1;bispage and the next, street fighting in Seoul as captured by Life magazine photographer David Douglas Dzmcan.

35

on red-eyed, soot-facedMarines.

Given these circumstances, it isnot surprising that the Marinesgreeted with hoots of derision thecommunique by General Almondthat Seoul had been liberated at1400 the previous afternoon, the25th of September. "Three monthsto the day after the North Koreanslaunched their surprise attacksouth of the 38th Parallel," themessage proclaimed, "the combattroops of X Corps recaptured thecapital city of Seoul." To theirastonishment, the Marines learnedthat their corps commander con-sidered the military defenses ofSeoul to be broken. "The enemy isfleeing the city to the northeast,"the communique concluded. AnAssociated Press correspondentreflected the infantry's skepticism:"If the city had been liberated, theremaining North Koreans did notknow it."

In truth the Marines and soldierswould still be fighting for full pos-session of the capital 48 hours pastGeneral Almond's announced lib-eration date, but the issue wasinsignificant. The troops viewedthe battle from purely a tacticalperspective; their corps comman-der sensed the political ramifica-tions. Of far greater significance atthis point was the fact that fiveinfantry regiments with a total lackof experience waging coalitionwarfare with combined arms in anenormous urban center were nev-ertheless prevailing against a well-armed, disciplined enemy.General MacArthur's visionarystroke at Inchon had succeeded ininvesting the city of Seoul in just 11days. In view of the allies' dis-heartening performance in theKorean War to date, MacArthur,and Almond, had earned the rightto boast.

Further, although the Marines

might not like to admit it, GeneralAlmond was essentially correct inhis flash message the night of the25th—the main body of the NorthKorean defenders, the remnants ofa division, was indeed retreatingnorth. What surprised all compo-nents of X Corps was the NKPAdecision to expend the equivalentof an armored brigade in suicidalnight attacks and die-hard defenseof the main barricades to keep theAmericans ensnared in the city.

Analyzing the NKPA decision toevacuate the main body of theirdefenders from Seoul is alwaysrisky, but there is evidence that thepullback resulted as much fromtheir surprise at the unexpectedcrossing of the 32d Infantry andthe 17th ROK Infantry from thesoutheast on the 25th—paired withthe rapid advance of the 7thMarines, threatening the northernescape routes—as from the steadybut predictable advance of the 5thand 1st Marines. Regardless, it wasobvious to Almond and 0. P. Smiththat seizing such a mammothobjective as Seoul would requireuncommon teamwork amongServices, nations, and combatarms. Allied teamwork throughoutthe night attacks of 25-26September had proven exemplary.

The Marines employed Corsairsand artillery to soften the barri-cades, then switched to 4.2-inchand 81mm mortars. The assaultcompanies delivered machine gunand rocket fire on the fortificationsto cover the deliberate minesweep-ing operations by combat engi-neers. Then came the M-26Pershing tanks, often with othertanks modified as flamethrowers orbulldozers. On the heels of thetanks came the infantry with fixedbayonets. The process wasunavoidably time-consuming—each barricade required 45-60 min-utes to overrun—and each of theseintermediate objectives took its toll

36

in Marine and civilian casualties.The city smoked and burned.

As Lieutenant Colonel JackHawkins' 1st Battalion, 1st Marines,fought its way clear of the railroadyards and entered a parallel thor-oughfare his riflemen stared inhorror at the rampant destruction.As it appeared to Private First ClassMorgan Brainard, the scene wasone of "great gaping skeletons ofblackened buildings with theirwindows blown out... telephonewires hanging down loosely fromtheir drunken, leaning poles; glassand bricks everywhere; literally atown shot to hell."

Not all the fighting took placearound the barricaded intersec-tions. There were plenty of otherNKPA soldiers holed up in thebuildings and rooftops. Many ofthese soldiers became the prey ofMarine scout-sniper teams, somearmed with old Springfield '03 boltaction rifles fitted with scopes, oth-ers favoring the much newer Mi-Csemi-automatic rifles, match-condi-tioned weapons graced with cheekpads, flash suppressors, leatherslings, and 2.2x telescopic sights.The snipers often worked in teamsof two. One man used binocularsor a spotting scope to find targetsfor the shooter.

Many of the buildings in the citycenter were multi-story, and,according to Private First Class

Brainard, "it meant going up thestairs and kicking open the doorsof each room, and searching thebalconies and backyard gardens aswell." Often the Marines had tofight their way through the build-ings, smashing their way throughthe walls like Smedley Butler'sMarines in Vera Cruz in 1914.

Colonel Puller led his regimentfrom very near the forward ele-ments. On this day he dismountedfrom his jeep and stalked up MaPo Boulevard shortly behindLieutenant Colonel Sutter's 2d

Combat Engineers in the Seoul Campaignmong the many unsung heroes who providedongoing combat support to the infantry regi-ments of the 1st Marine Division in the recapture

of Seoul were the dauntless practitioners of LieutenantColonel John H. Partridge's 1st Engineer Battalion. Asdid the division as a whole, the engineers representedan amalgam of World War II veterans, new recruits, anda spirited group of reservists, including members of the3d Engineer Company, United States Marine CorpsReserve, from Phoenix, Arizona.

Fortunately, the Inchon landing caught the NKPAforces in the region off guard, and the battalion hadtime to shake itself down in non-urgent missions beforebreaking into small units to tackle enemy minefields.The engineers at first cleared beach exits and assemblyareas in the Inchon area, then moved out to help recon-noiter the roads leading east to Seoul. Of immediateconcern to Major General Oliver P. Smith and his oper-ations officer, Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, Jr., was whetherthe numerous bridges along the highways and sec-ondary roads were sturdy enough to support theMarines' new M-26 Pershing tank with its 46 tons ofcombat-loaded weight.

The Marines encountered the first serious NKPAminefields (both antitank and anti-personnel) in thevicinity of Kimpo Airfield. The subsequent arrival ofhighly-trained, first-line North Korean reinforcements indefensive positions guarding the approaches to Seoulled to minefields of increasing size and sophistication.Soviet Red Army advisors had trained the NKPA in minewarfare, and many of the mines encountered by the

37

Marines were made in Russia. These mines slowed theadvance of the 1st Marine Division as it reached theouter defenses of Seoul along the Kalchon west ofYongdungpo or the avenues of approach to Hill 296 andits many subordinate peaks and ridgelines. Partridge'sengineer teams performed their high-stress mine-clear-ing missions with progressive efficiency. This helpedsustain the division's momentum and limited the timeavailable to the enemy to more fully develop defensivepositions within the city.

In Seoul, the Marines encountered barricaded road-blocks every 200 to 300 yards along the main boule-vards. The North Koreans seeded most approacheswith mines. The Marines formulated the necessary team-work on the spot. The rifle company commanderwould shower the obstacle with fire, including smokeor white phosphorus mortar shells. Under this coverthe engineer squad would hustle forward to clear themines. Behind them would come the tanks, followedby the infantry. It was dangerous, often costly work.Sometimes a mine would detonate among the engi-neers. Sometimes they would miss a string and a tankwould be lost. Most often, however, this painstakingprocess worked. Each barricade took an average of 45minutes to clear. Utilizing this well-coordinated andincreasingly proficient approach, the infantry battalionsof the 1st Marines advanced an average of 1,200 yardseach day—a small gain on a map, but an inexorableadvance to the North Koreans.

The 1st Engineers provided another exceptional ser-vice to the division in the Seoul campaign—river cross-

Gen Oliver P. Smith collection, Marine corps Research center

ing. The Han was a broad tidal river, and its fewbridges had been blown up during the first week of thewar. The Marines had amphibian tractors and DUKWson hand to transport riflemen and small vehicles acrossagainst the current, but the campaign would never suc-ceeci without the means of feriyirig, first, tanks andartilleiy, then heavy trucks and trailers. Major GeneralEdward A. Almond, USA, commanding X Corps, hadproven disingenuous in his repeated assurances thatheavy bridging material would arrive in plenty of timeto support the Marines' crossing in force. "GeneralAlmond promises bridge material," General 0. P. Smithrecorded in his journal. "This is an empty promise."

