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Will New Orleans Become theNew City of Choice?

A student starting public school in New Orleans in thefall of 2005 had little reason to be hopeful about her educa-tion. Of her 65,000 schoolmates in the New Orleans PublicSchools (NOPS), over half of those taking the state’s high-stakes tests (4th, 8th, 10th, and 11th graders) did not have“basic”competence in math and English; 68 of the 108 NOPSschools receiving performance labels had been rated “acad-emically unacceptable” by the Louisiana Department of Edu-cation, 13 more than just the year before (see Figure 1). Manyof the city’s high schools had double-digit dropout rates,and a state auditor, calling the district’s finances a “trainwreck,” estimated that NOPS was running double-digit (inmillions of dollars) deficits.

A student starting school in New Orleans in the fall of 2006,on the other hand, has some reason for optimism. There arenow only an estimated 22,000 students and 57 schools in thedistrict. Very few of them are being run by the New OrleansPublic Schools; more than half the schools are charters andanxious to please, offering new curricula, longer school days,even special summer sessions.

What happened? The short answer is Katrina, the cate-gory 3 hurricane that pounded southeast Louisiana themorning of August 29, 2005, and devastated New Orleans,including its schools. The longer answer is that the destruc-tion, terrible as it was, may prove to be the salvation of aschool district that had been drowning for years. Politicians,

BY KATHRYN G. NEWMARK AND VERONIQUE DE RUGY

PH

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Hope after

Katrina

educators, and parents, long frustrated with the state ofpublic education in New Orleans, suddenly had the oppor-tunity, as the waters receded, to build, almost from scratch,a new school system.

It will be years before we know the outcome of this majorrenewal effort. But already we can see outlines of the future.Before Katrina, the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB),which had run public schools in New Orleans, operated 123schools; in the spring following the storm, it was running just4. Before the storm there were 5 charter schools in a districtof 65,000 students; by May of 2006, ten months after the hur-ricane, there were 18 charters in a New Orleans Public Schooldistrict educating just 12,000 stu-dents (see Figure 2). It was, almostliterally, a sea change in the organi-zational structure of the city’s schoolsystem. Overnight, New Orleans,with nearly 70 percent of publicschool students in schools of choice,had become one of the most char-tered cities in America. (In Washing-ton, D.C., and Dayton, Ohio, two ofthe most charter-concentrated citiesup to now, only about a quarter ofpublic school students attend char-ter schools.) No doubt, the hurri-cane was destructive. Some 85, ornearly two-thirds, of the city’s schoolbuildings had been wiped out ordamaged by the floodwaters, at an

estimated loss of $800 million. And tens of thousands ofNew Orleans residents, their homes and livelihoodsdestroyed, fled the city; Houston public schools aloneabsorbed more than 5,000 of the refugee students. It seemedthat Katrina accomplished in a day—dismantling a derelictschool district—what Louisiana school reformers couldn’tdo after years of trying.

A Slow Road to RuinTo many observers, it seemed quite plausible that if a hurri-cane hadn’t closed them, New Orleans public schools wouldhave tumbled on their own. The city had 55 of the state’s 78

worst schools in 2003–04, andbetween 1998 and 2004 schoolenrollment had dropped by 26 per-cent, from 82,000 to 65,000 stu-dents. (The Orleans Parish popu-lation itself decreased by less than1 percent, from 466,000 to 462,000,during this time.) Mismanagementand corruption were rampant.

“In the dismal gallery of failingurban school systems,”wrote Asso-ciated Press reporter Adam Nos-siter in April of 2005, severalmonths before Katrina, “NewOrleans may be the biggest horrorof them all.”

Exasperation with the district’spoor management and record of


Math MathReading Reading Louisiana New Orleans

Student Performance on the Louisiana State Test and Per-Pupil Expenditure

4th Grade 8th Grade Per-Pupil Expenditure 2004-2005

Per

cen

t pro

fici

ent C

urren

t dolla

rs

80

60

40

20

0

10000

7500

5000

2500

0

Louisiana New Orleans

65

43

69

47

57

3631

7,6047,893

55

Note: Proficiency percentages are for the initial test takers in the spring of 2005. Data for Louisiana does not include New Orleans for either student per-formance or spending. Thus, the figure compares New Orleans to the rest of the state.

