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Form ApprovedREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188The public reporting burden for this collection of Information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources,gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of Information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collectionof information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports(0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding an y other provision of law, no person shall besubject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does no t display a currently valid OMB control number.PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b . GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e . TASK NUMBER

5f . WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBERDepartment of the Air ForceHeadquarters Pacific Air Forces, CHECO DivisionHickam AFB, HI9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10 . SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORTNUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENTA -- Approved for Public Release

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACTProject CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning ofthe acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of CounterinsurgencyOperations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of CurrentOperations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lastingcorporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.

15. SUBJECT TERMSCHECO reports, Vietnam War, War in Southeast Asia, Vietnam War- Aerial Operations, American

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSONa. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE ABSTRACT OFPAGES 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98)Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

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- +DECLASSIFIED BY AFIHOHIAW E.0.12958 (AMEN BEDDATE: 20080718

PUBL IC RELEASE

PROJECT

SOUTHEAST ASIA

I GROUP-1Excluded from automatic downgrading

and cleclassification.

c.71.041,4 20080910367

I.

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P' -*~ b.

I \\pe 0 0n s\3REOR TTRUSCOTT WHITE

311 DECEMBER 1968I HQ PACAF

Directorate, Tactical EvaluationCHECO DivisionIPrepared by: LT. COL. R. A. MACDONOUGHProject CHECO 7th AF, DOAC- DOTEC-68-77

K770434

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DEPARTE AIR FORCEHEADQUARTERS PACIFIC AIR FORCES

APO SAN FRANCISCO 96553REPLY TO

ATTN OF: DOTEC 11 December 1968SUBJECT: Project CHECO Report, "TRUSCOTT WHITE" (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION PAGE1. Attached is a SECRET document. It shall be transported, stored,safeguarded, and accounted for in accordance with applicable securitydirectives. Retain or destroy in accordance with AFR 205-1. Do notreturn.2. This letter does not contain classified information and may bedeclassified if attachment is removed from it.FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

WARREN'H. PETERSON, Colonel, USAF 1 AtchChief, CHECO Division Proj CHECO Rpt (S),Directorate, Tactical Evaluation 11 Dec 68DCS/Operations

IiI11111 I

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UNCLASSIFIEDDISTRIBUTION

HQ USAF SAFOI ............ 2 Cys 19AF (DA-C) ...... 1 CySAFLL ............ 1 Cy USAFAGOS ......... 1CyAFAAC ............ 1 Cy SAFAA ............ 1 Cy USAFSAWC (DO) ....1 CyAFAMA ............ 1 Cy USAFTAWC (DA) .... 1 CyAFBSA ............ 1 Cy MAJCOM USAFTARC (DI) .... 1 CyAFCCS-SA ......... 1 Cy USAFTALC (DA) .... CyAFCHO ............ 2 Cys AU (ASI-HA) ...... 2 Cys USAFTFWC (CRCD) .. 1 CyAFGOA ............ 2 Cys AU (ASI-ASAD) .... Cy FTD (TDPI) ....... 1 CyAFIIN ............ 1 Cy AU (AUL3T-66-7) .. 1 Cy AFAITC ........... 1 CyAFISI ............ 3 Cys AU (ACSC) ........ 1 Cy SRAFREP (SWC) .... 1 CyAFISL ............ lCy ADC (ADODC) ...... 1 CyAFMSG ............ 1 Cy ADC (ADOOP) ...... 2 Cys PACAFAFNINA ........... 1 Cy ADC (ADLPP) ...... 2 CysAFNINCC .......... 1 Cy TAC (DO-O) ....... 1 Cy DP ............... 1CyAFNINDE .......... 3 Cys TAC (DPL) ........ 2 Cys DI ............... 1CyAFOAPS ........... 1 Cy TAC (DOTS) ....... 1 Cy DO ............... 1 CyAFOCC ............ ICy TAC (DORQ)........ICy DPL .............. 1CyAFOCE ............ 1 Cy TAC (DI) ......... 1 Cy DXIH ............. 1 CyAFOMO ............ 1 Cy MAC (MAFOI) ...... 1 Cy 5AF (DOP) ........ 1 CyAFOWX ............ 1 Cy MAC (MAOID) ...... 1 Cy 7AF (DOAC) ....... 9 CysAFPDP ............ ICy MAC (MAOCO) ...... 1 Cy 13AF (DOP) ....... 1 CyAFPMRE ........... 1 Cy AFSC (SCL) ....... 8 Cys 13AF (DXI) ....... 1 CyAFRDC ............ 1 Cy AFSC (SCO. ....... 2 Cys 834AIRDIV ........ 1 CyAFRDR ............ 1 Cy AFLC (MCO ....... 1Cy 3TFW ............. 1CyAFRDQ ............ 1 Cy AFLC (MCF) ....... 1Cy 8TFW ............. 1CyAFSLP ............ 1Cy ATC (ATXDC) ...... 1 Cy 12TFW ............ I CyAFSMS ............ 1 Cy SAC (DO) ......... 1 Cy 14SOW ............ 1 CyAFSME ............ 1 Cy SAC (DPL) ........ 1 Cy 31TFW ............ 1 CyAFSSS ............ 1 Cy SAC (DXI) ........ I Cy 35TFW ............ I CyAFSTP ............ 1 Cy SAC (DIX) ........ 1Cy 37TFW ............ I CyAFXOP ............ 1 Cy SAC (OA) ......... 1 Cy 56SOW ............ 1 CyAFXOPS ........... 1 Cy USAFA (DFH) ...... 1 Cy 315SOW ........... 1CyAFX SL ........... 1 Cy USAFE (OPL) ...... 2 Cys 355TFW ........... 1 CyAFXQSO ........... 1 Cy USAFSO (BIOH) .... 1 Cy 366TFW ........... 1CyAFXPSN .......... 1 Cy USAFSS (ODC) ..... Cy 388TFW ........... 1 CyAFX PR .......... 1 Cy USAFSS (COI-5) ... 1 Cy 432TRW ........... 1 CyAFXOTZ ........... 1Cy 460TRW (DCO) ..... 1 CyAFXPD ............ 9 Cys OTHERS 483TAW ........... 1CyAFXDOC ........... 1Cy 553RECON WG ...... 1CyAFXDOD ........... 1Cy 9AF (DO) ......... 1 Cy 6400 TEST SQ ..... 1CyAFXDOL ........... 1 Cy 12AF (DI) ........ 1 Cy DOTEC ............ 6 Cys

iii

UNWLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIEDTABLE OF CONTENTS

* PageFOREWORD ............................................................... vCHAPTER I. CONCEPT AND STRATEGY ....................................... 1CHAPTER II. ARC LIGHT STRIKES ....................................... 5

