AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT June 17, 2015

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. The death of al Qaeda’s general manager and AQAP’s emir Nasser al Wahayshi will have a short-term impact on al Qaeda global operations. AQAP’s military operations against the al Houthis in southern and eastern Yemen will probably not be affected.

2. The death of veteran al Qaeda operative Mokhtar Belmokhtar in Libya following U.S. airstrikes, if confirmed, would have significant ramifications for the attempts of local Islamist groups to coordinate their activities. Belmokhtar previously led endeavors to synchronize the groups’ efforts.

3. Al Shabaab has increasingly focused its military operations in northern Kenya. Kenya’s response to al Shabaab’s threat will probably serve to inflame tensions with the Somali refugee population.

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ASSESSMENT:

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al Qaeda NetworkSuccessful U.S. airstrikes have significantly degraded al Qaeda’s leadership. Al Qaeda general manager and AQAP emir Nasser al Wahayshi was confirmed by AQAP to have been killed, for example. Recent reporting indicates that veteran al Qaeda operative in the Sahel Mokhtar Belmokhtar was also killed, though the report cannot be confirmed. AQAP named a new emir in Yemen, but al Qaeda has not yet named Wahayshi’s successor as general manager. Al Qaeda may seek to keep this information internal.

Outlook: Al Qaeda leadership attrition will have a short-term impact on operations, but will not directly affect the ongoing insurgent fights, particularly in Yemen. Al Qaeda leaders should eulogize Nasser al Wahayshi, which will serve as an indicator of continued membership in the al Qaeda network.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesOperation Zarb-e-Azb has killed 2,763 militants since its inception in June 2014 according to a Pakistani military spokesman. The operation emerged as an initiative to combat homegrown militancy, especially in Pakistan’s tribal regions bordering Afghanistan. The military also announced the launch of the final phase of the operation, which will target Shawal Valley and Datta Khel areas of North Waziristan. Pakistan’s tribal areas are far from being free of militants or militant activity even though the Pakistani government touts the operation as a major success. In addition, the government will have to take further measures to combat militancy as reports suggest the emergence of sleeper cells in urban areas.

Two separate ceremonies in which 118 militants from banned organizations in Balochistan surrendered their arms and renounced violence came as a surprise since militant groups in Balochistan have long demanded separation from Pakistan.

Outlook: The Pakistani government will launch the final phase of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in July 2015.

AL QAEDA

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PoliticalUN-led Yemeni peace talks in Geneva between the al Houthi movement and Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government began on June 15. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called for a two-week ceasefire in an effort to allow delivery of humanitarian aid to the country. Yemeni Foreign Minister Riyadh Yassin demanded that the al Houthis withdraw from major cities and release 6,000 prisoners as a precondition for a ceasefire. The al Houthis have not given a statement on a ceasefire, but have previously rejected calls for their withdrawal from territory.

Outlook: It is unlikely that the UN-led talks in Geneva will result in a political solution to the ongoing Yemeni conflict as both sides remain unwilling to compromise on key issues.

SecurityThe al Houthis seized key territory in al Jawf governorate, bordering Saudi Arabia. Militants seized control of al Hazm, the capital of al Jawf governorate on June 14 after prolonged fighting in the area. This is the first significant advance that the al Houthis have made within the governorate. The al Houthis also continued to attack Saudi territory, assaulting a Saudi mosque in Jizan province on June 12.

Outlook: The ongoing Saudi-led campaign against the al Houthis remains ineffective as the al Houthi movement continues to maintain and expand upon their territory throughout Yemen.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)AQAP confirmed that a U.S. airstrike killed its leader and al Qaeda’s general manager, Nasser al Wahayshi. AQAP military commander Qasim al Raymi, who was one of the founding members of AQAP, will replace Wahayshi as AQAP’s new emir. Recent U.S. airstrikes have degraded AQAP’s senior leadership, although have had little effect on the group’s operations throughout Yemen.