SOURCE: Louisiana Department of Education

Scraping Bottom (Figure 1)

Before Katrina, the test scores of New Orleans students were well below the state average, but per-pupil spending washigher than elsewhere in Louisiana.

The destruction,

terrible as it was,

may prove to

be the salvation of

a school district

that had been

drowning for years.

even poorer performance had already motivated manyefforts to fix things. But almost as persistent as the district’slow test scores and high dropout rates were the number ofschool superintendents—eight in seven years—whopromised change and failed to deliver, swallowed up by pettypolitics and power struggles. One early effort at reform wasa proposal from the University of New Orleans (UNO) inthe summer of 2001 to create and oversee a new charterschool district, converting 10 existing public schools tocharters. But the school board and teachers union objectedand UNO scaled the proposal down to managing just 1 char-ter school. Later, even that agreement fell apart over teachercontract issues.

In October 2003, over opposition from the OrleansParish School Board, voters in the state approved a consti-tutional amendment, by a 60 to 40 percent margin, allow-ing the state to assume control of public schools that received

an “academically unacceptable” rating four years in a row,applied retroactively so that failing New Orleans schoolscould be taken over sooner. And, in fact, of the 16 schoolsstatewide eligible for takeover for the 2004–05 school year,15 were in Orleans Parish. Those schools were made part ofa “Recovery School District,” run by the state but eligible tobecome charters if they wished.

The first takeover occurred in the summer of 2004 when thestate handed control of P.A. Capdau Middle School to the Uni-versity of New Orleans. Signaling the pent-up demand forchange in New Orleans, more than 500 students applied for 264spots at the revamped school, and more than 60 teachersapplied for the 16 available positions. Pleased by this progress,the school board reversed its earlier opposition to UNO-runschools and proposed that the university operate more of them.

In the middle of this small burst of reform came AnthonyAmato, a hard-charging administrator from Hartford with


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NEW ORLEANS NEWMARK & DeRUGY

Even after the shock wore off and city, state, and federal officials began talking about rebuilding, New Orleans school leaders werepredicting that most schools wouldn’t reopen for at least a year.


ambitious goals and a trackrecord of succeeding inurban schools. Taking up the superintendent’s reins in February of 2003, Amatopromised to increase testscores and root out corrup-tion. He demoted 20 princi-pals, standardized literacyprograms, and reduced stu-dent absenteeism by nearly30 percent in his first year onthe job. Typically, in doingthe hard things, he rubbedmany New Orleans school-establishment people thewrong way and by the mid-dle of 2004, there was amovement afoot to fire him.“In 18 months,” ran a head-line in the July 2004 issue ofDistrict Administration Mag-azine, a national journal forK–12 administrators, “NewOrleans SuperintendentAnthony Amato has rid his district of ghost teachers andfocused haphazard curricula. So why is he involved in a nastyfight to retain his job?” And though he had many support-ers, including powerful state legislators who pushed througha special bill that transferred powers from the school boardto the superintendent, Amato could not survive the disas-trous financial reports, audits, and indictments that beganflowing through his office in 2005, almost as a prelude toKatrina’s tidal surge.

First, it was the state auditor calling the district a “trainwreck” (this in early 2005) and detailing a list of abuses thatincluded promotion policies that put people in jobs theywere not qualified for and a district accounting office thatemployed “not one accountant.” The auditor estimated thatthe system was running a $25 to $30 million deficit, butcouldn’t be certain because of the shoddy quality of thefinancial records. Then the U.S. Department of Educationfound nearly $70 million in federal money for low-incomestudents either improperly accounted for or misspent. Finally,federal and state investigators, who had been looking at NewOrleans since 2004, opened an office inside the school admin-istration building itself. Their investigation resulted in twodozen indictments for theft, fraud, and kickbacks. (By earlysummer of 2006 there were 20 guilty pleas.)

Finally, at an April 2005 school board meeting that was“crackling with racial hostility,” according to the AssociatedPress, Amato tendered his resignation. In late May the

board finally gave in to thestark reality and hired thefinancial turnaround firm ofAlvarez & Marsal (A&M),which was headquartered inNew York City and had officesthroughout the world (thoughnot in New Orleans), to takecontrol of hiring, firing, andcontracting in the centraloffice. Though the OrleansParish School Board wouldstill maintain control over thebudget and the hiring and fir-ing of teachers, A&M wouldreport directly to the statesuperintendent and have theauthority to appoint the dis-trict’s top financial officers.