Summary of Enemy Situation ............................ 5Campaign of Interdiction .............................. 6

CHAPTER III. TACTICAL AIR ............................................. 13CHAPTER IV. SUPPORTING OPERATIONS ..................................... 17

CS Bulk Drum Drops .................................... 17Psychological Operations .............................. 19

CHAPTER V. GROUND OPERATION ........................................... 21CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY OF AIR ACTION ..................................... 25FOOTNOTES

Foreword ........................................................... 27Chapter I .......................................................... 27Chapter II ......................................................... 27Chapter III ........................................................ 28Chapter IV ......................................................... 28Chapter V .......................................................... 29

GLOSSARY ............................................................... 30FIGURES Follows Page1. Northwestern Highlands of II Corps ............................... v2. B-52 Tonnage ..................................................... 63. TRUSCOTT WHITE ................................................... 84. Tactical Air Sorties ............................................. 125. Tactical Air Tonnage ............................................. 126. Summary of Operations ............................................ 26

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FOREWORD

In May 1968, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., Commander, U.S. MilitaryAssistance Command, Vietnam, reported a major push by two North VietnameseArmy divisions in the Central Highlands was smashed by B-52 bombers "beforeit could get started". These words introduce one of the most dramaticallyI/successful Allied operations in the Vietnam conflict.

In mid-May 1968, the enemy massed two divisions, the 325th from theKhe Sanh area and the Ist from the Kontum-Pleiku area, to overrun Alliedpositions in mountainous Kontum Province. This was double the forcethat was originally engaged around Dak To in the bitter fighting for thestrategic hills in that area in November 1967. Based on what GeneralAbrams called "solid intelligence", B-52s were requested for mass strikes,breaking up enemy concentrations and forcing a retreat across the Cambo-dian border to his sanctuary. In his major effort, the enemy was ableto launch but one ground attack and a few attacks by fire against Alliedfire support bases.

"TRUSCOTT WHITE" details the action required in employing airpowerin this significant campaign, and emphasizes B-52 operations and tacticalairstrikes. This report shows how ARC LIGHT strikes contributed moresignificantly to the success of Operation MATHEWS, the Army groundoperation within TRUSCOTT WHITE, than to any previous 4th Infantry2/Division operation.

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NORTHWESTERNQL HIGHLANDS14 OF

LAOS II ORPS

#/I l DAK SEANG

%%\ / BENHECID

I10 1 512 DAK TO14U - i

CAMBODIAa' VIETNAMI '"I

POLEI KLENGPLEI TRAP

VALLEYLEGEND

Enemy RoadsEstablished RoadsBorder QL14Enemy Attack Route

MAP NOT TO SCALETO SAIGON

P1 FTKII

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CHAPTER ICONCEPT AND STRATEGY

A very successful air interdiction and ground offensive campaignwas completed in June 1968, in the northwestern highlands of II Corpsnear Dak To. The area of operation is bounded on the west by theCambodian/Laotian border, on the east by the provincial capitals of

and Kontum, and the strategic town of Dak To on the north. Theterrain is traversed from north to south by the Dak Se/Dak Poko Valley.Mountains in the area rise as high as 7,000 feet on either side ofthe valley and are covered by thick, double-canopied jungle.

Early in the spring of 1968, several significant events combinedto alert U.S. and Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces to the enemy'spossible future moves. The successful defense of Khe Sanh had resultedin the withdrawal of several large enemy units, which could be usedelsewhere. The partial bombing halt in North Vietnam was expected toresult in increased infiltration; the enemy might seek significant mili-tary victories to enhance his bargaining position in the Paris negotia-tions. In addition, many friendly units had been withdrawn from theCentral Highlands as a result of the Communist TET Offensive. Theapproaching monsoon season would make troop movement and resupply acti-vities very difficult, and therefore, any major enemy offensive intothe Central Highlands would have to start in March or April.

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Since January 1968, friendly Intelligence had been reporting enemyroad building activity, troop movements, and base camp construction inthe area west of Dak To. FACs had been reporting almost daily sightingsof new road and bridge construction in this area. The enemy was obviouslyadding new, all-weather roads to an already efficient 700-mile road netand logistic system. These routes supported infiltration of troops andsupplies through the Demilitarized Zone or across Laos and through Cambo-dia. Of strategic interest were the new routes discovered west of Dak Toand Pleiku. Aimed at the provincial capitals of Kontum and Pleiku, theywould give the enemy high-speed motorable roads on which to support amajor attack on the Central Highlands. Also, the enemy was constructinga major extension of Route 110 running from Laos through the northerntip of Cambodia into Kontum Province. The significance of this developingroad system was immense. Intelligence reports indicated that after makingallowances for operational commitments the enemy was infiltrating asmuch as 155 tons of material a day over the established road network.

If the North Vietnamese were allowed to continue unchecked, theywould soon drive their road net northeast to Highway 14, the second mostimportant north-south road in South Vietnam. Moving eastward alongRoute 512, the enemy could easily bring overwhelming pressure againstthe strategically placed town of Dak To. Should Dak To fall to theenemy, the gateway to the northern half of Vietnam would be opened, andthe DMZ could be pressured from the south as well as from the north.More importantly, the enemy could sweep down Highway 14 to the provincial

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capitals of Kontum and Pleiku, and thus control all the Central High-lands. It was obvious to Air Force and Army Intelligence personnel3/that this threat from the tri-border area must be stopped.

