€¦ · 2 Bangladesh: Avian Influenza Preparedness and Response Project Environmental and Social...

Bangladesh: Avian Influenza Preparedness and Response Project

Environmental and Social Safeguards Management Framework and

Environmental Management Plan

Department of Livestock Services January 2007

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Environmental Management Plan BACKGROUND

The Highly Pathogenic strain of Avian Influenza [HPAI] virus (H5N1) first was identified in South East Asia in 2003 and since then it has spread widely in Asia and to parts of Europe and Africa. The knowledge of the epidemiology of HPAI is still incomplete. But a number of key features are now known. Based on the evidence from a number of countries, the virus can enter either from migratory birds or from poultry imports (trade in poultry and poultry products). Countries with large commercial duck populations and which experience seasonal influxes of migratory birds, especially waterfowl, appear to be particularly susceptible; because the waterfowls intermingle closely with the domestic ducks and if they are infected with the virus, are likely to transfer them to the ducks, resulting in the ducks carrying the virus without showing clinical signs of disease.

Bangladesh is a high risk country as far as Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), especially the H5N1 strain, is concerned. Some 50 % of the national poultry flock (a total of about 185 million) is backyard poultry, with minimal bio-security. It has a large duck population (37 million). Bangladesh is visited annually by 21 species of migratory birds in the winter months that can carry the virus. Traditionally, it has imported a large number of day old chicks (d.o.c) and it has porous borders with neighboring countries (India and Burma) that have had outbreaks. To date, however, there have been no recorded outbreaks of H5N1 in the country.

Poultry disease surveillance in Bangladesh at present is almost entirely limited to clinical surveillance based on trigger points or indicators (mortality). The Department of Livestock Services (DLS) within the Ministry of Fisheries & Livestock (MOFL) is responsible for a Central Disease Investigation Laboratory (CDIL) in Dhaka, and a national network of 7 Field Disease Investigation Laboratories (FDILs). All these laboratories are in very poor condition with almost no equipment or staff trained in avian influenza diagnosis. In each of the 470 Upazilas (sub-districts) of the country, there is at least one DLS Livestock Officer and support staff who are responsible for disease surveillance and provision of basic veterinary services. Although most of the staff is in position, very few have reliable transport or operational funding to enable them to undertake routine disease surveillance. The DLS has received limited donor assistance in the past to strengthen its veterinary services. The MOFL is also the parent ministry of the Bangladesh Livestock Research Institute (BLRI) at Savar, just outside Dhaka. The BLRI is essentially a research facility and is currently recognized to have the national laboratory for Avian Influenza (AI) diagnosis (but not H5N1 strain). The diagnostic capability of the laboratories at BLRI has received some support from DANIDA and JICA. However no assistance has been provided for the central and field investigation laboratories or to enable veterinary

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officers to undertake regular surveillance. The commercial poultry sector (levels 1 & 2) in Bangladesh is responsible for another 50% of the national flock but has little interaction with the public veterinary services.

Some observers have attributed the lack of detection of HPAI in poultry in Bangladesh to the country’s very limited diagnostic capacity. However, HPAI has such high mortality (50% or more) that it is unlikely that a serious outbreak could occur and not be reported. Under the circumstances, it seems probable that the country has been fortunate with no virus introduction to date, or that any introduction (most probably from migratory birds) has not spread as a result of the special ecological features of the country. The main resting places for migratory birds are in the coastal areas where there is relatively little poultry production. If the former is the case then it is almost certain that it is a matter of time before HPAI arrives in the country, and steps need to be taken urgently to prepare for such an eventuality. If the special features of the country are providing some protection this needs to be investigated as part of the global epidemiological study of the disease.

Health care in Bangladesh is provided by both the government and the private sector. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) leads a large sector-wide program called the Health Nutrition and Population Sector Program (HNPSP) costing about US$ 4.3billion. The IDA support to HNPSP was approved in 2005. Government health services are provided almost free, whilst charges are levied for private sector services. There is very little linkage or exchange of information between the public and private health care providers. The public sector consists of a network of national, district and Upazila health complexes with basic facilities and staffing. There is at least one, 30/50 bed, health complex in each Upazila. In their present state, these hospitals are not well prepared for case management and would have difficulty handling even a modest outbreak of HPAI influenza in humans. Similarly, the larger hospitals in the urban areas, that are most likely to be needed in the event of a human pandemic, are also poorly equipped. Some steps have been taken at the central level to purchase limited supplies of Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) for health workers, anti-viral medication (oseltamivir), and influenza vaccine. A number of sensitization training courses for medical staff have also been undertaken.

Bangladesh has a relatively weak public health surveillance and response system. The MOHFW has an extensive network of local, district, and regional institutions, but the quality and accuracy of information about reported diseases is low. Most information comes from the public sector, while high rates of illness are seen in the private sector. In addition to passive, reportable disease data, the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control, and Research (IEDCR), the agency responsible for national disease surveillance, recently established a network of sentinel surveillance sites at the Upazila level in rural areas. Review of data from these sites suggests low sensitivity for capturing routine diagnoses like acute upper respiratory infections (Influenza like illness (ILI) and pneumonias). The International Center for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B) has well-established active surveillance sites and has been monitoring influenza-like illness. Until adequate national level systems are developed, IEDCR will have to continue to collaborate with ICDDR,B and other relevant non-governmental agencies to assure some level of surveillance.

In response to concerns about Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, the Government of Bangladesh (GOB), with assistance from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), has prepared a National Avian Influenza and Human Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan (NAIP). This plan, which conforms to the general standards for such plans set by FAO,WHO, and OIE, provides for specific strategies, institutional arrangements, and activities to be undertaken by concerned ministries to

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prepare for, prevent, contain and respond to HPAI outbreaks in poultry and humans. It also identifies the additional facilities and staff training needed to implement the plan. The NAIP was approved by the Prime Ministers Office in mid-April 2006.

A National Advisory Committee (NAC), comprising the Ministers of the participating Ministries, is the apex coordinating body for the plan. Beneath the NAC there is a National Multi-Sectoral Task Force (NMTF) with representation from a wide range of public and private sector agencies. In addit ion, intra-ministerial national technical committees are being established within the three main participating ministries (MOFL, MOHFW, and the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MOEF) that is responsible inter alia for monitoring migratory birds). According to the NAIP, during the pre-pandemic stage of the disease, the MOFL will have primary responsibility for implementation of the plan. During the alert phase (post pre-pandemic) responsibility will transfer to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare MOHFW. In the pandemic phase the Prime Minister’s office will take responsibility for implementation of the plan. In addition to the MOFL and MOHFW implementation of the plan will involve the MOEF. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The overall project development objective is to minimize the threat posed to poultry and humans by HPAI infection and other zoonoses by assisting the Government of Bangladesh prepare for, control, and respond to avian influenza pandemics and related emergencies. To achieve this, three areas are considered for support: (i) prevention, (ii) preparedness and planning, and (iii) response and containment. The Project will thus support the implementation of the National Avian Influenza and Human Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan (NAIP) prepared by the GOB in collaboration with FAO and WHO. The project has four components: (i) animal health, (ii) human health, (iii) public awareness and information, and (iv) implementation support, monitoring and evaluation. A summary of project components and activities is provided below.

I. Animal Health Component (A) Enhancing HPAI Prevention and Preparedness Capability A1 - Adapting National Policy Framework. This would be a relatively small sub-component that would include (a) a review of national policies for the control of livestock diseases, (b) an evaluation of the national veterinary services according to OIE standards, and (c) a review of national compensation policy. The sub-component would support national & international technical expertise to assist the DLS with the reviews, and would build on work started by other development partners.

A2 - Improving HPAI Prevention and Control Planning. There is a need for NAIP to be updated and, in particular, for private sector and NGOs to be fully involved in the development of the revised NAIP. Once developed, the plan needs to be bench tested with simulation exercises which the project would finance. There is also a need for better national and regional understanding of the issues associated with HPAI, and the project would provide for attendance at national and regional conferences and workshops. (B) Strengthening Disease Surveillance and Diagnostic Capacity

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B1 - Strengthening of Veterinary Services. Following the review of veterinary services and regulations, the project would support any amendments needed in legislation and also re-organization of the structure of veterinary services, as part of DLS. B2 - Strengthening Animal Disease Surveillance & Diagnostic Capacity. This would be a major intervention of the project and would have a number of sub-interventions including (a) improving animal health information flow, (b) improving detection, reporting and follow-up of reported cases, (c) public & community based surveillance networks, (d) epidemiological surveys and research to support strategic activity, and (e) improved laboratory diagnostic capacity. B3 - Strengthening Applied Veterinary Research. The project would support some applied research projects on the topic of HPAI in the form of competitive grants to veterinary colleges & faculties. (C) Strengthening HPAI Control Programs and Outbreak Containment Plans C1 - Targeting Virus Elimination at the Source. There is an urgent need to establish teams trained, equipped and with operational funding to enable rapid action to cull, safely dispose of birds and quarantining and disinfection of infected places. C2 - Contingency Fund for Supporting Animal Vaccination. There is need to design a vaccination strategy based on surveillance and epidemiological surveys, and on the basis of using vaccination in conjunction with culling, if necessary. The project would support a fund for the acquisition of good quality poultry vaccines. C3 - Personnel Safety. Given the highly pathogenic nature of the H5N1 virus it is important that all staff and workers, likely to be in close association with diseased birds, are trained in safe handling procedures. The project would also provide the staff and workers with personal protective equipment (PPE). (D) Improving Bio-Security in Poultry Production and Trade. In Bangladesh, the section of the poultry industry most at risk are the level 3 or small commercial producers. These are low cost producers and they generally have limited bio-security measures. The proposed program would support the DLS staff encourage such producers to improve their bio-security measures. (E) Compensation Fund The project would support the establishment of a fund to compensate affected poultry farmers for culled infected birds in accordance to the guidelines to be established. (F) Support for Surveillance of Migratory Birds

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The project would provide limited funds for the MOEF to improve surveillance and reporting of the occurrence of unusual wild bird deaths. The MOEF would also be provided with limited amount of PPE and bio-secure containers in which to transport samples from migratory birds suspected of dying from HPAI to a laboratory for analysis. II. Human Health Component The NAIP provides a strategy and framework for addressing all major aspects of preparedness and response to human disease from avian influenza. A key immediate task for MOHFW is to ensure that the avian influenza activities envisaged are incorporated into the Communicable Disease Operational Plan of the HSPNP and endorsed by appropriate GOB authorities. The activities under avian influenza can be divided into those representing improvements in general capacity for emerging and re-emerging diseases (such as information technology and laboratory enhancements) and those that are influenza-specific (such as antiviral medication acquisition). Both are important, but the former will probably have longer lasting impact. The Human Health component would have three sub-components.

