AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

September 20, 2016

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks sparking armed conflict between rival governments and drawing resources away from the counter-ISIS fight.

2. The unresolved question of representation for southern Yemenis may undermine international efforts to reach a peace deal in Yemen.

3. Planned demonstrations in Tunisia may reignite unrest and compromise security, despite government efforts to respond to protesters’ demands.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants continue to target Pakistani security forces as part of its fight against the Pakistani state. The TTP’s media arm released video footage purportedly showing attacks on Pakistani troops. The TTP’s spokesman claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in Quetta, Balochistan Province that killed two police officers on September 13.

Jamatul Ahrar, a TTP splinter group, continues to attack sectarian and Pakistani government targets in Pakistan. Jamatul Ahrar suicide bombers attempted to detonate suicide vests (SVESTs) during Eid al Adha prayers at a Shia mosque in Shikarpur, Sindh Province on September 13. A Jamatul Ahrar SVEST attack killed 23 people in a mosque in Mohmand agency, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on September 16 in retaliation for local cooperation with Pakistani counterterrorism efforts. Jamatul Ahrar also claimed responsibility for shooting three Pakistani soldiers in Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province on September 18. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) Wilayat Khorasan also claimed responsibility for the attack. Jamatul Ahrar’s leader has denied allegiance to both ISIS and al Qaeda.

Outlook: Jamatul Ahrar will continue to conduct sectarian attacks targeting Shia and Christian communities in Pakistan.

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| ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalSouthern Yemeni military and political leaders are seeking to secure their interests, which are in conflict with those of the internationally recognized Yemeni government under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Aden’s governor argued for an organization to unite South Yemen in the face of the “new reality” produced by the Yemeni civil war and the control of northern Yemen by the al Houthi-Saleh alliance. A southern council may further cement the divide between northern and southern Yemen. The governors of Aden, Abyan, Lahij, al Dhaleh and Socotra support the new council. The formation of a southern political council underscores the absence of a southern Yemeni consituency for the Hadi government.

Outlook: UN-led peace negotiations are unlikely to succeed while issues of local representation remain unresolved.

SecurityHadi government and allied forces continued shaping operations around Sana’a and Taiz cities. They clashed with al Houthi-Saleh forces in Sirwah, Ma’rib governorate, less than 100 km east of Sana’a. They also seized positions in Kirsh district, northwest Lahij, and Kahboub area, southwest Lahij. Hadi military officials confirmed their intent to encircle Sana’a city by seizing positions in Ma’rib, al Jawf, Hajjah, al Bayda, Lahij, and northern Sana’a governorates.

Outlook: Hadi government forces will lack sufficient force to encircle Sana’a and compel an al Houthi-Saleh surrender.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP intensified attacks against Hadi government and allied forces in southern Yemen. AQAP militants attacked security and judiciary institutions in southern Yemen between September 11 and 19. U.S. airstrikes targeted AQAP militants in al Bayda governorate on September 13. Hadi-allied forces expelled an AQAP cell in al Bayda governorate on September 14. Security forces arrested AQAP militants in Abyan and Lahij governorates on September 18 and 19. AQAP’s continued attacks in the face of counterterrorism operations reflect its strong base of support in southern Yemen.

Outlook: AQAP will continue to undermine security and target government officials in southern Yemen.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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1) 17-19 SEP: AQAP attacked security forces in Abyan governorate.2) 13-14 SEP: Hadi government forces clashed with al Houthi-Saleh forces along the Lahij-Taiz border. 3) 13 SEP: Al Houthi-Saleh forces counterattacked in Sirwah district, Ma’rib. 4) 14 SEP: Coalition airstrikes targeted a suspected missile manufacturing factory in Sana’a governorate.5) 15 SEP: Al Houthi-Saleh forces seized Saudi positions in al Khoba district, Jazan region, Saudi Arabia.

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PoliticalControversies over the upcoming Somali parliamentary and presidential elections continue to mount. Mogadishu’s mayor, Yusuf Hussein Jimale, issued an order requiring opposition party candidates to obtain permits for rallies or demonstrations in the capital city. Most presidential candidates, frustrated with the restrictions inside Somalia, are campaigning from outside the country.

Outlook: President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud will likely win re-election. His handling of the election process may complicate his relationships with foreign partners and further damage his legitimacy in Somalia.

Security Regional security forces are playing an expanding role in the fight against al Shabaab. Jubbaland State forces, backed by Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), conducted a series of operations to drive al Shabaab from areas in Middle and Lower Jubba regions. Jubbaland security forces also launched an operation to expel the wives of former al Shabaab militants from villages in Kismayo on September 16.

