2018 Insensitive Munitions & Energetic Materials Technology …€¦ · 2018 Insensitive Munitions...
Embed Size (px)
Transcript of 2018 Insensitive Munitions & Energetic Materials Technology …€¦ · 2018 Insensitive Munitions...

2018 Insensitive Munitions & Energetic Materials Technology Symposium Portland, OR
Slow Heating Testing Survey and Historical Events Review
Ernest L. Baker
Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (NATO), Brussels, Belgium
This report describes the results of an international review of the STANAG 4382 Slow Heating, Munitions Test Procedures, as well a review of heating rates and durations associated with actual fire events. The purpose of the slow heating test is to assess the reaction, if any, of munitions and weapon systems to a gradually increasing thermal environment. To perform the review, MSIAC created a questionnaire in conjunction with the custodian of this STANAG, the United States, and sent it to subject matter experts including test centers in most of the AC/326 nations. The questionnaire questions deal with the test purpose, test procedure, heating rate, actual events, oven design, oven standardization, temperature preconditioning, energetics melting, reaction temperature, test item restraints, test item orientation, instrumentation, and number of tests. This report provides an analysis of the answers received, summarizes best practice and provides some recommendations to potentially support an amendment of STANAG 4382. These recommendations are being discussed within the NATO AC/326 SG/B Slow Heating Custodial Working Group (SH CWG). The working group has already reviewed the review results and is currently drafting updates to STANAG 4382 NATO documentation, which includes the technical content of the STANAG that is being migrated into a new AOP 4382.
INTRODUCTION
This report describes the results of an international review of the STANAG 4382 Slow Heating, Munitions Test Procedures, as well a review of heating rates and durations associated with actual fire events. The purpose of the slow heating test is to assess the reaction, if any, of munitions and weapon systems to a gradually increasing thermal environment. To perform the review, MSIAC created a questionnaire in conjunction with the custodian of this STANAG, the United States, and sent it to subject matter experts including test centers in most of the AC/326 nations. Moreover, an analysis of similar standards has been done in order to achieve more consistency in the recommendations. From a NATO point of view, the requirements for the slow heating test are defined within three documents: STANAG 4439, STANAG 4382 and AOP-39. The test 7 (h) from the “UN – Manual of Tests and Criteria” specifies a slow cook-off test for the classification into hazard division 1.6. The questionnaire questions deal with the test purpose, test procedure, heating rate, actual events, oven design, oven standardization, temperature preconditioning, energetics melting, reaction temperature, test item restraints, test item orientation, instrumentation, and number of tests. This report provides an analysis of the answers received, summarizes best practice and provides some recommendations to potentially support an amendment of STANAG 4382. BACKGROUND
In 2015, MSIAC carried out a review of STANAG 4496 related to the fragment impact test This review was managed the same way as this current one, and resulted in a list of recommendations that are currently being discussed in a custodian working group to update STANAG 4496. Following the review of the bullet and fragment impact tests, MSIAC proposed

to perform a similar review for the slow heating test, on behalf of the United States who is the custodian for this STANAG. REQUIREMENTS From a NATO point of view, the requirements for the slow heating test are defined within three documents: STANAG 4439 [1], STANAG 4382 [2] and AOP-39 [3]. The test 7 (h) from the “UN – Manual of Tests and Criteria” [4] specifies a slow cook-off test for the classification into hazard division 1.6. Analysis of the requirements The table hereafter compares the STANAG 4382, AOP-39, and the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria test 7(h) regarding the slow heating test: Table 1: Differences between the STANAG 4382, AOP-39 and UN orange book test 7(h)
STANAG 4382 ed.2 AOP 39 Ed. 3 UN 7 (h)Alternative procedure Yes No
Number of tests 2 2Item configuration Bare or logistical, as
agreed by the national authority
Bare or logistical
Logistical
Test Procedure Yes Yes
Heating rate 3.3°C/hr 3.3°C/hr
Preconditioning Temperature 50°C for 8 hours or until equilibrium at 50°C
5°C below the predicted reaction temperature
Maximum Temperature 365°CReaction level acceptable Burning or no reaction Burning or no reaction
The main difference between the documents is related to the item configuration:
In logistical configuration for the UN document. This seems logical, as this document relates to the transport classification of the article;
Bare or packed, as agreed by national authority, in the STANAG, which seems logical as the national authority is able to define when a fire is more likely to impact the munitions during the life cycle.
An alternative procedure is provided in the STANAG: if no analysis has been done, a rate of 25°C per hour should be used as a default rate. With respect to temperatures specified, there are 2 main differences: the preconditioning temperature is different (higher for the UN) and the UN defines a maximum temperature. The STANAG provides more details on the test procedure and includes a basic test set-up description. Neither the STANAG nor the UN document provides a detailed example of test set-up. In addition, there are redundancies between the STANAG 4382 and the AOP-39, especially in the observations and reports part. They should be avoided to allow these 2 documents to remain independent. Indeed, the AOP-39 is linked to the STANAG 4439, and it is not automatically updated when there is a change in one of the STANAGs that defines the test procedure, like the STANAG 4382. The 3rd edition of AOP-39 includes Appendices which provided intermediate updates of all the IM full scale tests not referenced from STANAG 4382 and the contents of the Slow Heating appendix needs to be included in the review of STANAG 4382. MSIAC was requested to support AC/326 SG/B, which was agreed by the MSIAC SC, to review all these documents to remove redundancies or contradictions and to clarify where the