(A) Enhancing Public Health Program Planning and Coordination. This sub-component will further support (a) review of the existing regulatory and legal framework in Bangladesh for surveillance, prevention, and control activities and policies, (b) periodic assessments of capacity at the regional and sub-regional levels to address avian influenza, (c) development and dissemination of guidelines and protocols for avian influenza surveillance, investigation, and case management, and (d) development and conduct of tabletop and field simulations related to avian influenza. Technical assistance will be provided to the government to conduct the regulatory reviews, the periodic capacity assessments, development of the guidelines, to assist in training activities, and the simulation exercises

(B) Strengthening National Public Health Surveillance System B1 - Strengthening Disease Monitoring & Reporting. This sub-component will support (a) training of personnel on surveillance, investigation, and case management of this disease to include the strengthening and enhancement of sentinel surveillance for influenza-like illness (ILI), and (b) upgrading of priority infrastructure of health surveillance services to provide for better national surveillance for viral pneumonia and other manifestations of human disease caused by avian influenza, and (c) support for district and national rapid response teams to conduct field investigations related to avian and pandemic influenza. B2 - Strengthening Public Health Laboratory Network. Under this sub-component, funds would be provided for (a) laboratory strengthening to diagnose avian influenza, including provision of rapid diagnostic kits to regional laboratories, and (b) development of capacity for real-time polymerase chain reaction assays at the national reference laboratory at IEDCR, and virus isolation capacity at IEDCR. Technical assistance support will be provided for development of information technology related to disease surveillance and for carrying out a feasibility study for a bio-safety level 3 facility for virus isolation. (C) Strengthening Health Care System Preparedness & Response Capacity

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This sub-component would have four interventions. C1 - Personnel Safety. Acquisition of personal protective equipment (PPE) for use by health care workers and investigators. C2 - Purchase of Seasonal Vaccine Doses. Acquisition of seasonal influenza vaccine. C3 - Disease Case Management. This would include (a) training of clinicians and health care workers, (b) acquisition of antivirals and other medications for disease prophylaxis and treatment, (c) acquisition of hygienic and disinfecting supplies, and (d) renovation of health care facilities for case isolation and management. C4 - Pandemic Planning. This would include (a) development of protocols for health care system surge capacity, social distancing measures, and (b) equipment and materials for quarantine operations and mortuary services. Technical assistance to develop protocols for surge capacity, social distancing and mortuary services will be supported. III. Public Awareness and Information Component Provision of information to the public is an important component of prevention and control of avian influenza in humans. This component would be cross cutting in so far as it would provide support for both the MOFL and MOHFW to develop and disseminate information to the public about HPAI. The component is designed to safeguard human health, in particular extension staff, animal and human health workers, poultry producers and their families, by improving public awareness and information about the disease. Communication is also extremely important to minimize negative consequences of HPAI on poultry production and human health and has to be well adapted to the Bangladeshi context. Improving communication, public awareness and information would have three sub-components.

(A) Communication Preparedness Activities would include developing and testing messages and materials to be used in the event of a pandemic or emerging infectious disease outbreak, and further enhancing infrastructures to disseminate information from national to state and local levels and between the public and private sectors modules (web-based, printed, audio and video); presentations, slide sets, videos, and documentaries; and symposia on surveillance, treatment and prophylaxis. This would be undertaken by both MOFL and MOHFW in conjunction with the Ministry of Information and UNICEF Bangladesh and stakeholders form the private sector and NGOs. The on-going Government of Japan (GOJ) supported and UNICEF implemented communications initiative is scheduled to end in early 2007. It is unlikely that the work will be completed by then. It will, therefore, be necessary for additional funds for communication preparedness to be available. The project would support MOFL and MOHFW to develop messages which would be repeated in the last two years of the project.

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(B) Collaboration with Stakeholders The multi-dimensional problems associated with HPAl infection necessitate collaboration from a wide range of stakeholders, which has to be supported by broad communications and information campaigns to improve public awareness. The sub-component would support activities designed to improve the effective coordination and collaboration among all major stakeholders, including various ministries and government agencies (Planning, Finance, Agriculture, Health, Communications, DLS, national research institutions and diagnostic laboratories, NGOs, civil society, private sector companies and associations e.g. large poultry production companies, farmers’ associations, veterinarians and farmer involvement at the grass roots level). It would also involve the National Multi-Sectoral Task Force as the main GOB agency responsible for approving media messages in connection with Avian Influenza. The project would provide limited resources to facilitate meetings and coordination of the communication effort.

(C) Developing Pilot Models for Community-based Communication This sub-component would support the development and implementation of training courses in communications methodology for extension and veterinary staff as well as health workers at the central and local levels. It would include preparation of local programs, preparation and dissemination of information materials, and the provision of communications and information equipment for use at the local and central levels. IV. Implementation Support and Monitoring and Evaluation Component This component would have two sub-components. (A) Project Management & Implementation. The project would provide support for national and international experts to assist with implementation, coordination and management. In particular, the project will support (a) short-term international veterinary expertise to assist DLS, (b) a long-term national expert to head the Project Management Unit (PMU) within DLS, (c) the long-term national expert to assist with implementation and coordination of the human health component and who will be based in DGHS under MOHFW. The project would also provide support for the incremental staffing needs of the PMU, including M & E staff and operational cost for the PMU. The costs of the intra-ministerial committees would be met by the GOB. (B) Project Monitoring and Evaluation This sub-component would provide financial and technical support for independent Monitoring & Evaluation of the project.

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MAIN AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH AVIAN INFLUENZA IN POULTRY Within the Ministry of Fisheries & Livestock (MOFL), the two main agencies concerned with Avian Influenza (AI) are the Department of Livestock Services (DLS) and the Bangladesh Livestock Research Institute (BLRI) at Savar, just outside Dhaka. The DLS is headed by a Director General. It has five operational divisions: (i) Animal Health & Administration; (ii) Research, Training & Evaluation; (iii) Extension; (iv) Officers Training Institute, and (v) Production. Each division is headed by a director. It is envisaged that all divisions, except the Production division, will be involved in project implementation. The DLS has 5 Divisional Livestock Offices, 64 District Livestock Offices, 464 Upazila Offices, one Central Disease Investigation Laboratory & 7 Field Disease Investigation Laboratories. It has a large staff compliments with 2-3 Upazila Livestock Officers and support staff in each Upazila. The functions of the Upazila Livestock Officers include disease surveillance and reporting. The DLS facilities are in very poor shape centrally and in the districts, and are totally unable to undertake any Avian Influenza disease diagnosis at present. The BLRI was established in 1985. It is a semi-autonomous agency within the MOFL. It has five research divisions: (i) Animal Production; (ii) Poultry Production; (iii) Animal Health; (iv) Systems Research; and (v) Goat & Sheep Production. The Poultry Production division has received considerable donor support in recent years and now has laboratories equipped to undertake poultry disease diagnosis. Both agencies suffer from a serious shortage of operating funds. For example, the FDILs are reported to receive on average Tk5000 (US$8.0) annually for laboratory analysis. A multi- tiered health care system is present in Bangladesh. The primary level is the Upazila, or subdistrict level. Each Upazila has a population of about 300-400,000 persons. Health care personnel at this level include physicians, nurses, and allied health professionals, and there is a minimum 31 bed in-patient health complex in each of the 472 Upazilas. There are also health posts throughout the Upazila which offer simpler services for persons who cannot access the main health complex, and community health workers are present throughout the country. The intermediate level of the health care system is the district level. In Bangladesh, there are 64 districts which are grouped into six divisions (regions). Each district has a hospital which offers a range of primary and specialty services. In addition to the hospital, the district health center has a disease surveillance unit which collects and integrates data from the Upazilas and lower subunits. Districts also have epidemiologic investigative teams (also known as rapid response teams). The highest level of the health care system consists of a national network of medical college hospitals and specialized referral hospitals. For avian influenza, the Asthma Hospital in Dhaka has been designated the national referral center. Private medical centers and hospitals are also present in Bangladesh. Outside of the major urban centers, these hospitals are usually small clinics with minimal in-patient facilities. However, within the urban centers there are larger hospitals which can offer services at international standards.

A variety of disease monitoring systems are present in Bangladesh. The foundation is the management information system (MIS), which collects data on a number of diseases and conditions which present to the public sector medical facilities. Among these conditions are important infectious conditions, including respiratory diseases. The diagnoses included in the MIS are largely based on clinical impression, and therefore are of limited reliability. This is due to a lack of widely-utilized standardized definitions, and specificity of the diagnosis. MIS data submission is variable, as is collection, analysis, and dissemination of the information. While the MIS data are useful for trend analysis and prioritization, this system lacks the timeliness and accuracy necessary for an active public health response to

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emerging problems. The MIS is supplemented by a number of stand-alone (or vertical) programs, such as HIV and tuberculosis. There is an extensive network for collection of information on vaccine-preventable (EPI) conditions, including acute flaccid paralysis (AFP)/poliomyelitis. Data collected within these vertical systems is likely to be more accurate than that found in MIS, as there is more financial support, standardized case definitions are used, and there is laboratory confirmation.

National disease data are centralized at the Institute for Epidemiology and Disease Control Research (IEDCR), part of the Health Services Directorate. However, vertical program-specific data are collected outside of IEDCR. A list of reportable conditions is maintained by the government. IEDCR has established a network of sentinel sites for respiratory diseases, but there is little financial support and review of data from the existing sites indicates the network is currently of limited value as few cases are reported.

IEDCR also serves as the national reference laboratory for infectious diseases. Due to limited financial support and poor facilities, current diagnostic capacity at IEDCR is low. This is particularly true in the area of virology, which is crucial to rapid identification of influenza. Below the national level, limited microbiology is done. District level facilities do have microbiology capability, but this appears to be underutilized and diagnostic accuracy is difficult to evaluate. Most of these facilities, even at the Upazila level, can do basic parasitic microscopy, gram stains, acid fast stains for tuberculosis, and have serology kits for conditions such as hepatitis B & C.

The International Center for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B), is an international health research institution located in Dhaka. With the changing trend in the world scenario in health and population over the years, ICDDR,B has expanded its activities to address some of the most critical global health needs. In collaboration with partners from academic and research institutions throughout the world, the Center conducts research, training and extension activities as well as program-based activities. ICDDR,B receives some support from the Government of Bangladesh, and is located adjacent to IEDCR. It has diagnostic capacity for a variety of infectious conditions, including respiratory diseases such as influenza. ICDDR,B also runs active disease surveillance sites that monitor for respiratory diseases, and has set up a network of sentinel sites throughout Bangladesh for encephalitis surveillance. These sentinel sites are largely based at public sector medical colleges. ICDDR,B has been collecting respiratory samples for influenza virus isolation, but sends the strains outside the country for further analysis, including influenza A subtype. ICDDR,B has received outside financial support to upgrade their facilities to bio-safety level 3 and to expand the sentinel site network to monitor for influenza.

