2011/07/06 Areva EPR DC - Response to U.S. EPR Design ... · 1 ArevaEPRDCPEm Resource From:...

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ArevaEPRDCPEm Resource

From: WILLIFORD Dennis (AREVA) [[email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, July 06, 2011 3:47 PMTo: Tesfaye, GetachewCc: BENNETT Kathy (AREVA); DELANO Karen (AREVA); ROMINE Judy (AREVA); RYAN Tom

(AREVA); SALAS Pedro (AREVA)Subject: Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 456, FSARCh. 19 NEW

PHASE 4 RAI, Supplement 4Attachments: RAI 456 Supplement 4 Response US EPR DC - Public.pdf

Getachew, AREVA NP Inc. (AREVA NP) provided a schedule for a technically correct and complete response to RAI No. 456 on February 21, 2011. Supplement 1, Supplement 2 and Supplement 3 responses were submitted to the NRC on March 3, 2011, April 22, 2011, and June 1, 2011, respectively, to revise the schedule. The attached file, “RAI 456 Supplement 4 Response US EPR DC - Public.pdf” provides technically correct and complete FINAL responses to the remaining 6 questions, as committed. Because the response file contains security-related sensitive information that should be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, a public version is provided with the security-related sensitive information redacted. This email and attached file do not contain any security-related information. An unredacted security-related version is provided under separate email. Appended to this file are affected pages of the U.S. EPR Final Safety Analysis Report in redline-strikeout format which support the response to RAI 456, Questions 19-342 through 19-347. The following table indicates the respective pages in the response document, RAI 456 Supplement 4 Response US EPR DC - Public.pdf,” that contains AREVA NP’s response to the subject questions. Question # Start Page End Page RAI 456 — 19-342 2 4 RAI 456 — 19-343 5 5 RAI 456 — 19-344 6 6 RAI 456 — 19-345 7 7 RAI 456 — 19-346 8 8 RAI 456 — 19-347 9 9 This concludes the formal AREVA NP response to RAI 456 and there are no questions from this RAI for which AREVA NP has not provided responses. Sincerely, Dennis Williford, P.E. U.S. EPR Design Certification Licensing Manager AREVA NP Inc. 7207 IBM Drive, Mail Code CLT 2B Charlotte, NC 28262 Phone: 704-805-2223 Email: [email protected]

From: WILLIFORD Dennis (RS/NB) Sent: Wednesday, June 01, 2011 1:52 PM To: 'Tesfaye, Getachew'

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Cc: BENNETT Kathy (RS/NB); DELANO Karen (RS/NB); ROMINE Judy (RS/NB); RYAN Tom (RS/NB) Subject: Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 456, FSARCh. 19 NEW PHASE 4 RAI, Supplement 3 Getachew, AREVA NP Inc. (AREVA NP) provided a schedule for a technically correct and complete response to RAI No. 456 on February 21, 2011. Supplement 1 and Supplement 2 were submitted to the NRC on March 3, 2011 and April 22, 2011, respectively, to revise the schedule. The schedule for a technically correct and complete response to the 6 questions has been changed as provided below. Question # Response Date RAI 456 — 19-342 July 6, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-343 July 6, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-344 July 6, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-345 July 6, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-346 July 6, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-347 July 6, 2011 Sincerely, Dennis Williford, P.E. U.S. EPR Design Certification Licensing Manager AREVA NP Inc. 7207 IBM Drive, Mail Code CLT 2B Charlotte, NC 28262 Phone: 704-805-2223 Email: [email protected]

From: WELLS Russell (RS/NB) Sent: Friday, April 22, 2011 4:34 PM To: 'Tesfaye, Getachew' Cc: WILLIFORD Dennis (RS/NB); PEDERSON Ronda (EP/PE); BENNETT Kathy (RS/NB); DELANO Karen (RS/NB); ROMINE Judy (RS/NB); RYAN Tom (RS/NB) Subject: Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 456, FSARCh. 19 NEW PHASE 4 RAI, Supplement 2 Getachew, AREVA NP Inc. (AREVA NP) provided a schedule for a technically correct and complete response to RAI No. 456 on February 21, 2011. Supplement 1 was submitted to the NRC on March 3, 2011 to revise the schedule to align with the response to RAI 449. To allow additional time to interact with NRC staff and to complete a new technical report related to design features to protect against the impact of a large commercial aircraft impact, the schedule for a technically correct and complete response to the 6 questions has been changed as provided below. Question # Response Date RAI 456 — 19-342 June 3, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-343 June 3, 2011

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RAI 456 — 19-344 June 3, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-345 June 3, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-346 June 3, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-347 June 3, 2011 Sincerely, Russ Wells U.S. EPR Design Certification Licensing Manager AREVA NP, Inc. 3315 Old Forest Road, P.O. Box 10935 Mail Stop OF‐57 Lynchburg, VA 24506‐0935 Phone: 434‐832‐3884 (work) 434‐942‐6375 (cell) Fax: 434‐382‐3884 [email protected]

From: WELLS Russell (RS/NB) Sent: Thursday, March 03, 2011 10:55 AM To: 'Tesfaye, Getachew' Cc: BENNETT Kathy (RS/NB); DELANO Karen (RS/NB); ROMINE Judy (RS/NB); PEDERSON Ronda (EP/PE); SALAS Pedro (RS/NB) Subject: Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 456, FSARCh. 19 NEW PHASE 4 RAI, Supplement 1 Getachew, On February 21, 2011, AREVA NP Inc. (AREVA NP) provided a schedule for a technically correct and complete response to the questions in RAI 456. A revised schedule is provided below to align the FINAL response to RAI 456 to align with RAI 449. The schedule for technically correct and complete response to all questions in RAI 456 has been revised and is provided below. Question # Response Date RAI 456 — 19-342 April 29, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-343 April 29, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-344 April 29, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-345 April 29, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-346 April 29, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-347 April 29, 2011 Sincerely, Russ Wells U.S. EPR Design Certification Licensing Manager AREVA NP, Inc. 3315 Old Forest Road, P.O. Box 10935

