1759-4499-1-2

ral

ssBioMed CentAutomated Experimentation

Open AcceReviewThe philosophy of scientific experimentation: a reviewHans Radder1,2

Address: 1Faculty of Philosophy, VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands and 2De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Email: Hans Radder - [email protected]

AbstractPracticing and studying automated experimentation may benefit from philosophical reflection onexperimental science in general. This paper reviews the relevant literature and discusses centralissues in the philosophy of scientific experimentation. The first two sections present brief accountsof the rise of experimental science and of its philosophical study. The next sections discuss threecentral issues of scientific experimentation: the scientific and philosophical significance ofintervention and production, the relationship between experimental science and technology, andthe interactions between experimental and theoretical work. The concluding section identifiesthree issues for further research: the role of computing and, more specifically, automating, inexperimental research, the nature of experimentation in the social and human sciences, and thesignificance of normative, including ethical, problems in experimental science.

The rise of experimental scienceOver the past decades the historical development ofexperimental science has been studied in detail. One focushas been on the nature and role of experiment during therise of the natural sciences in the sixteenth and seven-teenth centuries. Earlier accounts of this so-called Scien-tific Revolution emphasized the universalization of themathematical method or the mechanization of the world-view as the decisive achievement. In contrast, the morerecent studies of sixteenth and seventeenth century sci-ence stress the great significance of a new experimentalpractice and a new experimental knowledge. Major figureswere Francis Bacon, Galileo Galilei, and Robert Boyle. Thestory of the controversy of the latter with Thomas Hobbes,during the late 1650s and early 1660s, has become a par-adigm of the recent historiography of scientific experi-mentation [1]. While Hobbes defended the 'old'axiomatic-deductive style of the geometric tradition,Boyle advocated the more modest acquisition of probable

of Boyle's air-pump experiments, the epistemological jus-tification of the experimental knowledge and the sociallegitimacy of the new experimental style of doing science.

A more wide-ranging account of the role of experimenta-tion in the natural sciences has been proposed by ThomasKuhn [2]. He claims that the rise of modern physical sci-ence resulted from two simultaneous developments. Onthe one hand, a radical conceptual and world-view changeoccurred in what he calls the classical, or mathematical,sciences, such as astronomy, statics and optics. On theother, the novel type of Baconian, or experimental, sci-ences emerged, dealing with the study of light, heat, mag-netism and electricity, among other things. Kuhn arguesthat it was not before the second half of the nineteenthcentury that a systematic interaction and merging of theexperimental and mathematical traditions took place. Anexample is the transformation of the Baconian science ofheat into an experimental-mathematical thermodynamics

Published: 29 October 2009

Automated Experimentation 2009, 1:2 doi:10.1186/1759-4499-1-2

Received: 6 May 2009Accepted: 29 October 2009

This article is available from: http://www.aejournal.net/content/1/1/2

2009 Radder; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Page 1 of 8(page number not for citation purposes)

knowledge of experimental 'matters of fact'. Simultane-ously at stake in this controversy were the technical details

during the first half of the nineteenth century. At aboutthe same time, the interactions between (at first, mainly

Automated Experimentation 2009, 1:2 http://www.aejournal.net/content/1/1/2

experimental) science and technology increased substan-tially. Important results of this scientification of technol-ogy were chemical dye stuffs and artificial fertilizers.

Starting in the second half of the nineteenth century,extensive experimentation also took root in various othersciences. This happened in medicine, in particular inphysiology, somewhat later in psychology, and still laterin the social sciences. A characteristic feature of manyexperiments in those sciences is a strong reliance on statis-tical methods (see, e.g., [3]).