In a July status report,barely six weeks before Kat-rina, Alvarez & Marsal sum-marized the grim situation:“The conditions we havefound are as bad as any we

have ever encountered. The financial data that exists is (sic)unreliable, there has not been a clean audit since FY 2001-2002,there is no inventory of assets, the payroll system is in sham-bles, school buildings are in deplorable condition and, up tonow, there has been little accountability.”A&M, projecting thatthe district would “run out of cash by September,” began tocut the budget by some 10 percent, and announced what it saidwas the first in a series of layoffs.

By the time Katrina struck and the levees broke that Augustmorning, New Orleans schools were already listing badly.

A Difficult RestartAt first it looked as if Katrina would spell the end of all of NewOrleans, including its schools. The city’s students and teach-ers were quickly scattered around the country, and manyhad no plans to return. Students enrolled in new schools,including the thousands who entered the Houston publicschools (altogether an estimated 250,000 evacuees went toHouston), and teachers found new jobs.

There wouldn’t have been much to come home to: Alvarez& Marsal officials reported that 47 of the 128 New Orleanspublic schools were severely damaged and 38 more hadmoderate damage.

Even after the shock wore off and city, state, and federalofficials began talking about rebuilding, New Orleans schoolleaders were predicting that most schools wouldn’t reopen forat least a year. The undamaged buildings on the West Bank,

Oct

2

00

4M

ay

20

06

New Orleans Public and Private Schools

Number of schools

District-run schools

Charter schools

State-operated schools

Private schools

123

5

4

92

18

3

60

140120100806040200

Note: There were no state-operated schools in New Orleans in October2004. Prior to the 2005–06 school year, four traditional public schoolshad already been converted to charter schools, one of which was not ableto open after Katrina.


A Different World (Figure 2)

By the end of the 2005-06 school year, a changed educa-tion landscape had emerged in New Orleans.


they said, wouldn’t be ready for students until January 2006,and no East Bank schools would educate students in the2005–06 school year. Even when school officials reassessed thesituation and determined that they could reopen schoolssooner than first thought, the district was immediately besetby the same old internal board conflicts, the same fightsbetween the Orleans Parish School Board and state officials.At the September 15 board meeting, barely two weeks afterthe city had been brought to its knees, tensions boiled overin a racially charged session where, according to the NewOrleans Times-Picayune,“the battle lines were drawn.” Boardmember Phyllis Landrieu, who is white (and the aunt ofU.S. senator Mary Landrieu and Louisiana lieutenant gover-nor Mitch Landrieu, who would lose a close race for mayorin the spring of 2006), proposed replacing acting districtsuperintendent Ora Watson, who took over from Amatoand is black, with Bill Roberti, who is the head of Alvarez &

Marsal in New Orleans and white. The proposal failed. Butit heightened racial tensions at a time when race had becomeas turbulent an issue as the storm.

As if that weren’t enough, with the city’s tax base wipedout by the hurricane, New Orleans could no longer count onlocal funding for schools, nor would the tax revenue be avail-able to back a pre-Katrina approved bond issue. State fund-ing would also decrease, as funds were redirected to other dis-tricts that had absorbed displaced New Orleans students.

But on September 30 came news that must have lookedlike a life preserver to many school reformers and wouldserve as a catalyst for change: a grant of $20.9 million fromthe federal No Child Left Behind charter school program. Themoney was earmarked to help Louisiana reopen existingcharters as well as 10 new ones.

Immediately, school board vice president LourdesMoran and state and local lawmakers representing Algiers

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With the city’s tax base wiped out by the hurricane, New Orleans could no longer count on local funding for schools, nor would thetax revenue be available to back a pre-Katrina approved bond issue.


(a neighborhood in the rela-tively undamaged West Bankdistrict of the city) drew up aplan to charter all 13 schoolsin that area. And in whatappeared to be an end runaround the perennially con-tentious school board, Moranand Algiers legislators pre-sented the proposal to an invi-tation-only group of some 20business, religious, and othercommunity leaders on Octo-ber 5 without telling theschool board.