Outlook: Nasser al Wahayshi’s death will likely have a greater effect on al Qaeda’s global operations and AQAP’s external operations rather than on AQAP’s military operations throughout Yemen. AQAP will remain in the al Qaeda network and will continue to focus on battling the al Houthis throughout south-central Yemen.

YEMENGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF

ADEN

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1) 11 JUN: Suspected Ansar al Sharia militants detonated an SVBIED targeting al Houthis in al Bayda.2) 10 JUN: Ansar al Sharia militants detonated an IED targeting al Houthis in Shaqra, Abyan.3) 14 JUN: Al Houthis seized al Hazm, the capital of al Jawf.4) 11 JUN-12 JUN: Al Houthis shelled the Saudi Arabian border in Jizan province.

Volume of media reporting focused on political negotiations. Data on kinetic activity not available.

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalKenya continues to undertake efforts to combat the growing al Shabaab presence in the country. Kenyan officials announced that they would begin restricting movement in and out of the Dadaab refugee camp, citing concerns that residents are supporting al Shabaab. Kenya will also begin making efforts to repatriate 100,000 Somalis by the end of the year.

Outlook: Kenya’s continued efforts to repatriate Somali refugees and restrict refugee movement within Kenya will likely increase tensions with the Somali community. Al Shabaab will most likely try to exploit these tensions for recruitment efforts. Continued al Shabaab attacks will also result in increased Kenyan crackdown on Somali refugees.

Security Insecurity in central Somalia continues as the federalization process attempts to move forward. The moderate Islamist group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) continues to hold Dhusamareb, in Galgudud region in, central Somalia. ASWJ militants are opposed to Somalia’s federalization process. Separately, unidentified militants detonated an IED targeting a Somali Federal Government convoy in Lower Shabelle region.

Outlook: Conflict between ASWJ and the Somali Federal Government will likely continue as long as ASWJ continues to hold Dhusamareb as a bargaining chip to gain concessions in the federalization process. Instability in central Somalia is likely to continue as the state building conference increases tensions among groups in the region.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab continues to increase its presence in Kenya. The group seized a town in Lamu County on June 12, preaching to its residents for three hours before fleeing. Al Shabaab militants also attacked a Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) convoy in Garissa County before engaging in a firefight with KDF troops in Lamu County on June 13. The fighting left two KDF soldiers and eleven al Shabaab militants dead, reportedly including British citizen Thomas Evans and regional commander Luqman Osman Issa.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to grow its presence in Kenya and may conduct more attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins on June 17.

HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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1) 11 JUN: Militants detonated an IED, targeting a Somali government convoy in Lower Shabelle region.2) 11 JUN: Al Shabaab attacked an Ethiopian AMISOM convoy in Bay region.3) 13 JUN: Al Shabaab attacked a KDF convoy in Garissa County.4) 14 JUN: Al Shabaab temporarily seized Baure, Lamu County, and clashed with KDF forces inside Kenya.

GULF OF ADEN

HORN OF AFRICA

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PoliticalUN Envoy Bernardino Leon has brought representatives from the House of Representatives (HoR), the Tobruk-based and internationally-recognized government of Libya, and the General National Congress (GNC), the Tripoli-based resistance government, to the negotiating table in Berlin after two years of civil war.

Outlook: The international negotiations will make slow progress, but the emergence of tribal reconciliation pacts will ensure the reunification of the country in the long term. Representatives from both sides continue to criticize the draft political accord, but it is clear that the political actors recognize the numerous security threats within the country.

SecurityThe Libyan National Army (LNA) of the HoR and Libya Dawn forces of the GNC have both stagnated recently. The LNA struggled to clear Benghazi and combat ISIS, and the Misrata Brigades of Libya Dawn recently lost control of Sirte to ISIS.

Outlook: It is highly unlikely that the LNA and Libya Dawn will coordinate or combine into one fighting force before or after the accord is signed, so the most that can be expected is containment of any and all security threats for the time being. The potential return of United States Air Force (USAF) assets will be instrumental to this mission, especially around Sirte.

Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in LibyaUSAF assets destabilized Ansar al Sharia’s operations this weekend when F-15s bombed a secret meeting of regional al Qaeda and Ansar al Sharia leaders in Ajdabiya, a town south of Benghazi, Libya. Early reporting suggests Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former senior AQIM leader, was killed, but the Pentagon has been unable to confirm his death. Separately, ISIS’s Wilayat Barqa, which comprises the northeastern coast of Libya, faced a significant setback when it was forced to retreat from Derna, Libya, following sustained resistance from the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) there after ISIS assassinated an MSC leader.

Outlook: The ousting of ISIS from Derna will probably cause Wilayat Barqa to recalculate its current military efforts in Libya. The group already appears to have resorted to asymmetrical attacks in the city to degrade MSC capabilities.

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

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AQIM Algerian forces continue to address the growing presence of ISIS in the country. Reports cited the arrest of 67 ISIS-linked Algerians in the last two months. Authorities also dismantled two terrorist cells and seized large weapons and explosives caches in the urban north.

Outlook: Terrorist and counter-terror activity will likely shift from the Algerian Atlas mountains to urban areas near the Mediterranean coast if reports of ISIS eroding AQIM’s support base in Algeria are true.

Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)The Libyan conflict continues to affect Tunisian security and citizens. Libya Dawn militants kidnapped over 70 Tunisian citizens, including ten diplomats, in retaliation for Tunisia’s arrest of Libya Dawn leader Walid al Qalib. Libya Dawn is the Tripoli-based militia opposed to the internationally recognized Libyan government. Separately, two Algerian jihadists carried out an attack targeting Tunisian police that resulted in 12 casualties in central Tunisia. The attack was claimed by ISIS.

Outlook: The threat to Tunisian citizens and diplomats in Libya and increasing attacks within the country may prompt the government to increase counter-terrorism operations along the border with Libya, though Tunisia previously emphasized it will not become involved militarily in the Libyan conflict.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Violence in Mali is no longer confined to the north. Katiba Sikasso, an affiliate of Ansar al Din that has pledged allegiance to al Qaeda, killed a police officer and burned down a police base in Misseni, southern Mali. This is the third attack in two weeks to occur in the southern half of the country. Separately, Libyan sources reported that al Murabitoun’s leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Libya. Both the U.S. government and AQIM confirmed the occurrence of the airstrike but did not confirm whether Belmokhtar was killed.

Outlook: Attacks in southern Mali are likely to continue as continued unrest throughout the country will allow militant Islamist groups like Ansar al Din to expands area of operations. Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s death would be a significant loss for al Murabitoun and AQIM, which have suffered defections of fighters to ISIS.

MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST

AFRICA

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1) 10 JUN: The Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna declared jihad against ISIS in Derna, Libya.2) 11 JUN: ISIS militants seized the Qardhabiya Air Base, south of Sirte, Libya, and destroyed the remaining two jets.3) 14 JUN: U.S. F-15s targeted a secret meeting of Islamist leaders in Ajdabiya, Libya. 4) 15 JUN: Libyan National Army began an operation to eliminate remaining ISIS forces near Derna, Libya

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Significant Libya Activity 09 JUN – 15 JUN 2015

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST

AFRICA1) 11 JUN: Tunisian authorities dismantled a terrorist recruiting cell in Tunis, Tunisia. 2) 12-13 JUN: Libyan militias kidnapped ten Tunisian diplomats and around 60 Tunisian citizens in Tripoli, Libya. 3) 15 JUN: Two jihadists carried out an attack in central Tunisia, killing three people and wounding 12 others. ISIS claimed credit for the operation.

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

WEST AFRICA

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1) 10 JUN: Ansar al Din-affiliated Katiba Sikasso militants killed a police officer and burned down a police base in Misseni, Mali. 2) 09 JUN: Unconfirmed reports stated that the CMA clashed with GATIA and pro-government factions of the MAA outside of Menaka, Mali. These reports claim that 38 MUJAO militants were killed during the fighting.