The rise of the philosophy of scientific experimentationAlongside the actual practices of experimentation, a vari-ety of authors--both philosophers and philosophy-minded scientists--have reflected upon the nature andfunction of scientific experiments. Among the better-known examples are Bacon's and Galileo's advocacy ofthe experimental method. John Stuart Mill (around themiddle of the nineteenth century) and Ernst Mach (latenineteenth-early twentieth century) provided some meth-odological and epistemological analyses of experimenta-tion. Claude Bernard promoted and analyzed the use ofthe experimental method in medicine. His Introduction tothe Study of Experimental Medicine [4] influenced a numberof twentieth century French writers, including PierreDuhem, Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem.While those authors addressed some aspects of experi-mentation in their accounts of science, a substantial andcoherent tradition in the philosophy of scientific experi-mentation did not yet arise.

Such a tradition did spring up in Germany, in the secondhalf of the twentieth century. Within this German tradi-tion two approaches may be distinguished. One devel-oped Hugo Dingler's pioneering work [5]. Dingleremphasized the manipulation and intervention characterof experimentation, and hence its kinship to technology.One of his aims was to show how the basic theoreticalconcepts of physics, such as length or mass, could begrounded in concrete experimental actions. During the1960s and 1970s, this part of Dingler's views was taken upand systematically developed by several other Germanphilosophers, including Paul Lorenzen, Klaus Holzkampand Peter Janich. More recently, the emphasis on themethodical construction of theoretical concepts in termsof experimental actions has given way to a more cultural-istic interpretation of experimental procedures and results[6].

A second approach within the German tradition took itsdeparture even more directly from the kinship between

ermas conceived of (empirical-analytical) science as'anticipated technology', the crucial link being experimen-tal action [7]. In the spirit of Karl Marx, Martin Heideggerand Herbert Marcuse, Habermas' aim was not merely todevelop a theory of (scientific) knowledge but rather a cri-tique of technocratic reason. More recently, attempts havebeen made to connect this German tradition to Anglo-Saxon philosophy of experiment [8,9] and to contempo-rary social studies of science and technology [10]. Recentwork on 'science as technology' by Sran Lelas [11] can becharacterized as, broadly, inspired by this second branchof the German tradition.

In the English-speaking world, a substantial number ofstudies of scientific experimentation have been writtensince the mid-1970s. They resulted from the Kuhnian'programs in history and philosophy of science'. In theirstudies of (historical or contemporary) scientific contro-versies, sociologists of scientific knowledge often focusedon experimental work (e.g., [12]), while so-called labora-tory studies addressed the ordinary practices of experi-mental scientists (e.g., [13]). An approach that remainedmore faithful to the history and philosophy of scienceidea started with Ian Hacking's argument for the relativeautonomy of experimentation and his plea for a philo-sophical study of experiment as a topic in its own right[14]. It includes work by Allan Franklin, Peter Galison,David Gooding and Hans-Jrg Rheinberger, among manyothers (see the edited volumes [15,16] and [17]).

More recently, several philosophers argue that a furtherstep should be taken by combining the results of the his-torical and sociological study of experiment with moredeveloped theoretical-philosophical analyses [18]. Amature philosophy of experiment, they claim, should notbe limited to summing up its practical features butattempt to provide a systematic analysis of experimentalpractice and experimental knowledge. The latter is oftenlacking in the sociological and historical literature on sci-entific experimentation.

Intervention and production, and their philosophical implicationsLooking at the specific features of experiments within theoverall practice of science, there is one feature that standsout. In order to perform experiments, whether they arelarge-scale or small-scale, experimenters have to interveneactively in the material world; moreover, in doing so theyproduce all kinds of new objects, substances, phenomenaand processes. More precisely, experimentation involvesthe material realization of the experimental system (thatis to say, the object(s) of study, the apparatus, and theirinteraction) as well as an active intervention in the envi-Page 2 of 8(page number not for citation purposes)

experiment and technology. The major figure here is theearly Jrgen Habermas. In his work from the 1960s, Hab-

ronment of this system. In this respect, experiment con-trasts with theory even if theoretical work is always


attended with material acts (such as the typing or writingdown of a mathematical formula). Hence, a central issuefor a philosophy of experiment is the question of thenature of experimental intervention and production, andtheir philosophical implications. To be sure, at times sci-entists devise and discuss so-called thought experiments[19]. However, such 'experiments'--in which the crucialaspect of intervention and production is missing--are bet-ter conceived as not being experiments at all but rather asparticular types of theoretical argument, which may ormay not be materially realizable in experimental practice.