informatiupdated guidanceSTANAGSTANAG QUESTI The quesnation resites fromheating energeticinstrumeprovided Origin o MSIAC hthe fact twere tak(Canada(South Aand 38%group re The follo
Figure 1 The follo(duplicat
ion should documents
e on commoGs have recG 4382 need
ONNAIRE
stionnaire wepresentativm previous rate, actuacs melting
entation, andd with additio
of the Answ
has receivedthat they weken into ac
a, France, GAfrica, Swed% from privat
sponses, ra
owing chart s
: Number of
owing table ptes indicate
reside. Ass. The revieon aspects ocently been d to reflect a
was conductves for distrisurvey respl events, o
g, reaction d number oonal comme
wers
d answers fere not perfoccount for
Germany, Thden and Finte test cente
ather than in
shows the o
f answers re
presents themultiple ind
s a result, mew includes of IM testingreviewed in
a common s
ted through bution, as w
ponses. Theven design
temperatuof tests. Fo
ents.
from 11 natorming this tthe analysihe Netherlaland). 62%ers. If shoudividuals.
origin of the
eceived by n
e complete ividuals from
most of thedrafting of
g, reporting n conjunctiostructure and
the MSIACwell as a lare questions n, oven stanure, test or each qu
ions. Withintest. Therefs. Answends, UK, No
% of the answld be noted
answers by
nations
list of test cm the same
e redundanca Standardand docum
on with this d content w
web site. Arge group ofdeal with thndardizationitem restrestion, a b
n these answfore, only thrs were anorway and twers come that the ma
y nations:
centers and organizatio
cies will nos Related D
menting. OthMSIAC revith these oth
A notice waf identified lhe test purpn, temperatraints, test
breakdown o
wers, one ne 34 respon
nalyzed fromthe USA) afrom govern
ajority of res
national auon):
o longer exiDocument toher IM full scview and chher STANAG
as sent to thelaboratories
pose, test prture precont item orof the resp
nation acknonses from 10m 7 NATOnd 3 partnenmental tessponses rep
uthorities wh
ist in the o provide cale tests anges to Gs
e MSIAC s and test rocedure, ditioning, ientation,
ponses is
owledged 0 nations
O nations er nations st centers presented
ho replied

Table 2: List of facilities and nations who replied to the survey
TEST PURPOSE The survey participants were asked about the purpose of the test. They were asked if the test purpose was to provide an extreme heat rate different from the fast cook-off test, if the test purpose is to characterize the munition being tested, and/or if the test purpose is to simulate a real life accident scenario. Additionally, they were asked to comment as to the reason that the slow heating test was developed. The majority agreed with all three statements, but a larger number agreed that the test purpose was to characterize the munition being tested. Figure 2 presents circle graphs of the responses.
Organization Country StatusDOS Australia Government
DRDC Valcartier Canada GovernmentGD-OTS Canada Canada Private
AC/326 Czech Republic GovernmentTest Firing Center Finland Government
AC/326 – DGA France GovernmentNEXTER Munitions France Private
Airbus Safran Launchers France PrivateWTD91 Germany Government
MBDA Systems Germany PrivateMBDA Systems Germany Private
Centre of Excellence Weapons and Ammunition
Netherlands Government
AC/326 Norway GovernmentAC/326 South Africa Government
Bofors Test Center Sweden PrivateQinetiQ United Kingdom Private
BAE Systems United Kingdom PrivateUS Army IM Board United States of America GovernmentNSWC Dahlgren D United States of America Government
Redstone (Army) United States of America GovernmentEglin Air Force United States of America GovernmentEglin Air Force United States of America Government
AFLCMC/EBDP United States of America GovernmentNAWC China Lake United States of America GovernmentNSWC Dahlgren D United States of America GovernmentNSWC Dahlgren D United States of America GovernmentNAWC China Lake United States of America GovernmentNAWC China Lake United States of America Government
DDESB United States of America GovernmentYPG ATC United States of America Government
NAWC China Lake United States of America GovernmentNSWC Crane United States of America GovernmentNSWC Crane United States of America GovernmentNSWC Crane United States of America Government

Figure 2 For Wha A large n
•
• •
•
•
• •
•
•
•
•
: Test purpo
at Reason W
number of coThe primwhat it mthe reactSimulateIt shouldrate nowThe testspecific SCO. O“severe” testing toearly on It may nreferenceTests peTo simuhold, preAnecdotaoccurringstatemenhow thiselse. OriginallyDue to firate achiThe 6°F conditionwas baseThe test to ensuretemperat
ose respons
Was the Slo
omments wmary reasonmight do in ttion. e the slow hed be performw in use (3.3t forms a hytesting is rever time, wenvironme
o the extremin the desig
not necessaed for all cu
erformed to flate a fire in
esumably onally, it wasg aboard a nts that “one SCO cook-
y several ranancial conievable as aor C/hr he
n to reduce ed on the limalready exi
e a munitionture or with
ses
ow Heating
were received for doing athe real wor
eating of a tmed to simu°C/h). I douypothetical equired to rewe have bent. We wou
mes. SCO agn processarily be reastomers andfulfill the cusn a storagen a ship, or is to serve
ship with e US Navy -off environ
ates were testraints, this
a “bookend” eating rate wthe influencmitation of tested – it wan didn’t autohin a certa
g Test Deve
d. These coany IM test irld and then
test item dueulate a real bt that it actscenario welate to speen able to uld have neaids in down
lity but it wd munitionsstomer reque hold that sin a depot oas a worsemultiple beship burnedment can e
ested provids slowly evoto the Fuel-
was intendece of item siest equipme
as just adapto ignite undeain period o
eloped?
omments wis to charac figure out a
e to heatinglife acciden
tually does swhich is worecific scenaimprove th
ever gotten n selection o
will be a stas requiring teuirements. slowly heats
or railcar. e case testlow deck md for three d
exist (in its c
ding thermaolved into us-fire test. ed to achievize, mass, aent availableted to SCOer very extreof time. At
ere: cterize the ma way to mi
g from an adnt scenario so. rst case. Otrios that fal
he reaction to where wof design co
andard comesting.
s a nearby
t to simulamagazines. days”, but ncurrent extre
al characterising only the
ve heating and other phe in that era. Prior to thaeme conditiothat time,
munition – tonimize the i
djacent buildbut with the
ther additionl between Fof munition
we are todayoncepts or
mparator tha
or adjacent
te a seriesI’ve seen a
no other ratieme form) a
istics for a e most extre
in a near-ishysical featu. at it was useons prior to the reactio
o find out impact of
ding e heating
nal more FCO and ns to this y without materials
at can be
t storage
s of fires anecdotal ionale on anywhere
munition. eme slow
sothermal ures; and
ed to test a certain
on wasn’t