Outlook: Regional security forces’ operations will not diminish al Shabaab’s ability to attack in southern and central Somalia.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab militants assassinated prominent public servants and military leaders as part of a continued campaign to undermine the Somali Federal Government. An al Shabaab suicide bomber killed a Somali general on September 18. Suspected al Shabaab militants attempted to assassinate the chief judge of the Bardhere region on September 15. Gunmen killed an SNA officer in Mogadishu on September 18. Separately, al Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage (Ali Dhere) warned tribal elders that al Shabaab will attack polling places to disrupt the upcoming elections.

Outlook: Al Shabaab may attack candidates and polling stations during the parliamentary and presidential elections.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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HoA SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 13 SEP -19 SEP

1) 16 SEP: Al Shabaab militants in Kenyan military uniforms attacked a Somali National Army (SNA) base in El Wak, Gedo region. 2) 16 SEP: Jubbaland security forces detained al Shabaab wives in Kismayo, Lower Jubba region. 3) 18 SEP: An al Shabaab SVBIED killed a SNA general in Mogadishu.4) 19 SEP: Al Shabaab militants attacked an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) convoy in Elbur, Galgudud region.

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PoliticalCompetition for control of oil ports in eastern Libya delayed the Libyan National Oil Company’s (NOC’s) efforts to restart oil exports after a multi-year blockade. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) sought to re-open Libya’s oil ports to generate revenue, but factions are now fighting for control of the oil ports. The GNA has held talks with the Libyan National Army, which supports the competing House of Representatives government, in an effort to regain access to eastern Libya’s oil resources. The NOC conducted its first export from a port controlled by the LNA on September 21.

Outlook: Rival armed groups may attack coastal oil ports or inland oil fields controlled by the LNA and its allies.

SecurityDemonstrators protested the GNA and Western intervention, including U.S. support for GNA-allied militias in Sirte, throughout northern Libya. Tripoli residents blocked streets into the capital city to protest electricity shortages, viewed as a governance failure by the GNA. Islamist militants retain safe havens in western Benghazi. Militants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeting pro-LNA demonstration on September 16 and an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting LNA soldiers on September 15.

Outlook: Islamist militants may infiltrate or target protests in Tripoli and Benghazi.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS may have retained or reconstituted combat units outside of Sirte. Reported ISIS militants briefly seized an infrastructure site 130 km southwest of Sirte, indicating that ISIS has the ability to attack hard targets in southwestern Libya. GNA-allied militias continued efforts to seize the final ISIS-held neighborhoods in Sirte. The remaining ISIS militants in Sirte are confined to a few coastal neighborhoods but remain capable of inflicting high casualties.

Outlook: ISIS may conduct retaliatory attacks against the GNA and allied forces in Tripoli and Misrata.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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1) 13 SEP: A gunman attempted to assassinate an LNA general in Ajdabiya.2) 15 SEP: ISIS militants briefly seized a site in southwestern Sirte district. 3) 15 SEP: An ISIS IED killed six LNA fighters in Qawarsha, western Benghazi.4) 18 SEP: The PFG attacked the LNA at Ras Lanuf and al Sidra.5) 19 SEP: Gunmen abducted three foreign workers in Ghat. 6) 19 SEP: ISIS claimed to kill more than 30 GNA-allied fighters in Sirte.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)It is unclear whether AQIM was behind a kidnapping of three foreign workers from Ghat Airport in southwest Libya on September 19. The Ghat Municipal Council denied AQIM’s involvement, but AQIM has conducted kidnappings in the region.

Outlook: AQIM, if it is responsible for the kidnapping, may release a statement to seek publicity or ransom.

Uqba ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)Mass anti-government protests, including demonstrations by security personnel, resumed in Tunisia. Tunisian officials deployed additional security forces to Ben Guerdane and Fernana. The Tunisian government’s efforts to address protesters’ demands largely quelled widespread economic protests last week. The deployment of security forces to protest sites may divert limited security resources away from counterterrorism missions. There are planned Tunisian labor union protests, including a labor strike in Ben Guerdane town on the Libyan-Tunisian border where ISIS militants have attacked in the past. Outlook: Salafi-jihadi militants may seek to expand and attack in the Tunisian border region if civil unrest resurges.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)The peace agreement in northern Mali remains fragile. The Coordination for the Movement of Azawad (CMA), a coalition of anti-government Tuareg groups, clashed with the Self Defense Group of Imghad Tuareg and Allies (GATIA), a pro-government militia, northeast of Kidal city on September 18. Canada may deploy up to 600 soldiers to the UN stabilization mission in Mali, according to unconfirmed reports.

Salafi-jihadi militants in Nigeria may increase attacks against Christian targets. The newly appointed wali, governor, of ISIS’s Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, Abu Musab al Barnawi, seeks to increase attacks on Nigeria’s Christian community to incite sectarian violence. Militants likely affiliated with Barnawi attacked churchgoers in northeastern Nigeria on September 19.

Outlook: Salafi-jihadi attacks on Christian targets in Nigeria will increase in the near term.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569