· PREFA CE THIS book is an attempt to review the problems of Nationality in the area affected by...

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PREFA CE

THIS book is an attempt to review the problems ofNationality in the area affected by the War. Myprincipal object has been to present the existing factsin their historical setting, and where these facts are ofa psychological order, as they so often are, I havetried to reproduce sympathetically the different nations '

conflicting points of view .

Some readers will regret that I have not confinedmyself to narrative altogether, and will resent the willand ought that punctuate the was and “ is .I would answer them that this practical application isthe justification of the book .

National questions are of absorbing interest at alltimes to the particular nations they concern ; they areof occasional interest to the professional historian whotouches them in the course of his research to the worldin general they are normally of no interest at all . Butwhat are we to do about it s

'

people exclaim when aproblem is thrust upon their attention, and finding noanswer they hark back to their own affairs .This normal life of ours has suddenly been bewitched

by the War, and in the revaluing of all our valuesthe right reading of the riddle of Nationality has becomean affair of life and death . The war has exploded themine upon which diplomatists have feared to tread,and we are walking in a trance across ruins . S olvitur

ambulando, or else we break our necks .This is my apology for laying down the law, and it

will clear up a further difficulty which might otherwise

v i NATIONALITY AND THE WAR

cause trouble . When you change from present tofuture,

” readers will say, which do you mean toexpound—what will happen, what may happen or whato ught to happen éCertain ly not what will happen If wewin is

the implied hypothesis of every sentence I have written ,a hypothesis that baffles prophecy. If I become cate

gorical, it is a lapse of style , not of standpoint .Certainly not what ought to happen in the

Utopian sense : political problems have no universalsolutions . What does not meet the situation meetsnothing : what meets it to-day will not meet it tom orrow, because the situation itself will have beentransformed by being met .My text is what may happen, yet may partakes

of both will and ought its meaning varieswith its application . The problem of Nationality hascome to concern ourselves, and so far as it concerns usi t depends upon us for its solution—upon our intellectualjudgments, the makin g up of our mind, and upon ourm oral judgments, the determination of our will . Wemay think this or that thought, feel this or thatfeeling, and each will give a different cast to the clayf ate has thrust into our hands . We have to decidewhich way we ought to fashion it .Yet the solution depends upon others as well . Inourselves we often include our allies , but the powerof British will to in fluence Russian action is slightindeed, and when we deal with neutrals or enemies, ourown will ceases to count while theirs becomes allimportant . This will of other parties is for us anobjective fact : we can conjecture what it is likely tobe, and frame our own action either to thwart or topromote it, but we cannot determine their will from

PREFACE vii

within, and it is therefore idle for us to debate whatthey ought to do . In discussing what mayhappen on the European continent we have simplyto discover what national ideals or ambitions will assertthemselves if the war removes certain forces like thetraditional regime in Prussia or the Dual System in theDanubian Monarchy, which hitherto have preventedlarge groups of population from exercising their willand working out their own salvation .

I thus repudiate Utopianism, and declare solvencyfor every draft I make upon the future . The only pieceof Utopianism of which I am deliberately guilty is thesuggestion that the US A . might undertake the ad

ministration o f the Black Sea Straits (Ch . IX . Sect .Of course they will not, and of course Russia will, andagain the reader will resent my inconsistency. Betterhave left out the suggestion he will say .

I have left i t in because it crowns an argument . It isthe reductio ad absurdum of that dearth of internationalorganisation which is largely responsible for Europe 'spresent pass , and possibly it will serve to bring out anunderlying purpose of this book .

My review of problems does not pretend to beexhaustive— that would be beyond the scope of a singlebook and a single writer, and it would also be a wearinesso f the flesh . Problems are legion, and they have noindividual significance in themselves they are valuableonly as illustrations of a phenomenon . By looking atNationali ty in the concrete from successive perspectives ,we may gain a clearer notion of what Nationality is thanby the direct approach of an abstract definition . At anyrate it is worth while making the experiment, for understand Nationality we must, now that it has proved itselfthe dominant politi cal factor in Europe .

NATIONALITY AND THE WAR

I have still to acknowledge my obligations . The chiefso urce of this book is an ingrained habit of gazing atmaps, and much of my material had been imbibedunconsciously in this way long before the war broke outand I sat down to write . My conscious debts are toS tieler

’

s Hand-A tlas of the contemporary world, andto the wonderful Historical A tlas created by KarlSpriiner and Theodor Menke his apostle . Both ofthese I have consulted continuously wh ile writing thebook and compiling my own maps that accompany it,and I have also derived much profit from the littleA lldeutscher A tlas published under the auspices of theA lldeutsche Verband by Justus Perthes , which plots outthe distribution of languages in Central Europe withadmirable exactitude, though it combines scientificexecution with chauvinisti c inspiration in a characteristically German fashion . The reader will note in passingthat the other atlases cited are also of German authorship , and that conclusions based on their evidence arenot likely to be biassed to Germany ’s disadvantage .I am also indebted to books . A mong works of

reference I would single out two of Baedeker ’s handbooks , the eleventh edition o f A ustria-Hungary (191 1 )and Konstantinopel and Kleinasien but in thiscase the German source yields precedence to the

Encyclope dia B ritannica (eleventh edition, publishedin which has proved the most indispensable of allmy guides . My extracts from the oflicial census returnsof various states are nearly all derived through thischannel,1 and I have made especially diligent use of the

1 The 191 1 edition o f the Encyclope dia takes its Austro-Hungarianstatistics from the census o f 1900 I m ight have rectified them by themore recent returns o f 1910, b u t I have deliberately refrained fromdomg so . The figures o f 1910 of course represen t the present abso lutetotals of the various popu latio ns m ore accu rately than those o f 1900,

PREFACE ix

excellently arranged arti cles on Austria-Hungaryand Hungary.

"

For what I have written on Hungary I am likewisein debt to the illuminating study on Hungary in the

Eighteenth Century,1 by Professor Marczali, the Magyar

historian,but above all to the work of Dr . Seton

Watson . So far as I deal with his subjects, my information is taken at second hand I have learnt all I knowabout Magyarisation from his Racial Problems inHungary, and all I know about modern Croatia fromhis S outhern S lavs. I can do no better than refer thereader to these two books for the substantiation of myindi ctment against the Magyar nation .

The War and Democracy, written in collaboration byMessrs . Seton-Watson, Dover Wilson, Zimmern andGreenwood, was only published after the relevant partof my own boo k was already in proof, and I have notyet had leisure to read it . Yet though I have beenunable to borrow from the book itself, I owe an incalcu lable debt to another of its authors besides Dr . SetonWatson . I have had the good fortune to be Mr .Zimm ern

’

s pupil .So much for maps and books they cannot compare

with friends . Without the help of my mother and mywife, this book would never have grown ripe for publication, and I have to thank my wife

’s father, ProfessorGilbert Murray, Mr. A . D . Lindsay and Mr. H . W . C .

b ut relative rather than abso lu te quantities are valuable for my purpose,and in this respect the figu res o f 1900 are undo ubtedly m ore accurate

than those o f 1910 . In 1900 th e o fficxal propo rtions were doubtlessalready distorted by the Hun garian census-o fficials, and doubtless thereal proportions have slightly sh ifted in the m eanwhile, b ut both thesem argins o f error are msrgmficant com pared Wi th the gross perversionso f truth perpetrated by Hungarian o fficraldom in 1910 . S o rapidlyis a nation dem oralised when once it succumbs to chauvinism .

1 Published by the CambridgeUniversity Press.

x NATIONALITY AND THE WAR

Davis of Balliol College, and Mr . R .W . Chapman of theClarendon Press, all of whom have read the book inwhole or part either in manuscript or in proof. Theiradvice has enabled me to raise the standard of my workin every respect . When the critics tear my final draftin pieces, I shall realise how my first draft would havefared, had it been exposed naked to their claws .Last but not least, I must express my gratitude to my

publishers , Messrs . I. M . Dent and Sons , Ltd . , for theirunfailin g kindness , especially for bearing with my delaysand reproducing my maps .

ARNOLD TOYNBEE .

February 1915 .

CONTENTS

CHA PTERI. THE FUTUREI I. PRUSSIA NISM, OR GERMANY '

S A MEITIONS at

A . The German Empire 2 1

B . The French Frontier 40

C . The Danish Frontier 48

D . The Po lish Frontier 5 1

E . Prussian S tate and Germ an Nation 80

I II. THE VITALITY OE AUSTRIA 98

IV. RECONSTRUCTION IN THE BALKANS 138

A. Hungary 140

B . The S outhern S lavs 167C . A Balkan Zo llverem 216

V. TRIESTE A ND ITALY 246

VI. Tc cn A ND GERMAN IN THE NEW AUSTRIA a6 r

VII. PA NSLA VISM, OR GERMANY '

S FEARS 273

VIII . THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE A ND NATIONAL S ELF-GOVERNMENT 281

A. The Risorgimento of Po land 281

B . The National Evo lution of Russia 294

C . Devo lution 300

D . Expansion 325

IX. RUSSIA'S NEEDS 337

A . The Liberation of the Baltic 339B . The Liberation o f the Black S ea 338

X . THE DISMA N'

I'

LING OE TURKEY 379

A . Thrace 379B . Armenia 385C. Panislarnism 399D . THE New Anato lia 412

B . THE New ArabiaXI. NATIONALITY , Exp LOITATION A ND STRONG GOVERNMENT

IN PERSIA

X II. NATIONALITY A ND SOVEREIGNTYAPPENDIX ON THE MAP OE EUROPEINDEX

433

LIST OF MA PS

IN THE TEXT

THE KIEI. CANAL Faczngpage 48

THE DANUB E Page 105

THE TRENTINO 260

IN COLOURS

THE FRAN CO-GERMA N FRONTIER

POLAND

THE SOUTHERN SLA vs

THE BALKANS

THE HINTERLAND OE ODESSA

THE NEARER EAST

THE NATIONALITIES OF EUROPE

N A TION A LITY A ND THE W A R

CHAP TE R I

THE FUTURE

FOR the first time in our lives, we find ourselves incomplete uncertainty as to the future . To uncivilisedpeople the situation is commonplace but in twentiethcentury Europe we are accustomed to look ahead, toforecast accurately what lies before us, and then tochoose our path and follow it steadily to its end andwe rightly consider that this is the characteristic ofcivilised men . The same ideal appears in every side ofour life : in the individual's morality as a desire forIndependence strong enough to control most humanpassions : in our Economics as Estimates and Insurances in our Politics as a great sustained concentrationof all our surplus energies, in which parties are b ecoming increasingly at one in aim and effort, while theirdifferences are shrinking to alternatives of method, toraise the material, moral, and intellectual standard of lifethroughout the nation . From all this fruitful, constructive, exacting work, which demands the best fromus and makes us the better for giving it, we have beenviolently wrenched away and plunged into a struggle forexistence with people very much like ourselves, withwhom we have no quarrel .We must face the fact that this is pure evil, and thatwe cannot escape it . We must fight with all ourstrength every particle of our energy must be absorbed

2 THE FUTURE

in the war an d meanwhile our social construction muststand still indefinitely, or even be in part undone, andevery class and individual in the country must suffer intheir degree, according to the quite arbitrary chan ce o fwar, in hves horribly destroyed and work ruin ed . Wehave to carry th is war to a successful issue, because onthat depends our freedom to govern our own life afterthe war is over, and the preservation of this freedomitself is more important for us than the whole sum ofconcrete gains its possession has so far brought us .Thus we are sacrificing our present to our future,

and, therein, obeying the civilised man’s ideal to the

uttermost . But we shall only be justified in our mostmomentous decision, by wh ich we have put to thetouch the whole of our fortunes at once, if the path wechoose and follow is worthy of the sacrifice and thedanger we are incu rring for the sake of it .At present we are all working, according to our

individual capacities, for success in the war, but wehave little influence, even collectively, upon the result .We have unreservedly put the control of it into thehands of experts whom we trust, and rightly done so,because it is the essence of this evil, war, whether theveiled war of Diplomacy or the naked war of militaryforce, that its conduct must be secret and autocratic.Naturally our thoughts are with the fleets and armies,for we know that if they are beaten, we lose the thingthey are fighting for, freedom of choice ; but we arein danger of forgettin g that, if we win , our object is notautomatically attained . If we read in the newspaperone day that the powers with which we are at war hadsubmitted unconditionally to the Allies, we should onlybe at the beginning of our real task . The reconstru ction of Europe would be in our hands but we should

THE FUTURE 3

be exposed to the one thing worse than defeat in thefield, to the misuse of the immense power of decision,for good or evil, given us by victory .

This is an issue incomparably graver than themilitary struggle that lies immediately before us .Firstly, we are more personally responsible for it asindividuals . The war itself is not only being managedby experts it was brought upon us (the WhitePaper leaves no doubt in our m inds) by factors outsideEngland altogether . But our policy after hostilitiescease will be decided by our own government relyingfor its authority upon the country behind it, that is, itwill be decided ultimately by public opinion . Secondly,the state of war will have shaken our judgment whenwe are most in need of judging wisely.

The psychological devastation of war is even moreterrible than the material . War brings the savagesubstratum of human character to the surface, after ithas swept away the strong habits that generations ofcivilised effort have built up . We saw how the breathof war in Ireland demoralised all parties alike . Wehave met the present more ghastly reality with adm ir

able calmness but we must be on our guard . Timewears out nerves, and War inevitably brings with it thesuggestion of certain obsolete points of view, which inour real, normal life, have long been buried andforgotten .

It rouses the instinct of revenge . If Germanyhas hurt us, we will hurt her more—to teach her not todo it again .

” The wish is the savage's automaticreaction, the reason his perfunctory justification of itbut the civilised man knows that the impulse is hopelessly unreasonable . The hurt is being at war, andthe evil we wish to bann is the possibility of being at

4 THE FUTURE

war again, because war prevents us working out our ownlives as we choose . If we beat Germany and thenhumiliate her, she will never rest till she has redeemedher honour,

" by hum iliating us more cruelly in turn .

Instead of being free to return to our own pressingbusiness, we shall have to be constantly on the watchagainst her. Two great nations will sit idle, weaponin hand, like two Afghans in their loopholed towerswhen the blood feud is between them ; and we shallhave sacrificed deliberately and to an ever-increasingextent, for the blood feud grows by geometrical pro

gression , the very freedom for which we are now givingour lives .Another war instinct is plunder . War is often thesavage's profession : With my sword, spear andshield I plough, I sow, I reap, I gather in the vintage .

’ 1

If we beat Germany our own mills and factories willhave been at a standstill , our horses requisitioned and ourcrops unharvested, our merchant steamers stranded indock if not sunk on the high seas, and our bloodand treasure lavished on the war : but in the endGermany’s wealth will be in our grasp, her colonies,her markets, and such floating riches as we can distrainupon by means of an indemnity . If we have had tobeat our ploughshares into swords, we can at least drawsome profit from the new tool, and recoup ourselvespartially for the inconvenience . It is no longer aquestion of irrational, impulsive revenge, perhaps noteven of Sweetenin g our sorrow by a little gain . Todraw on the life-blood of German wealth may be theonly way to replenish the veins of our exh austedIndustry and Commerce .” So the plunder instinctmight be clothed in civilised garb War,

” we might1 The song of Hyb rias theKretan .

THE FUTURE 5

express it, is an investment that must bring in itsreturn .

"

The first argument against this point of view is thatit has clearly been the inspiring idea of Germany’spolicy, and history already shows that armaments areas unbusinesslike a speculation for civilised countriesas war is an abnormal occupation for civilised men .

We saw the effect of the Morocco tension upon Germanfin ance in 191 1 , and the first phase of the present warhas been enough to show how much Germany’s commerce will inevitably suffer, whether she wins or loses .It is only when all the armaments are on one side and

all the wealth is on the other, that war pays when, infact, an armed savage attacks a civilised man possessedof no arms for the protection of his wealth . OurA fghans in their towers are Sharp enough not to stealeach other ’s cows (supposing they possess any of theirown) for cows do not multiply by being exchanged, andboth A f ghans would starve in the end after wasting alltheir bullets in the skirmish . They save their bulletsto steal cows from the plainsman who cannot makereprisals.

If Germany were really nothing but a nation inarms, successful war m ight be as lucrative for her asan Af ghan’s raid on the plain, but she is normally agreat industrial community like ourselves . In the lastgeneration she has achieved a national growth of whichshe is justly proud . Like our own, it has been entirelysocial and economic. Her goods have been peacefullyconquering the world ’s markets . Now her workershave been diverted en masse from th eir prosperingindustry to conquer the same markets by military force,and the whole work of forty years is jeopardised by thechange of method.

6 THE FUTURE

Fighting for trade and industry is not like fightingfor cattle . Cattle are driven from one fastness toanother, and if no better, are at least no worse for thetransit . Civilised wealth perishes on the way . Oureconomic organisation owes its power and range to themarvellous forethought and co -operation that has builtit up ; but the most delicate organisms are the mosteasily dislocated, and the conqueror, whether Englandor Germany, will have to realise that, though he mayseem to have got the wealth of the conquered into hisgrip, the total wealth of both parties will have beenvastly diminished by the process of the struggle .The characteristic feature of modern wealth is that

it is international . Economic gain and loss is sharedby the whole world, and the shifting of the economicbalance does not correspond to the moves in the gameof diplomatists and armies . Germany's economicgrowth has been a phenomenon quite independentof her political ambitions, and Germany

's economicruin would compromise something far greater thanGermany’s political future— the whole world’s pros

perity. British wealth, among the rest, would be dealta deadly wound by Germany’s economic death, and itwould be idle to pump Germany’s last life-blood intoour veins, if we were automatically draining them of ourown blood in the process .But issues greater than the economic are involved .

The modern Nation is for good or ill an organ ism oneand indivisible, and all the diverse branches of nationalactivity flourish or wither with the whole national wellbeing . You cannot destroy German wealth withoutparalysing German intellect and art, and Europeancivilisation, if it is to go on growing, cannot do withoutthem . Every doctor and musician, every scientist,

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8 THE FUTURE

tions against its promoters) we must carry through th echan ge completely and at once : we cannot possiblyafford to be exposed to the danger again .

No tool, machine, or idea made by men has an

immortal career. Sooner or later they all ru n amuck,and begin to do evil instead of good. At that stagesavage or unskilful men destroy them by force andreplace them by their opposite civilised men get themunder control, and build them into something new andgreater . Nationality will sink from being the pinn acleof politics only to become their foundation, and till thefoundations are laid tru e, further building is impossible .But the bases of nationality have never yet been laidtru e in Europe . When we say that nationality wasthe political ideal of th e nineteenth century,

” and that1870 left the populations of Europe organised innational groups, we are taking far too complacent a viewof historical facts . The same century that produceda united Italy and Germany, saw out the whole tragedyof Poland, from the first partition in 1772 to the lastrevolt in 1863 . Human ideas do not spring into theworld full-grown and shining, like Athena : they trailthe infection of evil things from the past.In the Dark Ages Europe ’s most pressing need and

only practicable ideal was strong government .1 Stronggovernment came with its blessings, but it brought theevil of territorial ambitions . The Duke of Burgundyspent the wealth of his Netherland subjects in tryingto conquer the Swiss mountaineers . Burgundy suc

1 The expression S trong Governm ent is used throu ghout thisbook in th e quasi-techn ical sense o f Governm ent in whi ch th e

govern ed have no share.

” “ Abso lu tism and Au tocracy are

terms m ore usually em ployed, b u t both have ac ired a sinister

connotation , and it is better to use som e neutral word that implies nojud gm ent on what it deno tes.

THE FUTURE 9

cumb ed to the king of France . But the very factorthat made the French kings survive in the struggle forexistence between governments, the force of compactnationality which the French kingdom happened tocontain

,delivered the inheritance of the kings to the

Nation .

The French Nation in the Revolution burst theChrysalis of irresponsible government beneath which ithad grown to organic life, but like a true heir it tookover the Royal Government’s ideal Peace withinand piracy without .” France had already begunaggression abroad before she had accomplished selfgovernment at home, and in delivering herself toNapoleon she sacrificed her liberty to her ambition .

Napoleon’s only enduring achievements outside Francewere the things he set himself to prevent, the realisation,by a forceful reaction against force, of German andItalian nationality. Nationalism was converted toviolence from the outset, and the struggle for existencebetween absolute governments has merely been replacedby a struggle between nationalities, equally blind,haphazard, and non-moral, but far more terrific, justbecause the virtue of self-government is to focus andutilise human energy so much more effectively than theirresponsible government it has superseded .

Naturally the result of this planless strife has been nogrouping of Europe on a just and reasonable nationalbasis . France and England, achieving racial frontiersand national self-government early, inherited the Earthbefore Germany and Italy struggled up beside them

,

to take their leavings of markets and colonial areas . Butthe government that united Germany had founded itspower on the partition of Poland, and in the secondBalkan War of 1913 we saw a striking example of the

10 THE FUTURE

endless chain of evil forged by an act of nationalinjustice .The Hungarians used the liberty they won in

1867 to subject the Slavonic population betweenthemselves and the sea, and prevent its union withthe free principality of Serbia of the same Slavonicnationality. This drove Serbia in 1912 to followHungary’s example by seizing the coast of the nonSlavonic A lbanians ; and when Austria-Hungary prevented this (a right act prompted by most unrighteousmotives) , Serbia fought an unjust war with Bulgaria andsubjected a large Bulgarian population, in order to gainaccess to the only seaboard left her, the friendly Greekport of Salonika .

Hungary and Serbia are nominally national statesbut more th an half the population in Hungary, andperhaps nearly a quarter in Serbia, is alien, only heldwithin the state by force against its will . The energyof both states is perverted to the futile and dem oralis

ing work of Magyarising and Serb ising subjectforeign populations, and th ey have not even beensuccessful . The resistance of Southern Slav nationalismon the defensive to the aggression of Hungariannationalism has given the occasion for the presentcatastrophe .The evil element in nationalism under its many

names, Chauvinism,

" Jingoism,

" Prussianism,

” isthe one thing in our present European civilisation thatcan and does produce the calamity of war . If our objectis to prevent war, then, the way to do so is to purgeNationality of this evil. This we cannot do by anymechanical means, but only by a change of heart, byconverting public Opinion throughout Europe fromNational Competition to National Co-operation .

"

THE FUTURE 1 1

Public opinion will never be converted so long as thepresent system of injustice remains in force, so long asone nation has less and another more than its due. Thefirst step towards internationalism is not to flout theproblems of nationality, but to solve them.

The most important practical business, then, of theconference that meets when war is over, will be therevision of the map of Europe . Merely to suggest sucha thing is a complete reversal of our policy during thelast generation . We in England have been steadilyshutting our eyes to nationality, and minimising itsimportance . Our English national question wassettled long ago . Our geographical situation as anisland of manageable size gave our mediaeval Normanand Angevin kings an exceptional opportunity forestablishing at an early date a strong well-knit government. The nation became self-conscious when itexpanded under the Tudors, and self-governing by thepolitical revolutions of the seventeenth century, a fullhundred years ahead of France . While France wasrealising her nationality, we were passing through theIndustrial Revolution, and during the last century wehave been working, with rapidly increasing successduring latter years, to adapt ourselves to our neweconomic conditions .If we do not think about nationality, it is simply

because we have long taken it for granted, and our mindis focussed on posterior developments ; but it isincreasingly hard to keep ourselves out of touch withother countries, and though our blindness has beenpartly distraction, it has also been in part deliberatepolicy . We saw well enough that the present phase ofthe national problem in Europe carried in it the seedsof war. We rightly thought that war itself was the

12 THE FUTURE

evil, an evil incomparably greater than the nationalinjustices that might become the cause of it. We knewthat, if these questions were opened, war would follow.

We accordingly adopted the only possible course . Webuilt our policy on the chance that national feelin g couldbe damped down till it had been superseded in thepublic opinion of Europe by other interests, not becauseNationalism was unjustified, but because it endangeredso much more than it was worth . Knowing that wehad passed out of the nationalist phase ourselves, andthat from our present political point of view war waspurely evil, we hoped that it was merely a question oftime for the Continental populations to reach the samestandpoint. Notably in Germany, the focus of danger,we saw so cial interests coming more and more to thefront at the expense of militarism . We threw ourselvesinto the negative task of staving o ff the catastrophe in theinterim , by a strenuous policy of compromise and conciliation, which has been successful on at least twocritical occasions . Now that the evil has been toopowerful and the catastrophe has happened, the reasonsfor this policy are dead . Nationalism has been strongenough to produce war in spite of us . It has terriblyproved itself to be no outworn creed, but a vital force tobe reckoned with . It is stronger on the Continent thanso cial politics . It is the raw material that litters thewhole ground . We must build it into our foundations,or give up the task, not only of constructive socialadvance beyond the limits we have already reached, buteven of any fundamental reconstruction of what thewar will have destroyed .

Perhaps we might have foretold this from the case ofIreland immediately under our eyes . Failure to solveher national problem has arrested Irelan d

’s develop

THE FUTURE 13

ment since the seventeenth century, and imprisoned herin a world of ideas almost unintelligible to an Englishman till he has travelled in the Balkans . This has beenEngland's fault, and we are now at last in a fair way toremedy it. The moment we have succeeded in arranging that the different national groups in Ireland governthemselves in the way they really wish, the nationalquestion will pass from the Irish consciousness ; theywill put two centuries behind them at one leap, andcome into line with ourselves . The Dublin strike,contemporary with the arming of the Volunteers, showshow the modern problems are jostling at the heels ofthe old . Although Unionist and Nationalistpoliticians could still declare that their attitude towardsthe strike was neutral, the parliament of the new Irishstate will discuss the social problem and nothing else .Ireland, then, has forced us to think about the problem

of nationalism ; and our Irish experience will be invaluable to us when peace is made, and we take in hand,in concert with our allies, the national questions of therest of Europe . To begin with, we already have anotion of what Nationality is . Like all great forces inhuman life, it is nothing material or mechanical, but asubjective psychological feeling in living people . Thisfeeling can be kindled by the presence of one or severalof a series of factors a common country, especially ifit is a well defined physical region, like an island, ariver basin, or a mountain mass a common language

,

especially if it has given birth to a literature a commonreligion and that much more impalpable force, acommon tradition or sense of memories shared fromthe past .But it is impossible to argue a priori from the presenceof one or even several of these factors to the existence of a

14 THE FUTURE

nationality : they may have been there for ages andkindled no response . And it is impossible to argue fromone case to another : precisely the same group offactors m ayproduce nationality here, and there have noeffect. Great Britain is a nation by geography andtradition, though important Keltic-speaking sections ofthe population in Wales and the Highlands do notunderstand the predominant English language . Irelandis an island smaller still and more compact, and isfurther unified by the almost complete predominance ofthe same English language, for the Keltic speech isincomparably less vigorous here than in Wales ; yetthe absence of common tradition combines withreligious differences to divide the country into twonationalities, at present sharply distinct from one anotherand none the less hostile because their national psychology is strikingly the same . Germany is divided byreligion in precisely the same way as Ireland, hercommon tradition is hardly stronger, and her geographical boundaries quite vague : yet she has built up herpresent concentrated national feeling in three generations . Italy has geography, language and tradition tobind her together ; and yet a more vivid tradition isable to separate the Ticinese from his neighbours, andbind him to people of alien speech and religion beyonda great mountain range . The Armenian nationalitydoes not occupy a continuous territory, but lives bylanguage and religion . The Jews speak the languageof the country where they sojourn, but religion andtradition hold them together. The agnostic Jew acceptsnot only the language but all the other customs of hisadopted countrymen, but tradition by itself is too strongfor him he remains a Jew and cannot be assimilated .

These instances taken at random show that each case

16 THE FUTURE

ference which will follow the war, and is so much moreimportant than the war itself, with a clear idea of thealternative solutions and a mature judgment upon theirrelative merits .To accomplish this we need a co-ordination of know

ledge on a large scale, knowledge of history, geography,religion, national psychology and public opin ion . Itis a case for the collaboration of experts

,but mean

while an attempt to review the whole question, even ifthere is no deep knowledge behind it, may, if honestlymade, serve at least as a plea for more detailed andauthoritative contributions .The remainder of this book is an attempt to make

such a beginning . We will take a series of actualpolitical groups, some of them states with no nationalbasis, some in which state and nation roughly coincide,some that are true nationalities at present prevented fromrealising themselves in concrete form, and we will startin each case by trying to understand the group ’s ownpoint of View. We shall find that it nearly always hassome justification, and is hardly ever justifiable in itsentirety. This need not make us pessimistic it is oneof the commonest traits of human nature . Right andWrong are always a question of degree, and our nextstep will be to criticise the case of the group under discussion , and estimate how far it is just and reasonable togive it what it asks . In reaching our conclusions weshall find ourselves evolving a scheme for the reconstruction of that particular corner of Europe .Such a reconstruction must be guided by certain

obvious principles .

(i.) It must be done with the minimum of territorialor administrative change . There is always a presumption in favour of the existing machinery, so long

THE FUTURE 17

as it works, varying in proportion to the civilisation ofthe people concerned . In a civilised country the plantof self-government is elaborately installed, not only inthe material sense of public services and adm inistration,business concerns with capital invested in them, whichmust in great measure be wasted if they are broken upand reconstituted on quite different lines, but in themore important psychological sphere of political habit .There is a certain political value, for instance, in theesprit de corps of the motley Austrian army, or even inthe still callow constitutional tradition of the AustrianCrown-lands’ parliament . It is very hard to makepeople work together, very easy to pull them apartagain . If th ey work together so badly that they bringthe whole organism to a deadlock, there is no course leftbut to part them, and regroup them on other lines whichwill enable the various elements to function moresmoothly. But we must never forget that the negativework of demolishing what other men have spent theirlabour in building up, even if it be a Bastille, is at best aregrettable necessity.

(ii .) In the last resort there must always be minoritiesthat suffer. This must be so if men are not to letdifference of opinion prevent them working together,and co-operation in spite of disagreement is thefoundation of politics . We can only secure that theminorities are as small and the suffering as mild aspossible . This again is a question of degree . InMacedonia, until the year before last, one Turk withone rifle caused a minority of a hundred Christianswith no rifles to suffer robbery, rape, and murder.Every one agrees that this was an abomination . InGreat Britain at the present moment the numericallysmall Welsh-speaking minority of school children have

18 THE FUTURE

to learn English as well as their mother tongue, but theEnglish majority do not learn Welsh . Here we havesuff ering or disadvantage to one party, withoutinjustice : the Welsh child does not learn Englishbecause it is th e English-speaking majority ’s interestthat he should do so, but because it is his own . Hisonly quarrel is with the fact that the English populationis much larger than his, and its language much morewidely spoken, and it is as useless to quarrel with factsas it is to beat the sea and bind it in chains .The Irish question has produced a rich crop of mis

guided arguments on both sides . First came theskirmishes of historical sentiment . The Unionistswished to keep everythin g as it was because Irelandhas been conquered by England, and united therebyto the English Kingdom . They were silenced by theoutstanding fact that the Catholic Irish are a separatenationality, but not content with this, the Nationalistsdeclared that the whole island was the heritage of theIrish nation,

” with the deplorable result that theUlster Protestants made good their objection by threatsof force . Now the Protestants in turn are trying to grabmore than their share by maintaining that Ulster is oneand indivisible,

” in defiance of the fact that the territoryUlster as such has no organic life, or in other wordsno nationality, of its own . This is mere encouragementto Nationalists to claim all Ulster counties completewhere there are Catholic majorities, though one cornerof them may be entirely Protestant in population .

The only way out is for both parties to face the factthat there are two nationalities in Ireland, Englishspeaking Protestants and English-speaking Catholics,which in the greater part of the island form uniformpopulations covering continuous territories ; but that

THE FUTURE 19

there is an irreducible zone, especially in County Tyrone,where the two nations are inextricably mingled, notonly Catholic village interspersed with Protestant, butCatholic and Protestant householders occupyingalternate premises in the same town . Even here theterritories justly belonging to each nation could beplotted out to a nicety on a big-scale map, but it would bequite impossible to draw a frontier of equal delicacyfor the practical purposes of public service and selfgovernment .With the growth o f civilisation the human and theterritorial unit become less and less identical . In aprimitive community the members are undifferentiatedfrom one another : the true human unit is the totalgroup , and not the individual, and the territory thisgroup occupies is a unit too, self-su fficing and cut o fffrom intercourse with the next valley. In modernEurope every sub-group and every individual hasdeveloped a character or individuality of its ownwhich must have free play while the growth of communications, elaboration of organisation, and economicinterdependence of the whole world have broken downthe barriers between region and region. The minimumterritorial block that can be organised efficiently as aseparate political unit according to modern standardsis constantly growing in size : the maximum humangroup which can hold together without serious internaldivergence is as steadily dim inishing .

This would look like an impasse, were it not correctedby the virtues of civilisation itself. We started withthe fact that the essence of civilisation was Forethought and its ideal the power of free choicethe complementary side of this ideal, on the principleDo as you would be done by,

” is to allow free choice

20 THE FUTURE

to others when they are in your power. It is a virtuewith as many names as there are spheres of human lif eForbearance,

” Toleration,” Constitutionalism.

When we have drawn our frontier through Tyrone withall the ingenuity that Geography allows us, therewill inevitably be a minority left on either side, aminority no map-makin g can further reduce . Savageswipe out minorities : civilised men take testimonialsfrom them . The drawing of the frontier is only thefirst step towards the solution of the Irish question .

It will truly be settled if the minorities find that thedisadvantage to which Geography puts them is morethan made up by the good-fellowship of the populationwith wh ich it yokes them. Then they will become asstrong a link between Catholic Ireland and Ulster, asthe colonies of business men, that voluntarily takeup their residence in Liverpool and Hamburg, arebetween Germany and England .

Havin g stated these principles, which once moredraw our attention to psychological facts as being thereally important forces to which all concrete, mechanicalmanipulations of frontiers and institutions must bereferred in the end, we may now more safely plun geinto the great sea of European controversy. Let usbegin with the nation whose action has drawn us into thevortex, Germany .

THE GERMAN EMPIRE 2 1

CHAPTER II

PRUSSIANISM : OR GERMANY ’

S AMBITIONS

A . The German Empire

THE living generation of Germans is suffering for athousand years of history. They started in the raceto emerge from the Dark Age with a smaller fundof civilisation than France had accumulated by herthorough Romanisation, and than the Norman con

querors carried from France to England ; and theyfurther handicapped themselves by the only Romantradition they did inherit, the ghost of universal empire .The Hohenstaufen dynasty, Germany

’s chance of astrong government, spent its strength warring in Italy,on the impossible quest of bringing this ghost to lifeagain . When they failed, Germany fell to pieces intoa de

’

bris of principalities, of every size and character :self-governing trading-cities, often more in touch withforeign traders across the sea than with the serfs at theirgates ; Imperial knights, the landlords of these serfs,ruling their estates with practically sovereign power ;prince-bishops, who governed some of the most civiliseddistricts of Germany in the valley of the Rhine ; andlay princes small and great, from the Thuringian dukes,whose dom inions were subdivided equally among thewhole male issue of each generation, to the strongmilitary lords of the marches, Brandenburg and Austria,and the compact, steadily-growing duchy of Bavaria.When the Reformation brought religious war, evenunified France and England were riven by the conflictGerman particularism fought out the issue to an incon

22 PRUSSIANISM

clu sive compromise in the devastating War of ThirtyYears, which paralysed the growth of Germany fora century, just when England was workin g out herinternal self-government and prep aring for the immensedevelopment of her colonies and industry. During theThirty Years ’ War Germany’s consolidated neighboursbegan to fish in her troubled waters in the eighteenthcentury she had become the plaything of the powers,her prin cipalities pawns in their game : at the end ofthe century she fell completely under the dom inion ofFrance, and had to endure the merited ridicule of theconqueror for her particularism and its r esults, asecond-handness and a helpless in ert stolidity.

This was the more bitter in that she was not merelyfeeding upon memories of a past dawn that had neverbecome day she was conscious of an immense vitalityin the present . While Napoleon was annexing orhumiliatin g her principalities, Germany was givingEurope the greatest philosopher and the greatest poetshe had yet known , Kant and Goethe, while the succession of German masters who were creatin g Europeanmusic was represented by Beethoven . Germany wasalready a nation : the spark had been kindled byintellect and art . An intense desire followed to buildup all the other sides of national life .Germany’s striking defect was her political disinte

gration this delivered her into the hands of the French,who preached their creed with drums and bayonets .Civilised Germany turned again to the ideal of the DarkAge, which more fortunate nations had long realisedand transcended, a strong military government. Anorganisation of just this type presented itself in thekin gdom of Prussia . Its nucleus was the march ofBrandenburg, the old frontier province against the

24 PRUSSIANISM

principality was absorbed in Nassau during his lif etime),he did not find his vocation therein, but took servicein the Prussian admin istration . He came to the frontafter 1806, and was the inspiration both of the in ternalreforms and of the war of liberation they made possible .He was afterwards fired by the Romantic movement, anddevoted his old age to promoting the collection andpublication of documents for the origins of Germanhistory, a historical interest that really looked towardsthe future .But the débris of the middle ages could not be clearedaway in a moment, and the next fifty years were a periodof flux and indecision . Two factors were striving toharmonise and never succeeding . On the one hand, theintellectual and artistic growth of Germany was gathering momentum : in music, philology, philosophy, andtheoretical politics the nation had not only found itselfbut achieved the primacy of Europe . On the other sidestood the political organism of Prussia, far stronger thanbefore, for the Vienna congress had greatly increasedher territory, and far more representative of Germanyas a whole, for she had exchanged the greater part ofher alien Polish provinces in the East for the GermanRhineland on the West, which made her a Catholic aswell as a Protestant state and the bulwark of Germanyagainst France . She used the fif ty years to unite allNorth Germany in her customs union but her rulingclass kept within its mediaeval traditions and only cameinto hostile contact with the spiritual movement inwhich German nationalism still concentrated itself.The Prussian governin g class aspired to rule Germany,but it did not wish to merge itself in the growth of theGerman nation .

These two discordant elements were welded together

THE GERMAN EMPIRE 25

by a genius, Bismarck . He persuaded the German peoplethat the Prussian machine alone could give them whatthey wanted, and that to make the machine workeffectively they must conform themselves to its actionthere must be no more liberalism . He persuaded thePrussian government that irresponsible absolutismcould only survive by giving the people what it wants,

”

and that if it took the plunge, from which other obsoleteinstitutions, like the Pope and the Hapsburgs, hadshrunk to their ruin, it had a great future before it .He worked with titanic tools . In the blast-furnace ofthree great wars with Denmark, Austria and France,he poured the whole energy of the German nation intothe Prussian crucible, and successfully drew out a solidmass of metal, molten in just the form he had intended,the German Empire .To those who look at his work from outside after a

generation has passed, it appears that the task was toogigantic even for his powers . The metal shows a flaw.

The Prussian machine has not proved itself adaptableenough it has not learnt to understand and work forthe needs and tendencies of the German people . Thenation on the other hand has lost in success some of thequalities it preserved in adversity, and taken a Prussianalloy into its soul . Bismarck’s harmonisation wassovereign for achieving the immediate result he had inview. If his material had not been men but stone, thestatue of Germany he carved would have been a monument to him for ever . But living material is alwaysgrowing, and those who work in it must direct theireye less upon the present than upon the future .Bismarck brought Germany into line with France

and England. Her national question was solved at last,and she was free to throw herself into industrialism.

26 PRUSSIANISM

She threw herself into it with all that concentration ofenergy of wh ich Bismarck had first mastered the secret .Here was a new sphere where intellectual activity anddisciplined organisation might co-operate to giveGerman nationality expression .

The commerce and manufactures that Germany hasbuilt up during the last forty-three years are among themost wonderful achievements in history . there is avigour behind them th at feels itself capable of inheritingthe whole Earth . Perhaps if the Earth had lain un

tenanted for Germany to inherit, she would have foundsalvation in the ach ievement, and Prussian principlesand German character might have hardened into steelof a temper that Bismarck, in idealisti c moments, mayhave dreamed of.But unfortunately the pleasant places of the Earthwere occupied already. The tropical countries thatsupply Europe with raw materials her own climatecannot produce, were in the hands of England, France,and Holland : in the temperate regions capable ofreceivin g the overflow of European population, newwhite nations of English, Spanish, or Dutch speechwere growing up, one of them, the US A alreadya world power, the rest guaran teed an undisturbeddevelopment to maturity either by the United States orby Great Britain . In the partition of the waste placesof Africa durin g the last twenty years of the nineteenthcentury Germany took her share, but she got little byit. Her tropical acquisitions seem not to pay their wayfrom the commercial point of view, and the only colonywith a temperate climate, S .W . Africa, was vacantsimply because its soil was desert, while its one asset,the good harbour of Walfisch Bay, had been earmarkedby Great Britain . In 1870 the Germans thought they


had at last buried their unhappy political past, yethere in the new chapter they had magnificently opened,they were suffering for history still . This has been morethan they can bear, and explains, though it does notexcuse, their foreign policy ever since . With thebrilliant success of the Prussian military machine freshin their minds, they turned to Prussianism once moreto accomplish their desire . Instead of purging outthe alloy when once the metal was cast, the new industrial Germany has become Prussianised throughand through .

In hoping to cancel by the use of military force thegrave initial disadvantage with which they started theirindustrial career, they have made a miscalculationthat has brought evil upon themselves and all Europe .The machine is entirely unadaptable to the new task setbefore it . Blood and Iron could drive other nationsoff German soil ; they could even, in Bismarck

’shandling, cause a great psychological revolution in thepolitical feeling of the German people . They couldnot possibly be made fruitful for economic progress .Economic advance can only be made by economic

effort. We are deeply conscious of this in England .

War as a constructive national activity is for us essentiallya thing of the past between our warlike ancestors andourselves there is a great gulf fixed, the IndustrialRevolution, which has put us into a new environment .In the effort to adapt ourselves to that environment weare increasingly absorbed we more and more recognisethe vital importance of succeeding in this, and resent theunremitting burden of armaments,

” the distractingrumours of war, and now this destructive folly intowhich we have really been drawn at last .The retort is easy England has all she wants .

28 PRUSSIANISM

She got it by war a century ago now she wants to belet alone to exploit it.” That merely proves that wehave been more fortunate than Germany : it does notprove that the same military method will produce thesame result now that the century has passed . Theconditions have changed, and not, after all, in Germany

’sdisfavour. In spite of her bad start, she has developedsuch immense industries that her town population hasincreased at a greater rate than that of the U .S .A . duringthe same period : she has won markets for her manufactures, not only in her own protectorates, but in thecolonies of other nations, and even in the homeland ofindustrialism—Great Britain itself. The surplus of herpopulation, whose growth has even outstripped herdemand for labour,1 has found outlets, entirely satisfactory from the individual ’s point of view, in Northand South America, where they already form a veryprosperous section of the population, and play aninfluential part in the self-government of their adoptedcountries . German enterprise has competed on equalterms with French, English, and A merican in China andTurkey, and obtained contracts that offer good investments for all surplus German capital for some time tocome .This has been Germany’s true victory in the en

vironm ent of modern civilisation, and she has done itall without moving a single gun against her neighbours .She has not yet got abreast of England in wealth thatis not the fault of living England or Germany, but ofdead history but, so far as she has thrown herself into

1 This is true in th e sense that the hom e m arket for skilled labour

is glu tted . B ut while the ski lled Germ an is seeking new openingsabroad, th e unskilled Po le is drifting into Westphalia to do the workfor which the native German ’

5 standard is too high, so that the Immigration statistics at present ou tbalance those of Emigration


the economic field, she has, by her own merit, gainedupon us to the utmost extent possible . Her only avoidable handicap has been the great Prussian fleet and armywhich she has deliberately imposed upon herself. Theircreation, upkeep , and increase have steadily taxed hereconomic growth, and their existence has tempted her,in her foolish trust in their efficacy for her ulteriorobjects, to risk all her real economic gains by bringingthem into action .

This policy of Germany’s has been an immensemistake . It can work her no good, but it has a vastpotentiality for working both herself and the rest ofEurope evil . There is the sum of all evil in the factthat by attacking the rest of Europe with arms, she hasforced us all to take up arms against her. It is only oursubordinate object to beat her, because we know thatif she beats us her public opinion will become moreconvinced than ever that her militaristic policy wasright . But the converse by no means follows, that ifwe beat her we thereby convince her of her error .Masses of people are only converted from ingrainedopinions about complicated questions, if they have everyopportunity given them to be reasonable . It is alwaystempting to refuse to be reasonable if you are beingharshly treated, and at the same time presented withunanswerable refutations of cherished beliefs, youinevitably prefer to go mad rather than be convinced .

Our ultimate object is to prevent war for the future, andthe essential means to this end is to convince Germanythat war is not to her interest. We and the Frenchdisbelieve in war already, but a minority of one canmake a quarrel, in spite of the proverb . The onlyway to convince Germany is first to beat her badly andthen to treat her well .

30 PRUSSIANISM

If we humiliate her, we shall strengthen the obsoleteideas in her consciousness more than ever— perhapsno longer the idea of Plunder,

” but certainly that ofRevenge, which is much worse : if we deal disinterestedly with her (though it will be in our owntruest interest) we may produce such a reaction ofpublic opinion in Germany, that the cu rse of aggressivemilitarism will be exorcised from her as effectively in1914, as the cu rse of political paralysis was exorcisedin 1870 .

We have seen that Germany was led to pursue thepolicy which has culminated in this war, by the oppressive sense that her development was being cramped bythe action of her neighbours . At first she conceivedtheir action as of a passive kind, as the mere automatic,dog-in-th e-manger instinct of effete powers to clingto possessions they had not the initiative to utilise, andin which nothing but historical chance had given themtheir vested interest : her own mission, she thought,was to bend all her youthful energy and resolutionto the task of evicting them, in order to actualise allthe golden opportunities that they had missed . Morerecently, however, since her methodical pursuit of heraim has roused her victims to a sense of their dangerand stimulated them to concert measures for theirsecurity, she has viewed their behaviour in a moresinister light, as an active, though veiled, campaign ofhostilities unremittingly carried on to compass herdestruction and now that her ambition has combinedwith this undercurrent of fear to precipitate her in toan aggressive war, so that she finds herself actuallyengaged in a life-and-death struggle with these neighbours whom she has envied, despised, and feared in onecomplicated emotion, she is more firmly convinced than

32 PRUSSIANISM

man S .W. Africa, they will say, is essential, firstlyin order to round o ff the frontiers of the South AfricanComm onwealth, and secondly to prevent for the futurethe fostering, from this hostile focus, of the disloyaltyagainst the British Empire, unfortunately still rife inthe Dutch element .But it will be a perverse cure for Dutch disaffectionto reinforce it by including a still more irreconcilableGerman population within the same community, unlesswe mean to abandon the liberal policy which has goneso far towards wiping out the memories of the SouthAfrican War, and rule Dutch and German alike with aheavy hand . Such a disastrous course would lose usSouth Africa altogether, by a war of independence likethat which severed from us the North American states,the finest colonies we ever had . If, on the other hand,we restore Germany her territory, and avoid disturbingthe natural development of our own South A f ricanComm onweatlh by the problems involved in theannexation , we shall see a new South African nationality grow up, which will first blend Dutch and Britishinto one people, and in process of time exercise anattractive influence upon the territories adjoining, whenthey too have filled up with a white population drawnfrom their respective mother-countries, and haveevolved a separate lif e of their own . If German S .W.