Unusual disease circumstances or outbreaks are investigated by a network of rapid response teams. Each district has at least one rapid response team composed of specially trained clinicians, microbiologists, sanitarians, and other skills as needed. These teams can receive back-up from national- level rapid response teams, when requested or when deemed to be necessary. National teams can receive support from personnel at ICDDR,B. The rapid response teams and senior personnel from the districts have received training at IEDCR on avian influenza monitoring, investigation, and control. Personal protective equipment (PPE) has been obtained at the national level for the members of the rapid response teams to be able to safely conduct field investigations of possible human disease due to avian influenza.

Safeguard Policies Table 1 List of Applicable Safeguard Policies

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Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4.01) [x] [ ] Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04) [ ] [x] Pest Management (OP 4.09) [ ] [x] Cultural Property (OPN 11.03, being revised as OP 4.11) [ ] [x] Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12) [ ] [x] Indigenous Peoples (OD 4.20, being revised as OP 4.10) [ ] [x] Forests (OP/BP 4.36) [ ] [x] Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37) [ ] [x] Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP/GP 7.60) [ ] [x] Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP/GP 7.50) [ ] [x]

POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SAFEGUARD ISSUES Environmental Issues and Impacts Considering the type of interventions proposed under the Project and the nature and magnitude of potential environmental impacts, this Project has been assigned a safeguard classification of a Category B Project. Activities under the proposed Project are expected to cause limited adverse environmental effects, since most activities of the Project are considered to support preventive measures. The Project, due to its prevention focused nature, will generally have positive environmental and social impacts as the project’s investments in facilities, equipment, laboratories, and training will improve the effectiveness and safety of existing avian influenza handling and testing procedures. This would be reinforced by mainstreaming environmental safeguards into the protocols and procedures for the culling and disposal of animals during AI outbreaks, decontamination of production facilities, and laboratories. Most of the key potential impacts will be avoided or minimized by integrating environmental and public health safety aspects in the preparation/design and implementation of the project activities. The main risks of adverse environmental impacts can be grouped into three categories:

(i) Inadvertent human exposure and spread of the virus due to: improper culling and disposal of dead birds (wild birds, sick and dead birds from backyard and commercial poultries); lack of, or improper use of personal protection equipment (PPE); improper disposal of farm waste (i.e., bedding, manure, washings, etc. during and/or after an outbreak); and inadequate lab biosafety protocols.

(ii) Inadvertent release of chemicals in the environment from unsatisfactory decontamination procedures (for personnel, poultry sheds, and transport vehicles, etc.).

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(iii) Release of chemicals and infectious agents into the environment from inadequate laboratory and medical facility waste management.

Likely impacts for the main project components are identified below: Animal Health Component:

The emphasis is to improve the country preparedness to deal with an HPAI outbreak. The review and improvement of the regulatory and the legislative framework should include all institutional, financial and human resources, procedures and arrangements to deal with adverse environmental impacts from prevention and control activities. Training of veterinary workers should include procedures for safe handling of AI materials with specific reference to internationally accepted laboratory waste management practices, including environmental issues related to zoonotic disease containment. The training should also include appropriate Biosafety Level Standards. If this component includes construction and/or refurbishing of selected facilities such as clinics or laboratories, care will be taken to ensure that GOB approved Building Codes (such as FIDIC) are followed. Training programs for the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MOEF) staff, particularly field staff, should include, inter alia, improved surveillance and reporting procedures, identification and safe handling of AI infected migratory birds and safe collection and disposal methods.

The current policy in the management of AI outbreaks is stamping out by imposing a quarantine area, slaughter of infected and potentially exposed birds, and decontamination of poultry houses, sheds and contaminated areas. Improper transport of any contaminated birds, bird products or waste (eggs, manure and feathers) and equipment (for example in open containers) may pose environmental and public health risks so training and guidelines for safe culling and transport will be prepared as part of the Environment Management Plan. The guidelines will also cover decontamination and worker protection. A practical and sanitary system for disposing of dead birds will help prevent the spread of disease and protect air and water quality. Potential options for safe disposal of carcasses have been listed in Annex 1. Specific guidelines will be prepared under the EMP. Human Health Component: Training of health workers will include procedures for safe handling of AI materials with specific reference to waste management practices in laboratories, clinics and hospitals, including environmental issues related to zoonotic disease containment. It will also include exposure to appropriate Biosafety Level Standards. Worker Safety: The proposed investments in health facilities, equipment, clothes, staff training and waste management will improve the safety and effectiveness of HPAI handling and testing and disposal procedures. The Project Implementation Manual should include these provisions. The project will help GOB in developing strategies to manage future outbreaks of infectious and zoonotic diseases that may emerge and re-emerge. The Environmental and Social Safeguards will be benefited from this in two major ways: (i) Environmental safeguards will be

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mainstreamed into protocols and procedures for the inspection and disposal of animals during an outbreak in due consideration of OIE standards, and (ii) Policies on compensation for poultry owners affected by future outbreaks will be developed. Social Issues and Impacts: There are no Social Safeguards triggered by the project because there will be no land acquisition, voluntary or involuntary, therefore there would be no displacement of people. If any land is required, either temporarily or permanently, for burial pits for mass disposal of dead birds, or for construction of incinerators or for open burning of carcasses, or for the construction of laboratories and/or other medical or veterinary facilities, such land will be provided by the Government. Such lands will be free of squatters or other encumbrances. The Project will have significant positive social impact by protection of human lives through HPAI early warning, prevention and containment, improved poultry farming practices, increased public awareness of HPAI and improved hygiene and food preparation practices and waste management. There will be a Compensation Fund under the Project to compensate for culled infected birds in accordance with guidelines to be finalized by GOB. Prior to finalization of the guidelines for compensation, consultations will be held with small scale farmers, as well as commercial producers, to formulate an acceptable policy for compensation. Without a clear, broadly accepted and properly implemented policy, there will be insufficient incentives to report incidences of illness and/or death. There is need for communications campaigns in both local languages to ensure that:

(i) Individuals/communities can assist the FDILs with early detection of an outbreak; (ii) Farmers/producers are aware of any relevant legislation requiring them to allow access to their farms, or the circumstances under

which they would be required to destroy their animals or place certain areas under quarantine ; (iii) Farmers/producers are aware of GOB policy on compensation for culled birds, and the requirements for accessing this

compensation; and (iv) Small scale producers, in particular, are aware of technological improvements and ways in which they can improve their bio-

security measures. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PLAN Summary of Environmental Management Plan (EMP) The overall project development objective is to minimize the threat posed to poultry and human by HPAI infection and other responses by assisting the Government of Bangladesh to prepare for, control, and respond to avian influenza pandemics and related emergencies. The Project will support the implementation of the National Avian Influenza and Human Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan

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(NAIP) prepared by the GOB in collaboration with FAO and WHO. The Bangladesh Avian Influenza (AI) Project has been assigned World Bank Environmental Category B. The Project activities supporting AI prevention, preparedness and planning, and response and containment are not expected to generate significant adverse environmental effects. The project activities are expected to have a positive environment impact, as the investments in facilities, equipment, and training for veterinary and public health service and laboratories will improve the effectiveness and safety over existing AI handling and testing procedures by meeting international and national standards. However, the activities do present a moderate environmental risk from inadvertent spread of the AI virus and waste management. The EMP addresses the moderate environmental effects and can be managed during implementation of the project. The draft national livestock policy and action plan regards livestock as a sub-sector and has direct as well as indirect implications for other national policies such as Bangladesh Environmental Policy 1992 and Action Plan, Bangladesh Trade Policy, National Water policy, PRSP and other policies. Bangladesh Environmental Policy 1992 and Action Plan include all regions and development sectors in its activities. It suggests that all developmental activities require environmental protection permit to involve population in all activities. The Bangladesh Environment Conservation Rules, 1997, included poultry farm, its feed and related products under Orange –B category; requiring submission of specified details of the projects, no objection certificate from the local authority, emergency plan relating adverse environmental impacts and plan for mitigation of the effects. It also states standards of discharge of untreated solid, liquid and gaseous wastes from any industry, laboratory and sewerage to surface water and groundwater. National Water Policy and National Drinking Water and Sanitation Policy also prohibit pollution of water sources. Bangladesh Diseases of Animals Act, 2005, and Bangladesh Animal and Animal Product Quarantine Act, 2005, Bangladesh Wildlife Preservation (Amendment) Act 1974 are the important control and disease eradication laws. Bangladesh is a member of OIE, FAO and WHO. The National AI Preparedness and Response Plan prepared with FAO and WHO means that the international policies and interests are given due considerations. Overall, the national and international policy/legal environment allows opportunities to prepare and response to AI. For the Animal component, the EMP addresses zoon tic disease containment and waste management as pertain to disposal of special waste, emissions and materials at laboratories, and training for veterinary services workers, to include procedures for safe handling of AI materials, safe culling of infected and at-risk poultry, disposal of carcasses and decontamination of places and materials in Bangladesh environmental context. The environmental impacts and mitigation measures in relation to social, floods, high groundwater table, soil conditions, seasons, crowding and other conditions in Bangladesh need special considerations. For the Human Health component, the EMP focuses on equipment, refurbishing and training for reference and regional diagnostic laboratories to include key environmental issues in genetic disease containment and waste management. An environmental specialist working with the PMU at the DLS will lead monitoring, supervision, reporting and its related technical inputs in implementation of the EMP. The EMP will be further revised and updated with the evolving situation and conditions in the country with regard to AI. The necessary adjustments in the scope of the EMP will be specified during the initial phases of the project implementation, when detailed guidelines will be prepared based on the real environmental, social and financial factors. The DG of DLS will be responsible to implement the EMP in collaboration with the relevant policy and plan as suggested by concerned government and international organizations. Dr. A. Motalib and his team in DLS with assistance from WB consultants prepared the EMP.

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ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PLAN

A) Project Description

The Highly Pathogenic strain of Avian Influenza [HPAI] virus (H5N1) first was identified in South East Asia in 2003 and since then it has spread widely in Asia and to parts of Europe and Africa. Bangladesh is a high risk country as far as Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), especially the H5N1 strain, is concerned. Some 50 % of the national poultry flock (a total of about 185 million) is backyard poultry, with minimal bio-security. It has a large duck population (37 million). Bangladesh is visited annually by 21 species of migratory birds in the winter months that can carry the virus. Traditionally, it has imported a large number of day old chicks (d.o.c) and it has porous borders with neighboring countries (India and Burma) that have had outbreaks. To date, however, there have been no recorded outbreaks of H5N1 in the country. In response to concerns about Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, the Government of Bangladesh (GOB), with assistance from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), has prepared a National Avian Influenza and Human Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan (NAIP). This plan, which conforms to the general standards for such plans set by FAO,WHO, and OIE, provides for specific strategies, institutional arrangements, and activities to be undertaken by concerned ministries to prepare for, prevent, contain and respond to HPAI outbreaks in poultry and humans. It also identifies the additional facilities and staff training needed to implement the plan. The NAIP was approved by the Prime Ministers Office in mid-April 2006.