To counter this threat, in March 1968, both the USAF and Armyinstituted priority intelligence-gathering efforts consisting of aerialphoto reconnaissance, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP), VisualReconnaissance (VR) by fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, ARDF, andprisoner interrogations. The intelligence gathered clearly showed thatthe enemy was making a major effort to construct roads and bridges whichwould be usable during the entire monsoon season. NVA soldiers capturedwere identified as members of the 325th NVA Division, which had movedsouth from Khe Sanh. The redeployment of division-size units underscoredthe enemy's determination to make a major push in this area in the near4/future.

In April 1968, the U.S. Army began Operation TRUSCOTT WHITE in anarea west and southwest of Dak To and toward the Laotian and Cambodianborders. The objective of this operation was to "deny the enemy theunrestricted use of the road net by destroying his installations, per-sonnel, and equipment". In the 4th Infantry Division operations plan,tactical airpower was programmed, along with artillery, defoliation,chemical warfare, B-52 strikes, electronic and visual reconnaissanceequipment, reconnaissance patrols, and primary ground units to locate,harass, and destroy the enemy equipment and troops. The flexibility

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and tremendous weight of firepower delivered by the USAF met and sur-5/passed this goal.The Air Force effort assumed a far greater role than was originally

planned for TRUSCOTT WHITE. It must be emphasized that this campaignwas a jointly-coordinated Air Force and Army effort. Seventh Air Force,however, considered this campaign to be the highest priority mission in6/South Vietnam, and the results later justified this emphasis.

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CHAPTER IIARC LIGHT STRIKES

Summary of Enemy SituationThe enemy border road system consisted of one north-south segment,

entering RVN in the vicinity of YB 723063 and extending south to thevicinity of YA 667715, with two extensions to the east from the north-south road. One began at YB 735041 and the other at YA 752909. Daily,this road system was being extended, farther south and east, and

improved to accept a greater truck capacity. There were numerousconfirmed reports from aerial VR and LRRPs operating in the area, oftrucks using the road for movement of troops and supplies. There werealso repeated instances of troops being sighted along the road. On14 March, a company size unit was sighted working on the road. Thenumerous prepared defensive positions, bivouac areas, and supply pointsI/clearly indicated the planned permanency of the road system.-

The amount of ground-to-air fire from automatic and antiaircraftweapons indicated the enemy's determination to protect the road. Thisroad provided the enemy with a high-speed, heavy-duty vehicular highwayfrom the tri-border area south, deep into the Plei Trap Valley. Thesouthernmost terminal of the road was only 32 kilometers from the SeSan River and 32 kilometers from New Plei Djereng. The two confirmedextensions to the east terminated north and west of Polei Kleng. Inaddition to the greatly increased capability to rapidly infiltratelarge forces into RVN, the road system provided the enemy a similarly

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increased capability to shift troops from the Ben Het/Dak To area to2/the Pleiku City area within a matter of hours.

Campaign of InterdictionTactical air operations were required by the 4th Infantry Divisionwithin the limits of the MAC ARTHUR area of operation to prevent unrestricteduse of the road network, hamper the buildup of supplies by the NVA, delayroad building operations, suppress AA positions, and interdict the existing3/road.-

The OPlan called for tactical airstrikes on road choke points,truck parks, bridges, supply points, and antiaircraft position. Thecampaign of interdiction began on 7 April 1968 and lasted until 22 June.

One of the major achievements of this campaign was the tremendousfirepower placed on an enemy, who was constantly on the move shiftinghis bases, material, and troops. The teamwork demonstrated by theAir Force and Army was outstanding in that Allied forces were able tohit enemy positions with a tremendous sustained rate of airstrikesand artillery bombardment. For example, there were 1,261 ARC LIGHTsorties flown in a two-and-one-half month period, with 35,308 tons of4/ordnance expended.- (Fig. 2.)

Col. Joseph Fix, Commander, Ist Brigade, 4th Infantry Division,5/stated the situation:

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TONS B-52IN

THOUSANDS TONNAGE1098765432-10 I i

M- rQI- N)00X) r) N)

C) -j 0) c n jc

CD

B-52 Average-28 Tons Per Sortie35,308 Tons Total

FIGURE 2

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"Now at this point I think the Air Force can takeexceptional satisfaction in the ARC LIGHT missions,because they were used in a tactical role, not inthe strategic interdiction mission, but in theclassic tactical support of troops on the ground.We brought them in as close as 1,500 meters, in somecases. If you were to ever experience an ARC LIGHTup close, within 1,500 meters, as I have, it is asclose as I ever want to be. It is a horrendouspsychological weapon, and I thought at the timethat Nagasaki and Hiroshima must have been likethis when all of a sudden the peace and quiet ofthe jungle erupted into terrible nerve-shatteringexplosions and all hell seems to erupt. For theenemy to live under this threat must be a fantasticpsychological problem for their leaders to over-come and their soldiers to accept. Even if theylive through it, they cannot escape without someminor concussion problems, and the psychologicaleffect must be terrible when they come out oftheir bunkers and see the destruction wrought bythese strikes that come without any warning....

"According to my figures, in the month of May1968, we put in about 98 ARC LIGHT strikes, totalingalmost 600 aircraft sorties. I don't have it at myfingertips right now - the amount of sorties thatwent in from 1-15 June, but it was a tremendousamount and I suspect it was close to 500 sortiesthat went into this (actually 377 sorties). Sothere was this fantastic amount of firepower thatcould be dropped and covered this huge area on aminute's notice, around the clock, and they justconstantly heckled and harassed him... in all Lisassembly areas. "

The key point of the entire campaign was that the Army controlledthe high ground west of Dak To and Kontum, and the enemy was forced tomass troops to attack any key fire support bases located in the moun-tains. U.S. reconnaissance efforts were successful in keeping closewatch on all enemy movements and finding his base camps in the thickjungle. Therefore, when the enemy did attempt to mass his troops for

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an attack, he was almost always hit immediately by tactical air orARC LIGHT strikes. The airstrikes spoiled his efforts before he couldlaunch the attack, and he was forced to move to another location toresupply and regroup.