Africa is not subjected to the South African Commonwealth now as a conquered province, she is more thanlikely to join the Federation, when she is ripe for selfgovernment, as an independent member of her ownfree will, and so enrich the new nationali ty by adding aGerman strain to the Dutch and English basis . Whenthis happens, the South African federal state will take itsplace by the side of Great Britain on the one hand and


Germany on the other as a separate political unit,absolved from the control of either, but inheriting thetradition of cordial relations with each, and will becomethe strongest bond of good understanding between theminstead of the bitterest cause of dissention .

The case of the other German possessions in A frica issimpler . They are not white men ’s countries,

” anddo not adjoin any great self-governing member of theBritish Empire, whose policy and interest must be considered as well as our own they all lie within thetropical belt, and like most European protectorates inthose latitudes, profit their owner, if at all, as fields forenterprise, sources for raw products, and markets formanufactures . Towards these too we may be temptedto stretch out a grasping hand . They do not even paytheir way,

” people will declare and she has not learntthe secret of governing natives it would save Germany ’spocket and her African subjects ’ hides, if we took overthe business instead of her . Perhaps Togoland andKamerun might be passed over every country inEurope, after all, has some little claim staked out on theWest African coast, and they are hardly worth pickingup but German East Africa is another question andthink how satisfactory it will be to obtain an all-redroute for the Cape-to-Cairo Railway.”

Here we see the cloven hoof, and it is sufficient toanswer that the profit and loss of Germany’s A fricanpossessions is emphatically her affair not ours, that theskill to govern native races is only acquired by experience

(we ourselves, for instance, blundered into our presentmore or less satisfactory Crown Colony system throughan unhampered century of experiments in misgovernment), while the all-red route, even if it could beachieved without alienating Germany (and it would

B

34 PRUSSIANISM

be out of all proportion to obtain it at the cost ofth e alternative) , actually presupposes th e contin uanceof that national antagonism which it is our object toab olish . Not the monopoly of the chief trunk railwayof the A frican continent, but the co-operation of allinterested parties in its construction and utilisation,will open the way to the international entente we hopeto call into being .

The most serious claim to German East Africa mightbe lodged by the Indian Empire . The population ofIndia is suffering from congestion at least as acutely asthat of Germany, and the East African coast that facesIndia across the A rabian Sea, o ffers the obvious field forher expansion . There has indeed been an attempt toconvert in to a white man ’s country the highlandsthat, both in the German and in the English territory,in tervene between the coast and the great lakes ; butthe experiment seems to be in process of breakin g downin bo th provinces . India, then, m ight conceivably ask,as a reward for her loyal aid in the present war, thatboth British and German East Africa should be assignedto her as a specifically Indian colonial area .

This, however, is askin g for more than is in ourpower to grant. We shall be ill-advised if we do not infuture offer the Indian citizens of o ur empire the mostfavourable openings we can, at least in regions whoseclimate renders them pre-eminently suitable for Indianimmigration, like our own East African protectorate .We hope that our German neighbours on that coast willdo th e same, and we might even poin t out to th em thatthe introduction of a civilised Indian population in to acountry where there is little question of their comingin to competition with white settlers, will enormouslyin crease its economic productiveness, which is its para


mount asset to the white nation to which it belongs .Moreover, British government in India is building forthe Future an immensely powerful Indian nation andthe exclusion of Indians from this territory wouldinvolve Germany in the same conflict that alreadythreatens Canada and the unless they modifytheir policy in the meanwhile . But we must let ouraction rest at that. The problem of Asiatic expansionmust be met primarily by every state concerned on itsown account. It is probable that they will find thedifficulty of its solution so great that they will organisein tim e some intern ational authority to co -ordinate theirpolicy on this question, and voluntarily submit themselves to its direction but the solution cannot possiblybe furth

"ered by pressure of one individual state upon

another, exercised as the result of a victorious war.Germany has another group of possessions in thePacific, and perhaps here she cannot succeed in comingout of the war unscathed . Her Pacific territories havelittle value as areas for settlement or commerce .Kaiser-Wilhelmsland in New Guinea is the only oneof any extent ; several archipelagoes of small islandsonly useful as coaling stations, and the notoriousfortress of Kiao-Chao, plan ted like a piratical stronghold on the Chinese peninsula of Shantung, constitutethe remainder . They are not so much an Empire inthemselves as a strategical framework laid down for afuture empire of indefinite extent, and as such havecaused considerable uneasiness to the maritime statesin this part of the Pacific, especially to Japan our ally,and to Australia and New Zealand, two self-governingmembers of our empire . The anticipations of thesenations with regard to Germany

’s designs are revealedby the energy with which they proceeded to attack

36 PRUSSIANISM

th ese positions as soon as war broke out . NewZealand struck at Samoa, Australia at Neu-Pomm ern,Kaiser-Wilhelm sland, and the Solomon islands, whileJapan undertook the severest task in the reduction ofKiao-Chao . Japan will emerge from the war in possession of the latter place, and she has handed over theCaroline and Marshall Islands, which she occupied inthe course of her operations, not to ourselves but to ourtwo Pacific Commonwealth s .The disposition of Germany’s Pacific dependencieswill therefore not come into our hands at all . We mayensure that Japan keeps to her declared in tention ofconsignin g Kiao-Chao to its ultimate owner China, byofiering to resign simultaneously Wei-hai-wei on theother coast of Shantung, which we only leased as anoffset to Germany’s coup in seizing Kiao-Chao ; butin any event Kiao-Chao will not pass back intoGermany’s possession, and it is most unlikely that anyof the other territories in question will be relinquishedby their respective holders . Certainly Great Britainhas no authoritative power to procure their retrocessionto Germany, even did she desire it, and there is afterall no reason why we should deplore Germany

’s lossof them . It will involve no corresponding loss toher in dustrial and commercial prosperity, a Germaninterest that we mean scrupulously to respect and ifpossible to promote, but will only cripple her design of amilitaristic world-empire, a German interest that weintend, in self-defence, to remove from the sphere ofpractical politi cs .Great Britain ’s true policy, then, is to allow Germanyto retain all openin gs for peaceable, as opposed toforcible

,expansion aff orded her by her oversea

dominions as they existed before this war broke out,


and we shall have a particularly free hand in thedecision of this question, because the command of thesea, and the world-wide naval operations it makespossible, fall almost entirely within our province, andnot within that of our European allies . We mustfurthermore give just as great facilities as before toGerman immigration through all the vast portions ofour empire that are still only in process of being openedup and settled, and we must urge our allies to adoptthe same principle with regard to the territories in asimilar phase of development which ackn owledge theirsovereignty. We must also respect the concessionswhich German enterprise has secured for its capital,with such fine initiative and perseverance, in neutralcountries of backward growth . We shall find instances,similar to the coaling stations in the Pacific, whereprofessedly economic concerns have an essentiallypolitical intention— certain sections of the projectedBagdad railway occur at once to our minds—and herewe may be compelled to require Germany to abandonher title ; but we must confine such demands to aminimum. Both we and our allies must take care thatneither political panic nor economic greed induces usto carry them to excess , and in every case where wedecide to make them, we must give Germany theopportunity of acquiring, in compensation, more thantheir equivalent in economic value .If we meet Germany in this spirit, she will at leastemerge from the war no more cramped and constrictedthan she entered it . This will not, of course, satisfy herambitions, for they were evil ambitions, and could notbe satisfied without the world ’s ruin ; but it will surelyallay her fears . She will have seen that we had it inour power to mutilate her all round and cripple her

38 PRUSSIANISM

utterly, and that we held our hand . Once her fear isbanished, we can proceed to conjure away her envy forto leave her what she has already would prepare theground for an invitation to join us in organisin g somestanding international authority that should continuouslyadjust the claims of all growing nations , Germany amongthe rest, by reasonable methods of compromise, and soprovide openin gs for the respective expansion of theirwealth and population .

Such an intern ational organ would replace the strugglefor exis tence between nations, in wh ich each tries tosnatch his neighbour ’s last crust, by a co -operation inwhich all would work togeth er for a common end ;but many tan gled problems strew the ground in frontof us, before we can clear it for such a construction .

The national foundations of Europe must first be relaidand just as in the question of territories over sea thedecisive word will lie with ourselves, so in the case ofEuropean frontiers it will lie with our allies, becausethe war on land is their provin ce and because thenational problems at issue affect th em even moredirectly than us .This does not absolve us from the duty of probing

these problems to their bottom rather it makes it themore imperative that we should do so, inasmuch asour influence upon their so lution will depend prin cipallyon the impartiality of our point of view and the reasonableness of our suggestions, and very little on any powerof making our will prevail by mere intransigeance,or by the plea of paramount in terests . Great Britainought to come to the conference with very defin iteopinions about the details of these problems, even at therisk of annoying her allies by the appearance of meddlin gwith what is less her business than theirs . The Allies

40 PRUSSIANISM

nationalities included against their will within thepresent frontiers of the German Empire . The settlement after this war mu st bring justice to these populations by affording th em an opportunity for choosingfreely whether they will main tain their connection withGermany or no, and if not, what destiny they prefer.When we have estimated the probable results of theirchoice, we may proceed to consider what the efiect islikely to be on German public opin ion, and look forsome means of cancelling the bitterness which cannotfail to be aroused in some degree . But this is essentiallya secondary consideration . We have accepted theprinciple that the recognition of nationality is thenecessary foundation for European peace ; and peaceis endangered far more by the unjust violation of thenational idea than by the resentment due to the justreversal of the injustice, even if the wrongdoer be themost potent factor in Europe and his victim the mostin significant . We will proceed, therefore, to considerin turn the national problems within the GermanEmpire on their own merits .

B . The French Frontier

The question of Alsace - Lorraine is in soluble ifit is treated as a controversy between Fran ce andGerm any. This land,

” the Germans will say, haslegally remained German soil ever since Karl the Greatdivided his empire between his three sons . It is truethat the French annexed it by a series of conquests inthe 17th and 18th centuries, but the German speech ofthe major part of its inhabitants is a living proof of itstrue own ership .

”

Granted,

” the French will reply, that we won

THE FRENCH FRONTIER 41

our title by co nquest, yet its recognition by innumerableGerman governments in innumerable treaties gave it avalidity at least as great as that inherent in Charlemagne’stestament, before you wrenched it from us again by noother right than a conquest of precisely the same character. If your present claims rest on ancient history,why did you still leave us half Lorraine in 1871 , for youhad no worse a titl e to it than to the half you took ?Y ouleft it because you knew you could not hope to holddown by force so large a territory as that. No, forceis your sole title now, as you say it was ours before, andthe moment has come for our revenge .”

The two nations have bandied historical argumentslike these for forty-three years, without approachingany nearer to a conclusion, because their pleas, thoughmostly correct in fact, are none of them relevant to thesituation . The question, indeed, only affects Franceand Germany in a secondary degree the partiesprimarily concerned are the inhabitants of the disputedterritory themselves, and their present will is the onlysolution . But the autocratic regime on the Prussianmodel, established in the Reichsland since its cessionto the German Empire, has assiduously suppressed anyattempts on the part of that will to declare itself, andour first business, once this pressure is removed, will beto organise some machinery for ascertaining what thepeople ’s will may be .We must, in fact, insist that a plebiscite be takenthroughout the Reichsland . Many people will treatthis proposal with cynicism A plebiscite,

” they willsay,

“ invariably confirms the desire of the authoritythat conducts it. A vote taken under the auspices of theAllies would as certam decide for union with France,as one taken by the German regime before the war

42 PRUSSIANISM

would have declared for adhesion to the GermanEmpire .This, however, assumes a sinister in tention, when the

presupposition of the proposal is the desire on our partto deal justice to all nationalities and a belief that it isour in terest to do so and it is clear that we are capableof honestly conducting a plebiscite, if we will . Amore valid objection would be th at, however honest ouroonduct, our opponents would never credit the fact ifthe result issued to our advantage and to their disadvantage, so that even the reality o f free choice by thevoters would not modify the resentment of their formermasters . The remedy for this would be th at thevi ctorious party should evacuate the districts in disputealtogether, and hand over the organisation of the votin gto some neutral power. It might even then be objectedthat the foregoing decision of the war would necessarilyinfluence the decision of the vote, and this is probablytru e but it will certainly not influence it automaticallyin favour of the conquerors . A ll sorts of events, isolatedincidents of the war itself and the varied memories ofhalf a century before it, will affect the voters

’ judgmentmore than the total sum of past history drawn by thewar

’

s issue in fact, this issue will be only one of manystimuli to the complicated motives that will go to makeup the fin al desire of the votin g population .

A plebiscite, then, need neither be an unreality to thevoters nor seem so to the parties interested ; and justas the will of the former is more important than that ofthe latter, so the moral effect upon the voters themselvesof its true declaration is especially valuable . The greatmerit of the plebiscite is that it saves populations frombein g consigned like cattle from pen to pen, a treatmentthe more in tolerable in proportion to the civilisation


of the people that suffer it, and little calculated, as thecase of the Reichsland itself has proved, to conciliatethem to the nationality with which they are thusarbitrarily yoked .

The mere taking of a plebiscite will always go fartowards easing the situation : the real difficulty lies indetermining the practical method on wh ich it is to beconducted . Clearly the result will differ according tothe S ize of the minimum unit within which a separatepoll is taken . If the votes of the whole population ofthe Reichsland were polled, for instance, they wouldprobably produce a balance in favour of the reunion ofthe whole unit with France, while at the same time asmaller unit or units could have been detached from thewhole, which with almost equal certainty would havedeclared for standing by Germany. But it is obviouslyunjust that units capable of being separated out geographically and possessed of a local consciousness oftheir own, should be denied the expression of their willby artificial inclusion in a larger but inorgan ic mass .The most important preliminary, therefore, to the takingof a plebiscite is the definition of such minimum areas ,and it is here that the impartial application of as muchobjective knowledge as we can muster is most essential .Many of the following pages are occupied by tentativeexperiments in this direction .

The Reichsland 1 is shaped like a T-square with itsangle poin ting North -East, and its two arm s are sharplydivided by the barrier of the Vosges .2 The Westernarm stretches across the gap between the Vosges andthe Ardennes, and forms the transition between the

1 The total popu lation was in 1905, the German-speakingelement constitutin g 85 per cent. of the Who le.

See Map I.

44 PRUSSIANISM

plains of Northern France on the one hand and thePru ssian Rhineland on the other .This district includes both French and Germ an

speaking populations, and a line drawn diagonallyacross it from North -West to South - East, and

rough ly coinciding with the watershed between theSeille and the Saar, would indicate the boundarybetween the two elements . It is certain that theFrench-speaking section of the district 1 would voteunanimously for reunion with France, wh ile the Germanspeakin g section, on the other hand, seems either never tohave felt, or easily to have lost, political sympathy withFrance, and to have become conscious now of solidaritywith its Northern neighbours of the same speech,further down the Saar and the Moselle . The areasrespectively inhabited by the populations in questionform compact blocks adjoining the countries with whicheach is likely to seek union, and the boundary betweenthem follows a line quite suitable for a military andpolitical frontier. Clearly, therefore, these areas presen ttwo natural units within which the vote should betaken separately, and the result of the polling shoulddecide definitively the fate of each .

The town and district of Thionville (Diedenhofen)ought perhaps to vote by itself, because here thepopulation is mixed and the decision correspondin glydoubtful, while its geographical situation would equallypermit its inclusion in either country . It is probablethat it will vote for the conne ction with France, andthis will certainly be the case with Metz, the greatfortress of purely French population, at the junction ofthe Seille and th e Moselle ; with all the villages andtownships of the Seille basin itself ; and with the

1 About 15% of the total popu lation of th e who leReichsland.

46 PRUSSIANISM

uncompromisingly determ ined to break loose from theirpresent union with Germany. The notorious incidentthat occurred at Zabern less than a year ago, advertisedthe fact that Prussian military government was into lerable, and that, so long as Alsace was subject to it, thegran t of constitutional self-government would remainan empty formality but it might well become a realityas a result of this war, and if Alsace had the opportunityof enterin g the German Empire as an independentmember on an equal footing with the other states , sti llmore if she could enter it as part of a united SouthGerman state, strong enough to hold its own withinthe Empire against the North, there is strong reason toexpect that the bond of common speech would assertitself, and attract her strongly to her South Germ anbrethren only parted from her by the Rhine .1

On the other hand the crescendo and culminationof Prussian brutality may have alienated Alsace fromGermany altogether, and made her feel that her salvationlies neither in a problemati cal reform of the GermanEmpire ’s internal organisation, which she would havelittle influence in promoting, nor in a precariousautonomy, which she could never defend by her ownresources, but solely in placing herself once more underthe a gis of France, where the gratification afforded byher choice would ensure her a pecu liarly benevolentreception .

The decision, then, of Alsace, or in other words hernationality, is quite unpredi ctable, and the question ofmethod in organising the plebiscite accordingly assumeshere a special importance . It is clear, in the first place ,

1 Economics, as well as language, draw Alsace towards Germanyall the markets for her manufactures lie down the Rhine, none o f themWest of the Vosges.


that the probable decision of North-Eastern Lorraineto remain within Germany would incidentally decidethe fate of the northernmost strip of Alsace adjoiningit on the East. If Saargem i

‘

in d continued German, itwould not be feasible either from the military or fromthe economic point of view that the railway connectingit with the Rhine valley should become French, so thatif the rectified frontier of Germany crossed the Saarnot far North of Saarb ourg, it would have to includeat least Weissenburg, Hagenau and Bischweiler on itsway to the Rhine The small minority of populationinhabiting this strip would thus inevitably suffer theloss of their freedom of choice but the rest of Alsace,that is, the Southerly pass and the whole country Southof it between the Vosges and the Rhine, would stilldecide its own fate .The crucial question next arises Wh at units of voting

should be adopted in this area 4 Seeing that the decisionis so delicately balanced, it might be argued that theunits should be as small and numerous as possible,and that every commune should be allowed to make itsown choice . Such a procedure, however, would involve us in difficulties . Suppose Phalsbourg voted, likeSaargemfind, for Germany, while all the other communes voted for France, it would be impossibleto give Phalsbourg its way, because its fulfilmentwould drive a German wedge across the extremelyimportant railway and canal connecting French Saarbourg with French Strasbourg or again, suppose that,while Strasbourg voted for France, Colmar andMi

’

ilhausen voted for Germany, it would be geographically impossible to link both groups with theirchosen fatherlands . In fact, Alsace itself is a minimumun it . There are no suitable lines for a frontier to follow

48 PRUSSIANISM

between the Vosges and the Rhin e, or between Phalsbourg, Strasbourg and M iilh ausen so that, if we takethe plebiscite by fragments of the district, we shall becompelled seriously to tamper with its result in orderto reduce it to a workable shape, and so nullif y the votingto the discontent of all parties . It is worse than uselessto take a vote unless it is meant to be definitive, and thedisappoin tment of a single large minority is a lesserevil than the disillusionment of many small majorities .Alsace, then, within the limits defined, must vote asa single unit . We cannot foretell how the decision willgo, and the importance of the result, both for Franceand Germany, is momentous . Only one thing iscertain, that the accession of Alsace would profit eithercountry little, unless it were compassed by the desireand the initiative of Alsace herself.

C . The Danish Frontier

The question of Schleswig-Holstein 1 has not yetbeen opened by this war , but we must not for thatreason neglect it, for the seeds of future war are there .When the German Conf ederation fought Denmark onthis account in 1864, the two provinces had long beenunited under the Danish Crown, and the prize of victorywas their cession as a single unit to the conquerors ;but the situation before the war, and the settlementafter it, were alike unjust, because this political unityhas neither a national nor a geographical foundation .

It was monstrous that the whole territory should be inDenmark’s hands, for 85% of the total population 3 isGerman but it is equally outrageous that the Danishminority of should have been violently wrenched

1 S eemap on opposite page.

1 Total popu lation in 1900.

THE KIEL CANAL AND THE BALTIC SEA

DIS I A N

B remei havenilh o lmshav

to B erl inPPOPO S ED FRO NTI ER S DA N I S H

RA ILWAY S S"“ POPULATIO N

THE DANISH FRONTIER 49

away from their national state . The problem shouldnow be solved by allowing either province to go itsown way.

Holstein belongs entirely to Germany, by nationality,geography, and tradition . No Danish is spoken withinits limits it flanks the Right bank of the Elbe estuarybelow Hamburg ; it contains the whole course of theKiel Canal, a vital artery of Germany

’s commerce thatgives her the necessary direct connection betweenthe Baltic and the North Sea ; and even whileactually under Danish control, it always formed ajuridical part, first of the Holy Roman Empireand then of the German Confederation,

” through thedarkest days of Germany’s political history. To severthe connection of this province with Germany is unthinkable .Schleswig, on the other hand, is predominantly

Danish in speech, and the plebiscite will almost certainlyshow that the whole province (for it is one of thoseminimum units that are not susceptible of sub-division) is Danish in national sentiment . Geographically,moreover, its links are as strong with the Jutlandpeninsula as are those of Holstein with the Germancontinent, and the present Dano-German frontier is asunnatural and meaningless a line as is the South-Eastboundary of Holstein against Hamburg, L iib eck andMecklenburg. The true frontier of Germany andDenmark does not lie at either extremity of the twoprovinces, but between them . In sketching it, wemust compromise between racial distribution andgeographical necessity. The presumption in favour ofan existing line would suggest that we should simplyfollow the historical boundary between Schleswigand Holstein, but unfortunately the Kiel Ship Canal

50 PRUSSIANISM

coincides with this along its Eastern section, and bothbanks of the Canal must clearly remain within Germanterritory ; so that while still taking the estuary of theEider as the Western terminus of the frontier, we mustdraw its Eastward course further North, and bring it tothe Baltic at the head of EckernfOrde Bay, instead of theleft shore of Kiel Haven .

This kne, though it leaves to Germany a slice ofSch leswig in addition to all Holstein, which is in itselfby far the more populous and important of the twoprovinces, sti ll assigns to Denmark a small Germanspeaking area, including the towns of Schleswig andFlensburg, whi ch cannot be detached from the Danishspeakin g unit.1 The sympathies of this tiny minoritywill be revealed by th e plebis cite . Probably the factorof language will be outweighed by historical tradi tionand by the rigour of Prussian administration, for whichthe German nationality of the Prussian state, in whichSchleswig has been forcibly incorporated, is only ath eoreti cal compensation ; but even if these Germanspeaking Schleswigers would prefer to remain within areconsti tuted Germ an y, they are one of those m inoritiesthat must inevitably be sacrificed 2 to the exigenciesof geographical facts, for there is no natural, physicalfrontier to be found that corresponds more closely thanthe Eider-line to the actual frontier of speech .

In detail, then, and it is better to descend to detail,for concreteness ’ sake, the new frontier should probablyrun as follows : starting from the head of Eckernf é rdeBay, so as to assign the town of Schleswig to Denmarkbut to leave EckernfOrde to Germany, it should make a

1With and inhabitan ts respectively.1Without prejudice to a possible guarantee, on the part of Europe,

o f their national cu lture and individuality.

52 PRUSS IA NISM

(c) The Poles’ possible gain from the war amounts,

therefore, to the creation of a united national state, enjoying internal autonomy, but incorporated in a largerpolitical organisation . A ny of the three powers wouldbe willing, if the opportunity arrived, to m ake concessionsto the Poles already subject to it, in order to attractwithin its frontier upon the same terms the remain ingsections of the nation .

The Poles, then, can make a bargain on much thesame lines with either group . We have now to considerwh ich group is in a position to negotiate most favourablywith th em .

Our ally Russia is the traditional enemy of the Polishnation . The two peoples have been rival leaders ofthe Slavonic world . Poland drew her culture from theLatin West, and her peasantry remained staunch to theCatholic Church 1 durin g the crisis of the ReformationRussia took upon herself the inheritance of the B yzantine Empire . Sin ce 1814 more than half Poland

’sterritory and population, includin g the national capital,Warsaw, has been incorporated in the Russian Empire .Accordin gly, the national revolts of 183 1 and 1863were directed primarily, and in effect solely, againstRussian rule, and in th e concerted repression which theyprovoked from the three powers, the Russian government has taken th e lead . The most cruel symbo l ofPoland ’s humiliation is the flaun tingOrthodox Cathedralplanted in the ch ief public square o f Warsaw.

The bitter hatred Russia had in curred from the Poleswas an opportunity for Russia ’s enemies . Austria,realising that some day she would be drawn into alif e-and-death stru ggle with Russia over the questionof the Balkans, was clever enough to seize it.1 The history o f Po land and Ireland has been parallel in many points .

THE POLISH FRONTIER 53

The Hapsburg Empire, with its medley of races,could never convert itself in to a uninational state, ofthe type to which nineteenth-century Europe was conforming its true policy was to become a happyfamily, in which various nationalities should live andlet live side by side . When the disasters of 1866 forcedin ternal reconstruction upon the government at Vienna,it miserably failed, on the whole, to realise this ideal 1

only in the case of its Polish subjects did it carry its newpolicy to completion . In 1869 the province of Galicia,Austria’s share in the Polish spoils, was granted a farreaching measure of Home Rule, and Polish was declaredthe normal lan guage of its adm inistration and highereducation .

These concessions 2 have made the Poles the mostloyal citizens of the Empire . The Polish club orparliamentary block has practically become the government party in the Austrian Reichsrath, on which theministry can always rely for the voting of supplies andthe passing of army bills . The Austrian Poles have not,of course, abandoned the dream of national reunion,but they have learnt to seek it under the Hapsburgbanner, and their propaganda in the Russian provincesserves Austrian foreign policy at least as much as thecause of Polish nationalism . When the Russian soccupied Galicia towards the beginning of the war, thePolish population rose en masse again st the invaders .Their own experience will never commend to them thechange from Austrian to Russian allegian ce . The only

1 See Ch . 111.1 It m ust b e mentioned that this recognition o f the Po lish language

in Galicia hit not on ly Germ an, which was form erly the universallanguage of o fficial business in the province, though itwas only spokenby an insignificant proportion of the popu lation , b ut also the Ruthene

gwe

ého

‘

fnfi

US

éian, the native speech o f nearly half the inhabitants.

ee

54 PRUSSIANISM

factor that may mod ify their feelin g is th e Polish policyof Austria’s German ally.

Prussia, too, found her interest in fomenting theenmity between Russian and Pole, but sin ce, till thelast generation of the nineteenth-century, she was stillAustria’s rival and had not yet become her ally, sheworked for the same object by supporting the oppositeparty. She consistently played second fiddle to Ru ssiain the Polish concert, and at the same time contrivedto call the tun e . Prussian diplomacy at Petersburgthwarted all attempts at a Russo-Polish reconciliation ,and then the Prussian military authorities lent a helpin ghand to the Russian government across the frontier tosuppress those insurrections which the breakdown ofconciliation had stimulated . By their machiavellianhandling of the Polish situation, the Prussians securedthat their Ru ssian neighbour should have neither thewill nor the power to menace themselves .In 1879, however, the German Empire transferred its

allian ce from Russia to Austria, and the coun ter-alliancebetween Russia and France, finally consummated in the’nin eties , made the breach irreparable . Yet while shethus reversed her foreign policy, Germany entirelyomitted to correct her behaviour towards the Poles athome, so as to brin g it into line with that of her newAustrian ally. Instead, she succumbed to th e obsessionof nationalism, and began to chastise her Poles withscorpions instead of whips .In 1888 the Prussian parliament established an

A nsiedelungs-kommission (Colonisation Board) for

bu yin g up the land of Polish proprietors in the provin cesof Posen and West Prussia and plan ting German settlersupon it. In 1908 the Board was even granted powersof compulso ry expropriation . Sin ce 1872 pressure of


the most extreme kind 1 has been exerted to makeGerm an in stead of Polish the medium of instruction,not only in higher education, but in the local elementaryschools . In fact, the whole Prussian administrativemachin e has been brought to bear against Polishnationality within the German Empire, and in this caseits efficiency has been Germany’s misfortune . Russia’sintentions towards the Poles may have been equallysinister, but she lacked the means to carry them in toeffect, and national sentiments are determined less bymotives than by results . Germany has robbed Russiaof the premier place in Poland ’s hatred . Her Polishpolicy sin ce 1871 has been as unintelligent as it wasastute during the fifty years preceding . She has calleddown upon her head the enmity of both Poles andRussians at once.At the outbreak of war, then, the Polish national con

sciousness hated the three powers in the followingorder of intensity : Austria, Russia, Germany. Itremains to be seen whether the strong preference forAustria over Russia will be outweighed by the extremedetestation of Austria’s German partner.Several factors make it probable that this will happen .

In the first place there are the events of the war . Thewar has already made it patent to the world thatGermany is the dominant partner in the alliance, andAustria merely her tool . If, therefore, the CentralEuropean powers win the war, it will be Germany

’s andnot Austria’s policy that will be imposed upon Europein general and Poland in particular . Meanwhile, theGermans have shown beyond all doubt what that policywill be . They began, of course, like the other twopowers, by proclaiming the unity and autonomy of the

1 Not stopping short o f corporal punishment.

56 PRUSS IANISM

Polish nation ; but when they crossed the frontier tomake their word good, they dealt with the Polish sub

jects of Russia, th e nation’s central core, not as friends

to be liberated but as a hostile population to be terrorised .

The treatment of the frontier town of Kalisch was on a

par with the worst incidents in Belgium . Warsaw hasbeen shuddering ever sin ce at th e possibi lity of the samefate overtaking her, and there has been something likea national risin g of the countrypeople against the Germantroops in occupation . Poles and Russians seem inprocess of being fused together in feeling by the fireof a common hate . They are stimulated now by theinstinct to defend their united country against theinvader, but when the Russian armies cross the frontierin turn , both the Polish and the Russian soldiers thatmarch in their ranks will respond alike to the Pan slav

impulse of rescuing the Polish minority in Prussia fromthe jaws of Pangerm an ism .

If, then, we and our allies are victorious, the erectionof an autonomous Poland within the Russian Empire isalmost assured, and it will include not only the formersubjects of Russia but the Polish victims of Prussia aswell . This will come about not so much in virtue ofthe Grand Duke ’s proclamation, which under othercircumstances might well have left the Poles cold, butbecause Germany’s behaviour has put th e Poles in amood to respond warmly to her opponent’s overtures,and to compromise with Russia in a spirit of give andtake .” The chief obstacle to an entente between Polesand Russians was the memory of wrongs infli cted byRussia in the past. These memories will be eclipsedeffectively by the direct action of Germany in thepresent.There is also the permanent factor of Geography.


The Russian provinces by their central position and theirgreat superiority in extent to the Prussian and Austrianfragments, are the necessary nucleus of a united nationalstate . The same cause that made the Poles single outRussia for attack when they hoped to restore their nationto complete independence, will make them rally roundRussia now that they have accepted the principle ofautonomy within a larger Empire . The victory of ourenemies would certainly ensure to the Austrian sectionof the nation the liberties it already enjoys ; but inpromoting such an issue, the Galician Poles would besacrificing the one chance of national unity to thepreservation of their local Home Rule .In making her bargain with the Poles, Russia has the

supreme advantage of being one and indivisible, whileon the other side there are the ambitions of two partiesto be satisfied . Whatever their professions, or eventheir wishes, Germany and Austria could never arrangebetween them the erection of a united Poland .

The reunion of the whole nation within the frontier ofeither one or the other is clearly out of the question, forneither would surrender its own Polish provinces to itsneighbour. A second possibility would be the creationof an autonomous Poland under their join t protectorate,to which they should cede their respective Polish territories . But though the Galician Poles are perhaps astrong enough power in Austria to compel assent to theirsecession into the new national state, it is hardly conceivab le that Prussia would of her own free will relaxher grip upon her Polish districts . The German andPolish populations on her Eastern frontier are desperatelyintermingled, and she still hopes to simplify the tangleby the forcible Germanisation of the aliens . Moreover,much of the country in question is important to her

58 PRUSSIANISM

strategically. A Poland manufactured under AustroGerman auspices would therefore be robbed from theoutset of at least three mil lion of its citizens, no less than17 per cent. of the whole nation and it is further probable that the government at Vienn a, in order to main tainthe balan ce of power between itself and its ally, wouldinsist upon following Prussia

’s example, and successfully oppose the transference o f the Galician Polesfrom their Austrian allegiance to the autonomousprincipality.

In the event of Austro-German victory, therefore, thepromises of national restoration would result in noth ingbut the grant of auto nomy to the present Russianprovinces, which include no more th an three-fif ths of thetotal Polish population . The new Poland would startlife a cripple, and even this maimed existence wouldprobably be short, for the situation thus created couldhardly be permanent . The emergence of a selfgoverning Polish state in their immediate neighbourhoodwould rouse the nationalism of the Prussian and AustrianPoles to fever heat . They would be obsessed by resentment at their arbitrary exclusion from it, an d theautonomous prin cipality, in turn , could not remain indifferent to their struggles . Gratitude towards Austriaand Germany, its liberators from Russian ru le and itsofficial guarantors again st the reimposition of it, wouldbe eclipsed by indign ation at these patrons ’ flagrantlyinconsistent treatment of its brethren within their ownborders . The national government at Warsaw wouldbegin to bargain , behind its prote ctors ’ backs, withdefeated and chastened Russia for a genuin e reunion ofthe whole nation under Russia ’s banner . Berlin andVienna would get wind of the danger in time, and theywould forestall it by partitioning the principality itself

60 PRUSSIANISM

vote to a man for liberation from her dominion, and willcarry the Austrian Poles with them . It is one of theironies of history that Gali cia, the best governed province of Austria, should also be the provin ce whose loss,in the event of defeat, we can most confidently predict .Austria will lose the reward for her righteousness inGalicia, in retribution for her ally

’s sins in Posen andWest Prussia .The exasperation of national feelin g on this Eastern

frontier makes it considerably easier to ascertain the willof the populations concerned than on the frontierstowards Denmark and France . We can assume, beforeany plebiscite is taken, that every Pole desires secessionfrom Germany, and we must also keep it clearly beforeour minds that every German in the disputed zone willbe still more eager to remain a citizen of the Germanfatherland .

In seeking to compromise between the wishes of theGerman and Polish inhabitan ts of these districts, wemust not let ourselves be prejudiced by the atrociouspolicy of the Prussian government . A government’sactions are no certain test of a nation ’s fundamentalcharacter : political systems come and go, and theirideals pass with them, while the nation

’s growth maintains its even course . Let us forget, for the moment,how the Prussian administration has treated the Poles,and refrain from conjecturin g how a nationalist Polishregime might treat any German subjects it acquired,but compare with open minds the relative culture of theindividual German and Pole . We shall probably receivethe impression that the Germ an would suffer greater disadvantage by bein g annexed to a community of Poles,whose standards would be lower than his own, than thePole would suffer by enrolm ent as a German citizen ,


whi ch would be a kind of compulsory in itiation in to asuperior civilisation .

Of course compulsory conformity to an alien systemof life, even if the compulsion does not extend beyondthe sphere of politics, is almost equally distasteful,whether the people whose citizenship you have beenforced to adopt are relatively more advan ced than yourself or more backward ; but in the present in stan ce weare in face of the situation that so commonly arises inquestions of nationality : a minority must in evitablysuffer .The German and Polish populations along this frontier

are intricately interlaced . This is not due to themodern activities of the Colonisation Board theirresult has been the stimulation of national feeling, notthe modification of national distribution .

1 The racialconfusion is the gradual effect of four centuries, thetwelfth to the sixteenth, durin g which the superiorityof German culture over Polish was so marked thatGerman speech and nationality were continuously pushing out their advance-guards Eastward at the Poles ’

expense, less by violent conquest than by peacefulpenetration at the summons of native Polish rulers .This movement died down as soon as the Poles beganto overtake in civilisation their German teachers,2 and

1 During the generation since the Board’s institu tion , the percentageso f the popu lation in Prussian provinces contain in g both nationalitieshave persistently shifted in favour o f the Po les. The Po les’ birthrateis m uch higher than the Germans , and this gives them a greater sharein the to tal annual increase. A higher birthrate is, o f course, symptomatic of a lower standard of life in a sense the Germ ans are sufferin gfor their superior cwrlisation, and this explains why they to lerate thebarbarous methods by which the Prussian governm ent attempts toright the balance.

1 In the sixteenth centu ry the Po lish nobility was converted to

Calvinism , and took a leading part in the cu ltural development o f

Europe. In the next century the Po lish renaissance was submergedby the Counter-Reformation .

62 PRUSSIANISM

the Colonisation policy is an un justifiable and impracticable attempt to set it going again by force b ut

by whatever process the various Germ an enclaves havecome to be established on what was originally Polish soil,their sole but sufficient title is their actual presence therenow. In dealin g with th ese awkward German minoritieswe must es chew all historical arguments, and simplystart from the fact of their present existence .Besides the intermixture of the two nationalities, there

is a further factor which limits the possibility of rectifying the Eastern frontier of Germany in accordancewith the wishes of the local population in the variousdistricts affected .

Our object in changin g the political map is to sift outas large a proportion of the Polish element as we canfrom the German, and free them from their presen tcompulso ry association . If the liberated territories weredestined to be incorporated in an entirely independentPolish state, we could pursue this object without anysecondary considerations, but we have seen that thePrussian Poles will break their asso ciation with Germanyonly to efiect a new association with Russia . We havestill to exam in e what form this partnership is likely totake, but we can prophesy this much with certainty, thatthe New Poland and Russia will have a common tariffsystem and a comm on military organ isation : in the

economic and the strategical sphere, the Western frontierof autonomous Poland will be identical with the Westernfrontier of the whole Russian Empire .No settlement would be perman ent which left Ger

many’s Eastern flank strategically and economically atRussia’s mercy. Frontier-lines must be drawn so asto enable the countries divided by them severally tolead an independent and self-su fficient life of their own .

THE POL ISH FRONTIER 63

This is the first condition they must satisfy if they areto have any significance at all, and an essential part ofIndependence is the capacity for resisting by forceof arms an armed attack on the part of the neighbouring state .This fact is unquestionably true at the present time in

Europe, and our reconstruction after the war is overwill be Utopian if we ignore it. We are all hopin g thatrevulsion from war will lead to disarmament, and thatthe military factor will cease to play in the internationalpolitics of the future the terribly domin an t part whichit has played in the past ; we are all agreed that the positive impulse to disarm can come from no calculation ofmaterial advantage, but only from a change of heart ;but we must recognise that this psychological conversionwill not be produced automatically by shutting oureyes to the diflicu lties in its way. We must at leastfacilitate it by securing that it involves no materialsacrifices of prohibitive magnitude .We saw that we could banish the struggle for existencebetween nationalities only by solving national problemsand not by neglecting them . This principle applies tothe crudest form of the struggle, its conduct by the bruteviolence of war. Nations will have no ear for thegospel of Peace, so long as they feel themselves exposedto each oth er’s arms . The present war was precipitatedwhen several nations reached breaking-point in a longdrawn agony of mutual fear. We shall not cure them ofmilitarism by placing them at each other’s mercy morecompletely than ever. War will only become impossiblewhen either party’s frontier has been made so invu lnerab le that the other abandons all idea of violating it.If the frontiers of Belgium against Germany and Fran cehad been as invincibly fortified as the Franco-German

64 PRUSSIANISM

frontier itself is fortified on either side, there would havebeen no campaign in the West .In delim iting, therefore, our new frontier between

Germany and the Russian Empire, we must exposeneith er country to the other’s strategic initiative (otherwise we shall only accentuate their fears, and open anew era of war between them, instead of closing the erath at is past) , and here we are confronted with a dilemma,for the existing frontier, though it grievously violatesthe national principle, was negotiated with the precisein tention of producing a true strategic equilibrium.

This frontier dates from the Congress of Vienna,which resettled Europe in 1814 after the overthrow ofNapoleon . One of the main lin es of settlement, uponwhich all were agreed, was that Prussia should take hershare of the spoils in Western Germ any, while Russiashould be paid off with those Polish provinces which hadbeen seized by Prussia and Austria in the last partitions,1

and subsequently erected by Napoleon into the GrandDuchy of Warsaw. Prussia stipulated, however, thatthis principle should not apply to the districts ofKulmer

land 2 and Posen, and insisted upon their inclusion withinher own frontier . She gain ed her poin t, because it wasuniversally recognised that her demands in this quarterwere based on considerations of strategical necessity,and were not prompted by territorial ambition .

The present frontier, then, was admitted in 1814 tobe the min imum line which Prussia could defend successfully against Russian attack . We now propose to pushthis line still further back towards Breslau and Berlin indeference to the principle of Nationality, but we must

11793 and 1795.

1 S ituated on the Right bank of the Vistu la, and containing the

fortresses Graudenz and Thorn .


not allow our insistence upon true national frontiers toblind us to the strategic factor. Our final result mustbe a compromise between the two prin ciples, and beforewe put the question of national allegiance to the voteamong the inhabitants of the debatable zone, we shallhave, like the diplomatists of 1814, to lay down a limitb ehind which the German frontier must not be driven,even though it may deprive considerable enclaves ofPolish population lying within it of the right to choosefor themselves their own political destiny.

This limit imposed upon the new frontier willseriously restrict the range of the Polish plebiscite .Theoretically the vote might still be taken in the strip ofterritory between the German minimum and the presentfrontier-line but in practice there would be a one-sidedness about such an arrangement against which thevictorious Poles and Russian s would energeticallyprotest. A m in imum has always a strong tendency tobecome a maximum as well, and our allies will probablyaccept the principle of the min imum line only on condition that Germans on the wrong side of it shall sufferthe same loss of free choice that the Poles must sufferwho are left on the opposite side .In this case the situation would be exactly opposite to

that on the Fran co-German border . There the tracingof boundaries by the parties to the conference will besimply a preliminary step towards constituting the localpopulation into groups, and the free vote of these grou pswill then decide the fate of their respective districts .In Poland, on the contrary, the plebiscite would beeliminated altogether, and the new frontier defin itivelyconstituted by negotiations between plenipotentiariesof Germany on the one side and Poland and Russia onthe other.

66 PRUSSIANISM

The actual course the new lin e will follow mustdepend largely upon the bargainin g-power possessed atthe close of the war by the two parties, and is to thatextent unpredictable, but the transaction will not beconducted by Germany and Russia alone . All membersof the Congress will take a hand in it, and GreatBritain ’s influence as a mediator will be especiallyvaluable in this question, because she has absolutely nodirect interest in the issue . It is in cumbent upon us,therefore, to work out for ourselves a compromise whichwe can recommend, independently of bargainin g power,as the best possible under the permanent geographicaland racial circumstances, and we had better framesuggestions for a new frontier in some detail .Our discu ssion will be clearer if we treat the extensive

line from the Carpathians to the Baltic in severalsections .1 We will begin with Silesia .

(a) The province of Silesia occupies the whole upperbasin of the River Oder. It forms a portion of the greatNorth-European plain , and its only physical frontiersare the Riesen Gebirge Range on the South-West, whichlies between it and Bohemia, and the Carpathian Mountains on the South , which divide it from Hungary. Thecountry possesses two chief lines of communication withthe rest of the world North-Westward, the Oderdescends to the port of Stettin at the head of a landlocked arm o f the Baltic, the Half thegreat Moravian Gap between the Riesen Gebirge andthe Carpathians opens a route to the Danube basinwhich is traversed by several lines of railway leadingto Vienna .These geographical factors have determined Silesian

history. Silesia was occupied about 600 A D . by the1 S eeMap I I. for all sections.

68 PRUSSIANISM

ally on either side of the Austro-Prussian frontier, whilethe focus of the coal-district 1 lies just within the Prussianfrontier against Russia, near the point where the German ,

Austrian and Russian Empires meet, an d is continuouswith th emin ing districts of Russian Poland, from whichit is only separated by an artificial boundary.

The existin g frontiers, then, do not express economicarticulation, but they correspond still less to the boundaries of Nationality . The German colonisation up theOder never reached the head-waters of the river. Up toa poin t between Brieg and Oppeln, slightly above theconfluence of the Neisse tributary, the Oder is flanked bya German population on either side ; but above thatpoint, though along the mountain s the German elementstretches still further South, and even spreads into theMoravian Gap as far as the water-parting between theOder and Vistula systems, the native Pole has maintained himself astride the actual course of the Oder, andis in occupation of the river’s Left bank as well as itsRight. Above Ratibor, again, along the highest reachesof the Oder, the Pole is replaced by the Tchech . Wehave to devise a new frontier which shall do more justicethan the present to national distribution,without runningviolently counter to economic facts .The Western frontier of the Russian Empire and the

New Poland, or in other terms the Eastern frontier ofAustria and Germany, might start from the Hun garianboundary on the summit of the Carpathians, at a pointjust East of the pass through which the railway connectsSillein (Zsolna) in Hungary with Teschen in AustrianSilesia and thereafter with Ratibor in Prussian Silesia on

1 Th e towns of Gleiwitz, Beu then , Konigshu tte, Kattowitz ,Myslowitz form one practically continuous urban zone skirting the

frontier.


the Left bank of the Oder. From this starting-point itmight run parallel to the railway, along the dividebetween the Oder and Vistula systems, and continuein a N .N .W . direction till it struck the Oder’s Rightbank a few miles below Ratibor . It might thence followthe Oder downwards to a point opposite the junctionof the HotZea Otz tributary from the Left bank, andthen take a straight line, slightly East of North, to theSouthernmost point in the province of Posen .