The overall project development objective is to minimize the threat posed to poultry and humans by HPAI infection and other responses by assisting the Government of Bangladesh prepare for, control, and respond to avian influenza pandemics and related emergencies. To achieve this, three areas are considered for support: (i) prevention, (ii) preparedness and planning, and (iii) response and containment. The Project will thus support the implementation of the National Avian Influenza and Human Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan (NAIP) prepared by the GOB in collaboration with FAO and WHO. The project has four components: (i) animal health, (ii) human health, (iii) public awareness and information, and (iv) implementation support, monitoring and evaluation. The Bangladesh Avian Influenza (AI) Project has been assigned World Bank environmental category B, since it involves moderate environmental impacts that can be managed during implementation of the project. The EA process for the AI project is addressed through this EMP.

• Generic initial screening to determine appropriate environmental assessment; • Compliance with existing environmental regulations in Bangladesh; • Linkages with social assessment • Analysis of alternatives;

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• Public participation and consultation with affected people and organizations; and • Disclosure of information. The EMP will be further revised and updated with the evolving situation and conditions in the country with regard to AI. The EMP was prepared by Dr Motalib and his team in DLS with assistance from WB consultants. The presented information was collected/ analyzed based on internet and literature search, WB reports and field visits to a few backyard as well as different kinds of farms and District and Upazila consultations. Key considerations to be taken into account during the EA process include: B) Overview of Applicable National and International Agreements, Policies and Laws Bangladesh Environmental Policy 1992 and Action Plan include all regions and development sectors in its activities. One of its 15 channels is ‘’Fisheries and Livestock’’. It suggests that all developmental activities require environmental protection permit and involve participation of population in all activities. The National Environment Management Action Plan ( NEMAP) recognizes that all citizens have right to healthy environment.. The Bangladesh Environment Conservation Rules, 1997, included poultry farm, its feed and related products under Orange –B category; requiring submission of specified details of the projects, no objection certificate from the local authority, emergency plan relating adverse environmental impacts and plan for mitigation of the effects. Also there are restriction and guidelines about discharge of any solid, liquid and gaseous biological or chemical (including detergent on any material) to water, soil and air by any industry, laboratory, sewage, community and/or organization. National Water Policies. National Trade Policies, National Forestry Policy (1994), National Agricultural Policy (1999) and other national policies are also linked to the management and development of poultry and animals. The water preservation standards whose objective is to preserve the water resources are specified in the water protection norms and standards under the National Environment Policies, National Water Policies, National Drinking Water and Sanitation Policies and other policies. Animal Health Bangladesh Diseases of Animals Act, 2005, and Bangladesh Animal and Animal Product Quarantine Act, 2005, Bangladesh Wildlife ( Preservation) (Amendment) Act 1974 are the three main legal instruments for keeping Bangladesh free from HPA/H5N1 in animals ands enables the control and eradication of the disease in case of an outbreak. It clearly states that all kinds of owners of poultry will immediately report about occurrence of any communicable disease in poultry or birds to DG DLS /its representatives. DG will investigate it and take the necessary actions about the management of the suspected or identified infected poultry, place and related materials according to the assigned methods. The Bangladesh Garjjette, Monday, February 28,2005, Law-5 includes rules, clause and/or by- laws about: investigation, communication of information on identified places among population and other stakeholders; transportation; export or import of animals and its products; culling/destruction, decontamination and its related other orders/instructions in emergency situations. The Bangladesh Garjjette, Monday, February 28,2005, Law-6 includes further information/instruction for the control of animal disease and public health in

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import and export of animal, its products and related accessories. Every exporter of any animal or its product should inform the concerned authority based on prescribed method (and specified documents on animal health from the source) and get the approval from concerned local and national authorities before the assigned periods. Moreover, Bangladesh Penal Code ( BPC), Bangladesh Customs Act 1969 and Imports and exports(Control) Act. 1950 Section 3A are used for quarantine and import bans respectively. According to Bangladesh Diseases of Animal Act, 2005, HPA1/H5N1 is a notifiable disease. The Wildlife Act makes killing, catching, poaching and illegal trade of wildlife a punishable offence. The draft national livestock policy and action plan regards livestock as a sub-sector and links to other policies. Human Health The most important public health laws are: The Bengal Prevention of Inoculation Act, 1865; the Bengal Vaccination Act, 1880; the Epidemic Disease Act, 1897; the Public Health (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance Act 1944; the Bangladesh Pure Food Ordinance, 1959; and the Bangladesh Pure Food Rules, 1967 will provide the platform for preventing and responding to avian influenza and human pandemic influenza. In support of these national laws, the International Health Regulations (revised 2005), which come into full effect in 2007 will ensure reporting any outbreaks are adequately reported to the international community. Current Status Overall, there are national and international opportunities to prepare and response to AI. All the multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary Committees have been formed and working as suggested. A National Advisory Committee (NAC), comprising the Ministers of the participating Ministries, is the apex coordinating body for the plan. Beneath the NAC there is a National Multi-Sectoral Task Force (NMTF) with representation from a wide range of public and private sector agencies. In addition, intra-ministerial national technical committees are being established within the three main participating ministries (MOFL, MOHFW, and the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MOEF) that is responsible inter alia for monitoring migratory birds). According to the NAIP, during the pre-pandemic stage of the disease, the MOFL will have primary responsibility for implementation of the plan. During the alert phase (post pre-pandemic) responsibility will transfer to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfa re MOHFW. In the pandemic phase the Prime Minister’s office will take responsibility for implementation of the plan. In addition to the MOFL and MOHFW implementation of the plan will involve the MOEF. DG, DLS is the lead agency in Stage 1, investigation and declaring, if any, outbreak in poultry and culling poultry and decontamination activities. It will undertake the key responsibilities in implementing EMP in coordination and collaboration with other organizations during that stage and in animal health component in the following stages. The Line Director Communicable Disease would be the operational focal point for the program, along with the Director IEDCR. However, the environmental management knowledge and capacity among the various stakeholders at national and field level have been identified weak by DLS and consultants. The capacity building and training, monitoring, communication and other activities should address it adequately/in details during the preparation of guidelines, tools and implantation processes.

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In addition to these, collaboration and partnerships with members of non-governmental organizations (NGO), civil society organizations, religious bodies, and the private sector will be instrumental in ensuring effective response to influenza pandemic through development of capacities and utilization of resources. But there is lack of coordination and collaboration among the stakeholders as well as lack of capacities in adapting the environmental management opportunities. The country is a member of OIE, FAO and WHO, meaning it is an agreement to the guidelines, standards, recommendation and other international conditions. The country’s National Avian Influenza and Human Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan 2006-2008 incorporates the international dimensions; such as reporting, research, preparedness, progressive control and eradication in outbreak after acceptable methods, and other activities as suggested in immediate and other term perspectives. The draft national livestock policy and Action Plan, however, might consider proper incorporation of the AI perspectives. C. Summary of Potential Environmental Impacts and Mitigation Measures Potential Impacts Activities under Al projects are not expected to generate significant adverse environmental effects as they are focused largely on public sector capacity building and improved readiness for dealing with outbreaks of avian influenza in domestic poultry and a potential human pandemic. These prevention-focused activities are expected to have a positive environmental impact as the Project's investments in facilities, equipment, and training for border inspection points and for veterinary and public health services and laboratories will improve the effectiveness and safety over existing avian influenza handling and testing procedures. This would be reinforced by the mainstrearning of environmental safeguards into protocols and procedures for the culling and disposal of animals during Al outbreaks. In addition, waste generated in upgraded laboratory facilities will be managed using existing national guidelines that are consistent with international good practice. The main areas of environmental risk from project activities are the inadvertent spread of the Al virus during culling, transport and disposal of carcasses, animal waste, litter, and used protective, gear; contamination of surface and groundwater from use of disinfectants; and laboratory bio-safety and waste management. In addition, minor environmental disturbances may occur during renovation of laboratories and construction of inspection facilities at major border crossings. The project environmental mitigation plan is attached as Annexes 1 and 2. Animal Health: Equipment, refurbishing and training for regional laboratories and border inspection to include key environmental issues in zoonotic disease containment and waste management as pertain to special waste, emissions and materials; training for veterinary services and poultry sector workers to include procedures for safe handling of Al materials; safe culling of infected and at-risk poultry, disposal of carcasses and disposal of wastes generated in laboratories as well as during the culling. Impacts of /links with season, flood and other hazards to be incorporated in all activities. Disposal of carcasses and infected materials by burial

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In Bangladesh, the existing poultry carcass disposal method is burying in holes. Often the holes are not hygienic, not properly constructed or not properly covered. According to DLS improved and appropriate methods of burying will be adopted based on the suggested methods (Annex 1). The methods are accepted in other countries with due attention to factors such as the amount of material for disposal, location of the burial site, proximity to water catchment areas, soil characteristics, etc. Of particular concern however is the risk to groundwater contamination from poorly sited pits. Safe distance and barriers will be maintained to manage the risks to groundwater as well as surface water contamination. Season, flood and other environmental variables will be considered as well. The Project aims to address the risks of inadvertent spreading of the virus during disposal of carcasses by burial through (i) training of veterinary services staff in proper handling of potentially infected materials (Annex 2); (ii) training for farmers and commercial poultry workers on proper burial pit construction and operation; (iii) provision of quicklime, PPEs and other supplies; (iv) guidance regarding siting of burial pits to be collected from National Environment, Water and other policies to avoid groundwater contamination. Disposal of carcasses and wastes by incineration Other options for disposal include cremation, incineration, pit burning and rendering. Mobile incinerators to be provided to the selected Laboratories involved in the surveillance and diagnostic activities. A few private laboratories/hospitals will be provided with funds for procuring mobile incinerators. The incineration facilities will be procured in compliance with the international Animal By-products Directive and the process will be operated within established guidelines drawn from published documents in other countries. The key emissions to the air from operation of the incinerators are odour, particulate matter, hydrogen chloride, nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds (from methane to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH)), and dioxins and furans (PCDD/F). There will also be noise when the incinerator is operating. In addition there is also risk from airborne release of virus as the dead poultry are loaded into the incinerator. The key actions of mitigation are to ensure that the formation of harmful substances is avoided through operation of the incinerator at the design temperatures and combustion air supply. The burning of materials e.g. polyvinyl chloride(PVC) that could lead to the formation of harmful substances when burnt will be avoided.Discharge of liquid and solid wastes from the DLS, BLRI and private Laboratories will be managed as per specified methods under the supervision of concerned Senior Laboratory Officers. The key emissions to water and soil from the incineration processes arise from the water and disinfectants that are used in decontamination of: the incinerator, the vehicle used in transport, places and structures associated with the poultry and slaughter of the poultry. There is also a risk from fuel spillage during transport and on site commissioning of the facility or overflow of fat from the incinerator. The key actions of mitigation are to provide adequate training and working materials to the concerned personnel at national, District, Upazilla and local levels. Timely stockpiling of the working materials and its proper storage at the regional level or priority level are to be done during the preparedness Phases. Management of chemicals and disinfectants used for decontamination

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Contamination to surface and groundwater from use of disinfectants necessary for sanitization of infected premises will be mitigated by (i) promoting use of least toxic appropriate disinfectants (soaps and detergents), and (ii) providing training to veterinary services personnel and poultry growers on measures to limit use of toxic disinfectants and prevent untreated drainage or runoff into surface or groundwater systems. These measures are all supported through technical assistance, training and financing for the Compensation Fund. While these actions do not raise environmental issues, they will enable Bangladesh to the meet international standards set by the OIE and the recommendations developed by FAO for development of appropriate procedures and standards for the implementation and management of animal health measures and international veterinary certification activities. This in turn will help to provide the capacity for safe and environmentally sound management of culling and disposal of Al infected materials. Human Health Equipment, upgrading, refurbishing and training for national reference and regional diagnostic laboratories to include key environmental issues in zoonotic disease containment and waste management; guidelines, equipment and supplies for hospital infectious waste management. Strategic Communications No environmental issues, but an important component for design and delivery of communications tools for good hygiene, safe culling and disposal of animal carcasses, animal waste management. Impacts of /links with season, flood and other hazards to be incorporated in all activities. Hospital waste management will be included in the training and capacity building activities.