6/Colonel Fix commented on this phase of the operation as follows:

"We know the terrain better than the enemy and,based on his past performance, we were able topredict where he would go and that is exactly whathe did. So, to set the stage from the Army side,we held the critical terrain, we had magnificentartillery support and we had tremendous knowledgeof the enemy's capabilities and past performancein this area. Once this was set then you got intoone of the finest examples of joint teamwork I haveever seen. It was not a question of whether theartillery was going to fire on the target orwhether we were going to use airpower, and ifairpower was going to be ARC LIGHT or tacticalair, but it was a question of how we could hurtthe enemy the most."The enemy had to expose himself to constant sur-veillance from both the Army and Air Force. Weknew if we saw him in one area generally where hewould go, so we could track him almost foot byfoot...So he was moving from his secure basesinto an area where he was under constant surveil-lance and he was faced with the foreknowledge thatthe critical terrain that he had operated in beforeno longer belonged to him. Therefore, he was forcedto mass in less desirous areas. He no longer couldtravel with impunity the twenty-five clicks (25kilometers) or so from the border to Dak To and getup into the high ground around us. As soon as hecame across that border we knew where he was at, ashe came closer in, he was meeting our advance firebases...."

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TRUSCOTT WHITE

TOTALSB-52 Missions 233B-52 Sorties 1 261B-52 Missions with BDA 91

Secondary Explosions 346Bunkers, Trenches, Fighting Positions 1,045Automatic Weapons Position (AA Sites) 25Bridges/Roads-Damage or Destruction 10

SOURCES OF BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENTVisual Recon 46Strike Crew 59Helicopter Recon 4Photo Inter Report 1Prisoner Report IGround Follow-up I

FIGURE 3

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The battering of enemy supply routes and base camps continuedrelentlessly from 7 April through 25 May 1968. Around-the-clock use ofairpower and artillery had reduced the enemy traffic to a standstill.Motor carrier operation had been replaced by foot traffic, and the enemysupply effort had been seriously curtailed. His laboriously constructedroads and bridges lay in ruins in most strategic locations. The survivorsof this relentless pounding were forced to devote most of their time torepair, salvage, and defense instead of offensive movement.

The ARC LIGHT strikes were particularly devastating at some of thechoke points. In one key area, west of Dak To (YB771239), the entirecontour of the land was completely altered by the concentrated bombing.What was once dense jungle pierced by a creek bed with thickly coveredmountainson both sides, became nothing more than barren, pockmarkeddesert. Even the stream bed had been diverted by the landslides causedby the 750-pound bombs. An Air Force FAC of the Ist Brigade, 4th InfantryDivision, described the area:

"The choke points were struck repeatedly and, tothe best of my knowledge, this was very successfulin creating a blockade in the area. Coincidentallywith the destruction of the choke point, and thedenial of the use of the road to the enemy, the XM-41GRAVEL mine was employed approximately three KM east ofthe Capbodian border to deny that area to the enemy."

The continuing problem of bomb damage assessment (BDA) was evidencedagain during TRUSCOTT WHITE. From a total of 233 B-52 missions flown(Fig. 3), there were BDA results on only 91 missions, or 39 percent

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of the total. These results, however, showed a total of 346 secondaryexplosions, 1,045 bunkers, trenches, and fighting positions damagedor destroyed, but only 25 automatic weapons/antiaircraft sites damagedor destroyed. Only ten bridges or roads were damaged by this heavy8/bombardment.

The ALO of the Ist Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, stated the actualinterdiction of the road was planned to be accomplished primarily through9/tactical air and ARC LIGHT missions.

The problem of BDA was vividly portrayed by the ARC LIGHT statisticsfor this campaign. Although the most accurate and timely BDA is accom-plished by a ground follow-up by infantry, there was evidence of onlyone mission that had any ground follow-up report. The second best methodwas helicopter recon, but there were only four such missions flown. Thegenerally accepted method for BDA acquisition employed in Vietnam wasfor the FACs to VR the area as soon as possible after the strike. Thismethod had many shortcomings. As far as the FACs were concerned, BDAhad a low priority, since their primary function was to seek out newtargets and to control tactical airstrikes. Also, it was very difficultfor a FAC, flying an aircraft in circles over a large, devastated area,while looking through binoculars, to accurately count bunkers, trucks,trenches, equipment, and bodies destroyed and damaged by bombs. Atbest, he could only estimate the results.

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Most of the ARC LIGHT BDA was generated by the strike crew, whocounted the secondary explosions and estimated their intensity, whileflying at extremely high altitudes. These results were useful, however,as they proved there were enemy storage areas, food, and munitions withinthe target box. The color and intensity of the secondary fires also werevaluable intelligence devices for determining the quantity and type ofequipment destroyed in the attack. Nevertheless, not all important enemytargets, such as fortified positions and base camps, would have secondaryfires generated by the bombing attack, and therefore, only ground recon-naissance units or low-flying helicopters could adequately assess thetrue bomb damage.

Maj. Eugene Carnahan, FAC, 21st TASS, highlighted the problem all10/the FACs had during this campaign:

"There were so many ARC LIGHTs that went in therethat we got forty to fifty ARC LIGHTs behind ourBDA. It got to the point that there was absolutelyno way to BDA an individual ARC LIGHT strike becausethere were just too many of them. They were justlaid right on top of one another."