This frontier would exclude from the new Poland thePolish population on the Left bank of the Oder, but evenalong this section of the Oder’s course it is only the ruralpopulation that is Polish the towns on the river-bank— Oppeln, Kosel, and Ratibor— are predominantlyGerman . If, moreover, we allowed Russia to cross theOder, and extend the frontier of her Empire right upto the Erz Gebirge, we should be transferring to herthe strategical command of the Moravian Gap, placingVienna at her mercy, and cutting the direct comm unication, East of the mountains, between the Prussian andAustrian sections of Silesia .We are proposing, on the other hand , to include inPoland the extremely important mining-district of theFive Towns .” Germany will doubtless protest againstthis, on account of the considerable German populationthat has been attracted to this area by the openings itoffers for all kinds of employment ; but we can fairlywrite off this German minority abandoned to Polandagainst the Poles across the Oder whom we have assignedto Germany. Moreover, the German element here isnot merely a minority, but actually a small and a decreasing one . The mass of the miners and workers isrecruited from the Polish countryside, and the growthof the Polish majority has already made itself felt in

79 PRUSSIANISM

politi cs. In spite of official pressure exercised uponelections, the Five Towns now return PolishNationalist representatives to the Prussian Landtag andthe Im perial Reichstag.The economic issue raised by the tran sference of this

distri ct to Poland is not so simple as the national . Bydriving a political frontier between these coal-min es inthe corner of Silesia and the industrial towns furtherNorth -West, which at present consume their output,shall we be ruinin g the prosperity of both ? We mayanswer th at a political frontier need not imply an in surmoun table tariff-wall, yet if such a fiscal barrier wereto be erected in this in stance, all parts of Silesia wouldcertain ly suffer economically for the adjustment of thecoun try’s national problem . Even in the latter case,however, the dislocation would only be temporary .

There are coal-seams in the German portion of Silesia,round Breslau, which could be developed to supply insufiiciency that region

’s industrial demand . This wouldof course deprive the Five Towns of their currentmarket, but they would rapidly find a new markettowards the East . A considerable manufacturin gindustry has already grown up in Russian Poland, notablyin the neighbourhood of Lodz . It is capable of almostlimitless expansion, because the huge agricultural andpastoral hinterland of Russia is its potential customer .If the produce of th e frontier coal-fields were divertedfrom German Silesia hither, the expan sion of Polishmanufacture would receive an immense impetus, and

would more than keep pace in its demand for coal withthe output the Five Towns offered it .The frontier- line, th en, which we have suggested in

the Silesian section, seems to stand the econom ic as wellas the nationalistic test . We may now turn our attention to the section that follows .


(b) The province of Posen is shaped like a flin t arrowhead, with its wings resting on the present Russianfrontier, and its point directed inwards straight towardsBerlin . Strategically, as we have seen, its control isvitally important to Germany for her security. Aforeign power established in military possession of PosenCity could, from this fortified base, strike South-Westward towards Glogau on the Oder, and cut the connections between Silesia and Berlin or it could strikeNorth-Eastward towards Dan zig on the Baltic, andisolate from the rest of Germany the provinces East ofthe Vistula. If the Russian General Staff were given afree hand in Posen, Germany would virtually cease tobe an independent power.In Nationality, on the other hand, Posen is predom in

antly Polish .

1 It is a wedge of alien population drivendeep into the German mass, and the considerableGerman minority is mostly concentrated on theNorthernboundary, along the River Netze . Isolated Germanenclaves, however, are scattered over the whole area ofthe province .These advan ce guards are not the fruit of theColonisation Board ’s plantations, which have hardlysucceeded in affecting the racial map like their compatriots in Silesia, they are descended from Germanburghers summoned by the native government in theMiddle Ages to civilise the country. Their history,therefore, is above reproach, and even had the title o fthe original settlers been doubtful, that would not havewarranted us in treating the present generation withless than justice .Nevertheless, in so far as the destiny of Posen is to

1 The popu lation o f th e province to talled in 1905 : thePo lish element numbered over a mil lion .

72 PRUSSIANISM

b e determined by the national factor, this dispersedmin ority of German s is not sufficiently strong to retainfor Germany any part of the province but its Northernfrin ge, and we find ourselves placed in a dilemma . Ifwe give precedence to Nationality, almost the whole ofPosen should be ceded to the New Poland if toStrategy, then no portion of the country should bedetached from its present connections .There seems to be only one possible solution of the

difficulty. The overwhelmingly Polish districts mustbe incorporated in the Autonomous Prin cipality, and

this mean s that they will come within the bond of theRussian Empire but Russia in return must allow thefortifications of Posen City to be dismantled, and mustundertake not to push forward her military lin e in to thenew territory, but to keep it within the limits of thepresent frontier.Military conventions of this kind, which have no sanc

tion behind them but the good faith of the contractingparties, are best secured by being made reciprocal, andthe question of Posen might give occasion for a compactbetween the Russian Empire and Germany of a muchwider range . Russia on her side might promise to construct no military works in any of the territories she mayacquire from Germany along the whole lin e from the

upper Oder to the Balti c Germany might demolish, incompensation, all fortifications in her provinces East ofthe Vistula, and withdraw her strategical front to theline of the Vistu lan fortresses .Such an arrangement would greatly diminish the

extent to which each coun try was exposed to an aggressive movement on the part of the other. Of course itwould be in the power of either to break its word at anymoment, and fortify the neutralised territory within its

THE POLISH FRONTIER 7;

own frontier, and this would give it a momentarystrategical advantage over its more honourable neighbour ; but fortifications cannot be built in a day, and theother would immediately retaliate by doing the same inits own neutralised area . If, as we have suggested, fearis a mo re potent stimulus of armaments than ambition, aGeneral Staff would be very reluctant to increase theirpower of offensive against the rival nation, if they knewthat the inevitable price would be similar action on theother’s part, which would correspondingly diminish theirown power of defence . A compact, therefore, whichstrengthen s the defensive capacity of both parties, hasthe greatest possible chance of stability.

If such a compromise could be effected, the newfrontier migh t run from the Southernmost corner ofPosen along the whole Western boundary of the province, to the point where that boundary h its the RiverWarta . After crossing the river, the frontier shouldchan ge direction abruptly to slightly North of East, andtake a course midway between the Warta and the Netze,continuing in the same line till it struck the Vistulabetween Bromberg and Thorn . This would leavewithin German territory the whole course of the RiverNetze, and also the canal which links the Netze andVistula systems through Bromberg, and is one of theprincipal in land waterways of Prussia .

(c) The lower course of the Vistula, from a poin t justabove Thorn to its mouth, runs through the Germanprovince of West Prussia, which flanks the river on bothsides . West Prussia, in spite of its name, is a com

paratively recent acquisition of the Prussian kingdom.

It was only incorporated at the first Partition of Polandin 1772 . Before that date it had been Polish territory,

74 PRUSSIANISM

ever sin ce Y agiellon1 broke the power of the Teu tonic

Knights at the battle of Tannenberg in 1410 A .D.

In the manifesto addressed to the Poles shortly afterthe outbreak of the war, the Grand Duke made a pointedallusion to this historic victory,

2 and hin ted that if theRussian s and Poles in concert carry the present struggleto a triumphant conclusion,West Prussia will be one ofthe national heirlooms which he will restore to the newPolish state .The Polish claim to the province has strong argu

ments in its favour. The Polish element is hardly lessim portan t here than in Posen .

3 The Germans are in am ajority, but they are concentrated in the great portof Danzig, and only thinly scattered through the ruraldistricts . On stri ct grounds of nationality, a strip ofWest Prussia on the Left bank of the Vistula, stretching all the way to the Baltic so as to include a smallextent of coast immediately West of Dan zig, ought to bedetached from Germany, and added, just like the majorpart of Posen, to autonomous Poland .

Probably this would not content the Poles . Foreconomic reasons they covet the fundamentally Germancity of Dan zig, and would therefore insist on a cleancut of the whole province, Polish and German portionsalike, although any such demand is of course refuted bythe National Prin ciple itself. Yet the mangled slice,

”

as well as the clean cut,” receives a categorical veto

from Geography.1 Thefirst king who ru led at once over thePo lish and the Lithuanian

nations.

1 The reverse sustained a few weeks afterwards on this very spo t bythe Russian armies in their first invasion o f Trans-Vistu lan Germany,hasmade the name less auspicious.

11 A t the German census o f 1905 the popu lation of West Prussiatotalled of whom were oflicially admitted tobe Po las.

76 PRUSSIANISM

the parties to the European conference . The nationalideals of theWest Prussian Poles are to be subordinatedto a paramount interest of the German nation . It isGerman y’s part to see that the sacrifice entailed shallbe as light as possible, and she must not be allowed torepudiate her obligation .

Moreover, the exclusion of this half million of Po lesfrom their national state affects not only the disappointedfragment itself, but also the liberated Polish nation .

The new Autonomous State has a claim to compensationfor submitting to this national loss, and the account canbest be settled by an economic concession .

The Vistula is Poland ’s river. It rises on the Po lishflan k of the Carpathians, both the national capitals,Cracow and Warsaw, lie on its banks, and it is themain artery of the country’s communications . If thelower reaches of the river, and the numerous Polishpopulation that dwells along them also, must defin itivelyremain outside the new political fro ntier, there is noreason why Polish traff ic on the river should be barredby a tariff-fence at this line . A further condition forthe retention of West Prussia must be imposed onGermany. She must grant the new Poland free tradedown the Vistula to the Baltic, and throw open to herDanzig, at the river

’s mouth, as a free port.This provision is essential to Polan d ’s future pro s

parity . Its extortion through military defeat maywo und the pride of the German nation, but its mostardent advocates will be the great German busin essfirm s at Dan zig itself, who will be fully sensible of thepossibili ties opened to them by this immense extensionof their city’s commercial hinterland .

(d) We have still to discuss the frontier East of theVistula . The homogeneou s German population of


East Prussia, compactly marshalled along the Balticcoast between the Vistula and the Niemen, does notproperly come into question . In all German y there isno more German land than this . We shall doubtless bereminded, however, that this inheritance was won forGermanism not by the peaceful penetration of burghers,like Silesia and the fringes of Posen and West Prussia,but by the sword of the Teutonic Knights. The

German s came here,” the fanatical Germanophobe will

cry, by brute force : by brute force let them beexpelled again .

”

If historical arguments must needs be answered, wemay point out that the folk they dispossessed were notPoles nor even Slavs . The original Prussian s belongedto a separate branch of the Indo-European family, andwere kinsmen of the Lithuan ians across the Niemen ;but the German crusaders who set themselves to rootout heathenism from this secluded corner of Europe,did their work so thoroughly that they annihilated theheathen th emselves together with their beliefs . Nonative Prussian now su rvives to Claim his ancestralinheritance, and the title remain s with his destroyers,who have robbed him even of his name, and raised itfrom an obscure tribal appellation to be the official styleof the greatest political organism that Germany has yetcreated .

The German-speaking region in East Prussia, then,must be left on the same side of the frontier as before .Its natural boundaries are sharply defined towards everyquarter, not merely by the Sea on the North and therivers that guard its flanks, but by the chain of theMasurian Lakes, that stretches parallel to the coast, anddivides the district from its hinterland .

The Slav advancing from the South-East has never

78 PRUSSIANISM

penetrated this barrier. It sheltered first the aboriginalPrussian s and then their German namesakes from thePoles, and in the present war it is proving itself aformidable obstacle to the Russian armies ; yet whileGeography has made it the perman ent strategicalfrontier of East Prussia, the political frontier has nevercoincided with it since the settlement after Tannenberg,but has kept to a quite artificial lin e drawn further inland towards the South .

The strip o f country between this present frontierand the lakes could be detached from East Prussia without aff ecting the strategical situation, and it is inhabitedby a Polish population, the Masurians .1 This is perhapsthe only unit in the whole of the Eastern frontier-zoneof Germany to which the decision by plebiscite can beapplied, and we must not neglect the opportunity, forwe cannot predict a priori the choice the Masurian swill make, as we can predict that of the other Poles .They have been united politi cally with their Germanneighbours beyond the lakes for considerably more thanfive hundred years, and in the sixteenth century theyfollowed them in their secession from the Roman Church .

They have shared since then in the Lutheran culture ofNorthern Germany. It is highly probable that traditionwill prove a stronger factor than language in determiningtheir nationality, but certain ty will not be reached tillthat nationality declares itself in the vote .

(e) As far as the Left bank of the Niemen, EastPrussia, with the possible exception of the Masurianunit, will thus main tain its present connections . Wehave still to consider the fragment of the province beyondthe river’s further bank . This is the only portion of EastPrussia that ought undoubtedly to be ceded to the

1 They number abou t


Russian Empire . The majority of the inhabitants areLithuan ians, at present separated by an artificial linefrom the mass of their fellow-countrymen on theRussian side of the frontier . The only considerableGerman enclave is the port of Memel,1 situated on theexit from the Kurisches Haff or lagoon, into whichthe Niemen debouches ; but we can write off againstMemel the Lithuanian enclaves on the South bank of theriver,2 which we propose to leave within the Germanfrontier, and from the economic point of view Russia

’sclaim to Memel is as strong as Poland ’s to West Pru ssia .The upper system of the Niemen provides waterwaysfor the traffic of Russia’s Lithuanian and White Russianprovinces, and Memel is the natural point of connectionbetween this in ternal trade and the sea .We can now suggest how the frontier East of theVistula should run .

Crossing the Vistula at a point between Brombergand Thorn, it should assign Thorn to Poland . Thepossession of this fortress is strategically essential to thenew principality, for the present campaign has alreadyshown how a German force concentrated on the lowerVistula can from this base strike towards the interior inany direction . If Thorn remained in Germany’s hands,Poland would be exposed perpetually to a Germanoffensive, and communication between Posen andWarsaw might be cut at any moment . In Polish hands,on the contrary, Thorn would not be a menace toGermany, for the course of the Vistula below it is flanked

1 Popu lation, in 1905 .

‘1 There are Lithuanians in East Prussia altogether. In

1905 the total popu lation of the province was S ince the

Masurians and Lithuanians am ount together to about half a m illion , theGerm an block must total am illion and a half.

80 PRUSSIANISM

by a series of German fortresses 1 all the way down .

This is the one instance we have encountered in whichthe strategical factor outweighs the racial to Germany’sdetriment and not to her gain , for Thorn is inhabited bya German population .

2

Beyond Thorn the course of the frontier will be determin ed by the Masurians’ choice . If they elect to abideby Germany, the new frontier, after skirtin g Thorn tothe North, will bend Eastward , and coincide with thepresent line a few miles East of the fortress : if theymerge themselves in Poland, the frontier will head NorthEastward towards the line of the lakes . It will runjust South of Deutsch-Eylau, Osterode and Allenstein,and parallel to the railway that connects them . Then,leaving LOtzen to Germany but giving Lyck to Poland,it will converge upon the present frontier where it isin tersected by the 54th parallel of latitude .From this point the new frontier will in any case

follow the lin e of the old, till it hits the Niemen . Thencethe Left bank of the river will form the remainder of itscourse .

E. Prussian S tate and German Nation

We have completed our survey of Germany’sEuropean frontiers, and have found that, however considerately we treat her, she cannot escape Without veryserious territorial curtailment . Can we reconcile herfeelings to this necessary loss 9’

If we glance back at the cessions we have demandedfrom the German Empire, we shall see that nearly all ofthem are at Prussia’s expense . In fact, our proposalsmight seem in tended as a deliberate reversal of Prussianhistory . The acquisition of Silesia and the Polish

1 Graudenz, Marienwerder, Marienburg. 1

PRUSSIA AND GERMANY 81

provinces first raised her to the rank of a great power.The campaign against Denmark in 1864 won her notonly Schleswig but most of Northern Germany twoyears later. The territory taken from Fran ce in 1871

did not become Prussian soil, but as the Reichslandit symbolises the hegemony over all Germany, whichPrussia attain ed through her French victory by thefoundation of the German Empire .Those to whom vae victismakes the paramoun t appeal

will here find a fresh opportunity to interpose . Weare now prepared to grant you, they will say, thatin the Allies’ settlement with the German nation, justiceand mercy may prove the best policy. Your hopes ofreconciling Germany are not so fantastic as might besupposed but the facts to which you have just calledour attention prove far more conclusively that youcannot possibly reconcile Prussia. We therefore offeryou a general principle for your guidance . SpareGermany by all means, but humiliate Prussia withoutrestraint. Destroy Prussia’s hegemony in Germany byliberating all the German lands which she annexed in1814 and 1866 . Make them independent members ofa truly federal Empire, and remove the diminishedPrussia’s last hold upon the remainder of the nation, bystipulating in the terms of peace that the Hohenzollernshall resign the dignity of German Empero r. Youcannot make your peace with Prussia then you mustannih ilate her with a ruthless hand .

”

Our first reply to this will be that the interference offoreign powers in a nation’s internal affairs is the sovereign mean s of weldin g together that nation’s mostdisco rdant elements .1 If we ordered Hanover to secede

1 The success.

of Bismarck’s po licy is a commentary on this fact.He induced foreigners to put spokes into Germany’s wheel, in order touse them himself as levers for upheaving Germ any’s national sen timent.

82 PRUSSIANISM

from Prussia, the Hanoverians would for the first timerealise their pride in Prussian citizenship, and if theKaiser were bidden doff his Imperial Crown, Bavariawould for the first time acclaim him whole-heartedly asher war-lord . Instead of cru shing Pru ssia by isolatingher from the German nation, we should most effectivelyalienate the German nation by rallying it round Prussia .So much is certain

,but we can clear up the argument

more satisfactorily by thin kin g out What meanin g thename Prussia conveys to our minds .Historically, the Prussian is the Squire from beyond

the Elbe,” 1 a character in which we divine the ferocity

of the Borderer, th e fanaticism of the Crusader, and thedogmatism of the Protestan t, While behin d the squiremarches the peasan t from his estate, who seems to haveno life beyond obedience to his leader’s commands, andto revert, whenever he fin ds himself leaderless, to thehabits of his barbarous an cestors in the days before thesquire appeared in the land .

Looked at from one poin t of view, the growth ofmodern Prussia is simply the story of how this sinistertroop (hostility makes us distort their features beyondthe truth) has imposed its domination progressively uponthe whole German world, first stretching out its handsfrom Elbe to Rhin e to swallow up the North, and thencompellin g the South to follow in its train . We picturethe Prussian drill-sergeant forcing the too pliableRhin elander into his iron mould, and we feel that wehave been watching the deliberate depravation of anation ’s character. You may know Prussia,

” weexclaim, by her fruits . Prussianism made th ewar, andthe war is a disaster for Germany and for the whole ofEurope .”

1 Ost-Elb ischer Junker.

84 PRUSSIANISM

tion . These two Prussian areas have been the actualtheatre of this German achievement. Lo oked at fromthe economic point of View, Prussia is not an incubuswhich has fastened itself upon the German nation’s life,but the most vital element of that life itself, which hasraised Germany to her present pitch of greatn ess .The Prussian state may still be controlled by theAgrarian Interest,

” but the squirarchy is not thefactor in Prussia which enables her to control in turnthe rest of Germany. The German Empire is heldtogether by the hegemony not of the Eastern markbut of the Industrial North . Westphalia and Silesiaare not merely typical elements of modern German ythey are the country’s core . Junkerdom, the traditionalPrussia of the squire, may still call the tun e , but nomusic would follow, if the resourceful, indefatigablePrussia of the industrial workers were not there to translate the deman d into reality . Germany could neverhave borne the cost of her stupendous armaments, ifthe new Prussia had not all the time been disseminatingher manufactures through the markets of the world andwinnin g for her profits an ever-increasing proportion ofthe world ’s surplus wealth she could not have outdonethe armaments of Great Britain and Fran ce in qualityand elaboration as well as in mere mass, had not Westphalia lent all her engineering skill to manufacture andimprove Germany’s armaments, as well as to pay forthem. The new Prussia has virtually supplanted theold even in her own peculiar sphere : the works atEssen are the driving force behin d the militarism whichwe are combatting in this war, and the Krupps haveeclipsed as the exponents of Prussianism the vonB li

’

ichers and von Bulows .The futu re character of Prussia, then, will in no case


be determined by the military caste which originally'

built her up . Already they seem to feel the reins slipping from their grasp, and to suspect that the creaturewill one day be impelled to deny his creator. Thefuture, however, belongs to Herr Krupp as little as tohis aristocratic godfathers . Behind the capitalist S tandthe myriads of his workers . All over Europe they arecomin g to realise the services of their class to the state,and its potential power in politics, and they are reso lving to conquer the position in society which is theirclue ; but in Germany the class-consciousness of theWorkers is even stronger, and their resentment morebitter, than in the countries of the West, becausethey are here thrust more ruthlessly into the outerdarkness .It is certain that the German Workers will one day

come into their own . Krupp may still claim all creditfor the cannon and armour-plate, and hold his own

against his employees yet machines, however perfect,do not constitute an army : its essence is always its men .

The German General Staff boasts far more loudly ofits four million trained combatants than of its 42-centimetre guns, and the new industrial Prussia supplies theblood as well as the gold and the iron . The increase of

5o°/0 in the population of the Empire, between the years

1871 and 1905, has been entirely urban . The newindustry of the Westphalian and Silesian town s produces the subsistence for these new mouths . Theindustrial centres have become the main reservoir onwhich the General Staff depends for its recruits .1

In a m ilitaristic state, political power gravitates into1 Bernhardi, in Germany and the Next War, discusses this without

appearing to realise its significance. He notes, and deplores, th e factth at the townsman is not such sym pathetic m aterial for the Army asthe peasant.

86 PRUSSIANISM

the hands of those who bear the military burdens . Ithas been hin ted that the forces which now governGermany, Capital and Privilege in coalition, actuallyprecipitated the war in order to forestall the outbreakof the in ternal class-stru ggle and th eir own downfall .Whether there is any truth in this or not, the socialproblem in Germany will not be decided automaticallyin this sense or in that by victory or defeat. An army ofworkers , elated by a military triumph and convincedthat it was due to their own organised endeavour andsacrifice, might well make short work, after the warwas over, of the un scrupulous directorate which haddeliberately involved them in this fiery trial . We haveseen, on the other hand, that defeat followed by undiscriminatin g humiliation might reconcile the principalvictims to the schemers who were ultimately responsiblefor both misfortunes . In either case the attitudeof the industrial masses will be the important factor,and their state of mind, in the event of the Allies

’

victory, will depend much more upon how we deal withthem in the settlement at the close of hostilities thanupon th e military results of the war itself.Here the believer in external intervention will inter

rupt us again . I discern,” he will exclaim, an

infallible means of securing for ourselves the gratitudeand sympathy of this industrial class, whom you havenow proved to be the real Prussia of the future . I nolonger propose to crush Prussia—I see th at the Prussianhegemony in Germany is synonymous with the natural,unalterable economic supremacy of the North—but Ido advocate in tervention in the social evolution ofPrussia herself. You say that the workers are bound togain the upper hand , let them gain it by our goodOfi ces.

88 PRUSSIANISM

heretofore, will make itself felt at last, and will in spirePrussian policy with a new spirit.Moreover, this change of heart (your own phrase)

will prepare the way for a further salutary modification of Prussia’s equilibrium . Formerly I proposed todetach all the liberal parts of Prussia from her irreclaimable core : now I suggest that we smother and softenthe core by reinforcing the fruitful fibres that surround it.You have poin ted out that the non-Prussian com

m unities in Northern German y are isolated survivals,destined to ultimate absorption in their Pru ssian environment. Perhaps you have not sufficiently emphasisedthe effect their assimilation will have upon Prussia herself, for their importance cannot be measured by theirterritorial extent. There are the three Hansa towns forin stan ce . Hamburg is the second largest city in theEmpire, even Bremen is bigger than Danzig,1 and thegroup as a whole conducts all the trade of the Elbeand theWeser. The barren naval bases of Cuxhaven,Wilhelmshaven and Helgoland are the only markPrussia ’s advent has made upon the North Sea coast.You have related, again, how the German national

consciousness was first fostered by German Intellect andArt ; but if you call to mind the Spiritual centres ofNorthern Germany, you will half fancy that they havepurposely been boycotted by the Prussian frontier.Dresden, Leipzig, Jena, Weimar, Gotha—not one ofthem lies on Prussian soil . Berlin has striven for acentury to array herself in their glories, but there is

1 Popu lations in 1905BerkhHamburgBremen

DanzigLubeck


a tradition in their very names which she cannotplagiarise . Finally I will meet you on your own ground,and remind you that in the industrial world Silesia andWestphalia have not entirely outdistanced the oldermanufactures of Saxony. Chemnitz can still bear comparison with Beuthen or Elberfeld .

The incorporation, then, in Prussia of the otherNorth-German elements will immensely strengthen thatindustrial democracy whose triumph we wish to ensure,while they on their part will find no grievance in suchchange of status, if it coincides with a radical revision ofthe Pru ssian constitution, guaranteed by the hand andseal of Europe .”

There is far more wisdom in these suggestions than inthe programme they supersede . The eradication ofPrussia hardly needed refutation, but the liberalisationof the Prussian constitution and the consolidation of allNorthern Germany within the Prussian state are clearlyessential steps towards a better future . In this instancethe end is not at fault, but only the means . We shallhave to insist once more in reply that even the mildestand most beneficial of internal transformations cannotbe eff ected by external pressure, that a ready-madeconstitution has no more charm than a ready-made coat,and that even if Industrial Germany accepted thepolitical costume we offered her, there would be notelling in what fashion our gift would be worn : shemight even give it a militaristic turn, and disconcert usby aping the drill-sergeants from whom we haddelivered her . Nevertheless,when these objections haveduly been filed, we shall probably admit that we havesighted our desired goal, if only some road thitherwardwere apparent .The upshot of our discussion is this . We hope for a

99 PRUSSIANISM

far-reaching chan ge of equilibrium in Northern German y, but we realise that if we meddle with the scalesourselves, we shall end by inclining the balance moreheavily then ever in the present direction . Theauspicious revolution can only be produced by aspontan eous internal movement.Can we promote, or at any rate foresee, any issue

which would rouse Northern Germany to cast outPru ssianism on its own initiativeWe know the cause of Germany’s devoted loyalty tothe military caste in the present war. She sees in themthe cham pions of her nationality, the leaders in herlife-and-death struggle against a world in arms . Onething alone would utterly discredit the Prussian squirearchy in German eyes : if, on some grave question ofstate, the Junkers sacrificed the national in terest to theinterest of their own tradition .

We have seen that the keystone of Bismarck’s policywas the creed that Prussia’s and Germany’s interestswere identical . He equated th e unification of Germanywith the extension of Prussia’s hegemony, but hisdoctrine had one stumbling-block to overcome itinvolved the exclusion from the national Empire ofone sixth part 1 of the nation ’s strength, the Germansof Austria.The settlement between Prussia and Austria after theSeven Weeks ’War of 1866 was a violation of Germannational tradition . Since the Great In terregnuminto which the Holy Roman Empire fell after the reign ofFrederick II . in the thirteenth century, German unityhad been little more than a name but the ghost of itthat lingered on had attached itself during the last four

1 N ot counting the Germ an-speaking Swiss, who , of course, cannotb e reckoned Germ an in nationality.

92 PRUSSIAN ISM

who would be enabled by this heightening of the oddsto hold her entirely at their mercy. They wou ld respondto the militarists ’ call for still greater armaments, notfrom motives of revenge so much as in self-protectionagain st a greater evil .Such misgivings would be set at rest completely by

the reunion of the Austrian Germans with the Empire.

Even if every Alsatian, Schleswiger and Pole managedto extricate himself from Germany’s net, the accessionof the Austrian block would more than doubly compensate the loss . Germany would be placed beyond alldanger from her neighbours, and the North Germanwould have solved effectively the external problem of thenation, without seriously compromising his internalsupremacy within it.The economic primacy of Northern Germany is

almost certainly sumcient to outweigh Austrian Germanyin addition to the South , but to make the continuan ceof their hegemony sure, the Northerners would probablytake of their own free will the steps we so inten sely desire.The reinforcement of the Southern groups would givePru ssia and the Northern enclaves a strong mutualinterest of their own in consolidation, and this wouldnecessitate a prelimin ary reform in the Prussianfranchise, for Hamburg and Saxony would declin emembership of the Prussian state on the present terms .1

1 The conso lidation of the North wou ld probably evoke a sim ilar

movem en t on the part of th e three Sou thern states. Their unitedpopu lation in 1905 was only and their area squarem i les. S ingly, they wou ld find themselves in a very weak positionbetween the great Prussian and Austrian units . The natu ral line o fdivision between the conso lidated states of North and South wou ldstart from the Austrian frontier at the extreme North-West corner ofBohemia, and follow the present boundary between Bavaria on the onehand and S axony and the Thuringian principalities on the other.

Thence itwou ld cu t into what is now Prussian territory, passin g slightlySouth of Fu lda, till it hit the boundary o f Hes se-Da mstadt (the

PRUSSIA A ND GERMANY 93

Thus the internal effect upon Northern Germany ofAustria’s restoration to the Empire would immediatelyprove fatal to the traditional Prussian ruling class . Theywould have the choice of letting the reins drop quietlyfrom their hands, or of being overthrown ignominiouslyin the effort to deflect the nation from its natural course .The revision of the Imperial constitution would crowntheir discomfiture.

Under the present system the supremacy of Prussia isvested in the Imperial title and privileges of her HohenZollern king, who is the war-lord and executive head ofthe whole nation ; but if the Hapsburgs return, theHohenzollern can be suzerain no more . Bismarckban ished the Hapsburgs from Germany, because heknew that they could never take a subordinate placewithin it. Hapsburg and Hohenzollern can only comeinto partnership again on terms of absolute equality .

This does not mean the weakening of that unity withwhich Germany was endowed by Bismarck : it onlymean s that un ity will no longer be maintained by amonarchi cal bond . The Hohenzollern will sink to be noNorthern block o f the principality) . It wou ld coincide with thisboundary along its S outhern segment, and break next into PrussianNassau , fo llowmg the crest of the TaunusMountains till it reached theRhine opposite Bingen .

This wou ld assign to th e S outh not only Hanau and Wiesbaden b utFrankfurt, the centre of Germ an railways and finance, which has beenincorporated in Prussia since 1866 . By Geography the who le basinof the Main belongs to the S ou th as well as the upper basin o f the

Rhine as far as Bingen and the Taunus, for at this point the unitedstream formed through their junction pierces by a narrow defile a lineof hills athwart its course, and enters a new stagewhen it emerges againinto the open .

Beyond the Rhine the boundary-linewou ld coincide with the presentboundary between the Bavarian Palatinate and Rhemsh Prussia, as faras the boundary of the Reichsland in the neighbourhood of Saargemund, where it wou ld take to the water-parting between the Rhineand the Moselle till it reached the frontier o f France. The positionof the Franco-German frontier wou ld, of course, depend on whetherAlsace united herself with France or with this new South German unit.

94 PRUSSIANISM

more than constitutional sovereign of the new NorthGerman state, consolidated under the Prussian title andgoverned from Berlin the Imperial Reichstag will gaincorrespondingly in scope and authority by this relieffrom monarch ical concurrence . The national unity thatoverrides federal particularism will thus receive inGermany the same parliamentary expression that itpossesses in the and through this commondemocratic organ the v arious groups within the nationwill be represented in the national counsels in strict proportion to their several importance . On this prin ciplethe North will preserve its leadership in Germany,Germany will be freed from fear of her neighbours, andEurope will be reassured as to Germany’s policy in thefuture . The ejection of the Hohenzollern from thehighest place in the Empire will be equivalent inEuropean eyes to a renunciation of Prussian ism .

These are great expectations, but as far as Europe andGermany are concerned, there is no apparent obstacle totheir realisation . Germany, however, is no more incommand of the situation than ourselves . Everythin gturns upon the reincorporation of Austrian Germany,and this lies in the hands of the Austrian s alone . Noone can compel them to re-enter Germany against theirwill, nor prevent them from doing so if they wish.

Will the Germans of Austria be moved to take thisstep or no f Certainly they will not take it to obligeGermany or Europe . Nations do not dispose of themselves upon altruistic motives . Austria will only seekmembership in the German Empire if She finds her owninterest in doing so, and obviously her interest will notpoin t this way unless the result of the present warupsets the status quo even more momentously for herthan for Germany.

96 PRUSSIANISM

only be caused by some external agency in theirdespite .This definition of what a break-up of the Hapsburg

Empire implies, may forestall an objection that mustlong have been in the critic’s mind . You talk veryglibly,

” he will have been thinking, about reconcilingGermany by giving her two -fold compensation for herEuropean losses, but perhaps her conquerors may findsuch conciliation clear at the price . Do you reallysuppose that the Allies, if they finally beat Germany byan exhausting war, will allow her to emerge even strongerthan before from the subsequent settlement 5It is of course obvious that they will not, and the

objection is so far cogent . It is not relevant, however,to the case in question .

During the last generation, the states of Europe havetended to play a less and less individual part in the gameof diplomacy and war. The coalition, not the singlecountry, has become the un it of power. Germany’smilitary strength can only be estimated in terms of thewhole group to whi ch she belongs, and, since theGerman and the Hapsburg Empires have now beenpartn ers in in ternational politi cs for thirty-five years,1

we must for this purpose treat them as a sin gle block .

It is true that the standard of so cial efliciency ingeneral, and of military organisation in particular, isconsiderably higher in the German section of the blockthen in the other, so that the transference within theblock of an important element from the inferior Hapsburg system to the superior German would certainlyincrease the power of the block as a whole, given that itstotal composition continued the same . If the break-upof the Hapsburg Empire were merely nominal, and the

1 S ince 1879.

PRUSSIA A ND GERMANY 97

group which had formerly consisted of Germany andAustria-cum-Hungary were reconstituted as Germanycum-Austria and Hungary, then our critic

’s commentwould be quite in point. The coalition would indeedemerge stronger than before, with a margin of increasethat would cover the loss of a few border provinces, andthe Allies could not suffer events to take such a course .This possibility is disposed of, however, by our con

clusion that Austria will never merge herself in Germanyunless the other elements of the Hapsburg Empire dobreak away from her in some real sense, and fly o ff ata tangent both from the Hapsburg state and from theGerman coalition . If this were to happen , it would ofcourse immeasurably lessen the total offensive power ofGermany and her group, and we could regard a considerab le addition to the individual strength of Germanyherself with perfect equanimity.

We are accordingly faced with the question : willthe War produce a radical break-up of the HapsburgMonarchy, and if it does, on what lines will the dissolution take place 5We shall then find a further question awaiting us .

Dissolution, supposing we come to believe it probable,will certain ly cancel the factors which at present renderunion with Germany undesirable to Austria, but it neednot in spire her with a positive desire for it .

”If the

Hapsburg complexus is loosened, Austria will findherself released from old ties . She may prefer to contract no new ones, and embark instead upon a phase ofindependent existence . This is a contingency we shallhave to consider, before we can proclaim ou r Austriansolution of the German problem as a certainty ; but wemust not be over-hasty. We will try to deal with onlyone question at a time .

98 THE VITAL ITY OF AUSTRIA

CHAPTER III

THE VITALITY OF AUSTRIA

CA N the Hapsburg Empire survive the present crisis fThe question has been asked several times already duringthe past century, and has been answered invariably inthe negative, yet the Empire still exists , and is playing aleadin g part in international politi cs at this moment .Twice over Austria was utterly defeated and shom of

extensive territories by Napoleon, only to emerge in1814 with wider frontiers than She possessed in 1792 .

For the next thirty-three years international statesmansh ip took its cue from the Austrian Chancellor Metternich . Then the international revolution of 1848

overth rew Mettem ich with bewildering suddenness,and it seemed as though the Monarchy would vanishwith the diplomat who in carnated its ideals .In this year it was buffeted from one quarter by the

full storm of Italian Nationalism, which had been brewing for half a century, and now swept the people of everyItalian principality into a common crusade against thealien master encamped on the Po . On the other flankTchechs and Magyars renounced all participation in aGermanised state, and summoned the Hapsburg toaccept the crowns of independent Bohemia and Hungaryat Prag and Pészony, unless he were willing to forfeittheir allegiance altogether . Even Vienna, the capitaland core of the Empire, rejected her native sovereign .

The fire of Liberalism set the Viennese population ina blaze : they made common cause with the MagyarLiberals further down the Danube, and the Emperor

100 THE VITALITY OF AUSTRIA

and consummation . Napoleon III. dealt her a hardblow in 1859, which led directly to the establishmentof the Italian national state . In 1866 the new Italy andPrussia, drawn together by coincidence of resentmentand ambition, attacked Austria simultaneously from twoflanks , and ousted her completely from the Italian andGerman spheres . Yet themain body of the Empire didnot dissolve under these strokes external humiliationmerely opened a new epoch of in ternal evolution .

The Hapsburg Monarchy, then, has resisted theshock of three titanic phenomena : Democracy, theRisorgimento and Bismarck . The earthquake carriedaway Lombardy, Venetia and the hegemony of Germany—two pinnacles and an ornamental facade—but thebu ilding itself stood firm . So, we might infer, thepresent catastrophe may detach Galicia, and possiblyBosnia as well, but still the Monarchy will not collapseif it outlived th e nineteenth century, it need have nofear of the twentieth .

Nevertheless, the prophets of death have reason,though not precedent, on their side .The Hapsburg state, like the Prussian , has grown out

of one of Germany’s Eastern marks .” It is entirelythe creation of the Hapsburg Dynasty, which established its hold on the duchies of A iistria and Styria in1282, when Rudolf of Hapsburg was Holy RomanEmperor . Round this nucleus successive generationsof Hapsburgs have gathered the present collection ofprovin ces by conquest, inheritance, feudal escheat,marriage-settlement, free gift, legal chicanery, and allthe other methods which contribute to the growth ofprivate estates . Austrian history has therefore beendomin ated likewise by the personal factor, but here theanalogy with Pru ssia ends : both developments are

THE VITALITY OF AUSTRIA 101

expressions of family character, but their comparisonillustrates the marked divergence of Hapsburg andHohenzollern temperament .The Prussian collector has been systematic and self

controlled . Starting on the Eastern fringe of theGerman world, we have seen how persistently he shiftedhis land-marks towards the West, never grasping tooeagerly but never relaxing his grip, till his estates coincided with Northern Germany in extent, and hisadministration was adopted for the government of theGerman nation .

The Hapsburg has shown no such consistent policy.

He has pursued his hobby in happy-go -lucky fashion,gaining here and losing there with good-humoured indifference . There are few territories in Europe thathave not passed through his hands . Before the greatprize of Austria became his, he lived in a castle on thebanks of the Aar,1 from which he derives his family name .The warriors of the Five Cantons ejected him from hisancestral dwelling when they founded Switzerland, andat present not one rood remains to him of this land, norof Alsace and the Black Forest, his earliest acquisitions .He has own ed Spain and Belgium in the West, Venice,Milan, Naples and Sicily have been ruled by him ; incombat with the Turk he advanced far deeper intoSerbia during the eighteenth century than his armieshave penetrated during the present war, and the occupation of the Danubian principalities once carried him to

the Black Sea coast. All these bizarre properties havebeen lost to him, but there is variety enough in the assetsthat remain .

Prussia has made herself the exponent of Germannationality : modern Austria is representative of no

1 The chief Southern tribu tary of theUpper Rhine.


nationality at all . It is true that two 1 small nations, theMagyars and the Tchechs, are wholly contain ed withinher frontiers ; but these constitute no more thanand per cent. respectively of her total population .

2

The majority that remains is composed of fragmentsdetached from six nationalities Germans, Italians andRoumans ; Poles, Ruthenes and Southern Slavs . In allthese six cases the main body of the race lies beyond theAustrian frontier, while in four of them it is organisedin to a national state immediately conterminous with it.Germany, Italy, Roumania and Serbia are each waitingto claim their Austrian irredenta when the favourable moment arrives .The Hapsburg Monarchy has set Nationality at

defian ce, and that is why the prophets shake their headsover its destiny. What is the secret of its extraordin aryvitality, which has falsified all the prophets

’ calcu lationsand enabled it to survive both in ternal dissidence andpressure from without é An organ ism cannot thrivewith complete disregard to its environment. If theMonarchy has not adapted itself to the national principle,it must have responded to some other factor of equalsignificance in the modern world .

We shall find th is factor in Geography.

The political maps of mediaeval and contemporaryEurope produce quite different impressions . Theformer is complex and variegated like a mosaic, or likesome rich window of stained glass, which has beenshattered by cannon and pieced together again hap

1 We might brin g the number up to fou r, if we treated th e S lovaksas a nationality independent o f th e Tchechs, and distin guished theS lovenes from the S ou thern S lavs.

1 Total popu lation of Austria-Hungary, Magyars,Tchechs-S lovaks, The figu res are taken from

the census of 1900 .


intended to confine the chastened Magyars within ironlimits . It was therefore similar in design to the Markof Brandenburg, which was founded during the sameperiod to protect Northern Germany against theSlavonic tribes likewise advancing Westward on thefurther flank of the Carpathians .Austria, however, outstripped Brandenburg in itsearly development. Under the House of B ab enb erg,which ruled it from its foundation until th eir ownextinction in 1246, it grew steadily in population andextent : when the Hapsburgs took possession of it in1282 , it included not merely Upper and Lower Austriaup to their present boundaries, but the Mark of Styriaas well, and was thus already one of the most importantunits in the German world .

This prosperity was due to the province ’s commanding geographical S ituation . Vienna, which has been itscapital since the middle of the twelfth century, is the keyto the Danube basin, because it lies at one of theprincipal breaks in the river’s course .1 At this poin ttwo great mountain -giants stretch out their arms towardsthe Danube from opposite sides . On the South-Westthe Alps press forward till their last spur, the WienerWald, plunges into the stream imm ediately West of thecity : North-Eastward the Carpathian s spread theirwings fanwise, and one of them, the Little Car

pathian ridge, descends as far as the North bank of theDanube immediately East of the March tributary andjust above the Hungarian town of POSzony (Pressburg) .Between these two lines of mountains there intervenesa strip of plain , the Marchfeld, in the angle formedby the junction of the March with the Danube .Across the Marchfeld , A lp and Carpathian beckon to

1 The Iron Gates are the other.


Kievo

o Lem b erg

one another, and the river whispers to all human wayfarers from the South-East th at they must slip throughthis gap if they wish to reach his source, since to left andright the mountains close their ranks and present animpenetrable barrier. Vienna, however, has seizedcontrol of this narrow gate . Ensconced between th e

Wiener Wald and theDanube, it commands the Marchfeld on the opposite bank . A n army that traversed th eplain from the East and sought to ascend the riverfurther in Vienna’s despite, would make the attemptat its peril .Vienn a has proved its strategic worth against more

formidable enemies than the Magyar : in the sixteenthand seventeenth centuries it shielded Germany 1 andWestern Europe from the Turk . The two sieges laid toit by the invader, first in 1530 and then again in 1683,

were the most critical moments in the protracted assaultupon Christendom, but the Turkish tide found here its

1 Albrecht Du rer’

s woodcu t, the Grosse Kannone, reveals howdeeply a Tu rkish invasion was dreaded in Germ any abou t 1500 A .D.


high-water mark. After the crucial year of the secondsiege, it ebbed steadily back, and Vienn a ceased to be amilitary outpost, as the border between Christendom andIslam shifted further and further down the Danube again .

Thus ended the mediaeval phase of Vienn a’s history.

For seven hundred years the place was a fortresssevering the upper from the middle basin of theDanube sin ce then it has become an imperial city, thecentre of a state formed by the union of both regionswithin a common frontier . S uperficially, this lookslike a complete reversal of character in reality, Viennahas risen to be the capital of a great modern monarchyprecisely because it has continued to be the point ofcontact and division between two worlds .The portion of the present Hapsburg Monarchy that

lies West of Vienna belongs to the industrial worldof Central Europe . The manufacturing district ofReichenberg in the Northern corner of Bohemia is continuous with the Saxon Black Country immediatelyacross the frontier . In Silesia we have seen hownegligible the political boundaries are from the economicpoin t of view Austrian and Prussian Silesia constitutean indivisible economic unit, and this un it in turn is onlyone section of a vast industrial belt, which begins inPoland, and extends Southward through Moravia andLower Austria as far as Styria beyond the Danube, onthe Alps ’ South-Eastern slope .The portion of the Monarchy that lies East of Vienna

presents a striking economic contrast. The immenseplain of alluvium deposited by the Danube and theTheiss, which opens out below Buda-Pest and is knownas the A lfOld,

” specialises in the production of wheatand horses . The mountainous country between theDrave and the Adriatic is devoted to stock-breedin g .


head to foot of the Empire like a spin al cord, and theHapsburg domin ions have consolidated themselvesround this central conductor of economic life . Hapsburgterritories beyond the range of the Danubian nervoussystem have inevitably fallen away an d been absorbedin other organisms, while territories within its compasshave been irresistibly drawn into the Hapsburg sphere,and vitalised into an organ ic whole .The centripetal prin ciple we divined in the Hapsburg

Monarchy reveals itself, therefore, as economic . TheMonarchy has accommodated itself to the current setgoing by the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenthcentury, and this augurs strongly for its survival . Theeconomic factor operated side by side with the nationalin the mouldin g of nineteenth-century Europe . Theterritorial simplification, which we have noted in generaland traced more closely in the Hapsburg instan ce,was determined principally by the economic cause .Economics have been winning their way to primacy,and we may prophesy that in the future internationalphase of civilisation, they will play the dominant rOle.

The settlement of 1866, then , brought the HapsburgMonarchy economic unity and equilibrium . A livingorganism cannot, however, remain static : to survive,it must grow. A ll states are in process either of growthor of decline, and they are inevitably reduced to thelatter phase by failure to succeed in the former. Until1866 Austria wasted her strength and jeopardised herfuture by failing to recognize her Danubian characterBismarck and the Risorgimento taught her, by a rudelesson, that the true field for her expansion lay neith ertowards Italy nor towards Germany, but in the samedirection as the Danube ’s current . Thenceforth Austriaset her face steadfastly towards a South-Eastern horizon .


This trend Eastwards 1 has taken a very sinistercomplexion, and has even occasioned the present war ;yet its motive force is not the dynastic ambition whichgovern ed Austria’s development as recently as theNapoleonic period . It is only partly accounted forby that national chauvinism of the Prussian type,which during the last century has been superseding therivalries of Autocracy and caricaturing them in itsexaggerated egotism . The essence of the movementis not militaristic but economic . It is the penetrationof an industrialised unit, in search of wider markets andwider sources of raw produce, into regions still on thefar side of the Industrial Revolution .

The most S triking expression of the Eastward Trendis the position won by the Austrian Lloyd SteamshipCompany in the traffic of the Levant . You can boardthese steam ers bound for Trieste at every great port inthe Nearer East . The express service from Alexandriahas become the favourite route of British officialsreturn ing from Egyp t and the Soudan on leave, and theCompany has had the enterprise to run another serviceso far afield as Bombay and Ceylon, in order to capturethe passenger-traffic from British India as well. Batoum,

the port of Russian Caucasia, is another terminus of theline, and it serves the whole of Asiatic Turkey for thecarriage of the European mail . In all the E gem youwill not meet fin er ships than these, and they producethe sense of some strong, civilised power behind thehorizon .

As soon as you have passed Corfu the impressiondeepens . Serious competition from the FrenchMessageries Maritimes or from the various Italianlines ceases conspicuously at the mouth of the

Drang nach Osten .

