectual dominance in the mid-twentieth century.

The purpose of this paper is to examine this statement, and the stance that it implies,

with a great deal of scrutiny. Thus the task here is not only to argue either for or against

this position, but to consider, more broadly, the debate in which it is situated, and the

implications of this debate for the very state of our discipline.

Although this will all be examined in much more detail below, it is immediately

apparent that the above quotation equates the 'academic study of politics' to an objective

'political science'. This is to the exclusion of the rich historical, evaluative, and

normative analytical traditions of political philosophy and political theory. It is that

exclusion that is the core issue with adopting this objectivist perspective. As is suggested

by Ruth Grant, '[i]f we ignore the humanist's questions when studying politics, we will

see only a small part of the political phenomena, and even that part we will see badly'

(Grant, 2002: 591-592). The perspective of the 'political scientist' is one in which the

questions asked by the academic discipline of politics are limited to merely those with

'scientifically knowable' answers. It is the implication of that stance which is to be

explored here.

The first task will be, then, to clarify some key terms, the meanings of which are

often ambiguous. With those parameters established, we shall turn to the critical

evaluation of the statement at hand – what are the implications and exclusions of this

position? What might be the state of the discipline if the approach represented by the

above quotation was adopted by all researchers? Is the claim to objectivity itself both

political and (partially) responsible for the 'contemporary disenchantment with politics'

(Hay, 2007: 5); and, finally, a proper defence of ethical empiricism will be laid out.

With the above issues considered, this will bring us to the thesis of this paper: if

the academic study of politics should attempt only to answer questions which are

answerable by a specific methodology, then the outcome will be a discipline comprised

of 'idiot savants' – those whose technical expertise has little relevance to the real world1.

Such a discipline does little to dispel contemporary political disillusionment.

1 The kind of epistemological shift seen here does not occur in a vacuum. The parallels between the idolisation of objectivity in both political science and neoclassical economics are immediately apparent. Both of these intellectual developments are rooted in Enlightenment ideals of rationality and secularism.

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Definition of Terms

Ethics, 'the good life', and Politics.

It is important to take time to clarify what is meant by 'ethical questions about the

good life', if we are to understand why some might consider such questions to be

'distractions'. Kant provides us with a succinct definition of ethics: 'Ethics is sometimes

considered as the theory of virtue' (Kant, 1979 [1817]: 64). Consequently, to consider

ethical questions is to consider the state of things in comparison to an ideal – an ethical

approach is essentially one which is critical and normative (Muirhead, 1981: 414). The

role of ethical questions and approaches in the study of politics is as old as the discipline

itself. Indeed, for the classical political thinkers, the studies of politics and ethics were

inseparable (Gomperz, 1912: 241). As is suggested by the quotation, the best example of

this antiquarian perception of entwined politics and ethics is encapsulated within the

Aristotelian ideal of 'the good life'.

For Aristotle 'the good life' was the desirable end goal of political organisation –

'the state is not merely good, but exists for the highest good, the best life possible for

humankind' (Maddox, 1996: 4). In fact, contrary to popular misconception, this is what

Aristotle was exploring when he wrote that 'man is a political animal'. This can be

understood by placing this statement in a fuller context:

Man is by nature a political animal; and so even when men have no need of assistance from each other, they none the less desire to live together. At the same time, they are also brought together by a common interest, so far as each achieves a share of the good life. The good life then is the chief aim of the political community, both collectively for all its members and individually (Aristotle, in Vlassopoulos, 2010, p. 118).

There is no definitive list of criteria for the attainment of the good life – indeed, it

is its ephemeral, subjective nature that renders it incompatible with contemporary

'political science' methodologies. 'The good life' implies that the purpose of both the

study and the practice of politics is to strive for the continual advance of the human

condition – individually, and collectively – over the alternative of the brutish and cruel

existence that would persist without collective political organisation. This traditional

conception of politics, ethics, and 'the good life' did not, however, abide unchallenged.

The crucial difference between ancient political thought and the political thought

of the eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty first centuries is the breakdown of

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the consensus that the aim of the political community is to improve people and their

lives (Vlassopoulos, 2010, p. 130). Much of this shift has its roots in the secular

movement of the Renaissance. The thought of this modern period can be characterised

thus:

The aim of politics should not be the moral formation of citizens, the pursuit of the common good, or the creation of conditions for the attainment of glory and the exercise of virtue; instead, politics had only the instrumental role of securing the natural rights of citizens... (ibid.).