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Mail Stop OF‐57 Lynchburg, VA 24506‐0935 Phone: 434‐832‐3884 (work) 434‐942‐6375 (cell) Fax: 434‐382‐3884 [email protected]

From: BRYAN Martin (External RS/NB) Sent: Monday, February 21, 2011 9:25 AM To: 'Tesfaye, Getachew' Cc: DELANO Karen (RS/NB); ROMINE Judy (RS/NB); BENNETT Kathy (RS/NB); SALAS Pedro (RS/NB); WELLS Russell (RS/NB) Subject: Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 456, FSARCh. 19 NEW PHASE 4 RAI

Getachew, Attached please find AREVA NP Inc.’s response to the subject request for additional information (RAI). The attached file, “RAI 456 Response US EPR DC.pdf” provides a schedule since a technically correct and complete response to the 6 question (s) is not provided. The following table indicates the respective pages in the response document, “RAI 456 Response US EPR DC.pdf ,” that contain AREVA NP’s response to the subject questions. Question # Start Page End Page RAI 456 — 19-342 2 3 RAI 456 — 19-343 4 4 RAI 456 — 19-344 5 5 RAI 456 — 19-345 6 6 RAI 456 — 19-346 7 7 RAI 456 — 19-347 8 8 A complete answer is not provided for the 6 questions. The schedule for a technically correct and complete response to these questions is provided below. Question # Response Date RAI 456 — 19-342 April 4, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-343 April 4, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-344 April 4, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-345 April 4, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-346 April 4, 2011 RAI 456 — 19-347 April 4, 2011 Sincerely, Martin (Marty) C. Bryan U.S. EPR Design Certification Licensing Manager AREVA NP Inc. Tel: (434) 832-3016 702 561-3528 cell [email protected]

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From: Tesfaye, Getachew [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2011 2:52 PM To: ZZ-DL-A-USEPR-DL Cc: McCann, Edward; Dreisbach, Jason; Ford, Tanya; Colaccino, Joseph Subject: U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 456 (5150), FSARCh. 19 NEW PHASE 4 RAI

Attached please find the subject requests for additional information (RAI). A draft of the RAI was provided to you on October 29, 2010, and on January 13, 2011, you informed us that the RAI is clear and no further clarification is needed. As a result, no change is made to the draft RAI. The schedule we have established for review of your application assumes technically correct and complete responses within 30 days of receipt of RAIs. For any RAIs that cannot be answered within 30 days, it is expected that a date for receipt of this information will be provided to the staff within the 30 day period so that the staff can assess how this information will impact the published schedule.

Thanks, Getachew Tesfaye Sr. Project Manager NRO/DNRL/NARP (301) 415-3361

Hearing Identifier: AREVA_EPR_DC_RAIs Email Number: 3198 Mail Envelope Properties (2FBE1051AEB2E748A0F98DF9EEE5A5D47AF75D) Subject: Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 456, FSARCh. 19 NEW PHASE 4 RAI, Supplement 4 Sent Date: 7/6/2011 3:46:35 PM Received Date: 7/6/2011 3:46:41 PM From: WILLIFORD Dennis (AREVA) Created By: [email protected] Recipients: "BENNETT Kathy (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "DELANO Karen (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "ROMINE Judy (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "RYAN Tom (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "SALAS Pedro (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "Tesfaye, Getachew" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None Post Office: auscharmx02.adom.ad.corp Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 8952 7/6/2011 3:46:41 PM RAI 456 Supplement 4 Response US EPR DC - Public.pdf 409471 Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date: Recipients Received:

Response to

Request for Additional Information No. 456, Supplement 4

1/20/2011

U. S. EPR Standard Design Certification AREVA NP Inc.

Docket No. 52-020 SRP Section: 19 - Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Severe Accident Evaluation

Application Section: 19.2.7

QUESTIONS for Balance of Plant Branch 1 (AP1000/EPR Projects) (SBPA)

AREVA NP Inc. Response to Request for Additional Information No. 456, Supplement 4 U.S. EPR Design Certification Application Page 2 of 9 Question 19-342:

OPEN ITEM

AIRCRAFT IMPACT ASSESSMENT

It is stated in EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.3 Rev 2, that the methodology used for assessing effects of aircraft impact is described in NEI 07-13, “Methodology for Performing Aircraft Impact Assessments [AIA] for New Plant Designs,” Revision 7 . Tables 3-4 and 3-5 of NEI 07-13 describe the guidelines for assessing the effects of an aircraft impact that could occur. Contrary to the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of 10 CFR 50.150:

� EPR FSAR Sections 19.2.7.5.1 (containment), 19.2.7.5.2 (RCS heat removal), 19.2.7.5.4, (SFP Heat Removal), 19.2.7.4, and 19.2.7. 5 may not contain all the design features credited or in sufficient detail such as what systems/trains/structural features/ equipment are being credited for AIA in Technical Report ANP-10296 Sections 1 and 2 which is referenced in FSAR Section 19.2.7.4 as detailing the credited design features for AIA.

� EPR FSAR Sections 19.2.7.4 and 19.2.7. 5 do not specifically contain a description of design features nor functional capabilities nor the specific equipment relied upon to ensure that the assessment requirements in paragraph (a)(1) of 10 CFR 50.150 are met while the plant is producing power.

� EPR FSAR Sections 19.2.7.4 and19.2.7. 5 do not specifically contain a description of design features nor functional capabilities nor the specific equipment relied upon to ensure that the assessment requirements in paragraph (a)(1) of 10 CFR 50.150 are met while the plant is shutdown and the reactor is being cooled via the shutdown cooling system.

� EPR FSAR Sections 19.2.7.4 and19.2.7. 5 do not specifically contain a description of an assessment for the potential for damage to prevent a scram should it have not occurred is not described.