"

1 10 THE VITALITY OF AUSTRIA

Adriatic, and the whole trade up the East coast ofth is gu lf is monopolised by the Lloyd .

1

In Epirus and Albania the Lloyd stands for Europeancivilisation . It provides the only means of transport,for no practicable roads have yet been constructed onland . Goods, mails and travellers depend upon itentirely for local as well as for foreign traffic : in thesqualid coast-towns the arrival of the Austrian packetboat is the event of the week, and even the hostileMontenegrin s cannot afford to boycott it from theirmore imposing harbour of An tivari .Montenegro is an improvement upon Albania . Here

for the first time the steamer can come directly alongsidea quay, instead of anchoring a mile out and transactingher busin ess by means of lighters plyin g clumsily toand fro across the strip of shoal water inshore . When,however, you leave Antivari behind, and turn to enterCattaro Fjord, you stumble suddenly in to Europeancivilisation . As the reaches of the Bocche open out,fin ely

-metalled and graded roads, substan tially builtcottages and beautift terraced mountain slopes present themselves on either hand, and a general air ofprosperity and good management pervades the scene .Thereafter you touch in succession at the Dalmatian

ports—Gravosa, Spalato, Sebenico—each busier thanthe last, and you wonder curiously in what this serieswill culm inate, and what is the fountain -head of thiscontinually intensified economic activity, the firstsymptoms of which you encountered in such distantquarters . In Dalmatia, as in Krete and the Morea,your imagination is fired by the majestic remains of

1 The Ungaro-Croata lin e from Fium e is an artificial enterprise,with the sam e po liti cal intention as the recent attem pt to m akeHungaryindustrially independent o f Austria by th e development of Hungarian


The economic solidarity of the Empire was strikinglyi llustrated during the crisis of 1908. The Ministry forForeign Affairs had seized the opportunity of theTurkishRevolution to proclaim the formal annexation of theOccupied provinces,

” Bosnia Herzegovin a. Theinhabitants of the district are Southern Slavs, and theact was a much heavier blow to Serbian nationalism,

which still aspired to in corporate the territory in theSerbian state, th an to Ottoman Imperialism, wh ich hadlong resigned itself to a merely nominal suzerainty.

The announcement accordin gly aroused the deepestresentment throughout the Slavonic world, and notleast among the Slavonic citizens of th e Empire itself.The Slavs, however, could make no reprisals . Russia

was paralysed by disaster in the Far East and revolutionat home, pro-Serbian demonstrations within the Hapsburg Monarchy itself were vigorously suppressed by thegovernment, and Serbia was impotent without externalsupport . Turkey, on the other hand, was able to retaliate most effectively by boycottin g Austrian shippingalong her whole imm ense coast-line, and eschewin g theuse of Austrian manufactures . In particular the Turksabandoned the fez,

” for they had come to dependfor the supply of their national headgear almost entirelyupon Austrian industry .

This Austrian manufacture of fezes happened to havebecome localised in Bohemia,1 and so the Turkish retorthit the German and Magyar elements in the Monarchy,who were really responsible for the government’s action,far less severely than theTchechs, its bitterest opponents .Austrian Official Circles might therefore have been

1 Reichenberg, the chief industrial centre o f the province, lies in a

German-speaking district ; b ut the who le o f Bohem ia, Tchech and

German portions alike, has become thoroughly industrialised duringthe last century.

THE VITALITY OF AUSTRIA 1 13

expected to congratulate themselves on killing two birdswith one stone . Yet the economic interaction of eachpart of the Monarchy with every other is so close, andBohemian industry is such an indispensable element inthis delicate rhythm, that the effects of the local blowmade themselves universally felt. Instead of rubbingits hands, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was broughtto its knees, and strenuously exerted itself on theTchechs

’ behalf. The Turkish Government was able toextort more than adequate material reparation for theMonarchy’s moral delinquency before it gave the signalfor the boycott to cease .The breach with Turkey in 1908 was an interlude.

Since the Balkan crisis which culminated in the RussoTurkish war of 1878, the Hapsburg and OttomanEmpires have normally main tained a good understanding, and the birth of this friendship was followedimmediately by the alliance with Germany in 1879.

This triple association, which has endured ever since,and has embarked in common upon the present war, islikewise explained by the economic situation . If Pangerman politicians dream of eventually consolidatinga zone of territory from Hamburg on the North Seato Koweit on the Persian Gulf into a single politicalunit, th is is simply a hypothetical expan sion of thegrouping which already exists in miniature in the Hapsburg Monarchy itself. The Hapsburg state is built upout of the industrial districts West of Vienna and theagrarian districts East of it : the Pangerm an Confederation would include the whole of industrialisedCentral Europe on the one hand, and a proportionateagrarian element in South-Eastern Europe and NearerAsia on the other .There is considerable economic justification for this


programme .1 Geography has imposed the TrendEastward upon the younger industry of CentralEurope as in evitably as she summoned the olderindustry of the West to the Atlantic, and to the colonialareas which lay along its highways . Yet Pangermanismhas set itself a difficult and perhaps a disastrous goal, indetermin ing to convert this economic possibility in to apolitical fact . It has begun by challenging the rest ofEurope to a mortal duel upon this issue . We have goodhope that the battle will end in the discomfitu re of theaggressor and th e frustration of his plans , but even ifhe were victorious in the war, he wou ld find himselfhardly nearer to his objective . He hopes to fashion avast political structure upon his economic frameworkhe has first to learn whether this basis suflices for theexecution of a less ambitious piece of craftsmanship .

Will the centripetal force of economics finally overcome the centrifugal force of Nationality in the presentHapsburg Empire .

3 The programm e of Pangermanism

stands or falls by the answer to this question, and it isalso a repetition, in more precise terms, of the questionwe asked ourselves at the close of the last chapterWill the Hapsburg Empire break up as the result of thiswar ? Our attention is recalled to the internal strueture of the Hapsburg state, this time in its politicalaspect.

The countries which have coalesced into the presentHapsburg Empire are some degrees removed from theoriginal centres of modern European civilisation, and

1 The Germano-Austro-Turkish league has proved itself firmerthe official Triple Alliance," of which Italy, not Turkey, is the thirdmember. Italy joined the Central European powers in 1882 on

account o f a temporary economic clash with France, b ut her fundamental in teres ts, as we shall see later, are entirely difi

'

erent from theirs.


kin g, and attempted by means of Strong Government to wrench unenlightened populations out oftheir cherished traditions and convert them forcibly bythe accomplished fact . Neglectin g all local differencesof lan guage, religion, and custom, he proceeded to te

fashion his dominions on a pedanti cally uniform plan .

Joseph’s crusade was a disastrous failure . Reformwas checkmated by revolt, and he was killed by ten yearsof unrelieved disappointments . Yet his short reign hasdetermined the course of theMonarchy’s internal historyever since .He contrived to range Nationality and Enlighten

ment in opposite camps . His dogmatic disregard fornational feeling awakened it into frantic life, and itarrayed itself for the battle not in the Rights of Man

(of which it had never heard) , but in the fam iliarharness of medie val vested in terests . The centres ofnationalistic resistance were the provincial estates,

”

bodies representative not of peoples but of castes .They were dominated by the nobility and the Church,SO that nationalism in the Hapsburg Empire started witha strong feudal and clerical bias ,1 which has left permanent effects . The movement has remain ed legalisticinstead of becoming ph ilosophic . It loo ks to the pastrather than to the future, and has fallen a willin g victimto the malady of historical sentiment.”

Joseph ’s death in 1790 concluded the first boutin th e contest between enlightened despotism and

nationalistic reaction, but the factors of success and

1 This is true of the different m ovem ents in various degrees. Magyarnationalism , for instance, has been who lly aristocratic and not clericalam ong the S lovenes, where the nobi lity was German , clericalism has

till recently been supreme nati onal feehng among the Tchechs wasfostered, in its earlier phase, by the Chu rch and the originally Germannobility in con junction

THE VITALITY OF AUSTRIA H 7

failure were too evenly divided between the two forcesto allow a speedy decision . The struggle continuedin termittently till the revolutionary year of 1848 broughtit to a head .

We have already seen how Hapsburg autocracy wasoverthrown in one year only to rise again in the next,how the national principle was championed by theMagyars, who were willin g to take up arms on its behalf,and how their heroic resistance to Francis Joseph’sarmies was overcome by the intervention of Nicholas,his accomplice .From 1849 to 186 1 Joseph ’s theories seemed to have

triumphed, but in the bitterness of the conflict despotismhad discarded its enlightenment. A uniform regimeof absolutism was imposed upon the whole Monarchy,and the official use of German , the language of theViennese bureaucracy, was universally enforced, without regard to the nationality of the governed . Such asystem could not last, because its spirit was entirelynegative . It was created to repress the evolution ofnin eteenth-century Europe, and was bound to succumbunder the wave ’s return .

The external blows which forced the Monarchy toresign its Western ambitions and set it free to pursuethe economic career of a Danubian unit, had an equallymomentous effect upon its internal politics .The war of 1859 induced the government to tempercentralisation by the grant of a constitution. Theprovincial estates or diets were called into existenceagain, though their traditional institutions were now

standardised to an off icial pattern , and each diet wasempowered to elect representatives to a two-chamberedparliament for the whole Monarchy ; but the utterde

’

bc‘

icle of 1866 followed hard upon this concession,

1 18 THE VITA LITY OF AUSTRIA

and the government found itself at its subjects ’

mercy.

At this crisis the initiative was seized by the Magyarnation . The relative weight of their numbers in themotley population of the Monarchy, the corporatefeeling in spired in this mass by the tragedy of 1849, aninherited political tradition and able leadership in thepresent all combin ed to give them the mastery of thesituation . They were able to dictate their own terms,and the Ausgleich or Compromise which theyimposed upon the Dynasty has remained the basis ofthe Monarchy’s internal organ isation ever since .The prin cipal terms of the compact were as follows

(i.) Hungary recovered her separate existence as astate, with the territorial extent traditionally claimed bythe Crown of St. Stephen,

” and with Magyar as itsofl’icial language .

(ii .) This state was organised as a constitu tionalmonarchy, and the sovereignty was declared hereditaryin the House of Hapsburg . Francis Joseph and hisheirs were to reign with the title of king after coronationat Pest.

(iii .) The new Hungarian Kingdom was madeautonomous in every department of political activity,with three exceptions

(a) Foreign Affairs, including the Consular Service .

(6) Naval and military organisation .

(c) The budget required for these purposes .

(iv.) The control of these three departments wasvested in an organ of authority common to Hungaryand the rest of the Monarchy, and the character of thecommon institutions was jealously defined

(a) Hungary’s allegiance to them was conditional

upon the establishment and maintenance of a unified


independence . Durin g the war of 1849 the Magyarshad deposed the House of Hapsburg, denoun ced allconnection with the other parts of the Monarchy andproclaimed Hungary a republic . This declaration ofthe national will had been nullified by brute force, forseventeen years the national freedom had been paralysedby a tyrannical regime, and now at last in 1866 the bondswere broken in sunder . A fter passin g th rough suchan experience as this , the Magyars might have beenexpected to assert their in dependence more vehementlythan ever before . Yet in this supreme moment thenation was guided not by the violent Kossu thists,

” 1

but by the moderates under Deak : it chose constitutional monarchy within the Hapsburg complex insteadof republican independence outside it.The Magyars are strongly influenced by sentiment,

and this choice involved the most severe sentimentalsacrifices . Their constancy in abidin g by it thereforeproves that since 1848 they have become conscious ofa higher necessity which impels them to main tain theHapsburg unit unbroken .

The Austrians, on th eir part, made perhaps even agreater sacrifice in acceptin g the Magyars ’ terms .Sentiment they could not have saved, for it was boundup with the maintenance of the Germanising regime,and since the de

’

bc‘

icle that was of course beyond theirpower but it might appear th at they would have consu lted their material interests better by resortin g to theother extreme, and breaking o ff from Hungary altogether .The compromise imposed upo n them a disproportionateshare of the common burdens they must accordinglyhave found that co-operation with Hungary brought

1 Louis Kossu th was the Magyar exponen t o f the ideals of ’

48, and

hewas president o f th eHungarian republic in 1849.

THE VITALITY OF AUSTRIA 12 1

th em more than adequate material compensation in otherdirections .The explanation lies in the economic structure of the

Danubian unit which we have already analysed . TheAusgleich is simply the political expression of theeconomic situation . The Austrian half of the DualMonarchy corresponds to the industrial region aboveVienna,1 the Hungarian half to the agrarian region belowit. Their economic interdependence is recognised inthe common tariff : Hungary abandons the possibilityof building up an indigenous industry of her own, byprotection against Austrian m anufactu res, ,

in order tosecure a virtual monopoly of the Austrian market forfoodstuffs and raw produce . The value of politicalmassiveness in the competition of international commerce is recognised in the three Joint MinistriesAustria helps Hungary to pay her way, because thesecommon organs enable her to draw on Hungary’sstrength as well as her own for the diplomatic andmilitary support of her commercial expansion .

The political powers, then, which control respectivelythe Austrian and the Hungarian half of the Monarchy,have reckoned with the economic factor, and have bothconcluded that it is the determining force in theirpolitical destin ies . They see that neither of them iseconomically strong enough to stand alone, and thatthe alternative to Dualism is not independence, butthe in corporation of each in an other group or unit .Yet why should such a change of grouping beessentially less desirable for them than the presentarrangement ? It need involve no economic loss : we

1 The province o f Dalmatia belongs to Austria, thou gh it lies fardown the Adriatic, on the other Side o f the Crown of S t. S tephen ’

s

strip o f coast-line b ut it is an insignificant exception, due to chancerather than des ign .


can imagin e conditions under which it would actuallybe advantageous . Suppose the Central Powers wonthis war and realised the Pangerm an

’

s dream by buildingtheir politico-economic confederation from Hamburgto the Persian Gulf, this colossal complex wouldnaturally articulate itself into two groups . The GermanEmpire and Austria would coalesce to form the industrialhalf : the agrarian half would constitute itself out ofHungary, the Balkans, and the Ottoman Empire .It might seem that Austria and Hungary would both

gain by such te-organisation . We have allowed thatthe Germans of Austria would be degraded to a secondary rOle in the German Empire ; but meanwhile wehave discovered that they cannot stand alone . Forthem it is merely a choice of yoke-fellows, and theirmightier kinsmen of North ern Germany would bemore sympathetic companions than the Magyars withtheir alien speech and inferior cu lture . Moreover, asmembers of a consolidated German block they wouldobtain much better terms in a new Ausgleich with theagrarian win g than they enjoy in their present Ausgleichwith the Crown of St. Stephen .

The Magyars, on their side, would gain considerably in political importance . In the Dual MonarchyHungary is no more than an equal, if not actually anin ferior partn er : in a new South-Eastern group, hercomparative population, wealth and culture would giveher undisputed leadership .

The loyalty with which both parties have clung to theAusgleich must therefore depend upon some furth erfactor in addition to the economic .We have seen that the Ausgleich takes full account of

the economic facts . It is a compromise between unityand independence dictated by economic necessity,


remainder : actually it was concluded between theMagyars of Hungary, a strong minority, and theGerman s of Austria, who constituted no more than

per cent . of the extra Hungarian or Austrianpopulation inIn this light the Dual System acquires a sinister

connotation . It could fairly be represented as aconspiracy between the two strongest nationalities inthe Hapsburg Empire for the concerted oppression ofth e rest . From 1849 to 1866 the entire population ofthe Empire was subjected to compulsory Germanisation,but the buffets the German master received from hisenemies in 1866 so weakened him that he was drivento take one of his serfs into partnership . He struck abargain with the Magyar, the slave with the mostpowerful fists . He raised him to be his peer, madeover to him a large Share of his land and chattels to dealwith as he pleased, and obtained for himself in returnimmunity to exploit the remainder of his ill-gottenpossessions just as unscrupulously as ever. TheAusgleich registers no real advance in political ideals .After its institution, no less than before, the populationof the Monarchy has been divisible into two categories,oppressors and oppressed . The grouping has beenmodified, the system has endured .

This secondary compromise between ‘uniformity anddevolution makes not for stability but for disruption .

The Germans and Magyars muster between them onlyper cent. of the total population . They will not

succeed in exploiting the majority for ever. If they relyupon economic solidarity to cover their sins, they areleaning on a broken reed, for we are in presence of afactor infin itely stronger than the economic . Man is

1 Popu lation o f Austria, Germans,


no more exclusively homo econom icus than he is

homo sapiens his motives are determined neitherby free choice nor by mechanical reaction, but by anincalculable combination of both, yet as he advances incivilisation his own will plays a more and more dominantpart . No amoun t of economic pressure Will stifle agrowing nationality’s revolt against injustice . Thebreak-up of the Dual Monarchy would dislocate theeconomic life of oppressors and oppressed withoutdiscrim in ation, but the latter will assert their freedom atthe cost of anysacrifice . Samson dragged down the pillar,though he knew he must perish with the Philistines .The Dual phase of the Hapsburg national problem

is therefore essentially transient, and since a return tothe centralisation of the ’

fifties is out of the question,the alternatives before the Monarchy are thoroughdevolution to all nationalities alike or a series of nationalsecessions which will be equivalent to a break-up.

We have now defined our original question withinnarrow limits . To forecast the fate of the Empireafter the present war, we have to examine whether thetendency towards devolution has been on the increaseor on the decrease durin g the forty-seven years sincethe Dual System was established . A house that remain s divided against itself must fall in the end . Hasthe rift grown so wide that the Hapsburg Monarchymust succumb to the first tremor of earthquake, or isit so nearly closed that the danger-point is passed,and the building can defy even the most appallingshocks ?To discover this we must review the in ternal politics

of the Monarchy since 1867. There are two strandsof development to follow, for under the Ausgleich theCrown of St. Stephen has disengaged itself from the


rest of the Danubian Unit, and led a separate life of itsown . We will leave this junior Hungarian partner forthe moment, and concentrate our attention upon theAustrian 1 half of the complex, which has continuedin the direct line of the Hapsburg tradition .

The Ausgleich stipulated for the establishment ofparliamentary government in the Austrian as well asthe Hungarian state . The country thus re-awakenedto political life found itself divided into two camps .On the one side stood the Parti cularists who had

beaten Joseph eighty years before . They championedthe traditional rights of the provin ces, and preferred themost conservative measure of local Home Rule to themost liberally-conceived centralist constitution . Democracy was indifferent to them, for their main stays werestill the nobility and th e Church, and their influence wasconfined to the backward provinces .They were not primarily nationalists . One of their

strongholds was the Tyrol, a purely German district 2

more devoted to the Dynasty than any other part of theEmpire . It was Particularist because the unsophisti

cated peasants had not emancipated themselves fromclerical leadership, and because the province itself ismountainous and isolated . Another Particularist strong

1 S ince 1867 the ofi'

i cial style o f the Hapsburg state has been the

Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy," yet the non-Hungarian half is no t

technically entitled Austria. The on ly ofi CIal Austrias are the two

Danubian arch-duchies, the o ld Germ an mark, and the correct title of

the non-Hungarian partner as awho le seems to b e the kingdoms andlands represented in theReichsrath at Vienna. A convenient, thoughquite unofiicial formu la is Cis-Leith ania and Trans-Leithania.

The Leitha is a S outhern tributary o f the Danube, which forms th e

boliindary between the two sections o f the Dual Monarchy for a few

in as .

S

2 r

i

f t counting the Italian-speaking Trentino appended to it on the

out


her into a closely-knit, efficiently organised, industrialstate .1

The Liberals found their chief support in the Germanelement, especially in the provinces of Lower Austriaand Styria. The reactionary sympathies of the

Tyrolese were as exceptional among the German s ofAustria as they were normal among the Slavs, and theGerman nationality contributed an overwhelmingproportion of the commercial and professional classes,by whom the new Austria was to be built up .

The Liberal Party accordin gly envisaged its policyfrom a German point of view. They contemplatedthe Germanisation of the Austrian state, not so muchthrough national chauvinism as because uniformitywas part of their theoretical programme and was onlyconceivable on a German basis .The Liberals of 1867 met with far more success than

their imperial forerunner. The leaven had worked itsway deeper since his time . The philosopher-autocrathad wrestled alone against all his subjects : now hisideas were being put into action by the best-educatedand best - organised section of the popu lation itself.Moreover, they were setting themselves a more modesttask. Joseph had grappled with the whole HapsburgEmpire : the Liberals were loyal and convinced supporters of Dualism . By lettin g the Crown of St.Stephen go its own way, they had relieved themselvesof the more backward and stiff-necked half of theDanubian Unit, and saved all their energies for dealingwith the rest.In the parliamentary struggle with the Particularists,

1 The application o f their poh tical creed to economics led them to

the same conclusions as their English predecessors. They wereconvinced Free-traders.


the Liberals won an easy victory. The Ausgleichitself gave them a preliminary advantage by stipulatingfor unified parliamentary government . A commonconstituent assembly had to be summoned, as we haveseen, to ratify the Compromise on Austria

’s part, andthis body proceeded in the same session 1 to frame aparliamentary constitution on centralist lines . Onthis occasion, and on many others, the ParticularistBohemian depu ties played into their opponents ’ handsby refusing to take their seats as a protest against therejection of their demands . With the assistance of thePolish group, the German Liberals were still able tomuster a quorum and carry on the government accordingto the letter of the constitution . Bohemian abstentionmerely relieved the government of an opposition .

The Liberal ministry rallied to itself all the forces ofenlightenment in the country by passing in 1868 aseries of laws which uncompromisingly abolished thecivil authority of the Catholic Church .

2 In 1871 theTchechs made their supreme effort for the restorationof the Bohemian kingdom, and failed . In 1873Centralism achieved its fin al triumph by carrying alaw which took the election of parliamentary deputiesfrom the provincial diets and transferred it to the directvote of the constituencies .The Liberals, however, had a Short career . They had

shot all their bolts . Austria was freed from her mostgalling medie val handicaps and initiated into herindustrial phase ; the party had no more to offer the

December 1867.Joseph had already done this work, b ut the ecclesiastical organisa

tion had been swept back into power by the re-action against theRevo lution . The concordat o f 1855 between Viennese Abso lutismand Papal Obscu rantism had given the Church almost complete powerover marriage and education in theHapsburg Monarchy.


country, and its influence began to decline . A financialcrisis in 1873 tainted it with discredit, and six years laterit fell .The era of Liberal reform was followed by a lull .

For fourteen years 1 Austria acquiesced in the neutralministry of Count Taaffe, who conciliated all partiesby a policy of parliamentary inactivity . The IndustrialRevolution, however, was producing its effect, and greatchan ges were taking place beneath the surface .

(a) The first symptom was a dramatic reversal in theclerical position . The workers of the German-speakingindustrial centres were beginning to ach ieve classconsciousness . They were profoundly hostile to theLiberal capitalism which had created and exploitedthem, and were determined to gain a hearing for theirown point of view . The Clericals saw their opportunity .

Their old enemies and conquerors were being attackedon the opposite flank : they did not remain passivespectators , but circled round the Liberals

’ rear fromRight to Left, and joined forces with the new movement .In 1882 the Catholic group had detached itself from

the Conservative mass : during the next decade itbegan to be converted to Christian Socialism . Theideas of Joseph had triumphed by appealin g to themiddle class the Church went one step further, andsought to re-establish its hold over the people byidentifying itself with Industrial Democracy. In thecourse of the ’eighties the New Toryism achievedstriking successes . Factory legislation was passed andNational Insurance introduced . The clerical cu rrentwas confirmed in its new trend .

(b) The general rise in economic prosperity hadlikewise affected the Austrian Slavs . Education had

11879

-93 .


This programme was not Utopian . The Tchechsand Poles had entered the pale of European civilisationearlier than any other branch of the Slavonic racePrag and Cracow had played a promin ent part in historybefore the foundation of Petersburg or Tobolsk . Moreover, the emergence o f the new Christian Socialist partyamong the Young Tchechs’ German fellow-citizensoffered hopes of racial reconciliation . Industrialismand the Catholic Church both overrode the divisions ofnationality. The German Liberals had failed to removethe national problem unity might still be attained bytranscendin g it . The Promised Land, however, wasstill far off, and the path was so beset by dangers that itwas doubtful whether Austria would reach her goal .

(c) Christian Socialism was not the only new movement among the Austrian Germans . The old Liberalshad fallen because they failed to move with the times .They had lost control over the Industrial Revolution, andthe Clericals had snatched from them the initiative insocial politics ; but they had also mismanaged theassimilation of the Slavs , and the Young Tchechs hadarisen in their despite . This Slavonic renaissanceevoked a German party of a purely nationalisticcharacter.Austrian Pangerm anism had its root in theGerman districts of Bohemia, which were threatenedmost immediately by the progress of the Tchechs innumbers and education . The alliance with th e German Empire in 1879 gave the movement great impetus .In 1880 an association called the German SchoolUnion 1 was founded, to f oster education in the German language throughout Austria . Bismarck becamethe party’s hero, and Prussian methods their ideal .

1 Deutsche Schu l-verein .


They wished to direct all the resources of governmentto the Germanisation of Slovenes and Tchechs.

This German chauvinism thwarted the larger interestsof the German nationality. The new German Left” inthe Austrian Reichsrath was obsessed by the nationalistic idea, and spurned all the factors that were making forprogress and unity. Had it triumphed, the later conception of a German confederation from Hamburg tothe Persian Gulf could never have taken shape, for theDanubian Unit, the central link in the chain, wouldhave been shattered in pieces by German fanaticism .

The crisis came four years after Count Taaffe’sresignation . In 1891 the Young Tchechs had com

pletely ousted the old Bohemian Particularists, andth enceforward they were a power in the Reichsrath .

By 1897 they had become strong enough to imposetheir will upon the government, and ordinan ces werepromulgated which established Tchech as an oflicial

language side by side with German through all districtsof Bohem ia .The result was a complete breakdown of constitutional

government. The German nationalists made parliamentary procedure impossible . Obstruction developedinto a physical struggle between the parties for thepossession of the House . The resignation of theministry and the repeal of the decrees eased the situation at Vienna, only to necessitate martial law inBohemia. Both sides were intractable, and since theycombined to prevent the conduct of any business inparliament, government had to be carried on for nearlynine years independently of it, by aid of an emergencyclause in the Constitution . During this period nationalbitterness steadily grew, to the exclusion of all otherpolitical interests .

134 THE VITA LITY OF AUSTRIA

Such conditions could not las t for ever. Austria wasrapidly losing all political morale, and unless the nonnationalistic forces in the country could rally themselvessufficiently to make some great step forward, nothingcould prevent the state from sinking through a phase ofirresponsible government into utter disruption .

The situation was saved by a fresh appeal to democracy. In 1905 people began to discuss the introductionof Manhood Suffrage, in place of the old franchise ofthe Pru ssian type .The proposal brought out the positive community of

interest between the Slavonic national groups and theGerman socialists . Both had everything to gain by anelectoral system based not on privilege, either of class orof race, but upon the numerical proportion between thevarious sections of the population, and there was norivalry between them, because their aims did not comeWithin the same plane of politics . The Slavs were sti lloccupied by the preliminary question of nationality, theGerman workers were devoted to social problems . Thesatisfaction of th e Slavonic nationalists could bringGerman Labour nothing but gain . National aspirationswould pass out of the realm of politics as soon as theywere realised, and their Slavonic devotees would beliberated to recruit the non-nationalistic ranks of SocialDemocracy and Christian Socialism .

1

The projected Reform Bill produced a b eneficen tefiect even before it became law. During the monthswhen it was in debate, a fresh current of political interestswept through the mass of the population, and it didnot disappoint the country’s expectations when it wasfin ally promulgated towards the close of 1906 .

1 Com pare the relations between the Irish Nationalists and theLiberalParty in theBritish Parliam ent.


If the unity of the Hapsburg complex is essential tothe maintenance of its members’ position in the world,developments accomplished in one half of the Monarchywill be of little consequence unless they extend themselves ultimately to the other . Austria had transcendednationalism in vain if the same sinister force were stillcapable of precipitating catastrophe in Hungary ; yetthe Ausgleich rigidly debarred the Austrian people fromany intervention in Hungarian affairs . There was onlyone power in the Empire to which an appeal from theAusgleich could be made, and that was the HapsburgDynasty.

The Ausgleich had never challenged the Dynasty’ssupreme position . Francis Joseph had witnessed manytransformations of his Empire before 1866, and heremained the living symbol of a tradition older andmore enduring than the settlement of that year. It wasto the King-Emperor’s credit that he accepted the DualSystem with whole-hearted loyalty, though the verysincerity with which he devoted himself to securing itssuccess rendered him, as he advanced in years, less andless capable of seeing beyond it.Francis Ferdinand, however, his nephew and his

heir, held a very different opinion about the Dyn asty’s

mission in the present. For him Dualism was no stateof perfection, but only a passing phase in the Monarchy

’slong history. He saw with a clear eye that the MagyarGerman compact was bound up with racial oppression,and that so long as it remained in force, the DanubianUnit went in danger of a devastating explosion ofnationalism . What he would have accomplished hadhe ascended the throne, it is impossible to say. Peopleare always apt to magnify possibilities that have beendenied the chance of realisation, yet this much seem s


certain, that he contemplated th e abolition of Dualism,

and the substitution of a Trialism in its place . TheSlav was to be raised to an equality with the Germanand the Magyar, and to receive his just share in thepolitical control of a state which depended upon himso largely for its wealth and population .

Had Francis Ferdinand lived to do his work, he mighthave created an epoch in Hapsburg history even moreimportant than that of the Ausgleich . The forwardmovement which triumphed in Austria in 1906, mighthave conquered the remainder of the Monarchy withinthe next generation . Such hopes were cut short by hisassassination at Sarayevo in June 1914. That crimewas the tragedy of Austria . By plungin g her into aEuropean war, it cancelled in a moment all the constru ctive work of half a century and made the woundof nationalism break out again, to bleed more violently,perhaps, than it has ever done since 1848.

We have seen that this mortal disaster was due tono causes latent in Austria herself. To understandits an tecedents , we must examin e contemporary eventsin the other half of the Monarchy, the Crown of St.Stephen .

138 THE BALKANS

CHAPTER IV

RECONSTRUCTION IN THE BALKANS

IN Vienn a people like to say that the East begins atthe River Leitha if we borrow the epigram with themodification that the Balkan s begin there, we shallbring Hungarian history into its true perspective .Vienna is not merely the dividing-point between two

economic worlds : it is also the point of tran sitionbetween opposite phenomena of racial distribution .

West of the Leitha, the nationalities of Europe are

main ly grouped in compact blocks, which correspondwith considerable accuracy to the physical and economicarticulation of the continent.1 The national basis wouldsuggest itself naturally to the observer as a principle ofpolitical organisation, and this quarter of the world wasin fact the cradle of the National State . South-Eastof the Leitha, however, the nationalities are interlacedin inextricable confusion over an area that extends tothe Black Sea and the lEgean , and the internationalcongress which will follow the war might well despairin this region of coaxing sovereign national states outof Geography, not to speak of reconcilin g their structurewith the necessities of modern economic life .Th e problem must be faced nevertheless . The

popu lations of South-Eastern Europe are possessed bythe idea of nationality to a morbid degree . Intimatecontact has produced mutual exasperation instead ofunderstanding and good-fellowship, while the difi cu ltyof devising any compromise that would deal impartial

1 For a visual presentation of this fact seeMap VII.

149 THE BALKANS

that we could not deal with any one of them in isolation .

We will therefore include Hungary with the rest underthe common denom ination of a Balkan State,

” andwe will approach her first, because she holds the premierplace in the group both in geographical situation andin degree of spiritual and material development. Weshall find that she displays all the characteristics of theBalkan type .

A . Hungary

The Kingdom of Hungary covers the major part ofthe middle Danube-basin . From the junction of theMarch tributary as far as the Iron Gates the riverflows through Hungarian territory . The CarpathianRange, which circles from the former point to the secondin a vast sweep towards the North and East,1 constitutesboth the watershed of the Danube-system and thefrontier of the Hungarian state . Southwards alonethe kingdom is bounded first by the Drave descendingfrom the Eastern face of the Alps, and then by theDanube itself, from the point where it unites with theDrave and adopts th e latter stream’s Easterly course .The mountainous zone on the other S ide of this line,which intervenes between the Danube-basin and theAdriatic, has never been in corporated in Hungarydirectly.

The heart of the Hungarian land is the Alfold, analluvial plain deposited in the hollow of a vanished sea.In shape it is roughly an isosceles triangle, with theSouthern river-boundary of the kingdom as its base,and with its apex at the Vereczka Pass,2 the midmostpoint of the Carpathian arc. The Danube flows throughit from Buda-Pest to its junction with the Drave, and

1 See map on p . 105.

2 Immediately East of theUjok Pass.

HUNGARY 141

it includes the strip of country between the Danubeand the Theiss, as well as a wide zone beyond the Leftor Easter n bank of the latter river.This central plain was occupied by the Magyars in the

ninth century A .D. Bursting through the Carpathiansby the Vereczka Pass, they entered the A lfOld at its apex,flooded it with their settlements, and pressed still furtherup the Danube above Buda till they were checked, as wehave seen, by the Austrian and Styrian Marks .Yet the Magyars never made the whole of Hungary

their own . On either flank of the A lfOld there arestretches of hill-country, included like itself with in theencircling wall of the Carpathians, but sundered fromit by lesser mountain barriers . In two comparativelyiso lated regions the earlier possessors of the landmanaged to maintain their existence under Magyardominion .

North-West of the Alfold a series of long, windingvalleys descends from the Carpathians and opens uponthe Danube between Pressburg and Buda-Pest . Theyhave remained in the possession of the Slovaks, aSlavonic population hardly distinguishable in dialectfrom the Tchechs of Moravia and Bohemia on the otherS ide of the River March .

East of the A lfOld lies the district called Transylvania .Between the Vereczka Pass and the Iron Gates the mainchain of the Carpathians makes an extremely salientangle towards the East, but a secondary branch of therange takes the shortest course from the one point to theother, and skirts the Eastern side of the A lfOld in aNorth-and-South direction .

1 A considerable extent of1 In the thirteenth centu ry this ridgewas clothed in dense forest, and

the settlers who penetrated it from the direction of the Alfo ld thereforegag

e t

he nam e of Transylvania to the country they reached on the other

Si e o it.

142 THE BALKANS

tangled hill and valley is caught within this split in themountain line, and is almost equally secluded by itfrom the more open country on all three sides .The passes which lead through the outer Carpathian

wall, North -Eastward into the Moldavian steppe andSouthward into the plain of Wallachia, carry as manylines of railway as those which pierce the interior walland debouch upon the levels of the Alfold . Theprovin ce is rich in rivers, but the water-system hardlyfacilitates communication with the outer world . Thecountless streams have to concentrate their forces inthree main channels before they can succeed in breakingthrough the mountain barriers, and even then theycontent themselves with precipitous gorges, barelywide enough for the current itself. Two of thesechannels,1 however, fin d their way to the A lfOld andonly one 2 to the Wallachian plain, so that to that extentTransylvania may be reckoned to have closer geographical links with Hungary than with Roum ania .When the Magyars appeared in the Alf

'

old, thissheltered province was already occupied by the Roumans,a popu lation of Latin speech?The Kingdom of Hungary was thus heterogeneous

in nationality from the beginning, and as her historydeveloped the confusion increased .

After the conversion of the Magyars in the eleventhcentury A .D., German colonies were introduced tocivilise the country . They opened up the mineralresources of the Slovak hills , and established themselves

1 The Maros and the S zamos.

2 The A lt (Aluta) .1'Probably they are descended from the Latinised inhabitants ofIllyricum , the section o f the Roman Empire between the Alps, theDrave and the Adriatic. When S lavom c imm igran ts from the Northdescended upon the Adriatic coast in the seventh century A .D. (seebelow), they wou ld have been likely to press the native provincialsEastward across theDanube.

144 THE BALKANS

the line of the Save and the Iron Gates, and the Peaceof Belgrade in 1739 delimited a frontier between theOttoman and Hapsburg Empires which resigned thewhole of Hungary to the latter .1 Yet the ejected Turkhad not failed to set his mark upon the land, and thevictors found the Alfold a desert.

In the middle of the eighteenth century the HapsburgMonarchy was entering the Strong Governmentphase, and the newly-acquired territories offered amagnificent field of experim ent for the ideas ofEnlightened Autocracy.

”

The country was rich in natural resources it laywaste through want of population to develop them, andthe Government met the need by schemes of colonisationand town-building on an extensive scale . The re-construction of Hungary was the most striking success ofMaria Theresa’s and Joseph’s policy . During theirreigns the material traces of the Turk’s presence wereobliterated, and before the end of the century theKingdom once more approached the standard ofCentral Europe, in acute contrast to the territories stillblighted by Turkish misgovernment immediately beyondher frontier . Yet in restorin g Hungary ’s material prosperity, her new ru lers immeasurably aggravated theimpending problem of nationality .

Before the Turkish conquest the Alfold had been thestronghold of the Magyar race , and the Magyars hadtherefore suffered more severely than any oth er elementin the country by the devastation of the Turkish wars .The remnant of the nation that survived on the plain ,

and th e fragment of it that lay West of Buda along the1 This frontier remained unaltered until th e occupation o f BosniaHerzegovina in 1878. The on ly change in the interval was the annexation to Austria o f the Dalmatian coast-province, formerly a Venetianpossession, at the settlem en t of 1814.

HUNGARY

Austrian and Styrian border, might perhaps have madegood the losses by their own gradual increase under theregime of peace and security that had descended uponthem at last. The process, however, would havebeen extremely slow, and the autocracy was neitherpatient nor far-sighted, while it would have ignored thefactor of nationality on principle, even had it realisedits bearing on the situation .

The Government therefore re-peopled the Alfoldby the indiscriminate introduction of settlers from allthe surroundin g races . Roumans from Tran sylvan iawere allowed to encroach upon the plain till they hadadvanced half the distance between their mountainsand the Theiss . Serb refugees from Ottoman territorywere encouraged to settle on the Northern bank of theDanube . Enclaves of German colonists from Swabiawere distributed all over the land to leaven the otherelements with Western civilisation . By the time thework was finished Hungary had been reduced to such aracial medley that the Magyars no longer constitutedmore than a bare majority of the population .

1

1 A n analysis of thecensus taken in 1900 for theKingdom of Hungary(exclusive of Croatia-S lavonia) is the best commentary on the resu lt

Nationalities N umbers Percentages

Magyars

“artisan

Total popu lation

146 THE BALKANS

Had historical continuity been broken as completelyin Hun gary as in other Balkan lands, this confusion oftongues might have proved harmless . Joseph’s politicalgenius might have steered the country into the wakeof the Swiss Confederation, and initiated it into the

European fraternity as a non-national state . TheTurkish rule in Hungary, however, had been short,and it had never extended to the whole kin gdom . TheSlovak country in the North, Pressburg on the Danube,and a strip of territory between the Danube and theDrave along the Styrian boundary had all escapedconquest by electing the Hapsburg as their king andsheltering themselves beneath his strong arm . In theopposite quarter Transylvania had been saved by avigorous lin e of princes, who secured the autonomy oftheprovin ce under the suzerainty of theTurkish Empire .In a very considerable portion of the country themedie val tradition thus maintained itself unbroken,and when the unconquered North-Western border, theTurkish pashalik, and the Transylvanian principalitywere united once more, the forces derived from the pastwere strong enough to challenge the Hapsburgs’ schemesfor the future .We have seen that the Hungarian Estates tookthe lead in the struggle between Centralisation andParticularism which convulsed the Whole HapsburgMonarchy from 1780 to 1849. They were able to doso because medie val Hungary had developed herparliamentary institutions more strongly than any otherEuropean country except our own .

The Hungarian nobility was abnormally numerous .The majority of the class consisted simply of the freeproprietors in the Magyar-speaking districts, includingalmost everybody who was not a serf. Many were

148 THE BA LKANS

new-found liberties of their common country, butrequired the recognition of the Serb language as theofficial medium in Serb localities . The Magyarm inistry refused to consider their claim . Magyar,they declared, must be the only language of administration in the whole kin gdom of Hungary, and when theSerb leaders refused their allegiance on such terms asth ese, Kossuth replied that then the sword mustdecide between them .

”

The ruin of the Magyars ’ hopes in the following yearwas largely due to the dread with which the rest of theHungarians looked forward to their success . All othernationalities in th e kin gdom sympathised with theHapsburg cause, and the Serbs, at least, fought valiantlyon its behalf . When the events of 1866 enabled theMagyars to snatch victory out of defeat, the fo reb odings of their alien fellow- citizens were more than realised .

To the remaining inhabitants of the Hapsburg Monarchy the Ausgleich brought some measure of relieffrom the intolerable regime of the ’

fifties : for thesubject populations of Hungary it opened the gloomiestpage of a precarious history .

The Compromise with the Germans of Austria andthe Hapsburg Dynasty delivered Hungary into the handof the Magyar Liberal Party. If the Liberals of Austriacorrespond to the English Radicals of 1832, we canonly liken their Magyar namesakes to the men of 1688.

The Glorious Revolution was heralded with aflourish of trumpets, and the tale has been continuallyenhanced by conventional eloquence yet in Hungary,as in England, the era of free institutions merelyestablished the ascendancy of a close oligarchy.

The Hungarian magnates, who in 1867 emergedvictorious from nearly a century of political warfare,

HUNGARY 149

reproduced both the virtues and the vices of the EnglishWhigs .1 They treasured an ingrained tradition ofstatesmanship that has been valuable to the backwardmajority of their countrymen, and experience had madethem convinced haters of certain pernicious politicalideals ; but they were not concerned to practise theirprinciples too pedantically, and in the last resort theysubordinated all scruples to the retention of their power .The Liberalism of the Magyar Whigs was more

than a veneer . In questions of religion, for instance,Hungary remained true to her traditions of toleration .

2

But they were fanatical nationalists, and the wholepolitical energy of the party rapidly became absorbed ina campaign of Magyarisation .

Magyar chauvinism has been of a different stampfrom the policy of any German party in Austria. TheAustrian German s have always been content to dominatetheir fellow-nationalities . The Magyars, however, wereless civilised than the Germans, and they bore a muchlarger proportion to the total population of their

1 The conservation of the Whig families depended on the systemof Entail,” which had developed in the seventeenth century. In

Hungary the conso lidation of landed estates was sti ll m ore drasticallypromoted by a law forbiddin g any noble to alienate his land. Thism

gefgurewas introduced by Lou is I. in 1351, and remained in force till

12 Hungary is divided between many creeds. The Roman Churchdraws its adherents from three o f the races—Magyars, Germans and

S lovaks—and accounted in 1900 for nearly 49% o f the popu lation .

Calvinism , the next strongest sect is confined to the Magyars.

A ll the S erbs and a m ajority of the Roumans are orthodox whilethe remainder of the Roumans and all the Ruthenes are Uniatsobserving the Orthodox ritual b u t owning allegiance to the Pope.

Lu theranism is comm on to S lovaks and Germ ans.

The era of Turkish ru le in Hungary was contemporary with theCatho lic reaction . Whi le the Hapsburgs were savagely repressingProtestantism in the territories under their contro l, the Turks extendedtheir to leration to all Christian sects in the Alfo ld, and the MagyarCalvinists in revo lt against the tyranny of Vienna often made commoncause with theMoslem across the border. In the autonomous principality o f Transylvania Protestantism was the o fficial religion .

150 THE BALKANS

coun try . They aimed at nothing less than the extirpation of other languages and cu ltures, and the ultimateconversion to th eir own nationality of every inhabitantof the Hungarian Kingdom .

The methods for obtaining this result which wereinaugurated by the Magyar Liberals after 1867 were animitation on a far larger scale of Prussia’s policy onher Polish frontier. Nothing comparable to them hasbeen perpetrated in Western Europe for at least acentury. To find an English parallel we must harkback once more to the Whigs of 1688, and call to mindthe repression of the Catholics by the British administration in Ireland during the black era that followed theBattle of the Boyne .The Magyars, like the Russians, Ottoman Turks and

other peoples on the outskirts of European civilisation,are ostentatious of theoretical enlightenment, but theirborrowed idealism serves to cloak the survival ofrealities which have ceased to be possible further West .By the new constitution all citizens of Hungary weredeclared equal before the law with out distin ction ofrace, and were expressly guaranteed the enjoyment oftheir national individuality. Yet the same constitutionrecogn ises Magyar as the only lan guage of state, andthe other tongues have been jealously excluded fromofi cial use .This ordinance is perpetually in evidence . In

purely Slovak or Rouman towns the names of the streetsare posted up in Magyar, and the name of the place itselfis Magyarised in official parlance . On the state railwaysthe Magyar language has a monopoly : time-tables,notices, and even the tickets are printed in Magyaralone, and Magyar is the administrative lan guage of therailway staff. The same thing applies to all other

152 THE BALKANS

service . The state itself must suffer by forfeiting theassistance of some of its most capable citizens .Again the Magyar will have a ready answer . We

Magyars,"he will say, have a much higher standard of

education and culture than the other inhabitants of ourcountry . Power gravitates towards efficiency, and evenif no language-ordinances had been passed, the Magyarswould have found them selves in control of the Hungarianstate .This also is true . In 1867 the Magyars were ahead

of the rest in education, and they have likewise maintained their lead in the meanwhile . Yet the history ofeducation in Hungary during this period should putthe Magyar apologist to silence .The Magyars have ensured their superiority by

paralysin g their neighbours ’ progress rather than byprogressin g themselves . If the subject nationalitiesare more and not less illiterate now than they were fiftyyears ago, it is because the Magyar government hasclosed practically all their secondary, and the greatmajority of their primary schools, and has made itin creasingly hard to obtain instruction in any

.

but theMagyar tongue . The Magyars ’ political monopolywas originally justified by culture, but they haveperverted politi cs to the monopolisation of cultureitself by grotesquely uncultured means . Under thesecircumstances the relative degree of education attainedat present by the Magyars and their fellow-citizens losesall significance as a standard of political value .Hungary, however, is at least a constitutional country.

Why, then, have the minor nationalities failed to redresstheir wrongs by constitutional pressure 5 They amountto little less than half the population . Surely theycould retu rn such a formidable contin gent of representa

HUNGARY 153

rives to the parliament at Buda-Pest, that Magyarministries would be driven to a compromise f

This door is closed because the government ofHungary is not constitutional in the modern sense : itis only called so by courtesy. The country still awaitsits Great Reform Bill,

" and the mediaeval franchise,which Great Britain sloughed o ff in 1832, has hereendured till the present day. We have said that theMagyar politicians of 1867 were Whigs we shalldiscover their rotten boroughs in the non-Magyarconstituencies . They were as well-versed in corruptionas English politicians were in the eighteenth century,and they reinforced bribery by intimidation . In nonMagyar constituencies the precedent of overawingopposition voters by the presence of troops hasbecome well-established, and the device has more thanonce led to bloodshed which would have been calledmassacre if it had occurred in Turkey.

