AEI’s Critical Threats Project

Update and Assessment

February 28, 2017

2

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. The U.S. may expand its military operations in Somalia to increase pressure on

al Shabaab.

2. Russia supports a military leader in Libya as part of a broader strategy to

counter NATO and draw Egypt away from the U.S. sphere of influence.

3. An increase in U.S. airstrikes on al Qaeda leaders will not meaningfully

degrade the al Qaeda network in Syria or globally.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Al Qaeda Network

The U.S. increased its targeting of al Qaeda’s senior leadership in Syria. A U.S. airstrike

killed the deputy leader of al Qaeda, Abu al Khayr al Masri, in Idlib Province, Syria, on

February 26. Al Masri fought in Afghanistan, served on al Qaeda’s shura council, and

participated in planning the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Al

Qaeda in Syria is unifying the Syrian armed opposition under its leadership and now

operates alongside Syrian opposition groups as part of the Tahrir al Sham Assembly.

Outlook: U.S. airstrikes targeting al Qaeda leadership will have no meaningful impact on

global al Qaeda operations.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda

associates

Pakistan is attempting to balance tense relations with Afghanistan with the threat of Salafi-

jihadi militants based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The Pakistani military

launched operations against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) splinter group Jamatul Ahrar

(JuA).

Outlook: Pakistan’s crackdown may limit JuA’s operations in the near term, but will not

degrade the group’s safe havens in the border region and in Afghanistan.

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| ASSESSMENT:

Political

The Saudi government is lobbying the Trump administration to support the Saudi-led

coalition campaign against the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. Saudi state media increased reporting

on casualties caused by al Houthi-Saleh cross-border attacks in southern Saudi Arabia.

Outlook: The Saudi-led coalition will prioritize military over political solutions in Yemen.

Security

Iran may have transferred technology to support production of offensive drones by al Houthi-

Saleh forces. An al Houthi-Saleh exhibition revealed drones similar to those that Iran’s

Ghods Aviation Industries gave to Lebanese Hezbollah for use against Israel.

Outlook: The al Houthi-Saleh faction may grow more dependent on Iranian support.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen

AQAP is undermining Emirati-backed security forces in southern Yemen through military and

information operations. AQAP and ISIS have demonstrated their ability to cooperate in

central Yemen, although AQAP remains dominant.

Outlook: AQAP’s ability to operate in central and southern Yemen will increase.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 24 FEB: AQAP

conducted a

SVBIED attack on al

Hizam forces in

Zinjibar, Abyan.

2) 24 FEB: AQAP and

ISIS Wilayat al

Bayda seized Laqah

village in al Bayda.

3) 26 FEB: AQAP

militants detonated

an IED targeting al

Houthi-Saleh forces

in al Nadirah, Ibb.

4) 28 FEB: Militants

prevented a UN

Under-Secretary

from entering Taiz.

5) 28 FEB: Popular

resistance forces

killed an al Houthi

judge in Dhamar.

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| ASSESSMENT:

Political

The planned construction of a UAE base in Somaliland could exacerbate tensions between

the Emiratis and the Saudis in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. Those

tensions could permit other international actors to involve themselves in the region.

Outlook: Saudi Arabia will probably not prevent the UAE construction of this base.

Security

The Pentagon has recommended easing restrictions on airstrikes and deploying additional

Special Operations Forces fight alongside Somali National Army troops in order to increase

pressure on al Shabaab.

Outlook: Additional U.S. capabilities could slow the resurgence of al Shabaab as long as

AMISOM forces do not accelerate their withdrawal timeline.

Al Shabaab

Intensified al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu are likely intended to draw Somali security

resources to the capital and let al Shabaab operate in surrounding critical terrain.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely attempt to seize Afgoi in the near term.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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1) 22 FEB: Al Shabaab

militants clashed

with KDF forces

near Kismayo.

2) 22 FEB: Al Shabaab

militants fired mortar

shells into

Mogadishu after the

presidential

inauguration.

3) 23 FEB: Al Shabaab

seized Elhur town,

Mudug region.

4) 25-26 FEB: Al

Shabaab

assassinated three

government officials

in Mogadishu.