The 4th Infantry Division Operational Report, prepared after thecampaign, attributed much of the success of the campaign to the ARCLIGHT strikes:

"ARC LIGHTs were employed in mass for the firsttime in the Division area of operations and wereclosely coordinated with the scheme of maneuver

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and other fire support means. These strikesproved to be a major factor in the attritionof enemy forces and caused him to abandon hismieeion of overrunning friendly positions inthe Dak Pek and the Dak To-Ben Het area. Al-though single ARC LIGHTs had been planned onenemy targets previously, the grouping ofseveral ARC LIGHTs in one area and over shorttime spans created a devasting effect on theenemy."

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TACTICALAIR

SORTIESSORTIES250- 245225-200-175 182

184

156 151150- --125- 121I 100 109100"75-50 - 49 51

N). N)1II I I M 80IS ) 'D00 LnL N)C-,c.

*1 rDCDDC

1,387 Total Tactical Sorties

FIGURE 4

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TACTICALAIRTONNAGE

TONS401450

400301300-

250 221200 -- 193 189

166 167 152150- 134100 79 86_3

5 I I I I PI FcoALn1(7 N)tokmI M C.-. C -.

Total Tonnage by Tactical Air = 2,089 TonsFIGURE 5

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CHAPTER IIITACTICAL AIR

A brief summary of the intelligence information, as found inthe 4th Infantry Division OPlan, provided a clear picture of the enemythreat to the roads in the area. One Intelligence sighting is quotedas follows:-

"On 29 March 1968, U.S. personnel at Ben Hetobserved an estimated 200 enemy troops movingalong Route 512 at YB 863245. Air reconnais-sance on 30 March revealed the column hadcome directly down the Bet Het border road.(Route 512)."

2/The OPlan continued:

"The Ben Het border road has been used bytracked vehicles. On 12 April, 1st BrigadeLRRP teazn reported finding tracked vehicletracks in the vicinity of YB 780220 andYB 778221. No tracked vehicles have beensighted on the road. The enemy could intro-duce armor into the area of Ben Het borderroad."

There were 390 tactical air sorties planned in the OPlan, but whenthe final tally was made for TRUSCOTT 11HITE, the total reached 1,387sorties. (Fig. 4.) During the campai-'n, 0-1 and 0-2 spotter aircraftand photo intelligence aircraft continually located new targets, whichwere fed to the Intelligence Section. As new targets were developed,the daily request for tactical air missions rose at an outstandingrate. (Figs. 4 & 5.) All forms of firepower were used, including

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artillery, F-lOOs, F-105s, F-4Cs, A-lEs, C-130s, and helicopters. Aerialmining was accomplished in many key segments of the road net. Also, 250drums of C-l and C-2 CS gas were dropped by C-130 cargo aircraft atstrategic choke points. Defoliation missions were flown by UC-123 air-craft and were highly effective in uncovering enemy sanctuaries. TheAir Force effort reached a final peak in mid-May with 401 sorties by tac-tical air.

3/A DASC Alpha IFFV narrative report stated:

"From mid-May to the beginning of June the Air Forcerained upon the enemy the destructive power whichapproached the level seen at the historic defense ofKhe Sanh. However, in the final week, the airdelivered firepower exceeded the level of thatcampaign. "

The significance of this achievement is better understood whenthe concepts of the two campaigns are compared. In the battle of KheSanh, one large force had another force under siege, and the battlewas one of static defense. In the TRUSCOTT WHITE operation, theenemy was constantly moving, shifting his forces from one sanctuaryto another in an effort to mass his troops for a decisive attack.This attack never developed because Air Force and Amy Intelligencewere able to pinpoint his every move. The result was massive airpowerand artillery attacks that stalled his efforts. For example, the totaltonnage of bombs delivered (37,307 tons) ranks as the second heaviest4/bombardment of the war.

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Although the main emphasis of the attack was the area west of DakTo on both sides of Route 512, there were many tactical airstrikesagainst road construction efforts as far south as the Plei Trap Valley,30 miles west of Kontum City. In addition, base camps and troop con-centrations were kept under pressure 30 to 40 miles west and northwestof Kontum. A significant interdiction effort by fighter-bombers wasflown against roads in the far northwest corner of II Corps TacticalZone, west of Dak Pek, which was extremely effective in deterring enemy5/reinforcements from reaching the main battle zone.

In spite of the success of the overall tactical air efforts, theproblem of targeting was significant in the early stages. Comments made6/by the FACs, who worked the fighter strikes, highlight this issue:-

"The Amy built a fine plan for interdicting theI road, depicting the nunbers of strikes to be flownon each point; i.e., bridges, choke points, storageareas, truck parks, gun sites, etc., and they laidthese out with exact coordinates to the nearestten meters. When it came time to implement theptans we would be given a set of coordinates anda target description. Then we'd go out there andwouldn't find anything.... We'd have to look aroundand we would find somewhere about 500 to 1,000 metersaway a bridge or bunker or something that resembledthe target description. We would then ask for per-mission to move the airstrike and, at first, wewere denied permission. Later, they did allow usto move up to 100 meters, without prior approval,in order to move the ordnance onto the target."

7/Mother FAC made the following comments on the same problem:

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"We ran into several instances where the road hadbeen misplotted and we had to strike coordinatesbecause they did not coincide with the road to anyknoam target on that particulargrid. This raiseda small problem in the early phases of the inter-diction program in that we would have to adjust thetarget coordinates to a suspected position, or overon the road where the coordinates were obviouslymeant for. But, in the early weeks of the progran,the actual trace of the road was inaccurate and,consequently, it took a concerted effort by theFACs to move the targets over to the correct targetareas or on the road itself. Quite often you wouldbe guessing at the target because there was abso-lutely nothing on the target grid. So you would haveto hunt within 400 to 500 meters to find a targetand, consequently, the ordnance was often deliveredon suspected locations or non-profitable areas."