Clearly, not just any kind of intervention in the materialworld counts as a scientific experiment. Quite generally,one may say that successful experiments require, at least,a certain stability and reproducibility, and meeting thisrequirement presupposes a measure of control of theexperimental system and its environment as well as ameasure of discipline of the experimenters and the otherpeople involved in realizing the experiment.

Experimenters employ a variety of strategies for producingstable and reproducible experiments (see, e.g., [20,21]and [6]). One such strategy is to attempt to realize 'purecases' of experimental effects. For example, in some earlyelectromagnetic experiments carried out in the 1820s,Andr Ampre investigated the interaction between anelectric current and a freely suspended magnetic needle[22]. He systematically varied a number of factors of hisexperimental system and examined whether or not theywere relevant, that is to say, whether or not they had adestabilizing impact on the experimental process.

Furthermore, realizing a stable object-apparatus systemrequires knowledge and control of the (actual and poten-tial) interactions between this system and its environ-ment. Depending on the aim and design of theexperiment, specific interactions may be necessary (andhence required), allowed (but irrelevant), or forbidden(because disturbing). Thus, in his experiments on electro-magnetism, Ampre anticipated a potential disturbanceexerted by the magnetism of the earth. In response, hedesigned his experiment in such a way that terrestrial mag-netism constituted an allowed rather than a forbiddeninteraction.

A further aspect of experimental stability is implied by thenotion of reproducibility [9]. A successful performance ofan experiment by the original experimenter is an achieve-ment that may depend on certain idiosyncratic aspects ofa local situation. Yet, a purely local experiment that can-not be carried out in other experimental contexts will, inthe end, be unproductive for science. However, since the

ment and many repetitions may be dissimilar in severalrespects. For this reason, we need to specify what we takeor require to be reproducible (for instance, a particularaspect of the experimental process or a certain averageover different runs). Furthermore, there is the question ofwho should be able to reproduce the experiment (forinstance, the original experimenter, contemporary scien-tists, or even any scientist or human being). Investigatingthese questions leads to different types and ranges ofexperimental reproducibility, which can be observed toplay different roles in experimental practice.

Laboratory experiments in physics, chemistry and molec-ular biology often allow one to control the objects underinvestigation to such an extent that the relevant objects insuccessive experiments may be assumed to be in identicalstates. Hence, statistical methods are employed primarilyto further analyze or process the data (see, for instance,the error-statistical approach by Deborah Mayo [23]). Incontrast, in field biology, medicine, psychology and socialscience, such a strict experimental control is often not fea-sible. To compensate for this, statistical methods in theseareas are used directly to construct groups of experimentalsubjects that are presumed to possess identical averagecharacteristics. It is only after such groups have been con-structed that one can start the investigation of hypothesesabout the research subjects. One can phrase this contrastin a different way by saying that in the former group of sci-ences statistical considerations mostly bear upon linkingexperimental data and theoretical hypotheses, while inthe latter group it is often the case that statistics alreadyplay a role at the stage of producing the actual individualdata.

The intervention and production aspect of scientificexperimentation carries implications for several philo-sophical questions. A general lesson, already drawn byBachelard, appears to be this: the intervention and pro-duction character of experimentation entails that theactual objects and phenomena themselves are, at least inpart, materially realized through human interference.Hence, it is not just the knowledge of experimental objectsand phenomena but also their actual existence and occur-rence that prove to be dependent on specific, productiveinterventions by the experimenters. This fact gives rise toa number of important philosophical issues. If experi-mental objects and phenomena have to be realizedthrough active human intervention, does it still makesense to speak of a 'natural' nature or does one merely dealwith artificially produced laboratory worlds? If one doesnot want to endorse a fully-fledged constructivism,according to which the experimental objects and phe-nomena are nothing but artificial, human creations, onePage 3 of 8(page number not for citation purposes)