Modify FSAR Sections 19.2.7.4 and 19.2.7.5, to include a description of (1) design features and/or functional capabilities and the specific equipment including location of equipment relative to the specific design feature credited relied upon to ensure that the assessment requirements in paragraph (a)(1) of 10 CFR 50.150 are met for each item above, and (2) how these design features and/or functional capabilities and the specific equipment required meet the assessment requirements in paragraph (a)(1) of 10 CFR 50.150. In your response, please describe how these features are capable of assuring core cooling following a beyond-design-basis aircraft impact event for a sufficient period of time to allow implementation of measures that will assure long term core cooling. The staff considers 24 hours to be a sufficient amount of time to implement mitigation measures for long-term core cooling. Please provide the staff with a marked-up copy of EPR FSAR Tier 2 Sections 19.2.7.4 and 19.2.5.7.5, that shows the required descriptions and include the descriptions in the next Revision of the FSAR.

In addition, the submittal reviewed by the NRC must accurately reflect the results of the AIA performed by the applicant as required by 10 CFR 50.150. The AIA must assess the design described in the FSAR submitted for certification. The FSAR submittal should include all key design features and functional capabilities identified as needed to meet the acceptance criteria in the AIA. The applicant must either revise the FSAR submittal or revise the AIA if it is found

AREVA NP Inc. Response to Request for Additional Information No. 456, Supplement 4 U.S. EPR Design Certification Application Page 3 of 9 that there are key design features and functional capabilities identified in the AIA that are not found in the EPR FSAR Section 19.2.7 currently being reviewed by the NRC.

Response to Question 19-342:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.4 and Section 19.2.7.5 will be revised to include a description of the design features and/or functional capabilities used to verify that the assessment requirements in 10 CFR 50.150 (a)(1) are met. Figures in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2 Section 1.2, Section 3.8, Appendix 3B and Appendix 9A will also be revised to show some of the credited design features. In addition, U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.4 and Section 19.2.7.5 will be revised to address the assessment requirements of 10 CFR 50.150 during plant operation and shutdown conditions, as well as an assessment of the potential for damage to prevent a scram.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.8, Reference 20 (Technical Report ANP-10296) will be deleted. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.8 will be revised to add a new reference to Technical Report ANP-10317, “Design Requirements for the U.S. EPR Aircraft Hazard Protection Structures.” This report will also be added to the list of reports referenced in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Table 1.6-1.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.4 will be revised to add details on the protection provided by the hardened and isolated shield structures, site arrangement, redundant trains, and fire barriers, including a list of the protected systems. Using the methodology in NEI 07-13, Revision 7, the commercial aircraft impact damage assessment evaluated the physical damage, vibration damage, and fire damage from an impact of a large commercial aircraft with the characteristics provided by the NRC to determine which divisions of key safety-related systems would remain functional after the impact. The evaluation indicates that for the locations subject to commercial aircraft impact defined by NEI 07-13, Revision 7, one or more divisions of the key safety-related systems will remain functional after the event.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.5.2 will be revised for clarity to state:

“The U.S. EPR design has features, such as hardened and isolated shield structures, a strategic site arrangement and plant structural design, fire barriers and the physically separate and redundant trains. These features contribute to the success of one or more divisions of systems credited in Chapter 15 to maintain functionality to provide reactor core cooling after the impact of a large commercial aircraft.”

The commercial aircraft impact damage assessment evaluation relied on the results of the system performance assessments used in the U.S. EPR Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to determine if the functional equipment was sufficient to prevent loss of sufficient core cooling, as demonstrated by core cladding temperatures for 24 hours following the impact. As stated in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.5.2, the results of these evaluations indicate that one division of installed key safety-related systems is sufficient to provide adequate core cooling.

Certain details of some of the key design features have been determined by the NRC to be Safeguards Information (SGI). Because this question states that the submitted information must accurately reflect the results of the AIA performed by the applicant as required by 10 CFR 50.150, AREVA NP proposed to the NRC via telecon that the SGI information would be

AREVA NP Inc. Response to Request for Additional Information No. 456, Supplement 4 U.S. EPR Design Certification Application Page 4 of 9 provided separately. For this response, the NRC informed AREVA NP not to submit SGI, and to state that the subject information will be made available for NRC inspection.

FSAR Impact:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 1.2, Section 3.8, Appendix 3B, Appendix 9A, Section 19.2.7.4, Section 19.2.7.5, Section 19.2.8 and Table 1.6-1 will be revised as described in the response and indicated on the enclosed markup.


OPEN ITEM


It is stated in EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.5.2, that NEI 07-13 does not require postulating a Chapter 15 event concurrent with an aircraft impact that does not perforate the structures containing RCS piping. However, any Chapter 15 like events caused by an aircraft impact need to be evaluated. The applicant needs to modify FSAR Section 19.2.7.5.2 to state that no Chapter 15 like events is caused by an aircraft impact. Please provide the staff with a marked-up copy of FSAR Section 19.2.7.5.2.


U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.5.2 will be revised to state that an aircraft impact does not create any new events that have not been analyzed in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Chapter 15.

FSAR Impact:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.5.2 will be revised as described in the response and indicated on the enclosed markup.


OPEN ITEM


It is stated in EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.6, that the assessment confirmed that the U.S. EPR design meets the four acceptance criteria. The applicant needs to clarify FSAR Section 19.2.7.6 to state that all areas meet all four acceptance criteria or state which areas meet which criteria. Please provide the staff with a marked-up copy of FSAR Section 19.2.7.6.


The assessment followed the methodology described in NEI 07-13, Revision 7 Methodology for Performing Aircraft Impact Assessments for New Plant Designs. This methodology has been endorsed by the NRC in Draft Guide (DG)-1176, “Guidance for the Assessment of Beyond-Design-Basis Aircraft Impacts.” The complete aircraft impact assessment is available for NRC inspection. The assessment concludes that the U.S. EPR maintains containment integrity, RCS heat removal capability, spent fuel pool (SFP) integrity, and SFP heat removal capability following the impact of a large commercial aircraft. A description of the design features credited for conformance with 10 CFR 50.150 and how these design features meet the functional capabilities of containment integrity, RCS heat removal capability, spent fuel pool (SFP) integrity, and SFP heat removal capability are provided in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.4 and Section 19.2.7.5. The conclusion in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2 Section 19.2.7.6 will be revised to clarify that the design meets the four acceptance criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1).