On October 7, the day ofthe next school board meetingand with the board stillunaware of Moran’s plans (shehad e-mailed the plan to hercolleagues the night before, butaccording to Education Week,some board members and Act-ing Superintendent Watsonsaid they hadn’t had a chance toread the application before themeeting), New Orleans mayorRay Nagin announced that hewould ask the governor for help in creating a citywide char-ter school system. Nagin later explained that he had writtena letter to Governor Kathleen Blanco on October 5:“Give methe charter schools I’ve been asking for—20 charter schools,a citywide charter school district.”And on October 7, the dayof the Orleans Parish School Board meeting, Governor Blancoissued several executive orders to smooth the way for char-ter schools in New Orleans. It was a measure of the schoolboard’s intransigence that, despite a devastating hurricane,a $20 million grant, and a ton of political pressure, the Algierscharter plan passed by only a 4–2 vote (with 1 abstention).

Board member Jimmy Fahrenholtz, a persistent advocateof reform, expressed his disgust at the nay-sayers, remark-ing,“[The state] should have taken us over a long time ago.”Moran, who admitted that she had purposely kept her col-leagues in the dark about the proposal, was amicable in vic-tory. “I’m not saying that I want to do this because I wantto change governance,” she explained. “I am interested inmaking sure we access all the resources necessary to have aquality education.”

There was some momentary drama when a group ofmostly black leaders in Algiers won a temporary restrainingorder against the plan and Acting Superintendent Watson andboard president Torin Sanders, who was one of the votes

against the Algiers plan,began to talk about OPSBopening four of its own WestBank schools in November,but the resistance was short-lived. Alvarez & Marsal toldthe board that the districtdidn’t have the funds.

On October 28, as therestraining order expired, thedissenting board membersreversed course and OPSBunanimously approved 20charter school applications,including 13 on the West Bankto be overseen by the AlgiersCharter School Association(ACSA). OPSB required,among other things, that 20percent of the students at eachcharter school be studentsreceiving free or reduced-pricelunch, and 10 percent be spe-cial-education students.

Meanwhile, New Orleans’private schools were alreadystarting to reopen. In partbecause of its dismal public

school system and in part because of a strong religious, espe-cially Catholic,tradition, New Orleans had a robust privateschool network before Katrina: some 25,000 students, morethan a third of the number in the public schools, attended92 different schools. (Nationally, only 10 percent of K–12students are enrolled in private schools.) And their relativeimportance only increased after the storm. By the firstweek of October, nearly 1,100 students were attending 2Catholic schools in Algiers. Soon after, the first 3 privateschools opened their doors on the East Bank, and by earlyNovember, 8 of the city’s Catholic schools were open—allbefore a single public school, charter or not, had reopenedanywhere in New Orleans. Even after the public schoolsbegan operating, the private sector proved more nimble. Bythe spring of 2006 there were nearly 20,000 studentsenrolled in private schools, three-quarters the prestorm fig-ure, but well above the number that were back in publicschool (see Figure 3).

Starting FreshWhile the immediate impetus for the charter school plan wasmoney, these new schools promised hope to a devastated cityschool system. The new Algiers Charter School Associationemphasized the benefits of being liberated from Orleans Parish

It was a measure

of the school board’s

intransigence that, despite

a devastating hurricane,

a $20 million grant,

and a ton of

political pressure, the

Algiers charter plan

passed by

only a 4–2 vote

(with 1 abstention).


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School Board policies, which, according to the association’sapplication,“currently consist of over a one foot thick set of doc-uments that have not been reviewed for consistency and neces-sity in the past 20 years.” The charter schools “would be ableto start fresh”in developing new policies and procedures to bestmeet the needs of students.

The difference betweencharter and regular publicschools was quickly appar-ent in Algiers when ACSAbegan hiring teachers.Instead of giving first prior-ity to teachers who were atthe school before Katrinaand hiring them based onseniority, as the union con-tract would have dictated,the charter school groupasked each teacher appli-cant to take a short test ofmath and writing skills. Itscreened out 50 of 250applicants based on the testresults alone.

