2000 - Stanley Hauerwas - The Nonviolent Terrorist. In Defense of Christian Fanaticism

7/27/2019 2000 - Stanley Hauerwas - The Nonviolent Terrorist. In Defense of Christian Fanaticism

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105

title : The Church As Counterculture

SUNY Series in Popular Culture and

Political Change

author : Budde, Michael L.

publisher : State University of New York Press

isbn10 | asin : 0791446077

print isbn13 : 9780791446072

ebook isbn13 : 9780585285061

language : English

subject Christianity and culture--United States.

publication date : 2000

lcc : BR115.C8C49 2000eb

ddc : 261/.0973

subject : Christianity and culture--United States.


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4TheNonviolentTerrorist:InDefenseofChristianFanaticismSTANLEYHAUERWAS

OnBeingaFanaticIbeginwithanapology.Icannotmeettheexpectationsofthosewhoorganized

theconference.IcannotbecauseIrepresentadifferentpoliticsthanthepolitics

thatcreatedthe"between"foundinthetitleoftheconference,thatis,

"ChristianEthicsbetweenRadicalismandFanaticism."IwantChristianstobe

radicals.Iwant

Christians

to

be

fanatics.

1Indeed

Isuspect

that

is

why

Iwas

invited.Youwantedanexampleofafanaticalradical.Iwilltrynottodisappoint

you.

Imustapologize,however,ifIhavemisunderstoodmyroleinthis

colloquium.Intheletterinvitingmetoaddresstheconferencethepurposeof

thecolloquiumissaidtobeanattempt"toanalyzethenecessityandthedangers

oftheradicalismof(Christian)ethics."IassumeIamtorepresent"thenecessity"

ofChristianradicalism.YetIwasaskedinparticular"todealasanethicistwith

thequestion

of

the

tension

between

the

radicality

of

the

gospel

in

sociopolitical,

peace,andecologicalmattersandtheriskofbecomingafanatic.Howcanyou

liveouttheradicalityoftheChristianmessagewithoutbecomingintolerant?"I

donotwanttokeepyouinsuspense.Beingafanaticisnotariskbuta

requirementandthereisnothingwrongwithintoleranceifyouarethekindof

ChristianradicalIbelievewearecalledtobe.

Irealize,however,thatsuchasummaryanswerwillnotsatisfymostwho

areworriedaboutChristiansactingresponsiblyintheworldaswe


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knowit.Fanaticsandradicalsareseldomthoughttoberesponsible.Inother

wordsIrealizeIbeartheburdenofproof.Inordertotrytomakean

unapologeticcaseforChristianradicalismIamgoingtoprovideadefenseof

whattomanyistheclearestcaseoffanaticismterrorism.Irealizethiswillseema

bizarrestrategyforapacifist,butIhopetoshowwhynonviolencecannothelp

butappear

as

aterrorist

tactic

by

those

who

want

to

make

the

world

safe

for

war.

Inthelightofwhatmanytaketobethemoralanarchyofourculture,itis

comfortingtothinkthatthereisastrongmoralconsensusaboutsomethingsfor

example,childpornographyandterrorism.Thereforemyattempttoprovidea

justificationofterrorism,atleast,akindoftheologicalterrorism,cannothelpbut

seemunsettling.YetIwanttotrytoshowthatinsofarasmostcontinueto

believethatwarisanecessaryinstrumentforthemaintenanceofthegoodsof

thehuman

community,

then

terrorism

cannot

be

automatically

subject

to

moral

condemnation.

Iwanttobecandid,however,aboutwheremyargumentismeanttolead.I

wantyoutobe,likeme,apacifist.AsapacifistIobviouslythinkthatwarand

terrorismarenotcompatiblewithChristiandiscipleship.2YetmanyChristians

thinkthat,thoughwaristerrible,undercertainconditionsitmaynotonlybe

justifiedbutaduty.ThosethatwouldsojustifywarforChristiansusuallyassume

thatterrorismisbeyondjustification.Iwilltrytoshowthattheattempttosave

waras

amoral

project

by

distinguishing

war

from

terrorism

will

not

work.

In

short,ifyouthinkterrorismisprohibited,thensoiswar.Christiannonviolence,

therefore,cannothelpbutappearasfanaticaljusttotheextentitchallengesthe

assumed"normality"ofwarandviolence.

Thediscussionoftheethicsofterrorism,however,ismeanttoprovidea

contextforwhatItaketobethecentralquestionthatgaverisetothesubjectof

thisconferencenamely,howcantheradicalcharacterofthegospelbereclaimed

withoutmakingChristiansirrelevantor,worse,intolerant.RadicalChristocentric

ethics,

such

as

I

represent,

at

least

to

some

seems

to

threaten

the

ability

of

Christianstoactconstructivelyinaworldalreadyfartoodivided.Insucha

dividedworldwhatisneeded,itisargued,isauniversalethiccapableof

resolvingconflict.Incontrast,IwilltrytoshowthatifChristiansaretohelpsuch

aworldlivemorepeacefully,wecanonlybewhatwearethosewhoworship

JesusChrist,theSonofGod.Forthatisthebasisofour"radicalism"as

Christiansthatis,wearenotradicalsbecauseweassumearadicalstanceonthis

orthatissuethattheworldunderstandsasradical,butbecauseanystancewe

assumemustbewitnesstotheGodofJesusChrist.


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The"Ethics"ofTerrorism"Onecommunity'sterroristisanothercommunity'smartyr"isthekindof

generalizationthatisastrueasitisfalse.Yetitisnotabadplacetobegin

thinkingaboutterrorismjusttotheextentsuchastatementremindsusthatany

descriptionof

terrorism

implicates

aset

of

moral

practices

and

presumptions.