FSAR Impact:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.6 will be revised as described in the response and indicated on the enclosed markup.


OPEN ITEM


The EPR AIA may take exceptions to NEI 07-13 guidance or methodology. If so, the applicant is requested to identify and provide rationale for the exceptions.


U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.3 will be revised to clarify that the methodology of NEI 07-13, Revision 7 was followed without exceptions.

FSAR Impact:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.3 will be revised as described in the response and indicated on the enclosed markup.


OPEN ITEM


It is stated in EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.5, that the fire damage footprint includes effects from exterior fires that may damage areas within the air intake and exhaust ducts up to the first fire-rated doors. Fire barriers credited for the “one-barrier” option in NEI 07-13, including intervening penetration seals, doors, and dampers, should have both a 3-hour fire rating and be able to withstand 5psid overpressure to prevent fire spread. The applicant needs to revise FSAR Section 19.2.7.5 to identify and describe the specific fire barriers credited for the “one-barrier” option. Please provide the staff with a marked-up copy of FSAR Section 19.2.7.5.


U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.5 will be revised to identify and describe the fire barriers credited for preventing fire damage from spreading due to an aircraft impact in accordance with in NEI 07-13. Figures in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Appendix 9A will also be revised to identify the fire barriers credited for the one-barrier option.

FSAR Impact:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Appendix 9A and Section 19.2.7.5 will be revised as described in the response and indicated on the enclosed markup.


OPEN ITEM


It is stated in EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.5, that the finite element analyses indicate that interior areas of the Safeguard Buildings, Fuel Building, or the Containment Building are not susceptible to damage due to physical perforation of aircraft components into the structures. However, only Safeguards Buildings 2 and 3 have a hardened shield building as per ANP-10296. The applicant needs to clarify which Safeguard Buildings have a hardened shield building in FSAR Section 19.2.7.5. Please provide the staff with a marked-up copy of FSAR Section 19.2.7.5.


Although Safeguard Buildings 2 and 3 have a separate hardened and isolated shield wall, Safeguard Buildings 1 and 4 have a robust concrete exterior wall that has been evaluated for aircraft impact as part of the Aircraft Impact Assessment (AIA). The statement in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.5 regarding finite element analysis of the Safeguard Buildings applies to the four Safeguard Buildings.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.5 will be revised to clarify that the four Safeguard Buildings are not susceptible to damage resulting from physical perforation of aircraft components into the structures. The Response to Question 19-342 revised U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7.4 to describe the hardened and isolated shield structures providing protection of Safeguard Buildings 2 and 3, the Fuel Building, and the Containment Building.

FSAR Impact:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 19.2.7 will be revised as described in the response and indicated on the enclosed markup.

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U.S. EPR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

Tier 2 Revision 3—Interim Page 1.6-4

ANP-10310PRevision 1

Methodology for 100% Combinatorial Testing of the U.S. EPR™ Priority Module Technical Report

03/11 7.1

ANP-10315PRevision 1

U.S. EPR Protection System Surveillance Testing and Teleperm XS Self-Monitoring Technical Report

6/11 7.1,7.3

ANP-10317 Design Requirements for the U.S. EPR Aircraft Hazard Protection Structures

5/11 19.2.7.4

ANP-10318P Pipe Rupture External Loading Effects on U.S. EPR Essential Structures, Systems, and Components Technical Report

3/11 3.6.2

BAW-10132-A Analytical Methods Description – Reactor Coolant System Hydrodynamic Loadings During a Loss-of-Coolant Accident

7/20/79 App. 3C

BAW-10133P-ABAW-10133-ARevision 1, Addendum 1 and 2

Mark-C Fuel Assembly LOCA-Seismic Analysis

10/30/00 4.2

BAW-10147P-ABAW-10147-A Revision 1

Fuel Rod Bowing in Babcock & Wilcox Fuel Designs

6/28/83 4.2, 4.4

BAW-10156-ARevision 1

LYNXT, Core Transient Thermal-Hydraulic Program

8/18/93 4

BAW-10163P-ABAW-10163-A

Core Operating Limit Methodology for Westinghouse Designed PWRs

6/2/89 4.3 and 16

BAW-10164P-ABAW-10164NP-ARevision 6

RELAP5/MOD2-B&W - An Advanced Computer Program for Light Water Reactor LOCA and Non-LOCA Transient Analysis

11/20/07 3.9.1, 6.2, and 8.4

BAW-10168P-ABAW-10168-ARevision 3

BWNT Loss-of-Coolant Accident Model for Recirculating Steam Generator Plants

1/31/97 6.2

BAW-10169P-ABAW-10169-A

B&W Safety Analysis Methodology for Recirculating Steam Generator Plants

11/28/89 6.2

BAW-10172P-ABAW-10172NP-A

Mark-BW Mechanical Design Report 12/19/89(Note 4)

4.2

Table 1.6-1—Reports Referenced Sheet 3 of 4

Report No.(See Notes 1, 2,

and 3) Title

DateSubmitted

to NRC FSAR Section

Number(s)