No redress, therefore, is possible through parliament,because the leaders of the non-Magyar nationalitiescan never obtain a seat there . They are rigidly debarredfrom a political career, and even in the neutral sphereof literature, art, h istory, and all that is included underthe name of culture, they are made to suffer for theprivilege of leadership .

The Magyars have adopted the Greek tyrant’s policyof cutting off the tallest ears in the cornfield .

" Anyform of distinction renders a Slovak, Rouman or Serbcitizen of Hungary immediately suspect to his coun try'spolice . Personal liberty in Hungary suffers direly fromthe want of a Habeas Corpus Act. The laws of conspiracy are so comprehensive that arrest Withoutspecification of the charge and protracted imprisonmentbefore trial are events of normal occurrence . When

154 THE BALKANS

it is remembered that, in virtue of the language-ordinances, all proceedings in court have to be conductedexclusively in the Magyar language, the picture of racialoppression is complete .

This atrocious system was eleb orated by the LiberalParty which came into power in 1867.

The Liberal regime was protracted . Deak, thestatesman of the Ausgleich, was succeeded in 1876

by Count Co lom an Tisza, the Magyar Walpole, whoremained uninterruptedly in office until 1890. Hisresignation in that year started the party on its decline,but its fall was staved off for a dozen years longer bythe raising of those ecclesiastical issues which Austriahad settled as early as 1868. In 1902 the Liberalswere first challenged on their real standing-ground,the maintenance of the Ausgleich .

A radical movement had been gaining strength, whichaspired to pass beyond compromise to independence .The ideal of the “

_Left was self-su fficiency. They

wished to see Hungary take her place as a sovereignunit, on an entire equality with the other states ofEurope .In our analysis of the Danubian Monarchy we have

noted that great economi c difficulties stood, and alwayswill stand, in the way of such a development. Theonly chance of overcoming them would be the en thusi

astic co-operation for this end of the whole Hungarianpeople . The first object, therefore, of the MagyarLeft should have been the conciliation of the nonMagyar nationalities. They should have driven theirLiberal opponents from office on this issue, justifiedth eir own installation by a complete reversal of theprevailing chauvinism and a definitive solution of theracial problem on democratic lines, and then joined

1 56 THE BALKANS

and they surrendered at discretion as soon as it becamecertain that a bill of identical purport was on the vergeof passing into law in the Austrian half of the Monarchy.

At the beginning of 1906 a Coalition min istry whichhad renounced the Magyar word of command was

at last called into office, but their quiver had beenemptied of its arrows .Towards the end of 1908 they introduced a carefully

planned reform bill, which would have advanced theHungarian franchise from the mediaeval to the Prussianlevel . The electorate was to be increased very considerab ly in numbers, the qualification for suffrage wasto be literacy, the electors were to be classified accordingto degrees of education, and the more highly qualifiedwere to possess more than one vote . Political powerwas thus represented as the privilege of culture, butsince the dominant Magyars had long been engaged inexterminating all non-Magyar culture within the bordersof Hungary, the bill was calculated to produce a democratic impression without extending the franchisebeyond the limits of the Magyar race .It was of little consequence, therefore, that the

ministry’s main programme of independence eclipsedtheir perfunctory efforts towards internal reform beforethe franchise bill had tim e to pass into law. Its mereformulation proved once and for all that the subjectnationalities had nothing to expect from MagyarRadicalism,

1and in the trial of strength with Austria

and the Crown to which the Coalition now committeditself, Francis Joseph was still able to wield his masterweapon .

1 Although one o f the components of the Coalition was th e People’sgroup which had taken the cause o f th e nationalities

into its programm e.

HUNGARY 157

Early in 1909 th e more extreme elements of theLeft forced the Coalition premier, Dr. Wekerle, toopen the campaign for economic autonomy with thedemand for a separate Hungarian state bank. TheCrown refused to consider the question so long as thefranchise remained unreformed : such a momentousproposal, Francis Joseph declared, must be endorsed bya parliament truly representative of the whole Hungarianpeople .This shrewdly-aimed blow broke up the Coalition

into fragments. The moderates and the intransigeantswere each strong enough to stalemate the other, noministry could be formed, and in 1909, as in 1905,

parliamentary government was suspended . At thebeginning of 1910 Francis Joseph appointed a ministryof king’s friends under the leadership of CountKhuen-Hedervary, a notorious political boss whohad thoroughly learnt his trade during a twenty-yearstenure of the Croatian vice-royalty.

1 The Hedervarycabal scattered promises broadcast to all aggrievedelements in the country, and the elections conductedunder its auspices next summer surpassed even Hungarian precedent in their corruption . When the newparliament met, the Count had a docile majority at hisbeck, and the Magyars saw their constitutional traditionreduced to a farce .The lesson sank deep . Khuen-Hedervary was too

shady a character to serve as more than a stop-gap, andwhen he vanished from the scene all sections of Magyaropinion were more than content to accept CountStephen Tisza once more . Tisza remains in office atthe present moment, and his restoration means that theevolution of Magyar politics has come to a dead stop .

1 See Section B .

158 THE BALKANS

He stands for a reaction to the programme of 1867compromise with Austria and the Dynasty, war to theknif e again st th e non-Magyar nationalities in Hungaryitself. The Magyars have realised that dem ocratisa

tion and Magyarisation are incompatible, and they havepreferred to sacrifice progress to chauvinism .

Thus Hungary and Austria have diverged profoundlyin their po liti cal history since the year of the Ausgleich .

In 1867 Hungary possessed the more enlightenedtradition of the two, and the initiative towards constitutional government came from the Magyar side . Thenfor a time they marched abreast but when the problemof nationality emerged like a steep cliff athwart theirpath, Austria pressed forward, and after a hazardousstruggle attain ed the summit : Hungary halted, andwithout even scannin g the cliff s face for a handhold,turned about and began to retrace her steps .Between 1867 and 1914 the political standard of th eMagyar nation has grieviously deteriorated .

The results of our survey warrant the assumptionthat if the two Central-European monarchies suff erdefeat in the present war, the subject nationalities ofHun gary, when the plebiscite at last enables them toexpress their desire, will act like the Polish subjects ofGermany, and vote to the last man for liberation fromthe Magyar state . We have to examine whether theirsecession from Hungary will involve the disruption ofthe Danubian Empire .

Ju st as in the case of Poland, their extrication willnecessarily be incomplete . Geography has madeHun gary a natural unit, sundered from her neighboursand knit together within herself by prom inent physicalbarriers , and within this area the races are extraordinarily

160 THE BALKANS

From the sentimental pom t of view, we needhave little scruple in wounding the Magyars ' pride .

Individually they are an attractive people, and theyhave known how to keep the sympathies of WesternEurope alive on their behalf by harping on the tragedyof 1849 ; but since the year of the Compromise theyhave behaved like the servant in the parable, who wasforgiven by his lord and then seized his fellow-servantby the throat . They cannot altogether escape thehypocrite ’s retribution .

In the interests of common justice, therefore, Europemust guarantee the alien enclaves in Magyar territory .

Yet a guaranteed te-organisation of the Hungarian stateon still more drastic lines might well be in the bestinterests of the Magyars themselves, for it would betheir one chance of inducin g the much larger blocks ofalien population which are not debarred from secessionby geography, to hold fast of their own free will to theirpresent allegiance .The prin cipal terms of such a guaranteed re-settle

ment should run as follows

(i.) Local self-government should be re-organised .

At present it is based upon the mediaeval counties,which are very unequal in size an d entirely out ofrelation to racial boundaries . These county divisionsshould be recast into n ew local units , standardisedapproximately in area and population like the Frenchdepartments, and each department should be maderacia lly homogeneous as far as possible . Thiswould give every nationality in Hungary a numberof local units more or less proportional to its percentage in the total population of the country.

The department should employ its national lan guageas its official medium of administration, and should

HUNGARY 161

be the basis of electoral organisation for the centralHungarian parliament.

(ii .) There should be no parliamentary devolution tonational blocks . The races are so interlaced that itwould be impossible to carve out areas including all theRouman or all the German inhabitants of Hungary,and endow them with extensive Home Rule . Thevarious national territories are too scattered for effectiveorganisation as unities .

(iii .) On the other hand, national education and allpublic activities that contribute to national cultureshould be placed under the exclusive control of nationalcommittees, consisting of the deputies elected to thecentral Hungarian parliament by the various departments belonging to each particular nationality. Thesecommittees should share between them the annualbudget voted for public education by the parliament asa whole, in proportion to the percentage of the totalpopulation which they respectively represent .

(iv.) All questions of universal interest, such ascommunications and defence, social and economicdevelopment, fiscal relations with other countries

,

consular service and foreign policy in general, shouldremain as heretofore within th e provin ce of the centralparliament,1 now to be elected on the new departmentalbasis .If the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary were

assured some such reform s as these, it is conceivablethat geographical and economic considerations wouldprevail with them over hatred of the Magyars and desirefor incorporation in their own national states ; but

A nd thereforepresumably subject to the conditions of theAusgleich,un less other

.

Circumstances lead the Hungarian parliam ent to term inatethe connection with Austria.

162 THE BALKANS

prediction is impossible, and we must reckon with thecontingency that certain elements may in any eventsecede .1 Will the cohesion of the whole HapsburgMonarchy be endangered by their secession fThe German colonies in the A lfdld and in the Slovak

hills are too widely dispersed for extrication,2 and theSlovaks themselves do not come in to question from ourimmediate standpoint . They may be eager to secedefrom Hungary, but they would only do so in order tocoalesce with the Tchechs of Austria . They have noblood-brethren outside the frontiers of the DanubianEmpire, and the satisfaction of their national aspirationswould affect the internal organisation of the whole unitrather th an its solidarity towards the outer world . Weare left with the Ruthenes, Roumans and Serbs .

(i.) The Roumans are the strongest non-Magyarnationality in Hungary, and we have seen that they areconcentrated in Transylvan ia and the adjoining stripof the A lfdld, towards the border of the nationalRoumanian Kin gdom .

3 Their transference, therefore,from Hungary to Roumania would seem a natural

1 In spite of Magyarisation, the S lovaks, Ruthenes and Roumans

have steadily been disengaging themselves since 1867 from theMagyartorls. The growth of a native in tellegenzia has heightened theirnational consciousness, and in recent years the curren t o f emigrationto th e U .S .A . has brought wealth in to their districts. Peasants whohave made their little pile in Am erica have been buying ou t the b igestates of th e Whig magnates, and thereby freeing their soil from the

alien master’

s presence.

2 Though the Germ ans o f Hungary wou ld escape from the Magyarsif they cou ld, for the Ausgleich has secured them no better treatment

than the other nationalities. While theMagyars have been in allianceWith the Germ ans o f Austria, they have not hesitated to Magyarise

the two m illion Germ ans in their midst. For the distrib ution o f thelatter seeMap I I I.

3 The free Roumans of the present kingdom are probably descendedfrom Transylvanian settlers, who during the early Middle Ages pushedo ut through the Carpathians and established them selves in the openSteppes.

164 THE BALKANS

present crisis . If Roumania intervenes in the war infavour of the Allies, the prize will fall into her grasp :if she remains neutral till hostilities cease, her claimswill not obtain preference in the subsequent settlement.

(ii .) The Serb settlements in the A lfdld are conterminous with those of th e Roumans . They skirt theNorthern bank of the Danube from a point opposite thejun ction of the Morava tributary as far upstream asthe junction of th e Drave, but they are bewilderinglyentangled with Germ an and Magyar enclaves . Themajority of them lie within the Banat of Temesvar,

"

a square field delimited in the South-Eastern cornerof the Alfold by the Transylvanian mountains on theEast, and the Maros, Theiss and Danube rivers on theother three sides .The Banat was one of the principal theatres of

eighteenth-century colonisation : the Roumans haveestablished themselves in the Eastern half of it, andthe Western half is divided between Germans andSerbs, while the Magyar element is almost negligible .If the Rouman section became detached fromHungary, the annexation of the remainder to Serbiawould be a logical corollary . The courses of theTh eiss and the Maros offer a good frontier in thisquarter for the Magyar state, and the Serbian nationalkingdom South of the Dan ube will be anxious to incor

po rate its irredenta on the river’s further shore,in order to remove Belgrade beyond the range of siegeartillery planted on Hungarian soil . If, however, theRouman part of the Banat fails to break away fromHungary, its fate will be decisive for the Serb districts

1 This wou ld invo lve the transf erence of the German enclaves in the

Banat as well ; b ut they are doomed in any case to be m erged in a

state o f alien nationality, and any alternative wou ld be a relief fromMagyarisation .

HUNGARY 165

as well . They are no more than a wedge driven inbetween the Magyar and Rouman populations of theAlfold,1 and could not be excluded from the Hungarianfrontier if the country on both sides of them remainedwithin it .

(iii .) The Ruthenes occupy the opposite corner of theA lf iild , round the head-waters of the Theiss . Theynumber less than half a million, and are divided fromtheir Magyar neighbours by no natural boundary, whilethe other twenty-five millions who speak the samedialect 2 live on the further side of the Carpathians .The geographical factor, therefore, strongly favours theexisting political situation, yet the force of nationalantipathy and sympathy is more imperious still, andthe mountain barrier is not impassable . Two lines ofrailway traverse that section of the range under theshadow of which the Hungarian Ruthenes dwell, and oneof the routes is the famous Vereczka Pass, which gaveentrance into the land first to the Magyars and then tothe Ruthenes themselves, and has witnessed the passageof Russian invaders during the operations of thepresent war. It is therefore possible that the Ruthenesmay set geography at defiance, and throw in their lotwith the vast body of their race which stretches uninterruptedly Eastward from the Carpathians ’ furtherslopes to the upper waters of the Don .

These, then, are the three instances in which Hungaryis liable to suffer territorial loss . Our discussion hasyielded no certain conclusions,3 but it has sufficed toshow that secession in these quarters will not jeopardisethe continued existence of the Hapsburg Empire . Even

1 SeeMap I II. 1 S ee Ch. VIII . C.

3 Rectifications o f theHungarian frontier are indeed so problematicalthatwe have not attempted to indicate possibilities in themaps attachedto this book.

166 THE BALKANS

if all possibilities were actualised, the Magyar Kingdomwould still be left with nearly twelve million inhabitants 1

in occupation of a compact and productive territory.

The balance between Austria and Hungary would, ofcourse, be destroyed, but the break-down of the DualSystem might strength en the inward cohesion of theMonarchy by opening the way for a federal re-construction of the whole on genuinely national lines . Evenif the losses in Galicia an d Hungary were serious enoughto degrade the Dan ubian unit from the ranks of theGreat Powers, it might survive as an essential memberin the re-organised fraternity of European nations .We have now examined the state of the nationalproblem in the Kingdom of Hungary, as well as in theKingdoms and Lands Represented in the Reichsrathat Vienna,

” without discoverin g any ulcer fatal to thelif e of the Hapsburg organism ; but our examinationof the Trans-Leithanian half of the Monarchy is notyet complete . In addition to the Hungarian realm,

the Crown of St . Stephen comprises the Kingdomof Croatia-Slavonia beyond the Southern bank of theDrave .This Hungarian dependency has implicated the

Hapsburg Monarchy in the national problem of theSo uthern Slavs .1 Popu lation of Hungary within presentfrontiers (according to census o f 1900)

Possible losses after the present war, calculated at a maximum

(a) Roumans, S zekels and S axons(b) S erbs .

(c) Germ an enclaves am ong S erbs,approximately .

(d) Ru th enes

Total of possible losses

Minim um remainder 1

168 THE BALKANS

The system of the Morava and the Save, and in factthe whole region between the Drave, the Iron Gates ,and the sea, was occupied in the seventh century A .D.

by a swarm of the great Slavonic host, which found itsway through the Moravian Gap and the Marchfeld

,and

drifted down upon the Adriatic coast.This flying column of the Slavonic invasion did not

remain undifferentiated within itself . Its rearguardtarried under the lea of the Alps, and is representedby the modern Slovenes . Its vanguard crossed thewatershed of the Middle Danube, spread out fanwisetowards the ZEgean and the Black Sea, and has developedinto the Bulgarian nationality. Both these detached

groups have evolved racial and dialectical characteristicswhich distinguish them sharply from the main bodywhich lies between .

1 We will leave them aside for themoment, and concentrate our attention upon the latter,for whom we will reserve the title of Southern Slavs .”

The Southern Slavs, in this specialised sense ofthe name, speak an absolutely homogeneous dialect,and occupy a compact geographical area, extendingfrom Agram (Zagreb) to Uskub (Skoplye) , and fromBelgrade to Salona . They have thus become immediateneighbours of the Magyars, who two centuries laterdescended upon the country on the further bank of theDanube and the Drave, and at the present time the tworaces are approximately equal in numerical strength,2

but in every other respect their history has beenstrikingly different .The rich, unbroken levels of the Alfold offer a naturalcradle for a strong, unified national state the Southern

1The B u lgars derive their nam e, b ut nothing else, from a non

S lavonic caste of nomad conquerors o ff the steppes.

1 Eith er language is now spoken by between eight and nine millionso f people.

THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 169

Slavs, on the other hand, have been grievously handicapped by their physical environment. The gauntribs o i the Dinaric Alps, which shoulder the Danubesystem away from the Adriatic, are not kindly to Man .

The rock-surface cropping out through the scan ty soilsets a rigid limit to the growth of population, while thescanty communities that maintain their existence areisolated from one another by the parallel ranges ofmountains and the rushing rivers which carve theirway among them . Even the Adriatic coast-line, whichrivals Norway in the maze of its fjords and islands, isof little avail for internal communication . The landopens towards the Danube, and the watershed riseshard above the shore . The rivers invariably flow inland,and only one, the Narenta, drains South-Westward tothe sea .Such a land could never have become an independent

focus of human life . Its physical function as a linkbetween the mountain-masses of Central and SouthEastern Europe has conditioned the history of its inhabitants, and doomed them to be the victims and thespoil in the warfare of alien worlds .The country of the Southern Slavs has been debat

able ground from the beginning . Christianity penetrated it simultaneously from opposite directions .The Croats in the North-West were converted from theCatholic centres of Aquileia and Salzburg Orthodoxmissionaries from Byzantium mounted the valley of theVardar and secured the allegian ce of the Serbs in theMorava-b asin .

l

1 Croat and Serb were in origin two kindred tribes, identical with theChrobat and Sorab who remained North o f the Carpathians. Thenames have gradual ly been adapted to denote all S outh-S lavonicspeakers who belong respectively to the Catho lic and the OrthodoxChurch, irrespective o f po litical grouping or local habitat.

170 THE B ALKANS

The independent career of both these tribes wasbrief. The Croatian principality flourished in theeleventh century, but in 1 102 it was annexed to theexpanding realm of the Magyars, and for the next threecenturies Hungary and Venice fought for the sovereigntyof the land, ti ll the dispute was settled by a compromise .About 1420 Venice finally established her rule alongthe Dalmatian littoral, while Hungary retained hersuzerainty over the hin terland .

The fortunes of Serbia were grander . In 1 159 theHouse of Nemanya came to the front, and steadily builtup a national state which attained its zenith in thefourteenth century. Stephen Dushan, Tsar of theSerbs from 1336 to 1356 A .D., ruled from the Danubeto the 1B gean , and threatened to besiege Constantinopleitself, but disaster followed close upon his triumphs .The year before Stephen’s death, the Ottoman Turkshad occupied Gallipoli on the European shore of theDardanelles thirty years later 1 they fought the Serbsin the heart of their country on the field of Kossovo,2

and their crushing victory made an end of Serbianindependence .The advance of the Turks aggravated the disunion of

the Southern Slavs by introducing another creed . Inthe twelfth century the Pauli cian heresy from Armeniahad obtained a footing in the region,3 and the nobilityof Bosnia, a Hungarian dependency on the banks ofthe Bosna River, embraced it as th eir national faith .

Their choice isolated them from their neighbours , and11386.

1 Kossovo Po lye= Field of Blackbirds.

3 It was brought by Arm enian subjects o f the East Rom an Empire,whom the Byzantine governm ent had failed to convert to Orth odoxy,and had punished for their contumacy by exilin g them to the oppositeborder of the Im perial territory The S lavonic converts they made intheir new home too k the title o f B o gum i ls theo -phi loi

172 THE BALKANS

example . From 1527 to the present day, the Dynastyhas ruled this section of the South-Slavonic world byhereditary right .The battles between Austrian and Turk were decided

on the banks of the Danube, but the Dinaric mountainzone was the scene of fierce and continuous subsidiarywarfare . Durin g two centuries of inconclusive strifethe Turkish cavalry sometimes penetrated right up theSave, and ravaged the Venetian plains at the head ofthe Adriatic, while for nearly twenty years 1 the Hapsburg standard was planted in Belgrade and the Austrianfrontier pushed far up the valley of the Morava .Neither power, however, proved strong enough towrest from the other the undisputed dominion ofthe whole South-Slavonic region, and the Treaty ofBelgrade in 1739 terminated the struggle by a partition .

The whole of Croatia and Slavonia fell to the Hapsburg : the Ottoman retained Serbia and Bosnia . Thenew frontier started 2 from the Iron Gates, and followedthe course of the Danube upwards as far as the junctionof the Save . Belgrade, in the South-Eastern anglebetween the two rivers , remained a Turkish fortress,and the Hapsburg frontier proceeded along the Save ’sNorthern bank, till it reached the point where the latterriver is joined by the Una . Thence it turned SouthWestward, first conformin g to the Una

’s windings, andthen taking an irregular course of its own across themountains, till it struck the coast opposite the islandof Pago .

This made the Hapsburg Empire immediatelyconterminous with the provin ce of Dalmatia, whichthe Venetians had managed to defend against Ottoman

1 Fo llowmg upon the Treaty o f Karlowitz in 1718.

SeeMap II I .


aggression, ever since it fin ally passed into their handsin the fif teenth century . Napoleon made an end ofthe Venetian Republic and cast her territories into themelting pot. In the general re-settlement of 1814,

Dalmatia and Ragusa were defin itively incorporatedin the Hapsburg dominions, and the whole Easternlittoral of the Adriatic, from Trieste to the fjord ofCattaro, thus came to be united under the same Austriangovernment. With this exception, however, the territorial arrangements of 1739 still remained in forcewhen the events of 1866 forced the Danubian Monarchyinto the most recent phase of its history.

In the year of the Ausgleich the Monarchy’s positionwith regard to the Southern Slavs almost exactlyreproduced its relation towards the Italian nationafter the settlement of 1814. In both cases one sectionof a nationality was included within the Hapsburgfrontier while the remainder lay beyond it, and theMonarchy’s Italian experience had proved thatsuch a situation was essentially unstable . A dividednationality was bound to attain unity in time . It mightachieve it within the compass of the greater Empire

,if

the latter succeeded in advancing its frontier to includethe whole race, but the frontier could not remainstationary. If it failed to advance it must retire, andnational unity be realised at the Empire ’s expense bythe total secession of the nationality from its organism .

In the Italian case we have seen that such secessioncould occur without vital injury to the Monarchy’sstructure : in the present instance failure involved farmore serious consequences . The Monarchy had justbeen forced to accept its geographical destiny as aDanubian state, and in the new development of itshistory the South-Slavonic region offered the necessary

174 THE BALKANS

avenue for expansion . Excluded from Germany andItaly, Austria-Hungary must grow Eastward, or elseresign herself to paralysis, diminishment, and finaldissolution .

Since 1867, therefore, the attention of the JointMinistry for Foreign Affairs has become increasinglyconcentrated upon the South-Slavonic problem . TheMonarchy has never been faced by a graver issue

,but

on the other hand it has seldom enjoyed conditions sofavourable for a successful solution .

The South-Slavonic population within the frontierincluded Orthodox as well as Catholi c elements

,and the

Dynasty had a strong traditional hold over both its Serband its Croat subjects . Each regarded the Hapsburgas their saviour from the Turk . The Croat ’s loyaltywas reinf orced by religion, for he was a devoted clerical,and Austria has never abandoned the role of theleading Catholic state : the Serb was conciliated byan exceptional measure of toleration . Imperial rescriptsof 1690 and 1 691 granted the Serb refugees in Hapsburgterritory complete freedom in the practice of theirritual, and allowed them to organise an autonomouschurch under the presidency of a patriarch establishedat Karlowitz .

The erection of the Military Frontiers along theSave

,towards the close of Maria Theresa’s reign,

transformed the South-Slavonic borderers into regularsoldiery, and in the struggles against Napoleon and theRisorgimento, the Croat regiments were the flower ofthe Austrian armies . To their enemies they weremerely notorious for the savagery they had acquiredin their warfare with the Turks, but the Dynasty theyserved was deeply indebted to their adm irable constancy .

In 1848 Croatia was the only non-German province

176 THE BALKANS

festation of it against any constituted authority whatsoever. By his over-logical policy he played into Russia’shands . Russia followed up her advantage with decision

,

and when Serbia started her new life under Russianauspices, the Danubian Monarchy found its rivalestablished on the very threshold of its Balkan doorway.

Ever since the turn of the Turkish tide in 1683, it hadbeen obvious that the ebb would never cease till allEurope was free of the flood . The Turk’s presencemight be protracted, but it had become provisional,and sooner or later he must vanish out of the land .

The Treaty of Adrianople taught Austrian statesmenthat in playing for the Turk’s inheritance they mustreckon with Russia henceforward .

In 1867, therefore, the Monarchy’s road Eastwards

was already overshadowed by the Russian cloud, butthe danger, though formidable, might sti ll be bravedwith impunity . The cloud might pass without a storm .

The Balkan drama was not yet played out . TheSerbs who had won their freedom with Russia’said were only a fraction of the race . The majoritysti ll remained under Turkish rule, and the principalityin the Morava valley aspired to liberate a Serbiairredenta of greater territorial extent than itself .

0 sh ia, w ere more than the u tion was0 ox in religion : Southwards round the upper

m and its tributaries, the district ofKossovo, once the focus of the national life, still awaitedits redemption . Serbia and the Danubian Monarchywere bo th under a vital necessity to advance in the samedirection, and both were Obstructed by the same Turkishoccupant of the land . Why should they not advancein unison to satisfy their common need at the Turk’s


expense ? Serbia had one supreme desire, the accom

plishment of her national unity. Russia had left thework half-done , and had alienated her protege

’

e intothe bargain, by intriguing to strengthen her influenceover her. Serbia was ready to throw herself into thearm s of any great power that would help her to completethe realisation of her ideal . The refugee-communitiesNorth of the Danube, which had become the chiefcentres of modern Serb culture, afforded a spiritual linkbetween the Hapsburg Empire and the autonomousprincipality. If the Hapsburg Government hadprofited by the experience of 1830, and espoused thecause of Serbian nationality, it might still have ralliedthe whole South-Slavonic race under its own banner .The breakdown of the reactionary regime in 1866

offered the occasion for such a change of policy towardsthe Southern Slavs . Some concession to the principleof nationality was essential if the internal cohesion ofthe Monarchy was to be saved : liberalism in thisparticular instan ce would bring positive gain as well,by setting the salvaged Danubian unit upon its newpath towards expansion under the most auspiciouscircumstances .Unfortunately, however, reform was baulked bycompromise . We have seen that the Ausgleich of 1867was no reconstruction of the Hapsburg Empire on thebasis of nationality, but simply a deed of partnershipbetween Germans and Magyars for the continued oppression of the rest . It made the Magyar oligarchy apower in the Monarchy. That was the only new factorit introduced, and its effect upon the foreign policyof Austria-Hungary as a whole has been even moredisastrous than the internal race-conflict to which it hasgiven vent within Hungary itself.

178 THE BALKANS

The Magyars were reckless, egotistic and wellorganised . These qualities gave them an undueinfluence in the Dual State, and their geographicalS ituation made that influence paramount on the SouthEastern frontier . A fter 1867 the South-Slavonicproblem, and therewith the fate of the EastwardTrend,

” passed more and more completely underMagyar control, at the very time when it was becomingof extreme impo rtance to the whole Danubian Unit .The terms of the Ausgleich assigned to the Crown

of St . Stephen almost all the Southern Slavs withinthe Hapsburg frontier 1 The stru ggle of 1848- 49 hadinspired the Magyars and their Slavonic neighbourswith mutual fear and resentment, and the memory ofit did not promise well for the future of the HapsburgCroats and Serbs, now that they were abando ned to theMagyars ’ mercy.

We have already examined the case of the Serbs inHungary : we have now to consider the relationsbetween the Magyar government and the vice-royaltyof Croatia-Slavonia.The Magyars secured this province for the Crown

of St . Stephen,” basin g their claim upon their m ediz val

suzerainty over it . Such a historical argument wasof course without value, yet the terms Croatia obtain edseemed generous enough to compensate her for incor

po ration with her larger neighbour.The Croato-Hungarian Compromise was voted bythe Hungarian parliament and the Croatian diet in1868. It conceded at once to the Croats and Serbsbeyond the Drave fundamental rights which thenationalities in Hun gary itself have been strugglingvain ly for half a century to obtain . There was no

1 TheDalmatians were the exception .

180 THE BALKANS

By the terms of the Croato-Hungarian Compromise this state-built and state-owned railway wascommon property of the Crown of St. Stephen,

”and

the control of it fell within the province not of theHome Rule government at Agram but of the centralgovernment at Buda-Pest . If the Compromise hadany meaning, the railway administration Should havetaken due account of both Croatian and Hungarianinterests, but the fash ion in which Buda—Pest interpreted its trust revealed the Compromise as afiction .

The Magyars have used their pohtical predomin ancein the common parliament to govern the Fiume railwayexclusively to Hungary ’s economic advantage, anddeliberately to the economic detriment of Croatia.Freightage-tariffs are manipulated so as to favourthrough-traffic from the A lfOld to Fiume at the expenseof local traffic in Croatia itself,1 and every effort is madeto focus at Buda-Pest all railway connection betweenCroatia and the rest Of the continent. Where moredirect routes are already in existence, not only tariffsbut time-tables are distorted to induce goods and

passengers to travel to Vienna or Belgrade by way ofthe Hungarian capital where the railways have yet tobe built, the Magyar government does everything in its

power to obstruct their development . While Hungaryitself is covered with a network Of lines, the section ofthe Fiume railway between Agram and the coast hasnever been extended by a single branch, so that Croatiais deprived of independent communication with hernatural market in Austria on the one hand, and with her

1 In 191 1 the goods-tariff from Essek on the B rave to Agram was

lower th an the tarifi from the same place to Fium e, though the distancein the former case is only three-fif ths as great as in the latter.


South-Slavonic neighbours in Dalmatia and Bosnia onthe other.The Croats could not be expected to submit gladly

to such a system, and the attitude of the Magyarstowards them has been governed solely by the determination to force it upon them . For this purpose itwas necessary to hold Croatian politics well in hand,and the settlement of 1868 offered facilities for thetask.

Croatia possesses her own autonomous legislature,but the Ban or Viceroy, the supreme executiveauthority, is appointed by the ministry at Buda-Pest .The Magyar government perceived in this office aninstrument for keeping Croatia to heel, and they foundthe right man for the post in Count Khuen-Hedervary.

The Count governed Croatia for twenty years 1 by aTammany regime which he worked out almost toperfection . He paralysed the Opposition in the Dietby fomenting the rivalry between the Croat and Serbsections of the population, and secured a safe governmental majority over the disorganised nationalist votesby the Magyar method of electoral corruption .

2 Officialpressure was not difficult to exert, for the entire politicalpatronage of the country belongs to the Ban, but if thepolling turned out against him, Khuen-Hedervary wasalways prepared to dissolve the newly-elected diet andrepeat the process till he obtained a house of a moresatisfactory complexion .

Such were the effects of Magyar domination upon theSouth-Slavonic communities under the Crown ofSt . Stephen meanwhile, Magyar influence had

11883

- 1903 . In the latter year he lent his services to FrancisJoseph and accepted theHungarian premiership. See above.

1 Even the Diet o f 1868, which voted the Com prom ise withHungary, had been packed with safe m en by illegitimate means.

182 THE BALKANS

asserted itself in the relations between the Monarchyand the Southern Slavs beyond the frontier .In the summer of 1875 there was a general rising

of the Christian peasants in Bosnia . The OttomanGovernment failed to suppress it, and in the followingsummer the Serbian principality in the Morava valleyintervened in favour of the Bosnian Serbs, and wasfollowed by Montenegro, a little community of Serbmountaineers above Cattaro fjord which had neverforfeited its independence to Austrian, Venetian orTurk . In a few months the Ottoman arm ies crushedSerbia to earth, and a sympathetic insurrection of theBulgar population along the Danube was quelled withappalling savagery, but the only result of these Turkishsuccesses was to bring Russia into the field . TheTsar declared war in Turkey in the spring of 1877before the close Of the year the Tchataldja lines wereforced, and the Russian troops within striking distanceof Constantinople . In March 1878 the Turkish government signed the Treaty of San Stephano .

Thus once more salvation had come to th e BalkanChristians from the Muscovite, and the DanubianMonarchy had missed another Opportunity . Thistime the fault lay not with the authoritarian principlesOf Vienna but with the Magyar chauvinism of BudaPest . While Russiawas hesitating in 1876, the Monarchymight have forestalled her by championing Serbia inher desperate straits . The Croats and the HungarianSerbs were watching with intense anxiety the vicissi

tudes of their Slavonic b rethren ’

s struggle for liberty,yet so far from being guided by the feelings of such an

important element in the Crown of St . Stephen,”

th e Magyar government brutally trampled upon them .

Not only were Hungarian subjects rigorously debarred

184 THE BALKANS

ments,1 has produced remarkable results . In strikingcontrast to the policy pursued in Croatia during thesame period by Magyar statesmanship , the materialprosperity Of the country has been conscientiouslyfostered . Law and order have been established, roadsand railways have been built, education has beenprovided for . On the other hand, the development ofnational self-consciousness has been uncomprom isinglyresisted .

The hostility of the Moslem Bosniaks was quicklyovercome . Left stranded by the ebb of the Turkishtide, they found their existence threatened once moreby th e Orthodox and Catholic majority of th eir fellowSlavs, among whom they had lived a life apart, aspariahs or taskmasters, for more than seven centuries .Naturally they turned for protection to the Germanand the Magyar, to whom the Christian Slavs were asalien as to themselves . The Joint Adm inistration, onits part, espied in this powerful but denationalisedelement the very ally it needed, and set itself withsuccess to win the Bosniaks ’ support .

M eg an“?eir own, and to stim u te their particularism still

further, Kallay even attempted to create the consciousness of a separate Bosniak language,

” differentiatedfrom the standard South-Slavonic idiom of Croat andSerb by a few insignificant dialectical peculiarities

1 The adm inistration o f Bosnia was assigned to the departmen t ofthe Joint Ministry for Finance.

Total popu lation o f Bo snia in'

1895S outh-S lavonic element abo ut

l Orthodox S erbsConsisting of Moslem Bosniaks

lCatho lic CroatsFor their distrib ution seeMap II I.


the Serb element in the province, which amounts totwo-fif ths of the total population, was correspondinglydiscountenanced .

This deliberate discrim ination in treatment betweenthe various sections of the population has marred theAdministration by giving it an illiberal cast, and in oneimportant sphere it has hampered the policy of materialimprovement . To conciliate the Moslem landowners thepressing agrarian problem has been indefinitely shelved .

The occupation of Bosnia thus sowed seeds ofdissention between the Serb nationality and the DualMonarchy, yet these seeds might still have witheredwithout bearing fruit . The excellence of the BosnianAdministration worked potently for stability, and the

step might plausibly have been explained as the finalact in the Danubian State ’s geographical evolution .

Ever since the Hapsburgs had added Dalmatia as wellas Slavonia to their dominions, the ultimate incorporation of Bosnia had been a geographical necessity .

The province is shaped like a triangular wedge , and itsapex presses upwards, perilously close to the lines ofcommunication between the centres of industry andagriculture in the Danube-basin and their ports onthe Adriatic seaboard . The occupation of the trianglegave the Monarchy its short base-line for a frontier,instead of the combined length of the other two sides .The General Staff might have vindicated it as a defensivemeasure of purely military import .Unfortunately, however, the Berlin Conference

did not confine its mandate to Bosnia . Serbia andMontenegro were both granted considerable increasesof territory,1 but their frontiers were carefully held

1 S erbia obtained in addition complete independence from Ottomansuzerainty—Montenegro had never submitted to it.

186 THE BALKANS

asunder. The Turkish Government was left inpossession of the Sandjak 1 of Novi-Bazar, a strip Of

mountainou s country which ran from South-East toNorth-West in the general direction of the DinaricRan ge, and serv ed as a land-bridge between the DualMonarchy now in occupation of Bosnia and the OttomanEmpire still established in the interior of Macedoniaand along the littoral of the ZEgean . To make themaintenance of this bridge secure, the two powersconcluded a convention, under which the distri ct wasgarrisoned by Austro-Hungarian troops, without prejudice to the Ottoman civil adm inistration .

The garrisoning of the Sandjak revealed the occupation Of Bosnia as the first step in a new movementof offence . The Trend Eastward was to fin d itsrealisation in territorial expansion to an ZEgean seaboard, but instead of proceeding in unison with SouthSlavonic national aspirations , the Dual Monarchy hadmade up its m ind to march over the Southern Slavs’

dead bodies .Ever since 1878 Austro-Hungarian statesmanship has

been pavin g the way for a fresh advance . Duringthe Hamidian regime the garrisons in the Sandjaklooked on while the Serb population of the Kossovodistrict, a few miles away, was being exterminated bybands Of Moslem A lb aniam tea~bkt e ttom an Government . usfi aT Hiifig

'

ar‘

y refused fo”

interf ere she professed scrupulous respect for Ottomansovereignty, yet all the time she was spreading herpropaganda among Ottoman subjects in the immediateneighbourhood . She established a virtual protectorateover the Catholic Albanian clans in the h interland ofSkodra,

2 a mountainous region between Kossovo and

Province.

188 THE BALKANS

At first the statesmansh ip of 1878 seemed likely tobe justified by success . The supersession of the SanStephano Treaty by the diplomats at Berlin went farto cancel the prestige which Russia had won by hermilitary victory, and the new principality of Bulgaria,which the Powers had grudgingly allowed to come intoexistence with in reduced limits , did not prove a sourceOf strength to its Russian creator . Like the Serbs after1829, the Bulgars found Russian tutelage a doubtfulblessing, but they displayed far more vigour in shakingthem selves free . In an incredibly short time theyventured to steer an independent course Of their own .

Flouted by Bulgaria, Russia looked to Serbian loyaltyfor consolation, but Serbia had been mortally offendedby the erection of a rival Slavonic state in the Balkanarea, and had entered on a new politi cal phase .The throne of the principality was occupied at this

time by Milan Ob renovitch ,1 the most notable statesmanmodern Serbia has produced . He saw that Serbia wasnot strong enough to achieve her destin y unaided, andthat to invoke the assistance of greater powers wasmerely to offer herself as a pawn in their game . It wasclear that the Berlin settlement would not be upset in aday, and Milan determined to take advantage of theinevitable lull for the development of his country’smaterial prosperity . Geography has made the Moravavalley a natural appendage of the lVIiddle DanubianBasin . The Danubian Monarchy spreads its bulkbetween Serbia and Western Europe, and the little statecould not begin its economic growth unless it had secured

under the Crown of S t. S tephen, in Bosnia they were under th e jointpro tectorate o f the Dual Monarchy, in Serbia and Montenegro th eywerem em bers of independent national states, in Kossovo they were stillsubject to Turkish misgovernm ent.

1 He ascended it in 1868.


its big neighbour’s good-will . Moved by these considerations, Milan did not hesitate to sacrifice nationalideals and turn his kingdom into a satellite of AustriaHungary .

The next ten years witnessed a struggle between theking supported by the Liberal or Progressive Partyon the one hand, and the Russophil Radicals on theother. Milan succeeded in carrying out his programme .Railways were built and the finances reorganised, inspite of the opposition aroused by increased taxeswithout any immediately visible returns . In 1885 anopportunity presented itself for striking at Bulgaria,and jealousy prompted Serbia to seize it. She declaredwar only to suffer a severe defeat, and nothing but theDual Monarchy’s veto prevented the Bulgarian armyfrom marching upon Belgrade . This interventionmarked the zenith of Austro-Hungarian ascendencyover Serbia,1 yet Milan actually survived the bankruptcyof his foreign policy. It was not till 1889 that he wasdriven to abdicate, and allow Alexander his son to reignin his stead .

Alexander was a minor, and the Liberal regency founditself unable to cope with the growing Radical block inparliament . In 1893 the young king took the reins intohis own hands, and attempted to govern through aRadical min istry, but the experiment soon broke down .

The Radicals endangered the understanding with theDual Monarchy, and wrought havoc with the public

1 A nd also the lowest eb b o f Russian influence in the Balkans. A t

the outbreak o f the war, Russia had immediately withdrawn her

military staff which was engaged in building up the Bu lgarian army.S he hoped that this step wou ld at once conci liate Serbia and teach the

wayward Bu lgars that they cou ld not dispense With Russian assistance.

When the Bu lgars improvised victorious generalship out of their nativeresources, and Serbia applied to the Dual Monarchy to save her fromthe consequences o f defeat Russia was dealt two staggering blows.

190 THE BALKANS

finances a political catastrophe was imminent, andthe country recalled the only man who could avert it .Five years after his exile, the Old king returned toBelgrade in triumph . His policy had conquered .

Serbia submitted herself to his gu idan ce, party rancourscooled down, and the national energy concentrateditself in economic channels .King Milan ’s success did no t fail to produce its eff ect

upon the Russian Foreign Office . Deserted by twoof her protegees, Russia found herself left with no friendin the Balkans but Montenegro, and was forced toreconcile herself to an abatement of her ambitions .Russian and Austro Hungarian interests in the

Balkans were not essentially incompatib le . Russia’sobjective was the Black Sea Straits : the DanubianMonarchy coveted an i

ZEgean seaboard . There was nogeographical obstacle to the partition of the Balkanpeninsula by the two powers into an Eastern and aWestern sphere,1 and Russia was now prepared toconsider Austro-Hungarian overtures to this effect .The advent of the next phase in Turkey’s dissolutionprecipitated a compromise .The Berlin Congress had stipulated for administrative

reform throughout the territories abandoned to Ottomansovereignty in Macedonia,2 and the Porte had publisheda pretentious scheme of enlightened government, butthe project remained a dead letter, and the Christianpopulations at last determined to help themselves . Thesituation, however, was complicated by their disunion.

1 The idea had already comm ended itself to Joseph I I. just a centurybefore. In 1789 he m ade an alliance with Catherine of Russia for th epartition o f the Ottom an Empire, b ut the Turks defended themselvesstou tly, and the vu ltures soon diverted their attention to the Po lishcarcase.

2 A n unofficial name employed to cover the three Ottoman vilayetsgovernm ents o f Kossovo , Monastir, and Salonika.

192 THE BALKANS

The Murzsteg Programme seemed to have startedthe Dual Monarchy upon the last stage of its advancetowards Salonika without committing it to the dreadedconflict with Russia . In 1904 Russia was divertedfrom the Balkans by her war in the Far East, and itsdisastrous close in the following year gave AustroHungarian statesmen cause to congratulate them selves .Apparently the Eastward Trend had an absolutelycl ear field before it : their good fortune had exceededtheir expectations .At the very moment, however, when Russia retired

from the lists , South-Slavonic nationality was coming ofage, and preparing to champion its own cause .In 1900 A lexander of Serbia made an unfortu nate

marriage, and broke away from his father’s influence .

His action was bitterly resented by the country, Milandied before he could recover his authority, and his lossincreased the general misgiving . A conspiracy wasformed among the Officers of the army, and in 1903 KingAlexander and Queen Draga were murdered in theirpalace under the most brutal circumstances .This atrocity did not strike the Austro-Hungarian

Foreign Ministry as important at the time,1 but AustroGerman and Magyar hatred has battened upon it duringthe struggle between the Dual Monarchy and Serbiawhich has supervened . In the October of 1908 the

writer happened to be dining in an Oxford college wherea distinguished Magyar was a guest . He was an ownerof vineyards in the Tokay district, a major of Honved

2

cavalry, and a professor of mathematics into the bargain,in fine, he was a typical representative of the cultured

1 Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Mon tenegro were the on ly foreignstates which did not tem porarily withdraw their diplomatic representarives from Belgrade as a protest.

1 Y eomanry.


Whig oligarchy. The Balkan War had just broken out,and the name of Serbia was mentioned in the conversation, when suddenly the table was startled by anexclamation The Serbs Liars and thieves 1 Theykilled their king and queen with bayonets. Thievesand liars During the hush which followed, agraduate of the college, who was by birth a GalicianJew, was heard remarking aside that in our part of theworld you can always guess a man ’s nationality by thepeople he abuses .”

The comment hit the mark. The hate was primaryin the professor’s mind, his justification of it an afterthought. In arriving at his estimate of the Serbs ’

national character, he had never consulted his reasonhad he done so, it would have shown him the absurdityof judging a young nation by the scandals in its highplaces . The history of Serbia since 1878 is not to bedivined in the intrigues of a handful of politicians atBelgrade, but in the industry of the peasants, who havebeen purging from the Morava-basin the traces ofTurkish misrule . The success with which they haveovercome their initial handicap , and brought theircountry into line with more fortunate parts of Europe,is sufficient to vindicate their capacity for civilisation .

When Alexander was murdered, his father's economic

policy was already bearing fruit . Serbia had developedher agrarian resources to the point of producing anannual surplus she was now in a position to enter thefield of international commerce . Her natural marketwas the industrial world of Central Europe, and thedirect line for the export of her produce accordingly laythrough the Danubian Monarchy. SO long, however,as she monopolised all Serbia’s economic outlets

,

Austria-Hungary could impose on Serbian exports

194 THE BALKANS

whatever prices she chose economic independencecould only be achieved by openin g up an alternativeroute . Alexander Ob renovitch was succeeded on thethrone of Serbia by Peter Karageorgevitch , the heir of arival dynasty, and the first important act of the new reignwas the negotiation in 1906 of a tariff-convention withBulgaria, wh ich promised Serbia access on reasonableterms to a port on the Black Sea .This sudden change in the relations of the two

principalities caused considerable consternation atVienn a and Buda-Pest. Not only did it threaten torelieve Serbia from her economic thraldom to the DualMonarchy it portended a political entente between therival Slavonic groups in the Balkan Peninsula . Moreominous still, it coincided with a similar movementamong the South-Slavonic citizens of the Monarchyitself.When Khuen-Hedervary resigned the Croatian viceregency in 1903, he left no competent successor behindhim , and the political life of Croatia began to revive .The prolonged parliamentary crisis at Buda-Pest, whichfollowed the overthrow of the Magyar Liberal Party,produced its echo South of the B rave. In the Autumnof 1905, a conference of Croat deputies from theCroatian Diet and the Austrian Reichsrath was held at

Fiume .1 A resolution was adopted, expressing sympathy with the Magyar Coalition in its stru ggle againstthe Crown , but demanding that the liberties for whichthe Coalition professed to be fighting should be extendedto Croatia as well the Compromise of 1868 was to beObserved in spirit as well as in letter, and constitutional

1 Th e initiative cam e from the Croat leaders in Dalm atia, who as

citizens o f Austria had been able to develop a m ore untramm eledpo litical activity than their less fortunate brethren under the Crowno f S t. S tephen .