JamesBurtchaellrightlyarguesthatitis

misleadingtoaddresstheethicsofterrorismandresponsetoterrorismby

acceptingwithoutquestionthefashionablepresumptionthatterrorismisa

developmentsodiscontinuouswiththetraditionsofwarfarethatitdeserves

unconventionalmoralscrutiny.Onthecontrary,terrorism,likethemany

enlargementsofviolencebeforeit,isalinealdescendentoftraditionalwarfare.

It

can

best

be

understood

and

evaluated

by

analogy

with

conventional

conflict.

AndIamincreasinglyoftheopinionthatitraisesnotoldquestionsaboutnew

kindsofcombatbutnewquestionsaboutoldformsofwar.Itiswarfare's

newestandmostsoberingprogeny.3

ItisinterestingtoreflectontheIsraeli/PLOconflictinthelightof

Burtchaell'sclaimthatitisbynomeanseasytodistinguishwarfromterrorism.

ThegovernmentofIsraelfounditusefultocallthePLOa"terroristorganization"

becausetheysometimeskilledschoolchildrenonbuses.YetthestateofIsrael

wasbrought

into

power

by

an

extended

and

very

well

organized

terrorist

campaign.ItiseasytoforgetthatthosewholaterbecamepoliticiansinIsraelat

onetimeintheirlivesblewupthePrinceDavidHotel.TothisdayIsraelassumes

ithastherighttobombPalestinianrefugeecampsinretaliationfor"terrorist

attacks,"butsuchbombingisnotconsideredterrorismeventhoughthecamps

housewomenandchildren.Isthebombingperpetratedbyanestablished

governmentbydefinitionnotterror?4NowthatthePLOisagovernmentwith

landdoesthatmeanformeractsof"terrorism"arenowwar?

Ithas

been

assumed

that

astrong

distinction

can

be

made

between

terrorismandwartotheextenttheformerfailstoobservethecivilizedrulesof

war,andinparticular,engagesinattacksoncivilians.Yetfromthe"terrorist"

pointofviewdistinctionsbetweencombatantsandnoncombatantsarenot

easilymaintained.Forexample,someyearsagotherewasageneraloutrage

againstthosewhoraidedawhiteman'sRhodesianfarmandslaughteredhiswife

andchildren.Yetfromtheperspectiveof


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thosewhohadconductedtheraid,thosekilledwomenandchildrenalikehad

been''washed,dressed,schooled,andconveyedabroadandentertainedand

cultivatedbydintoftheoccupationoftheirlandandlowpaidlaboroftheir

backsandthedeprivationandhumiliationoftheirchildren.Ithadbeenthewhite

children'sfather'sriflethatviolatedthemandtheirhomeland,butitwashis

familythat

lived

good

naturally

on

his

violence.

How

could

he

be

guilty

and

they

beinnocent?"5

Suchexamplesarebutremaindersthatoftenthosewhoarecalledterrorist

useviolencebecausetheyhavebeendeniedanyotheralternativebythe

"recognizedgovernment."Ofcoursethisgoestotheheartoftheattemptto

distinguishbetweenterrorismandwar,sinceanysuchdistinctiongainsitsmoral

warrantfromtheassumptionbasedinjustwartheorythatthereisacontinuity

betweenthepolicefunctionofthestateanditswarmakingpotential.The

justificationof

war

is

but

an

extension

of

the

right

of

the

state

to

punish.

The

latterispossiblebecauseitisthedisciplineduseofviolenceforthegoodin

commonincludingthegoodoftheonepunished.Whichisbutareminder,as

PaulRamseyemphasized,justwarisnotsomuchacasuistrytodetermineifa

warmeetspriordeterminedcriteria,butratheranaccountofstateaction

requiredfortheprotectionoftheinnocent.6Sowarisbutacontinuationofthe

justiceinternaltothestatetransposedtorelationsbetweenstates.

Thereare,however,somestrongreasonstodoubtthatwarisbuta

continuationof

the

police

function

of

the

state.

The

latter

includes

not

only

aprioragreementonwhatacrimemaybe,butalsorequiresthecriminalbe

caught,adecisionbemadeofdegreeofguilt,theappropriatepunishment,as

wellasthecarryingoutofthepunishment.Itisinstructivetonotethatthepolice

donotcarryoutanyofthelastfunctionswhereasinwarallthefunctionsare

carriedoutbythesameagent.Inshort,warlacksexactlythepriorinstitutions

andpracticesthatlimittheviolenceintrinsictothepolicefunctionofthestate

and,atleasttosomeextent,makesuchviolencelessarbitrary.Yetaswenoted

above,

it

is

just

the

assumption

of

such

continuity

that

has

underwritten

the

distinctionbetweenwarandterrorism.

Ofcourseitmaybeobjectedthatthiswayofthinkingaboutterrorism

leavesoutthemostimportantaspectofjustwarreflectionthatis,theprincipleof

noncombatantimmunity.Thosecalledterrorist,however,donotnecessarily

attacknoncombatants,butiftheydotheyarenotwithoutsomemoralresponse.

Suchanattackmaybeanattempttomakeclearthekindofwartheyunderstand

theyareforcedtowagenamely,awarofthedesperatethatmustuseselective

targetinginnonselectiveways.