RAI 449, Q. 19-339RAI 456, Q. 19-342

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-17

7

Fig

ure

3.8-

1—R

eact

or B

uild

ing

Plan

at E

leva

tion

-50

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-21

7

Fig

ure

3.8-

41—

Fuel

Bui

ldin

g Pl

an E

leva

tion

0 Fe

etR

AI4

56,Q

.19-

342

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-21

9

Fig

ure

3.8-

42—

Fuel

Bui

ldin

g Pl

an E

leva

tion

+12

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-22

2

Fig

ure

3.8-

46—

Fuel

Bui

ldin

g Pl

an E

leva

tion

+64

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-23

1

Fig

ure

3.8-

55—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

1 Pl

an E

leva

tion

0 Fe

etR

AI4

56,Q

.19-

342

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-23

2

Fig

ure

3.8-

56—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

1 Pl

an E

leva

tion

+15

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-23

4

Fig

ure

3.8-

58—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

1 Pl

an E

leva

tion

+39

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-23

5

Fig

ure

3.8-

59—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

1 Pl

an E

leva

tion

+55

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-23

6

Fig

ure

3.8-

60—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

1 Pl

an E

leva

tion

+69

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-23

7

Fig

ure

3.8-

61—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

1 Pl

an E

leva

tion

+81

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-23

8

Fig

ure

3.8-

62—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

1 Pl

an E

leva

tion

+96

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-23

9

Fig

ure

3.8-

63—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

1 Se

ctio

n A

-AR

AI4

56,Q

.19-

342

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-24

2

Fig

ure

3.8-

66—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ings

2 a

nd 3

Pla

n El

evat

ion

0 Fe

etR

AI4

56,Q

.19-

342

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-24

7

Fig

ure

3.8-

71—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ings

2 a

nd 3

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+69

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-24

8

Fig

ure

3.8-

72—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ings

2 a

nd 3

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+79

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-24

9

Fig

ure

3.8-

73—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ings

2 a

nd 3

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+94

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-25

1

Fig

ure

3.8-

74—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ings

2 a

nd 3

Sec

tion

B-B

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-25

3

Fig

ure

3.8-

77—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

4 Pl

an E

leva

tion

0 Fe

etR

AI4

56,Q

.19-

342

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-25

6

Fig

ure

3.8-

80—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

4 Pl

an E

leva

tion

+39

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-25

7

Fig

ure

3.8-

81—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

4 Pl

an E

leva

tion

+55

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-25

8

Fig

ure

3.8-

82—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

4 Pl

an E

leva

tion

+69

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-25

9

Fig

ure

3.8-

83—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

4 Pl

an E

leva

tion

+81

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-26

0

Fig

ure

3.8-

84—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

4 Pl

an E

leva

tion

+96

Feet

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

8-26

1

Fig

ure

3.8-

85—

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

4 Se

ctio

n A

-AR

AI4

56,Q

.19-

342

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-2

Fig

ure

3B-1

—D

imen

sion

al A

rran

gem

ent R

efer

ence

Pla

nt B

uild

ing

Loca

tion

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-3

Fig

ure

3B-2

—R

eact

or B

uild

ing

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n at

Ele

vatio

n -1

5 m

(-50

ft)

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-2

4

Fig

ure

3B-2

3—Fu

el B

uild

ing

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+19.

5 m

(+64

ft)

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-3

3

Fig

ure

3B-3

2—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 1

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

0 m

(0 ft

)

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-3

4

Fig

ure

3B-3

3—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 1

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+4.7

m (+

15 ft

)R

AI4

56,Q

.19-

342

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-3

6

Fig

ure

3B-3

5—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 1

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+12

m (+

39 ft

)RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-3

7

Fig

ure

3B-3

6—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 1

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+16.

8 m

(+55

ft)R

AI4

56,Q

.19-

342

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-3

8

Fig

ure

3B-3

7—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 1

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+21

m (+

69 ft

)

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-3

9

Fig

ure

3B-3

8—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 1

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+24.

7 m

(+81

ft)

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-4

0

Fig

ure

3B-3

9—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 1

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+29.

3 m

(+96

ft)

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-4

1

Fig

ure

3B-4

0—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 1

Dim

ensi

onal

Sec

tion

A-A

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-4

4

Fig

ure

3B-4

3—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

gs 2

and

3 D

imen

sion

al P

lan

Elev

atio

n 0

m (0

ft)

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-5

1

Fig

ure

3B-5

0—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

gs 2

and

3 D

imen

sion

al P

lan

Elev

atio

n +2

8.8

m (+

94 ft

)R

AI4

56,Q

.19-

342

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-5

8

Fig

ure

3B-5

7—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 4

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+12

m (+

39 ft

)R

AI4

56,Q

.19-

342

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-5

9

Fig

ure

3B-5

8—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 4

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+16.

8 m

(+55

ft)

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-6

0

Fig

ure

3B-5

9—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 4

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+21

m (+

69 ft

)

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-6

1

Fig

ure

3B-6

0—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 4

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+24.

7 m

(+81

ft)

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-6

2

Fig

ure

3B-6

1—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 4

Dim

ensi

onal

Pla

n El

evat

ion

+29.

3 m

(+96

ft)

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 3.

B-6

3

Fig

ure

3B-6

2—Sa

fegu

ard

Bui

ldin

g 4

Dim

ensi

onal

Sec

tion

A-A

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 9A

-101

Fig

ure

9A-8

—Fi

re Z

one

Layo

uts-

Safe

guar

d B

uild

ing

(UJH

and

UJK

): 1

, +/-0

Fee

t

RA

I456

,Q.1

9-34

2&

Q.3

46

U.S

. EPR

FIN

AL

SAFE

TY A

NA

LYSI

S R

EPO

RT

Tier

2 R

evis

ion

3—

Inte

rim

Pag

e 9A

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46



mitigation design alternatives from previous industry studies and from U.S. EPR PRA insights was performed against broad acceptance criteria. None of the SAMDA candidates met the criteria; therefore, the overall conclusion is that no additional plant modifications are cost beneficial to implement due to the robust design of the U.S. EPR with respect to prevention and mitigation of severe accidents.

19.2.7 Beyond Design Basis Large Commercial Aircraft Impact Assessment

19.2.7.1 Introduction

The U.S. EPR design has been evaluated to demonstrate that it has inherent protection to avoid or mitigate, to the extent practical and with reduced reliance on operator actions, the effects of a large commercial aircraft impact.

19.2.7.2 Assessment Scope

The scope of the assessment was to demonstrate—using realistic analyses— that the U.S. EPR design has design features and functional capabilities such that with reduced reliance on operator actions:

� The reactor core remains cooled, OR the containment remains intact.