Thinking ahead, and acting on his own initiative,Lieutenant Colonel Partridge had obtained a pair of 50-ton pontoons in San Diego and had zealously protectedthem from the enraged embarkation officer who had tosomehow load these unwelcome monsters on shipsalready stuffed with "essential" combat cargo. The pon-toons proved priceless. Partridge had at least one sec-

tion on hand to support the crossing of the 5th Marinesat Haengju on 20 September. Lieutenant Colonel HenryP. Crowe's 1st Shore Party Battalion quickly establisheda smooth functioning ferry service, doubling their pro-ductivity with the arrival of Partridge's second pontoon.Here the 7th Marines crossed, as well as the companyof M-26 tanks needed so direly by Colonel Puller in hisfirst full day of street fighting in Seoul. GeneralAlmond's bridging material arrived in time to supportthe crossing of General MacArthur's official party asthey arrived in Seoul on 29 September.

Greater glories awaited the 1st Engineer Battalion inthe forthcoming Chosin Reservoir campaign, where theycleared an expeditionary airfield at Hagaru-ri and

assembled the air-dropped Treadway Bridge inFunchilin Pass below Koto-ri, but their yeoman perfor-mance in close support of the 1st Marine Division'sassault on Seoul set a standard of combined arms oper-ations and greatly facilitated the timely recapture of thecapital.

Battalion, 1st Marines, as it clawedits way along each city block.Sergeant Orville Jones, Puller'shand-picked driver throughout1950-55, followed his colonel inthe jeep, a short distance to therear. Sometimes the Marines fight-ing door-to-door along the streetwould he appalled to see ChestyPuller walking fully exposed andabreast of the action, Jonesrecalled. "Holy Jeez,' they wouldyell to each other—'Don't letChesty get ahead of us—move it!"

Yet even the famously aggres-sive Chesty Puller could not expe-dite the methodical reduction ofthe barricades. Puller admitted,"progress was agonizingly slow."Said the engineer Captain NicholasA. Canzona: "It was a dirty, frus-trating fight every yard of the way."

Army Lieutenant Robert L.

Strickland, a World War II veterannow assigned as a cameraman forX Corps, got caught up in thestreet fighting. He sought shelterin an open courtyard behind aburning building, but the enemyfire came from all directions. "Wegot so much fire of all kinds that Ilost count," he said. "I have seen

a lot of men get hit both in this warand in World War II, but I think Ihave never seen so many get hit sofast in such a small area."

David Douglas Duncan, veteranMarine and extraordinary combatphotographer for Lfe magazine,accompanied the 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, during their advancethrough the rail yards towards thestation. Describing the action inhis subsequent photo book This isWar, Duncan highlighted the time-ly arrival of Marine Pershing tanksthat "growled up across the rail-road tracks, into the plaza—andmet the enemy fire head on."Then, Duncan continued: "Thetanks traded round for round withthe heavily-armed, barricadedenemy—and chunks of armor andbits of barricade were blown highinto the air. They were killingthemselves at point-blank range."

Private First Class Brainard ofCompany A, 1st Marines, describeda barricade that had just beendemolished by a pair of M-26Pershing tanks:

We pass by the barricadewhich had been constructed

38

with large-sized rice bags .and also with odd bits of fir-niture, such as tables, chairs,and wooden doors, all piledup together. There wereabout ten dead gookssprawled in and around theobstruction, and the black-ened antitank gun was tippedover on its side with lots ofunused shells scatteredaround it.

The 1st and 5th Marines werenow converging close enough thatColonel Puller's men could clearlysee Lieutenant Colonel Murray'stroops still fighting to clear thefinal eastern finger of Hill 296, theridge that extended into the heartof Seoul. Certain riflemen in 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, spokeadmiringly of the 5th Marinesbeing "once more on top of thehighest hill in the local vicinity—born billy goats."

The 5th Marines may haveappreciated the compliment, butby 26 September they were sickand tired of the steep northwestapproaches and the stubbornlydefending remnants of the 25th

NKPA Brigade. Captain Robert A.McMullen's Company I, the menwho had spearheaded LieutenantColonel Taplett's crossing of theHan back at Haengju and earnedthe praise of General Almond bytheir double envelopment of Hill125, would again be in the spot-light on the 26th. Taplett assignedMcMullen the mission of sweepingthe eastern terminus of the hugelower spur of Hill 296 that extend-ed very near the major intersectionof the Kaesong-Seoul highway andMa Po Boulevard. Ahead, lessthan a mile to the northeast layGovernment House. And not farbeyond the palace was the bound-ary between the 1st and 7thMarines. By design, Murray's regi-

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press ment, which had sustained theWhile the Pershing tank 'Dead Eye Dick" advances beyond a captured North highest casualties the precedingKorean barricade, a Marine sniper team waits for the 45mm antitank rounds to week, was close to being pinchedabate before moving into new firing positions. out and assigned a reserve role.

A brief helping hand from a Marine amid a day of great ter- downed power lines, and scattered families.ror for the civilians—high explosives, burning buildings, Photo by David Douglas Duncan

39

glanced at the thin flicker ofautomatic fire running acrossthe barricade like a single lineof flame and dived off thesidewalk into an alley.

Stanford's radio failed at thiscritical juncture. He had theoption of bypassing Company Fand the barricade and carrying outhis assigned mission along theright fork, notwithstanding hisnaked left flank, or bowlingstraight ahead through Company F,smashing the barricade, andattacking with Company E up theleft fork. He had the firepower—four tanks, an engineer platoon,rocket squads, and a 75mm recoil-less rifle section attached. "I knewthat we could go through anythingfor 250 yards," he said, risking thesecond option. He hurled hisforces forward, towards the barri-cade. "We had it hot and heavy

among the burning buildings andthe crumbled sandbags of the bar-ricade, and then they broke andran . . . and we butchered themamong the Russian AT [antitank]guns and the Japanese Nambumachine guns." Company E losttwo officers and 18 men in theirheadlong assault. Captain Stanfordwas one of the wounded.

Sutter's battalion, like Taplett'salong the ridge just to the west,had fought their best, but "the flee-ing enemy" had limited hisadvance to 1,200 yards. Seoulwould not fall this day.

Further to the northwest, andnow not very far away, the 7thMarines veered towards the capitalin keeping with 0. P. Smith'sorders to pinch Out the 5thMarines. Company D, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, led theadvance along the KaesongHighway as it threaded through

42

two towering hills, the now-infa-mous Hill 296 on the right and Hill338 on the left. First LieutenantWilliam F. Goggin, the machinegun officer, led the advance party.

Compared to all the grief beingexperienced by the other two reg-iments on the 26th, the 7th Marinesenjoyed what at first appeared tobe a cakewalk. Thousands ofgrateful civilians thronged theright-of-ways and hillsides, cheer-ing the approaching Marines. Itwas an uncommon experience forMarines of any war to date, a wel-come grace note to serve as a par-tial offset for the horrors to come.The North Koreans, of course, tookprompt advantage of this opportu-nity.

The dense crowds preventedCompany D from maintaining itsown outriding flank protectionalong the ridges on both sides ofthe road and caused the van to

overshoot the intended linkuppoint with the 5th Marines. Thecompany unwittingly entered thecity and the final defenses of oneof the sacrificial battalions leftbehind by the departed 25th NKPABrigade.

Sudden machine gun fire fromthe front felled First LieutenantWilliam F. Goggin, halted the col-umn, and created panic among thewell wishers. Then other machineguns opened up at close rangealong the high ground on bothsides. Another enemy force scram-bled downhill to establish a block-ing position in the rear. CompanyD was abruptly encircled and cutoff.