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Inthisrespectitisparticularlyimportanttorememberthatevenattackson

civiliansbyallegedterroristsarenotindiscriminate.Whogetsblownupbya

bombonabusmaybeindiscriminate,butthatthebombwasplantedonabusis

notindiscriminate.Rather,suchbombingmaybetiedtopolicyobjectivesthat

mayevenmakesuchabombinganalogoustothedefenseofciviliandeathson

justwar

grounds

of

indirect

effect;

for

alleged

terrorist

strategies

are

meantlike

waritselftomakepeoplepreferpeace,oratleastorder,ratherthancontinuethe

conflict.Thereforethe"randomviolence"oftheterroristisanythingotherthan

randomjusttotheextentitisusedintheinterestofmakingtheadversarysue

forpeace.Indeed,theterrorofterrorismisoftendesignedtobrutalizethose

whomustfighttheterroristsothattheverymeanstofighttheterroristbecomes

selfdefeating.

Accordingly,JamesBurtchaellarguesthatterrorismwillincreasinglybeseen

notas

an

anomaly

but

as

one

of

the

degenerate

progeny

of

conventional

war.

He

callsattentiontothreedistinctreactionstoweaponsdevelopment,suchasthe

machinegun,elicitedinthiscentury.Somethoughtsuchweaponssohorrendous

theywereinherentlyimmoral.Othersthoughtthemsoterribletheywouldmake

warlesslikely.Stillothersthoughtsuchweaponsonlymadeclearhowhorrible

warhasalwaysbeen.Burtchaellconcludesthatterrorismjustifiesallthree

conclusionsasitisindeedsavageandinhumane.Yetsoiswar.So"inquiryinto

thenatureandethicalimperativesofterrorismissoundonlyifwedonot

imaginethat

it

is

inhumane

by

contrast

with

war,

which

is

humane.

Conventional

warfareisconventionallyinhumane."7

Yetthisisaconclusionfromwhichmostofuswouldrecoil.Butiftheabove

discussionofterrorismhastaughtusanythingwemustaskwhoisthe"us"doing

therecoiling.MaxStackhouserepresentswhatItaketobethemostpersuasive

answertothatquestionthe"us"mustbetheuniversalvoiceofhumanity.

Stackhousearguesthatweareatalosstorespondtoterrorismbecausesomeno

longerbelieveinauniversalethic.AccordingtoStackhouse,

Ethically,weareinanageinwhichthereisgravedoubtamongtheologians,

philosophers,jurists,andsocialscientistsastowhetheranyuniversalprinciples

existwhichcanbereliablyknownandusedbytheinternationalcommunityto

definetortureorterrorismaswrong.Tobesure,manysaythatterrorismand

tortureareterrible.Butwhenthequestionisposedastowhetherthereareany

universalabsolutes,orwhetherthereare


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intrinsicallyevilacts,orwhethertherearecrossculturalvalueswhichcouldbe

thebasisfordeclaringsuchpracticestobeinherentlywrongwefindonlydoubt

andskepticism.8

AccordingtoStackhouse,withoutsuchauniversalethicwehavenomeansto

challengethe

assumed

right

of

nation

states

to

make

decisions

on

the

basis

of

selfinterest.

Stackhouse'sconcerntocounterthe"relativism"hethinkstobethecause

ofourinabilitytocondemnterrorismcouldbemeantasacritiqueofme.9SinceI

amallegedtoholdtheviewthatnouniversalethicexists,Irepresentaformof

confessionaltheologythathasnobasisforsayingwhyterrorismiswrong.10As

Stackhouseputstheissue:

Ifwe

believe

terrorism

and

torture

are

in

fact

fundamentally

contrary

to

the

truthandjusticeofGodandoughttobestoppedeverywhere,wemust

recognizethatthetheologicalfoundationsonwhichmanycontemporary

contextualistandconfessionalisttheologiesrestareinadequatetothistask,

whatevertheircontributionstootherareas.Sadly,theydonothavethecross

cultural,intellectualormoralamplitudetoaddresstheseissues.11

Withoutsuchacrossculturalvision,Stackhouseargueswewillbeplungedintoa

Hobbesianworldwhereallcontendagainstall,aworldinwhichonlymight

makesright.

Stackhouse

thinks,

however,

that

we

do

not

live

in

aworld

devoid

of

universalprinciples.Suchprinciplesarethosefoundindemocraticallyauthorized

constitutions,whichStackhousebelievestobetheharbingersofthe"enormous

transformation"theworldiscurrentlyundergoingtowardthecreationofa

"universalcivilization."12Stackhousearguesthatthosewhodonotrecognizethe

universalityofsuchdemocraticallyauthorizedconstitutionsshouldberegarded

asnotyetfullyrationalor,worse,morallyperverse.Asurprisinglyintolerant

conclusionforsomeonesocommittedtotolerance.13Yetitisaconclusionthat

helpsmake

intelligible

my

willingness

to

describe

myself

as

aterroristfrom

a

perspectivesuchasthatofStackhouse,peoplelikemethreatentheprojectto

freetheworldofwarbecauseofourunwillingnesstoassumeauniversalstance.

EpistemologicalCrisesandWarSohowarewetogoon?Ifwearetobe"responsible"mustwebeableto

provide,asStackhouseargues,anethicofuniversalprinciplesso


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thatwecandistinguishbetweenwarandterrorism?Orarewecondemned,asI

amallegedtobe,torepresenta"local"or"restricted"morality,evenonecalled

Christian,whichcannotprovideabasisforrationalagreementssowemight

avoidwar?Icertainlydonotthinksuchanalternativetobeouronlychoice,but

toshow

why

Iwill

need

to

explore

Alasdair

MacIntyre's

account

of

what

he

calls

epistemologicalcrises.IndoingsoIshallhavetoaskyourpatienceasitmaynot

beimmediatelyclearhowissuesofwarandterrorism(muchlesswhyI

characterizemyownpositionasoneofChristianfanaticism)areclarifiedbywhat

atfirstappearstobeawayofunderstandingscientificdisputes.YetbythetimeI

amfinishedIhopetohaveshownyouwhyMacIntyre'saccountiscrucialfor

helpingusrecognizethatnothingcouldbemorerationalthanthepeaceitisour

privilegeandobligationtowitnessasChristiansandwhysuchapeace,fromthe

world'sperspective,

may

be

thought

to

be

aform

of

terrorism.