� Spent fuel cooling, OR spent fuel pool integrity is maintained.

19.2.7.3 Methodology

The methodology used to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.150 is NEI 07-13, Revision 7, “Methodology for Performing Aircraft Impact Assessments for New Plant Designs,” dated May 2009 (Reference 18), applying the aircraft impact loading function provided by the NRC (Reference 19). The methodology of NEI 07-13, Revision 7 was followed with no exceptions.

The methodology is subdivided into two major evaluations:

� Containment and Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation.

Two distinct types of structural failure modes were evaluated for the containment structure and spent fuel pool: local failure (i.e., scabbing and perforation) caused by aircraft fuselage or engine impact and global structural failure (i.e., plastic collapse) caused by impact of the complete aircraft.

� Heat Removal Evaluation.

The evaluation considered physical, shock, and fire effects of a large commercial aircraft impact that can cause damage to systems needed to maintain cooling of fuel in the vessel and the spent fuel pool.

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19.2.7.4 Design Features Credited for Conformance with 10 CFR 50.150

The U.S. EPR design incorporates system redundancy, diversity, and independence. The key features incorporated to mitigate the effects of potential impact of aircrafts that are credited for compliance with 10 CFR 50.150 are as follows:

1. The use of individual hardened and isolated shield structures specific to the Containment, Fuel Building, and Safeguard Building 2/3.

The hardened and isolated shield structures, as described in ANP-10317, “Design Requirements for the U.S. EPR Aircraft Hazard Protection Structures¨ (Reference 24) and Sections 1.2.3.1.2, 3.8.4, Appendix 3B, and Appendix 3E.1.7, are a key design feature credited for compliance with 10 CFR 50.150. The use of hardened and isolated shield structures provides protection for the Containment, Fuel Building, and Safeguard Building 2/3 structures and the following credited SSCs that are housed in these structures:

� Containment vessel (Section 3.8.2).

� RCS (Section 5.0).

� Emergency core cooling water source, IRWST (Section 6.3).

� Main steam system (MSS) from the SGs to the Safeguard Building annulus penetration (Trains 1, 2, 3, and 4) (Section 10.3).

� Main feedwater system (MFWS) from the SGs to the Safeguard Building annulus penetration (Trains 1, 2, 3, and 4) (Section 10.4.7).

� SFP (Section 9.1).

� Fuel pool cooling and purification system (Section 9.1.3).

� MCR (Section 6.4).

� MCR HVAC (Section 9.4.1).

� Safety injection/RHRS (Trains 2 and 3) (Section 6.3).

� EFW system (Trains 2 and 3) (Section 10.4.9).

� CCWS (Trains 2 and 3) (Section 9.2.2).

� ESWS (interior portions) (Trains 2 and 3) (Section 9.2.1).

� Uninterruptible electrical power supply systems (Trains 2 and 3) (Section 8.3.2).

� Safety chilled water system (SCWS) (Trains 2 and 3) (Section 9.2.8).

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� Electrical division of Safeguard Building ventilation system (Trains 2 and 3) (Section 9.4.6).

� Fuel Building ventilation system (Section 9.4.2).

� Annulus Ventilation System (Section 6.2.3.2.2).

� EBS (Section 6.8).

� I&C for the systems and components in this list (Section 7.0).

The structural isolation of the shield structures provides protection against shock-induced vibration from the impact of a large commercial aircraft so that the SSCs housed in these structures are not damaged.

2. The use of a hardened building exterior for Safeguard Buildings 1 and 4.

The hardened building exterior, as described in Reference 24 and Sections 1.2.3.1.2, 3.8.4, and Appendix 3B, is a key design feature credited for compliance with 10 CFR 50.150. The hardened building exterior provides protection for the following SSCs housed in Safeguard Buildings 1 and 4 from physical damage resulting from the impact of a large commercial aircraft:

� Safety Injection/RHRS (Trains 1 and 4) (Section 6.3).

� EFW system (Trains 1 and 4) (Section 10.4.9).

� CCWS (Trains 1 and 4) (Section 9.2.2).

� ESWS (interior portions) (Trains 1 and 4) (Section 9.2.1).

� SCWS (Trains 1 and 4) (Section 9.2.8).

� Uninterruptible electrical power supply systems (Trains 1 and 4) (Section 8.3.2).

� MSS from the Safeguard Building annulus penetration to the MSIV (Trains 1, 2, 3, and 4) (Section 10.3).

� MFWS from the Safeguard Building annulus penetration to the MFW isolation valve (MFWIV) (Trains 1, 2, 3, and 4) (Section 10.4.7).

� Electrical division of Safeguard Building ventilation system (Trains 1 and 4) (Section 9.4.6).

� I&C located in Safeguard Buildings 1 and 4 for the systems and components in this list (Section 7.0).

3. Screening by the site arrangement and plant structural design.

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The site arrangement and structural design of major structures are key design features credited for compliance with 10 CFR 50.150. The arrangement and design of the major structures limits the location and effects of potential aircraft strikes on these structures. The characteristics of the structures credited for compliance with 10 CFR 50.150 are described in Reference 24 and supplemented by information in the U.S. EPR FSAR. The assessment credits the arrangement and design of the following building features to limit the location and effects of potential aircraft strikes on the U.S. EPR structures:

� The location and design of concrete barriers at selected locations along the exterior of the U.S. EPR structures described in Reference 24 or in Appendix 3B provides protection of the interior of these structures.

� The location and design of the Emergency Power Generating Building structures and layout described in Section 3.8 and Reference 24 provides protection of portions of Safeguard Building 2/3 and Safeguard Building 4.

� The location and design of the Essential Service Water Building structures and layout described in Section 3.8 and Reference 24 provides protection of portions of Safeguard Building 1, Safeguard Building 2/3, and Safeguard Building 4.

� The location and design of the Nuclear Auxiliary Building structure and layout described in Section 1.2.3 and Reference 24 provides protection of portions of Safeguard Building 4 and the Fuel Building.