Just as the charter schoolplan continued the pre-Kat-rina trend of decreasingboard control of NewOrleans public schools, thepost-hurricane changesaccelerated the trend ofincreasing state involve-ment and paved the wayfor many more charter schools. Gradually, the focus wasless on the financial benefits of charters and more on theiradvantages in governance.

In early November Governor Blanco proposed an expan-sion of the state’s authority to take over New Orleansschools. Instead of applying only to “failing” schools, thenew powers would now pertain to all schools in districts “inacademic crisis” that had performance scores below the stateaverage. By state law, only Orleans Parish and one small ruraldistrict met this criterion. As a result, OPSB would bestripped of responsibility for 107 of the 128 public schoolsin the district.

Anti-OPSB sentiment was running so high that the legis-lature quickly approved the plan by an overwhelming major-ity. The statehouse was even more eager to see the state take thereins in New Orleans, handily passing an alternative plan (thatdidn’t become law) to take over all schools in the district. Stateboard member Leslie Jacobs summarized the feelings of manywhen she described OPSB to the Times-Picayune: “There’s no

trust in the institution and no outcome of results that wouldmake the institution worthy of the public’s trust.” Blancosigned her takeover plan into law on November 30, 2005.

Most of the newly chartered schools had below-averagescores, but reapproval of their charters seemed very likely as

universities and privatefoundations such as theGates and Broad founda-tions, reluctant to getinvolved while the dys-functional OPSB leader-ship remained in place,were now calling. Accord-ing to Mayor Nagin,“Theysaid, ‘Look, you set up theright environment, we willfund, totally fund, brand-new schools for the cityof New Orleans. But wedon’t want to go throughwhat you’ve been through.All that struggle you’vebeen having with thatschool board. We don’twant to do that. We wantto come in clean.’”

In January 2006, thestate announced that it wasseeking charter operatorsfor the 38 Recovery Districtschools that were not toodamaged to open in the2006–07 school year.

Twenty groups hoping to run new charter schools submitted43 applications to a review committee, comprising a team fromthe National Association of Charter School Authorizers and local,state, and national representatives. The committee grantedapproval to 6 groups to run 10 schools.

Will It Last?Since the board’s charter-school decision and the new statetakeover law, progress has been steady. The first public schoolsto open were 2 that had been chartered by the state board ofeducation long before the hurricane and were in the relativelyundamaged Uptown area of the city. The Orleans Parish SchoolBoard reopened its first school, Benjamin Franklin Elementary,with 146 students, also in Uptown, at the end of November2005. On December 14, 5 Algiers charter schools opened theirdoors, “without a hitch,” for more than 1,300 students.

And so it continued. By mid-January, 14 charter and 3 tra-ditional public schools were educating again, serving about9,000 students. By the spring, 25 schools were running, only


Answering the Call (Figure 3)

In comparison to public school enrollment, the number of pri-vate school students remained relatively steady after Katrina,representing over 60 percent of total New Orleans enrollmentin May 2006.

92,102 students 31,659 students

October 2004 May 2006

Enrollment in New Orleans before and after Katrina

District-RunCharter

1,683

64,588

25,831 8,112

2,6131,141

19,793

PrivateState-Run

4 of which, as mentioned, wereoperated by OPSB. The com-bined registration at the 18charter schools and 7 traditionalpublic schools was only 12,000students, less than 20 percentof the pre-Katrina public schoolpopulation. Alvarez & Marsaland state officials were esti-mating that by January 2007,New Orleans public schoolswould be serving 34,000 stu-dents—still barely half of thepre-Katrina enrollment.

To the extent that the post-Katrina developments are a nat-ural continuation of earlierreforms, it seems likely that thecharter school momentum willcontinue. But to the extent thatcharter schools came to domi-nate the New Orleans educa-tion scene only because of a nat-ural disaster, it is reasonable towonder whether the changeswill stick. Will New Orleanswant to continue as the U.S. citywith the highest concentrationof charter school students?

The federal governmentseems to hope so. In June of2006, Secretary of EducationMargaret Spellings came toLouisiana to announce theawarding of $24 million to create more charters. The grant,reported the New York Times, “is likely to cement the role ofNew Orleans … as the nation’s preeminent laboratory for thewidespread use of charter schools.”