performance of an experiment is a complex process, norepetition will be strictly identical to the original experi-

needs to develop a more differentiated categorization ofreality. In this spirit, various authors (e.g., [20,9]) have


argued that an appropriate interpretation of experimentalscience needs some kind of dispositional concepts, suchas powers, potentialities, or tendencies. These human-independent dispositions would then underlie and ena-ble the human construction of particular experimentalprocesses.

A further important question is whether scientists, on thebasis of artificial experimental intervention, can acquireknowledge of a human-independent nature. Some philos-ophers claim that, at least in a number of philosophicallysignificant cases, such 'back inferences' from the artificiallaboratory experiments to their natural counterparts canbe justified. Another approach accepts the constructednature of much experimental science, but stresses the factthat its results acquire a certain endurance and autonomywith respect to both the context in which they have beenrealized in the first place and later developments. In thisvein, Davis Baird [24] offers an account of 'objective thingknowledge', the knowledge encapsulated in materialthings, such as Watson and Crick's material double helixmodel or the Indicator of Watt and Southern's steamengine.

Another relevant feature of experimental science is the dis-tinction between the working of an apparatus and its the-oretical accounts. In actual practice it is often the case thatexperimental devices work well, even if scientists disagreeon how they work. This fact supports the claim that varietyand variability at the theoretical level may well go togetherwith a considerable stability at the level of the materialrealization of experiments. This claim can then beexploited for philosophical purposes, for example to vin-dicate entity realism [14] or referential realism [8].

The relationship between (experimental) science and technologyTraditionally, philosophers of science have defined theaim of science as, roughly, the generation of reliableknowledge of the world. Moreover, as a consequence ofexplicit or implicit empiricist influences, there has been astrong tendency to take the production of experimentalknowledge for granted and to focus on theoretical knowl-edge. However, if one takes a more empirical look at thesciences, both at their historical development and at theircurrent condition, this approach must be qualified as one-sided. After all, from Archimedes' lever-and-pulley sys-tems to the cloned sheep Dolly, the development of(experimental) science has been intricately interwovenwith the development of technology ([25,26]). Experi-ments make essential use of (often specifically designed)technological devices, and, conversely, experimentalresearch often contributes to technological innovations.

nological processes, most significantly the implied possi-bility and necessity of the manipulation and control ofnature. Taken together, these facts justify the claim thatthe science-technology relationship ought to be a centraltopic for the study of scientific experimentation.

One obvious way to study the role of technology in sci-ence is to focus on the instruments and equipmentemployed in experimental practice. Many studies haveshown that the investigation of scientific instruments is arich source of insights for a philosophy of scientific exper-imentation (see, e.g. [15,17,18] and [27]). One may, forexample, focus on the role of visual images in experimen-tal design and explore the wider problem of the relation-ship between thought and vision. Or one may investigatethe problem of how the cognitive function of an intendedexperiment can be materially realized, and what thisimplies for the relationship between technological func-tions and material structures. Or one may study themodes of representation of instrumentally mediatedexperimental outcomes and discuss the question of theepistemic or social appraisal of qualitative versus quanti-tative results.

In addition to such studies, several authors have proposedclassifications of scientific instruments or apparatus. Onesuggested distinction is that between instruments that rep-resent a property by measuring its value (e.g., a device thatregisters blood pressure), instruments that create phe-nomena that do not exist in nature (e.g., a laser), andinstruments that closely imitate natural processes in thelaboratory (e.g., an Atwood machine, which mimics proc-esses and properties of falling objects).