In simple terms, the communal pursuit of the good life was abandoned, replaced

by a conception of politics and morality which was to build upon the natural value of

private property. This was legitimised by the ultimate Renaissance construct – the idea

of society being a machine which followed natural and objective rules, and that it would

continue to work regardless of the intentions of the individuals that comprised it. Just

some of the ramifications of the Enlightenment include: Adam Smith's philosophical

legitimisation a limited political sphere, and the idea that objective analysis could reveal

the laws which govern human behaviour – all resulting from our hubris in believing that

human reason can fully perceive the workings of the natural and social worlds (Beck,

1963: 3). The ancient world’s approach to the study of politics did, however, survive.

The roots of the modern disciplines of Political Theory and Political Philosophy are in

the rich classical tradition. A brief exploration of those contemporary approaches –

approaches which many still aim to exclude – will now follow.

Political Theory and Philosophy

Political theory and political philosophy are both approaches to the study of

politics which are based on the ethical approach of the classical thinkers. That is to say

they are both inherently critical and normative modes of study. In this sense there is a

dichotomy between political science on the one hand, and theory and philosophy on the

other. That said, some make a distinction between theory and philosophy, rather than

conflate the two.

Firstly, we have political theory, which is to be seen as 'critical, systematic

reflection about power in its public and private forms, particularly about the claims of

government to possess legitimacy and authority; and, more generally, such reflection

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about the place of politics in social life' (Reeve, 2009, online). Political theorists will

consider questions regarding the purpose of government – some, for example, might

argue that purpose is collective action in pursuit of 'the good life' – and then, building on

analysis of that purpose and legitimacy, they would then suggest the best way to pursue

or create that ideal (Plamenatz, 1967: 19-20). The connection between this normative

understanding of the discipline, and the normative nature of Aristotelian politics should

be noted.

Political philosophy, however, is somewhat more abstract and constructivist.

Political philosophers often take the time to critically appraise those assumptions that

political theory acknowledges, but merely glances over. This is summarised by Smith:

'[p]olitical philosophy is not a methodology, a doctrine, or a world view, but an

assemblage of problems that can help to deepen, enliven, and guide our investigations’

(Smith, 2000: 190). The purpose of such a discipline is to provide a yard-stick for public

conduct; the provision of suitable ethical definitions for contentious problems. Just one

such issue which cannot be addressed without reference to political philosophy is the

distribution of scarce resources (Freeden, 2004: 6) – there are, of course, many more.

While there are subtle distinctions between these two rich traditions of political

thought, those differences can be bypassed somewhat in my discussion. The two can be

brought together as value-laden, critical, and normative academic approaches to the

study of politics (Reeve, 2009, online), which contrast directly with the 'objective'

approach of political science – the approach exemplified by the initial quotation.

The conflation of the two is not only legitimised by their common approach of

evaluation and normativity, but also since the criticisms brought against them by

'political scientists' are often the same. Those pursuing objectivity have suggested 'that

many of the problems which exercised the great political thinkers of the past were

spurious, resting on confusions of thought and the misuse of language' (Plamenatz,

1967: 19). Others claim that 'political theorists have failed to keep up with the times,

and have not engaged in sufficient value-free theoretical study of the raw data of

politics' (Pennock, 1951: 1081). The criticism is often that the questions being asked by

political theorists and philosophers in the twenty-first century are the same ones that

puzzled thinkers hundreds of years ago. In our neoliberalised universities the qualities of

this mode of research are trivialised, in preference of the 'swift and dramatic progress'

(King, 2014: 165) offered by research which emulates that of the natural sciences.

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These ongoing debates should not, however, be seen as trivial or irrelevant to

modern politics. Of course, questions about the nature of the ideal state will be ongoing.

But as the stances of the liberal and the conservative are heavily influenced by different

conceptions of that ideal, a 'science' which seeks to understand their motivations and

values – without critically engaging with the philosophical discourse – will fail to

understand its subject matter (Clark, 2008: 168). The illogicality of excluding the

approaches of Political Theory and Political Philosophy from the study of politics is to

be discussed at length below. First, however, we must understand more

comprehensively the approach of the political scientist.