MacIntyre'saccountofepistemologicalcrisesisacorrelativeofhis

traditionedaccountofrationality.AccordingtoMacIntyre,itwasthecentral

aspirationoftheEnlightenmenttoprovidestandardsandrationaljustification

thatanyrationalperson,thatisapersonindependentofallsocialandcultural

particularities,wouldorshouldacceptwithoutrecoursetoappealstoauthority.

14Thisidealhasbeenimpossibletomaintainbecauseithasprovedimpossible

tosecureagreementonpreciselythoseprinciplesthatweretobeundeniableby

allrational

persons.

Yet

what

is

particularly

troubling

is

any

attempt

to

provide

analternativeaccountofrationalitytothatoftheEnlightenmentcontinuestobe

judgeddeficientbythefailedstandardsofthatsameEnlightenmentstandard.

YetMacIntyrearguesthatanalternativeaccountofrationalinquiryis

possibleasthat"embodiedinatradition,aconceptionaccordingtowhichthe

standardsofrationaljustificationthemselvesemergefromandarepartofa

historyinwhichtheyarevindicatedbythewayinwhichtheytranscendthe

limitationsofandprovideremediesforthedefectsoftheirpredecessorswithin

the

history

of

that

same

tradition."15

Such

a

view

of

rationality

is

historical,

since

anyattempttojustifyistonarratehowtheargumenthasgonesofar;

accordingly,anysubjectneedingjustificationisitselfaconceptwithahistory;

whichmeansthattherecanbenodenialofthediversityoftraditionsofenquiry.

ForthoseschooledonEnlightenmentpresuppositionsthislastpointis

particularlytroubling.FromsuchaperspectiveitisassumedthatMacIntyre

cannotavoidrelativismand,inspiteofhisdenials,mayevenadvocate

relativism.16Moreoverthisview,itisalleged,hasdisastrous


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politicalresultsbecauseifthereisnoalternativetorelativismthenweare

condemnedtoliveinaworldofwar.Absentanywayofsecuringagreements

betweenpeoplewhootherwisesharenothingincommonotherthantheir

rationality,itseemstheonlyrecourseforresolvingdisputesiswar.

YetMacIntyrearguesthattraditionsmaybeabletoresolveconflictsnot

onlywithin

the

tradition

itself

but

between

traditions.

In

this

respect,

it

is

importanttoattendtotheantiCartesianandantiHegelianaspectsof

MacIntyre'saccountoftraditions.ForMacIntyre,unlikeCartesians,assumesthat

traditionsbeginnotfromunassailableselfevidenttruths,butratherare

contingent.Moreover,incontrasttoHegelianpresumptionsthateachtradition

mustsharewithallothertraditionssomefinalrationalstate,forMacIntyre

"traditionsarealwaysandineradicallytosomedegreelocal,informedby

particularitiesoflanguageandsocialandnaturalenvironment,inhabitedby

Greeksor

by

citizens

of

Roman

Africa

or

medieval

Persia

or

by

eighteenth

centuryScots,whostubbornlyrefusetobeorbecomevehiclesoftheself

realizationofGeist.ThoseeducatedorindoctrinatedintoacceptingCartesianor

Hegelianstandardswilltakethepositivityoftraditiontobeasignof

arbitrariness.Foreachtraditionwill,soitmayseem,pursueitsownspecific

historicalpath,andallthatweshallbeconfrontedwithintheendisasetof

independentrivalhistories."17

Yetthissuggestionisbeliedby"oneparticularkindofoccurrenceinthe

historyof

traditions,"

which

MacIntyre

calls

"epistemological

crises."18

Such

crisescanoccurinthehistoryofparticularpersons,groups,andforawhole

tradition.Indeed,suchacrisisinatraditionmaywellfinditselfmanifestinour

inabilitytotellthestoriesofourliveswithnarrativecoherence.Tosharea

culturemeansweshareschematathatareatonceconstitutiveofandnormative

forintelligibleactionsthatis,itmeanswecan"get"ajoke.Yetitmayhappenthat

anindividualmaycometorecognizethepossibilityofdifferentpossibilitiesof

interpretationwhichpresentanalternativerivalschemataofwhatisgoingon

around

him

or

her.

MacIntyre

suggests

that

Shakespeare's

Hamlet

exemplifies

in

thepersonofHamletaswellasthequestionofhowtointerprettheplay,

Hamlet,theproblemofhavingtoomanyschemataforinterpretation.19That

suchacrisismayoccurdoesnotmeanitcanalwaysberesolvedsinceitmay,asit

wasinthecaseofHamlet,makeitimpossibleforhimorustounderstandwhatis

goingonaroundus.Suchalackofunderstandingmaymakeitimpossibleforus

tomakeourownlivesintelligibleandmayevenlead,asitdidforHamlet,to

madness(ortothenecessitytofeignmadness).Yeteventhat


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descriptionmaybetoocomfortingsinceitassumesthatinsuchasituationwe

areabletodistinguishnormalityfrommadness.

Anewnarrativeisrequiredfortheresolutionofanepistemologicalcrisis.