”

196 THE BALKANS

Danubian Monarchy must seize this opportunity torealise its ambitions , or else abandon them for ever.A erenthal deliberately embarked upon the deathstruggle with the Southern Slavs .The first bout in the conflict did not result in his

favour. During 1907 he retaliated upon Serbia for hereffort towards economic liberty by waging a remorselesstariff-war against her .1 The Serbian peasantry sufferedseverely, but they showed unexpected obstinacy :instead of coming to terms , they developed new outletsand markets with such enterprise that A erenthal hadto abandon his campaign as a failure .Next year, however, he returned to the charge . In

January 1908 he concluded a convention with theOttoman Government for the construction of a railwaythrough the Sandjak of Novib azar, which was to linkthe Austro-Hungarian railway system in Bosnia withthe Turkish rai lhead at NIitrovitza. His object was toside-track Serbia by diverting to this new route thethrough-traffic between Central Europe and the lEgeanli ttoral, wh ich had utilised hitherto the line throughBelgrade and up the Morava valley to Salonika.1 Hepaid dearly for this move, for it drew Russia once moreinto the Balkan arena .Russian opinion regarded the railway scheme as adirect violation of the Miirzsteg agreement : it portended the consummation Of the Danubian rival’sEastward Trend .

” The Government shook o ff itslethargy, and determined upon a counter-stroke . In

1 Nicknam ed th e Pig War in Austria-Hungary, swine beingSerbia’s chief article o f export.

1 The Mitrovitza line traverses the Kossovo district and joins the

Salonika Railway atUskub. Like the Bosnian system and th eproposedconnectin g h

’

nk, it is narrow-gauge, whi le the Belgrade-Uskub-S alonikaRailway is built on the regu lar Continen tal standard . S ee Map I I I.


June 1908 the Tsar entertained King Edward VII. - at

Reval, and Great Britain and Russia announced inconjunction a new and drastic scheme of Macedonianreform .

1

The effect was momentous . A Young Turkcommittee had been planning for years the overthrowof Abd-u l-ham id ’s absolute government . Educated byexile in Western Europe, they had imbibed its nationalchauvinism as well as its liberal ideals . The RevalProgramme convinced them that Turkey wou ldforfeit the sovereignty over her European territoriesaltogether, unless she could accomplish immediatereform from within . They resolved to risk everythingto save the integrity of the Empire . The revolutionwas started among the troops in Macedonia before thenext month was out, and in a few days Turkey wasconverted into a constitutional state .The duel between A erenthal and Serbia had thus set

all the Balkans and the Nearer East in commotion beforethe autumn of 1908. Meanwhile, the South-Slavonicproblem had rapidly been assum ing more serious proportions within the borders of the Dual Monarchy.The Spring of 1907 witnessed the inevitable

breach between the Serbo-Croat Coalition Party andthe Magyar Coalition Ministry. In a bill submittedby Francis Kossuth 1 to the parliament at Buda-Pest,Magyar was declared the sole official language for therailway-system not merely of Hungary as heretofore,but of all territories included under the Crown of St.Stephen . This was a clear contravention of theComprom ise of 1868, by which the South-Slavonic

1 Comm on fear o f Germ any had led these two powers to com posetheiroutstanding differences the year before.

1 The son of Louis.

198 THE BALKANS

tongue had been guaranteed Official status within thelim its of Croatia. In proposing it the Magyar Radi calshad shown their hand . Their Liberal predecessorshad confined the policy of Magyarisation to Hungarythis bill was an attempt to extend it to Croatia .The Serbo-Croat deputies in the parliament at Buda

Pest at once resorted to obstruction . They weredefeated by a tacti cal manoeuvre and the bill became law,

but the struggle was only continued the more fiercelyat Agram . At the beginn ing of 1908 the Magyargovernment dismissed the Ban then in office asunequal to the situation, and specially appointed BaronPaul Rauch to superintend as Viceroy the impendingelections in Croatia yet Rauch, though he strenuouslyapplied Khuen-Hedervary

’

s methods, did not obtainfrom them his gif ted predecessor’s results . TheCroato-Serb coalition secured an absolute majority inthe new Diet, and all that Rauch could do was toprorogue the session for an indefin ite period, and governin defiance of the constitution .

During the months , therefore, that followed theTurkish revolution, A erenthal found all sections of theSouth-Slavonic race in a dangerous state of agitation .

Being a man of courageous temper, he resolved to crushthe spirit of Serb and Croat alike by an overwhelmingblow. In October 1908 he repudiated the sovereigntyof the Porte over Bosnia, and declared the annexationof the Occupied Provinces to the Austro-HungarianMonarchy.

1

This act at once provoked a European crisis, butA erenthal showed himself not unequal to the occasion .

1 The coup was efi'

ected in co llusion.

with Bu lgaria, whichsim u ltaneously denounced Ottoman suzerainty and proclaim ed th e

ann exation (in a similar sense) of Eastern Rumelia.

200 THE BALKANS

two camps into which the European powers were divided .

A erenthal had unchained forces beyond his control .He had asserted his will in a problem of vital importanceto the Danubian Monarchy, but he had done so at theprice of transferring the initiative for the future to thedominant partn er in the Central-European alliance .The aftermath of the crisis within the Monarchy

itself was hardly less embarrassing . Baron Rauchhad rid himself of the Croatian Diet for the moment :he was resolved to ru in the Croato-Serb Coalition beforehe faced it again . Durin g the early summer of 1908

his Official press worked up a scare of Pan-Serbconspiracy ; in July the first arrest was made on thecharge of High Treason, and before the end of January1909 no less than fifty-eight Serb citizens of Croatia,all people of Obscure station , were in prison pendingtheir trial on this account. The judicial proceedings at

not open till March, when the external crisisg its détente, and the attention of Europe

was concentrated upon them before they dragged totheir belated close in October . Thirty-one of thevictims were sentenced to terms of imprisonmentvarying from twelve to five years , but Rauch had failedin his real objective : all attempts to implicate theCoalition members of the Croatian Diet had brokendown, and the party was able to follow up this negativesuccess by a triumph of a more startling character .During the same month of March in which theBosnian crisis ended and the Agram trial began, theNeue Freie Presse newspaper had published at Viennaan article on the relations of the Dual Monarchy tothe South-Slavonic problem by an emin ent Austrianhistorian, Dr . Friedjung. This article was written inan authoritative tone it specifically charged the Serbo

THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 20 1’

Croat Coalition With being the exponents and tools ofagencies in Belgrade, and supported its assertions byquotations from documents . Some of the documentspurported to be official correspondence of the SerbianForeign Office, others were minutes of a semi-O fficialrevolutionary society, but Dr . Friedjung, when challenged, refused to reveal their provenan ce, and theCoalition deputies accordingly entered a libel actionagainst him at Vienna .The hearing of this case only came on in December

1909, after the treason trial was over, but this time theproceedings lasted no longer than a fortnight . Thetrial at Agram had cast a lurid light upon the methodsof espionage employed by the Austro-HungarianAdm inistration in Bosnia, Croatia, and Dalmatia nowat Vienna Dr . Friedjung

’

s documents were revealedas forgeries concocted within the walls of the AustroHungarian legation at Belgrade, communicated toFriedjung as genuine by the Joint Foreign Office, andutilised by him in all good faith .

The action was hastily stopped by a comprom ise,before these results could be registered in the verdictof the court, but the evidence of the witnesses hadcreated an immense sensation . Dr . Spalaikovitch ,the incriminated Serbian official,put in an appearanceand brilliantly vindicated himself and his countryThe Tchech savant Professor Masaryk of Prag, whocounted among his pupils men of the rising generationin all the Slavonic countries of the Danubian Monarchyand the Balkans, proved himself still more formidable .Implicated as a witness in the trial, he refused to letthe matter drop . He was a member of the AustrianReichsrath, and when the Delegations next met inNovember 1909, he was elected as one of the Austrian

202 THE B ALKANS

representatives . This gave him an opportunity for adirect passage of arms with the Joint Foreign NIinisterA erenthal hardly attempted a defence, and Masarykproceeded remorselessly with his interpellations till hehad pieced together and exposed the whole oflicial

conspiracy. A erenthal aspired to be the AustrianBismarck without possessing the capacity of hisPrussian ensample . The exposure was as damningas that of the Ems Telegram,

” and it had overtakenhim with disconcerting speed .

Thus ended the first bout in the conflict before thenext began Baron A erenthal had been removed from thescene, but during five short years of office 1 he had fixedthe lines on which it should be fought to its conclusion .

Baron Rauch did not survive the Friedjung incidentearly in 1910 he was superseded, and the Croatian Dietwas convened once more . The respite, however, wasbrief. The ideals of the Serbo-Croat Coalition and ofMagyar nationalism were not compatible with oneanother. So long as Magyar ministries could controlthe politics Of Croatia, it was possible to observe inoutward form the Compromise of 1868 now that themajority in the Diet was possessed by a party trulyrep resentative of the Croati an people, co-operationbetween the parliaments at Agram and Buda-Pest hadbecome impracti cable, and the Compromise inevitablybroke down . A fresh deadlock led once more to thesuspension of constitutional government in Croatia inthe spring of 1912, and almost immediately afterwardsthe Serb Church in the Hapsburg dominions wasdeprived of its charter, which had been consistentlyrespected since its original grant in 1691 .

1 From October 1906 until early in 1912 . He died soon after hisretirement.

204 THE BALKANS

Dalmatian coast, and nationality as well as geographysupports Serbia’s title to an outlet in this direction, sincethe whole territory that intervenes between Belgradeand Spalato 1 is occupied by a homogeneous SouthSlavonic population . Yet here, too, Serbia

’s ubiquitousneighbour blocked the way : the crisis of 1908 hadshown that Austria-Hun gary was established just as

permanently West of the Drina as North of the Save,and that Serbia’s dream of concessions in this quarterhad been Utopian .

A casual glance at the map suggests that, after theannexation of the Kossovo-distri ct, Serbia might haveengineered a railway across it to the Montenegrin portof Antivari, and thus obtained an outlet only slightlyfu rther to the South but with a map that representsthe relief of the land, the idea will be dispelled by closerexamination . Antivari possesses a tolerable harbourbut an impassable hinterlan d . The massif of theBlack Mountain rises immediately behind it, andthe very physical quali ties that have safeguardedMontenegro’s liberty have denied her the possibilityof railway development . The Dinaric barrier between

1 Spalato lies approximately at the mid-poin t o f the S outh -S lavoniccoast, half way between Fiume on the one hand and the m ou th o f theBoyana River on the o ther. It is destined by geography to b e th e

principal port of the South-S lavonic area, b u t at presen t its capacitiesare neu tralised by the lack o f railway conn ecti ons With its hin terland(see Map The Bosnian Rai lway has not yet opened is way toany port further up the coast than MetkOVi tch on the estuary of theNaren ta, though a branch diverges from that poin t in the oppositedirection to Ragusa, and continues still furth er So u th-East as far as

Castelnuovo, at th e entrance o f Cattaro fjord . To link the Serbianrailway system With these actual o r potential ports on the Dalmatiancoast, little further rai lway construction is required . A S erbian lineascends theval ley o f theWestern Morava and its tributary, theTzetinya,as far West as Ujitze : a branch o f the Bosnian Railway starts fromS arayevo , crosses the Drina at Vishegrad, and runs right up to the

S erbian frontier at Vardishte. The distance between the two rail

heads is les s than twenty-five m iles (see Map


the Danube-basin and the sea is at no poin t moredifficult to surmount.Serbia was thus driven to look further South. As

soon as the Turkish resistance in Northern Macedoniahad been overcome, she despatched a column by forcedmarches across the Albanian mountains, and occupied astretch of the Turkish coast- line extending from Alessioat the mouth of the Drin as far Southward as the portof Durazzo .

At this point the Dual Monarchy intervened . CountBerchtold, who had succeeded Baron A erenthal at theJoint Ministry for Foreign Affairs, set his veto upon theestablishment of Serbian sovereignty at any point onthe Adriatic coast . Once more the Monarchy had tomobilise her troops in support of her diplomacy, andthis time against Russia on the Galician frontier, yetby Sir Edward Grey’s efforts the catastrophe was oncemore averted, and Serbia yielded to B erchto ld

’

s demand .

B erchto ld’

s action was not defensible . He made playwith the Austro-Hungarian protectorate over the NorthAlbanian clans, and posed as the champion of a smallnationality against its unscrupulous neighbour, yet ina precisely similar case the Magyars had avowedlybeen sacrificing the interests of the Southern Slavs inCroatia to their own need for railway communicationwith the sea. The hypocrisy of B erchto ld ’

s plea wasenhanced by the fact that Serbia, unlike Hungary, couldhave found a seaboard in Dalmatia without doing anyviolence at all to the national principle, had not her waybeen barred by the Dual Monarchy itself.Even the occasion for this stroke seemed ill-chosen .

Feeling in Croatia and Bosnia was already inflamedagainst the government by the internal situation theSerbian successes had further agitated it by a wave of

206 THE BALKANS

sympathetic enthusiasm, and the morale of Serbiaherself was very different in the spring of 1913 fromwhat it had been in the Spring of 1909. B erchto ld

’

s

diplomacy, however, had an ulterior object . Hedivined that Serbia, now entirely debarred from theAdriatic, would insist on obtaining an lEgean outletin compensation . This would bring her into collisionwith Bulgarian claims in Macedonia, the Balkan allieswould quarrel over the division of their Turkish spoil

,

their formidable harmony would be destroyed, and afterthey had exhausted one another by an internecine war,the Monarchy’s path towards Salonika would once morebe open .

In startin g this train of events, Berchtold overreachedhimself. Serbia duly enlarged her Macedonian claims ,the tension between the Balkan allies increased, andtowards the end of June 1913 Bulgaria opened theSecond Balkan War by a treacherous night-attack uponthe Serbian outposts along the line of the Vardar .Yet the result O f this secondary contest was an evengreater surprise than the collapse of the Turks . TheGreek and Serbian armies almost immediately assumedthe Offensive, and cleared Macedonia of Bulgarian troops ;Roumania declared war, and invaded Bulgaria from theopposite quarter : hardly more than a month hadpassed before the Bulgarian resistance was completelybroken . The Treaty of Bukarest, which defined theterms of the re-settlement, was a proclamation ofB erchto ld

’

s failure .Serbia’s gains were far greater than they would have

been if the Treaty of London had remained in force,and the four allies had settled their claims by peacefulcompromise . The Dual Monarchy

’s discomfiture wasproportionately aggravated . In the autumn of 1913

208 THE BALKANS

formidable military power . They would be strong inthemselves, and, worst of all, they would be strong intheir friends .B erchto ld

’

s diplomacy had exorcised the first BalkanConfederacy only to conjure up a more dangerousentente in its place . The alliance between Serbia and

Bulgaria was essentially directed against Turkey oncethe Turks were driven behind the Chataldja lines, itspositive stimulus would in any case have vanished .

Roumania, however, was as disinterested in respect ofTurkey as Bulgaria was towards the national problemsof the Middle Danube-basin, and her new understanding with Serbia could have but one meaning . Justas Serbia had made common cause with Bulgaria toliberate the Slav populations under Ottoman rule, soshe would fight shoulder to shoulder with Roumaniato wrench away from the Hapsburg complexus theirredenta coveted by each of them in this quarter .The cherished dream of a Trend Eastward wasfading away, and the foreboding of a WestwardTrend at the Monarchy’s expense was beginning totake its place .Thus ended the second bout in the conflict between

the Dual Monarchy and the South Slavonic nationality .

Could the Monarchy retrieve its position before thedrama was played out Yes, if the face of Europe werechanged by a trial of strength between the opposingcamps into which the European Powers were divided .

If the central group triumphed, the Danubian partn ercould snatch success out of failure, and lay hands uponSalonika after all .1

Would Germany, the dominant member in thepartnership

,be willing to stake her all upon this issue ?1 See the British White Paper, No . 82 .


Yes again, for while the events of 1908-9 had alreadyendowed the South-Slavonic problem with internationalsignificance, the solution of the Moroccan question afterthe crisis of 191 1 had promoted it to be the supremetest of the Balance of Power .

”

These considerations counselled the Joint Ministerfor Foreign Affairs to precipitate a dénouement at thefirst opportunity, and the murder of the ArchdukeFrancis Ferdinand at Sarayevo in June 1914 presentedhim with the initiative .The crime was perpetrated by a South-Slavonic

subject of the Monarchy, a Bosnian Serb . It is idleto brand 2 whole race with an individual’s misdeedOrsini ’s attempt to assassinate Napoleon III . in 1858

did not stain the honour of the Italian people, still lessdid Napoleon tax the Sardinian Government withresponsibility for the act of a man who was not aSardinian subject . There is no shadow of proof thatKing Peter’s ministers were implicated in the presentaffair any more than Cavour was in the other the factscan only be established when the trial of the murderershas run its course, yet before the proceedings wereopened at Sarayevo, Count Berchtold had exploited theoccasion to force war upon Serbia against her will .German and Magyar apologists represent this un

provoked attack as a punitive expedition . Theyremind us that when the A fghans massacred Sir LouisCavagnari and his suite at Kabul, Lord Roberts retracedhis steps and exacted a bloody vengeance Suppose

,

they argue, that the Viceroy of India or the Prince ofWales were sniped at his camp-fire during a tour alongthe North-West Frontier, you would carry fire andsword through the hills without remorse .”

We will accept the comparison, if we may carry it to

2 10 THE BALKANS

a sustained conclusion . If we suppose so much, wemust likewise suppose that the inhabitants of Irelandand the Scottish Highlands happen themselves to beAfghans in race, that the Welsh and the Cornishmen,if they are not actually A f ghans too, speak some closelyallied Persian dialect, and that Afghan is recognisedas an official language in the British Navy :1 add to thisan inflexible system of universal conscription, and weshall be able to picture our Afghans from Ireland andScotland bein g mobilised in company with theirEnglish-speaking neighbours and marched across theIndian frontier to slay their barbarous brethren whohad sniped an English grandee?Whatever the German and the Magyar may feel about

their onslaught upon Serbia, for their South-Slavonicfellow-citizens it is compulsory civil war .This abominable culmination of the Dual System

is the Th ird Act in the South Slavonic drama, but theplot has broadened out . This time we are parti cipatin gin the action ourselves , and playing for life and death .

If we and our allies succeed in dominating the finale,in what guise will the original actors emerge from theirprotracted ordeal

If the Dual Monarchy suffers defeat in the presentstruggle, its South-Slavonic subjects will find themselvesfor the first time at liberty to consult their own interests ,instead of bein g exploited in the selfish interest of oth ernationali ties . We can be sure beforehand of their

1 Every oflicer in the Austro-Hungarian Navy is required to showprofiCiency in the South-S lavonic tongue, because the crews are drawnalm ost entirely from the Croat popu lation of Dalmatia and Istria,and are apt to understand nothin g b u t their native language, beyondthe bare Italian words of command .

1 To make our comparison exact, we m ust im agine that the Afghanwho fired the dastardly shot proved to hail from Ireland .

2 12 THE BALKANS

This gulf will take many years to bridge, and here againcircumstances have placed the Southern Slavs at adisadvantage they have been compelled to begin thework of construction from the wrong end .

In Italy the initiative came from the most advancedcommunity in the country . Startin g from Piedmont onthe borders of France the movement proceeded m ethodi

cally towards the East and South : Lombardy, Emilia,and Tuscany were consolidated into a national statebefore Garibaldi sailed for Sicily with his Thousand .

If Piedmont had shared the fate of Venetia andLombardy, and had been assigned to Austria at thesettlement of 1814, the course of events would havebeen very d ifferent . By 1860 the North would havebeen consolidated not as an independent kingdom butas a complex of provinces jumbled together in theHapsburg collection . Italian Nationalism would havebeen forced to abandon Tuscany and Romagna, andwould have found no stan ding-ground North of theMarches . If at this stage the Pope had identified himself with the Risorgimento , and had incorporated theSouth in his dominions , as Serbia incorporated Macedon ia after her Balkan victories, he might have preacheda crusade against Austria and liberated all the Northfrom her yoke with the assistance of her European rivals,yet when the oppressor had been driven beyond theAlps, his highly-civilised victim s and their Papalchampion would have been left in an embarrassingposition . The Pope would have become the hero ofthe North, but the clerical ideals which had inspired hisvictorious armies would not have commended themselves to Italians the other side of the Apennines .The Northerners released from Austrian stronggovernment would have hesitated to accept a clericalparliamentarianism in its place .

THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 2 13

This fantastic analogy may serve to indicate theattitude of patriotic Croats towards the Orthodoxnationalism of the Morava-principality . When Serbiaprostrated the Turkish and Bulgarian armies in twosuccessive campaigns , her triumph reacted upon theSouth-Slavonic provinces of the Dual Monarchy. TheSerbs of Hungary and Croatia tu rned their eyes inearnest towards Belgrade, and the Croats took pride intheir kinship with the victors . This spiritual exaltation brought the South-Slavonic nation to self-consciousness, but we must guard against over-estimatingits effect . The spell of the Hapsburg is broken, andCroatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia are ready to transfer theirallegiance to the Karageorgevitch , yet they will not doso at the sacrifice of their historical sentiment .”

We have noted the strength of tradition in this partof Europe . When Croatia and Dalmatia are set free,their first impulse will be to restore the TriuneKingdom 1 as it existed in the eleventh century A .D.,

and they will insist on entering the South-SlavonicUnion on this basis . The national state will thus takeshape as a federation of at least two members .In Bosn ia the Serb element predominates over the

two others, and Serbia will doubtless incorporate thewhole country . The Bosnian problem involved her inher struggle for life and death, and the possession ofthe province is the stake of victory as the protagonistin the national cause, Serbia is worthy of her reward .

Whether the federation will contain more than twomembers depends upon the choice of Montenegro .

No South-Slavonic community cherishes so glorious atradition as she , but her history is bound up with thenational adversity . She remained a virgin fortress of

1 Croatia-S lavonia-Dalmatia.

2 14 THE BALKANS

liberty when all her brethren had succumbed to alienmasters : when they are free once more, her isolationwill have lost it significance, and if she clings to herparticularism, she will be holding her friends at arm

’slength instead of her foes . She will be cutting herselfo ff from the social and economic development uponwhich the South-Slavonic world will enter as soon asthe preliminary question of nationality has beensolved . When Bosnia gravitates towards Belgrade, themoment will have come for Montenegro likewise tomerge herself in a Greater Serbia .”

The South-Slavonic Union, then, will articulateitself into a Triune Kingdom of Croatia-SlavoniaDalmatia on the one hand and a Greater Serbiaon the other, with an autonomous Montenegro as apossible third partner .Its geographi cal frontiers 1 are determined already

by the boundaries of the several provinces . On theNorth-West it will inherit the former frontier betweenAustria and the Crown of St . Stephen,

” on the NorthEast it will be divided from Hungary by the line of theDrave 1 and the Danube, on the South—West it will takepossession of the Adriatic coast-line from Spizza toFiume .3

1 See Map 111.1 The triangu lar enclave between the Drave, the Mur, and the

S tyrian border is inhabited exclusively by Croats, and shou ld thereforeb e assigned to Croatia in addition , instead o f being included, as at

present, in the kingdom o f Hungary.1 The coast shou ld b e distributed between the m embers of the

Conf ederacy . A t present it is entirely m onopo lised by Dalmatia, b u t

th e Triune Kingdom ,

"as th e price Of its particu larism , shou ld cede

to S erbia and Montenegro such parts of the Dalm atian littoral as heS ou th-East o f the Narenta estuary, including Metkovitch and Ragusa,the term ini o f the Bosnian Railway, as well as the shores o f Cattarofjord, which is th e natural doo rway o f the Montenegrin Highlands .

The Triune Kingdom shou ld b e compensated in the oppositequarter by th e addition o f three islan ds—Veglia, Cherso , and Lessmat present included in the Kusten land provmce of Austria.

2 16 THE BALKANS

anarchy it superseded . He will regard the national ideawith suspicion, and the long-deferred but inevitablesolution of the agrarian problem will seem to confirmhis fears , by singlin g him out from the Christianpeasants and impoverishing him to their advantage .Yet the spread of education will break down even theBosn iak’s sullen tradition . As the consciousness of hisSlavonic language grows upo n him , the barrier of hisoriental religion will melt away . Nationalism willultimately heal the breach between the descendant of theB ogumils and the men of his own blood from whom hehas been alienated for eight centuries by religion .

C . A B alkan Zollverein

The secession of the Southern Slavs will dislocate thestructure of the Danubian Monarchy more seriouslythan any mutilations on its Carpathian border . TheHungarian member of the Dual Partnership will be cuto ff from the sea by an independent state of its owncalibre,1 occupying the whole region between theMorava-basin and the Austrian frontier . The Magyarswill find the tables turned upon them . They willexperience henceforth the geographical disabilities theyimposed upon Serbia heretofore . Deprived of a coastline o f their own, they will be compelled to make termswith one of their neighbo urs to secure access to a port .Satisfy this vital need they must, yet they will still

1 A reduced Hungary will still num ber nearly twelve m illioninhabitan ts : a S ou th-S lavonic Union will m uster som ewhat undernine, Viz .

A BALKAN ZOLLVEREIN 2 17

be free to choose between two alternative means ofdoing so . They may address themselves either toAustria or to the South-Slavonic Union, and the issuewill probably be taken up by the two political partieswhich have been struggling for the allegiance of theMagyar nation .

Tisza and his following will press for closer unionwith Austria . They will take advantage of the nationalanimus against the Slavs, which will have been embittered immeasurably by the result of the war, and

they will appeal to the national pride never to acknowledge defeat . Fate,

” they will say, has robbed usof our railway to Fiume, and of the harbour to whichwe have devoted so much money and labour, yet Fium e

is only sundered by the Istrian peninsula from theAustrian harbour of Trieste, and the one port is hardlymore remote from the A lfOld than the other . ThroughLaibach, Marburg, and Steinamanger Trieste can bebrought into direct railway communication with BudaPest . Why humiliate ourselves by begging favours ofthe enemy, when we can fall back upon the loyalty ofour Austrian partners , who have passed with us throughthe terrible ordeal of war Thus Tisza will arguefor the maintenance of the Dual System .

The secession of the Southern Slavs , however, willupset that economic balance on which Dualism depends .When either half of the Monarchy stretched from theCarpathians to the sea, Austria controlled Hungary

’saccess to her markets in Central Europe, and Hungaryin like measure controlled Austria’s access to her sourceof raw material in the South-East . Each was in aposition to inflict equal economic damage upon theother, and both would have been left losers by fiscalwarfare, while fiscal co-operation brought them mutual

2 18 THE BALKANS

gain . It was therefore in their common interest tocompromise on a joint tariff, wh ich gave each themonopoly of the other’s custom .

Under the new conditions, on the other hand, theoperation of the Dual System would place Hungary atAustria’s mercy . So long as the Southern Slavs onthe Austrian border were under the Magyar yoke,Austria was debarred by Magyar policy from openingup relations with them once they are independent, shewill be able to deal with them as principals , and thelong-delayed railway connections will at last be established between Salzburg and Vienna on the one hand,and Agram on the other .After this , Hungary

’s co-operation will no longer beindispensable to Austria. Austria will be able to turnHungary’s flank at any moment by putting her industryinto direct communication with the Balkan area inHungary’s rear along this new land-route South of theDrave . Hungary will be side-tracked as effectivelyby the completion of the Croatian railway system asSerbia would have been by Baron A eren thal’s abortiverailway schemes in the Sandjak .

This would give Austria a crushing tactical advantagein the decennial readjustment of the Joint Tariff. Bythreatening to abandon the existing partnersh ip, andto contract a new one with the Southern Slavs instead,she could force the Magyars to unconditional surrender .If the threat were carried into effect, Hungary wouldbe powerless to disturb Austria’s communications withthe South-East, while the Austrian tariff-wall woulddebar her from her sole remaining egress to the sea .Austria’s economic life would be unaffected, Hungary

’swould be completely paralysed .

Under these circumstances the equality of the two

220 THE BALKANS

bids us be loyal to the A ustrians,who at this very momen tare taking advantage of our difficulties to exploit usin cold blood . Why sentimentalise over a partnershipsolely recommended by opportunism, when loyaltyto it quenches the last glimmer of hope for our nationalfutureLet us Shake o ff our paralysis, and help ourselves .

The secession of the Southern Slavs has destroyed theequilibrium between Austria and our own country,but it has also cast the South Slavonic Conf ederationas an independent weight into the balance . Theequilibrium may still be righted, if we can incline thisweight to our side of the scales . Let us take theinitiative out of Austria’s hands by denouncing theAusgleich ourselves, and forestall her by securingthe partnership of the Southern Slavs for Hungary .

”

This hypothetical disputation between two politicalparties stands in effect for the contest between nationalfanaticism on the one hand and economic necessityon the other . Let us assume that a short experience ofDualism under the new conditions converts theMagyar nation 1 to the Independence poin t of view,

1 The S lovaks are the on ly importan t elem ent in Hungary that islikely to clin g to the Austrian connection . Their coun try is linked bynature with Pozsony, Buda-Pest, and the Alfo ld : their dialect isidentical with that o f the Tchechs in Austria. Geography and nation

ality thus draw them in opposite directions, and their one hOpe o f

reconciling the two factors lies in some form o f national devo lu tionWithin an u nbroken Danubian Unit." If Austria and Hungary part,the S lovaks m ust sacrifice one factor or the other. The Tchechs Wi llu rge them to vindicate their nationality by seceding from Hungaryto Austria . This wou ld benefit the Tchechs themselves by cancellingtheir num erical inferiority to theAustrian Germ ans and giving them the

prospect o f a majority in the Reichsrath at Vienna, b ut it is doubtfu lWhether the S lovaks wou ld b e influenced by this consideration . Theirbro therhood with the Tchechs extends to langu age alone they havenever shared a comm on tradition, and there are few indications at

present o f a comm on national consciousness. The S lovaks wil lprobably defer to geography, and work out a national life of their


and suppose that the Left supersedes Tisza in Ofliceto carry out its rival programme what response willits overtures receive from the Southern SlavsThe Southern Slavs will be torn between the sametwo motives as the Magyars themselves . Theirnational hatred of their neighbours is at least as strongas their neighbours ’ hatred of them with distantVienna they have always been on friendly terms . Whenthey find themselves in the proud position of beingwooed by Austria and Hungary in competition, prejudicewill certainly incline them to favour the Austrian suit .Their economic interest, on the other hand, will reallybe identical with the interest of Hungary.

At the first glance their new economic position mightappear invu lnerable : the territorial resettlement thatexcluded Hungary from the sea will have assigned tothe Southern Slavs an extensive Adriatic seaboard, andthe possession of open ports is a guarantee of economicindependence . Yet so long as the new Confederationstands alone, the settlement will not essentially haveimproved the nation’s continental situation .

Before the war Serbia was isolated from Centraland Western Europe by the whole bulk O f the DualMonarchy : after the settlement, the Austrian half Ofit will still present a narrower but no less impenetrablebarrier to the united South-Slavonic nation, and thegame will be in Austria’s hands more completely thanever. She may start by playing Off the Confederationagainst Hungary,but she will be free to reverse her

own within a regenerated Hungarian state. Prophecy, however, isim possible. The relation o f the Croats to the Serbs remained preciselyparal lel till as recently as 1912, and with this precedent before our eyeswe can on ly say that if the S lovals are inspired to identify themselveswith the Tchech nationality, they m ust b e granted perfect liberty tocarry their choice into effect.

222 THE BALKANS

tactics Whenever she pleases, and play off Hungaryagainst the Confederation . The Southern Slavs willdiscover, like the Magyars , that Austria is mistress ofthe in itiative, so long as they attempt to cope with hersingle-handed . By the time the Hungarian Independence Party makes its overtures, the Federal Government will be ready to welcome them . Experience willhave prepared both nations simultaneously to composetheir feud and adopt the alternative poli cy of co

operation .

If the negotiations are crowned with success, thegeographical structure of the Danubian Unitwill have proved itself a stronger force than nationalchauvinism . The political edifice of Dualism willhave collapsed under the tempest, yet the Transleithaniawh ich perished with the breaking of St . Stephen’sCrown will have reasserted its econom ic function ina Zollverein between two independent national states .The new Zollverein will prove in turn that the national

and the economic principles of articulation are notfundamentally in compatible . A reconciliation on thisbasis between the Magyars and the Southern SlavsWill win for both parties what they really want . TheSouthern Slavs will enjoy national unity, the Magyarseconomic freedom . The port of Fiume will become thecommon property of the two states, an d the railway thatlinks it with the A lfOld through Agram will be ad

ministered conjoin tly in the interests Of both .

The South-Slavonic Question has been the mostdifficult problem in the Balkans . If we have found itssolution

,can we not apply our discovery to solve the

rest The Transleithanian Zollverein will alreadycover a wider area towards the South-East than was

A BALKAN ZOLLVEREIN 22;

ever included in the frontiers of Hapsburg Transleithania cannot its limits be extended still furtherin the same directionThe friendships as well as the enmities of Serbia will

be inherited by the South-Slavonic Federation, andsince the Second Balkan War Serbia has maintained aclose understanding with Roumania and Greece . Thisentente has been inspired in part by the fear ofBulgarian reprisals, but chiefly by the discovery ofmutual economic interests of an enduring character .No better means of providing for these interests couldbe found than the incorporation of Serbia’s two friendsin the Zollverein .

(i.) Immediately after the settlement at Bukarest inthe autumn of 1913, Roumania began to negotiate withSerbia for the construction of a railway-bridge acrossthe Danube at Turnu Severin,1 which was to lin kthe railway systems of the two countries . Roumaniapossesses a coast-line of her own on the Black Sea, buttraffic through th is door is condemned to make thecircu itous passage of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles ,and may at any moment be brought to a completestandstill by the caprice of the Ottoman Government .The railway convention with Serbia was Roumania

’sfirst S tep towards an open port on the Adriatic, andin the present stru ggle between Serbia and the DualMonarchyRoumanian as well as South-Slavonic interestsare at stake . If Bosnia becomes Serbian soil and thepresent Serbian railhead at Ujitze is connected throughthe Bosnian system with a port on the Adriatic, the newroute will serve not only the basin of the Morava, butthe whole Wallachian plain beyond the bridge at Turn uSeverin .

1 SeeMap II I.

224 THE BALKANS

The freedom of this economic highway will be asimportant to Roumania as the freedom of the FiumeRailway is to Hungary, and it will be open to her tosecu re it by the same method . Roumania will almostcertainly apply for membersh ip in the Transleithanian

Zollverein, and the two original members will consulttheir best in terests by granting her request . Roumaniawill win her outlet on the Adriatic Hungary and theSouthern Slavs will gain in return free passage over theRoumanian railways to the port of Costanza on theBlack Sea .1

(ii .) By another railway convention the Bukarestsettlement linked Serbia to Greece .Before the Balkan Wars , Greece was practically in

the position of an island : for commun i cation with continental Europe she was as dependent upon the sea asGreat Britain and Ireland . By 1908 she had constructeda railway of standard European gauge from Athens asfar North as Larissa, and before 1912 she had extendedit through the pass of Tempe to the point where theGraeco -Turkish frontier struck the coast of the ZEgean .

The undertaking had involved great engineeringdifficulties and a proportionate expense, yet just whenthe arduous part of the task had been accomplished, andno physical barrier remained between the Greek railheadand the terminus of the European system at Salonika,the Ottoman Government cheated the Greek nation ofits object by refusing to allow the prolongation of theline through Turkish territory .

1 Hungary and S erbia already en joy free comm unication with the

Black S ea down the channel o f the Danube. By a series of Europeantreaties- 1856, 1871 , 1878, 1883

—the river was thrown open to freenavigation from its m outh as far upwards as the Iron Gates. S ea

going craft, however, cannot ascend above Braila, and th e greater parto f this international section is on ly available for barges and riversteamers.

226 THE BALKANS

Roumania in seeking economic partnership with theSouth-Slavonic state, and she negotiated a railwayagreement on very similar lines . She gave Serbia freeaccess to the E gean , and received in return the freedomof the continental route as far as the Austro-Hungarianfrontier . Like Roumania, she speculated on theeventual removal of the Austro-Hungarian barrierin the present struggle the Southern Slavs are fightingthe Greeks ’ battle as well as their own, and any policythat enables them to succeed in their endeavour mustcommend itself equally to Greece . If the SouthSlavonic federation can only cope with Austria byjoining Hungary in a Zollverein, then it is the interestof Greece to enter the Zollverein too . Her applicationwill not be refused, for she has as much to give as toreceive . The admission of Roumania will extend theZollverein to the Black Sea : the admission of Greecewill realise the Trend Eastward by bringing itdown to the lEgean .

This twofold increase in its membership will haveexpanded the Zollverein from its Transleithanian

nucleus to the opposite limits of the Balkans . Fournational units will already be included within itsboundary : will it succeed in federating the two thatremain If Albania and Bulgaria can be induced toenter the fold, the Zollverein will become co -extensivewith the whole Balkan area .

(iii .) Albania will not find it easy to stand out of acombination to which both Greece and the SouthSlavonic Federation belong . The country consists of astrip of coast fronting the heel of Italy across the narrowestpart of the Adriatic and backed by a zone of barrenmountains, through which several passages lead Eastward into Macedonia and descend eventually to the

A BALKAN ZOLLVEREIN 227

Northern littoral of the lEgean . This hinterland isencircled by Greek and South Slavonic territory on allsides .Albania has no history. The principality was created

by the flat of the Powers ; its limits were laid downby the conference of ambassadors that supervised themaking of the Treaty of London ; its frontiers weredrawn out in detail by an international boundarycommission . It was called into existence not becauseit had the will to exist as a national state, but simplyas an alternative to a vacuum that would inevitably havebeen filled by the encroachment of the Greek andSerbian frontiers . Its function is to hold the ring,while the native population develops from a barbarousaggregate of clans into a civilised nationality .

Meanwhile, Albania has started life destitute . Herpopulation is uneducated and her material wealthunexploited . Her only immediately available assetis her geographical position . She is mistress of twoports which have recently won notoriety in Europe .The direct transit from Brindisi 1 leads to the Southern

extremity of the Albanian coast . Here lies the mountain-locked basin of Avlona, which disputes with SpezziaBay the claim to be the finest harbour in the Mediter

ranean , but suffers more than Spezzia from the highmountains that hem it in on the landward side . Inspite of the limestone barriers, Avlona is likely tobecome the terminus of a narrow-gauge railway

,

1

which will work its way up the valleys of the Viosaand Dhrynos to Greek Yannina, and thence descend toArta and Agrinion, whence a line of narrow gauge runsalready to a point opposite Patras on the North coast of

1 Thecrossing occupiesmostof thenight in an ordinary mail-steamer.

1 SeeMap IV.

228 THE BALKANS

the Co rinthian Gulf This route will probably competewith the Salonika Railway for the express-trafficbetween Paris and Athens .Durazzo, the other port, lies half-way up the Albaniancoast-line . The transit from Italy is accordinglylonger, and the harbour itself is wretched beyonddescription . The town lies huddled under the Southernlee of a group of sand-dunes , which are linked to themainland by a malarial waste of marshes and lagoons .The deposit of the swamp has silted up the sea far outbeyond the actual shore-line, and the smallest steamercannot approach within half a mile of the jetty . Durazzohas nothin g to recommend it except its communicationswith the interior, which are as excellent as those ofAvlona are poor .Since the Roman period Durazzo has been the

terminus of a route 1 which ascends the valley of theSkum b i to Elbassan, penetrates by a pass to the valleyof the Black Drin, crosses the stream at Struga, whereit issues from the Lake of Ohrida, and then, afterskirting the lake shore and passing through Ohridaitself, breasts a second mountain range and descendsat last into the basin of Monastir .To compensate Serbia for the renunciation of terri

torial sovereignty over Durazzo, the Powers bestowedon her the freedom of the port, and gave her the rightto construct a railway through Albanian territoryin order to connect this outlet with her own railwaysystem . The route we have described will probablybe chosen for the final section of the new Serbian line .From Monastir a railway already leads South-Eastwardthrough Greek territory to Salonika : it will only be

1 S ee Map IV. The Romans improved the track into a metalledroad, their via Egnatia.

230 THE BALKANS

On the other hand, it infli cted considerable hardship upon the clans inhabitin g the mountainouscoun try immediately West of the Metoya, who hadbeen accustomed to deal with the outer world throughIpek, Jakova, and Prisren , the three towns of the plain,and now found them selves barred out from their onlyavailable market-places by the new Serbian frontier .The Zollverein will elimin ate the new injustice withoutrestorin g the old . The Serbo-Albanian frontier willremain where the commissioners drew it, but since itwill no longer constitute a customs-barrier the clansmenfrom the Albanian side will once more be able to visitthe towns in the Serbian plain land as freely as whenplain and mountain were yoked together politically byOttoman misrule .

(b) The mountains of Northern Albania verge ontheir other flank towards the Lake of Skodra,1 and halfthe clans descend to market at Skodra town, which liesat the lake ’s South-Eastern extremity . Geography hasdestin ed Skodra to be a focu s of traffic . The lakedischarges itself past her walls into the channel of theBoyana River,1 and for the small steamers that ply uponthe lake the Boyana is navigable from this point to thesea . The sea-going steamers employed in the coastaltrade find good ports of call at Dulcigno, a few milesNorth of the B oyana

’

s mouth, and at San Giovanni diMedua, a few miles South of it . Both these harbours

(if they may be dignified by the name) are connectedwith Skodra across level country by good high-roads .If all the Shores of the lake were Albanian, no problem

would arise , but unfortunately its North-Western1 Sku tari.A branch thrown ofl by the united stream of theWhiteand Black

Drin, after it has wound its way through th e Albanian mountains, andwon a clear passage to thesea. S eeMap IV.


extremity passes beyond the Albanian frontier, andpenetrates deep into the mountain-mass of Montenegro .

Physically, Montenegro and Northern Albania constitu te a single region, of which Skodra is the naturalcapital : historically, this homogeneous hinterland hasbeen partitioned between two hostile races, whichcan never merge themselves into one political organism .

An open door at Skodra is equally vital to Albania andto Montenegro, yet the town cannot be included in thepolitical frontiers of both at once .The rightful ownership of Skodra is not in doubt .

The Southern Slavs extend to the head of the lake, b u tan Albanian population dwells along its lower shores,and Skodra itself, at its opposite extremity, is a purelyAlbanian city. The struggle for Skodra is the historyo f Montenegrin encroachment upon alien territory.

The Montenegrins have been forced in this direction through the fault of Austria-Hungary, which hasdebarred them from their lawful outlet to the SouthSlavonic coast. Had the Montenegrins been at libertyto reach the sea through Cattaro fjord, by incorporatingthe kindred villages that fringe the waterside, theywould never have tried to reach it through Skodra bysubjugating an Albanian population almost as numerousas their own .

In 1878 the Congress of Berlin assigned toMontenegro the harbour of Antivari, beyond theextremity of the Austrian littoral. Antivari is not aconvenient port for the Black Mountain . A high rangeof hills blocks the way thither from the head of SkodraLake, yet the Montenegrins have striven with success toovercome this physical disadvantage by the constructionof a mountain-railway across the barrier? Au stria

1 It starts from Virpazar, on the lake-shore.

222 THE BALKANS

Hungary, however, grudged her South-Slavonic neighbour even this hard-won economic liberty. By acorollary to the Berlin Treaty she secured for herselfpowers of control 1 over the traffic of the new Montenegrin port, and to win an untrammeled outlet Montenegrowas forced to go still further afield . After the Berlinsettlement had produced a revulsion of feeling in GreatBritain, Gladstone succeeded Disraeli in office to undoas far as possible what Disraeli had done, and one o fhis first acts 1 was to extort the transference of Dulcignofrom Turkey to Montenegro .

Gladstone ’s gift was more b eneficent in its intentionthan in its result . The only practicable route betweenthe Montenegrin hinterland and Dulcigno lies throughSkodra. So long, therefore, as Skodra remained inother hands, Dulcigno was of no economic value to itsnew masters, while Skodra was deprived of its naturalport . In 1913 the Balkan War gave Montenegro theopportunity to annex Skodra as well, but when thefortress capitulated the Powers rightly intervened, andthe inclusion of Skodra in the new Albanian principalityput an end for ever to Montenegrin hopes .Skodra and Dulcigno can now never be reunited under

Montenegrin sovereignty the logical alternative istheir reunion Within Albania. Baulked of Skodra,Montenegro will lose nothing by the retrocession ofSkodra

’

s port, and her whole title to Dulcigno will fallto the ground as soon as Cattaro fjord and the Austrianlittoral on either side of it have passed into her possession .

Yet no amount of compensation on the opposite flankwill induce Montenegro to yield territory to A lbaniaWithout some equivalent return on Albania

’

s part .

1 Waived by Baron A erenthal in 1909 as part compensation for theannexation of Bosnia.

11880 .

234 THE BALKANS

the geographical point of view, Epirus and Greece areinseparable .The Powers took their stand upo n nationality .

The country,” they argued, may be Greek, but the

people are Albanian . They speak an Albanian dialect .”

This argument betrays a misconception of whatnationality means . Nationality is not an objectiveattribute but a state of consciousness which depends forits stimulus upon a certain degree of civilisation . We

have seen that among the majority of the populationincluded within the principality

’s frontiers it is conspicuously absent : they have no group consciousnessbeyond the clan . The Epirots alone are civilised enoughto possess it, and their civilisation and nationality areboth drawn from the same external source .The significant fact about the Epirot is n o t that he

speaks Albanian at home, but that he learns Greek atschool,1 and finds in his adopted language a passportto a wider life . The Epiro ts are the only Albanianswho can boast a history, and their history consists inthe castin g off of Albanian barbarism and the puttingon of European culture in its Greek form . After theTurkish conquest the majority of the Albanians wereconverted to Islam : the Epirots alone followed theexample of their Greek neighbours, and remained loyalto the Orthodox Church . In the eighteenth centurythe Orthodox ecclesiastical tradition developed into anational Greek renaissance the Epiro ts were fired bythe new movement, and welcomed the Greek schoolthat grew up beside the Greek church . They lookedforward as eagerly as the Greek of Macedonia or

1 The village schoo ls in Epirus havem ostly been endowed by nativeswho m ade th eir fortunes in Greek comm erc1al centres like Sm yrna andAlexandria.