D. Monitoring and Supervision An environmental specialist working with the PCU under MOFL will be responsible for monitoring of the implementation of EMP for the Animal Health Component of the Al project. The specialist will also handle environmental oversight under the Human Health Component and provide periodic monitoring reports to the Al Project Implementation Team and to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry during implementation, and will notify the relevant authorities in the event of problems or issues connected with the mitigation measures. He/she will conduct the EMP training in the capacity building component of the different stages. A detailed guideline on implementation processes, methods and monitoring and evaluation tools related to the EMP and in line with the national and international policies will be developed by a consultant expert and handed over to the specialist. These guidelines and tools will address the regional and local environmental, social and contexts. It will be updated by the Project Specialist and included in refresher trainings. He/she will attend the multi- task committee

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meetings at the national level and report the progress, observations and actions as required. He/she will make regular periodic visits to the Laboratories and sampled farms and collect information based on the developed monitoring tools. At the field level trained District Livestock Officer will be responsible for regular supervision and assisting the Specialist in data collection and reporting. The arrangements have to be made based on the main implementation process components and may be summarized as in the following Table 1: Table 1: Reporting requirement for monitoring and supervision purposes Components Sub-

components Mainly reporting on:

Animal Health Adapting National Policy Framework

(i) Compilation and analysis of environmental laws, rules, strategies, policies and of information in the EMP (ii) requesting for environmental clearance to MOEF ,(iii) development of guidelines and training materials, and (iv) dissemination

Animal Health Strengthening Disease Surveillance and Diagnostic Capacity

(i)Updating draft national livestock policy by incorporating/linking EMP, (ii) assessing environmental management capacity and indicators in Laboratories and service, (iii) training and improving the capacities (iv) applied environmental health research on technology development and (v)dissemination and communication

Animal health Strengthening HPAI Control Programs and Outbreak Containment Plans

(i) Placing EMP trained personnel appropriately at the various levels, (ii)implementation of the identified appropriate culling, disposal and decontamination methods by regions/areas based on local conditions and alternatives, (iii) stock piling and properly storing the materials near vulnerable areas as much as possible (iv) monitoring and supervision of the potential environmental impact and mitigation measure indicators and (v) dissemination and communication

Animal Health Support for surveillance of migratory birds

(i) Training on proper disposal of carcasses

Human Health Enhancing Public Health program Planning and Coordination

(i) Analysis of EMP and its incorporation , (ii) Communication and dissemination (iii)development of training materials

Human Health Strengthening surveillance system

(ii) Incorporating and monitoring EMP related indicators and (ii) training

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Human health Personnel Safety

(i) Procurement and stockpiling of the equipments and materials

Public Awareness and Information

(i) Communication (ii) Preparedness and (ii) Coordination and Collaboration

(i) Development and promotion of tested proper EMP messages avoiding panic and/or negative impacts on poultry production, (ii) Establishment of proper EMP coordination and collaboration as suggested the in the response plan. It will be enhanced by proper reporting to DOE and all other stakeholders.

Disclosure of information

Translation and posting in various public media

Monitoring for Disposal and Decontamination under the Animal Health Component.. Information about environmental monitoring methods and operation guidelines for the various disposal and decontamination methods are to be derived based on the methods presented in details in a separate Bangladesh EMP document and summarized in Annex 1 and 2. The methods adopted may change and improve with time, situations, national and international contexts and analysis of the alternatives. Consequently, the monitoring indicators will also change. Selected information relevant to Bangladesh based on the existing conditions may be discussed as follows:

(i) Disposal of culled birds done in properly constructed and managed burial pits. Proper pits should be constructed, used and maintained, at least, in the laboratories. The pits can be used for demonstration during training as well.

(ii) Proper siting of the burial pits considering the water sources (iii) Any materials or substances contaminated or likely to be contaminated with avian influenza viruses are carried out under official

supervision in accordance with : a) the instructions of the official veterinarian; and b) the principles and procedures for cleansing, disinfecting and treatment set out in Annex VI of the directive.

(iv) Mobile incinerators in the Laboratories maintained at the operating temperatures of the incinerator facilities to that will ensure that the destruction of harmful products of combustion.

(v) Liquid/wastewater discharged from the Laboratories tested as per DOE requirements.

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E) Legal Agreement

Compliance with the Environmental and Social Safeguards Management Framework and the Environmental Management Plan will be a covenant under the Development Credit and Grant Agreements between the Government of Bangladesh and the International Development Association. In addition, every relevant civil works contract will include clauses to ensure that the contractor complies with the relevant provisions contained in the Environmental and Social Safeguards Management Framework and the Environmental Management Plan. Non-compliance with the above mentioned provisions will be linked to financial penalties under respective civil works contracts. F) Bidding Contracts The culling, disposal and decontamination responsibilities will be carried out by DLS under the supervision of Central Quick Response Team. However, private companies and workers may be assigned to cleaning, transportation and other activities. All bidding contracts should properly include the relevant EMP issues with adequate directions about its prevention, protection and/or mitigation measures.

G) Implementation Schedule The summary of implementation schedule will be as in the following Table 2:

Table 2: Implementation Schedule Components Sub-

components Main activities Schedule and concerned organization

Animal and Human Health

Adapting National Policy Framework

(i) environmental clearance to MOEF ,(ii) Hiring of Environmental Specialists and external consultants for the development of training materials and tools, (iii) development of EMP training materials and monitoring tools and (iv) training and dissemination

(i) Clearance achieved by January 30, 2007 (ii) Hiring done right after the signing of the agreement by DLS, (iii) The hired personnel develop the materials and tools assessing the needs within the first month and update it as needed/changes in the situations. (iv) proper incorporation of EMP information in the communication materials discussed among DLS, Health UNICEF and other concerned organizations by first quarter 2007/UNICEF project deadlines. .


Strengthening Disease

(i)Updating draft national livestock policy by

(i) DLS and BLRI will attempt to update the national livestock policy as

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Surveillance and Diagnostic Capacity

incorporating/linking EMP, (ii) assessing environmental management capacity and indicators in Laboratories and service, (iii) training and improving the capacities (iv) applied environmental health research on technology development, operational variables and further development of EMP.

soon as possible (ii) Assessment and training (with demonstration) will be done during the same period. Refresher training will be done in 2-3 years frequency depending on the changed/not changed situations. (iii) Environmental indicators of waste management in the DLS and BLRI laboratories will be monitored as required by National Environmental Policy and reported to DOE. The improvement of waste management systems in the DLS and BLRI laboratories and hospitals will start within 3 months of the Project initiations (iv) Appropriate culling, decontamination and disposal methods identified/agreed upon by areas in immediate and medium-long terms in 1-3 months after signing. (v) Applied research started as soon as possible and accordingly EMP updated.

Animal and human health

Strengthening HPAI Control Programs and Outbreak Containment Plans


(i) EMP trained personnel will be placed right after the training; within 3 months of agreement signing. (ii) Procurement of materials, stock piling and proper storage at central and appropriate lower levels will be done after the training. (iii) important potential bidding contracts will be completed in 3 months or earlier. It may be updated with time and needs (iv)


(i) Communication (ii) Preparedness

(i) Development and promotion of tested proper EMP messages avoiding panic and/or negative impacts on poultry production,

i) Done in line with UNICEF Project (ii) since the various committees are in place and working, EMP should be introduced to all of the Committees

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and (ii) Coordination and Collaboration

(ii) Establishment of proper EMP coordination and collaboration as suggested in the response plan. It will be enhanced by proper reporting to DOE and all other stakeholders.

them by February, 2007, while the training program may continue as planned in the capacity building component.



By January 15, 2007

H) Implementation Arrangements The Environmental Specialist of the Project will conduct monitoring according to its schedule to make sure that it meets the Environmental standards and requirements and report to his/her Project Team members. Department of Environment (DOE) will monitor the waste discharge, air quality and its management in Laboratories according to its requirements. Health Department will be informed of the environmental standards in its Laboratories by the Specialist and DOE. I) Institutional Arrangement The institutional arrangements may be summarized as shown in the following Table 3:

Table 3: Institutional Arrangements Components Sub-components Main activities Main Institutions Animal Health Adapting

National Policy Framework


DLS with assistance from WB, FAO and WHO


(i)Updating draft national livestock policy by incorporating/linking EMP, (ii) assessing environmental management capacity and indicators in Laboratories and service, (iii) training and improving the capacities (iv) applied environmental health research on

DLS and BLRI in coordination/collaboration with DOE and government and non-governmental organizations. UNICEF

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technology development and (v)dissemination and communication

and its partners



DLS, UNICEF, DOE,MOEF


(i) Training on proper disposal of carcasses DLS and DOE



Health and DLS and UNICEF



Health and DLS

Human health Personnel Safety (i) Procurement and stockpiling of the equipments and materials

Health




DLS (Environmental Specialist) collaboration with Health, DOE, UNICEF and other organizations


Translation and posting in various public media DLS and Health

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J) Reporting The reporting procedure may be summarized as shown in the following Table 4: Components Sub-

components Main activities Reporting Procedures




(i) Clearance requested in MOEF forms and attaching the needed documents (ii) Hiring reported in Project implementation progress report and Multi-sectoral Technical Committee report. The reports should include a separate section on EMP , (iii) The development of training materials and tools reported in a separate report (including methods used and comments from the concerned authorities) and attached with the Project progress report.


Strengthening Disease Surveillance and Diagnostic Capacity

(i)Updating draft national livestock policy by incorporating/linking EMP, (ii) assessing environmental management capacity and indicators in Laboratories and service, (iii) training and improving the capacities (iv) applied environmental health research on technology development, operational variables and further development of EMP.