Such classifications form an excellent starting point forinvestigating further philosophical questions on thenature and function of scientific instrumentation. Theydemonstrate, for example, the inadequacy of the empiri-cist view of instruments as mere enhancers of human sen-sory capacities. Yet, an exclusive focus on the instrumentsas such may tend to ignore two things. First, an experi-mental setup often includes various 'devices', such as aconcrete wall to shield off dangerous radiation, a supportto hold a thermometer, a spoon to stir a liquid, curtains todarken a room, and so on. Such devices are usually notcalled instruments, but they are equally crucial to a suc-cessful performance and interpretation of the experimentand hence should be taken into account. Second, a strongemphasis on instruments may lead to a neglect of theenvironment of the experimental system, especially of therequirement to control the interactions between theexperimental system and its environment. Thus, a com-prehensive view of scientific experimentation needs to goPage 4 of 8(page number not for citation purposes)

Moreover, there are substantial conceptual similaritiesbetween the realization of experimental and that of tech-

beyond an analysis of the instrument as such by taking


full account of the specific setting in which this instru-ment needs to function.

Finally, there is the issue of the general philosophical sig-nificance of the experiment-technology relationship.Some of the philosophers who emphasize the importanceof technology for science endorse a 'science-as-technol-ogy' account. That is to say, they advocate an overall inter-pretation in which the nature of science--not justexperimental but also theoretical science--is seen as basi-cally or primarily technological (see for instance, [5,7]and [11]). Other authors, however, take a less radical viewby criticizing the implied reduction of science to technol-ogy and by arguing for the sui generis character of theoret-ical-conceptual and formal-mathematical work. Thus,while stressing the significance of the technological--orperhaps, more precisely, the intervention and productiondimension of science--these views nevertheless see thisdimension as complementary to a theoretical dimension(see, e.g., [8,24] and [28]).

The role of theory in experimentationThis brings us to a further central theme in the study of sci-entific experimentation, namely the relationship betweenexperiment and theory. The theme can be approached intwo ways. One approach addresses the question of howtheories or theoretical knowledge may arise from experi-mental practices. Thus, Franklin [21] has provideddetailed descriptions and analyses of experimental confir-mations and refutations of theories in twentieth centuryphysics. Giora Hon [28] has put forward a classification ofexperimental error, and has argued that the notion oferror may be exploited to elucidate the transition from thematerial, experimental processes to propositional, theo-retical knowledge (see also [29]).

A second approach to the experiment-theory relationshipexamines the question of the role of existing theories, ortheoretical knowledge, within experimental practices.Over the last 25 years, this question has been debated indetail. Are experiments, factually or logically, dependenton prior theories, and if so, in which respects and to whatextent? The remainder of this section reviews some of thedebates on this question.

The strongest version of the claim that experimentation istheory dependent says that all experiments are planned,designed, performed, and used from the perspective ofone or more theories about the objects under investiga-tion. In this spirit, Justus von Liebig and Karl Popper,among others, advocated the view that all experiments areexplicit tests of existing theories. This view completelysubordinates experimental research to theoretical inquiry.

cluded that this claim is false. For one thing, quite fre-quently the aim of experiments is just to realize a stablephenomenon or a working device. Yet, the fact that exper-imentation involves much more than theory testing doesnot, of course, mean that testing a theory may not be animportant goal in particular scientific settings.

At the other extreme, there is the claim that, basically,experimentation is theory-free. The older German schoolof 'methodical constructivism' (see [6]) came close to thisposition. A somewhat more moderate view is that, inimportant cases, theory-free experiments are possible anddo occur in scientific practice. This view admits that per-forming such 'exploratory' experiments does require someideas about nature and apparatus, but not a well-devel-oped theory about the phenomena under scrutiny. IanHacking [14] and Friedrich Steinle [22] make this claimprimarily on the basis of case studies from the history ofexperimental science. Michael Heidelberger [30] aims at amore systematic underpinning of this view. He distin-guishes between theory-laden and causally-based instru-ments and claims that experiments employing the lattertype of instruments are basically theory-free.