� The location and design of the concrete sliding door in the Radioactive Waste Processing Building at Elevation 0 feet described in Section 1.2.3 and Reference 24 provides protection of portions of the Fuel Building.

4. Physically separate and redundant trains.

Physically separate and redundant trains, as described in Section 1.2.3.1 are a key design feature credited for compliance with 10 CFR 50.150. This design feature results in one or more divisions of systems credited in Chapter 15 analyses remaining functional after the impact from a large commercial aircraft to maintain core and SFP cooling capability. The following U.S. EPR safety-related and support systems credited in Chapter 15 are physically separated and redundant:

� Safety Injection/RHRS (Section 6.3).

� EFW System (Section 10.4.9).

� CCWS (Section 9.2.2).

� ESWS (Exterior and buried portions) (Section 9.2.1).

� Ultimate heat sink (Section 9.2.5).

� Uninterruptible electrical power supply systems (Section 8.3.2).

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� Emergency power supply system (EPSS) and EDG (Section 8.3.1).

In the event of an aircraft impact threat while the reactor is at power operation, NEI 07-13 (Reference 18) allows the assumption that the operators will have advance warning to take manual action to shutdown the reactor prior to impact. Because the systems necessary to scram the reactor are housed in the hardened and isolated Shield Building structures, there is no potential for impact damage that would prevent a scram. Following shutdown, one or more trains of the safety-related and support systems in this section are available to maintain core cooling and SFP cooling.

For an aircraft impact that occurs during shutdown with the reactor head removed and the reactor pit not flooded, the same safety-related and support systems in this section are used and one or more trains of these systems remain available to maintain core cooling.

5. Fire barriers and fire protection features.

Selected fire barriers, fire dampers, fire doors, and penetration seals are three-hour rated to prevent fire damage in one division from spreading to an adjacent division. Selected structural elements and blast dampers are 5 psid rated to prevent explosion effects from spreading to adjacent areas. The credited fire barriers, fire dampers, fire doors, penetration seals, structural elements, and blast dampers are identified on the fire zone layout figures in Appendix 9A.

The U.S. EPR design incorporates system redundancy, diversity, and independence. Two key features incorporated to mitigate the effects of potential impact of aircrafts are:

� The use of a hardened shield building structure.

� The site arrangement of major structures.

The following U.S. EPR design features are credited for compliance with 10 CFR 50.150:

� Hardened Shield Building over Containment.

� Hardened Shield Building over Fuel Building.

� Hardened Shield Building over Control Room.

� Hardened Shield Building over ECCS Components.

� Hardened Decay Heat Removal Systems.

� Hardened and Internalized Emergency Feedwater Tanks.

� Hardened and Internalized Emergency Core Cooling Water.

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� Physically Separate and Redundant Trains.

These features are described in Section 2.0 of ANP-10296, “U.S. EPR Design Features That Enhance Security Technical Report” (Reference 20).

19.2.7.5 Evaluation of U.S. EPR Performance

The U.S. EPR design was evaluated to establish a damage footprint for physical, fire, and vibration damage.

� Physical Damage.

Finite element analyses indicate that interior areas of the four Safeguards Buildings, Fuel Building, orand the Containment Building are not susceptible to damage due to physical perforation of aircraft components into the structures. The containment vessel, emergency core cooling water, spent fuel pool, fuel pool makeup systems, main control room, safety injection/residual heat removal systems, emergency feedwater systems, component cooling water systems, essential service water systems (interior portions), and uninterruptible electrical power supply systems are housed in the Safeguard, Fuel, or Containment Buildings and are not susceptible to damage resulting from physical perforation of aircraft components into the structures. The physically separate and redundant train design of the U.S. EPR provides for survival of supporting functions such as emergency power and ultimate heat sink capability.

� Fire Damage.

The analyses indicate that perforation and entry of aircraft fuel are prevented or controlled, and areas within the protected perimeter are not are prevented; therefore, no interior areas are susceptible to damage because of accelerant-fed fires. The fire damage footprint includes effects from exterior fires that may damage areas within the air intake and exhaust ducts up to the first three hour and 5 psid fire-rated doorsbarrier.

� Vibration Damage.

An analysis was performed of the linear distance from the impact point to each elevation of each structure. This resulted in specific zones at each elevation to account for the damage footprint for the most sensitive equipment. Analyses were performed based on shock induced vibration from an exterior wall strike and a strike on the adjacent Containment Shield Structure.

The damage footprint was used to assess containment integrity, RCS heat removal capability, SFP integrity, and SFP heat removal capability.

19.2.7.5.1 Containment Integrity

The Containment Structure is considered to be acceptable if the containment is maintained intact after both the local and global impact analyses. The assessment

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concluded that the hardened and isolated containment shield structure was not perforated, and no significant structural damage occurred because of either local or global impacts. The Containment Building, inside the Containment Shield Structure, was not impacted by the aircraft or any associated debris. Therefore, the containment performance, including ultimate pressure capacity, is unaffected. Under these conditions, no physical damage or fire damage inside containment needs to be considered.

19.2.7.5.2 RCS Heat Removal Capability

The reactor coolant system heat removal is considered sufficient if the heat removal capability analyses performed conclude that sufficient heat removal equipment is available consistent with the PRA success criteria. The analyses performed demonstrated the ability of the U.S. EPR design, after the impact by a large commercial aircraft, to maintain functionality of one or more divisions of systems credited in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Chapter 15 with providing reactor core cooling under accident conditions. The U.S. EPR design has features such as hardened and isolated shield structures, a strategic site arrangement and plant structural design, fire barriers, and the physically separate and redundant trains. These features contribute to the success of one or more divisions of systems credited in Chapter 15 to maintain functionality to provide reactor core cooling after the impact of a large commercial aircraft. In addition, an aircraft impact does not create any new events that have not been analyzed in Chapter 15. NEI 07-13 does not require postulating a Chapter 15 event concurrent with an aircraft impact that does not perforate the structures containing RCS piping. Therefore, the RCS heat removal capability evaluation demonstrates additional margin in the U.S. EPR design.