The tactical air phase reached its peak during the week of 26 May,when MACV inaugurated "Operation MATHEWS", a two-week ground campaigndesigned to destroy elements of the 325th NVA Division west of Dak To.Tactical air was used to prepare landing zones and soften enemy posi-tions prior to attack by friendly units. During this climactic week,245 sorties expended 401 tons of assorted ordnance on enemy positions.Around-the-clock capability was maintained through COMBAT SKYSPOTground-controlled radar techniques, which enabled the fighter bombersto strike the enemy regardless of weather conditions. After this peakeffort, the tactical air phase rapidly decreased as the ground effortcame to a close.

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CHAPTER IVSUPPORTING OPERATIONS

During the li-week period of the campaign, there were 1,387 tacticalair sorties flown, delivering 2,089 tons of ordnance. (Figs. 4 and 5.)Air Force FACs put in 72 percent of this ordnance, while the remaining28 percent was controlled by COMBAT SKYSPOT radar techniques. All typesof ordnance were delivered; bombs from 250 lbs. to 2,000 lbs., napalm,I/rockets, 20mm strafing attacks, and cluster bomb units (CBU).- GravelMines were used successfully in two key areas at YB 746040 and YB 762215.There were 116 sorties flown, delivering the XM-41 Gravel Mine to twogeneral target areas.

Maj. Eugene Carnahan, FAC of 21st TASS, expressed his opinion on3/the effectiveness of the Gravel operations as follows:

C"Gravel Mines (M-41) were delivered by A-lEs out aof Nakhon Phanom. I don't know how many sorties wereexpended on the east-west road, but they were highlysuccessful. We got good road cuts immediately andtraffic slowed down or stopped almost immediately.But they (the enemy) were rebuilding it constantly. IsWe just kept pounding them, and kept the cuts in Dethere. " ,w

CS Bulk Drum DropsTwo of the largest bulk drum drops of persistant chemical agent

(CS-I) were successfully accomplished during TRUSCOTT WHITE. The firstexperimental drop took place on 28 May 68, when four C-130 aircraftdropped a total of 256 drums of bulk CS on the northern road in the

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vicinity of YB 9085. The aircraft loads were on target, detonatingunder the canopy and resulting in 75 percent effectiveness. Approximatelyone-third of one aircraft load detonated above the canopy, due to release

4/at a higher altitude than planned, causing the CS to dissipate.

"Based on TRUSCOTT WHITE and 4th Inf Div reportsand photography, the area in which the CS wasdropped apparently resulted in denial for 9 days.(Earliest activity reported on road is 7 June.)"

Again on 2 June, three C-130 aircraft dropped a total of 192 drumsof bulk CS on QL-14, vic (YB 9384,9485,9484) near the intersection ofthe Northern Road. The targets were three choke points which had beencut by tactical air strikes. All drums were on target, all detonatedunder the canopy, or just above the ground, and neither duds nor pre-mature detonation was noted. The Forward Air Controller reported 100percent effectiveness, and aerial photographs taken immediately following5/the drop confirmed the FAC reports.

As a result of this drop, the choke points were not used nor wererepairs attempted for a period of 14 days.

The following comments and observations are quoted from the COC-76/(MACV) Report:

"Both operations proved the feasibility ofaccurately dropping large quantities of bulkCS on specific targets."Weather was the limiting factor in both dropsbecause of heavy rainfall subsequent to thedrops. CS-1 is rapidly dissipated by rain.

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The new CS-2 programed fo r RVN in July orAugust 68 is not affected by moisture andis considered twice as persistent as CS-1."The experimental DM 920EZ fuze and bursterused to detonate the drums, seemed to performsatisfactorily but required a thoroughlytrained individual to set and install, toinsure proper functioning and correct heightof burst."An impact fuze can be used on each drum insteadof the XM 920EZ fuze to insure detonation, pre-vent duds and to preclude adherence to a defi-nite altitude which is not always feasible inmountainous country."This operation, which constitutes the largestCS drop in Vietnam, was very successful. Infuture drops consideration should be given toCS-2 as the agent of choice; the target weathermust be considered (monsoon season reduces effec-tiveness) and the target should be such as topreclude any other means of egress into or outof the area."

Psychological OperationsA small program of psychological operations was conducted toward the

end of the campaign in the area west and north of Dak To. It s purposewas to create dissatisfaction and to cause desertion among NVA units.

A total of 108 psyops missions were flown in support of the TaskForce for Operation MATHEWS, the Army ground operation, in the TRUSCOTTWHITE campaign. These missions dropped 2,200,000 leaflets and made 140hours of taped loudspeaker broadcasts. In addition, psyops personnelconducted 82 hours of live broadcasts over known and suspected enemy7/locations.

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During the operation, three NVA soldiers rallied to the Alliedcause. These individuals provided unit identification, personalities,and locations of units, which were promptly exploited by psyops teams.The Chieu Hoi's (ralliers) wrote leaflets and made tapes urging theircomrades to rally; their reasons for rallying were B-52 strikes, suffering,8/and the hardships of life in the jungle.

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CHAPTER VGROUND OPERATION

On 27 May 1968, the Army began the first phase of Operation MATHEWS,using a Task Force consisting of the lst Brigade, 4th Infantry Division,and the 3d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, under the command ofthe Assistant Division Commander of the 4th Infantry Division. The areaof operation encompassed Dak Pek, Dak To, and the area west, to theCambodian/Laotian border. Operation MATHEWS was the Army ground opera-tion within TRUSCOTT WHITE, and was notable for the unusually closeair support rendered by ARC LIGHT strikes. The B-52s were employedI 4/against the enemy troop concentrations in the mountains west of Ben Het.