•
•
•
TEST PR The survthe SCOseparateapprovedby the Stheir natiNSWC Creasoninresponse
Figure 3 Nationa When ascommen
•
•
importanbe testedDeveloperate thanIt has bmagazinHistoricaEdition (4382).
ROCEDURE
vey participaO test as ree nationally d procedureTANAG 438ionally agreCrane divisng for develoes.
: Test proce
lly Approve
sked for whnts received
Confirm acceptanThis is aper lates
nt, just the td at the timeed to provid
n in a fast cobeen establnes can be sally SCO wa(HD 1.6) an
E
ants were aequired by approved p
e developed82 primary t
eed test procions provideoping these
edure respon
ed Specific
hat reason were: that our tr
nce from all procedure
st requireme
ime to reace. de a scenaook-off testished than
slow heated as imposedd then intro
asked about the STANA
procedure. d. The vast test proceducedures. Aed the deslocally agre
nses.
c Procedure
was this na
rials plan mparties concreated to g
ents as well
ction. And, th
rio in which
in the casas low as 6
d by the USoduced in th
the test proAG 4382 prAdditionallymajority of rure. Germa
Additionally, ignations ofeed procedu
e
ationally ap
meet the recerned. give clear coas other Ha
he heating
h the test ite
se of fire o6°F/hr. S in UN Mahe IM policy
ocedure. Trimary test y, for what rresponders any and Frathe US Navf their localures. Figure
pproved spe
equirement
oncise stepsazard Classi
rate was th
em is heate
on the ship
anual of Tesy (MIL-STD
hey were aprocedure,
reason was conduct SC
ance providevy NAWCWlly agreed te 3 presents
ecific proced
and has o
s to conductfication Tes
e slowest th
ed at a muc
p deck, nei
sts and Crit2105 and S
sked if theyand if theya specific n
CO tests as ed the desig
WD and the test procedus circle grap
dure develo
bjective rev
t a slow coosts
hat could
ch slower
ighboring
teria 2nd STANAG
y conduct y have a nationally required
gnation of US Navy ures and
phs of the
oped, the
view and
ok off test

Locally A The com
•
•
Another former Mdefinition2105B.
Figure 4 HEATIN The survrate shouSpecificashould bwhether About haresponderespondepresents
Approved S
mments assoProceduand natreasonabSimpler dcold
interesting MIL-STD 21n. Figure 4
: MIL-STD
G RATE
vey participauld be chanally, they wbe used in pr
they had aalf of the resers were uers thought s circle graph
Specific Pr
ociated with res developtional), envble cost design and
related com05B (12 Ja
4 presents
2105B conf
ants were aged and if it
were asked rocedure 1, ny informatsponders ag
unsure or sthat item s
hs of the res
rocedure
local specifped to meevironmental
it is easier t
mment was tanuary 1994a diagram
figuration of
asked about tem size shoto commenwhy shouldion on duragreed that thstated that size should sponses.
fic proceduret STANAG
requireme
to control th
that some te4). It is desof the slow
the slow he
the test heould be a cont on what d this rate beation or ratehe heating rit depends not be a co
res were: G requireme
nts, and g
he temperatu
est areas usscribed as
w heating te
eating test.
eating rate. onsiderationheating rat
e used, shos of actual rate should on the tes
onsideration
ents, safety gather qual
ure if the ou
se the test sa very conv
est configura
They were n in definingte they useuld size be real world sbe changed
st intent. Tn in defining
requiremenlity test da
utside tempe
set-up definvenient andation from
asked if theg a slow heae, what heaa consideraslow heatingd. HoweverThe majoritg the rate.
nts (local ata at a
erature is
ned in the d efficient MIL-STD
e heating ating rate. ating rate ation, and g events. r, several ty of the Figure 5

Figure 5 What Ra The com
• •
• • • •
What Ra The com
• •
•
What Sh The comshould b Should k
• Should b
•
: Heating ra
ates Are Cu
mments receMajority Sometimsystems not be reWhateveAs requeEither 3.We use intermed
ange of Rat
mments receLess thaThis is vrate if theNearly arates areamps to
hould be th
mments recebe based on
keep the origIt should
be based onIt shouldbe based
ate response
urrently Use
eived were: response: 3
mes faster rto ensure t
eal world. er the customested by cus3°C/hr or 253.3°C/hr fo
diate rate, to
tes is Acce
eived were: an 3.3°C/hr avery depende item is not
any rate cane limited by tthe elemen
e Heating R
eived can b“real world
ginal rate: remain at 3
n “real world be realisticd on real w
es
ed?
3.3°C/hr rates – up they will wo
mer wants …stomers…ty5°C/hr or standardo allow us to
ssible with
and greater dent on the t extremely n be prograthe numberts.
Rate be in P
be divided idata” and th
3.3°C/hr.
data”: c to the scenorld data, p
to 100 °F/hork for more
…but almosypically 6°F/
tests for qo run one tes
h your Heat
than 25°C/hsize of the large. mmed. Lowr of heating e
Procedure
into three rhat the rates
nario that a spast occurre
hr – are use than the st
st always 3.3hr or 50°F/h
qualification.st per day.
ing Equipm
hr item under
w rates are eelements. A
1?
esponses: s should be
slow cook-oences, and S
sed for evatandard rate
3°C/hr hr.
. For routin
ment?
test. We ca
easily accoAt this time, a
keep the oworst and t
off test is simSME evalua
luation of me which ma
e, we often
an test at alm
mmodated, an upper lim
riginal rate, the most like
mulating. Thations of wh
mitigation y or may
n use an
most any
but high mit of 150
the rate ely.
is should hat is and