19.2.7.5.3 SFP Integrity

The SFP integrity is considered to be maintained if the fuel pool liner does not have a leakage path below the minimum water level, the fuel is protected and there would be no unacceptable releases of radionuclides to the environment. Analyses demonstrate that no physical damage to the interior of the Fuel Building results from the aircraft crash. The prevention of aircraft perforation of the exterior wall of the hardened and isolated shield structure surrounding the Fuel Building ensures that the SFP is not perforated and that SFP integrity is maintained.

19.2.7.5.4 SFP Heat Removal Capability

With the SFP integrity maintained, SFP cooling is provided consistent with the PRA. The availability of the make-up systems is assured due to the integrity of the hardened and isolated shield structure surrounding the Fuel Building. The shield structure provides physical and fire damage protection against an aircraft impact. The isolation of this structure provides continued functionality of the SFP makeup and protection

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against shock induced vibrations.Fuel Building exterior walls. The fire protection system provides the capability to fill the Spent Fuel Pool.

19.2.7.6 Conclusions

The U.S. EPR has inherent protection to avoid or mitigate,, to the extent practical and with reduced reliance on operator actions, the effects of an aircraft impact. Although the regulations require meeting only two of the acceptance criteria, the assessment summarized above confirms the U.S. EPR design meets the four acceptance criteria in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1) by following the methodology described in NEI-07-13 (Reference 18). The assessment confirmed that the U.S. EPR design meets the four acceptance criteria. The reactor remains cooled, AND the containment remains intact,; ANDand spent fuel cooling is maintained, ANDand spent fuel pool integrity isare maintained. Accordingly, the U.S. EPR design features and functional capabilities provide for adequate protection of public health and safety in the event of an impact of a large commercial aircraft as required by 10 CFR 1050.150. In fact, by exceeding the minimum acceptance criteria, the U.S. EPR design maintains significant margin beyond the minimum requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.150.

19.2.8 References

1. ANP-10268P-A, Revision 0, “U.S. EPR Severe Accident Evaluation Topical Report,” AREVA NP Inc, February, 2008.

2. Fauske and Associates, Inc., 1994a. MAAP4—Modular Accident Analysis Program for LWR Power Plants, vol. 2, Part 1: Code Structure and Theory, prepared for Electric Power Research Institute, May 1994.

3. SECY-90-016, “Evolutionary Light Water (LWR) Certification Issues and Their Relationship to Current Regulatory Requirements,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, issued January 12, 1990, and the corresponding SRM, issued June 26, 1990.

4. SECY-93-087, “Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light-Water (ALWR) Designs,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, issued April 2, 1993, and the corresponding SRM, issued July 21, 1993.

5. WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), “Reactor Safety Study-An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,” U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 1975.

6. NUREG-1116, “A Review of Current Understanding of the Potential for Containment Failure Arising from In-Vessel Steam Explosions,” Steam Explosion Review Group (SERG), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 1985.

7. Theofanous, T. G., et al, DOE/ID-10489, “The Study of Steam Explosions in Nuclear Systems,” Department of Energy, June 1996.

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8. Deleted.

9. Wilks, S.S., “Determination of Sample Sizes for Setting Tolerance Limits,” Ann. Math. Stat., Vol. 12, pp. 91-96, 1941.

10. EPRI TR-103413, “The MELTSPREAD-1 Computer Code for the Analysis of Transient Spreading and Cooling of High-Temperature Melts – Code Manual,” Electric Power Research Institute, December 1993.

11. Breitung, W., et al, “Flame Acceleration and Deflagration-to-Detonation Transition in Nuclear Safety,” NEA/CSNI-(2000) 7, October 2000.

12. Tutu, N.K., T. Ginsberg, and L. Fintrok (1988). “Low Pressure Cutoff for Melt Dispersal from Reactor Cavities,” Fourth Proceedings of Nuclear Thermal Hydraulics, 29-37.

13. Pilch, M. M., et al, “Resolution of the Direct Containment Heating Issue for All Westinghouse Plants With Large Dry Containments or Subatmospheric Containments,” NUREG/CR-6338, SAND95-2381, 1996.

14. Meyer, L., et al, “Melt Dispersion and Direct Containment Heating (DCH) Experiments in the DISCO-H Test Facility,” FZK Report FZKA 6988, ISSN 0947-8620, May 2004.

15. ANP-10290, Revision 1, “Environmental Report Standard Design Certification,” AREVA NP Inc, September 2009.

16. NEI 05-01 (Rev A), “Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) Analysis, Guidance Document,” Nuclear Energy Institute, November 2005.

17. NUREG/BR-0184, “Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook,” U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1997.

18. NEI 07-13, “Methodology for Performing Aircraft Impact Assessments for New Plant Designs,” Revision 7, May 2009.

19. Letter from D. Matthews, NRC to R. Ford, AREVA NP, “Approval of AREVA NP Inc. Safeguards Protection Program and Reviewing Official, and Transmittal of Beyond Design Basis, Large Commercial Aircraft Characteristics Specified by the Commission”, December 21, 2007.

20. Deleted.ANP-10296, Revision 0, “U.S. EPR Design Features that Enhance Security,” AREVA NP Inc., December 2008.

21. Achenbach, J.A., Miller, R.B., Srinivas, V., “Large-Scale Hydrogen Burn Equipment Experiments,” EPRI NP-4354, Electric Power Research Institute, 1985.

22. NUREG/CR-5334, “Severe Accident Testing of Electrical Penetration Assemblies,” SAND89-0327, November 1989.

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23. ANP-10314, Revision 0, “The Operating Strategies for Severe Accidents Methodoloy for the U.S. EPR Technical Report,” AREVA NP Inc., July 2010.

24. ANP-10317, Revision 0, “Design Requirements for the U.S. EPR Aircraft Hazard Protection Structures,” AREVA NP Inc.,May 2011.

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