Political Science

As has been the case with many of the key terms discussed so far, 'political

science' has many usages and association. Herein political scientists are taken to be

those who advocate a scientific approach to the academic study of politics:

American methods have consciously aspired to the modern concepts of natural science. There has been an advocacy of an integrated science of society resting especially on concepts drawn from modern physics, biology, and psychology, and on a marked displacement of speculative and historical study.... The extreme members of the school look forward to the elimination of ethical problems by scientific method, and view democracy as in itself merely the scientific method of hypothesis and experiment (Crick, 1954: 308-309).

The approach described here, which can also be described as 'behaviouralist'2, rose to

methodological dominance in the post-World War context, and maintained that

dominance through to the 1970's. Behaviouralism is defined by empirical methods, with

statements resulting from research having to scientifically confirmable (Bookman, 1970:

17-18), meaning that values and ethics have no weight. The appeal of a 'value-free'

science is understandable: 'objectivity produces credibility; credibility establishes

legitimacy; legitimacy is the basis of applying social science knowledge to social

purposes and political goals. The circle is complete' (Prewitt, 2005: 21). Of course, there

were some academics who continued to include normative and evaluative aspects in

2 This shift to empirical methods in our study of politics has had wide-ranging effects on other debates in the discipline. As just one example, Robert Dahl's conception of 'power' rested on this new methodological approach (Isaac, 1987: 5).

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their research, but they were marginalised, especially in North America (Calhoun, 2002,

online).

The task here is not an exhaustive history of the development of this approach to

the study of politics, and as such the nuances of that history will be bypassed somewhat.

Thinkers who played a part in that intellectual journey include: Machiavelli, Comte,

Mill, Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, Hobbes, Hume, and others (Almond, 1996: 65).

Unfortunately their contributions cannot be explored individually. To take the arguments

of just one of those thinkers – Weber – as indicative of the general trend, we can see in

more detail the project that is implied by the political science approach. According to

Leo Strauss, it was Weber who legitimised the modern approach to social science which

separated so clearly fact and value. Weber's search for objectivity produced an

emancipation from moral judgements... The habit of looking at social or human phenomena without making value judgements has a corroding influence on any preferences. The more serious we are as social scientists, the more completely we develop within ourselves a state of indifference to any goal, or of aimlessness and drifting, a state that can be called nihilism3

(Strauss, 1959, in Almond, 1996: 79).

This trend was then continued by an approach sometimes termed 'logical positivism', the

epistemology of which can be described thus:

Logical positivism.... reflected a deep faith in scientific understanding and suggested that propositions that are not empirically verifiable are simply meaningless. Normative concepts such as 'liberty', 'equality', 'justice' and 'rights' [and 'the good life'] were therefore disregarded as nonsense, and [positivists], as a result, tended to lose interest in moral and political issues (Heywood, 2004: 11).

This approach has received much criticism. To make one immediate criticism, the

idea that political analysis might become disinterested in political issues seems

ridiculous. Nonetheless, in pursuit of scientific status, values and ethical approaches

must be removed from the academic study of politics. In response to critics who defend

the place of morals and ethics in the study of the politics, many practitioners have

heralded technological advances in data collection and analysis – popularly referred to

as the 'big data' revolution – as legitimisation of their scientific approach (Forbes, 2004:

online).

3 Further on Stauss qualifies this statement, suggesting that the result of Weberian positivism was more 'conformism and philistinism', rather than nihilism.

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Some may argue – in response to the above characterisation – that the division

between political theory and science has broken down since the time of Strauss and

Crick, and that critical analysis is now part of a theory-science synthesis. Yet in 1994, 74

per cent of articles published in the leading journal American Political Science Review

were behavioural or empirical in their methodology (Tansey & Jackson, 2008: 8). Even

more recently Harvard's Professor Gary King noted

the social sciences are in the midst of an historic change, with large parts moving from the humanities to the sciences in terms of research style, empirical methods, substantive understanding, and the ability to make swift and dramatic progress (King, 2014: 165).

This would suggest that emphasis on the quantitative has not yet reached its high-water

mark. It is quite clear that political science is still dominant, especially in the US, and

that co-operation between the scientific approach and the philosophical approach is

'marginal', at best (de Shalit, 2009: 41).