what is not a realistic heating rate in real world incidents. A suggested heating rate with some supporting data is 45-50 degrees F per hour.
• The heating rate should be changed to a rate that is consistent with reaching cook-off temperature within a reasonable time for a fire to be extinguished. If the worst case is 24 hours, then the heating rate should be determined based on the item reaching cook-off temperature in 24 hours.
Should be worst case and most likely:
• The problem with the current rate is that we don’t know if it will produce the worst reaction. No, it’s not “real world”. But, the real world rate for any munition will be highly dependent on the life cycle of that item. There should probably be at least two rates – a worst case rate and a most likely rate (one set by the specific program depending on the life cycle assessment).
Why This Rate? The received comments are:
• Maintain compatibility and comparability with previous test data. • We should be assessing for IM compliance over a range of slow rates, rather than
just at a single point. Having a single point may enable developers to focus on passing just that single requirement, whereas passing over a range of rates might make them more focused on a better IM solution.
• A suggested heating rate with some supporting data is 45-50 degrees F per hour. • With modern day fire fighting equipment aboard ships, fires should be completely
extinguished in less than xx-hours. I do not know what that reasonable timeframe is but we should be able to determine it from the experts. The example I cited above was for a 24-hour fire. Using a cook-off temperature of 180-Deg C, starting at 50-Deg C, 130 divided by 24 hours equals 5.5-Deg C per hour.
• Various energetic materials will have their worst case reaction at different rates. There will not be one rate value that will invoke the worst case reaction in all or most articles or even components. Retaining rates of 3, 4, 5° C etc. will only be valuable for scientific research. A real fire will be extinguished well before any reaction occurs (and won’t last for two days).
Should Size be a Consideration? The received comments are:
• The size of the item to be tested is not foreseeable. It is as big as it is. • The rate should be based on what can be expected in a real world application. • It might be necessary/prudent to tailor the heating rate(s) to item size in order to
assess the effectiveness of reaction mitigation features across a range of credible stressing conditions (see previous comment).
• We already have an artificial rate…don’t make it worse by adjusting the rate based on size. How does that relate to anything real?
• We should remain standardized for all, rather than variable. • Worst case should be used, whatever that rate is.
OVEN DESIGN The survey participants were asked about test oven design information, including oven construction material and thickness, the oven heating system, the oven airflow and oven photographs. They were also asked about oven design issues that affect the testing and potential test outcome, including the item spacing to the oven wall, the observed temperature homogeneity while testing and about protection for energetic material exuded out of the item.

General Figures 6The ovenon the sc
• •
•
•
Figure 6
Figure 7
Oven Desi
6-17 presenn designs vcale and typ
Our ovenDesign fbeing tesIt's an expipe beininsulatedWe have
: NSWC Ch
: Qinetiq, U
ign Informa
nt provided pary significa
pe of test iten designs arfor oven: Ssted. xpandable dng covered d box. e various ov
hina Lake, U
UK.
ation
photographsantly and it im. Below are tailored fo
Square oven
design conswith an ele
vens.
US Navy.
s and diagras clear that
are the commor individualn or cylinde
stituted of a ectric blank
ams of variotest areas u
ments receil items.
er oven dep
metallic pipket. This set
ous testing fuse differenved on gene
pendent on
e surroundit is enclose
facility oven t designs deeral oven de
dimension
ng the muned itself in a
designs. epending esign:
of asset
ition, this a thermal

Figure 8
Figure 9
: Bundeswe
: Yuma Prov
ehr Technica
ving Ground
al Center for
ds, US Army
r Weapons
y.
and Ammunnitions, Germmany.

Figure 10
Figure 1
Figure 12
0: Explosiv
1: NEXTER
2: GD-OTS
es Centre, F
R Munitions,
S, Canada.
Finnish Defe
, France.
ence Forcess, Finland

Figure 13
Figure 14
Figure 15
3: Airbus Sa
4: BAE, UK
5: BAE, UK
afran Launc
.
.
chers, Franc
ce.

Figure 16
Figure 17 Oven Ma A very lalisting of
• • •
•
• •
•
6: MOD NLD
7: Redstone
aterial and
arge variety the differen
16 and 14 inch thUsually insulationMade frowith alumRegular The oveform of sacrificiaDouble w1” Cerampresent t
D / KCW&M
e Test Cente
Thickness
of materialsnt responses
8 gage steeick insulatiowe use larn we use mom 4 ft x 8 fminum tape.steel, arounns used areinsulation.
al. wall design: mic Thermalto interfere
M, Netherlan
er ATEC, US
s and thickns: el dependingon material.rge air condineral wool ft x 3’’ Hom. The oven ind 1mm thice thin doubThese oven
1” thick, fol blanket ratwith potent
nds.
SA.
nesses are
g on the siz
ditioning pip(thickness 1
me Insulations mounted o
ck. le walled alns are cust
il-faced, fibeed to 2400Ftial fragmen
used for the
e of the ove
pe/tube or 10-20cm), an sheeting pon a steel fr
luminium detom built fo
erglass ductF. (“Soft” ovet flight) for t
e oven cons
en for structu
“chicken waluminium fopolyisocyanurame/table.
esigned withor size and
t board lineden design wthe inner bo
struction. B
ural integrity
wire” and fraoil and tape. urate R3 as
h fibreglassare all dee
d with singlewith no hard ox, which is
elow is a
y.
ame. For
ssembled
s or other emed as
e layer of surfaces
s covered

with an outer box made from the same duct board allowing 3 inches airspace between the inner and outer to allow for circulation.
• Standard Stone Wool inside steel grid. • 1/16” aluminium walls with a 1” aluminium angle skeleton to produce a box which is
then covered with high temperature insulation as needed and then covered by a clear tarp to protect the insulation from dew or rain.
• Double-wall construction with inner wall of 1-in thick fiberglass duct-board and outer wall of 2-in thick rigid polystyrene foam.
• Usually steel sheet, appx 1/16” (China Lake) or appr 1/8” (Eglin) • Bespoke oven created for each individual test scenario. • Mild steel with insulating material sandwich between inner and outer layer. • Double-wall design (i.e. inner chamber/outer chamber). Inner chamber constructed
from 1-inch thick duct board. Outer chamber constructed from 1 ½ inch thick foam insulation.
• We use reinforcement mats for the framework of the oven and 200 mm thick mineral wool for insulation. The oven is protected from wind and rain with polyethylene foil.
• Heat resistant wool. Thickness is very much dependent on the outer conditions, i.e. thicker insulation in the winter time than in the summer time.
• Oven material and thickness 1mm steel plate on light frames, rockwool insulation • Thin steel sheet metal, see NAWCWD 473000D for detail info • Ceramic, approx. 3 inches.
Heating Systems and Airflow There appears to be much less variation in the heating systems, with two main approaches: internal heat source convection oven, or external heat source convection oven both using electric heating elements. Almost all responses indicated that they used forced airflow in order to try and achieve temperature homogeneity. So the primary difference between the two heating systems approaches is the location of the heat source: internal for convection ovens and external for heat source convention ovens which employ a pipe to transfer the heat.…are that for the internal heat source convection ovens, the electric heating elements are within the oven, and for the external heat source convection oven, the electric heating elements are in a separate unit from the oven and heated air is piped into the oven. Below are some associated comments from the survey:
• Heating system is like large “fan-oven”. • Convection oven heated by four 120 Volt, 500W strip heaters protected by thin
aluminium witness plates. The heaters may me reusable from test to test. • Electrical resistances. • One or more heating elements off the ground and away from the item under test
within the oven system and fan assisted for air circulation. • ( 4) 500 Watt heating elements. • Hielkema Air Heaters. • Typically 3 each tubular heaters controlled by a Watlow control device that regulates
the time that the heaters receive voltage, thereby, providing heat to the box. Wall Distance All survey responders indicated that they maintained the distance between the test item and the oven wall to be >200mm per the STANAG requirement. Temperature homogeneity The STANAG lists a requirement for temperature homogeneity to be within 5°C. Most respondents indicated that this requirement was not difficult to meet, except for large test items.