Captain Richard R. Breen,

though wounded early in the fight-ing, maintained his presence ofmind. He still commanded a large,fresh, well-armed company. Oncethe civilians vanished and hisMarines went to ground in goodfiring positions, he figured his mencould hold their own, despite thedanger. When Colonel Litzenbergcalled to see what kind of help heneeded, Breen answered calmly,"We're okay, Colonel."

Had Company D's entrapmentoccurred two days earlier the ensu-ing darkness might have provencatastrophic, but by now the NKPAforces lacked the punch to finishthe job. Additionally, CaptainBreen received some spectacularhelp. Two U.S. Air Force C-47s

dropped ammunition, rations, andmedicine to the surroundedMarines just before dusk (oneplane, badly shot up by NorthKorean antiaircraft gunners, had tocrash-land at Kimpo). During thenight Lieutenant (junior grade)Edward Burns, USN, the regimen-tal surgeon, led a high-balling con-voy of jeep ambulances throughthe enemy perimeter to retrieve 40of Company D's most seriouslywounded men.

Lieutenant Colonel Parry's 3dBattalion, 11th Marines, still indirect support of the 7th Marines,was the first artillery unit to crossthe Han. At that point the infantryregiment extended from the northbank of the Haengju ferry crossing

By the third full day of the battle for Seoul, the city lay in everywhere, and a thousand fires blazed furiously.ruins. Shell holes buckled the streets, rubble lay strewn Exhausted Marines regroup for the final barricade assault.

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

43

the end. Taplett's tank-infantryteams carried the day. ColonelRobert D. Heinl preserved the dra-matic climax: "Moving at the highport up KwangwhamunBoulevard, Company G, 5thMarines burst into the Court of theLions at Government House,ripped down the red flag, andGunnery Sergeant Harold Beaverran up those same colors his fore-bears had hoisted 103 years earlieratop the Palace of theMontezumas." Two KoreanMarines raised their national colorsat the National Palace.

The fight for Seoul continued,especially along the towering

ridgelines to the north, but by duskin the city the NKPA had ceased tooffer organized resistance. Twelvedays after the surprise landing atInchon (and two days afterGeneral Almond's victory commu-nique), X Corps had seized solepossession of the capital city of theRepublic of South Korea.

The 7th Marines continued toadvance through the high groundnorth of the city, cutting the high-way from Seoul to Uijongbu on the28th. In this fighting LieutenantColonel Thornton M. Hinkle, com-manding 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,was wounded and evacuated.Major Webb D. Sawyer took com-

45

mand. Meanwhile, the 31stInfantry and 17th ROK Infantryattacked to the east, successfullysealing off the last NKPA escaperoutes. There were still smallbands of North Korean troopsloose within the city—two of thesestruck the 2d Battalion, 1st

Marines, in predawn counterat-tacks as late as the 29th. The firstoccurred at 0445, when an obser-vation post on Hill 132 was infil-trated by an estimated 70 to 100North Korean troops. A secondattack hit the left flank of the bat-talion a short time later. Bothattacks were repulsed with a lossof 28 Marines wounded and four

Private First Class Stanley R. Christiansonrivate First Class Christianson was born in January1925 in Mindore, Wisconsin. After he enlisted inthe Marine Corps in October 1942, he served with

the 2d Division in three World War II campaigns. Forhis services, he was awarded a Letter of Commendation.Following duty during the occupation of Japan, he hada variety of assignments, including drill instructor atParris Island.

When the Korean War broke out, he was a memberof Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and took partin the Inchon assault. For his actions at Inchon, hereceived a Bronze Star Medal. During the subsequentbattle for Seoul, he gave his life on 29 September, at theage of 25, on Hill 132. Private First Class Chistianson'scitation for the Medal of Honor awarded him reads, inpart:

Manning one of the several listening posts coveringapproaches to the platoon area when the enemycommenced the attack, Private First ClassChristianson quickly sent another Marine to alert therest of the platoon. Without orders, he remained inhis position and, with full knowledge that he wouldhave slight chance of escape, fired relentlessly atoncoming hostile troops attacking furiously withrifles, automatic weapons and incendiary grenades.Accounting for seven enemy dead in the immediatevicinity before his position was overrun and he him-self fatally struck down, Private First ClassChristianson was responsible for allowing the rest ofthe platoon time to man positions, build up astronger defense on that flank and repel the attack

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A-43986

with 41 of the enemy destroyed, and many morewounded and three taken prisoner.

After the war, his sacrifice was recognized by the ded-ication of a statue in his honor at Camp Lejeune, NorthCarolina. —Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

killed, among them Private First Class Stanley R. Christianson, who subsequently received the Medal of Honor for his actions. Despite these counterattacks, the war was moving north, well above Seoul. Indeed, South Korean troops were about to cross the 38th Parallel.

On 29 September, General MacArthur and South Korean President Syngman Rhee and their wives returned to Seoul for a tri- umphant ceremony, accompanied by a large official retinue. The concentration of so many VIPs within the smoldering city so soon after the heavy fighting made General 0. P. Smith nervous. Isolated NKPA antiaircraft gunners still exacted a price against allied planes flying over the city's north- ern suburbs, especially the slow flying observation aircraft of VMO- 6, which lost a single-engine OY and an H03S-1 helicopter on the day of the ceremony. Smith posi- tioned Lieutenant Colonel Taplett's 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, on the hill overlooking the palace and Lieutenant Colonel Ridge's 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, along the route to be taken by the digni- taries-out of sight, but loaded for bear.

Despite the cost of more than 700 Marine casualties in seizing most of Seoul during the climactic three days of 25-28 September, only a handful of Marines attended the commemorative ceremony. Generals Smith and Craig, Colonel Puller, and Lieutenant Colonel Murray were there (Puller barely so; when a Military Police officer barred his jeep from the sedan entrance he ordered Sergeant Jones to drive over the officious major), but Colonels Litzenberg and Brower were still fighting the war north of the city and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing senior offi- cers were gainfully employed else- where. In retrospect it is unfortu-

Photo by Frmk Noel, Associatccl Press

South Korean civilians curiousky obserue one of their exhausted Marine lihera- tors.

nate that more of those who had battled so hard for the victory- Marines, Navy corpsmen, soldiers, ROK troops, men of all ranks and specialties, grunts and aviators alike-could not have shared this special occasion. For a moment on the afternoon of the 27th, Seoul had seemed their dearly-won city. Two days later they were being told to remain out of sight of the official celebrants.

MacArthur conducted the special ceremony at high noon in the National Palace, ignoring the tinkle of broken glass that fell from the ceiling dome windows with every concussive rumble of distant artillery. "Mr. President," he intoned in his marvelous baritone voice, "By the grace of a merciful Providence our forces fighting under the stan- dard of that greatest hope and inspi- ration of mankind, the United Nations, have liberated this ancient capital city of Korea . . . . I am happy to restore to you, Mr. President, the seat of your govern-

ment that from it you may better ful- fill your constitutional responsibili- ties." With tears running down his cheeks, MacArthur led the cligni- taries in the Lord's Prayer. President Rhee was nearly overcome with emotion. To MacArthur he said: "We love you as the savior of our race. "

The ceremony at the national capital represented Douglas MacArthur at his legendary finest. In the best of all worlds the Korean War would have ended on this felicitous note. In reality, howev- er, the blazing speed with which MacArthur had reversed the seem- ing disaster in South Korea con- tained the seeds of a greater clisas- ter to come in the north. The United States and the United Nations, flush with September's great victories, were fatally modify- ing their war aims to include the complete subjugation of North Korea and the forcible reunifica- tion of the entire peninsula. Already there were plans afoot to

deploy the Marines north of the38th Parallel. General Almondtook 0. P. Smith aside as they wereleaving the ceremony and issued awarning order. The 1st MarineDivision would soon be makinganother "end-run" amphibiouslanding on the northeast coast.