Exclusions and Implications

As noted above, the most troubling implication embedded within the provided

quotation is that the academic study of politics is synonymous with objective political

science. This perspective excludes more critical and normative approaches, such as

political theory and political philosophy. This implication is then made explicit, by

labelling the Aristotelian conception of politics – its study and its practice – as a

'distraction'. From this perspective academic study which considers ethical questions

about the nature of the good life – considerations which are both critical of the status

quo, and also normative in providing prescriptions for an alternative system – are to be

expunged from the discipline. Most disconcertingly, this is not a fictitious perspective

playing out in an imagined world; rather, it is indicative of the state of the discipline, as

illustrated by King above. We turn now to consider the ramifications such an approach

would have on the academic study of politics as a whole.

The Political Subject

Here it should be noted that there is a clear reason why the very first thinkers

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considered politics an ethical epistime – that reason is the very subject matter that we are

concerned with. Politics is a study of people and of society, and the logical approach to

such a study is that of the humanities (Allison, 2009, online). Yet the political scientist

would try and understand the political realm without considering the values which

motivate political actors in a more meaningful way than ever-more-sophisticated

polling. The effect of this is to render the discipline incapable of contributing to

society’s collective knowledge in any significant way. This concern is echoed by

Stretton: '[t]o abstract the observable act from its understandable rules will not make the

study of society more scientific; it will avoid the study of society altogether' (Stretton,

1969: 222). The illogicality of a purely 'scientific' social science is made explicit by

Spragens Jr.:

This reintegration of the theoretical enterprise in political science is a necessity because politics is the intersection of order and power. The latter cannot be wholly abstracted from the former, however diligent the effort, and the former cannot be described apart from patters and standards which are perceptual, interpretative norms (Spragens Jr., 1973: 168).

In short, if ethical considerations are excluded from the academic study of politics then

an academic understanding of people and their actions in the political sphere – actions

based upon their values, concerns, motivations, and influences – is impossible.

The implications of a universal acceptance of the objective approach to the study

of politics are concerning. Sheldon Wolin (1969) labelled this approach 'methodist' – in

the sense that the approach is directed by its methodology. Paul Martin and Donna Craig

also articulate a concern for the state of research in the face of methodological 'purity',

and although their work is based in Law, it speaks to the political discipline as well:

Many of the key questions are multifaceted. Simplifying the issues so that they can fit within an empirical methodology is hardly likely to represent a significant advance. The risk of a tyranny of methodological purity over research meaningfulness is not something that can be lightly dismissed (Martin & Craig, 2014 (forthcoming): 8).

Put another way, the subjects for research are chosen from those which are

congruent with this particular methodology. To consider this in contrast, the approach of

the humanities is typically to consider the most relevant and pressing questions being

asked at that particular time. And, as mentioned earlier in this paper, objective political

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science research would then be descriptive in character, rather than evaluative or

normative. This speaks to the poverty of such a discipline, and the inability of that

discipline to make a meaningful contribution to the society which it studies.

Objectivism ignores the fundamental nature of its subject matter. It also risks

answering the wrong questions, due to its methodist approach, while being limited to

mere description of political phenomena, rather than evaluation. Ruth Grant poses a

challenging burden of proof to those who would ignore the distractions of ethical

questions:

Can we know what is worth knowing about politics through scientific research methods alone? … Is research in political theory worth doing, or can politics be adequately understood without it? (Grant, 2002: 578).

Certainly, Smith’s perspective offers a direct answer to that question.

Politics is about ideas. No one will ever be able to understand fundamental political phenomena like war or revolution without first understanding the ideas that motivate the central political actors (Smith, 2000: 191).

The perspective represented by the opening quotation is one that seeks to remove

all ethical concerns from the academic study of politics. This would leave only the

objective approach of the political scientist in the academic context. The implication of

this for the quality of the discipline, and the ability of that discipline to meaningfully

understand its subject, is quite dire. This concern is echoed by Pennock: 'All of the

empirical propositions of political science that can be discovered may be worse than

useless if they are put to the service of the wrong values' (Pennock, 1951: 1083). Not

only would our understanding be limited, but is might be 'worse than useless', as will be

discussed below.