Suchanarrativemustenableagentstounderstandbothhowtheycouldhave

intelligiblyheldtheirformerbeliefsandhowtheymayhavebeenmisledby

them.When

historically

founded

certitudes

are

rendered

problematic,

new

conceptsarerequiredtoenrichourschemestofurnishsolutionstoproblems

thatseemintractable;anexplanationmustbegivenwhythetraditionhad,

beforethesenewresourceswereavailable,seemedsterileorincoherent;and

thesetasksmustbecarriedoninafashioninwhichthenewconceptual

resourcesareseenincontinuitywiththetraditionasarticulatedtothatpoint.20

MacIntyresuggeststhewaytheCatholicdoctrineoftheTrinitywasresolvedin

thefourthcenturyisagoodillustrationfortheresolutionofanepistemological

crisis.Aquinas,

providing

the

means

in

which

Aristotle

could

be

received

into

an

Augustinianframework,isofcourseMacIntyre'scrucialexemplificationofa

successfulresolutionofanepistemologicalcrisis.21

Relativismnowappearsasthedoctrinethatdeniesthepossibilityof

epistemologicalcrisesoccurring,butbytheveryfactthatsuchcrisesoccurwe

cannowseethatrelativismasapositionisamistake.MacIntyre,however,is

willingtoconcedetotherelativistthatoverlongperiodsoftimerivaltraditions,

bothinternallyandinrelationtooneanother,maydevelopwithout

encounteringmore

than

minor

epistemological

crises.

Yet

when

this

happens

suchtraditionswillbeunabletoencountertheirrivalsinawaytodefeat

them.22Moreover,thereisnothingtopreventatraditionfromdegenerating

intoaselfcontainedenclavetoavoidrecognizingthatitisbeingputinto

questionbyrivaltraditions."Thisis,"MacIntyreobserves,"partofthe

degeneracyofmodernastrology,ofsometypesofpsychiatricthought,andof

liberalProtestantism."23

MacIntyre'sconcessionthatforlongperiodsoftimetraditionsofvery

different

kinds

can

coexist

without

bringing

their

conflicts

and

disagreements

to

rationalresolutionmakesclearthatanepistemologicalcrisis,whilepossiblyquite

painful,isevenmoreimportantlyagreatachievement.Ourproblemisnotthat

Christianscomeintoconflictwiththeworldinwhichwelive,butthatwedonot.

Indeed,fromthisperspectivewarcannowbeseenasafailuretosustainthe

kindofconflictMacIntyredescribesasanepistemologicalcrisiswarisnecessary

whentraditionsareunabletorecognizethecrisestheycreateforoneanother.

Thisisnottodenythatawarmightbetheformanepistemologicalcri


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sismighttakeorthatterrorismcouldbeconstruedasadesperatewaytoforcea

conflictthatisotherwisedenied.Yetwarandterrorismusuallyarenotwell

knownforproviding"conceptualschemes"thatallowcontinuitywiththepastto

benamed.

WitnessasTheologicalTerrorismMacIntyre'saccountofepistemologicalcrisesiscrucialifwearetoavoidthe

unhappychoicebetweenStackhouse'sappealtouniversalprinciplesandwar.

Moreover,ifMacIntyreisright,thenwecanbetterappreciatewhyChristian

nonviolencecannothelpbutbeseenfromadvocatesofboththosealternatives

asaformofterrorism.ForChristianshavebeensentoutintoaworldofwarto

challengethenecessityofwararmedonlywiththeweaponsoflove.Put

differently,that

Christians

are

first

and

foremost

called

to

be

witnesses

by

necessitycreatesepistemologicalcrisesforthosethatdonotworshiptheGodof

JesusChrist.(Ofcourse,Ialsowanttocreatesuchacrisisforthosewhodo

worshipChristbutthinktheycanstillparticipateinwar.)Suchcrisesmayforlong

periodsbeirresolvableandthetensioncreatedtemptallinvolvedtoviolence.

ThatChristiansmustresistsuchtemptationsisnotbecausesuchviolencemay

not,atleastforawhile,seemtoprovide"peace,"butbecausethepeace

providedisnotthepeaceofChrist.

Christianwitness

so

understood

is

particularly

threatening

to

those

who

assume,likeStackhouse,thatouronlyalternativetowarandterrorismisto

representauniversalalternative.24Thatnarrative,inspiteofitsgreatdesirefor

peace,cannothelpbutattempttosilencethosewhorepresent"particularistic"

traditions."Particularists,"particularlythosewhorefusetoacceptthe

marginalizationofferedbysuchuniversalists,cannothelpbutappearasfanatics

and/orterroristswhothreatenwhatappearstobeouronlyhopeforpeace.

FromtheperspectiveofliberalChristianity,Christianswhoinsistonthe"politics

of

Jesus"25

cannot

but

appear

like

Islamic

fundamentalistsnot

a

bad

place

to

be

frommyperspective.

Witnesscanbeunderstoodasauniversalimperative,butitissuchasan

expressionofhoperatherthananassuredresult.AsEmmanuelKatongole

observes,"witnessinvolvestheaffirmationofthehermeneuticalsignificanceof

thepresenceofothers.Becausehumanbeingsarenotaccidentallyculturally

mediated,butnecessarilyso,truthdoesnotcomeasacorrespondencetoan

independentlyexistingreality.Rather,


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truthisaninterpretativeperformancerealizedthroughandwithinthecultural

linguisticpractice.Thishistoricalnatureoftruthmilitatesagainstany

epistemologicalsingularityorselfsufficiency.Witness,astheformofcontact

betweenhistoricallyconstitutedtraditions,affirmstherealizationthatnoone

traditionisinpossessionofthetruth.Ifthatwerethecase,contactwithother

traditionswould

take

the

often

preferred

form

of

enforcement

and

imposition."