Associat•
•
•
• •
• Protecti The survprematuthey did Associat
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Figure 18
ted commenWhen tevalid testTemperaoccasionTypicallywith relaUsually 4Usually can be aWhy sho
on for Exud
vey asked rely ignited use some p
ted commenA “drip tthe heatiWe havebe insulaDependsto have cWe put prompt igOur ovensurface. I undersbad. As that you right undWe cons
8: Protectio
nts are: esting new it. ature homogns, this tolery we can mtively large, 4-7°C. If insless than 5
at least 30°Could there be
ded Energe
if any proon contacti
protection, a
nts were: ray” is locating elemente a tray addated from ths on the testcontact withthermally ingnition whenns are built We try also
stand why thwe don’t hawon’t have
der the weapsider the pyr
on from exud
tems, dry ru
geneity hasrance has beeet the reqelongated iulation is no°C but with
C hotter. e uniform te
etic Materia
tection wasng the oven
as seen in Fi
ted below tht. ed to the ine hotter ovet item, in so
h oven wallsnsulated recn energetic of heat resi
o to insulate he concern ave a valid rhot spots o
pon? Then trolysis gase
ded energet
un with iner
s almost alween exceeduired homoitems (e.g., ot done well
strip heate
emperature?
als
s used to n wall. . Abigure 18.
he test item
side of the oen wall. me occasio
ceptacle belmaterial fallistant wool wthe fixtures exists abou
rationale foron the floor?the floor will
es as having
tic material.
rt dummy is
ways been ed.
ogeneity. Holarge surfac, it can be 1
ers the oven
? Based on w
prevent exbout 40% of
m to avoid e
oven so fill
ons, “trays” a
low tested ml on the ovewhich is insin the oven
ut exuded mr the test, ho? What if the be the hott
g more influe
s always pe
kept below
owever, we ce-launched0°C or more
n wall, espe
what real wo
uded energf the respon
nergetic ma
that exudes
are added to
munition. Inen wall. ulating and
ns which holmaterial: it ow do you me fire is in thest part.
ence on pre
rformed to
w 5°C. On v
have had pd rocket mote.
ecially on th
orld rational
getic materndents indic
aterial dropp
s out of the c
o prevent m
n the aim to
do not act d the test itemakes the
make the asshe portion of
mature ignit
ensure a
very rare
problems tors).
e bottom
le?
ial being cated that
ping onto
case can
elted EM
o avoid a
like a hot em test look sumption f the ship
tions.

OVEN DESIGN ISSUES The survey asked that any issues with the oven designs be raised. The primary topics discussed by the respondents were that the oven should be: 1) very well Thermally insulated and 2) designed so as not to significantly confine the reaction, fragmentation or blast. Thermal issues Comments associated with thermal insulation are:
• Forced air flow ovens have resulted in varying responses from the same munition. It is believed the air inlet is creating localized hotspots.
• The convective oven wall is much hotter than the oven air so when fill contacts it ignites. This not only causes a slightly earlier reaction but ignites the remaining fill in the case in a location that may not be realistic.
• We use heat resistant wool as construction material and place most metal parts (heating elements, fans etc.) beneath the test item.
• The ultimate SCO oven material would be a heat resistant, light colored (better “in oven camera” coverage) affordable, light weight / density and environmental friendly plate.
• Air flow in our test set up does not have high velocity. On my opinion that does not have significant influence to test item and test result.
• Several different cameras that look through a window in the oven and the most difficult problem is determining how to keep the camera cool to keep the internal view camera alive. I have had successes and failures, but I haven’t found the perfect answer for that yet.
Confinement and Fragment Flight Issues Comments associated with confinement and fragment flight are:
• Heavy wall construction can influence the flight of fragments. • I feel that the greatest issue is ensuring that the design of the oven truly provides the
minimum confinement that can be achieved practically, in order to minimize suppressive effects on the ejection of debris and attenuation/focusing of blast
• Oven walls should be constructed of foam/fiber panels with minimal structural integrity to lessen their effect of slowing fragment projections
• Even if the confinement exacerbates oven throw distance we do not believe it throws test item parts farther.
• Confinement will always be an issue, but items can be compared using the same test setup and a “calibration” shot can be used to measure/determine the full detonation properties of the test item.
• Oven design should have minimal effect on the projection of fragments from the oven.
OVEN STANDARDIZATION The survey asked whether the oven design should be standardized. The results split fairly evenly as seen in Figure 19. The problem with standardizing the design is that different munition types require different considerations. Differing sizes of munitions required different sized ovens. Rocket motors will need to be restrained to prevent flight in case of a strong propulsive reaction. Also, munitions tested inside a shipping container or canister can affect the oven design. One thing to consider is the use of the oven itself as a surrogate shipping container or canister. This could avoid duplicate confinement. Another point to discuss will be the consideration of the effect of heating bands on the reaction if material is extruded out of the test item. Heating bands create localised hot surfaces which are eliminated if forced air is used. So, guidance could be provided to use forced air if energetic extrusion is anticipated. External conditions affect the design as well: if it’s very cold outside additional insulation will be needed. Recommendations could be