Another view admits that not all concrete activities thatcan be observed in scientific practice are guided by theo-ries. Yet, according to this view, if certain activities are tocount as a genuine experiment, they require a theoreticalinterpretation (see [8,9,28] and [31]). More specifically,performing and understanding an experiment depends ona theoretical interpretation of what happens in materiallyrealizing the experimental process. In general, quite differ-ent kinds of theory may be involved, such as general back-ground theories, theories or theoretical models of the(material, mathematical, or computational) instruments,and theories or theoretical models of the phenomenaunder investigation.

One argument for such claims derives from the fact thatan experiment aims to realize a reproducible correlationbetween an observable feature of the apparatus and a fea-ture of the object under investigation. The point is thatmaterially realizing this correlation and knowing whatcan be learned about the object from inspecting the appa-ratus depends on theoretical insights about the experi-mental system and its environment. Thus, these insightspertain to those aspects of the experiment that are relevantto obtaining a reproducible correlation. It is not necessary,and in practice it will usually not be the case, that the the-oretical interpretation offers a full understanding of anydetail of the experimental process.

A further argument for the significance of theory in exper-Page 5 of 8(page number not for citation purposes)

However, on the basis of many studies of experimentationpublished during the last 25 years, it can be safely con-

imentation notes that a single experimental run is notenough to establish a stable result. A set of different runs,


however, will almost always produce values that are, moreor less, variable. The questions then are: What does thisfact tell us about the nature of the property that has beenmeasured? Does the property vary within the fixed inter-val? Is it a probabilistic property? Or is its real value con-stant and are the variations due to random fluctuations?In experimental practice, answers to such questions arebased on an antecedent theoretical interpretation of thenature of the property that has been measured.

Regarding these claims, it is important to note that, inactual practice, the theoretical interpretation of an experi-ment will not always be explicit and the experimenterswill not always be aware of its use and significance. Oncethe performance of a particular experiment or experimen-tal procedure becomes routine, the theoretical assump-tions drop out of sight: they become like an (invisible)'window to the world'. Yet, in a context of learning to per-form and understand the experiment or in a situationwhere its result is very consequential or controversial, theimplicit interpretation will be made explicit and subjectedto empirical and theoretical scrutiny. This means that theprimary locus of the theoretical interpretation is the rele-vant scientific community and not the individual experi-menter.

In conclusion: further issues in scientific experimentationAs we have seen, the systematic philosophical study of sci-entific experimentation is a relatively recent phenome-non. Hence, there are a number of further issues that havereceived some attention but merit a much more detailedaccount. In concluding this review paper, three such issueswill be briefly discussed.

First, recent scientific practice shows an ever-increasinguse of 'computer experiments'. These involve various sortsof hybrids of material intervention, computer simulation,and theoretical and mathematical modeling techniques(see [32]). Often, more traditional experimentalapproaches are challenged and replaced by approachesresting fully or primarily on computer simulations (some-times this replacement is based on budgetary considera-tions only). More generally, there is a large variety of usesof computer science and technology in performing, ana-lyzing and interpreting experiments and in visualizing,storing and disseminating their results. Automated exper-imentation constitutes a significant part of these develop-ments.

These new developments raise important questions forthe scholarly study of scientific experimentation. First,although some pioneering work has been done (see, for

need many more empirical studies that chart this new ter-rain. Furthermore, new methodological questions ariseabout how to do this automated experimentation in inno-vative, yet plausible, ways. As the history of Artificial Intel-ligence teaches us, expectations about automation cansometimes be overenthusiastic and unfounded ([34,35]).For this reason, a critical assessment of what can, andwhat cannot, be achieved through automation is particu-larly important (for the cases of formal symbol manipula-tion and neural network approaches to AI, see [36], chaps.5 and 12). Related to this is the epistemological questionof the justifiability of the results of the new approaches.Should experiments always involve a substantial materialcomponent or are simulated experiments equally reliableand useful (see [37])? Finally, computer experiments areregularly applied to complex and large-scale systems, forinstance in climate science. Often, in such contexts, scien-tific and policy problems are intimately connected. Thisconnection also constitutes an important topic for thestudy of scientific experimentation (see, e.g., [38]).