26

Itisimportanttoobservethatwitnessinnowayismeanttoavoidthe

importanceofargument.YettohaveanargumentrequiresthatChristiansfirst

listentowhattheotherhastosay.Suchlistening,moreover,maywellcauseus

tolearnbetterwhatwehavetosay.Suchlisteningmayevencreate

epistemologicalcriseswithinChristianselfunderstanding.Yetthatistheriskwe

musttake,sinceourtraditionisunintelligibleifwefailtobewitnessesforthe

peacethat

God

has

secured

for

the

world

in

Jesus

Christ.

In

that

name

and

that

namealoneisatoncethelegitimationaswellasthenecessityofourwitness.

Whichfinallymustbringusbacktoquestionsofwarandterrorism.Does

thepositionIhavetriedtosketchinthispapermeanChristiansmustfinally

accepttheinevitabilityofwarand,perhapseven,ourinabilitytodistinguishwar

fromterrorism?Icertainlyseenoreasonwhysuchaconclusionmustfollow

fromwhatIhavesaid.Christianwitnessisanalternativetowarjusttotheextent

Christianwitnessestablishesconnectionsbetweenthosewhohavenoreasonto

beconnected.

Such

connections

in

themselves

cannot

insure

peace

because,

contrarytoliberalsentimentalitythatassumesifpeopleonlycometoknowone

anotherbetterviolenceislesslikely,theexactoppositemaybethecase.Rather,

whatiscrucialarethenarrativeconnectionsChristianwitnessmakespossible,

believingaswedothatthestoryofChrististheendofallstories.

Suchconnections,whichIbelievearebutanotherwordforchurch(forwe

mustnotforgettheChristianwordforuniversaliscatholic),giveChristiansthe

resourcesfordistinguishingwarfromterrorism.Forastheanalysisabove

suggests,

to

be

able

to

distinguish

war

from

terrorism

does

not

finally

rest

on

conceptualdistinctions,importantastheyare;butrather,throughthesharingof

storiesweareenabledtoseethechildrenofmyenemiesarenotmyenemies.

Sucha"seeing"isanachievementthatrequirestheslowworkofthosewho

mustlearntowaitinaworldofwar,knowingastheydothatGodwouldnot

haveGod'sKingdomaccomplishedthroughviolence.Withoutsuchafanatical

peopleweliterallywouldbewithouthope.


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100

Notes

1.See,forexample,myDispatchesfromtheFront:TheologicalEngagementswiththeSecular

(Durham,N.C.:DukeUniversityPress,1994),p.5.

2.Violence

and

nonviolence

are

descriptions

of

behavior

that

requires

analogical

display.

In

otherwordswedonotjust"know"violenceornonviolencewhen"weseeit."Peacetoooften

isjustanothernamefortheabsenceofoverthostilities.Foranexchangeaboutthe"meaning"

ofnonviolenceseePaulRamsey,SpeakUpforJustWarorPacifism(UniversityPark:

PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,1988)andmyresponseinthe''Epilogue."InDispatches

fromtheFrontIarguethatwecannotknowwhatviolence(andwar)isabsentthepracticeof

nonviolence.Thismayappeara"smallpoint,"butIthinkitssignificanceisoftenoverlooked.

FromaChristianperspectivenonviolenceisnotanexceptiontowar,butratherwarand

violenceareconceptuallyandinpracticeparasiticalonnonviolence.

3.James

Tunstead

Burtchaell,

The

Giving

and

Taking

of

Life:

Essays

Ethical

(Notre

Dame,

Ind.:

UniversityofNotreDame,1989),pp.21112.

4.Forexample,theUnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseassumesthatterrorismisdefinedas

useofviolencebythoseoutsideadulyconstitutedgovernment.Thus"terrorismisthe

unlawfuluseorthreateneduseofforceorviolencebyarevolutionaryorganizationagainst

individualsorproperty,withtheintentionofcoercingorintimidatinggovernmentsor

societies,oftenforpoliticalorideologicalpurposes."YetasBurtchaellpointsout(p.213),such

adefinitionleavesnoroomforstateterrorismdirectedtoitsownpopulationortoanother

state.In1954theU.S.Governmentengineeredtheoverthrowofthedulyelectedgovernment

inGuatemala,

for

instance,

and

has

since

made

every

effort

to

have

an

obviously

terrorist

control"dulyconstituted,"whilehavingtooverlookitsmassacresof100,000Guatemalans,

andthe"disappearing"ofcountlessothers.(It'sinterestingthatinU.S.newsreportsthose

Guatemalanswhoprotestordefendthemselvesareroutinelylabeled"rebels.")Burtchaell

providesotherdefinitionsfromtheFBI,InternationalLawAssociation,andothersthatonly

helponeseethatno"definition"ofterrorismcanbemadetodotheworkofanalysis.

5.Burtchaell,GivingandTakingofLife,p.221.Myuseofthisexampleisnotmeanttosuggest

itisimpossibletodistinguishbetweencombatantsandnoncombatants.Justwarthinkershave

rightlyemphasizedtheimportanceofthatdistinction.Yetthatdistinctioninitselfisnot

sufficientto

distinguish

war

from

terrorism.

6.InChristianEthicsandtheSitIn(NewYork:AssociationPress,1961),Ramseysays,

"democracymeansjustifiableandlimitedresistance(andthusitrefinesandestablishes

proceduresformakingajustifiablerevolution,whichisinprincipletoapplytodomestic

politicsthesamelineofreasoningthatdroveChristiansintheearlycenturiesofthiserato

justifyandlimitwarfarefortheresistanceandcorrectionofevil."p.93.Laterinthesamebook

heobservesthatdemocracyisnothingmorethanjustumbellum,"bothinitsorigininWestern


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101

historyandintheprinciplesofChristianethicsrequiringparticipationinitasaformof

regularizedstrugglebetweenmanandmaninthemidstofwhichalonewehaveinthisfallen

worldanylifewithmanpreserveduntoahigherandmoreopenfellowship."p.104.