(i) Reported in progress reports

(ii) submitted to National Advisory Committee. (ii) Training reported with activities conducted and post-training improvement assessed in a separate report/section with progress reports to Project Committees at national and field levels in prescribed tools/forms. (iii) Environmental indicators monitoring report attached to progress reports at national and local levels in prescribed forms.

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(iii) Reports on culling, decontamination and disposal methods done in prescribed forms to local and central DG DLS, FAO, WHO and local government systems.

The donor (WB) will be reported as agreed upon in the main proposal, in addition to sending copies of all the reports to Dhaka WB. International organizations such as OIE, FAO, WHO, UNICEF and other organizations/stakeholders will be reported as required and/or suggested in the policy or legal documents.

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Annex 1: Comparison of Disposal Methods for Animal Carcasses and Wastes Generated from Avian Influenza Outbreaks Guidance for Preparation of Detailed Guidelines

Bangladesh: Avian Influenza Preparedness and Response Project DESCRIPTION ENVIRONMENTAL

CONSIDERATIONS SAFETY

CONSIDERATIONS ADVANTAGES/

DISADVANTAGES OPTION 1: BURIAL IN A PIT

Decomposition of dead birds/ carcasses and other wastes through biological degradation in a pit and involves: • Excavation of a burial pit. • Placing carcasses in a deep

burial pit. • Covering carcasses and other

wastes with soil (about 40 cm) to: (a) prevent carcasses from rising out of the pit; (b) prevent scavengers digging up carcasses; (c) help filter out odors; and (d) absorb the fluids of decomposition.

• Possibly adding an unbroken layer of slaked lime [Ca(OH)2] to protect carcasses from being uncovered by carnivores after pit closure. But piling rocks on the closed mounded pit is preferred as lime may slow microbial decomposition of the wastes and alkaline conditions are favorable

Site Selection Considerations: • Distance to watercourses, bores,

and dug wells. • Height of water table (the base of

the pit must be well above the water table).

• Slope of the land at the burial site to the nearest watercourse (drainage to and from the pit).

• Soil permeability. • Distance to human settlements and

public lands (including roads). • Prevailing wind direction (for odor

emission). • Availability of space for temporary

storage of excavated soil. • Accessibility of the burial site by

digging equipment (e.g., excavator).

Burial Site Inspection: Three (3) months after closure, inspection of the burial site to identify any potential problems (e.g., seepage) and take corrective

• Use of personal protection equipment (PPE) to ensure hygiene and safety of personnel working at the site.

• Availability of emergency response measures and equipment for safety breaches (e.g., availability of first aid and rescue equipment if the personnel falls into the pit).

• Established and documented cleaning/disinfection procedures.

• Availability of cleaning/ disinfection supplies/equipment.

• Personnel training on personnel hygiene and safety measures.

Transportation of Carcasses/Wastes to an Environmentally Suitable Site: If carcasses and other contaminated materials need to be transported off-site for disposal, then: • The vehicles must be leak-proof

and covered. • The vehicles and external surfaces

of containers should not leave the

Advantages: • Safe disposal if

environmental conditions are met.

• Risk of disseminating the virus to other sites can be avoided if burial can be done on site.

• Low cost. Disadvantages:

• Likely to be affected by surface water, groundwater, soil or topographical conditions.

• If transportation to an environmentally suitable site is required, then: (a) increases the risk of disseminating the virus to other sites, and (b) higher costs for transportation and associated mitigation measures.

• Risk of groundwater

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DESCRIPTION ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS

ADVANTAGES/ DISADVANTAGES

to the virus. • Closing the pit to ground level

with soil (at least 2 meters of soil is required in total)., mounded to allow for decomposition volume reduction and to encourage runoff of rainwater, and piled over with rock to limit being dug up by carnivores.

measures. Transportation-Related Waste/Wastewater Treatment: • Any wastewater generated from

cleaning/disinfection of vehicles/ containers should be disinfected before discharge.

• Any waste generated during loading and unloading of vehicles as well as cleaning/disinfection of vehicles/containers should be safely disposed.

culling area without first being thoroughly cleaned/ disinfected.

• The vehicles and internal, external surfaces of containers should be cleaned/ disinfected after unloading carcasses and other wastes at the environmentally suitable site.

contamination if site selection is not appropriate.

OPTION 2: OPEN AIR BURNING (CREMATION) This method is based on destruction of infective pathogens, animal carcasses and other wastes through thermal destruction in open air. It involves: • Digging trenches, which act as

air vents. • Placing pyre (wood) on top of

trenches (upwind, at right angle to the prevailing wind direction).

• Placing carcasses and other wastes at the opposite side.

• Pouring fuel (e.g., kerosene) onto carcasses, other wastes and pyre and starting fire (adequate supply of fuel must be at the site to ensure complete cremation).

Site Selection Considerations: • Potential adverse impacts of heat,

smoke or odor on nearby people, infrastructure (structures, underground and aerial utilities, roads, etc.) and environment (e.g., trees).

• Accessibility of equipment to construct and maintain the fire and for delivery of fuel and carcasses

• The ashes should be buried and the site should be restored.

• Potential adverse impacts of volatilized heavy metals from animal feed, such as arsenic in poultry feed (used as growth promoter).

Waste Pretreatment/Containment: • To avoid emission of dioxins or

furans during cremation, carcasses should not be pretreated with a

• Maintaining adequate fire break around the pyre (consult local fire brigades or residents for advice).

• Use of PPE to ensure hygiene of personnel working at the site.

• Availability of emergency response measures and equipment for safety breaches (e.g., availability of first aid equipment and availability of fire fighting equipment and personnel if fire spreads around).




Advantages: • Cremation is not affected by

surface water, groundwater, soil, and topographical conditions.

• Low cost, compared to incinerator option.

Disadvantages: • Infective pathogens may not

be effectively destroyed if combustion of carcasses and wastes is incomplete, especially under adverse atmospheric conditions (wind, precipitation).

• It is not possible to easily verify that all infective pathogens are destroyed in the incomplete combustion process.

• Air emissions from open air

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chlorine-bearing disinfectant or should not be contained in PVC bags. For the same reason, no other material destined for cremation should contain chlorine-bearing chemicals.

burning (PM, CO2). • Disposal of ash from

cremation requires consideration for surface water, groundwater, soil and topographical conditions.

• More expensive than option 1 (burial).

OPTION 3: COMPOSTING This method is based on thermal deactivation of most pathogens. However, only sucessiful for hardy avian influenza virus if temperatures over 56 degrees C for over 3 continuous hours (which is not likely throughout a windrow pile), but only in a vessel type of composting. Process leads to microbial decomposition of carcasses, litter and other putrescible organic wastes through aerobic biological degradation. Success of composting depends on: (a) proper nutrient mix; (b) moisture; (c) temperature; and (d) pH. Details can be found in technical documentation and websites listed.

Site Selection Considerations: • Must be done at the affected farm

in a secure area not accessible by other animals (such as birds, rodents, cats, or dogs).

• Proximity to residential areas and water sources (must be away).

• Attention to wind direction and potential for contaminated dusts and bioaerosols.

• Need a burial site for the composted waste when completed, which will be roughly one-quarter to one-third of the initial weight, and perhaps less than one-quarter the initial volume.

• Use of PPE to ensure hygiene of personnel working at the site, particularly as process requires loading and turning over a period of 5-8 weeks which can create contaminated dusts and bioaerosols.

• Availability of emergency response measures and equipment for safety breaches.




• Temperature monitoring inside the pile or vessel required to be assure that all parts of the waste eventually experience temperatures over 56 degrees C for over 3 continuous hours for virus inactivation.

• Outside layer of the pile will not reach adequate temperatures, which

Advantages: • Effective for manure and

litter waste. • Can be undertaken within

sheds or otherwise on site to avoid the risks of disseminating the virus through transport.

• No transportation cost. Disadvantages: • Maintaining optimum

temperatures for 5 to 8 weeks for microbial decomposition of the wastes, which in cold climate areas/seasons may not be possible without enclosure or covers.

• Infective pathogens may not be effectively destroyed if ideal temperature conditions are not achieved.

• Risk of disseminating the virus if the composting area is not effectively

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means the period of potential danger of the pile will last for several weeks until all parts of the pile eventually experience the high temperatures of the inner pile. This issue is mitigated if in-vessel rotating drums are used for composting. Portable units are available.

secured/isolated. • It may not be possible to

easily verify that all infective pathogens are destroyed.

OPTION 5: INCINERATION (FIXED) This method is based on thermal destruction of infective pathogens, carcasses and other wastes in an incinerator. It involves: • Transporting carcasses and other

wastes to the incineration site. • Cleaning containers and vehicles

transporting carcasses and wastes, with treatment of the resulting wastewaters.

• Incinerating carcasses and other wastes (using fuel and air) at a high temperature.

• Transporting incineration residues (bottom ash/slag and fly ash) to the disposal site and disposal at the sanitary landfill.

• If metals in carcasses, manure or spent feed, may require chemical treatment to bind them from leaching after disposal.

Site Selection Considerations: • Should not be in a floodplain. • Distance to human settlements. • Human settlements upwind of the

prevailing wind direction (for odors before incineration and emissions from incineration).

Technology Requirements: • Incinerator at a minimum

temperature of 850oC and with a minimum residence time of 2 seconds to meet EU standards, but portable units may not meet this standard. Temperature must be measured and recorded.

• Incinerator equipped with an auxiliary burner that can be switched on when the temperature falls below 850oC.

• Concern over heavy metal volatilization, particularly arsenic which is a common ingredient in poultry feed (it is a growth promoter).

• Use of PPE to ensure hygiene of personnel working at the site (incinerator operators must change their PPE before handling animal carcasses and other wastes).


• Established and documented emergency response procedures.


• Availability of emergency response equipment (e.g., first aid, fire fighting)

• Personnel training on personnel hygiene/cleaning, safety and emergency response measures.

• Regular inspections of the environment and equipment, with documented inspection schedules and results.

Transportation of Carcasses/Wastes to the Incineration Site: When carcasses and other

Advantages: • Complete destruction of

infective pathogens. • Over 95% waste reduction. Disadvantages: • Complex technology which

may be imported to the country.

• High investment cost. • High operating cost

(especially fuel cost). • Some spare parts may need

to be imported (cost and downtime of incinerator in case of AI outbreak).

• High level of operator training.

• Scrutinized administrative requirements (recordkeeping, etc.).

• The incineration facility may be too far from the location with the AI outbreak, requiring

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• Incinerator automatic feed system connected to temperature measurement.

• Site security and inaccessibility by animals (such as birds, rodents, insects and other vermin).

• Storage areas for animal carcasses and other wastes as well as incineration residues must be covered. These areas must be labeled and designed and operated to prevent accidental releases of polluting substances to the environment. Storage capacity provided to collect contaminated storm water and wastewater from spillage or firefighting.