Other threats materialized. Onthe day following the Seoul cere-mony, Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai warned the world that hisnation "will not supinely tolerate"the invasion of North Korea. Few

people in the West took him seri-ously.

In the meantime, Almondordered Smith to seize and defenda series of blocking positions northof Seoul. The 5th Marines attackednorthwest. The 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, executed an aggressivereconnaissance in force as far asthe town of Suyuhyon againstwhat the division special actionreport described as "moderateenemy resistance."

The 7th Marines drew the short-

47

est straw, the division objective ofUijongbu, a vital road junction inthe mountains 16 miles due northof Seoul. Here the highway andrailroad tracks veer northeasttowards the port of Wonsan andbeyond, an important escape routefor NKPA forces fleeing the "ham-mer and anvil" of the now con-verging Eighth Army with X Corps.

Smith reinforced the 7th Marinesby attaching Major Parry's 3dBattalion, 11th Marines (reinforcedwith a battery of 155mm howitzersfrom 4th Battalion, 11th Marines),plus one company each ofPershing tanks, combat engineers,and Korean Marines, and an Armyantiaircraft battery. This constitut-ed a sizable force, virtually a smallbrigade, but Colonel Litzenbergwould need every man in histhree-and-a-half day battle for theroad junction. Intelligence reportsavailable to Litzenberg indicatedhe would be opposed by an amal-gamation of NKPA units, includingthe remnants of the Seoul CityRegiment; the 2d Regiment, 17thRfle Division, withdrawn from thePusan Perimeter after the Inchonlanding; and the fresh 75thIndependent Regiment, whichreached Uijongbu from Hamhungthe day before the 7th Marinesattacked.

Principal air support forLitzenberg's advance would comefrom the Corsair pilots ofLieutenant Colonel Frank J. Cole'sVMF-312, the Checkerboardsquadron, newly arrived at Kimpofrom Itami, Japan. Cole had com-manded the same squadron as amajor at the end of World War IIand had trained his new aviatorsexceptionally well.

On 1 October, ColonelLitzenberg led his well-armed forcenorthward. Advance aerial andmap reconnaissance led him toconclude that the NKPA wouldmost likely make a stand at

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

A Marine mortar section moves north of Seoul past a grateful band of South Koreans.

Nuwon-ni where the highwaypassed through a narrow defile—averitable "Apache Pass."Litzenberg planned for LieutenantColonel Raymond G. Davis' 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, to execute atactical feint along the high groundon both sides, while Major MauriceE. Roach's tank-heavy 3d Battalion,7th Marines, barreled straightthrough the pass during the dis-traction. The plan ran awry whenRoach encountered a thick mine-field in the pass. Litzenberg shift-ed both battalions to the highground, and the Checkerboards ofVMF-312 appeared at dawn on the2d with a vengeance, bombing,strafing, and dropping napalm can-isters. Davis and Roach scratched

forward slowly along both ridges;the engineers labored in the mine-fields. But the North Koreans con-tested every yard, shooting downthree Corsairs, disrupting the engi-neers, and limiting the Marines toless than a quarter-mile gain thatday. During this fighting, SecondLieutenant Joseph R. Owen, themortar officer in Company B, 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, learned bit-ter lessons in tactical communica-tions. "The North Koreans," hesaid, "used whistles and bugles forbattlefield command, more effec-tive by far than our walkie-talkies."In addition, Lieutenant Lloyd J.Englehardt of VMO-6 flew hisglassy-nosed HO3S-1 helicopterthrough heavy fire to rescue

48

downed Checkerboard pilotCaptain Wilbur D. Wilcox near thevillage of Chun-chon.

On 3 October, the regimentunveiled a good-luck piece,General Clifton B. Cates,Commandant of the Marine Corps,nicknamed "Lucky" Cates for hissurvival amid the First World War'sbloodiest battlefields. Cates hadflown to Korea to observe hisMarines in action. Litzenberg'sforce put on a stellar show. Theengineers having at considerablecost cleared the minefield in thedefile, Major Webb D. Sawyer's 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, poundedstraight up the middle. Soon theybegan overrunning enemy fieldpieces and had the enemy oti the

run. The NKPA had staked every-thing on holding the pass atNuwon-ni and had little left todefend Uijongbu. Litzenberg un-leashed all his forces. Sawyer'smen stormed through the ruinedtown by late afternoon, the majorpausing to telephone Litzenberg—widely known by his nickname"Litz the Blitz"—saying, "This is theMayor of Blitz!"

The Uijongbu drive cost the 7thMarines 13 killed and 111 wound-ed, but the combat experience wasworth the price to the newlyformed regiment. ObservedLieutenant Joseph Owen: "ForBaker-One-Seven it was combattraining under fire; in those five

days we became a good Marinerifle company."

The battle for the Nuwon-niPass marked the end of significantfighting in the Inchon-Seoul cam-paign. Almost immediately the 1stMarine Division turned over itsassigned sector to the 1st CavalryDivision of the Eighth Army andbegan returning by regiments tothe vicinity of Inchon for re-embarkation.

The leading elements of thedivision and other X Corps compo-nents assembled at a UnitedNations cemetery near Inchon on 6October to honor their dead.Division Chaplain Robert M.

Schwyhart led the spiritual salute.

Major General Oliver P. Smith laida wreath on the grave of CorporalRichard C. Matheny, a stalwartsquadleader of the 5th Marineswho .before his death qualified inswift succession for the BronzeStar, Silver Star, and Navy Cross.

The combined Inchon-Seoulcampaign cost the 1st MarineDivision 2,450 casualties, accord-ing to the official history (415killed or died of wounds; 2,029wounded in action; 6 missing inaction). North Korean gunnersshot down 11 fighters of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing. For theirpart, the Marines destroyed or cap-tured 47 Russian-built tanks andsufficient heavy mortars, fieldguns, antitank guns, machine guns,and rifles to equip a good-sizedbrigade. A preponderance of the14,000 NKPA fatalities claimed byX Corps in the campaign resultedfrom the combined air-ground fireof the Marines.

Such statistics had more rele-vance in World War II than in themurky political and psychologicalnature of limited warfare in theAtomic Age. The Cold Warbetween the United States and theSoviet Union and their respectiveallies and surrogates was fullyunderway by 1950. In Seoul inSeptember of that year, the UnitedNations for the first time restoredthe freedom of a democratic capi-tal captured by Communist forceof arms. The fact that all of XCorps' hard-fought gains would beswept away by the ChineseCommunist counter-offensive threemonths later added to the bitter-sweet irony of this protracted war.In the final accounting, the 1953ceasefire left Seoul firmly estab-lished as the capital of theRepublic. Seoul's flourishinggrowth and development over theensuing half century remain a trib-ute to the sacrifices of all thosewho fought and died to recapture

From left, BGen Edward A. Craig; the Commandant of the Marine Coips, GenCl,fton B. Cates; and MajGen Oliver P. Smith, inspect the North Korean flag thatrecently was hauled down by Marines at Government House in Seoul.