Another important factor on the side of charter schooladvocates is the greatly diminished power of the teachersunion, which had often been an obstacle in earlier reformefforts. When the state legislature swept 107 schools into theexpanded Recovery School District, it nullified the collectivebargaining agreement between the Orleans Parish SchoolBoard and the union at those schools. Where it once had 4,700members paying $600 in dues each year, the union now hasonly 300 members. The only schools with unionized teach-ers are the 4 schools operated by OPSB.

For those who want to preserve the new structure of NewOrleans education, the rebuilding plan developed by the edu-cation committee of Mayor Nagin’s Bring New Orleans BackCommission is also promising. The education committee was

chaired by Dr. Scott Cowen,the president of Tulane Uni-versity, who was assisted by an“education Dream Team” ofnational experts and localstakeholders. More than 1,500students, parents, teachers, andcommunity members, repre-senting every school open priorto Katrina, offered input. Inaddition, the committee inter-viewed more than 40 educa-tion experts and studied suc-cessful districts around thecountry. Contributors to thefinal plan included representa-tives from the New OrleansPublic Schools, state and localgovernment, Louisiana univer-sities, the U.S. Department ofEducation, the Broad Founda-tion, the Gates Foundation, theCouncil of the Great CitySchools, IBM,Teach For Amer-ica, the American Federation ofTeachers, New Orleans non-profits, and the Philadelphia,Norfolk (VA), and Oaklandpublic school districts.

According to the plan’s“educational network model,”the school system wouldinclude a mix of charter, con-tract, and system-run schools,

organized in small “networks” of similar schools. The AlgiersCharter School Association, for example, could be one net-work within the larger school system.

All schools will have considerable autonomy—includingcontrol over staffing, the authority to set their own budgets,and the freedom to offer extended school days or longerschool years—but will be held accountable for results, andfunds will follow students as they choose the schools that bestmeet their needs. A network manager will provide supportand accountability for each network of schools. A “lean”district office will focus on policymaking instead of top-downoperational decisions, including a small “strategy group”that will set learning standards and ensure the equitableallocation of resources, but will not mandate teaching meth-ods or control school spending. The other major componentof the district organization will be a new central support-ser-vices office that will provide optional assistance to helpschools obtain services such as food preparation and trans-


All schools will have con-

siderable autonomy—

including control over

staffing, the authority

to set their own budgets,

and the freedom to offer

extended school days

or longer school years—

but will be held

accountable for results,

and funds will follow

students as they choose

the schools that best

meet their needs.

portation. One superintendent will direct the network man-agers, strategy group, and services office and report to theschool board, whose role will be oversight, not execution.

The plan explicitly rejects an all-charter-school system, butpreserves many of the advantages of such a system, such asflexibility and decentralization. The plan also provides enoughstructure and support to help school leaders be successfulwithout impinging on their autonomy. In fact, it seems that,within this framework, even the system-run schools will beindistinguishable from charter schools.

Significantly, the school board, often a tough sell onreform plans, has endorsed the Bring New Orleans BackCommittee’s educational network model. The state educationdepartment will ultimately determine what reforms areimplemented, which signifies a major change in governancestructure. But since state officials participated in the commit-tee’s planning process and the proposals fit with the state’s gen-eral vision for New Orleans education, it seems likely that the

final plan will resemble the committee’s plan.To be sure, it’s just a plan, and large school districts are cer-

tainly famous for their ability to churn out weighty reportsthat go nowhere. But contrasting the New Orleans outline withanother high-profile school plan released around the sametime—D.C. superintendent Clifford Janey’s “master educa-tion plan”—it seems that New Orleans is considerably moreserious about overhauling school structure than Washington.Where the D.C. document is a 120-page hodgepodge, the NewOrleans education blueprint is only 30 pages long, offeringan ambitious, completely new vision for transforming the wayeducation is delivered. New Orleans seems determined to pre-serve the reforms brought on by Katrina. The question iswhether it can sustain the innovative momentum in the faceof old habits—and new storms.

Kathryn Newmark is a research assistant at the American Enter-prise Institute, where Veronique de Rugy is a resident fellow.


feature


Melvin Patterson listens to a lesson during seventh grade class at Samuel J. Green Charter School in New Orleans. Hurricane Kat-rina has given New Orleans’ chronically underperforming school system a fresh start.

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