A second issue that merits more attention is the natureand role of experimentation in the social and human sci-ences, such as economics, sociology, medicine, and psy-chology. Practitioners of those sciences often labelsubstantial, or even large, parts of their activities as 'exper-imental'. So far, this fact is not reflected in the philosoph-ical literature on experimentation, which has primarilyfocused on the natural sciences. Thus, a challenge forfuture research is to connect the primarily methodologicalliterature on experimenting in economics, sociology,medicine, and psychology with the philosophy of scienceliterature on experimentation in natural science (see, e.g.,[39] and [40]).

One subject that will naturally arise in philosophicalreflection upon the similarities and dissimilarities of nat-ural and social or human sciences is this: In experimentson human beings, the experimental subjects will oftenhave their own interpretation of what is going on in thesetrials, and this interpretation may influence theirresponses over and above the behavior intended by theexperimenters. As a methodological problem (of how toavoid 'biased' responses) this is of course well known topractitioners of the human and social sciences. However,from a broader philosophical or socio-cultural perspectivethe problem is not necessarily one of bias. It may alsoreflect a clash between a scientific and a common-senseinterpretation of human beings. In case of such a clash,social and ethical issues are at stake, since the basic ques-tion is who is entitled to define the nature of humanbeings: the scientists or the people themselves? The meth-odological, ethical, and social issues springing from thisPage 6 of 8(page number not for citation purposes)

instance, [33] about the role of databases, and, more gen-erally, bioinformatics in research in the life sciences), we

question will continue to be a significant theme for the


study of experimentation in the human and social sci-ences.

This brings us to a last issue. The older German traditionexplicitly addressed wider normative questions surround-ing experimental science and technology. The views ofHabermas, for example, have had a big impact on broaderconceptualizations of the position of science and technol-ogy in society. Thus far, the more recent Anglophoneapproaches within the philosophy of scientific experi-mentation have primarily dealt with more narrowly cir-cumscribed scholarly topics. In so far as normativequestions have been taken into account, they have beenmostly limited to epistemic normativity, for instance toquestions of the proper functioning of instruments or thejustification of experimental evidence. Questions regard-ing the connections between epistemic and social or ethi-cal normativity are hardly addressed.

Yet, posing such questions is not far-fetched. For instance,those experiments that use animals or humans as experi-mental subjects are confronted with a variety of normativeissues, often in the form of a tension between methodo-logical and ethical requirements [41]. Other normativelyrelevant questions relate to the issue of the artificial andthe natural in experimental science and science-basedtechnology. Consider, for example, the question ofwhether experimentally isolated genes are natural or arti-ficial entities. This question is often discussed in environ-mental philosophy, and different answers to it entail adifferent environmental ethics and politics. More specifi-cally, the issue of the contrast between the artificial andthe natural is crucial to debates about patenting, in partic-ular the patenting of genes and other parts of organisms.The reason is that discoveries of natural phenomena arenot patentable while inventions of artificial phenomenaare [42].

Although philosophers of experiment cannot be expectedto solve all of those broader social and normative prob-lems, they may be legitimately asked to contribute to thedebate on possible approaches and solutions. In thisrespect, the philosophy of scientific experimentationcould profit from its kinship to the philosophy of technol-ogy, which has always shown a keen sensitivity to theinterconnectedness between technological and social ornormative issues.

Competing interestsThe author declares that he has no competing interests.

AcknowledgementsThis article draws on material from an earlier publication. Copyright (

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AbstractThe rise of experimental scienceThe rise of the philosophy of scientific experimentationIntervention and production, and their philosophical implicationsThe relationship between (experimental) science and technologyThe role of theory in experimentationIn conclusion: further issues in scientific experimentationCompeting interestsAcknowledgementsReferences

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