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck Magazine

49

Date

20 Sep 21 Sep 22 Sep

23 Sep 24 Sep

25 Sep 26 Sep 27 Sep 28 Sep

29 Sep 30 Sep

1 Oct 2 Oct 3 Oct 4 Oct 5 Oct

1 st Marine Division Daily Casualties, Seoul Campaign Killed

in Action 24

30

27

19

68

33

29

33

8

19

11

Died of Wounds

1

3

3 7

4

4

7

3

4

1

2

Missing in Action

3

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

Total 321 43 4

Appendix J. Montross & Canzana. 7;be Znchon-Seoul Operation, 19 5 5

Wounded in Action

119

198

135

117

217

238

167

153

3 1

49

48

16

81

35

3

3

1,510

Total Battle Casualties

147

231

165

143

289

276

203

189

43

69

61

19

97

38

3

5

1,878

and protect the ancient city

General MacArthur ordered General Almond to re-embark X Corps and execute a series of amphibious landings along the east coast of North Korea. The 1st Marine Division would board des- ignated shipping at Inchon and land tactically at Wonsan, the main event. The 7th Division would proceed south to Pusan to board its ships for a subsequent landing north of Wonsan. The original D- Day for the Marines at Wonsan was 15 October. The actual landing date was not even close.

Operation Chromite was the codename for the Inchon landing. The troops would nickname the

Wonsan campaign "Operation Yo- Yo."

Inchon and Wonsan serve as book-end examples of amphibious warfare's risks and rewards. By all rights it should have been Inchon, with its legion of tactical and hydrographic dangers, that sput- tered in execution. Wonsan, scheduled for attack by a larger and, by now, more experienced landing force against a sharply diminished enemy threat, should have been a snap. But in the irony of war, Inchon stands as a master- piece, Wonsan as a laughingstock, as ill-conceived a landing as the United States ever conducted.

In late September 1950, there was nothing particularly wrong with the concept of a long-distance "Right Hook" amphibious landing from the Sea of Japan to seize

Wonsan and other smaller ports along the North Korean coast. Wonsan at the time represented a reasonable objective, and the 1st Marine Division had proven its amphibious prowess in the diffi- cult landing at Inchon and was expected to be available for the new mission in early October.

Wonsan had the best natural harbor in the Korean peninsula. Located 80 miles north of the 38th Parallel, the port's bulwark-like Kalma Peninsula provided an enormous sheltered harbor, a seven-inch tidal range, weak cur- rents, rare fog, and a moderate beach gradient-all incomparably more favorable than Inchon. Wonsan's near-shore topography also offered a decent lodgement area, suitable for a division beach- head, before the Taebaek

Mountains—eastern North Korea'slong, towering spine—rearedupwards from the coastal plain.The port's strategic appeal cen-tered on the combination of itsaccessible harbor with a high-capacity airfield, petroleum refin-ing facilities, and its locationastride major railroads and high-

ways leading west to the NorthKorean capital of Pyongyang,north to Hungnam, and southwestto Seoul.

On 4 October, General Almondformally assigned the 1st MarineDivision the mission of seizing andsecuring the X Corps base of oper-ations at Wonsan, protecting the

51

airfield, and continuing inlandoperations as assigned. Threeunforeseen developments almostimmediately knocked the Wonsanplans into a cocked hat: massiveport congestion; a drastically accel-erated invasion of North Korea;and the successful mining of theircoastal ports by the North Koreans.As a consequence, MacArthur'scelebrated "Right Hook" becamesuspended in mid-air, leaving theMarines (and all of X Corps) hang-ing in limbo—out of action—throughout a critical three-weekperiod. The Wonsan landing,when it finally occurred, has beenaptly described by military histori-ans as "the most anticlimactic alanding as Marines have evermade."

The 1st Marine Division opera-tions order directed a simultaneouslanding of the 1st and 7th Marinesabreast on the eastern shore of theKalma Peninsula, each supportedby an artillery battalion and a bat-talion of Korean Marines. Wonsanairfield lay directly inland, as closeto the landing beaches as Kadenaand Yontan had been to theHagushi beaches at Okinawa.

On 7 October, the day followingthe cemetery ceremony in Inchon,Major General 0. P. Smith reportedas landing force commander forthe Wonsan expedition to RearAdmiral James H. Doyle, USN,commanding the Attack Force, U.S.Seventh Fleet. The division beganembarking at Inchon the next day.It would take a week.

Here MacArthur's plans began tounwind. No one, it seems, hadforeseen the tremendous strainabout to be placed on the only twomedium-capacity ports available,Inchon and Pusan, during a time ofconflicting requirements to offloadthe mammoth supplies needed forthe Eighth Army's invasion of west-ern North Korea while simultane-ously backloading two large divi-

Korea /0 30 50

MiIes — — I

Chongjin

Hyesonjin

.Konggye

Sinuiju

I

Yodam-ni. £Hoqarui(oto-ri

Homhung.Tokchon

Mojon-ni

.Soriwon

HwochonKasong

Suw\

Taejon

Pohong- dong

back to a tentative date of 20October."

As junior officer in Company B,1st Battalion, 7th Marines, SecondLieutenant Joseph R. Owenassumed the demanding duties ofcompany embarkation officer. "Wewere assigned an old LST that ourNavy had used in World War II," hesaid, "but which was now leased toJapan for use as a cargo ship." TheJapanese captain spoke no Englishbut conveyed to Owen by angrygestures his displeasure at whatseemed to him to be gross over-loading of his ship's safe lift capac-ity. When Owen's runner chargedthe bolt on his carbine the skipperabruptly acquiesced. "There was ashortage of shipping," Owen ratio-nalized, "and, we were informed,we would be afloat for only a fewdays."

Private First Class MorganBrainard of Company A, 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, boarded hisassigned LST without bitching: "All

we knew at that moment was thatwe were steaming south; that wewere in dry clothes with a roof overour heads, and assured of two hotmeals a day and the chance to takesalt water showers . . . . Our sliceof life seemed to be improving."

Most of Admiral Doyle's WonsanAttack Force completed loadingthe 1st Marine Division and sortiedfrom Inchon on 15 October, theoriginal D-Day. By that time theother two factors that would ren-der the planned assault meaning-less had materialized. Five daysearlier, Republic of Korea's I Corpshad seized Wonsan by overlandadvance from the south. On 13October, Major General FieldHarris, commander of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, flew intoWonsan airfield, followed the nextday by the Checkerboards ofLieutenant Colonel Cole's VMF-312and other elements of MarineAircraft Group 12.

In the meantime, AdmiralDoyle's advance force commanderdiscovered that the North Koreanshad sewn the approaches toWonsan with more than 2,000 anti-ship mines, both contact and mag-netic. The U.S. Navy had only 12minesweepers available in the-ater—as compared to the 100employed in support of theOkinawa landing five years earli-er—and even when reinforced byKorean and Japanese craft, themission proved overwhelming.Two U.S. minesweepers hit minesand sank on 12 October. Heavyfire from North Korean coastdefense guns hampered rescueoperations. A Japanese sweepersank on the 18th; the next day ahuge mine practically vaporized aSouth Korean craft. Doyle's exper-iments in dropping 1,000-poundbombs and anti-submarine depthcharges to create enough over-pressure to detonate nearby minesfailed. Even the fact that a linear,tactical landing had been replacedby a simpler administrative offloadfrom amphibian tractors and land-ing craft in column did not helpexpedite the problem. Rear Ad-miral Allan E. Smith, commandingTask Force 95, the advance force,voiced the frustration of all handswhen he reported: "we have lostcontrol of the seas to a nationwithout a navy, using pre-WorldWar I weapons, laid by vessels thatwere utilized at the time of thebirth of Christ."

General Almond's frustrationknew no bounds. On 20 October,with the war fast shifting awayfrom his active influence (theEighth Army entered the NorthKorean capital Pyongyang the pre-vious day), and with no end insight to the tedious minesweeping,Almond departed the flagship byhelicopter and established hiscommand post ashore at Wonsan.

As for the embarked Marines,

53

rampant rumors swept the trans-ports, especially beginning theafternoon of 19 October when thetask force suddenly got underway,heading south. "War's over!"exclaimed many a Marine, "We'regoing back to Pusan and thenheading home!" But the shipswere only taking new precautionsto protect themselves in hostilewaters. For the next week—and aweek is a very long time at sea onboard transports as claustrophobi-cally crowded as these—the shipsreversed course every 12 hours,first heading south, then north,then starting over. Here emergedthe sarcastic nickname "OperationYo-Yo." As voiced by MarineCorps historians Lynn Montrossand Nicholas A. Canzona in 1957:"Never did time die a harder death,and never did the grumblers haveso much to grouse about."