Much of this might seem to be a criticism of political science itself – indeed, a

political scientist reading this paper might be about to suggest the many qualities which

political science possesses, and the contributions it might make to the work of political

philosophers and theorists. The criticism being made, however, is not directed at

political science, but rather at those who think only political science is needed. It is a

criticism which is echoed Roy Bhaskar:

we will only be able to understand – and so change – the social world if we identify the structures at work that generate those events or discourses. Such structures are irreducible to the patterns of events and discourses alike (Bhaskar, 2011: 2).

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The approach that Bhaskar advocates is known as ‘critical realism’. Critical

realism is based upon an understanding that society is an 'emergent entity with material

and ideational aspects', and that any separation between the empirical and the theoretical

will lead to a distorted perception of both (Patomaki & Wight, 2000: 235; Clarke, 2008:

128). It is an approach which attempts to move past the positivist-postpositivist

dichotomy which this 'objective political science' debate often revolves around, which

supports the argument being made here – that the limitation of inquiry to a specific

methodology will result in the poverty of that research. Before the case for empiricism

within political theory is made, however, first let us consider the political reality of a

purely objective discipline.

Political outcomes of Objectivity

Wolin (1969) had another concern with objective political science, beyond the

inability of such an approach to comprehend its subject matter; he was concerned that,

in aiming only to describe, rather than to challenge, 'objectivity' actually played a

political purpose in supporting the status quo. In the pursuit of scientific methodology,

the political scientist only ever describes political phenomena, because a critical

evaluation of current norms would employ the values of the researcher. This means that

there can be no meaningful criticism of current political organisation emanating from

those engaged in the academic study of politics (de Shalit, 2009: 39). Certainly, there

may be some criticism from journalists and other political actors. But, with the voices of

the most educated of our political thinkers falling silent in evaluation of political

processes, surely the constant push for progress in society will slow. The concern that

the contribution of academia to the political sphere will – and is – lessened by the quest

for objectivity is mirrored well by Stretton:

Social evils can survive without excuses, whether by apathy, honest mistake or selfish intent... Scientistic selection avoids the radical imagination or discovery of poor men's chances for social choice or change or conservation... But others' values should equip them to see in the methodological disputes about scientism a real social conflict: a competition for the talent, conscience, judgement and recruitment of scientists and students, the advisers and the next inheritors of power (Stretton, 1969: 431).

Not only does a scientific approach to the academic study of politics mean that that

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section of society falls silent in the political discourse, but it also means that radical

alternatives are less likely to be imagined. Objectivity has inadvertently supported

continuation of the status quo. Thus the provided quotation is itself a political statement.

Keynes offered in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money that 'it is

ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil' (Keynes, 1973 [1936]:

384). Not only are ideas, or values, integral in our understanding of politics; to ignore

them in our academic studies is to grant them even more power in the public discourse.

The case for empiricism

There is no doubt that, over the course of the twentieth century, there have been

huge advances in not only the availability of comprehensive data sets of use to the

political scientist (King, 2014), but also in the statistical tools we have to analyse that

data. Those advances have even been cited in defence of the 'scientific' approach of the

social sciences. It is important to note, however, that arguing against the exclusion of the

ethical within the academic study of politics does not then exclude the empirical. The

case being made here is not that empirical approaches be abandoned completely; rather

it is that methodology should not be allowed to direct the scope and direction of

research. The places for empiricism in critical and normative analysis is – and always

has been – clear:

Certainly, political theory has never divorced itself from knowledge of empirical reality and argumentation on the basis of historical evidence. Aristotle's discussion of regime types in the Politics should suffice as typical illustration (Grant, 2002: 580).

The importance of empiricism being used in conjunction with normative analysis in

social research is made by Thomas Piketty, the newly-famous economist, in Capital in

the Twenty-First Century:

Without precisely defined sources, methods, and concepts, it is possible to see everything and its opposite... Given this dialogue of the deaf.... there is a role for research that is at least systematic and methodical if not fully scientific... [Social science] can help to redefine the terms of the debate, unmask certain preconceived or fraudulent notions, and subject all positions to constant critical scrutiny (Piketty, 2014, online).