5) 27 FEB: Al Shabaab

militants detonated a

VBIED in

Mogadishu.

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| ASSESSMENT:

Political

Russia is lobbying the U.S. to back Libyan national Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar.

Russia supports the LNA partly to strengthen its relationship with Egypt, the LNA’s main

backer. Russia has reached out to both sides of Libya’s civil war. Russia aims to become a

significant player in Libya while decreasing Western influence in the region.

Outlook: Russia will try to leverage Western concerns in Libya to advance its interests.

Security

Turf wars between rival militias in Tripoli threaten the UN-backed GNA. Hardline Islamist

militias challenged GNA-aligned militias for control in Tripoli. The GNA brokered a ceasefire,

indicating that it can influence some militias in the capital.

Outlook: Clashes in Tripoli will increase due to the GNA’s military weakness.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya

The Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC), which includes Ansar al Sharia, is

conducting an assassination campaign to undermine the LNA’s control of Benghazi city.

Outlook: The BRSC will prioritize asymmetric attacks over controlling terrain in Benghazi.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 20 FEB: Militias

from Zliten and

Misrata clashed in

Suq al Thulatha.

2) 21 FEB: The

LNA conducted

airstrikes against

the BRSC in

Benghazi.

3) 23-24 FEB: The al

Burki brigade

clashed with

the Ghneiwa

militia in Abu Salim

district, Tripoli.

4) 22, 26 FEB:

Militants detonated

two VBIEDs in

Benghazi, killing

two LNA members

and injuring seven

others.

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| ASSESSMENT:

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb

ISIS claimed its first bombing in Algeria since October 2016. ISIS has the capability to

conduct small-scale IED attacks in northeastern Algeria. Algerian security forces cracked

down on the group in 2015 and 2016.

Outlook: ISIS will not expand its area of operations in Algeria in the near term.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)

An ISIS-linked militant group may be gaining capabilities in the Mali-Niger border region.

France deployed a small force to counter the group, led by Abu Walid al Sahrawi, after an

attack on Nigerien security forces. France seeks to protect its economic interests in Niger.

Boko Haram’s Shekau faction continues to weaken because of famine in its area of

operations. The Barnawi faction of Boko Haram, with ties to both ISIS and AQIM, has

developed a local support base that may allow it to draw more recruits than Shekau. ISIS or

al Qaeda may exploit the growing strength of Barnawi’s faction to expand in West Africa.

Outlook: Sahrawi’s group may target Burkinabe or Malian targets as French forces reinforce

Niger. The ISIS-linked Boko Haram faction will expand its area of operations in the Lake

Chad region.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB

1) 25 FEB: Tunisian

security forces

dismantled a five-

member ISIS-

affiliated cell in El

Mourouj, Ben

Arous, Tunisia.

2) 26 FEB: ISIS in

Algeria claimed

credit for a briefcase

bomb attack in

Constantine

province. Algerian

police fired on and

killed the attacker

before the bomb

detonated.

3) 28 FEB: Algerian

security forces killed

nine militants in

Azeffoun, Titi

Ouzou, Algeria.

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31

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL

1) 21 FEB: The Macina

Liberation Front

stopped inter-ethnic

clashes in Ke-

Macina, Mali.

2) 22 FEB: A Boko

Haram-Shekau

suicide bomber

attacked a

checkpoint in

Amchide,

Cameroon.

3) 23 FEB: ISIS linked

militants killed 15

Nigerien soldiers

near Ouallam, Niger.

4) 26 FEB: The

Nigerian army

arrested three

Chadian members of

Boko Haram-

Barnawi in Gombe,

Nigeria.

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)

Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)

Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)

Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)

Libyan National Army (LNA)

Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

Somalia National Army (SNA)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmerman

research manager

katherine.zimmerman@aei.org

(202) 888-6576

Marie Donovan

Iran analyst

marie.donovan@aei.org

(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacaria

program manager

heather.malacaria@aei.org

(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelle

al Qaeda analyst

emily.estelle@aei.org

(202) 888-6570

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagan

director

fkagan@aei.org

(202) 888-6569