developethe poten TEMPER The survthat prioprecondiwhichevemelt casbe chang Precond As seen the respmaterialsAbout 1/responde
Figure 19 Should a Commen
•
•
•
•
•
Should t
ed for oven ntial of seco
RATURE PR
vey participor to comitioned at 5er occurs fi
st energetic ged.
ditioning Re
in Figure 19ondents thos, whereas /3 of respoents though
9: Tempera
a Melt Cast
nts associatIt is usefas we adown beI don’t seto 120⁰F If the soaround 8case nowIf the tesabove thIf it is inneeded.
the Require
design to londary fragm
RECONDIT
ants were amencement0°C for 8 hrst. The sushould be p
esponses
9, almost allought that mabout ¼ ofndents thou
ht that it shou
ature precon
t Energetic
ted with pre-ful to have re performi
efore the tesee any reas(~50⁰ C) be
oaking temp80°C for the w, the soakist is to be uhe melting pontended to
ement to P
limit maskinmentation.
TIONING
asked about of the hhours or unurvey askedpre-soaked
l respondedmelt cast enf respondenught that thuld remain t
nditioning.
be Pre-soa
-soaking methe same sng the testst starts.
son to. Durinefore firing.perature is TNT whichng should bused as chaoint until all be used a
recondition
ng of primar
ut temperatuheating contil the test
d if they did differently a
d that they pnergetic sho
nts thought the requiremthe same.
aked Differe
elt cast enerstarting temps in autumn
ng firing test
much lowe is the lowe
be the samearacterizatiomaterial hareal-life su
n be Chang
ry blast and
ure precondndition (ratitem reachepreconditio
and should t
recondition ould be prethat they sh
ment should
ently?
rgetic are: perature forn and winte
ts we would
er than thest of the me
e. on test, the as melted. urrogate, the
ged?
fragment e
ditioning. Tte), the teses thermal on per the Sthe precond
per the STAe-soaked idehould be pre
be change
r all f munitier times and
also condit
e typical meelting explos
material sh
en all pre-s
effects whils
The STANAst item shequilibrium STANAG, wditioning req
ANAG. Aboentically to e-soaked d
ed and abo
on types. Ed the muniti
tion these e
elt temperasive used) a
hould be soa
soaks are n
st limiting
AG states hould be
at 50°C, whether a quirement
out half of non-melt ifferently. ut 1/3 of
Especially ion cools
nergetics
ature (i.e. as it is the
aked just
no longer

Commen
•
•
• •
• •
•
MELTIN The survtesting renergetic
Figure 20 PROPUL As seenprevent believe t
nts associatSome guitems mathink thesize (diaThe onlyheating iConsideWe do nensure tambient howeverenergeticI’m not aI would deg. Whmunitionmap to thI think thbetter fit
G
vey participarequirementcs during a
0: Melting e
LSION
n Figure 21propulsion. that they po
ted with poteuidance shoay reach the STANAG meter, weigy reason I cs a driver ofr making it enot see thethat initial tair and ov
r be much c materials o
aware of the consider eshat is gaines life cycle his requiremhat one shoone of the m
ants were ast. As seen test should
energetics.
, almost haMore than
ose some s
entially chanould be proermal equilshould prov
ght, amount can see forf the reactioeven higher e need to ctemperatureven walls telower than or other ma history of wstablishing
ed by doing or threat p
ment? ould take a most commo
sked whethin Figure 2not affect th
alf of the rehalf said th
safety risk.
nging precoovided on thibrium in 8 vide a guidof container
r it is if it afon severity.r if that can bchange thises are idenemperature.the temperterials.
why 50°C waand documthis? Why
profile? How
look at the on accident
er melting o20, about 7he requirem
espondents hat they do Many of the
nditioning ahe minimumhours but l
de for pre-cor/item insulaffects the o
be shown to. Precondit
ntical from . The precorature at w
as chosen amenting the
50 degreesw does a po
entire heatt scenarios.
of energetics75% of resent.
stated thatrestrain pote described
re: m time to plarger itemsonditioning ation). nset of self
o not changeioning shoutest to testonditioning hich degrad
as the soak need for p? What doeotential ther
ting rate pro
s during a tpondents th
t they do ntentially prod restraint m
recondition.s definitely wtime based
f-heating an
e results. uld be perfot, regardlestemperatur
dation begin
temperaturereconditionies it represermal threat
ofile so that
est should ahink that m
not restrain pulsive item
methods allo
. Smaller will not. I
d on item
nd if self-
ormed to ss of the e should ns in the
e. ng at 50 ent in the scenario
t it would
affect the melting of
items to ms if they ow some

item movitem. Some of
• •
• •
•
•
•
Figure 2 ITEM OR When asusually rthis is thby end cthe ejectstraight uproblems INSTRU The survresponsenormallypressuremeasurefacility lis
vement, pro
f the receiveTest itemThe motflying awthe test sMostly bSystem thrust ceWe onlyrange-sarocket mIn spite othat takeWe norm
1: Item restr
RIENTATIO
sked about representative horizonta
caps, plugs, tion of theseup, which cas evaluating
MENTATIO
vey requestes were ver
y used: digite gauges anement and psted bikini pr
oviding the t
ed commentm is normallyor is placed
way during resite. y using vertdependent,
ells, are usedy restrain iteafety hazard
motors. of a nearestes ordnancemally always
raint from pr
ON
item orientave of the orl orientationetc. that m
e pieces of dan result in g the results
ON
ted informary similar frotal data acqnd thermocopiezoelectricressure gau
testing facili
ts are: y strapped t
d in relativelyeaction due
tical orientat range safed as neededems in instad. Typically
t neighbor a off the stati
s allow prop
ropulsion.
ation duringrientation du
n, which canight be ejecdebris by dia misleadin if video cov
ation on insom all of thequisition recouples. Typc pressure guges for blas
ty has some
to the test sty open but sto the onse
tion when teety depended ances wherthis is uniq
t 20 miles, wion boundarulsion in IM
g testing, theuring most n facilitate thcted from threcting dow
ngly short apverage is po
strumentatioe respondenorders, videically type Kgauges for bst measurem
e informatio
tand with stestrong steel et of thrust –
esting rocketent. Tetheri
re propulsioquely assoc
we must be ries. tests. We h
e majority sor all of thehe assessme test item.
wnward into pparent ejecoor; or the re
on used for nts in terms eo coverageK thermocoblast overprment.
on on propu
eel bandingcage to pre
– this is a ge
t motor or ping, catch b
on of the caciated with
prepared fo
handle that w
stated that the item logist
ment of the dVertical oriethe oven floction range.eaction occu
the slow hof the instr
e, microphouples are uressure mea
lsive potent
. event the meneral requir
propulsive iteboxes, barr
ase might pitems that h
or a propuls
with our risk
he test orientics life-cycldebris hazaentation canoor or direct The latter c
urs at night-t
heating testumentation
ones, witnesused for temasurement.
tial of the
otor from rement of
ems. ier walls,
present a have live
ive event
k areas.
ntation is le. Often, rd posed n impede ting them can pose time.
ting. The that was
ss plates, mperature
One test