7.Burtchaell,GivingandTakingofLife,p.231.

8.MaxStackhouse,"Torture,TerrorismandTheology:TheNeedforaUniversalEthic,"

ChristianCentury

103,

no.

29

(October

8,

1986):

861.

9.Stackhouse'smostsustainedcriticismofmypositioncanbefoundinhis"Liberalism

Dispatchedvs.LiberalismEngaged,"ChristianCentury112,no.29(October18,1995):96267.

ThoughthisarticletakestheformofareviewofmybookDispatchesfromtheFront,itisa

wholesaleattackonwhathetakestobemyposition.WhatStackhousethinksImustthinkis

onlywhatsomeonelikeStackhousecanthinkIthinkbecauseofthewayhethinks.For

example,inhisreviewhesuggeststhatIthinkreligiousclaimsareimmunetorationalcriticism.

Icertainlydonotthinkthattobethecase,thoughIshouldliketoknowmorewhathethinks

rationalcriticismtobe.Imentionthispointsinceitrelatestothegeneralargumentofthis

essay.Icertainly

have

astake

in

rational

criticism

though

Iam

quite

suspicious

of

appeals

to

rationalcriticismintheabstract.

10.ForaresponsetothechargeIama"confessionalist"seemy"FailureofCommunicationor

ACaseofUncomprehendingFeminism,"ScottishJournalofTheology50,no.1(March,1997).

ThisarticleisaresponsetoGloriaAlbrecht'sreviewofmybook,InGoodCompany.Ifindit

interestingthatStackhouseandAlbrechtsharetheviewthatImustbea''confessionalist"

sincetheyare,politically,atotherendsofthespectrum.Ithink,however,thisisbutan

indicationofhowdeeplyeachofthemisembeddednotonlyinpoliticalliberalismbutmore

importantlyintheologicalliberalism.

11.Stackhouse,"Liberalism,"p.862.Stackhouse'sassumptionthatwemusthaveareasonfor

knowingwhyterrorismiswrongis,ofcourse,partoftheproblem.Suchaviewfailstoseethat

thequestionisnotjustificationbutdescription.Terrorismisoneofthosedescriptionsthat

workwithinthepracticesofacommunitythatmakethequestion,"Whatiswrongwith

terrorism?"distinctlyodd.Tortureworksmuchthesamewayasdowordslikemurderand,

perhaps,abortion.Thatsuchwordsexistcangivetheimpressionthatauniversalethicof

principlesexiststojustifytheiruse.Butsuchdescriptionsasdescriptionsneednojustification.

12.Stackhouse,"Liberalism,"p.863.StackhousedevelopsthispositioninhisCreeds,Society,

andHuman

Rights:

A

Study

in

Three

Cultures

(Grand

Rapids,

Mich.:

Erdmans,

1984).

13.TheverydayIwaswritingthisparagraphIreceivedmycopyofTheNewYorkReviewof

Books,44,no.1(January9,1997),whichcarriedareviewbyWilliamMcNeillofSamuel

Huntington's,TheClashofCivilizationsandtheRemakingofWorldOrder.McNeillquotes

Huntingtontotheeffectthat"WesternbeliefintheuniversalityofWesternculturesuffers

fromthreeproblems:itisfalse;itisimmoral;anditisdangerous."AccordingtoMcNeill

Huntington


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102

thinksitfalsebecauseothercivilizationshaveotheridealsandnorms;itisimmoralbecause

imperialismisthelogicalconsequenceofuniversalism;itisdangerousbecausesuch

universalisticassumptionsmakewarmorelikely."DeclineoftheWest?",p.18.ThoughIhave

otherthingstosay,certainlyHuntingtonhassaidsomeofwhatneedstobesaidinresponseto

Stackhouse.

14.Alasdair

MacIntyre,

Whose

Justice?

Which

Rationality?

(Notre

Dame,

Ind.:

University

of

NotreDame,1988),p.6.

15.Ibid.,p.7.NotenoughattentionhasbeenpaidtotheformMacIntyre'sargumenttakesin

thisbook.Hecannotprovideanyargumenttoendallargumentswiththosewhowantto

assumeEnlightenmentviewssincehisownaccountofrationalitycanonlybedisplayed.The

narrativedetailconcerningtheScottishEnlightenmentinthebookisnotMacIntyresimply

showingheunderstandsStair,Hutchenson,andHume,butratherisnecessaryforhisdefense

ofhowrationalityrequiresnarrative.

16.Thischargesimplywillnotgoawaynomatterhowmanytimesthepointismadethatthe

very"problem

of

relativism"

has

been

created

by

the

epistemological

theories

that

claim

to

be

ouronlyhopeagainstrelativism.MacIntyre'saccountofrelativismasanoptionthatdepends

onthedevelopmentofcosmopolitanculturesseemsexactlyright.SeeMacIntyre,Whose

Justice?WhichRationality?,pp.389403.

17.Ibid.,p.361.Thatatraditioniscontingent,however,doesnotmeanMacIntyrebelievesit

impossibletoarriveatfirstprinciples.Indeed,hebelievesAquinasexemplifieshowthe

articulationofsuchprinciplesispossible.SeeMacIntyre'sFirstPrinciples,FinalEnds,and

ContemporaryPhilosophicalIssues(Milwaukee,Wisc.:MarquetteUniversityPress,1990).