The Japanese-crewed LST trans-porting Lieutenant Owen's compa-ny soon ran low on provisions andfresh water. As Owen recalled: "athree-week ordeal of misery andsickness . . . . The stench below-decks made the air unbreathable."

Before long sickness swept theembarked landing force. Longlines of Marines suffering fromdysentery and gastroenteritis over-whelmed poorly-equipped sickbays. The "Binnacle List" on boardthe converted civilian transportMarine Phoenix ran to 750 Marinesat the height of the epidemic. Theattack transport Bayfield (APA 33)reported a confirmed case of small-pox. As a final insult to the divi-sion's pride, a traveling USO showfeaturing Bob Hope and MarilynMaxwell beat them to Wonsan, per-forming for an appreciative audi-ence of Marine aviators and ROKsoldiers while the fierce "spear-head" assault troops rocked in mis-ery among the offshore swells.

At long last, on 26 October, the1st Marine Division landed on the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4313

Finally off the ships the 1st Marine Division, which ended ashore by Navy LCVP towards Wonsan, North Korea.its interminable "Operation Yo- Yo" on 26 October, chugs

In the anticlimactic landing of the 1st Marine Division at Wonsan airfield. A chill wind blows in from the loomingWonsan, troops dismount from a column of LVT-3Cs and Taebaek Mountains.their escorting LVTA-5 armored amphibians along the Department of Defense Photo (1JSN) 421366

54

The 1st Marine Division suffered the ignominy of landing atWonsan weeks after South Korean forces had seized the portand the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had arrived. Here a col-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130364

umn of soaked infantrymen straggles ashore among good-hearted catcalls by VMF-312, the "Checkerboard" squadron.

Kalma Peninsula below Wonsan."The day was bright and cold,"recalled Private First Class Brainardof Company A, 1st Marines, "andthe sea had a real chop to it as our[LVTI slid down the ramp andnosed forward into the water."The captain of Brainard's shipwished the departing Marines luckover the public address system,adding that MacArthur's headquar-ters had just announced that thetroops should be "home byChristmas."

The airmen of the Checkerboardsquadron hooted in derision as theinfantry streamed ashore, puffingwith exertion after three weeks ofenforced inactivity. Lieutenant

Owen encountered more sarcasticinsults from the ROK troops whohad captured the town 16 daysbefore: "They had learned the mid-dle-finger salute, which they ren-dered to us with great enthusiasm."

Colonel Puller bristled at theignominy of his regiment beingcategorized as rear echelon troopsdue to no fault of their own. ThenBrigadier General Edward A. Craigmet Puller on the beach with thewelcome news that he had justbeen selected for promotion tobrigadier general. Puller's trade-mark scowl vanished momentarily.Then he turned to the job at hand.His regiment was about to be dis-persed over a huge area of enemy

55

territory, beginning with thedeployment of Lieutenant ColonelJack Hawkins' 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, on a special mission torelieve a ROK force guarding asupply depot at the coastal town ofKojo, 40 miles south.

Puller's dilemma reflected thedrastic changes in United Nations'strategic objectives being formulat-ed it seemed, day-by-day. The warin North Korea had evolved fromthe establishment of coastal oper-ating bases and the methodicalelimination of residual NKPAforces to a wide-open race to theYalu River, the Chinese border.General 0. P. Smith, accustomed toa relatively narrow zone of action

in the Inchon-Seoul campaign,suddenly found himself responsi-ble for a zone measuring 300 mileslong by 50 miles deep. WithGeneral Almond already calling fortwo infantry regiments to advanceas far north as Hamhung, Smithknew Puller's 1st Marines would

be hard-pressed to cover anuncommonly large piece of realestate around the port of Wonsan.The Kojo assignment was but thefirst of several far-flung missionsPuller would have to handle.

Half of Hawkins' battaliondeparted within hours after their

56

landing on the 26th. The troopswere still shaking out their sea legswhen they clambered into a longline of empty gondola cars of acoal train bound for Kojo. It wasan uncomfortable and singularlydirty ride. Captain Barrow notedthat the residual coal "left a markon all of us." The train had tomake two trips to deliver the entirebattalion, and those units travelingby road, like the attached artillerybattery, did not arrive until the sec-ond night.

The troops dismounted from thetrain at Kojo stiff and disoriented.The town itself proved pic-turesque, but the supply dump hadbeen largely emptied by thedeparting ROK garrison, too manyhills dominated the town, andthere was a critical lack of intelli-gence about a North Korean "guer-rilla force" reportedly lurking inthe area. "Quite candidly," admit-ted Barrow, "I never understoodour mission."

The situation bothered Hawkinsacutely. The late-afternoon ap-proach of 3,000 refugees towardsKojo made him more uneasy.These Hawkins diverted into anassembly area outside the seaport,but their unimpeded approachreflected the vulnerability of hisposition. The largely depletedsupply dump lay in low ground,difficult to defend. A well-definedavenue of approach into the sea-port lay open from the south andsouthwest. "Therefore," Hawkinswrote shortly after the Kojo

action, "I decided to placeCompany B in outpost positionsto cover these approaches . .

The remainder of the battalionwould be deployed on the hillmassif west of Kojo."

Accordingly, Captain Wesley C.Noren deployed Company B onoutpost duty along three scatteredhills two miles south of town. Asnight fell, Noren placed his men

Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine Corps Research Center

Men of the 1st Marines sweep through the village ofKojofol- Korean night attacks of 27 October on the 1st Battalion'slowing the sudden, violent, and well-coordinated North positions.

on 50 percent alert: each foxholeto contain one man awake, theother halfway zipped-up in hissleeping bag. The night was chilly;that morning the Marines had dis-covered the first ice of the seasonin the rice paddies. Their last fire-fight in burning Seoul a month agohad left them gasping in the heat.Now they began to shiver.

The security measures pre-scribed by Hawkins and Norenwere normal under the assumedthreat—light probing attacks bysmall bands of guerrillas. No onethen knew that Noren's dispersedplatoons had taken their nightpositions within direct observationof a significant organized force, the10th Regiment, 5th NKPA Division.Colonel Cho Ii Kwon commanded

this regiment, one of the highlydisciplined forces led by veteransof the fighting in China that hadspearheaded the invasion of SouthKorea four months earlier. Choand his men had successfully evad-ed the "hammer and anvil" trap setby the United Nations forces afterInchon and returned essentiallyintact across the border. The regi-ment had left its tanks and artilleryalong the Naktong River, but stillpossessed plenty of mortars andmachine guns. With more than athousand assault troops at hand,Cho had the numbers and leader-ship to overwhelm Noren's out-posts and simultaneously attackthe flank of Hawkins' main posi-tions west of Kojo.

Rarely in their long history had

57

the 1st Marines been in such mor-tal danger. Cho's veterans movedout of their staging areas at night-fall and approached each outpostwith disciplined stealth. Thesemen were superb night-fighters.Some infiltrated undetected towithin 10 feet of the nearestMarine foxholes. At precisely2200, they attacked with sub-machine guns, grenades, and shrillscreams.

Noren's rifle squads never had achance. Seven Marines died inone platoon before they couldeven scramble out of their sleepingbags. Vicious hand-to-hand fight-ing swept the hilltops. Some unitswere cut off and scattered. Well-drilled junior non-commissionedofficers grabbed disorganized mdi-

ment, and a hospital-configuredLST to be dispatched to Hawkins'aid.