Number of Thermocouples The STANAG is somewhat inconsistent in that it states “A minimum of four thermocouples should be used to be sure that the oven is uniformly heated and to monitor the surface temperature of the test item.”, but goes on to state “In general, there should be at least two thermocouples mounted on opposite surfaces of the test item, one each in the air space near the air inlet and exit, and one each in the air space on opposite sides of the round (see Figure 1).”, implying at least 6 thermocouples should be used. The number of thermocouples used by test facilities appears to vary greatly from 4 to 100. Below are some of the responses:
• 4 as per the STANAG. • 6 (minimum) installed in accordance with the STANAG to assess compliance with the
heating conditions and provide an indication of reaction of the test item. • Between 8 – 16: near the oven wall, near the item, and when possible inside the item
(charging tubes). • Typically fifteen. This includes the typical air temp at various points near the item,
oven wall temp, skin temp in several locations including just outside the oven wall, and one or two internal to the item to detect self heating.
• Ten to thirty thermocouples are typical. Some dictating factors include, size of the oven (ensure temperature homogeneity), specific test information about a location, efficiency of heat transfer, STANAG requirement, engineering considerations, etc. We are equipped to use as many as 100 thermocouples.
VISUALIZATION ISSUES A number of respondents described visualization issues:
• Occasionally an internal camera will fail or be obscured by fill exudate prior to initiation. This will compromise diagnostics.
• A minimum of four cameras are used. Two are fielded to view the test store inside the oven and two are deployed to view the outside of the oven.
• We use two cameras outside and one camera inside the oven to record the reaction of the munition.
• Cameras are used external to the event. Disposable internal cameras are often used, as many as four in a single test.
• We have a camera outside oven, shooting through window to inside oven, to the test item. It has been very useful and has given information during test and just before reaction.
• The window allows the ability to confirm reaction of the item but our current set-up does not allow for visualization of the test item reaction, since we prefer using a general surveillance camera. A system using bigger window, mirrors, and high speed camera is possible. Trigger is an issue with some instruments, although we used bridge-wire to acquire data (ex.: pressure) at a higher speed rate during reaction.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS This is a summary of the recommendations, the explanations have been provided in the core of this document:
• Develop a group consensus as to the intent of the test and document it. • Query all of the MSIAC nations to provide information on actual event durations and
rates. • Based on consensus test intent and supporting data, develop a consensus as to
changing rate or leaving the rate unchanged. • Clarify the minimum number of required thermocouples and thermocouple
positioning.

• •
• • •
ACTUAL There wactual sloHeating review ofrom thethreats. Areport sereport “Amany exresult, firminimumhave occfires thatday firestemperatsummaryassessmas 25°C/thermal which insimilar.
Figure 22
CONCLU This sturecomme
ObservaDevelop scales ofCharacteProvide aRemovebetweenprocess)
L EVENTS
were 32 respow heating Custodial W
of actual evee MSIAC saA search of earch resulteAssessing Txamples of re modelling
m heating racurred over t have occu
s appear to ture rise raty of this a
ment conclud/hr. Lower rmodelling. cluded sup
2: Thermal t
USIONS
dy and theendations to
ations of eveand provid
f test items. erize the heaa best pract redundanc
n the STANA).
HEATING R
ponses thatincidents. AWorking Grent heating afety databa
the MSIACed in a largehermal Threfire duratio
g results of tes. The vamultiple day
urred sequebe completetes remainsassessmentde that acturates appeaDr. David Hporting fire
threat categ
e associatedo further im
ents inside thde a best p
ating equipmtices exampcies or contrAG 4382 an
RATES
t the individAs a result, roup (SH Crates and d
ase regardinC MAD-X acce number ofeats” [33] thns and veractual even
ast majority ys, but it ne
entially. Thee in much ss the same t is presenal credible a
ar very difficuHubble frommodelling [
gorization.
d historical mprove the
he oven. ractice oven
ment and peple test confradictions and the AOP
duals had nduring the N
CWG) meeturations anng real-life scident databf referenceshat was pubry few actuants are requof fire event
eeds to be ree individual
shorter timesas that ass
nted in figuadjacent comult to justify
m NSWCDD[34]. The r
events assSTANAG 4
n design ex
erform calibiguration.
and clarify wP-39 (AC/32
no informatiNATO AC/3ting, MSIACd share anyslow heatinbase provids [5-32], inclulished in 20al temperatuired in ordets are compecognized thfire events
s. The sumsessed in thure 22. Tmpartment fbased on a
D, USA receresults and
sessment w4382. Thes
xamples for
ration testin
where the in6 SG/B has
ion on the 326 SG10-1C was requy available hng events aed no applicuding the pr
003. The revure rate meer to estimaplete within ahat these ev
s associatedmmary inferrehe 2003 MS
This review,fires could p
actual fire evently compleconclusions
was an efficse recomme
r different ty
ng.
nformation ss already be
duration or1 April 2017
uested to cohistorical infnd potentiacable informrevious 200view results easurement
ate credible a day. Somvents are ald with theseed actual firSIAC report, and the produce ratevents and aseted a simils appear to
cient way toendations a
ypes and
should sit egun this
r rates of 7 /B Slow onduct a formation l thermal
mation. A 3 MSIAC provided
ts. As a actual or
me events l multiple
e multiple re events t [33]. A previous
es as low ssociated lar study, o be very
o identify are being