• Transportation of bottom ash/slag and fly ash in closed containers to prevent environmental releases.

• Disposal of bottom ash/slag and fly ash in a safe disposal area that has impermeable soils and adequate impermeable soil cover to limit water pollution.

• Waste Pretreatment/Containment: To avoid emission of dioxins or furans during incineration, carcasses should not be pretreated with a chlorine-bearing disinfectant or should not be contained in PVC bags. For the same reason, no other material destined for incineration should contain chlorine-bearing

contaminated materials are transported to the fixed incineration site, then: • The vehicles must be leak-proof

and covered; • The vehicles and the external

surfaces of containers should not leave the culling area without first being thoroughly cleaned/disinfected; and

• The vehicles and internal/external surfaces of containers should be cleaned/ disinfected after unloading carcasses and other wastes at the incineration site.

Transportation of Incineration Residues to the Disposal Site: • The vehicles must be covered. • The vehicles and containers should

not leave the incineration area without first being thoroughly disinfected.

extensive transportation of carcasses and other wastes with infective pathogens, resulting in: (a) increased risks of disseminating the virus to other sites; and (b) higher costs for transportation and associated mitigation measures.

• Air emissions from the incinerator (PM, SO2, CO2).

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chemicals.

OPTION 6: INCINERATION (MOBILE) This method is based on thermal destruction of infective pathogens, animal carcasses and other wastes in an incinerator. It involves: • Transporting the mobile

incinerator to the culling site. • Incinerating carcasses and other

wastes (using fuel and air) at a high temperature.

• Transporting incineration residues (bottom ash/slag and fly ash) to a safe disposal site.




• Temperature must be measured and recorded.

• Incinerator equipped with an auxiliary burner that can be switched on when the temperature falls below 850oC



• Storage areas for animal carcasses and other wastes as well as incineration residues must be covered. These areas must be ventilated, labeled, and designed and operated to prevent accidental releases of polluting substances to








infective pathogens. • Over 95% waste reduction. • Avoids the need to transport

the infective pathogens, carcasses, and other wastes to the incinerator (i.e., reduced risk of disseminating the virus to other sites compared to the fixed incineration case).

Disadvantages: • Complex technology which


• Portable units may not meet necessary temperature and afterburner standards, and they wouldn’t meet stack height requirements usually required of incinerators.

• High investment cost. • High operating cost, with

particularly high fuel consumption due to wet organic waste.

• Some spare parts may need to be imported (cost and

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the environment. • Transportation of bottom ash/slag

and fly ash in closed containers to prevent environmental releases.


• Waste Pretreatment/Containment: To avoid emission of dioxins or furans during incineration, carcasses should not be pretreated with a chlorine-bearing disinfectant or should not be contained in PVC bags. For the same reason, no other material destined for incineration should contain chlorine-bearing chemicals.

downtime of incinerator in case of AI outbreak).

• High level of operator training and skill.


• Transportation of the mobile incinerator to the culling site is associated with: (a) the risk of exposing the incinerator (i.e., the investment) to damage/total loss in case of an accident (contributed by poor road conditions, severe weather, etc.); and (b) high cost of transporting incinerator to the culling site.

• Accessibility of the culling site by the mobile incinerator.


1 Guidance on culling, decontamination, worker protection, disposal of carcasses, and other containment procedures for HPAI and other highly infective zoonotic diseases, as appropriate, are available through the following recommended references: fss.k-state.edu/research/books/carcassdisp.html , http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/by-prods/publicat/dispguide.pdf , http://www.oie.int/downld/AVIAN%20INFLUENZA/A_GH_CARCASS.pdf , http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/004/y0660E00.htm , http://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3114/osha3114.html, http://www.osha.gov/dsg/guidance/avian-flu.html , http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=D4552211-C369-9A31-F51B-3DB61D0CCB39&siteName=aahc , http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/aahc/index.cfm?E9711767-B85D-D391-45FC-CDBC07BD1CD4#ops , http://www.oie.int /eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_3.6.1.htm ,

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http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_3.7.6.htm , http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/animal/diseases/controlmeasures/avian/directive_avian_en.pdf

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Annex 2: Interim Recommended HPAI Project Procedures for Disinfection, HazMat Workspace Arrangements, Worker Health and Safety, and Decontamination - for Animal Containment, Depopulation, and Wastes Generated from Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreaks1




Containment Planning • Obtain information from local

veterinarians or surveillance teams on outbreak locations, preferably with coordinates from hand-held GIS coordinate equipment.

• Map individual outbreaks and delineate on a map an outbreak area for containment and priority culling.

• Map safety zone for surveillance, culling and/or vaccination – usually 3 kilometer buffer around outbreak area.

• Plan logistics for each field team. • Assign roles to each team

member, namely on-site supervisor, on-site deputy supervisor, on-site safety officer, bird collectors, bird cullers, pit diggers, recordkeepers.

• Determine personnel protective gear and workspace equipment for each team and arrange full supply is organized in advance of travel to the site.

• Arrange security support to keep the work zones free from casual onlookers and animals, including pets.

• Professional planning and behavior will minimize anxiety and stress to the property owner and family members, as well as daily workers hired to provide labor support

• Preparation ensures that all needed gear is available on site to assure safety and decontamination.

• Work zone definition and security support will keep children and pets safely outside the contaminated activities.

• Training and technical support for determining proper burial pit locations minimizes the potential for contamination of groundwater, and eventually surface water, could result.

• Planning and definition of each person’s role and responsibilities will avoid on-site confusion, minimize on-site disagreements, and enable a professional controlled appearance to the concerned public.

• Arrange all packages for teams in advance of work and have them ready for the teams to pick up.

• Health and safety procedures will enable calm response to unexpected events that could occur, including heat stress, canister explosion, chemical intoxication, chemical burn, tear in PPE and resulting contamination, eye splash with contaminated material, encountering mines or other munitions, cuts or other injuries, etc.

• Requires management ability and time to do the planning and logistics.

• Capacity and time among professional staff may be limited.

• Procedures should not be so complicated that the team would not follow them.

• Some planning with the ideal in mind is still better than no planning.

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Workspace Zone Operations • Team suits up in PPE for all work

in an outbreak area, even for initial site logistics arrangements.

• Make arrangements with property owner for collection, culling, and compensation activities.

• Assess the likely contaminated materials to be removed for disposal along with culled bird carcasses, including accumulated manure, open sacks of food, loose grain stores, used egg cartons, hay and straw stacks, poultry litter, bedding, nesting, cages made of organic materials, debris and contaminated soils.

• Assess the likely porous shed materials, such as rotted wood or insulation that may be contaminated and require disposal.

• Assess the likely equipment, metal poultry cages, tools, livestock vehicles, manure spreaders, wheelbarrows, and other items to be decontaminated.

• Assess the likely shed walls and other surfaces to be decontaminated.

• Record property owner name(s), bird types and counts, and compensation records. Record GIS coordinates of property

• Chain of command and role definition motivates responsible and orderly behavior.

• Records, including GPS coordinates of burial pits, enable future monitoring for disease as well as environmental impacts.

• Contamination from collection, culling, and disposal activities is kept within a well defined and minimal area.

• Casual onlookers and animals have minimized risk of contamination from any work activities by being kept out of the work zones by stakes, tape, markers, and, as needed, guards.

• Separation of exclusion and clean support areas by an organized transition zone enables decontamination for breaks and end of work, to minimize worker risk from contamination.


• Health and safety plan outlines procedures for all emergency contingencies and minimizes safety risk.

• Workers subject to an accident or injury can be safely decontaminated and brought to the support area for treatment and speedy transport to medical facilities, as needed.

• On-site supervisor needs leadership skills and team needs to be willing to cooperate with his/her on-site management.

• Casual onlookers may be distressed to see workers in PPE and following rigorous procedures for safety, particularly if they live in the vicinity and have been taking no protective precautions.

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house or farm buildings. List all items for disposal and all items and surfaces for decontamination. Take digital photographs before and after procedures.

• Locate a suitable burial site wherein the bottom of the pit would be at least 1 meter above seasonal high groundwater. And at least 1 meter above bedrock. Make sure that the pit is not within a flood plain area, that the nearest well is at least 50 meters of any private well, spring, streat, or public area, and at least 200 meters from any public water supply source. Soils at the burial pit site would contain sufficient clay content adequate to limit permeability of leachate to groundwater, and should be either clayey loam or clayey silt. No sands or gravel soils are acceptable, as they allow virus migration. Burial pits more than 1.8 meters deep require precautions for trench safety related to trench cave- in hazards.

• Arrange for pit diggers or excavator operator in PPE to start excavation of burial pit to be sized to address all items assessed above as needing disposal. Record GPS coordinates of burial

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pit location for future monitoring. Dig pit of adequate dimensions that there will be at least 2 meters of soil above the final layer of disposed carcasses, spent PPE, and other waste materials, as noted above. Mound the burial pit to minimize infiltration from rainwater and to maximize the weight of soil above the carcasses, so that they do not rise to the surface as anaerobic decomposition gases accumulate.

• Burial pit dimensions shall include assessment of all materials to be buried, as well as an assumption of layering of buried materials and soil cover, with each layer being 0.3 meters thick.

• Delineate area for collection of live birds and for culling, near the burial pit. Use tape and stakes to mark off these spaces with a boundary. The internal contaminated area is called the Exclusion Zone.

• Delineate a corridor with tape and stakes to serve as the Contamination Reduction Zone.

• Setup security to keep all casual onlookers and animals out of the tape-designated Exclusion Zone and Contamination Reduction

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Zone. • Delineate a clean area at the end

of the Contamination Reduction Zone to serve as the Support Zone.

• Set up all equipment for culling and disposal, as well as first stage washing and outer gear removal in the Exclusion Zone.

• Set up all equipment for remaining gear removal and decontamination in the Contamination Reduction Zone.

• Set up facilities to wash, change clothes, eat, drink, smoke, use toilets, etc., in the Support Zone.

Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) and Decontamination Equipment and Supplies • All persons that will be exposed

to HPAI infected birds or infectious materials should be vaccinated with the WHO recommended influenza vaccine to avoid simultaneous infection by human influenza and avian influenza and to minimize the possibility of re-assortment of the virus’s genes, according to WHO guidance for culling teams.

• All persons that have been exposed to infected birds or materials should receive prophylaxis with antivirals3.

• All exposed workers are recommended to be monitored for

• Full change of all PPE and using HazMat procedures for decontamination minimizes risk of worker infection.

• Monitoring workers after work activities minimizes risk of disease transmission, if it were to occur.

• Catchment basins, tubs, and tarps and adequate rinsing minimize contamination of the ground surface and lowers contaminant levels in drainage.

• Site assessment for materials to be decontaminated and/or buried maximizes containment and deactivation of the virus.