Hawkins, convinced that theNKPA would return that night ingreat force, continued to sendalarming messages to GeneralSmith, but things had calmeddown when Puller arrived withSutter's 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, at2230. There were no furtherattacks by the 10th NKPARegiment. Puller was decidedlyunsympathetic to Hawkins' con-cerns (and in fact would replacehim in command of 1st Battalion,1st Marines, with LieutenantColonel Donald M. Schmuck aweek later).

The next day, Captain Noren led

a patrol south to recover a numberof his missing troops who hadgone to ground after being cut offduring the night. Similarly,Captain George B. Farish, a VMO-6 helicopter pilot on a reconnais-sance mission below Kojo, spottedthe word "HELP" spelled out inrice straw in an open field, landedwarily, and promptly retrievedsmart-thinking Private First ClassWilliam H. Meister, one of Noren'slost sheep, from his nearby hidingplace. The battalion's final countfor that bloody night came to 23killed, 47 wounded, and 4 missing.

On the same day, CaptainBarrow led Company A south on areconnaissance in force, accompa-nied by a destroyer offshore and a

section of Corsairs overhead. Justas he reached his assigned turn-around point, a Corsair pilotadvised him that a large number ofenemy troops were digging in sev-eral miles farther south. Barrowdirected the pilot to expend hisordnance on the target. He did so.Barrow then asked him if he couldadjust naval gunfire. "Yeah, I cando that," came the reply. For thenext half-hour the destroyer deliv-ered a brisk fire, expertly adjustedby the pilot, who at the endreported many casualties and flee-ing remnants. Barrow returned toKojo without firing a shot, hutfully convinced he had avengedBaker Company and taught hisunknown opponent a lesson in

With the Kojo area secured, the 1st Marines, in coordination with Marine Corsairs, move out in reconnaissance in force.Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine Corps Research Center

60

Brigadier General Edwin H.

Simmons, the Majon-ni missionwas a difficult defensive line thathad to be covered with a thinperimeter, thus providing 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, with goodpractice for their similar challengeahead at Hagaru-ri, the crossroadsmountain village situated at thesoutheastern edge of the ChosinReservoir. "Majon-ni was a dressrehearsal for what was going tocome up for us at Hagaru-ri," hesaid. For his part, General RobertH. Barrow considered Majon-nimore a precursor for Khe Sanh in1968, a remote plateau in themountains "at the end of a long,tenuous supply route in no-man'sland."

Elements of the 15th NKPADivision opposed Ridge's battalionin the mountains around Majon-ni.While more disorganized andmuch less proficient than the 10th

Regiment that had stung Hawkins'1st Battalion, 1st Marines, sopainfully at Kojo, these NorthKoreans were sufficiently trainedfighters to threaten Ridge's perime-ter each night and readily interdictthe Marine convoys trundling care-fully through Ambush Alley.

When Ridge went a week with-out resupply convoys being able toget through to Majon-ni, herequested an air drop of ammuni-tion, gasoline, and rations. The 1stAir Delivery Platoon packaged 21tons of these critical supplies into152 parachutes. These weredropped over the Marine perimeterwith uncommon accuracy by AirForce C-47s.

With ambushes occurring morefrequently, Puller assigned CaptainBarrow's Company A, 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, to escort a34-vehicle convoy from Wonsan toMajon-ni at mid-afternoon on 4

62

November. Barrow was uncom-fortable with both the late start andthe slow progress. The NorthKoreans struck the column withheavy fire late in the afternoon."They picked a good spot," saidBarrow. He called for air strikesthrough a patchwork network andtried to work his infantry up thesteep slopes towards the ambush-ers. "It soon became apparent thatwe were not going to be success-ful . . . and the bad thing wasnightfall was approaching."Stymied, and embarrassed by thefailure, Barrow ordered the huge6x6s and Jeeps with trailers to turnaround, a harrowing experienceunder automatic weapons fire.One vehicle went over the side.The Marines formed "a bucket-brigade" to retrieve the injuredmen.

Back at Wonsan, CaptainBarrow dreaded having to report

Battery H, 11th Marines, runs its gunsforward and preparesto go to work in support of the 7th Marines as the regimen-

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4492

tal combat team moves north from Hamhung into themountains of North Korea.

his lack of success to Chesty Puller.He found Puller in a school class-room, appropriately seated at theteacher's desk. "Colonel, I havefailed you," he said. "No you did-n't, old man," Puller growled, notunkindly. "Have a seat." Pulleroffered Barrow a drink of bour-bon, then asked him what heneeded to get the convoy throughthe next day. "More daylight anda forward air controller," Barrowreplied.

Barrow departed Wonsan earlyon the 5th, inspired by an innova-tive tactic he had devised duringthe night. The North Koreans, herealized, could hear the truckslaboring up the pass long beforethey hove into view. He wouldtherefore detach a reinforced pla-toon to precede the convoy on

foot by several thousand yards—comforting for the convoy,although spooky for SecondLieutenant Donald R. Jones' pointplatoon.

Private First Class MorganBrainard was a member of the sec-ond fire team in Jones' dismountedadvance patrol. After four bendsin the road he looked back andsaw the far-distant trucks begin tomove. "We were then so farahead, that I couldn't hear theirengines, only our labored breath-ing," he said. "It was a lonely,eerie feeling, forty-two of us plod-ding up a bleak mountain road byourselves."

"It worked!" said Barrow. Jones'point team caught the NorthKoreans cooking rice along theroad, totally unaware and non-tac-

63

tical. "We literally shot our wayforward," said Brainard. More than50 of the off-duty ambushers diedin the surprise attack. "We just laidthem out," Barrow recalled withobvious pride, adding, "sometimesthe simplest solutions are the mostsuccessful."

Barrow delivered his convoy toMajon-ni, stayed to help 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, defend theperimeter against a large-scalenight attack, then returned toWonsan the next day, the emptiedtrucks now laden with more than600 NKPA prisoners captured byRidge's battalion. Yet Barrow's suc-cess did not end North Koreaninterdiction of the Marine convoys.They had learned their ownlessons from their surprise defeaton 5 November and would fight

smarter in two additional ambush-es the following week.

On 10 November, the 3d KoreanMarine Corps Battalion reinforced3d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Majon-ni. The Korean Marines joinedtheir American counterparts in abrief but heartfelt celebration ofthe 175th Birthday of the U.S.

Marine Corps. Ridge's bakers out-did themselves with the resourcesat hand—an uneven yet ambitious-ly large cake, smeared with C-Ration jam—but what the hell!

The North Koreans struck theMarine perimeter once more inforce the night of 11-12 November,then faded back into the moun-tains. On the 14th, LieutenantColonel Ridge turned over defenseof the village to an Army battalionfrom the newly arrived 3d InfantryDivision and led his men back toWonsan, pleased that 3d Battalion,1st Marines, had acquitted itselfwell on such an isolated mission.The battalion sustained 65 casual-ties defending Majon-ni; another90 Marines became casualties in

the series of convoy fights alongAmbush Alley.

The Majon-ni mission endedthree straight months of significantfighting between the Marines andmain line elements of the NorthKorean Peoples' Army. Admirablysupported by the 1st MarineAircraft Wing, the Marines hadfought well from the start, expand-ed effortlessly from a small brigadeto a full-strength division, executedone of the most difficult amphibi-ous landings in history, and —withthe help of their allies and Armyelements of X Corps—recapturedan enormous capital city. Theresurgence of the Marines' stand-ing within the national securitycommunity in Washington wasdownright dramatic.

But that phase of the Korean Warhad ended. A new, starkly differ-ent, and more troublesome phasehad begun. The deceptive promiseof "Home by Christmas" seemedabruptly swept away by a bone-chilling wind out of the TaebaekMountains, out of Manchuria, a bar-

binger of an early winter—and per-haps something more ominous. Bythe time General Smith moved thedivision command post fromWonsan to Hungnam on 4 Nov-ember, he had been receivingreports of Red Chinese troops southof the Yalu for 10 days. A patrolfrom 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, vis-ited the headquarters of the 17thROK Infantry near Sudong-ni on 31October and confirmed the pres-ence of prisoners of war from the124th Division, Chinese Com-munist Forces.