discussed with AC/326 SG/B who has already chartered a working group to review and update the STANAG. The working group has already reviewed the survey results. According to the new requirements in the NATO documentation, the technical content of the STANAG will be migrated into an AOP. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT MSIAC would like to acknowledge the custodian of the STANAG, USA, and particularly Dr. Stephen Struck for his review and amendment of the survey. MSIAC also acknowledge the individuals from all the nations who have contributed to the survey by providing an answer to the questionnaire or information related to this test. REFERENCES 1. STANAG 4439, edition 3: Policy for introduction and assessment of Insensitive Munitions. 2. STANAG 4382, edition 2: Slow heating, munitions test procedures. 3. AOP 39, edition 3: Guidance on the assessment and development of Insensitive Munitions. 4. UN, Recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods, Manual of tests and criteria,
sixth revised edition, 2015. 5. Back, G., R. Darwin, J. Scheffey, “Propellant fires in a simulated shipboard compartment:
Project HULVUL Phase III, Naval Research Laboratory NRL/MIU6180 --99-8394, 1999. 6. Boggs, T., K.P. Ford, J. Covino; “Realistic Safe-Separation Distance Determination for
Mass Fire Hazards”, NAWCWD TM 8668, March 2013. 7. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.; Threat Hazard Analysis prepared for Program Executive
Office for Theater Air Defense, 26 November, 1996. 8. Budnick, E., D. Evans, H. Nelson, “Simplified fire growth calculations”, SFPE Handbook of
Fire Protection Engineering, Section 11, Chapter 10, 1997. 9. Bukowski, R., “Fire Hazard Assessment”, SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering,
Section 11, Chapter 7, 1997. 10. Doolan, C.;”Ordnance Heating Rates in Shipboard Magazines”, DSTO-TR-1188, July
2001. 11. Fontenot, J. and M. Jacobson; "Analysis of Heating Rates for the Insensitive Munitions
Slow Cookoff Test", NWC TM 6278 (1988). 12. Fournier, A., C. Lallemand, “Phénomènes thermiques induits par un accident de munition
à bord d’un navire”, AGARD-CP-511, paper 22, 1992. 13. Frey, R.; “Appropriate Slow Cookoff Heating Rates” Army Research Laboratory, 18 April
2000. 14. Guinn, W.R., “A study of heat transfer in liquid pool fires from steady burning through
boilover”, Paper for Fire Protection Engineering -520. 15. Kennett, S., G. Gamble, J. De Li, “Modelling of the HMAS Westralia fire”, DSTO -TR-0698,
1998. 16. Heimdahl, O., L. Bowman, “Standoff distance effect on cookoff of ordnance stowed in
MDCS ship cargo holds”, Twenty-ninth DoD Explosives Safety Seminar, 2000. 17. Leblanc, D., “Fire environments typical of Navy ships”, Thesis, submitted to the Faculty of
the Worcester Polytechnic Institute in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Fire Protection Engineering,1998.
18. King, B., “Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites”, Small Arms Survey Organization (http://www.smallarmssurvey.org), 2016.
19. Lundstrom, E., “Slow cookoff analysis”, Proceedings of the NIMIC 1993 Workshop on Cookoff, paper TP-7, 1993.
20. Mansfield, J., "Preliminary Analysis of the Heating of Ordnance in Ship Magazines Due to a Fire in an Adjacent Compartment", NAWCWPNS TP 8186 (1996).
21. Madrzykowski, D., R. Vettori, “Simulation of the dynamics of the fire at 3146 Cherry Road NE, Washington D.C., May 30, 1999”, Buildings and Fire Research Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, NISTIR 6510 (2000).

22. Null, G., “Computer simulation of the thermal effects on a concentric canister missile launcher with a fire in an adjacent compartment”, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, ADA337018, 1997.
23. Pitts, W., “Improved real-scale fire measurements having meaningful uncertainty limits”, W. Pitts, Workshop on Fire: Testing measurement needs: Proceedings, W. Grosshandler, Building and Fire Research Laboratory, 2001.
24. Stokes B.B., Fitzgerald-Smith J. DeFourneaux M., Kernen P., “Summary of NIMIC 1993 Workshop on Cookoff”, NIMIC-BS-307-94, 1994.
25. Taylor, T.N., “Ammunition Accident at the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base, Zygi, Cyprus 11 July 2011”, MSIAC Report O-150 Rev. 1, September 2014.
26. Victor, A., “Threat Hazard Assessment for Insensitive Munitions”, Presented at NIMIC Hazards Analysis Workshop, 1996.
27. Victor, A., “Exploring cookoff mysteries”, JANNAF Propulsion Systems Hazards Subcommittee meeting, 1994.
28. Wallace, I., “Cookoff – a UK naval perspective”, Proceedings of the NIMIC 1993 Workshop on Cookoff, paper TP-5, 1993.
29. Wharton, R., J. Harding, A. Barratt, R. Merrifield, “Measurement of the size, duration and thermal output of fireballs produced by a range of pyrotechnics”, 21rst international pyrotechnics seminar, pp.916-931, 1995.
30. Wilkinson, A., “Ammunition Depot Explosions”, SAS Conventional Ammunition in Surplus Book 15 Chapter 13.
31. “Recent Explosive Events in Ammunition Storage Areas,” South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (http://www.seesac.org), 2007.
32. “Dangerous Depots: The Growing Humanitarian Problem Posed by Aging and Poorly Maintained Munitions Storage Sites Factsheets”, Fact Sheet produced by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2010.
33. Peugeot, F., “Assessing Thermal Threats” MSIAC Technical Report L-097 published in 2003.
34. Hubble, D., “An Investigation into a Proper Heating Rate for Slow Cook-off Testing”, Insensitive Munitions & Energetic Materials Technology Symposium, Portland, OR, 2018.