Col. Joseph E. Fix, Commander of 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division,1/gives the following account of the ground offensive:

"I would point out that on 'D' day we went in andseized our initial objectives, hills 990 and 900,which gave me the shoulders of the penetration.It was planned the next day to jump deep, veryclose to the Laotian Border and put a battalionin there which in effect would pose two problemsto the enemy. He could either turn himselfout of position and fight this new threat or hecould stay in position and bring in heavy rein-forcement. Either way, it would be to our advan-tage. Unfortunately on the night of D-day...Dak Pek erupted. So the third brigade of the101st Air Cav, which had been sent into thisarea and had been holding my rear bases so thatmy brigade could carry the fight to the enemy,was diverted northward (to Dak Pek) within aperiod of 24 hours. Therefore, I had to standdown a lot of my offensive operations, pick upthese bases that were left uncovered and couldthen only make an attack that day that was veryshallow in effect.

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"We set up a line, but we never had the strength togo deep. A crucial point of the operation thattends to be forgotten, is that we were never ableto get the deep objective which would have trappeda larger part of them in a pocket, We intended totake the shoulders on D-day, go deep on D+ and then,depending on how the hell he reacted, I had the 4thBattalion cocked, on the original plan, to jump rightin the middle of them. This would have effectivelydemolished the 325 Charlie Division except for thatdatm Dak Pek incident. And3 interestingly enough,after we got Dak Pek stabilized, and I did get someforces back from there, and I was getting ready togo deep for the second time, in fact, deeper thanwe had anticipated originally because I had beenattacking over the ground and my forward bases werenow closer to the border. Again, I had done mypreliminary reconnaissance, we brought in air-strikes and artillery, softening up the objectivearea. I had deployed troops into fire base 18 withartillery to give me more adequate artillery support.I was going in the very next morning but Dak Pekerupted again that night and the battalion that wasto make the assault was diverted and I had to go upto Dak Pek... So the most frustrating thing about thisoperation was that two times when we could have reallynailed this guy (the enemy), I had to divert forcesbecause of requirements elsewhere. ,Now let me givesome casualty figures as to the effectiveness of theccrpaign. Because as has been pointed out, this wasthe most concentrated use of air power, next to KheSanh, I guess in the history of warfare, As opposedto that, the TET offensive, which was country-wide,there was a minimum of air support resources. Myrecords, available to me in my brigade, and I canonly stress that they are authentic, are these:that from the period 12 Oct 1967... until 24 Apr 68,the confirmned enemy killed in action that this bri-gade had totaled were 1,241, There were 25 prisonersof war captured and some Hoi Chanhs. Now in theperiod Apr through 23 June 1968, (about elevenweeks) we had 508 enemy killed, 13 captured and someHoi Chanh's. But the point I want to make here isthat in view of the tremendous amount of fire powerthat was expended in these 2-1/2 months, our killsdidn't increase appreciably."

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The question has been raised as to why there was not a higher enemykill during the campaign, and the answer can only be conjectured. Itis a fact that the enemy endured terrible punishment, in spite of hisfrantic efforts at complete mobility and concealment, As was pointedout earlier, BOA was very sketchy, with hardly any ground follow-up,while the heavy bombardment of the enemy positions was taking place.

Nevertheless, during Operation MATHEWS, the 4th Infantry DivisionAfter Action Report shows 352 enemy killed, 141 individual weapons and19 crew-served weapons captured, Friendly casualties during this period(24 May - 12 June) were 39 killed-in-action and 274 wounded. Therewere 309 fighter missions flown for a total of 661 fighter sorties. Inthe area west of Dak Pek, there were 31 ARC LIGHT missions flown againstenemy troops, which were threatening to overrun the camp. As a resultof these strikes, the enemy was able to launch only one ineffectiveground attack on the friendly positions.5

The 4th Infantry Division After Action Report summarized the effective-6/ness of airpower in this operation:

"In summary, it is apparent that the mass employmentof ARC LIGHT strikes played a major role in the decisivedefeat of elements of two NVA Divisions in OperationMATHEWS. Although extensive efforts were made to assessbomb damage, no single target strike could have provedto have produced dramatic results, Taken in sum, how-ever, the evidence of their effect is conclusive. Theenemy made a major effort during this operation, movinglarge forces for long distances to mass them againstnumerically inferior US forces; he introduced moresophisticated weapons systems than had been previouslyused in the Central Highlands, including artillery,and probably armor. Despite this major effort the

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enemy did not achieve one minor objective., but paida staggering price in casualties and damage. Friendlycasualties were very light by comparison when theresults achieved are considered. The large number ofARC LIGHT were massed in a relatively small area wherethe enemy forces had to assemble to attack their objec-tives, and they were never able to organize a sustainedattack."

7/The report continued with a summary for the action west of Dak To:"In the Dak To-Ben Het area the concept of operationcalled for the numerically inferior Allied forces tooccupy the critical terrain in the area in strength,concentrating the division reconnaissance package inthe area to find targets for exploitation of thefriendly preponderance of fire power... Although largeand determined enemy elements were known to have beenpresent in the objective area prior to the preparationphase, US forces were able to complete three battalionair assaults into bold landing zones on D-Day withoutloss of a single US soldier. In operations following theUS attack, ARC LIGHTs continued to be used in mass tocomplete the exploitation and to neutralize enemy fires.A total of 20 targets were attacked during this period,bringing the total for Operation MATHEWS in this areato 88."

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CHAPTER VISUMARY OF AIR ACTION

There was a combined total of 2,648 Tactical Air and ARC LIGHT sorties,releasing 37,397 tons of bombs on the enemy in an 11-week period. (Fig. 6.)

This was an interdiction campaign against an enemy attempt to builda motorable road net, which was threatening the Central Highlands ofVietnam. The enemy was unable to mount an effective ground threat of apersistent nature. The campaign raised the possibility that the enemycould be denied access to any area where massive air attacks could bebrought to bear. Accordingly, it had important effects upon the strategyfor conducting ground operations in VN.