• Rest breaks and monitoring of vital signs minimizes risk of heat stress, excess fatigue, etc., and lessens risk of accidents.

• Selection of safe decontamination surfactants and disinfectants, and appropriate dilution and use of these according to directions, minimizes risk of chemical inhalation distress, chemical burn, and skin irritation, as well as risk for damage to PPE integrity.

• Deep burial pits have a risk of trench cave- ins, unless the side slops are 1.5 horizontal to 1

• All necessary supplies need to be well planned and brought to the site for use.

• At least one well-trained person in HasMat is needed to assure PPE and decontamination equipment and supplies are properly used.

• Orderly and proper use of PPE and decontamination equipment and supplies requires on-

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relevant health problems (respiratory complaints, fever, flu symptoms, and eye infections) and serologically checked for HPAI.

• Each team member shall have a clean set of extra clothing placed in a plastic bag in the clean Support Zone.

• Personal protective equipment (PPE) ideally should be disposable.

• Full coveralls, impermeable spash apron, inner gloves of lightweight nitrile or vinyl, outer gloves of heavy duty rubber, splash safety goggles, respiratory masks designed for virus protection, and either rubber or polyurethane boots that can be cleaned or disposable shoe covers comprise a complete set of PPE for HPAI.

• Respiratory masks that are well-fitted US NIOSH certified N-95, N-99, or N-100 or European CE P2 or comparable respirator masks are preferred, following worker fit-testing. For workers with facial hair or in the event that these preferred respiratory masks are not available, standard disposable well- fitted surgical masks designed to provide protection from fine particle

• Selection and use of the correct surfactants and disinfectants maximizes containment and deactivation of the virus.

• Careful site selection for burial pits and adequate dimensions to enable layering of wastes and soils will minimize ground water contamination.

• Mounding of completed burial pits with slopes of 3 horizontal to 1 vertical and at least 0.6 meters of extra soil above the surrounding ground surface will minimize infiltration of rainwater to the pit, and thus minimize leachate generation and groundwater contamination. Mounding will also minimize carcasses floating to the surface due to entrapped gases of decomposition.

vertical or flatter. site supervision and teamwork.

• Use of casual daily workers for some activities requires adequate on-site training in use of equipment and supplies prior to beginning work, and supervision during work.

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viruses are recommended. • PPE sets shall be sufficient for at

least 3 breaks, i.e., at least 4 sets per day.

• Decontamination supplies include surfactants for washing, to dislodge adhesion forces between contaminants and surface being cleaned. As needed, long-handled brushes facilitate washing.

• Surfactants for HPAI include: any soaps and detergents used in contact for a minimum of 10 minutes to partially deactivate the virus and to dislodge contaminated materials for surfaces. Surfactant action deactivates HPAI viruses because of their outer lipid envelop, and thus provides some disinfection as well as cleaning.

• Decontamination supplies include disinfectants, to deactivate HPAI viruses on surfaces being cleaned.

• Chlorine released from hypochlorite solutions is the most powerful oxidizing agent for HPAI virus disinfection. Disinfectants for worker and equipment use include: sodium hypochlorite liquid diluted to 2-3% available chlorine for 10 to 30 minutes contact time to deactivate

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the HPAI virus, and solid or powdered calcium hypochlorite, diluted to 2-3% available chlorine for 10 to 30 minutes contact time to deactivate the HPAI virus. Where household chlorine bleach is used, 1 part in 3 parts water gives a 2-3% available chlorine solution.

• Disinfectants for machinery and vehicles (but not aluminum or similar alloys), as well as manure, include sodium hydroxide at 2% solution and 10 minutes contact time, or sodium carbonate anhydrous at 4% solution.

• Rinsing removes contamination through dilution, reduction of attraction bonds, and solubilization. Multiple rinses remove more contaminants than a single rinse.

• Used surfactants, disinfectants and rinse waters are collected in a basin large enough for a worker to be decontaminated, underlain by a tarp to avoid contamination of underlying soils.

• If disposable overalls are not provided, cotton or nylon overalls are possible, but each set must be soaked in disinfectant then sent for special washing or autoclaving, as similar to

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treatment of hospital laundry from infectious wards. In such cases, as with disposable PPE, there would need to be enough sets for 4 changes/person/day.

• Lime should NOT be placed directly over carcasses as it slows decomposition. For HPAI virus, lime could create alkaline conditions that extend virus longevity. Thus lime is not recommended in the burial pits, or at the surface of the burial pits.

HazMat (Hazardous Materials) Procedures • The official veterinarian shall

review and approve all planned field activities for containment and eradication, and approve the method of culling and disposal that is planned. The official veterinarian should provide overall guidance to all personnel and daily workers to ensure consistency with animal health and welfare guidelines for handling, gathering, and killing affected birds and animals. The official veterinarian shall remain on-site for initial operations, to be satisfied that correct procedures are being followed, and shall check in periodically to monitor operations.

• The official on-site supervisor

• Follow the World Bank’s Operations Procedures 4.09 dealing with chemical and pesticide use to minimize risk to humans and environment.

• HazMat training and following of HazMat procedures maximizes protection to workers and the environment, including the family and farm members and casual onlookers.

• Decontaminating sheds, equipment, surfaces, etc., enable faster restocking of poultry and return to normal poultry rearing activities.

• Signs of heat stress for work discontinuity include heat rash, heat cramps, muscle spasms, pain in extremities and abdomen, pale moist skin, heavy sweating, dizziness, nausea, fainting, strong rapid pulse, and coma. Emergency medical procedures from the health and safety plan are to be followed, including possible evacuation to a medical facility, following decontamination.

• Maintaining contamination within the Exclusion Zone enables protection of workers and others in the area.

• Team training in HazMat requires skill, dedication, and discipline.

• Casual daily workers need to be well supervised and given on-site supervision and training.

• Following procedures reduces work productivity, because of the time required to don PPE, remove PPE, decontaminate, check for worker vital signs, etc.

• Risk of worker stress, injury, or medical emergency is

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should provide overall guidance to all personnel and daily workers throughout the entire operation to ensure consistency with HazMat procedures , including PPE, and disposal standards.

• Inspect all PPE before use for imperfect seams, tears, malfunctioning closures, cracks, stiffness, chemical damage, etc. Inspect PPE for size and fit. Inspect eye goggles for fogginess.

• The official on-site recordkeeper shall document that all supplies are available on site and have been inspected as adequate, that HazMat procedures have been planned and on-site briefings conducted by the official veterinarian and supervisor. The recordkeeper shall also note the names of all team members and keet a record of their vital signs at the start of each break.

• Follow HazMat work space management procedures for activities designated for Exclusion Zone, Transition Zone, and Support Zone.

• Provide security guards as needed to keep casual onlookers and others out of the work spaces.

• Follow standard HazMat PPE donning procedures, including

• Correct burial pit site selection and proper use and cover of the pit minimizes leachate contamination of groundwater.

• Monitoring of workers during and after operations minimizes risk of infection occurrence and transmission.

minimized by following HazMat procedures.

• Orderly professional HazMat procedures give the public an impression that the hazardous situation is being adequately remedied.

• HazMat procedures may make the public fearful, especially if they have been handling contaminated HPAI excreta or contaminated birds without any protective procedures.

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inspecting gear, put on inner gloves, put on overalls one leg and one sleeve at a time, put on foot covers or boots, put on eye mask and respiratory mask, put on outer gloves, fit test respiratory mask, secure with duct tape as needed to close openings, have assistant check all closures, and put on impermeable apron.

• All work is conducted using the two-person buddy system because of risk of heat stress, chemical inhalation, lack of acclimatization, dehydration, lack of physical fitness, injury, etc.

• Work slowly and carefully in accordance with climate, in order to avoid fatigue.

• Take regular breaks and monitoring for stress, through temperature and pulse monitoring. If the heart rate exceeds 110 beats per minute at the start of the rest break, reduce the next work cycle by one-third. If the oral temperature exceeds 37.6 degrees Centigrade at the start of the rest period, shorten the next work cycle by one-third. During high heat, measure body weight. Body weight loss shall not exceed 1.5% in a work day,

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otherwise worker activity shall stop for the rest of the day and fluids shall be replaced.

• Before breaks and at end of day, remove PPE in reverse order, and have assistant check for possible leakage or contamination under PPE.

• Chemicals and contaminated materials can permeate PPE clothing and putting on used clothing can contaminate the worker. Therefore, all used disposable PPE shall be bagged in plastic bags for disposal. For reusable items, like cloth overalls, they shall be soaked in disinfectant and bagged for specialized laundry, as with hospital laundry. For reusable items that are heavy duty, such as heavy rubber gloves or boots, they shall be carefully scrubbed and disinfected.

• Ideally, portable camp showers would be available for washing, but at a minimum hands and face need to be carefully washed with clean water and surfactants for 10 minutes after removal of PPE, after decontamination and before any break or end of work day.

• If clothing has become contaminated, change into clean

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set of clothing brought and kept in plastic bag.

• When mixing concentrated chemicals, always add the concentrate to water, and never the water to the concentrate. Do not mix acid and alkali disinfectants. Workers involved in mixing and applying disinfectants must wear complete PPE, preferably including a full face guard, particularly if applying through a mist sprayer.

• Insecticides for insects and rodents may be needed to minimize transmission of the HPAI virus from any stored materials during the work period and prior to transport or burial.

• All vehicles leaving the HPAI outbreak containment and eradication zones shall be cleaned with surfactants, disinfected, and rinsed before entering the surrounding buffer zone. Long-handled brushes should be used to fully reach the tires and tire wells for cleaning purposes.

1 Guidance on culling, decontamination, worker protection, disposal of carcasses, and other containment procedures for HPAI has been developed through consultation with the following references, of which the first four references are considered most relevant:

1. fss.k-state.edu/research/books/carcassdisp.html , 2. http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=D4552211-C369-9A31-F51B-

3DB61D0CCB39&siteName=aahc ,

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3. http://www.oie.int/downld/AVIAN%20INFLUENZA/A_GH_CARCASS.pdf , 4. http://www.osha.gov/dsg/guidance/avian-flu.html , 5. http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_3.7.6.htm , 6. http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_3.6.1.htm , 7. http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/by-prods/publicat/dispguide.pdf , 8. http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/004/y0660E00.htm , 9. http://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3114/osha3114.html, 10. http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/aahc/index.cfm?E9711767-B85D-D391-45FC-CDBC07BD1CD4#ops , 11. http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/animal/diseases/controlmeasures/avian/directive_avian_en.pdf

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E) Legal Agreement













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By January 15, 2007









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and its partners











Health and DLS


Health







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chemicals.




























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E) Legal Agreement













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By January 15, 2007









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and its partners











Health and DLS


Health







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chemicals.




























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€¦ · 2 Bangladesh: Avian Influenza Preparedness and Response Project Environmental and Social...

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Transcript of €¦ · 2 Bangladesh: Avian Influenza Preparedness and Response Project Environmental and Social...