Mitylini to the day when nationality should findexpression in political liberation and unification . WhenYannina fell in the spring of 1913 , the clay seemed tohave dawned . The Powers thrust them into the outerdarkness of the Albanian principality just when theywere on the threshold of the promised land .

The Epirots have not submitted tamely to the ruin oftheir hopes . The Powers could prevent their annexation to Greece, but they could not compel their adhesionto Albania . In the summer of 1913 they raised anational militia, and have successfully resisted all

attempts on the part of the Albanian Government toassert its sovereignty. If Albania is to secure thefriendship of Greece, she must abandon a claim wh ichshe cannot enforce . The Epirots have proved thatcommon language is in th is case no national bond, bytaking up arms for the right to merge themselves in anation of other speech .

When she has solved the frontier problems of theMetoya, Dulcigno , and Epirus, Albania will be freeto face the task of internal construction . The newgovernment will here find the exercise of its authorityhampered by the very lack of that national consciousnessthe presence of which in Epirus has made it altogetherimpossible . Its writ will run where the Ottomansultan’s ran, in the ports and the plains, but ifit is wise it will follow the Ottoman policy of leavingthe mountains to themselves . To the clansman it willmake no difference that the government is nationalhe will still view its action simply as a menace to theliberty of the clan, and he will feel no greater obligationto pay taxes to an Albanian exchequer at Durazzothan to a Pasha who collected them at the same konakfor transmission to Constantinople . The Albanian

236 THE BALKANS

revenues will depend not upon the contributions of theAlbanian population but upon the customs levied onthe trade of Avlona and Durazzo that trade in turn willdepend upon the admission of the principality to theBalkan Zollverein .

(iv.) The Zollverein will not be complete until it hassecured the adhesion of Bulgaria .Since the Balkan Wars the Bulgarian territory has

extended to the [Egean as well as to the Black Sea,1

and the Bulgarian frontier thus blocks every land-routefrom the remainder of the Balkan area to the Black SeaStraits and to the Anatolian contin ent that lies beyond?The Zollverein would suffer grave inj ury from Bulgaria

’seconomic hostility, and in her present mood Bulgariais prepared to inflict as much injury upon her neighboursas she can .

The latest liberated of all the Balkan nations , shedevoted herself with fierce singleness of purpo se to therealisation of her national destiny. In the Balkan Warsshe staked all to win all, and issued the loser . Forher misfortune she has chiefly herself to blame . Byher murderous attack upon the Serbian outposts shedeliberately provoked the disastrous struggle with herallies, and her tactless diplomacy was responsible forthe intervention of Roumania . Yet the victors sacrificedthe righteousness of their cause to a most unrighteousexploitation of their victory? In the division of spoilsat Bukarest they stripped Bulgaria naked, and unless

1 S eeMap IV.

1 The m ost important o f th ese rou tes is the Orien tal Rai lway,which strikes Eastward ou t o f the Morava valley at Nish, enters

Bu lgarian territory just beyond Pirot, and passes throu gh Sofia, Philippopo lis, an d Adrian ople to S tam bou l . Th e line is continued on the

opposite side o f the Bosphorus by the Anato lian Railway, which startsfrom S tam bou l's Asiatic suburbs.

1 Bulgaria is the Germany o f the Balkans the Treaty o f Bukarest isa warning to theAllies.

238 THE BALKANS

dominantly Greek and the hinterland predominantlyBulgar, but there are large areas where the two nationaliti es are inextricably intermingled, village alternatingwith village in the same valley.

It is impossible to draw a politi cal frontier in strictaccord with the racial distribution . If Bulgaria claim edevery Bulgar village, it would not be feasible to siftout the Greek enclaves , and the whole debatable zonedown to the coast-line itself would be drawn withinthe Bulgarian frontier : on the other hand, if Greeceasserted her title to every patch of Gr eek population,she would have to incorporate not only the whole coastbut extensive portions of the Bulgar hin terland .

It is clear that the problem can only be solved by acompromise, and durin g the negotiations which wereinterrupted by the Second Balkan War, Venezelos, theGreek premier, worked for the partition of the zone in totwo sections .The Eastward or Thracian section was to be cc

extensive with the lower basin of the River Maritza :here he proposed to resign the coast as well as thehinterland to Bulgaria . The Westward or Macedoniansection was to include the lower courses of the Vardarand of the Struma, and here he claimed for Greece asufi cient hin terland to cover the coast.When the negotiations were superseded by war, and

victory put the initiative entirely into Venezelos’ hands,

he interpreted his principle in the sense most favourableto Greece, and extended his Western section asfar as the River Mesta?From the racial point of view the settlement was stilla compromise . If Venezelos annexed to Greece theBulgar hinterland West of the Mesta, he honourably

1 SeeMap IV.


abandoned to Bulgaria the Greek littoral between theMesta and the Maritza. The Bulgars demand a modification of the present frontier on economic and not onn ational grounds . The natural route from Sofia, theircapital, to the sea follows the valley of the Strumadown to the port of Kavala, a short distance East Of itsmouth . The Treaty of Bukarest left the greater partof this route in Bulgaria’s hands, but barred her outf rom its terminus . Bulgaria repudiates reconciliationwith Greece till this economic wrong is righted Greecerefuses to satisfy Bulgaria at the cost of territorial cessionswhich would violate VeneZelos

’ racial settlement.Bulgaria’s entrance into the Zollverein is thus the

only means of composing the quarrel, for it will satisfyBulgaria’s economic need without necessitating thechange of political frontier . Kavala, like Salonika,will remain under Greek government, but Bulgariawill be as free to make commercial use of it as Serbia isf ree to trade through Salonika .In this instance the benefits of the Zollverein accrue

to Bulgaria, and by refusing to enter it on this accountshe will be inflicting more harm on herself than on herneighbours .

(c) Bulgaria’s differences with Roumania and Greece

have proved to be not irremediable her last and mostserious difference is with Serbia, and this time the partsare reversed . Bulgaria claims territory on nationalgrounds Serbia refuses to cede it for economic reasons .The Vardar rises on South-Slavonic soil, and Uskub,at the junction of its head-waters, is as truly a Serbcity as Nish or Belgrade . Below Uskub, however, thewhole basin of the river is occupied by a Bulgar popu lation which extends as far Westward as the Albanianfrontier . The nationality of this population is not in

240 THE BALKANS

doubt : it is as Bulgar in sympathy as in dialect,

1

and it regards the Serbian regime as a foreign domination . Serbia gave witness against herself in the treatyshe concluded with Bulgaria in the summer of 1912

before their joint declaration of war against Turkey .

She admitted Bulgaria’s exclusive right to the regionSouth of Uskub, and even left the allotment of Uskubitself to the arbitration of the Tsar .By extendin g her sovereignty down the Vardar fromUskub to Y evyeli, Serbia committed a crime againstthe principle of nationality which can only be atonedby the retrocession of the whole territory in questionto Bulgaria? Before the outbreak of the present warsuch a suggestion would have been Utopian : withoutcompensation, Serbia would never have consented todisgorge the greater part of the spoils for which she hadfought two desperate campaigns . If Bosnia falls toher at the impending settlement, and her strength isfurther in creased by the incorporation of the TriuneKingdom in a South-Slavonic Federation, she will bein a position to do full justice to Bulgaria on her Macedomian frontier without being crippled by the territorialloss . Should she still persist in her refusal, she would

1 There is no truth in the S erbian contention that the S lavomc

dialect spoken in Central Macedonia is a variety o f South-S lavonicin the narrower sense. It is not even an intermediate link betweenS outh-S lavonic and Bu lgar . The two langu ages are sharplydifferen tiated from one another, and there can be no am bigu ity in theclassification of the Macedonian patois under one head or the oth er.

Lin guistically, the Macedonian S lavs are as unmistakable Bu lgars as

the S lavs of S ofia or Plevna, and the Bu lgarian propaganda of the lasttwenty years has roused in them a keen sense o f national brotherhoodth the speakers of their tonguewho livebeyond theBu lgarian frontier.

1 The m oral obligation contracted by her treaty in th e S ummer o f

1912 was cancelled by Bu lgaria’5 treacherous attack in the S umm er o f

1913 . On the other hand, if she secures her national unity as a resu ltof th e present war, her obligation to respect the principle o f nationalityin Bu lgaria’s case Wi ll b e proportionately increased .

242 THE BALKANS

Vilayets of Kossovo and Monastir in an Easterlydirection, till it strikes the River Vardar at a pointbelow the junction of the Peinya tributary but above thetown of Veles? After crossing the Vardar, it mightrun along the river-bank up

-stream, and continue itscourse up the Left bank of the Peinya to a point dueEast of Uskub . Here it might turn Eastward once moreand mount the watershed between the Peinya andB regalnitza valleys till it reaches the summ it of MountOsigova on the present Serbo-Bulgarian frontier .This line would leave to the South-Slavonic Federa

tion both Uskub itself and the railways that connectUskub with Mitrovitza, Nish, and the Egri PalankaPass to Bulgaria it would assign Ohrida,1 the basin ofMonastir, the middle course of the Vardar, and all thecountry between the Vardar and the Struma .

1

We have now discussed the economic federation ofthe six Balkan units Hungary and the Southern Slavs,Roumania and Greece, Albania and Bulgaria . Wecan abstract our conclusion in the followin g formulaThe political deadlock between national aspirations

in the Balkan area is due to economic individualismeconomic collectivism is the necessary condition ofnational self-realisation .

”

1 Better known under its Turkish nam easKopru lu bridge-place1 The capital o f the Bu lgarian Em pire in the eleventh century A .D.

1 To begin with, Bu lgaria Wi ll depend for railway communicationwith her new territory upon the S erbian line through Uskub and the

Greek line through S alonika b ut She will certain ly fo llow up her

incorporation in the Zo llverein and the rectification of her frontier bythe construction of two new railways(i.) From Kostendi l down th e valley o f th e S truma to S erres, whichwill give her a connection along the Greek rai lway system throughDrama to Kavala.

(ii.) From Kostendi l to Kod jana in the B regalnitza valley, over a

pass South o f Moun t Osigova, and thence through Ish tip, Veles, andPrilep to Monastir. This Wi ll give her an independent connection withherMacedon ian territories.


In the environment of a Zollverein Hungary andthe Southern Slavs, the Southern Slavs and Bulgaria,Bulgaria and Greece, Albania and Montenegro allalike can compose their respective feuds and arrive ata mutually satisfactory territorial reconstruction on anational basis . The Zollverein seems to be the instrument that will eradicate the seeds of war from theBalkans, so far as those seeds are sown by the Balkannationalities themselves .Our discussion, however, has also shown us that the

Balkan peoples are only responsible in a secondarydegree . They have erred in leaving their field unfencedtheir stronger neighbours are the enemy that hasscattered the tares .If we recall the outstanding factors that militate

against Balkan peace, we Shall find the root of them allin the machinations of the Great Powers . If Serbiahas fallen ou t with Bulgaria and Montenegro withAlbania, it is because Austria-Hungary excluded bothSerbia and Montenegro from the Adriatic . If Albaniais at enmity with Greece, it is because Italian diplomacyrobbed Greece of Epirus . If Roumania and Bulgariaare in dispute over the Dob rudja, it is because Russiain 1878 swindled Roumania out of her coast-line Northof the Danube . If A lbania is still likely to be convulsedwithin, When she has settled her differences with hertwo neighbours , it is because Austro-Hungarian pro

paganda has incited the Catholic clansmen to makethe task of the Moslem government impossible . By thebuilding-up of a Zollverein these standing tares maybe pulled out by the roots : how can we hinder theirreplacement by others more devastating stillThe Balkan area has been a menace to peace because

it has been a no-man ’s land , an arena flung open to the

244 THE BALKANS

strong nations of Europe, to tempt them to turn asidefrom the strait and narrow way of social advance andtear each other in pieces for the proprietorsh ip of awilderness .Once Germany has been what the Balkans are now .

In the seventeenth century she was dismembered bythe Thirty Years ’ War,

”and in the eighteenth

century the Powers fought over her carcase, as they h avebeen fighting over the Balkans during the century thathas just expired : Sweden drew the sword to holdPomerania, France to seize the Left bank of the Rhin e .Bismarck did one good service to peace . By raisingGermany from the dead and making her the peer of thePowers instead of their prey, he closed the Germanarena to the conflicts of Europe .

No Bismarck will arise to weld together the BalkanS tates and enrol them in the front rank of the comb atants that possibility need cost us neither hope norfear . In spiration will come not from Central Europe,the shadow from which the Balkans are being deliveredby the present war, but from America, the land ofpromise to which Balkan immigrants are finding theirway in ever increasing numbers .On the American continent during the last century

the Latin Republics have lived through their Balkanphase without disturbing the peace of the world atlarge, because the United States have held the ringand have prevented the big dogs outside from takingpart in the little dogs’ scuffle . The Balkan situationin Europe calls even more urgently for a MonroeDoctrine,

”and if it is to be directed impartially against

all the European Powers, its sanction must proceedf rom the Balkan peoples themselves .In co -operative movements it is the first step that

246 TRIESTE A ND ITALY

CHAPTER V

TRIESTE A ND ITALY

WE are now in a position to solve the problem raised atth e close of our chapter on Germany. We had concluded that if Germany were beaten by the Allies in thepresent war, she would have to relinquish her subjectprovinces of alien population, French, Danish, andPolish and we had argued that it would be in the bestinterests both of Germany herself and of her presentopponents if this loss were compensated by the gain ofGerman Austria .”

We admitted, however, that this solution of theGerman question, convenient though it might be to usall, depended upon the wishes neither of Germany norof Europe, but solely upon the initiative of the Austriansthemselves and we saw that we could only conjecturethe Austrian point of View by making clear to ourselvesthe internal situation of the Dual Monarchy. Oursurvey showed that the Austrian Germans would neveramalgamate with the German national state unless theHapsburg Empire had previously been laid in ruins , butthat in that event no other alternative would be left them ,

since they were incapable of standing alone .We then proceeded to discuss the Hapsburg Empire’sstrength and weakn ess . We found that the SouthernSlav question was the determining factor in its fateif the Southern Slavs won their national unity outside,and in despite of, the Dual Monarchy, the Monarchywould inevitably be shattered in the process but thev ery victory of the Allies, which would make the in

TRIESTE A ND ITALY 247

corporation of the German Austrians in the GermanEmpire desirable from the general point of view, wouldincidentally dissolve the Dual Monarchy by solving theSouthern Slav question on just these lines, and wouldthereby indirectly cause the special interest of GermanAustria itself to coincide with the universal interest ofEurope .If, then, our forecast comes true, and the present

Austro-Hungarian organism is superseded in SouthEastern Europe by a Balkan Zollverein or Entente,built up in harmony with Nationality instead of indefiance of it, we may fairly confidently assume that theNew Germany which will simultaneously come intobeing will include within its frontiers the Germans ofAustria .We have now to defin e what territories and popu la

tions this New Austrian member of the NewGermany will include . Large portions of the presentHapsburg dominions have already been eliminated fromconsideration . We have prophesied that all Galiciabeyond the Carpathians will gravitate, under somestatus or other, to the Russian Empire and all Transleithania,

” both the territories of the Crown of St .Stephen, and the outlying Austrian province Of

Dalmatia, enter the vortex of the Balkans . Thereremains only the section of the Austrian Crown-Landssituated to the West of Hungary’s Western frontier.Will the whole of this region rally to Germany en

bloc It is hardly conceivable that it should do so ,for there are several most important non-Germanelements still entangled in it . The German populationin Austria, like the Magyar population East of it inHungary, ceases on the North bank of the Drave, andSlavonic speech reigns South of the river as far as the

248 TRIESTE AND ITALY

sea ; bu t the situation is not so simple here as inCroatia . The Croats , we saw, have been atrociouslytreated by the Magyars, and, moreover, they are onlyone fragment of a larger homogeneous population, theSouthern Slavs, with whose other sections they canfederate as soon as they have thrown off the Magyaryoke . The Austrian Slovenes are an isolated littlebranch of the Slavonic family, speaking a dialect distinctly different from Southern Slav? They have beenwell treated by their German masters ; and, what ismore importan t still, they have no independent tradition or civi lisation of their own . Laibach, the chieftown of Krain ,1 has a thoroughly German character, andGottschee, in the extreme South of the country, is agenuine enclave of German population .

If Krain were a unit by itself, it would probablyvote for continued union with the Germans across theDrave, with whom po litics have knit the district forfive centuries . But unfortunately Krain is inseparablylinked by geography with the province of the Kiisten

land, and the Slovene population, neglecting theartificial boundary between the two administrativedistricts , spreads evenly to the sea . This coast, however, h as had a very different history from its hinterland . Here, too, the Slovene has adopted civilisationsecond-hand; but it has come to him from the oppositequarter, and the ports have taken a completely Italiancolour . Trieste, in deed, was an early acquisition of theHapsburgs,1 but the Western half of Istria belonged toVenice till the extinction of her independence in 1797,

and did not pass definitively to Austria till 1814. More1 They numbered at th e census of 1900.

The S lavonic for March," Italianised as Carnio la. See M ap

1

.

It has belonged to them since 1382 A .D.

2 50 TRIESTE A ND ITALY

becoming a world-po rt, Trieste has vastly increased hersize, like other European cities, by drawin g in to herselfthe rural population from a wide zone of attraction .

Modern urban concentration takes no account ofmedieval race-divisions, and the nucleus of ItalianTriestini has been alloyed with a mass Of Sloveneimmigrants who have come to stay. Encouraged bythe Austrian government, the new Slovene element hasbeen struggling for some years with the Italian to sharethe control of the municipality and seems likely to makegood its claim at any rate Trieste is no longer a purelyItalian city?This brings us to the negative conclusion that theSlovene Unit ” must not be incorporated politicallyeith er in Italy or in the new Germany. Laibach andGottschee would veto Italian annexation, Parenzo andAbbazia Germ

an , the Slovenes Who are making themselves a power in Trieste would veto both . It remainsthat it should either enter the Southern Slav UnitedStates or become an in dependent political un itguaranteed by Europe .The latter alternative is undesirable . Tin y states inoccupation of importan t and in tensely-coveted economicassets are not likely to possess th e resources for administering these assets on the increasin gly large scaleto which modern life is tending, or for defending themagainst the aggression of bigger organisms that thinkthey could use the opportunity better . But it would bestill worse to force a political destiny upon a population ofthis size against its will . It is probable, however, that

1 The total popu lation o f Trieste is including abou tItaliansS lovenesGermans

TRIESTE AND ITALY 251

the general sense of the various elements, as expressedin the plebiscite, will reveal itself in favour of federatingthe unit with the Southern Slavs as a third member oftheir Union . Guaran teed independence would hardlyrelieve the Italian and German minorities from thealternative fear of being engulfed respectively in the

German and Italian national state and such a possib ility would be far more repugnant to them than theprospect of loose co -Operation, more or less on theirown terms, with a Slavonic nationality. The Slovenemajority has recently been roused to active consciousness by that wave of national enthusiasm which theSerbian victories over Turkey and Bulgaria sent vib rating through the Southern Slavs . While a few yearsago it would have followed in the Italians ’ or theGerm ans ’ wake, it Will now take an initiative of its own .

Nevertheless, where wishes are divergent, the negativeproposition often wins, and if the plebiscite decides forseparatism, there is no more to be said about the politicalquestion .

The economic issue is quite independent of thepolitical and far more clear. We saw that the DualMonarchy, in its present shape as a political structure,was a negation of natural grouping imposed upon morethan half its total population by force ; and that tosafeguard the peace of Europe we must allow the imprisoned elements to burst their artificial bands asunder,and fundamentally reconstitute themselves on thenational basis . But we noted first of all that it had acogent raison d’etre as an economic organisation . Theraw production of the South-East, the manufacture ofthe North-West, and the sea traffic up the Adriaticcoast, are complementary to each other ; and ourpolitical reorganisation, so far from dislocating this

252 TRIESTE A ND ITALY

economi c relation, will actually emphasise it on agrander scale . Austria-Hungary as a political groupwill perhaps have disappeared ; but the economic interplay between its sections will thereby extend itself tothe whole Balkan Zollverein on the one hand, and tothe Whole rehabilitated German Empire on the other,and the port of Trieste will still remain the node ofthis larger rhythm .

Trieste has a great future before her, and it is veryimportant for the prosperity of Europe to keep uh

broken all her economic lin ks . Whatever its politicaldisposition, the state of Slovenia must remain anopen market where the new Germany and the BalkanZollverein can meet, that is, it must have free tradewith both at once . But there is no econom ic connectionbetween Trieste and Italy. Italian manufactures aredevelopin g along the Northern rim of the Po basin wherethey can avail themselves of Alpine water power ; butthe port of Lombardy is Genoa on the Riviera coast .Italian industry faces South-West, and belongs to aneconomic sphere in which the centre of gravity vergestowards the Mediterranean, and not towards theAdriati c .This is perhaps the strongest reason of all for not put

ting Trieste into Italy’s hands . Even if the exclusionof the Slovene territory from the Italian tariff-wall wereguaranteed as a condition of its incorporation withinher political frontier, she could hardly fail to use herpolitical control to deflect Triestine trade in her ownin terest. To abandon her claim to Trieste will be agrievous disappointment to her ; but she will receivecompensation in other directions .

(i.) Though She must throw no covetous glance uponCanton Ticino , which is Swiss in soul, yet further East


leave the Eastern coast of this sea in less formidablehands .At least two of the Austrian naval bases, Seben icoand Cattaro, will fall to the inheritance of the SouthernSlav Union, which will have neither the interest nor theresources to initiate a policy of naval adventure . Theheadquarters of the Austrian navy are at the fortress ofPola, the key of the whole Northern Adriatic, whichjuts out into the sea on the tip of Istria, and menaces alarge stretch of Italian coast includin g Venice on theone hand and Ancona on the other. Pola is destinedto form part of the Slovene unit, and if the latter inclinesto a gu aranteed autonomy, the natural corollary to thegran t of such a status would be the razing of all fortifications within the guaranteed area . But even shouldSlovenia elect to throw in her lot with the SouthernSlavs, Italy would still be quite justified in insistingupon the dismantling of P012 as the condition of herconsent to the loss of Trieste, while the other partiesto the conference could not deny her such a logicalcompensation .

While Pola controls the bottom of the Adriatic bottle ,its neck is potentially dominated by the bay of Avlona 1

in Albania, whose future we have already sketched asa part of transit and a railway terminus . Under theTurkish regime its strategical possibilities were neverexploited, but in the hands of an efficient naval power itcould be converted into a position strong enough toseal up the Adriatic, and it is obvious that it wouldthreaten Italy’s vital interests if such a strategical assetpassed into the possession of any other nation thanherself.The fall of Yannina in the Spring of 1913, during the

1 See Map IV.

TRIESTE A ND ITALY 255

course of the Balkan War, brought Greek armies intothe neighbourhood . The Greek government politiclyrefrained from proceeding to the occupation of Avlonaitself, but Italy

’s susceptibility with regard to the fateof the town was so extreme that, as we have seen, shecreated an international complication by insisting uponthe inclusion of Epirus, a district of Greek nationality,in the new principality of Albania, in order to interpose abroad zone of territory between Avlona and the newGreek frontier . Events have already shown that theartificial severance of Epirus from Greece cannot bemaintained against the will of both but since Avlonalies beyond the Epiro t border, and her Moslem Albanianpopulation will under no circumstances incorporateitself in the Greek national state, there is no reason whyany step the Epiro ts may take with regard to their owndestiny should involve the permanent presence of Italyat Avlona,1 a state of things that would virtually reduceAlbania to an Italian province, and would hopelesslycomprom ise the Monroe doctrine which we form u

lated for the whole Balkan region as one of the necessarysafeguards of European peace . Italy’s interests can becompletely satisfied by another alternative, the perpetualneutralisation of Avlona, under a guarantee, similar tothat we have proposed in the case of Pola, containingthe following provisions

(a) Avlona shall always remain part of Albania .

(b) It shall never be fortified, either by Albaniaherself or by any larger political group with a unifiedmilitary organisation, of which Albania may at any timehereafter become a member .

1 In November 1914 Italy virtually occupied Avlona itself, andformally announced her occupation of Saseno, theisland that commandsthe entrance to the B ay.


The general eff ect, then, of these various proposalswill be to leave Italy the control of the Adriatic by thedisarmament of its whole Eastern coast. Sympathiserswith Italy will probably declare that this is after all anegative gain, and hint that a great power like Italycannot in the te-settlement of Europe be treated in socavalier a fashion . To this we would reply that we havetaken our lead from Italy’s own policy . Her decisiveadoption of neutrality at the beginning of the presentwar proved that she herself realised what was alreadypatent from the facts, that she had no vital interests atstake on the European continent .If the ultimate reunion of Trieste had been to her not

merely a cherished object of national sentiment, but anecessity of life, she could not have abstained fromintervention now. In reality, if she were to yield tosentiment and insist on the assignment to her of Triesteby the conference that will meet after the war, she woulddeliberately be involving herself in intimate relationswith Central and South-Eastern Europe : every phasein the policy of the great German and Balkan groupswould th enceforth seriously aff ect her, and she mightfinally bring down upon her head the combined forceof the two groups in a concerted eff ort to oust her againfrom the possession of a port which, though of noeconomic interest to herself, would be the centre in whichtheir own respective interests met and coincided.

The relief from naval competition in the Adriati cwould, on the contrary, be a very positive advantage toher . Instead of the prom issory notes of continentalambitions

,it would yield her the immediate gain of

m i llions of lire struck o ff from her annual budget fornaval construction, and enable her at once to reduceher naval estimates and yet spare greater force than

2 58 TRIESTE A ND ITALY

tory on the one hand nor through Italian on the other,and there are two existin g lines of railway along whichsuch communication can be effected

(i.) The Sudb ahn from Vienna, that skirts theEastern flank of the Alps, passes trough the heart ofKrain at Laibach, and proceeds thence to Trieste, whichit thus links to an industrial hinterland towards theNorth-East in Bohem ia and Moravia .

(ii .) The Tauern Railway, only opened in 1909, whichhas yielded Trieste a new hinterland in SouthernGermany by giving her a direct Northward connectionthrough the Alps themselves .This line, in its Southern section, skirts the presentItalian frontier, keeping just outside Italian territory.

Starting from Trieste, it runs to GOrz on the Eastbank of the Isonzo, crosses the river, follows upits West bank to the junction of the Idria stream,

and then penetrates by a tunnel into the upper valleyof the Save, crosses this river too, and next pierces theKarawanken mountains by another tunnel, to emergeon the Drave at Villach . Hence the Tauern tunnel,the biggest engineering feat on the line, carries itthrough the main chain of the Alps into the Danubelowlands, which it enters at Salzburg . It is clear thatthis railway sets a limit to the advance of Italy’s Easternfrontier against Slovenia . All that we can give Italy hereis a tiny strip of territory on the West bank of the Isonzobelow GOrz, Where the population is Italian in nationality, and which possesses a sentimental importance ascontaining the little towns of Aquileia and Grado, withtheir beautiful cathedrals and their splendid ecclesiasticalmemories so closely bound up with Italian history.

The North-Western extension of Slovenia in turn islimited by the trunk line from Vienna to Italy, which

TRIESTE AND ITALY 259

passes by Leoben up the valley of the Mur, crosses intothe Drave valley at Villach, and proceeds thence intothe Tagliamento basin at Tarvis . It is equally clearthat this line must run entirely through Austrian andItalian territory, and pass outside Slovenia altogether.This further suggests the limits of Slovenia on theNorth . The Slovene population overflows the watershed between Save and Drave, and occupies the wholeSouthern bank of the latter river along its upper course,even passing beyond it in places ; but the Northernbank is predom inantly German, the towns, such asKlagenfurt and Marburg, being completely German incharacter, and the whole valley forms an indivisiblegeographical unity, which is linked by its railway connections with the German mass towards the Northrather than with the Slovene mass towards the South .

Slovenia must therefore abandon her frontiersmen inthe Drave valley to Austria, and accept the Southernwatershed of that river as her Northern limit.We are now in a position to designate the wholefrontier between Slovenia and Austria. It should startfrom the present Italian frontier at Mount Kanin (thusleaving the railway junction of Tarvis within Austrianterritory as before) , and follow the Southern boundaryof Karinthia along the Karawanken mountains till itreaches the point where the Karinthian boundary turnsNorth . Here it should part from the latter, and continue the Easterly direction of the Karawanken range

,

cutting through Styria till it reaches the Bacher mountains on a line that leaves Windischgratz and St.Leonhard to Austria . Thence it should turn SouthEast, run along the watershed between the Sann andDrann systems over the Cilli-Marburg railway tunnelto theWotschemountains, and then follow their summittill it hits the frontier of Croatia.


This is a rough attempt to sift Slovene from Germanalong a line corresponding with geographical strueture, and it will succeed approximately in shakingGerman Austria free from her Slavonic accretions onthe Southern side . But the Austria that is left, thoughnow a compact geographical unit, has a last and mostbitter national problem buried in her heart she has stillto settle her relations with the Tchechs. f

to Mun ich

-tc Ml la

0 B o lo gna

PROPOS EDFRONT I ERSn PR I NC IPAL RA ILWAY S EX I STI NG FRONTI ER S

ITA L IANSTO B E AB ANDONED

LATI NS

THE TRENITNO.

262 TCHECH AND GERMAN

Western Christendom . In the fourteenth century itsruler, Charles of Luxembourg, attained the (by this timeshadowy) dign ity of Holy Roman Emperor, and hisSlavonic capital Prag became for a generation thepoliti cal focus of Central Europe.The cosmopolitan un iversity of Prag, founded in 1348

and organised in four nations, which was Charles’

most endurin g legacy to the country, linked it stillcloser to the great world, and wandering stu dents fromEngland sowed seeds of Wyclif’s ideas from whichspran g two leaders of European importan ce, John Hussand Jerome of Prag, the fore-runners of the Reformation . They were both burnt at the Council of Constanzin 1415, but their followers took up arms for the rightsof the Laity again st the Clergy, and repelled the crusadesof all Catholic Europe .In this democratic uprisin g, half a universal religious

movement, half a local revolt of the peasan t again st hislord, the Tchech nation found itself and defied theworld . But the glory of the Hussites was brief. Theywere ruined, not by the power of the Roman Church,but by the bittern ess of their own internal factions . In1436 the moderate Utraquists crushed the fanaticalTaborites,

” who were the really vital element in themovement, and proceeded to make a concordat withRome, in which they abandoned their actually achievedreligious independence in return for a formal acknowledgment of the Laity’s right to communicate in bothkinds, the empty claim enshrined in the party

’

s title .The star of Huss had set before Luther’s sun rose in

the seventeenth century, while the Dutch were asserting their national independence against th e Hapsburgdyn asty, the Tchechs fell under its autocratic rule, andhave never extricated themselves sin ce ; but tradition

TCHECH AND GERMAN 263

lived on, and fed the flame of nationalism, which thenineteenth century kindled in the Tchechs as in all otherEuropean populations, to a white heat.No settlement of Austria is worth considering that

does not satisfy the Tchechs’ aspirations, but theirclaims are likely to be extravagant. At first they willprobably demand the erection of the two provinces,Bohemia andMoravia, where theyfo rm the preponderantelement of the rural population, and the substratumof the urban masses, into a completely independentnational state . It would be a close parallel to this claimif the Irish Nationalists proposed the complete separation of the whole island from the British Empire andthe absolute supremacy in the new state of the Catholicpopulation ; except that to the Tchechs

’ programmethe objections are graver still .

(i.) In whole districts along the borders there is a solidGerman population, and a German element has established itself permanently in most of the towns, especiallyin the more accessible province of Moravia? In thestreets of Prag, riots between Tchech and German mobsoften lead to bloodshed ; and the present war, in whichthe Austrian government has forced the Tchech conscripts to fight against their Slavonic brethren, theRussians, and shot them down when th ey hesitated toobey, will have immeasurably embittered the racehatred . This German minority cannot be abandonedto Tchech nationalism, enjoying power for the firsttime, and schooled, as a victim, in Austrian methods ofusing it.

Tchechs. Germans.

(71

Total pop. of bothw


(ii .) Bohemia and Moravia are great manufacturingand min ing districts , depending for their prosperity ongood comm unication with markets? If they separatethemselves politi cally from the New German y, they putit in her power to build a tariff wall against them whichwill cut them O ff from the outer world . The in terior ofthe Bohemian bastion is drained by the upper system ofthe Elbe, and its trade is tending more and more to flowdown with the river to Ham burg through the gorgewhere it breaks the Erz-gebirge while the arteries ofMoravia focus at Vienn a, where the Austrian trunk linestarts for Trieste . In both directions exit and entrancecan only be made through German territory.

(iii .) The Tchechs possess a third door to the East,of which Germany does not own the threshold, theMoravian gap that leads to Poland . But none of theirtrade passes in that direction to the vast Russian marketsthat lie beyond, because these are already monopolisedby the important Polish manufacturing districts thatintervene, and the Polish Black Country and the Russiancorn-lands form a closed economic system of their own .

On the old political s cale, then, Geography decreed1 These two provinces are in fact the centre of gravity o f Austrian

industry, far outdistancing both Lower Austria and S tyria in theirmining activity and their textile manufactures, While the provincesS outh-West of Vienna, the strongho lds of pure German nationality,lie astride th e Eastern section o f the Alps, and are handicappedeconomically by their geographical character. A comparative table ofpopu lations (taken from the census o f 1900) wil l make this clearGermano-Tchech Provinces. Pure German Provinces.

Bohemia Lower AustriaMoraviaS ilesia

Tyro l (including theItaliansof theTrentino)


Guarantees to a weaker partn er that outsiders Willuphold his in terests are a poor alternative to a capacityfor upholdin g them himself, and they gall the strongerpartn er, whose free action they limit and whose honestythey put in doubt. They are an occasion for bickerings,and we had better do without them if we can . Aguaran tee can perhaps be avoided in this case by lettingthe whole of Austria, within the limits to which wehave reduced her, enter the German Empire as a singleunit,1 on condition that she gran ts Home Rule withinthis district to the whole Tchech nationality. TheTch echs, possessin g more than a third 1 of the totalpopulation and equipped with national self-government,would easily hold their own within the Austrian state,and the whole Austrian unit, representing proportionately the interests of all its components, would hold itsown in turn within the German Empire .By such an arrangement the Tchech nationalitywould assert itself through co-operation with theGerman neighbour, and not by making war on him,

and two further advantages will appear when theformula is worked out in practice .

(i.) The existing political machinery will suffer theminimum amount of disturbance . In the Crown-landsParliament which at present sits at Vienna, representatives elected by manhood suffrage from populationsSpeakin g half a dozen diff erent languages, have made

1 To which North Germany,” for compactness’ sake, might cedethe fragm ent of S ilesia, which our proposed Po lish frontier wou ld leaveher beyond the Right bank of th eHo tzenplé tz stream .

1 Reckoning by provinces on the basis of the last census (1900) thetotal popu lation o f our Reduced Austria " will b e about sixteenm illions ; while in the sam e year there were Tchechs and

Germans in the who le Austrian Crown-lands, all of whomwill remain , according to the present scheme, Within th e Austrianunit, though practically all popu lations of other nationality will havebeen detached from it.

TCHECH A ND GERMAN 267

the effort to do legislative work together, and in spite ofscenes that the tension of the racial atmosphere almostexcu ses, have begun to acquire the constitutional habit.It would be a pity if Germans and Tchechs (the othernationalities will have simplified the situation bydropping out) should deprive themselves of this fieldfor collaboration and mutual understanding?

(ii .) The pattern for Tchech Home Rule alreadyexists in the Constitution of the Austrian Crown-lands,under which the several provinces, besides beingrepresented in the Vienna parliament, enjoy a modicumof local self-government under diets of their own?This system, and the present British government

’s billfor Home Rule in Catholic Ireland, would be goodprecedents for the scope of the new Tchech parliamentto be established at Prag . As in Ireland, the chiefdifficulty will lie in settling, not the powers to bedelegated, but the geographical limits within whichthey are to be operative and this problem brings outthe most decisive advantage of the scheme for Home

1 The fo llowing table shows the respective strengths of the differentnationalities within the Austrian Crown-lands, according to the censusof 1900, and the number of seats assigned respectively to each nationality in the parliament at Vienna by the electoral law which introducedManhood Suffrage in 1906.

Total 516

The representation o f certain nationalities is thus still very farfrom being proportional to their real numbers.

1 Galicia has secured m ore complete Home Ru le than any otherprovince.

Representation.

233= I

108= r=

34=r

371“: I 3 512459


Rule within Austria as against separate membershipin the German Empire .In the latter case just as much as if she became a

completely independent state, Bohem ia-Moravia wouldhave to be organised as a compact geographical unit,so that the German minority in the country would inboth cases be forced to take its government from Prag,and would need an external guarantee again st theTchechs of just the same kind as the Tchechs themselves would be requiring against the whole Germannation . But in the event of Home Rule within a unitedAustria, the total population, Tchech and Germanalike, would be represented in the Vienna parliamentalready the plebiscite to ascertain what sections wishedto avail themselves, in addition, of the proffered devolution, could be taken parish by parish ; and the areathe Tchech Nationalist administration should controlfrom Prag could be determined to a nicety by itsresult?We can, in fact, state the general principle that the

less absolute the sovereignty, that is, the power ofuncontrolled, irresponsible action, deman ded by any

1 The materials for drawing out the m ap of the Tchech Home Rulearea are already to hand, in the electoral districts constituted in 1906for theAustrian Central Parliament. S om e districts are purely Tchechin population and return only Tchech depu ties : these wou ld certainlychoose Home Ru le. Others contain a mixed popu lation of Tchechsand Germans, and are organised in two constitu encies of identical localextent b ut different nationality, each provided with its own register ofvoters and returning its own national candidate to parliament : thefate of these would be decided by whichever nationality was in the

majority. TheTchech constituency, if its register contained m ore votersthan the German constituency for the same area, wou ld outvote thelatter in favour of devo lution for the area in question, whi le the Germanconstituency in theoppositecasewou ld retain th earea for centralisationb ut o f course every racial constituency, those which fell Within theHome Ru le area and those which rem ained outside it alike, wou ldcontinue to send representatives to the general parliam ent at Viennaon the same excellent system as before.


tion of Germany, within its present limits, has risen inthe interval since 1905 to an increase ofper cent.: if we add this percentage to our total for

the United Germany,1 we shall find that the popu lation of the new German Empire within the proposedfrontiers would amount at the present moment to noless than souls, distrib uted into the followinggroups

(a) North Germany (Of whom 1 wou ldform erly have belonged to thepresent kingdom of Prussia.)

(13) South Germany 1

(7) Austria (Including about Germans and Tchechs.)

76.798.ooo

If, at the Conference which will meet at the end of thiswar to attempt, like the Vienna Congress a century ago,the lasting settlement of Europe, we could succeed inreconstituting the German Empire on some such lines

1 The rate o f increase am ong the added Austrian popu lation iscertainly lower than the averagewithin the present limits of Germany ;bu t on the other hand theGerman censuswas on ly taken in 1905, whi lethe census on which our figures for Austria are based was taken fiveyears earlier.

1pop . of Prussia less"total of S chleswigersin 1905 and Poles in 1905

10x

1305

1 BavariaWurtem bergBadenHessen (the Southern

.

block on ly)

Other territories detached.

fromPrussia Oneither side of Frankfurt

Total (by census of 1905)

TCHECH A ND GERMAN 27t

as these, we should have accomplished most of theobjects with which we started this discussion, and

avoided most of the dangers which we saw ahead of us .We should have relaid the foundations of Nationality

in Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig and Poland, wherePru ssian policy has deliberately broken them up , andwe should have restored the superstructure of Europeanpeace endangered thereby for many years and nowfinally shattered yet by honourably applying theprinciple of Nationality to Germany’s advantage as wellas to her detriment, we should have left her with aconsiderably larger territory and population than shepossessed before this war. This just aggrandisementwould primarily benefit Germany herself, but ultimately it would further the best interests of all Europe,because it would be more likely than any other measureto produce that change in German public opinion whichis the only possible keystone of peace in the future .If Prussian militarism be refuted by the issue of this

war, the German nation will assuredly be alienated fromthe Prussian system for ever, unless either or both oftwo consequences follow : either the humiliation of thenational honour, or such a rearrangement of frontiersas would leave Germany at the mercy of her neighbours

,

and reduce her to a state of permanent fear.Were the Conference to create such a situation as this,

the German nation would be thrown into the arms ofPrussian ism, and would serve its unsympathetic idealswith greater enthusiasm than it has ever yet lavishedupon them . But if the settlement takes the line of ourproposals , both these consequences will be avoided .

The German Empire will emerge more majestic andless vulnerable than before . The element that is notPru ssian, but is Germany

’s true soul, will regain free


play, take the lead in the nation’s life which it held till

Bismarck wrested it away, and swamp Prussianism not

merely by the greater vitality of its ideas, but even bythe weight of superior numbers .We can readily discern the policy which the NewGermany will follow. Her first task will be the re

building o f that magnificent commerce and industrywhich it took forty-three years to conjure up, and oneseason’s campaign to spirit away again . She will havea bitter moment when she gazes at its ruins, but heremotion will be regret and not despair. Our settlementOffers her once more the promise of a great economicfuture . Hamburg, Danzig and Trieste will be securedto her as open doors for her commerce, and mutualinterests will bring her to an understanding with theBalkan Zollverein, more stable and of wider efl

'

ect thanthe present precarious customs-union between the twohalves of the Dual Monarchy. This labou r of goodhope will occupy the New Germany’s best energies formany years to come .

274 PA NSLA VISM

Spain, Portugal) have expanded over the less civilisedparts of the Earth, and have divided between them boththe regions producing the best tropical raw materials,and the temperate regions ou tside Europe best suited toEuropean colonisation .

(b) Two of them, France and England, have becomeGreat Powers by leading the way in the IndustrialRevolution which has transformed the environment ofhuman civilisation ; and they are now with all theirenergies and with increasing success adapting themselvesto these new conditions .

(V In Central Europe, on the other hand, owin g to aless favourable start in civilisation and to subsequentmisfortunes, Nationality did not assert itself till 1866

1870, and then only by a comprom ise with StrongGovernment typified in the policy of Bismarck. Thishas caused several serious flaws in development here ascontrasted with the West

(a) Only two nationalities, the German and theMagyar, have here attained self-government, and theyhave been using it ever since (following StrongGovernment tradition) , to maim and stunt the development of weaker nationalities behindhand in the race :Frenchmen of Lorrain e and Alsatians, Dan es ofSch leswig, Poles, Tchechs, Italian Trentini, andSouthern Slavs .

(b) They have also entered with vigour the postnationalist phase of expan sion and Industrialism, buthere they have been handicapped by comin g late in therace themselves, as compared with the Western powers,who have already inherited the Earth .

”

(c) Germany is bitterly conscious that she has notfound for herself a place in the Sun ,

” but in orderto win it she has not concentrated all her efforts upon

PA NSLA VISM 275

economic and social construction, though this is thenormal activity of the present phase of Europeancivilisation . During the last forty-three years she hasdisplayed amazing ability in this direction, and alreadywon for herself a very large niche at the expense of herrivals in the field, and to their advantage as well, forthe whole world in the industrial phase profits by thesuccess of any one member of it . Nevertheless, she haschosen to foster her Militarism, the obsolete weaponof Strong Go vernment, which Bismarck partiallyadapted to the solution of the national problem, butwhich is entirely unadaptable to the conquest ofindustrial supremacy.

(VI .) The present war is Germany’s attempt to hack

her way through the Western nations to the bestplace in the Sun, by military force . The best commentary on her action are the results she hopes toachieve by it .

(a) She hopes to an nex Belgium, and possibly to forceHolland in to a disadvantageous Zollverein, in order thatshe may have more convenient ports for her industrialdistricts in Westphalia and the Rhineland and so tobreak the power of France that she may cease to bean independent factor in European politics. If shesucceeds in this, she will have reduced the West to achaos of robbery under arms such as it has notknown since the Hundred Years’ War and the careerof Charles the Bold, and have swept away the work offour centuries, not merely the national self-govemment inaugurated by the English and French revo lutions, but even the prelimin ary national consolidationaccomplished by Louis XI. and Henry VII.

(b) She threatens to seize the transmarine possessionsof all the Western nations alike, great powers and small,

276 PA NSLA VISM

belligeran ts and neutrals . The attitude of Portugaland Spain shows what they fear . This would destroythe whole vigorous colonial development of the nin eteenth century, which only began after the result of theNapoleonic wars had defin itively settled the own ershipof these territories .

(VI I .) We may fairly conclude that in this piraticalattack Germany stands for reaction to a crude idealthat European Civilisation has consciously transcended,while the Western powers that are defending themselvesagain st her represent the new activities by whichEuropean Civilisation is opening a better chapter . Inthis struggle, therefore, it is the World

’s vital interestthat Germany should fail .

We have reached these propositions through a surveyof the facts, starting for fairness

’ sake with the fact thatis at once the most importan t of all and the most diflicult for us to appreciate justly : Germany’s attitudetowards her own ambitions . But we found that toutcomprendre, c

’est tout pardonner peut-etre, mais cc

n ’est point tout permettre and we made up our mindsthat we must refute German force by force, in order thatwe may brin g it into our power to reorganise the politi calstructure of Central Europe on the basis of the West,instead of su ffering the West to succumb to the levelof the centre . We have therefore approached the taskof reconstruction on a national basis, and painfullystriven to right the injustices the German system hasperpetuated from Alsace-Lorraine to the Westernfrontier of Poland and from Schleswig to Macedonia .But we have also recognised that this recasting ofEurope, based though it be on the living will of popu lations, has no virtue in itself, and that it is merely the

278 PA NSLA VISM

be realised at the expense of the Western nations,although that is the real issue at stake . The consciousidea that spurs them is substan tially identical with theconviction that governs our own minds . They feelthemselves to be the champions of European civilisation,whose cause Great Britain has basely betrayed,

”

against the many-headed hydra of Panslavism , whomenvy has moved Great Britain to aid .