18.MacIntyre

first

developed

his

account

of

epistemological

crises

in

his

"Epistemological

Crises,DramaticNarrative,andthePhilosophyofScience,"TheMonist69,no.4(October,

1977):45372.ThisessayhasbeenreprintedinWhyNarrative?:ReadingsinNarrative

Theology,editedbyStanleyHauerwasandL.GregoryJones(GrandRapids,Mich.:Eerdmans,

1989),pp.13857.ReferencestothisarticlewillbetoWhyNarrative?.

19.MacIntyre,"EpistemologicalCrises,Narrative,andPhilosophyofScience,"pp.13841.Itis

importanttonotethatMacIntyre'saccountofepistemologicalcrisisisnotaninvitationto

resumetheEnlightenmentpresumptionthatbeforewecanknowanythingwemustfirsthave

anaccountofhowweknow.AsNicholasLashnicelyputsthematterepistemologyiswhatwe

dowhen

things

go

wrong.

The

Beginning

and

End

of

"Religion"

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

UniversityPress,1996),pp.11216.Itisnotquiterighttothinkanepistemologicalcrisisalways

indicatessomethinghasgonewrong,butattheveryleastacrisisindicatessomesensethatwe

haveaproblem.

20.MacIntyre,WhoseJustice?WhichRationality?,p.362.

21.SeeinparticularMacIntyre'saccountinhisThreeRivalVersionsofMoralEnquiry:

Encyclopaedia,Genealogy,andTradition(NotreDame,Ind.:UniversityofNotreDamePress,

1990),pp.10526.ByfocusingontheseexamplesIdonotmeantodistractattentionfromthe

compellingexamplesthatMac


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103

Intyreusesthatcomefromthehistoryofscience.YetonesuspectsthatMacIntyre'saccount

ofepistemologicalcrisiswasfirstilluminedforhimfromtheologyand,inparticular,Newman.I

mentionthistosuggestthatinherentinMacIntyre'saccountofthesemattersis,Isuspect,a

verypromisingwaytoappreciateatoncethedifferenceandthesimilaritybetweenthekindof

knowledgegainedthroughtheologyandthatgainedthroughscience.Nottheleastresult

couldbethatthecurrentprejudiceagainsttheformerinfavorofthelattermightbe

challengedwithout

recourse

to

Kuhn.

22.MacIntyre,WhoseJustice?WhichRationality?,p.366.

23.MacIntyre,"EpistemologicalCrises,Narrative,andPhilosophyofScience,"p.147.

MacIntyrenodoubttakesgreatpleasureinprovidingthesethreecandidatesasexamplesof

degeneratetraditions.Ionlywishthelistmightbetakenasawonderfuljoke.However,Ifear

itisunfortunatelyalltootrue.

24.ItismyviewthatthesignificanceofMacIntyre'sargumentinhisThreeRivalVersionsof

MoralEnquiryhasyettobeappreciated.ForwhatMacIntyreattemptsinthatbookisto

createan

epistemological

crisis

for

the

encyclopedist

and

genealogist.

The

form

MacIntyre's

argumenttakesisasimportantasitscontent.Putsimply,MacIntyrefightsfairjusttothe

extenthisargumenttakestheformofanarrativethatinvitesfurtherresponse.MacIntyre's

work,therefore,musthavethesameessentialincompletenessthathesoinsightfullysuggests

inThreeRivalVersions(p.124)istheheartandsoulofAquinas'Summa.

25.Iam,ofcourse,referringtothetitleofJohnHowardYoder's,ThePoliticsofJesus(Grand

Rapids,Mich.:Eerdmans,1994).ThisisthesecondeditionofthebookthatcontainsYoder's

updatefromthe1972edition.Forawonderfulattempttoworkoutthepoliticsofa

perspectivelikeYoder'swithincurrentdiscussionsinpoliticaltheory,seeThomasHeilke,"On

BeingEthical

without

Moral

Sadism:

Two

Readings

of

Augustine

and

the

Beginnings

of

the

AnabaptistRevolution,"PoliticalTheory24,no.3(August,1996):493517.Heilkedevelopsthe

Anabaptistpracticeofthebanasanalternativetothepoliticsofviolence.Henotesthatsucha

"politics"maynotseemsuchtothosewhoassumethatthe"efforttosustainahegemonic,

territorial,sovereignentity,embodiedinaphysicalcollectiveofhumanbeingsandarticulated

toactionforitsownselfpreservation"constitutestheonlyentitythatdeservesthename

"political"(p.513).Suchaviewofpoliticshelpsmakeclearwhythechurchcannothelpbut

appearasathreattosuch"politics''thechurchisapolitythatrepresentsnosuchcollective

butisatonceathomeandnotathomeinallsuchpolitics.Thechurch,likemanyterrorist

organizations,can

be

understood

as

an

international

conspiracy

against

all

politics

based

on

"selfpreservation."

26.EmmanuelKatongole,ParticularityandMoralRationality:QuestioningtheRelation

betweenReligionandEthicswithReferencetotheWorkofStanleyHauerwas(Ph.D.diss.

KatholiekeUniversiteit,Leuven,1996),pp.2089.Katongole'sclaimthattruthdoesnotcome

asacorrespondencetoanindependentrealityItaketobearejectionofcrudecorrespondent

theoriesoftruth,thatis,theoriesthatMacIntyrecharacterizesasconceivingarealmof


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factsindependentofjudgmentorofanyotherformoflinguisticexpression.MacIntyrerightly

suggeststhatthereismuchtobesaidforcorrespondencetheoriesandoneunderstandsthat

therelationbetweenmindanditsobjectsisgivenexpressioninjudgments.SeehisWhich

Justice?WhichRationality?,pp.35460.

2000 - Stanley Hauerwas - The Nonviolent Terrorist. In Defense of Christian Fanaticism

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