Colonel Homer Litzenberg,whose 7th Marines would lead theway into the Taebaek Mountains,warned his troops about the likeli-hood of a Third World War. "We

can expect to meet ChineseCommunist troops," he told them,"and it is important that we win thefirst battle. The results of thataction will reverberate around theworld, and we want to make surethat the outcome has an adverseeffect in Moscow as well asPeiping."

The 7th Marines, wearing and carrying cold weather equip- North Korean forces. A burden now, they would come tomenl press north into the Taebaek Mountains in pursuit of depend on this gear in the coming month.

National Archives Photo (USMc) I 27-N-A4524

64

olonel Joseph H.Alexander, USMC (Ret),

served 29 years on active dutyas an assault amphibian offi-cer, including two tours inVietnam and service as Chiefof Staff, 3d Marine Division.He is a distinguished graduateof the Naval War College andholds degrees in history andnational security from NorthCarolina, Jacksonville, and Georgetown Universities.

Colonel Alexander wrote the History and MuseumDivision's World War II 50th anniversary commemora-tive pamphlets on Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.His books include A Fellowship of Valor: The BattleHistory of the US. Marines; Storm Landings: EpicAmphibious Battles of the Central Pacf Ic; UtmostSavagery: The Three Days of Tarawa; Edson's Raiders.The 1st Marine Raider Battalion in WW II; and (withLieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett) Sea Soldiers inthe Cold War. As chief military historian for Lou RedaProductions he has appeared in 15 documentaries forThe History Channel and the Arts & EntertainmentNetwork, including a four-part mini-series on theKorean War, "Fire and Ice."

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines inthe Korean War era, is published for the education and training ofMarines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marinecorps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defenseobservance of the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have beendefrayed in part by contributions from members of the Marine CorpsHeritage Foundation.

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATiVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HIS TORYAND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (RET)GENERAL EDITOR,

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Charles R. SmithEDITING AND DESIGN SECTION HISTORYAND MUSEUMS DIVISION

Robert E. Struder, Senior EditorW. Stephen Hifi, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-50402000

PCN 190 00315 200

About the Author

SourcesPrimary sources included the 1st

\t:'rinc Division Special Action ReportsFur 29 :\iigust—7 October 1951), the' svardiaries ''t several ground and aviationunits, and Gen Oliver P. Smiths officialI et tees and iii culi Ii r ci in cern i ng theSc' ,i,i!!Wonsan campaigns. Of the nib-cial history series, U.S. MarineOperations in Ko,'i 'a, the vain rues I

Lynn NI' 'nfl'oss and Nicholas A Canzona(it: i'/'c Inchon-Seoul Operation[Washington, D.C., Hi ,u idea I Branch, G—3 Division, I iç)Nie:. 19551 and ill: The(hosts, Reservoir C'asnpagn [Washing-ton, D C , Historical Branch, G-3Division, HQMC, 19571), provide well-researched covcl'age 'I the recapture it

iii] anti the \\onsan, Kojo, and Niajon—ni operations. Among the Marine Corps

)ral Itistory Collecto in. I found mostuseful the interviews with Gen RobertH. Barrow, Col Francis I. Fenton. Jr Maj(Jen Raymond L. Murray. and LtCoiFrancis F. Parry. The interview with AdmJohn S. Thach. l.sN I Ret I, in the 13.5.N na I Institutes I )ra I History Collection,was consulted. 1 aLso benefited fromdirect irIu'r\ iew s v iii MajGcn Norman ,f.Anderson. Gen Ruben H. Barrow, hi-flier Larry S. Brunt, MCvct OrvilleJoin's, LlGcn Robert P. Keller. LtGenPhilip D. Sliutler. and BGen EcI' in 'I.immc ms Contemporary quotations by

I'LL Morgan Bnnnard and Li Joseph R.Owen a ft I rum their anti thu lgr:l Inchooks. Brainard's Then 7bty (. i//ed /vthe .1 Iai'on's (I 'rnierlv l/en in Lvii• Cut.ch,e.c [Todd & Honevs elI. 19861i andOwens ('older Than Hell: .1 .1

Rifle Company at ChosEn ReservoirtArtnapolis: Naval Instirtile Press, 1996 I.

'Iwo official monogra pits provedhelpful: DC t (1:t' W. Parhcr and MajFrank Ni. B:ttha, A Htsiorv o/' liar/rn'Oh.cer,xttion .cqotn (50?? '/.v I Washington,D.C. t tistory anti Nltiseu iris I )ivi.sion,FIQ\IC. 1982), and Curtis A. tft,..,4ssaultfront die Sea.' The Amphibious Lasi(/1514at Inchon )\x'ashingtun, I),C.: NavalHistorical Center, I 99.i I, which alsoincludes the Seoul campaign.

Robert D. I Icinl's stirring I ic/oil' a!High fir1,': The I,u'lioo—,Set,i,/ Campaign(Philadelphia: Lippi.nL itt, 1968) leadsthe list of recommended books. I alsosuggest Bevin Alexander, Korea: '1/icFirst II 'or W'i Los! I \etv Vi irLI lippocrene Books, l986) N iv E.'\ppletnan, Suit/h to the Nakto,tg..\nrt/ito the }'olu (Washington, I) C.: OFfice ofthe Chief of Military History. Departmentof (lie Army. 1961 : Clay Blair, TheForgotten Rat,: A rnenca iii Korea I NewYork: Times Books, 198): DavidDouglas Duncan's superb photo essay.This is Writ't. I Photo—Varralir'e in ThreePans t New York: Harper & Brothers.19511: George P. 1 tofmann and Donn A.st:irrv, ('amp Colt to flesert Storm: '[he

lIistoi'j' of (1.5 .,-Ii'moreil Force.'(t.exint.pon. [niversits of KentuckPress, I 999): 1. Rol 'cit 'ui ,sGu, /Ly' ('.5..1 last tie (Xsrps Slop')', 3d ed. (Bosu in,Little Brown ttc Co., 1992): and Rodl':i sehall, Il''ihsies.s to War: Korea (NewYork: Pcrigrce Books, 1995. Spi'i-i;tlthanks to l,ttol Ion I. I lofI'man, LSMCR,I. ir sI taring at I ia nec copies of theSeoul 'Wonsan chapters of Ins Inrthcoin—ing hii 'graphy of LiGen lewis B."Chests'" 'oiler.

I recomtnend these' li rur vintage naazinc essays: Nielo,l:ts 'N. Canzona, "Dog.1 irtip:tny s Charge." t '.5. Natal Institute

Proceedings (Nov56): Ernest It. Giusuand tscnnet Ii \\ Condit, "Marine Au

I N cr lnclio.u—sei 'ul, I/ionic C'rnpsc;az,'ue. June 1952; l.vnti NB intri iss."TlieCa pin 'c < it Seoul: Bait It' of the'Barricades,' :ttarint" Cusps (,az'elte,August 1951: and Ni )rman R. Stanl'urrl,"Road ,J unction," .i'kts'i,ii' ('or/s.c Gazette.September l9Sl For a flute recentaccount, see Al I Iemingw:ic.'' Marines'Battle for Seoul." lit/ira yr History,Ai gust I 090

lilt' author acknowledges Maryr.tclduck Hoffman who designed the

map it the overall Inelton—Seoul area,and i:l David Duitglas Diuue:in, t SM( II

Ret I, Ii 'r illi iiv ing the use ul his histor—ira I photographs of '*" ,ttl. Photographslit Frank N sd 1 'c used with permission

ii the Ass' It iated Press, \X'le Wi iridI'hoo us.