There is a very strong case for the role of empirical methods in the academic study

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of politics, as Piketty illustrates. Indeed many of the concerns Piketty illustrates here are

the true concerns of the political scientist. Just as there are significant dangers in

utilising only scientific methodologies, there are dangers in exclusively utilising the

methodologies of the humanities. This is not an argument against political science, but

an argument against the exclusive use of just one methodology. The real issue is how the

two may be synthesised.

Often at the conclusion of an essay such as this, there will be a platitudinous

call for cooperation between the two schools: a crude, two-dimensional synthesis. As de

Shalit noted above, attempts to stimulate discussion between the two have resulted in

only 'marginal' cooperation. The reality is that the perspective that 'values have

absolutely no place in academia' is a fringe view, and that the ethical already sits beside

the scientific. The issue is, rather, which lens is applied in the first instance. In the

United States, the leading group for politics’ academics is the American Political

Science Association. The leading journal is the American Political Science Review. By

some rankings of political journals, the first journal which doesn't focus on political

science, the Journal of Theoretical Politics, is ranked nineteenth among its peers.

Political Philosophy and Political Theory exist as distinct disciplines, but they are a

minority, as compared with Political Science.

The synthesis of ethical and empirical approaches which this paper would suggest

is a re-ordering of priorities. Political Theory – with ethical questions about the nature of

the good life – must be the master discipline. The rigorous tools of the political scientist

should be called upon when they are relevant, while other questions might require the

analysis of an economist, psychologist, or lawyer. As mentioned above, a useful lens to

through which to consider the integration of empirical and ethical approaches is critical

realism:

Critical realism... reconnects the world of ethical deliberation with the world of real causal processes and highlights the manner in which we act in this world as a result of the knowledge we possess of that which we value and that which we can do (Patomaki & Wight, 2000: 235).

Ultimately, the question at hand should dictate the methodology to be utilised, and

not the other way round.

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The resolution of centuries of debate around the appropriate way to study politics

in the academic sphere is somewhat outside of the scope of this paper. And while critical

realism offers some promise toward that end, that possibility must be explored in its

own forum. Our task was to consider the provided quotation; to consider the perspective

it implies, what is excluded in the adoption of such a stance, and what that might mean

for our discipline as a whole. On a broader level, the purpose was simply to gain a more

nuanced understanding of the debates that have shaped our discipline – debates which

are ongoing. The view represented by the initial quotation is not a hypothetical one.

Behaviourists, logical positivists, and those who strive for ever more 'scientific' methods

have always seen ethical considerations as distractions. To consider again Ruth Grant's

challenge:

Can we know what is worth knowing about politics through scientific research methods alone? … Is research in political theory worth doing, or can politics be adequately understood without it? (Grant, 2002: 578).

The answer must be a resounding 'no'.

Conclusion

The task here has been to consider the exclusions and implications of adopting the

position that

[t]he academic study of politics should be objective. The political scientist should not be distracted by ethical questions about the nature of the good life.

The core issue with this stance is the implied exclusion of all ethical – critical and

normative – considerations, leaving the academic study of politics the exclusive domain

of the objective political scientist. After a clarification of terms, the shortcomings of the

'objective' approach were then considered.

Not only does ignoring values and norms create the worrying scenario in which

political science cannot explain the actions of political actors, but, in failing to criticise

them in comparison to some kind of ideal, the result is a de facto support for the status

quo. Although investigating the possibility of causation between the orthodoxy being a

'value-free' approach to the study of politics and contemporary disillusionment with the

political process is outside the scope of this discussion, several commentators have

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noted a correlation between the two (Held & Leftwich, 1984; Hay, 2007; de Shalit,

2009).

The argument made by Stretton (1969) and Grant (2002) is repeated here.

Embracing the ethical in our academic study of politics does not imply that empirical

methods must be abandoned. If there is something which can be objectively, empirically,

or statistically analysed, then utilise those tools! But to argue for a discipline which

abandons those ethical 'distractions' would be a particularly useless pursuit. Such a

discipline would be completely incapable of contributing to the broader political

discourse anything other than ever-more-sophisticated polling statistics. If the academic

study of politics attempts only to answer questions which are answerable by a specific

methodology, then it risks becoming a discipline comprised of 'idiot savants', whose

technical expertise has little relevance to the real world. This would be discipline which

could do little to dispel contemporary political disenchantment.

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Beck, L. (ed) 1963, Kant on History, Bobbs-Merrill, New York.

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