1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

12
1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition
  • date post

    22-Dec-2015
  • Category

    Documents

  • view

    229
  • download

    0

Transcript of 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

Page 1: 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

1

Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition

Page 2: 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

2

Research and Development

Page 3: 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

3

Introduction• Technical progress is the source of rising living

standards over time• Introduces new concept of efficiency

– Static efficiency—traditional allocation of resources to produce existing goods and services so as to maximize surplus and minimize deadweight loss

– Dynamic efficiency—creation of new goods and services to raise potential surplus over time

Page 4: 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

4

Introduction 2

• Schumpeterian hypotheses (conflict between static and dynamic efficiency)– Concentrated industries do more research and

development of new goods and services, i.e., are more dynamically efficient, than competitively structured industries

– Large firms do more research & development than small firms

Page 5: 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

5

A Taxonomy of InnovationsProduct versus Process Innovations • Product Innovations refer to the creation of new goods and

new services, e.g., DVD’s, PDA’s, and cell phones• Process Innovations refer to the development of new

technologies for producing goods or new ways of delivering services, e.g., robotics and CAD/CAM technology

• We mainly focus on process or cost-savings innovations but the lines of distinction are blurred—a new product can be the means of implementing a new process

Page 6: 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

6

A Taxonomy of Innovations 2

Drastic versus Non-Drastic Innovations• Process innovations have two further categories• Drastic innovations have such great cost savings that they

permit the innovator to price as an unconstrained monopolist

• Non-drastic innovations give the innovator a cost adavantage but not unconstrained monopoly power

Page 7: 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

7

Drastic versus Non-Drastic Innovations• Suppose that demand is given by: P = 120 – Q and all

firms have constant marginal cost of c = $80• Let one firm have innovation that lowers cost to cM = $20• This is a Drastic innovation. Why?

– Marginal Revenue curve for monopolist is: MR = 120 – 2Q

– If cM = $20, optimal monopoly output is: QM = 70 and PM = $70

– Innovator can charge optimal monopoly price ($70) and still undercut rivals whose unit cost is $80

Page 8: 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

8

Drastic versus Non-Drastic Innovations 2• Now consider the case if cost fell only to $60,

innovation is Non-drastic– Marginal Revenue curve again is: MR = 120 = 2Q– Optimal Monopoly output and price: QM = 30; PM = $90– However, innovator cannot charge $90 because rivals

have unit cost of $80 and could under price it– Innovator cannot act as an unconstrained monopolist– Best innovator can do is to set price of $80 (or just

under) and supply all 40 units demanded.

Page 9: 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

9

Drastic vs. Non-Drastic Innovations 3Innovation is drastic if monopoly output QM at MR = new marginal

c’ exceeds the competitive output QC at old marginal cost c$/unit = p

Quantity

c

QC

c’

QM

Demand

$/unit = p

c

PM

QC QM

Demand

c’

PM

Drastic Innovation: QM > QC so innovator can

charge monopoly price PM without constraint

NonDrastic Innovation: QM < QC so innovator cannot charge monopoly price PM

because rivals can undercut

that price

MR

Quantity

MR

Page 10: 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

10

Innovation and Market Structure• Arrow’s (1962) analysis—

– Innovative activity likely to be too little because innovators consider only monopoly profit that the innovation brings and not the additional consumer surplus

– Monopoly provides less incentive to innovate that competitive industry because of the Replacement Effect

• Assume demand is: P = 120 – Q; MC= $80. Q is initially 40. Innovator lowers cost to $60 and can sell all 40 units at P = $80.

• Profit Gain is $800–Less than Social Gain$/unit

Quantity

80

60

120

B A

40 60

Initial Surplus is Yellow Triangle--Social Gains from Innovation are Areas A

($800) and B ($200)But Innovator Only Considers Profit

Area A ($800)

120

Page 11: 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

11

Innovation and Market Structure 2• Now consider innovation when market structure is monopoly

– Initially, the monopolist produces where MC = MR = $80 at Q = 20 and P = $100, and earns profit (Area C) of $400

– Innovation allows monopolist to produce where MC = MR = $60 at Q = 30 and P = $90 and earn profit of $900

– But this is a gain of only $500 over initial profit due to Replacement Effect—new profits destroy old profits

$/unit

Quantity

90

60

120

C

20 60 120

A

100

30

80

MRDemand

Monopolist Initially Earns Profit C—With Innovation it Earns Profit A—Net Profit

Gain is Area A – Area C Which is Less than the Gain to a

Competitive Firm

Page 12: 1 Strategic Investment and Non-Price Competition.

12

Innovation and Market Structure 3• Preserving Monopoly Profit--the Efficiency Effect• Previous Result would be different if monopolist had to worry

about entrant using innovation– Assume Cournot competition and that entrant can only enter if it

has lower cost, i.e., if it uses the innovation– If Monopolist uses innovation, entrant cannot enter and

monopolist earns $900 in profit– If Monopolist does not use innovation, entrant can enter as low-

cost firm in a duopoly• Entrant earns profit of $711• Incumbent earns profit of $44

– Gain from innovation now is no longer $900 - $400 = $500 but $900 - $44 = $856

– Monopolist always has more to gain from innovation than does entrant—this is the Efficiency Effect