The Air Force in TRUSCOTT WHITE, which the Army had termed "crucial"to the immediate ground situation, changed the entire nature of the battle,Around-the-clock bombardment by airpower reduced enemy traffic to a nearstandstill. The enemy was forced to move on foot rather than by trucks,and his supply efforts were drastically curtailed. Consequently, hewas compelled to spend most of his time repairing roads and salvagingequipment; he was placed in a defensive position, rather than an offensiveposture. His tediously constructed road network lay in ruins, poundedinto uselessness by the combined efforts of airpower and artillery.With no place to hide, the enemy no longer enjoyed freedom of action, butwas forced to react to constant harassment of the Allied bombardment. Theconstant joint Intelligence effort of the Air Force and Army, coupled

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with Visual Reconnaissance efforts of the Forward Air Controllers, keptcontinuous pressure on the enemy and forced him into a defensive posture.

The Air Force demonstrated in this campaign, as at Khe Sanh, thatairpower defense, through offensive tactical and strategic interdictionand close air support, is essential and effective.

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SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

TOTAL B-52 SORTIES TACTICAL AIR1,261 Sorties 1,387 Total Tactical Air Sorties28 tons per sortie-35,308 tons 2,089 Total Tonnage by Tacticalor Air70,616,000 pounds

72% of Tac Air Controlled by FACs

GRAVEL OPERATIONS(XM-41 Mines)116 Sorties Total 28% Tac Air Controlled by

COMBAT SKYSPOT

84 Sorties on "Charlie" Route

FIGURE 6

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I ~. iI V'ISSIFIEDFOOTNOTESFOREWORD

1. (C) News Release, Saigon, Joseph Fried, Staff Correspondent of"The News", New York News, 21 Jul 68, 20 Jul 68, Doc. 1.2. (C) Rpt, DOA, Hq 4th Inf Div, AVDDH-GC-MH, "Operational Rpt - LessonsLearned", 31 Jul 68, Doc. 2. (Hereafter cited: OperationalRpt - Lessons Learned.7

CHAPTER I1. (S) Ltr, DASC, Alpha, IFFV, APO 96350 to 7AF, TACC (TACD), APO USForces 96307, subj: Dak To Air Offensive Narrative Rpt, 28 Jun

68, w/2 Atch: Atch 1 (S), Rpt, "Dak To Offensive NarrativeRpt", undated; Atch 2 (S), Bomb Tonnage Chart, undated, Doc. 3.(Hereafter cited: Dak To Air Offensive Narrative Rpt.)2. Ibid.3. Ibid.4. (S) OPlan Nr 7-68, Hq 4th Inf Div, Camp ENARI, RVN (AR799347),051200H Apr 68, Doc. 4. (Hereafter cited: OPlan Nr 7-68.)5. Ibid.6. (S) Dak To Air Offensive Narrative Rpt, Doc. 3.

CHAPTER II1. (S) OPlan Nr 7-68, Doc. 4.2. Ibid.3. Ibid.

4. (S) Rpt, Hq USMACV, IDHS, Job Code 8206024, "ARC LIGHT Strikes -TRUSCOTT WHITE, undated, Doc. 5. (Hereafter cited: ARC LIGHTStrikes - TRUSCOTT WHITE.)

5. (S) Interview with Col Joseph E. Fix, Comdr, 1st Inf Bde, U.S.Army, undated, Doc. 6. (Hereafter cited: Interview with ColonelFix.)

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SECRET6. Ibid.7. (S) Interview with Maj Eugene Carnahan, FAC, 21st TASS, Pleiku, VNundated, Doc. 7. (Hereafter cited: Interview with MajorCarnahan.)8. (S) ARC LIGHT Strikes - TRUSCOTT WHITE, Doc. 4.9. (S) Interview with Maj Michael Burke, USAF, ALO, lst Bde, 4th Inf

Div, undated, Doc. 8. (Hereafter cited: Interview with MajorBurke.)

10. (S) Interview with Major Carnahan, Doc. 7.11. (C) Operational Rpt - Lessons Learned.

CHAPTER III1. (S) OPlan Nr 7-68, Doc. 4.2. Ibid.3. (S) Dak To Air Offensive Narrative Rpt, Doc. 3.4. (S) ARC LIGHT Strikes - TRUSCOTT WHITE, Doc 5.5. (S) Dak To Air Offensive Narrative Rpt, Doc. 3.6. (S) Interview with Major Carnahan, Doc. 7.7. (S) Interview with Major Burke, Doc. 8.

CHAPTER IV1. (S) Operational Rpt, 4th Inf Div, 14 Apr-6 Jul 68, Doc. 9.2. (S) Rpt, MACV, Gravel Operations; Gravel Seeding XM-41, 23 Apr-

12 Jun 68, Doc. 10.3. (S) Interview with Major Carnahan, Doc. 6.4. (C) Rpt, COC-7, MACV, "CS Drum Drops", undated, Doc. 11.(C) Rpt, COC-7, MACV, "Comments and Observations on CS Drops,undated, Doc. 12.5. Ibid.

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UNCLASSIFIED6. Ibid.7. (C) Operational Rpt - Lessons Learned, Doc. 8.8. Ibid.

CHAPTER V

1. (S) Interview with Colonel Fix, Doc. 5.2. (S) Dak To Air Offensive Narrative Rpt, Doc. 2.3. Ibid.4. (C) Operational Rpt - Lessons Learned, Doc. 8.5. Ibid.6. Ibid.7. Ibid.

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UNCLASSIFIEDGLOSSARY

ARDF Airborne Radar Direction FindingBOA Bomb Damage AssessmentBde BrigadeCBU Cluster Bomb UnitCIDG Civilian Irregular Defense GroupCOC Combat Operations CenterDASC Direct Air Support CenterDMZ Demilitarized ZoneDOD Department of DefenseEW Early WarningFAC Forward Air ControllerFSB Fire Support BaseLRRP Long Range Reconnaissance PatrolMACV Military Assistance Command, VietnamNVA North Vietnamese ArmyOPlan Operations PlanPOL Petrpleum, Oil, and LubricantsPsyops Psychological OperationsRecon ReconnaissanceRegt RegimentRVN Republic of VietnamSAC Strategic Air CommandTASS Tactical Air Support SquadronVR Visual Reconnaissance