SAHEL

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Domestic Politics and Security Imam Hossein University hosted the Second Congress on Sustainable Security, which began on June 10. Commander of Imam Hossein University Dr. Mohammad Reza Hosseini Ahangar said the congress was a way of developing security “schools of thought” that could build an Islamic civilization to challenge the West. The congress also introduced the “Sustainable Security School of Thought,” which may be a new comprehensive framework for the IRGC to integrate existing doctrines and cultivate innovative concepts. It is arguably an acknowledgement that Iran does not have the intellectual foundation to develop and execute an effective national security or military strategy in the current environment.

Outlook: The regime may cultivate the “Sustainable Security School of Thought” as part of its efforts to develop an intellectual foundation necessary to formulate an effective national security strategy.

Nuclear TalksPresident Hassan Rouhani reassured domestic audiences that the negotiating team is adhering to the Supreme Leader’s redlines as the negotiating team prepares to travel to Vienna on Wednesday for the next round of nuclear talks. Further, IRGC Brig. Gen. Massoud Jazayeri stressed foreign access to any military sites is a national security threat and will not be permitted. Regime members may be looking to rebuild domestic confidence in the government’s negotiating abilities following Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s leaked comments from a May 23 parliamentary session alluding to the Supreme Leader’s approval of foreign access to certain military facilities as part of a final nuclear deal.

Outlook: The regime will continue to contend that the negotiating team is adhering to the Supreme Leader’s previously prescribed red lines on military site inspections in an effort to project a stronger stance in the talks.

IRAN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

09 JUNE – 15 JUNE 2015

09 JUN: IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brig. Gen. Mohammad Pakpour stated, “We have no concerns about ISIS threats.” 

10 JUN: The Second Congress on Sustainable Security began at Imam Hossein University.

10 JUN: Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces IRGC Maj. Gen. Mostafa Izadi discussed the “security school of thought” in the Islamic Republic at the Second Congress on Sustainable Security.

10 JUN:  Former LEF Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam stated that an investment company named Qadr is at the center of a corruption case Moghaddam brought against the LEF Cooperation Foundation.

10 JUN: IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami stated, “Americans are our worst enemies.”

10 JUN: The head of the Iranian Oil Exporters Union Hassan Khosrojerdi announced a finalized joint venture plan with China and Indonesia to build an oil refinery on the island of Java.

10 JUN: In an interview with Hezbollah-run news outlet al Ahed, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani stated that the war against “terrorists” like ISIS is “more difficult than the war against the Zionists.”

10 JUN: Mayor of Tehran Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf criticized the Rouhani administration for suggesting Iran’s economic challenges can only be solved with a nuclear deal.

11 JUN: The office of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad described former Vice President Hamid Baghaei’s arrest as a violation of “legal rules and principles.”

13 JUN: Head of the Passive Defense Organization IRGC Brig. Gen. Gholam Reza Jalali announced the establishment of a “Cyber Defense Center” for the Armed Services to respond to cyber threats.

13 JUN: Minister of Communications and Information Technology Mahmoud Vaezi met with his Chinese counterpart in China to discuss sharing cyberspace and information technology.

14 JUN: President Hassan Rouhani reiterated that the negotiating team is observing the Supreme Leader’s “redlines in the nuclear talks” while addressing a large gathering in North Khorasan province.

15 JUN: Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian departed Monday for Saudi Arabia to attend an emergency ministerial meeting on Yemen for the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

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ACRONYMSAtomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)

Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)

Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)

Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)

Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)

Libyan National Army (LNA)

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)

Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

North Waziristan (NWA)

Pakistani Military (PakMil)

Possible military dimensions (PMD)

Somalia National Army (SNA)

South Waziristan (SWA)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Alexis Knutsenal Qaeda analystalexis.knutsen@aei.org (202) 888-6570

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Mehrdad MoarefianIran analystmehrdad.moarefian@aei.org(202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirectorfkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569