” For themRussia is the prin cipal and we are merely her secondsGerman defeat spells the abasement of civilised Europebeneath the barbarous Russian idea .The whole poli cy of Prussianism, which we haveweighed and found wan ting, transform s itself to Germaneyes under this light? If Germany is attacking theWestern nations, it is because they have sold theirbirthright, and the champion of civilisation must exactfrom them the power and wealth they have prostitutedto make it bear fruit again in civilisation ’s cause . IfMagyardom persecutes the Slovaks, and the Ministryof Foreign Affairs at Vienna ruthlessly repressesSouthern Slav nationality, it is because these are newheads of the hydra reared suddenly from an unexpectedquarter, and must be crushed before the vaster fangsof Russia have time to fasten upon the German worldfrom the other flank

‘

. If German policy maintain s thescandalou s misgovernment of the Turkish Empire overlarge alien populations, it is not simply in order to coaxa market for German enterprise, but to close the Russianmonster’s Southern sally-port . We can understandGermany’s fram e of mind most easily from this lastinstance, for if we had not kept the same disgracefu l

1 This, o f course, explains why the ofi cial justification of their actionpublished by the German government after the catastrophe had

happened, bea rs the title HowRussia made theWar."

PA NSLA VISM 279

guard over Turkey all through the nineteenth century,Germany wou ld not have been able to relieve us of itin the twentieth .

The arguments with which we defended our conductthen read like first drafts of the German arguments nowRussia’s expansion threatens our position in India,where our rule stands for civilisation and progress andwhere Russian conquest would bring darkness andreaction . The most vulnerable point in our position isour line of communications through the Mediterranean,which is at present screened from Russia by Turkey.

It will be laid bare to her if Turkey collapses . We musttherefore bolster up the integrity of Turkey,

’ andif the Berlin Treaty brings a generation more ofm isery to the Balkans, only to be terminated by abloody war, that does not weigh in the balance againstthe harvest of civilisation that the respite, perhapspermanent, will have enabled India to reap .

”

We pass our verdict on this argument in the shamewith which we recall it. The lacquer of idealism,

deposited upon it by a school of Victorian statesmenwith such good faith, has worn away, and we can seethe base metal of unenlightened self-seeking beneath .

Our own error in the past will help us both to excuseand to correct the strongest and most conscious elementin Germany’s feeling at the present .We must come to grips with Panslavism . Germany’sfear of it is a psychological fact . In her belief She hasbeen driven by deadly peril to put her whole fortuneto the touch . In the light of our own attitude towardsRussia, which we began to abandon less than a dozenyears ago, this creates a presumption that some realfulcrum exists to sustain such an immense spiritu alleverage, and if Germany

’s presentment of the Russian

280 PA NSLA VISM

national character is tru e, all our labours will have beenof no avail. England and Fran ce may be dis

in terested, and Germany may come to believe it ;but it is no use bringin g Nationality into its own inCentral Europe, and preserving it in the West, if Westand Centre alike are thereby delivered over to be theprey of Russian militaristic ambitions as bad as, or worsethan, those we are now combattin g in Germany.

If the A llies win this war, Russia will probably have amore decisive voice than any of us in the Europeansettlement that must follow. It is our imperative task,th erefore, to analyse those forces immanent in theRussian Empire, which may so greatly modify therealisation of our own in tentions, and the remainder ofthis book will be devoted to diff erent aspects of thesame question . In Eastern as in Central Europe, wewill approach our problem from the standpoint ofNationali ty.

282 THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

persistently endeavouring to blot out from the ro ll ofnations the noblest member of the Slavonic brotherhood .

It is irrelevan t that we Germans have aided and abettedher Polish policy. We are not now concerned to disprove our own guilt, but only to demonstrate thatRussia’s is at least as great as ours . The history ofRussia’s past relations with Poland does not augur wellfo i the sin ceri ty of her new homage to the NationalIdea . Woe to any nationality in Europe which refusesto subordinate its destiny to the destiny of Russia, ifRussia emerges omnipotent from this war .”

This formidable retort off ers us a definite field forour disputation . In our second chapter we saw thatGermany’s action during the present war is transforming the feelin g between Russian and Pole with almostmiraculous completeness, so th at, when the re-settlement of Europe is made, the Polish nation will almostcertain ly be prepared to accept its restoration as a giftfrom the Tsar, and try to realise its aspirations as anautonomous member of the Russian Empire . Butsuch a compact demands good faith from both parties,and the autonomy of Poland will indeed put Russia’sto the test. It may be a piece of Utopianism, and theGrand Duke’s manifesto S imply the vow extorted fromthe sinner by the menace of God’s thunderbolt : in thatcase the suppression of Poland on the morrow of thesettlement might well herald the successive ruin ofthe other European nations : or Russia may reallyabide by her word, and respect Poland

’s new-foundliberty .

The latter event would serve as an imm ediateguarantee of Russia’s good intentions towards thenationalities less closely involved with her and situatedaltogether outside her political and economic frontiers

THE RISORGIMENTO OF POLAND 283

but it would also have a momentous effect upon theinternal structure of the Russian Empire itself. Theleaven of Liberalism would not confin e itself to Poland .

It would steadily penetrate the whole lump, andproduce a Russia that might lead the van of Europeancivilisation, in stead of straggling in its rear .We must discover, then, whether Polish and RussianNationalism are indeed capable of reconciliation. Wewill begin by attempting to acquaint ourselves with thePolish point of View.

The history of Polish Nationality really begins withthe partition 1 of the old Polish Empire during thelast generation of the eighteenth century by the threevulture powers, Russia, Prussia and Austria, which hadestablished themselves on its flan ks .Their work was not so gross a crime as it is often

pain ted . Vultures devour carrion, never living creatures ; and the disappearance of the Polish state wasthe old story, a long-accepted commonplace furtherWest, of efficient strong government imposing lawand order by force upon a society in chaos .The Empire yoked together diverse nationalities andnational fragments . Its nucleus was the union of twoCatholic populations, the Poles on the Vistula and theLithuanians North-East of them, between the Niemenand the Dam . They were linked first in 1386 by theacceptance of a common dynasty, and were sub se

quently fused into a single constitutional kingdom bythe Act of Lublin in 1569. From that date the strongmonarchy gradually degenerated into an inept oligarchicrepublic . The Polo-Lithuanian noble caste wasparalysed by family feuds , and more inclined, when its

1 In three stages 1772, 1793 , 1795 .

284 THE RUSSIAN EMP IRE

members met in diet mounted and armed, to relieve itsfeelings in bloodshed than to carry on the business ofgovernment.If the Polish nobility had reduced merely their own

country to anarchy, it would have been bad enough ;but they were visiting their in competence upon largealien popu lations as well, and the eighteenth-centuryPartitions, while they opened the Polish nationalquestion, closed once and for all several others of longstanding .

(i.) In the fourteenth century, after the Mongolinvasion had shattered Russia into fragments, Polandand Lithuania incorporated by conquest vast districtsstretching South-Eastward in to the Cossack steppestowards the B lack Sea . The population of all thisregion was Russian by language, creed and tradition .

It included the White Russians, who lay North of thePripet marshes, and were hardly distinguishable fromthe Muscovites in dialect, and the Ruthenes or LittleRussians, extending South and South-East of them fromthe Carpathian mountains to Kieff half-way down thecourse of the Dn iepr. The eighteenth-century partitions reunited these peoples with the national Russianstate, except for a Westerly fragment of the Ruthenesin Galicia, which fell to Austria in 1772 . We shall findlater on that the relation between the Russian Empireand these branches of the Russian race still requiresadjustment, but their transfer from Poland to theMuscovite state at least advanced the problem manystages nearer solution .

(ii .) Besides these Russian-speaking regions, whichbecame a more or less integral part Of the Russiannational organism, the Russian Empire had incorporated by 1795 the whole Lithuanian nation . No


to Austria . The Poles drank the cup of nationalhumiliation to the dregs .The nationalist movement to which the Partition gave

birth had hardly time to gather force before the deliverercam e from France . Napoleon overthrew Austria and

Prussia in succession,1 and imposed on them, in theterritorial re-settlement that followed, the cession of alltheir Polish acquisitions except the first of 1772 . Hereconstituted the territory disgorged into the GrandDuchy of Warsaw.

” The reversal of fortune wascomplete . Not only was the whole Polish population,with insignificant exceptions, rescued from the foreignyoke, but for the first time it experienced the benefits ofself -government. To Hein e, the lonely Jew spurnedby 2 Germany with a still un softened medieval heart,the French armies came as the bringers of good tidin gsto the individual soul . In Polan d, which had seen nativearistocratic anarchy succeeded by alien bureaucraticrepression, the principles of the French Revolutionbecame the gospel of a whole nation . The advancedpolitical system of Western Europe, suddenly introduced and applied for seven years with the in tenseenergy of the Napoleonic spirit, left a tradition in the

nation which never died out, and which differentiatedthem from th eir neighbours on all sides, on whom theFrench had impressed other memories .With Napoleon ’s fall the flood of misfortun e did notreturn upon the Poles at once . We have seen how theCongress of Vienna shore away the province of Posen,to give victorious Prussia a strategic frontier, and metRussia ’s claims by erecting the remainder of the Duchyinto a constitutional kingdom of Polan d under the

1 A t Austerlitz in 1805 and Jena in 1806 . Austria did not forfeit hershareof thespoils till after thesecondwar of 1809.

THE RISORGIMENTO OF ROLA ND 287

Russian Imperial crown , with the exception of Cracow,

which was cut off and permitted to be a free city onits own account, to satisfy the strategic susceptibilitiesof Austria . For fif teen years the diminished nationretained its liberal constitution and even its Frenchorganised native army, but its position between thethree vulture powers, risen again from the dust withbeaks and talons sharper than ever, was too precariousto survive the first spasms of that birth of nationalismin Central Europe, which the shock of the Napoleonicwars inevitably precipitated . The July Revolution of1830 in France stirred Poland to an ill-considered re

volt in the following year, which gave Absolutism itsopportunity. The constitution was abolished, and thecountry organ ised in Russian military governorships,while in 1846 the Austrians marched into Cracow.

The desperate revolution that broke out again in 1863was suppressed by the cool co-operation of the threeinterested powers . It had come too late . The crisis ofItaly’s risorgimento was already overpassed ; in PrussiaBismarckianism was on the poin t of triumph . Withthe strangling of this last convulsion, the life of thePolish nation seemed to be extinguished for ever.But the nineteenth century saw a more important eventthan the ups and downs of national aspirations—thespread over Europe of that Industrial Revolution whichtakes no account of the political ordinances of men .

Poland ’s rich mineral deposits turn ed her into a stronghold o f the new economic regime, and during theblackest years of political persecution her population hasgrown steadily in numbers and wealth . There are nowat least eighteen million Poles in the world within theshelter of the Imperial tariff-wall, the manufactures ofthe Russian districts have a preference in the vast rural

K


market that stretches East of them in to Asia ; whi lePolish unskilled labour has supplanted the nativeGerman in Westphalia, permeated to Odessa on theBlack Sea, and foun d its way in increasing volume tothe United States .Thus the majority of the Polish nation under Russianrule has actually benefited economically by its subjection,and economics have gone far towards settling thepoliti cal destinies of the whole reunited Poland, forwhose creation we now hope . Even her eighteenmillions 1 cannot stand by th emselves, with no coastline and no physical frontiers ? She must go intopartnership with one of her larger neighbours .The Carpathian barrier shuts her out from the Balkan

Zollverein . The course of the Vistula and the freenavigation down it to Danzig that we have stipulatedfor her, point to union with Germany but the bulk ofPoland ’

5 exports do not flow down this natural route tothe Baltic. Her real commercial links are with thegreat Russian continent. If Ga li cia becomes Russiansoil up to the Carpathians, the trunk railway conn ectin gWarsaw with the Black Sea will pass through Lem b u rgto Odessa without encounterin g either poli tical frontieror customs ’ barrier, and Poland will turn her face SouthEastwards once more, but this time in co -operationwith Russia, and not in rivalry with her as during theMiddle Ages .Mutual economic interests, then, favour the idea of1 According to

‘

the last censu ses of the respective Empires, there arePo les in Russia, in Austria, and over in

Prussia. This gives a total of b ut there has been no

census in RuSS ia since 1897, and in 1907 th e Russian Po les wereunofficially estimated at

1 Except for a short section o f the Carpathians, the bou ndaries of thePo lish nation are demarcations of the Baltic plain as arbitrarily drawnas the ou tlines o f the prairie states in theU .S .A .


harmony between Man and his changed economicenvironment, and this effort cannot be guided to successby an alien strong government imposed from without

,

but only by a national democracy of the Workersevolved from within .

If, then, the new Poland is to be a healthy organism,

she will require the maximum measure of Home Ruleand the minimum of external control consistent withmembership of a wider political group . The localautonomy of Galicia, the most liberally- treated provinceof Austria, will fix a level which the Russian government’s concessions will have to surpass . We haveseen that if Russia is in a position at the end of the warto reunite the Polish nation, the Galician fragment willbe irresistibly attracted by the possibility ; but it willalso be full of apprehension at exchan gin g the certaintyof Austrian toleration for a dubious reception into theb osom Of Russia, and probably it will refuse to commititself without a guarantee from all the parties to theEuropean settlement that the autonomy of th e wholenation within the new state Shall be at least as far reaching as that whi ch this favoured section already enjoys .The Russian Government would certain ly chafe at

such a proposal, and deny the right of other nations tointervene in Russia’s internal politics . If the proposalconcerned merely the Poles already included withinthe Russian Empire, this protest would have weight ;but it would actually arise as the corollary to a largeextension of the Russian frontier, made possible by thejoint action of the Allied Powers, and Russia mustadmit the authority of France and Great Britain toassert their point of view in the settlement of questionsraised by the war in the East, unless she is willing toresign all share herself in the settlement of the West.

THE RISORGIMENTO OF POLAND 291

With out derogating from the dignity of Russia, theWestern Powers might well define a certain measureof Home Rule as the indispensable condition for there-union of the Austrian and Prussian fragments to themain body of Poland within the common frontier of theRussian Empire . They could not, of course, bringmore than moral pressure to bear upon Russia eitherto admit or to endorse the guarantee ; but if Russiawithheld her pledge, the Galician plebiscite would giveher a rude shock by declaring itself for federation withthe Balkan Zollverein or with the New Germany, and,deprived of the support of her friends , she would findherself compelled to yield subsequently with a bad gracewhat she might have granted beforehand as a bounty.

The federal relation, then, between Poland andRussia should be as secure as material in terests and

treaty-stipulations can make it ; but we have still todefine the geographical limits of the future autonomousstate against the main body of the Russian Empire .It goes without saying that the Poles must abandon thememory of their past dominion . The New Polandmust include no districts but those of Polish nationalityand, since the line to be drawn will simply be anadministrative boundary, not a tariff wall or a strategicfrontier, it can follow with some accuracy the convo lutions of the linguistic border. Determined on thisprinciple, it will exclude from Poland not merely a stripof the present Vistula-governments of Russia, butalso the major part of Galicia inhabited by a LittleRussian population . At the moment when they areregain ing their own liberty, the Poles cannot grudgeneighbour nationalities the same boon .

The course of the new boundary should be more orless as follows


Startin g 1 from the South-East corner of the EastPrussian frontier, just West of the point Where theLyck-B ialysto ck Railway crosses it, it Should run SouthEast to the North bank of the River Narew, hi ttin g itnear the junction of the Augustowo Canal, that links theVistula and Niemen systems . Hence it should followthe river’s course upwards to a point due South ofBialystock. Here it should leave the river and takea S .S .W. direction, excluding Bielsk towards the East,till it reaches the Bug . Crossing the latter river aboutfifty miles below Brest, it should contin ue in the samedirection till it hits the Wieprz, and Should then followup the course of this stream in turn towards theas far as its most Easterly bend, thus including Lublinbut excludin g Cholm . After leavin g the Wieprz, theline shou ld run due South, excluding Zamosz, till ithits the present Austro-Russian frontier, whence itshould bend So uth-West, till it meets the River Sanat its great angle from East to North-West, betweenYaroslav and Przemysl . Thence it should follow thecourse of the San upwards, thus assigning Yaroslavto Poland, but excludin g Przemysl, which lies on theriver’s Right bank, till it reaches the other great bendfrom North to East between Przemysl and Sanok . Atthis point it should leave th e San, excluding Sanok,run due South-West till it strikes the Hungarian frontieralong th e summit of the Carpathians, and proceed tofollow the mountains Westward, till it reaches th e pointon the summit of the range, just East of the RatiborSillein Railway, which we took as the starting-place forour western frontier?

1 S eeMap I I .1 Th e boundary which we have just sketched between Au tonom ous

Po land and th e main body o f the Russian Em pire practically coincideswith theEastern border o f th e territory continuously inhabited by Po les


understanding to grasp a liberal policy. If she weremerely uns crupulous, she wou ld begin to act righteouslyas soon as it paid her to do so but she is stupid as well,and from the combination of these two vices no goodcan sprin g .

This criti cism compels us to abandon the fieldof Russia ’s objective interests, and to reopen ourdiscussion on the more fundamental plane of hersubjective character ; for unless we can vindicate that,the New Poland we have so elaborately built up willprove a house of cards, and may carry the other nationsof Europe with it when it collapses in ru in

B . TheNational Evolution of Russia

Germany’s reproach to England for havin g join edforces with Russia against her, is couched in terms likethese You have decided to fight us because youhate and fear our Militarism . You believe we aspireto World Empire and mean to take your inheritan cefrom you by force and naturally you imagine, as everynation must, that your own downfall would be a setbackto civilisation . We will not be at the pains to arguewith you, but we point out that, if you succeed incrushing us with Russia’s aid, you are laying up a worsefate both for yourselves and for the world . Russia, onthe most favourable interpretation, is only made of thesame stufi as ourselves , but in an inferior quality and ofa coarser grain . Her ambitions and her methods offorwarding them reflect our own , and our strength is theonly bar to their realisation . The Cossack will rideover our corpses to the conquest of the world , andwhen you see him enter Copenhagen and Stamboul and

THE NATIONAL EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA 295

Koweit, you will regret the annihilation of Germanculture ."

We could dismiss Germany’s Panslav bogy witha smile, if it had not found a response in this coun try,but After Germany, Russia is a phrase that alreadycomes too glibly upon people ’s lips . Is the supremeobjective of Peace, for which we are sacrificing everything now, illusorys

‘ And does the lifting of one warcloud merely draw a heavier one above the horizon fIf the soul of Russia is like the soul of modern Germany,with the evil heightened and the good expunged, thereseem s no issue for the World . Germany has challengedthe comparison, and we will take her at her word andtest it .If we compare the governments of the two empires ,

the German contention is clearly right. The purposesand methods of the Russian and German bureaucraciesare roughly the same but whereas the German government is efficient and, on the whole, has public opinionbehind it, the Russian is out of touch with the nation,obscuran tist and ineffective . Judging, th en, by thefunctioning of the administrative machine, Germanyis far superior to Russia, and it may be argued thatadmin istrative efficiency is an adequate criterion of com

parative civilisation, because it presupposes that facultyof orderliness and looking-ahead, which we emphasisedat the beginning as civilisation's essence .This argument would be valid if the government

and the governed could be equated but even in thedemocratically-o rganised states of Western Europe thetwo factors do not coincide, and in the Cen tre and

East they do not approximate to one another. On theone side stands the German Government, exploiting allthe national accuracy and forethought born of civilisa


tion to brin g about its own specialised, and , as we judgeit, uncivilised end of world-conquest, just as a trustexploits security of property and rapidity of comm unica

tions to gnaw the wealth of the community in which itshelters . On the other side the great German nation,renouncing its ideals and surrendering that very essenceof civ ilisation, the power of free choice and of lookingahead with one ’s own eyes, has indentured itself to theservice of the Government’s bad cause . The successof the German Government in its present po licy has b eenan indictm ent of the German Nation in the presentphase of its character. You need employ no violenceagainst a willing accomplice, nor conduct an obscurantistcampaign again st a demoralised intelligenz ia which hasthe lie already in its soul .We have seen that Germany’s h istory has reversed the

normal order of European evolution . Prussian ism is inthe ascendant : it is the dominant, in spirin g force ofthe nation ’s growth, an d any success Germ any mayachieve under its banner will impress the iron mouldmore deeply upon her soul . The Prussian militaristicbureaucracy is a livin g power . Russia, on the otherhand, has reproduced so far precisely the phases ofWestern Europe, though, like Serbia and her otherBalkan protegees , she has suffered from a very late start .Her history began little more than two hundred years

ago . In the seventeenth century she was a stagn an tmass, still dazed by the shock of Mongol conquest thathad struck her down four centuries earlier, halforientalised by the Mongol suzerainty that had followedthe impact, and cut o ff from the outer World by thelack of a seaboard . She stood to Europe as Macedoniastood to Hellas at the beginning of the fourth centuryB .C., and she found her Philip in Peter the Great.


bureaucracy to bankruptcy. It has no longer risen tothe problems of internal growth, and it has suff eredgrave military discredit abroad . The Crimean cam

paign was its War of the Span ish Succession,” the

un expectedly disastrous struggle with Japan its

Seven Years ’ War. Its prestige has suffered blowsfrom which it can never recover, but the outwornchrysalis has held together long enough to do its work .

Durin g this same nineteenth century the Russiannation, an inarticu late Tityos lying prone across half acontin ent, has awakened to the clearest consciousness,and expressed itself in a literature as distinctive and asmomentous for the spiritual history of the World asthe literature of eighteenth-century France .Nor is this a house built on the sands . The Russian

intelligenz ia draws its living water from a deep wellspring of national life . When you read a Russian novelyou pass out of the cosmopolitan environment ofIndustrial Europe into Holy Russia, an environmentof river and forest and snow and sun, an d a tradition ofreligion and of social customs, utterly unfamiliar to youbefore, but you habituate yourself to it with un lookedfor ease, because th e sense of life that pulses throughit is as convincing as the sound of th e sea, when itfalls, after months of absence, upon your ears . TheRussian nation has found its soul : the next phasewill inevitably follow, and effete strong governmentgive place to the captain cy of the nation over itsown destiny.

The present war is a very important moment in thistransformation . It, too, finds a parallel in the historyof France, namely, the successful interv ention in thecause of A merican Independence, that gave liberalismentrance into the fortress of official policy . The

THE NATIONAL EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA 299

Russian Government cannot unfurl its banner in asimilar cause, with out considerably changing the legendembroidered upon it before it is laid away again . Achange of outlook will mean a change of personnel :Russia may find a Turgot and a Necker who, profitingby the experience of their French forerunners, will solvethe problems of which they despaired and there mayeven now be fighting in her army’s ranks a stronger andmore purposeful Lafayette .The friction and misunderstanding, then, that at

present exists between the Government and the Peopleof Russia is not, as German opinion suggests, a S ignof dissolution but a symptom of growth . If the nationhere assented to the bureaucracy's standpoint, thatwould indeed be a proof of national depravity. Butthe Russian bureaucracy belongs to the past Liberalismis in the ascendant, and will prevail .We have now compared Germany and Russia bybringing out the respective tendencies that are assertingthemselves in each and this is the only true principle ofestimating national values . The symbolism of politicalcartoons, in which the figure of John Bull, a squire inRegency costume, stands for the British Nation,and Uncle Jonathan, a business man with the beard andcoat of the 'sixties, for the United States, is activelymisleading . It takes a vivid impression of a nation atsome critical moment in its history, when the attentionof the World is centred upon it, and perpetuates it withthe implication that that is the nation ’s eternal essence .The device produces the same com ic effect as the snapshot o f a race-horse galloping, but the humour consists just in the static presentment of a kinetic reality,and thus depends upon a distortion of historicaltruth . National character is not static, because a nation


is alive . The essence of it is not the phase it happensto occupy at the moment, but th e whole movement ofits growth , and we can forecast a movement

's tendencywith most probability, though, of course, any calculation of the future is ex hypothesi conjectural, by asurvey of such phases of it as have already beenactualised .

Met in this way, Germany’

s challenge turns to herown despite . Our conclusion makes us more eagerthan ever for Germany’s discomfiture in this war andmore zealous in our alliance with Russia, for we feelthat the triumph of Russia, as well as the triumph ofGreat Britain and France, will be in harmony with thetrue advancement of European civilisation .

C . Devolution

We have compared the past history of Russia withthat of other European nations, and analogy hasinclined us to augur for her a liberal future . Yet weshall not satisfy our German critic till we have ofl

'

ered

him some concrete programme of the lines on whichth is prospective liberalism can, should, and will berealised .

The chief obstacle to the progress of self-governmentin Russia has been the shortness of her history . Thesecond, and hardly less formidable, factor is the immensity of her territorial extent . Before the inventionof modern communications, a vigorous absolutismseemed the only force capable of holding togethersuch a widespread mass of humanity. But now themechanism of telegraph and railway can take the placeof strong-government's centripetal action, and localindividuality receive free play in the political sphere


defence, and might satisfactorily leave the whole internaladministration of Lithuania to Home Ru le .

(b) The Letts, inhabiting Courland and Livland oneither bank of the Diina, lie next to the Lithuanians inthe Northward direction . They speak a variety of thesame language , but their history has been different .They were converted to Christianity by the sword of theTeutonic Knights, and at the Reformation submissivelyfollowed their masters into the Protestant camp like theMasurians in Prussia . After the dissolution of the Order,this territory was partitioned between Sweden andPoland, and, when it became one again under Russiangovernment, the German landed aristocracy, descendedfrom the secularised knights, played for a time aprom inent part in the history of the Empire, owin g totheir superior education and acquaintance with European life .

(c) The Northern part of Livland , from a lin e drawnEast andWest between the Lake of Pskov and the Gulfof Riga, together with Esthland, the sister province alongthe Southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, has sharedthe political and religious history of the Lettish districtsbut the population here speaks a language of entirelydifferent origin , a dialect of the great Ugro-Finnishgroup .

The bond of common Protestantism and Germanculture may override these diff erences of native speech,and incline the people of Courland, Livland and

Esthland to consolidate all three provinces into a singleself-govern ing area or, in asmuch as public educationin the national language is one of the chief objects ofdevolution, the Lettish-speakin g and Esthonian-speaking sections may elect to organ ise themselves apart.


and the nations themselves have come to man theopposing camps, with their former despots at theirhead as their chosen leaders, while the issue now at stakeis whether the strong nation shall use the freedom thatit has won for the oppression of its neighbour, or whetherall nations, great and small, shall live orderly side byside as members of a wider commonwealth .

This issue is being fought out in the present war, andRussia has joined battle on the side of national liberty .

If her efforts , in co -operation with those of the Westernpowers, decide the struggle in favour of our commoncause, and we achieve the much-desired re-settlement ofCentral Europe on the national basis , at the expenseof German and Magyar chauvinism, Russia will haveneither the will nor the power to tarry longer from settin gher own house in order. She has sinn ed against theNational Idea in the past no less than her presentantagonists, and if all the nationalities in her Empirehave rallied round her government at the present crisis ,it is because they are willing to forget the past in thehope of a happier future . Russia cannot now affordto disappoint this hope, even if she is tempted to do so .

The spark of Nationalism has continued to smoulderin the hearts of these border nations, during the centurythat they have been ground between the hammer andanvil of rival im perialisrns, and each oppressor hasfostered it in tu rn to point a thrust in the long bout offence against his accomplices . But now Russia, byputting forth all her strength to remove the pressurefrom the one side with blood and iron,

" has pledgedherself to relieve it by her own free grace on the other.The raising up of these prostrate nations in the blackesthour of their despair will transform th em from a fringeof disaffection into a girdle of loyalty, and will be the

DEVOLUTION 305

best guarantee that Russia will not have spent herstrength in vain but if the settlement, at the close ofthis war, fails to alleviate their condition by Russia

'

sgood-will, the liberal spirit of Europe which will havetriumphed in the victory of the Allies, will inevitablyaccomplish their redemption in spite of Russia, andperhaps to her undoing. Russia has put her hand tothe plough, and cannot turn back.

(ii .) The same considerations should induce Russianot merely to grant Home Rule to a ring of nationalitieswithin her frontier, but actually to abandon all holdupon a population Whose national centre of gravity liesdefin itely on the further side of it. In the presentcampaign the Russian armies have occupied the AustrianCrown -land of Bukovina, pin ioned between the Car

path ian s and the North-East angle of Roumania ; butwith the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy the provinceshould pass, not to Russia, but to the neighbouringRouman ian state, to which its inhabitants belong bynationality.

Roumania is at present considerably the most prosperons and well-populated 1 of the Balkan States, andwould take the next place in importance to Hungaryin our proposed Balkan League ; but she is in theunfortunate position of possessing a large irredentaboth in Hungarian and in Russian territory, which hasso far alienated her sympathies both from the DualMonarchy and from the Russian Empire, and preventedher arriving at an endurin g understanding with either.Should the European settlement, however, secure asatisfactory modus vivendi for the non-Magyar nationalities o f Hungary, in cluding her Rouman citizens, andso enable Hungary and Roumania to co -operate in the

1 Popu lation about in 1910.


new Zollverein, the quarrel between these two stateswould be at an end, and Roum an ia’s resentment wou ldconcentrate itself upon Russia, much more to Russia

’sdetriment than before, because Roumania would havethe whole Balkan group behind her. It would thereforebe worth Russia’s while to satisfy, if possible, Roumania’s just claim s by concedin g to her not merelyterritories conquered in this war, but a province longin corporated in her Empire .Roumania covets Bessarabia,1 the district betweenthe Pruth and the Dn iestr. This coun try is valuableto Russia sim ply for its coast-lin e, which gives heraccess to the Northern arm of the Danube delta . Thein terior is unimportant to her, for though her chiefBlack Sea port, Odessa, lies only a few miles up thecoast East of the Dniestr liman ,

3 the railways lin kingit to its hin terland, even to the new Russian territory inGalicia, all pass outside Bessarabia, beyond the Dniestr

’

5

Left bank . The interior, however, is the part of theprovince where the Rouman element is strong, while thesteppe towards the coast is inhabited by the relics ofTatar nomads , by German colonists planted there toteach them agriculture, and by a large Slavonic element,Russian colonists and Bulgarian refugees, who havedrifted in during the course of the century.

This gives us a reasonable basis for division . Thenew frontier between Russia and Roumania should start

1 Ceded by Turkey to Russia in 1812 . The popu lation registered inthe Russian census o f 1897 was including

RoumansBu lgarsGermans

b u tRouman au thorities reckon theRoum an elem ent to b e three quarterso f the popu lation . See M ap V.

Estuary.


Zollverein the free use of a railway to a port on the

In n coast, where she could lade and unload hergoo ds on the open sea .

We have now dealt with the whole fringe of aliennationalities within the Western frontier of the RussianEmpire . A fringe is all that they are their territoriesare insignificant slices carved from the Empire ’s enormous bulk, and their populations weigh light in thebalance against the Russian-speakin g masses that lieaway to their East . The Russians have far less excusethan the Magyars for the oppression by force or fraudof their fellow-nationalities, because the most quixoticgenerosity could not endanger the Russian element ’spreponderance .1 The mere weight of the Russianpopulation is sufficient to assure for ever the Russiancharacter of the Empire, and the balance of numbersis continually shifting further in its favour year by year,as colonial areas fill up in the Great North-East . Theonly really difficult problem of devolution within theEmpire concerns the relations between the differentbranches of the Russian Nation itself.The Russian race falls into two great divisions,

distinguished by considerable diff erence of dialect1 The fo llowing table, showing the comparative strengths of the m ost

im portant nationalities within the Russian Empire, was com piled fromestimates made in 1906

Great Russians Total N orth Russians

White Russians "Total RussiansLittle RussiansPo lesLithuaniansLettsFinnsTatarsBashkirsKirghizThe total popu lation of the Empire was estimated at

in the sam e year.

DEVOLUTION 309

(i.) The whole North of the country is occupied bythe Great Russian group, which is composed ofthree sub-sections

(a) The Northern, corresponding to the area ofthe former republic of Novgorod, where the GreatRussian dialect is spoken in its most extreme form.

(b) The Western, coinciding with the region oncesubject to Lithuania, where the so-called WhiteRussian variety of the dialect is current .

(0) The Eastern, round the original core of theMuscovite principality, where the dialect Shows divergences from the pure Northern type S imilar to thosethat prevail in White Russia.These three modifications of the Great Russian speech

have remained mere parochial peculiarities, and havenot aroused any separatist feelings between the popu lations that respectively Speak them. The third, orMoscow,

” type has established itself as the organof official administration and of educated intercourse,because the principality of Moscow was the nucleusout of which the New Russia grew up as the Mongolstorm subsided . The sudden birth of a wonderfulliterature in the nineteenth century, and the gradualspread of primary education since the beginning of thetwentieth, have secured it for ever from challenge bythe other local patois .

(ii .) Great Russian, then, is a single language,and all the populations that speak it form a singlenational unit ; but when we come to the second orLittle Russian division of the race, we find ourselvesin face of a real cleavage . The extension of the GreatRussians coincides on the whole with the forest-Zoneof the country. The Little Russians lie South of them,

deployed in a long line on the borderland between forest

3 10 THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

and steppe, which extends from the headwaters of theVistula and Dniestr systems in the Carpathian s towardsthe till it strikes the upper course of the Donnear Voronesh .

This wide-flung ribbon of population has a strongnational feeling of its own . The Great Russian canclaim that it was he who freed the race from the Moslemyoke, and th at the livin g Russia of th e present, with itsglories of arms and of letters, is solely his creation ;but the Little Russian looks back to the day beforethe Mongol appeared in the land, when the Dniepr, notthe Volga, was the holy river of Russia, and Kieff, halfway down its course, her holy city, the meeting-place ofthe “strong government and the world-religion thatcame up to her from opposite quarters, out of theBaltic and the Black Sea . He regards himself as thetrue heir to this primitive tradition, and his loyalty toit is all the keener because so many centuries lie betweenthe Golden Age and his present obscurity.

Little Russia, unlike Muscovy, never recovered fromthe Mongol catastrophe . She escaped from allegianceto the Moslem only by subm ission to the Lithuanianand Polish Catholic and even when the Polish Empirewas broken up, she did not win her unity from the

re-settlement, but was divided with the rest of thespoils between the governments of Moscow and Vienna .Yet the problem of Little Russian nationalism mightsti ll have been solved . The Ruthenes of Galicia wereonly a small fraction of the race the major part of it,including the national centre, Kieff, and the whole of theDniepr basin , was once more gathered into the fold of anational Russian state and if Moscow could havebeen liberal enough to accept Kieff as her peer, theLittle Russians would soon have forgotten their


the Ruthene peasant proprietors constitute the bulk ofthe population in Eastern Galicia,1 the big estatesare still nearly everywhere in the hands of a Polishupper class, a relic of the Polish domination before thePartition of 1772, and in the

’eighties of the last centurythe Austrian government abandoned the Ruthenemajority to the mercy of the Polish minority, when itwas bidding for the support of the Polish vote in theparliament at Vienna .The Poles had the game in their hands, because both

wealth and education were at that time their monopoly,and they took steps to confirm their racial predominance . They compelled the Austrian government torecognise Polish as the official language of the wholeprovince, and it has taken the Ruthenes a generation tosecure a modicum of instruction in their own langu ageat Lemberg 2 University . Resentment at their betrayalto the Poles raised a movement among them in favourof Russia, and a Moskalophil party grew up, whoseprogramme was that reunion with the national Russianstate which is now being realised but the Moskalophils

have always been in a minority, and no indictmentagainst Russian poli cy in the Ukraine could be moredamning than the almost universal rejection of Russianovertures by the Ruthenes of Eastern Gali cia .In modern Austria official language ” has not the

same sinister connotation as in the neighbour states of

1 The Ru thene territory am ounts to about two-thirds of the who learea of Galicia, even if we m ake a liberal allowance for the Po lishenclaves em bedded in it on th e other hand, the Ru th ene elem en t is

only a minority o f the total popu lation o f Galicia in 1900, as

against Po les) , because the Ru thene country is m ore m oun

ijai

pous and less developed than th e Western districts occupied by th e

0 es.

L2

(

‘

5

I'

he Germ an form o f Russian Lvov, Little Russian Lwiw, Po lishw w.

DEVOLUTION 3 13

Russia,Prussia and Hungary. Like German in the

remaining Austrian provinces, Polish is official inGalicia in the sense that it is the vehicle of internalservice in the adm inistration of the country. In theexternal service,

” however, that is, in all relationsbetween the provincial government and the individualssubject to its jurisdiction, Austrian public law prescribesin Galicia as elsewhere the employment of the privateparty’s native speech, if it is recognised as customaryLandesiib lich in the district .A Ruthene thus enjoys the right to conduct all his

business with the Polish administration in his ownRuthene tongue . If he is a peasant, he can bring anaction in Ruthene before the public courts if he is adeputy, he can debate in Ruthene in the provincial diet .If he can secure a majority in his village or municipality,he may make Ruthene the medium of his local selfgovernment . If he travels on the Galician railways, hefinds every official notice down to the inscription on histicket printed in Ruthene as well as in German andPolish . In every one of these points his status presentsa remarkable contrast to the position of his brethrenbeyond the Russian and Hungarian frontiers . Evenin the sphere of higher education, where the Polishregime has laid itself open to most criticism, the numberof Ruthene secondary schools in Galicia has at leastrisen, though slowly, since 1867, while in Hungary thenon-Magyar secondary schools have steadily shrunkin numbers during the same period . On the whole, wemay say that the Ruthene majority in the Eastern partof Galicia is treated as equitably as is consistent with theracial supremacy of the Polish minority in the region,and that here, as elsewhere, Austria has been Europe

’spioneer in the settlement of the problem of nationality .


In Galicia, then, the Little Russian language isdeprecated but in no sense banned . A society hasflourished for many years at Lemberg which fosters theliving literature, collects and edits the peasant-poetry ofthe past, and studies the philological characteristics ofthe dialect, with a freedom unheard of East of thefrontier. The Tsar’s government has held the mistakenpoin t of view that the encouragement of traditionalculture inevitably gives rise to new-fangled politicalaspirations, and has thereby provoked this literary groupat Lemberg to become in fact the mouthpiece of a LittleRussian nationalist party, which has the allegiance of amajority among the Austrian Ruthenes . This partydreams of a national state in which all fractions of theLittle Russian race shall be united, and its feelin g againstPetersburg is so bitter that, in spite of the entente at itsexpense between Vienna and the Poles, it is readyto march under Austria’s banner, and allows itscanvassing in the Ukraine to assume the form ofAustrian propaganda .1

This bizarre situation has suddenly been terminatedby the present war. In the event of the Allies ’

success, we have seen that Galicia will pass to theRussian Empire . The whole of the Little Russian racewill finally be united within Russia’s frontier, but theannexation of the Galician Ruthenes will create thesame situation for her as that of the Galician Poles .

1 It is true that to W in the loyalty o f th eRu th enes the Cen tral Governm ent at Vienn a has had to reverse in som e m easure its Galician po licy,and th at it has th ereby shaken th e loyalty o f the Po les, who were ou t

raged to find th e racial balance in Galicia being redressed from above.

To drive Po le and Ru thene in double harness is really a hopeless task,and it is probable that Vienn a only attempted it at the in stance o f

Berlin . S ince her bungling po licy began to reconcileRussian and Po le,Germ any has sought to embarrass Russia in another quarter by exploiting the problem of the U kraine.


From the outset this new population has been veryheterogeneous . The Germanophil governm ent ofCatherine II . copied the Hapsburg experiment of sowingcivilisation by scatterin g plan tations of German settlers ,and in New Russia,

" as in Hun gary, the balance waslargely made up of refugees from the various Christianpopulations subject to Turkish oppression . Thecolonisation of th e district received an immense impetusfrom the emancipation of the serfs in 186 1 , since whenthe peasants in every province of Russia have beenleavin g their ancestral villages and driftin g into all theundeveloped areas to take up freehold allotments th erebut, inasmuch as the Great Russian population of theEmpire is vastly stronger than the Little Russian innumbers , the Great Russian immigrants in to the steppesoutweigh the Little Russian in the like proportion .

When New Russia has been completely filled up, theLittle Russian element will not be found to predominate,and so , when the various elements subsequently fusethemselves into one type, the New Russian blendwill not assume a specifically Little Russian colour.What is true of the Black Sea steppes is still truerof the coast upon which they open . Odessa, the newport founded in 1792 , is an indispensable factor in theeconomic system of the Black Earth zone, for thewhole grain export passes through its harbour but ithas no special links of tradition or dialect with the LittleRussian nationality, an d is essentially a common outletand meetin g-place of all races in th e Empire, in cludingthe Poles, while the isolated Crimean peninsula whichadjoins it on the East has remained the stronghold of acivilised agri cultural and vine-growin g Tatar popu lation .

New Russia, then, has no social bonds of cohesion withLittle Russia, and could never be abso rbed into it but

DEVOLUTION 3 17

a self-governing Little Russian unit which did not extendto the coast would geographically and economically bealmost unthinkable . It would possess none of the prerequisites for self-su fficiency.

(ii .) Yet even if Little Russia were able, by assimilating the coast or otherwise, to consolidate herself, a moreserious diflicu lty would still remain she would be toounwieldy a block for the architecture of the RussianEmpire . There are two possible plans on which afederal group can be built up .

(a) Where the whole population to be federated ishomogeneous in nationality, and the only problem iscaused by its bulk, it is best organised in a large numberof self-governing units, which, being ex hypothesi

identical in quality, will probably work together inharmony, if only their parity in size and importance issecured as well . This structure has approved itself inthe history of the and will probably be adoptedas the basis of the New China .

(6) American history, however, has also shown that thissystem of equal units is extremely dangerous where thetotal population is divided by differences of nationality .

In fact, so soon as the least divergence of national selfconsciousness creeps in, it will transform the divisionsbetween units, which formerly had merely administrative significance, into spiritual lines of cleavage, andsince the units are equal and share no particular centreof gravity, there will be no constructive force to counteract this centrifugal tendency . A gradual divergence ofthis kind within such a structure cost the United States acivil war before they could remedy it in a case wherethe national differences are violent and traditional, andwhere the architect has still a clean slate, to adopt thisprinciple would be deliberate folly .


When common interest or necessity induces severaldifferent nationalities to attempt combination in a singleorganic politi cal group,1 success can only come throughinequality, by subjecting a number of lesser satellites tothe attraction of a central planet, and the inequalitymust be signal . If the satellites approach the planet toonearly in mass, or the planet shrinks into too even aratio with the satellites, they will all, when a certain pointis reached, fly o ff at a tangent, and probably collidefatally with one another before they severally disappearin space .The unity of the Russian Empire is to the interest of

nearly all the nationalities that are members of it butthat unity can only be maintained by grouping the rest

2

round a Russian national state of imm ense preponderance . We have said that the Russian nation need haveno fear of being swamped by its fellow-nationalities ,but that remains true only so long as the nation itselfremains united . The little Russian element form snearly a third of the whole race,3 an d if it were to breako ff from the main body and attempt to follow an orbit ofits own, it would fatally dislocate the balance of the wholeImperial system . It would approximate sufficientlyin mass to the Great Russian remnant to struggle withit for predominance, and this fratricidal strife wouldwear down the strength of the two fragments , andprevent them from concentrating their energy to keep

1 A s contrasted With a loose, passive concert like the proposed BalkanZo llverein .

2Withou t prejudice, o f course, to their own local self-government.

3 Great RussianLittle Russians

8In th e UkraineIn Galic1a

— 29 s%)

Total o f Russian Nation


Siberian Railway, which still await effective colonisation,and by the mi litary districts of the Caucasus and theAsiatic steppes, whose primary need at present is theunbroken maintenance of strong government, and whichwill not become able to govern themselves ti ll manyyears have habituated them to a civilisation establishedfrom without. The region ripe for immediate selfgovernment is nevertheless immense, and the popu lation contain ed within the limits indicated, which willbe represented in the parliament of the national Russianunit, falls little Short of a hundred millions . Thereare, however, several factors eminently favourable tothe successful organisation of this huge mass of humanbein gs .

(i.) The geographical unwieldin ess of the country iscounterbalanced by the extraordinary facility of comm unication . The great navigable rivers have alwaysafforded magnificent natural highways the Volgasteamer was as important a factor in nineteenth-centuryRussia as the Mississippi steamer was in the contem

porary development of the and the network ofrailways which, as in A merica, has first supplemented,and now begun to supplant, the river-steamer

’s use,especially in the new cornlands of the South, can extenditself over the length and breadth of the land withoutencountering any barrier of mountains .

(ii .) The Great Russian race has taken full advantageof the geographical elasticity of its habitat, and, expanding from its original centre of dispersion in the NorthWestern forests, has kept pace with the political extension of the Muscovite state ’s frontiers . In its contactwith the alien races that it has thereby encountered, ithas displayed a vitality and assimilative power comparable to that of the Anglo-Saxon race in America.

DEVOLUTION 321

The little patches of Ugro-Finnish population that stillsurvive in the heart of Great Russia,—Karelians betweenNovgorod and Tver among the Valdai hills, Cheremisses and Mordvins between Nijni Novgorod andKazan on the Middle Volga,— testify to the vanishedmajorities of these tribes, which have adopted thespeech and nationality of their Russian conquerors asfar as the White Sea. The same process is being continued to-day at the expense of the more widely spreadFinnish groups of the North-East,— Votyaks andSyryens and Voguls and Ostyaks,—protected thoughthey are by the rampart of the Northern Urals .1

The nomadic, Turkish - speaking communities,Bashkirs and Chuvashes,2 that adjoin the Volga-Finnson the South-East, wandering with their flocks amongthe Southern Urals and along the border of the steppes,are suffering the fate of those pathetic little Red Indianreservations in Canada and the round whichthe tide of European immigration surged higher allthrough the nin eteenth century, till some inconsequentact of lawlessness broke the moral obligation that hadso far preserved their bounds, and abandoned them tosubmergence beneath the flood . But the mere engulfingof in ferior races is not the greatest triumph of the

1 The remnants of Finnish popu lation still awaiting absorption by theRussian race, including the Ural groups, b ut excluding, of course, the

Finns o f the Grand Duchy who have a civilisation and anational consciousness superior, on the who le, to the Russian, make upa total of (identical, curiously enou gh, with the total ofcivilised Firms in Fin land) . There are furtherm ore civilisedFirms in Russian territory adjoining the Grand Duchy who areunlikelyto b e assim ilated.

1 BashkirsChuvashes


Russian nation it has known how to reconcile a rivalcivilisation .

Christian and Moslem have met as enemies on manyfields, and the result of the stru ggle has often broughtthem into the relation of conquerors and conquered .

Yet whichever party has triumphed, a great gulf hasgenerally remained fixed between the two, and enforcedpolitical union, instead of passing over, as in so manyother cases, in to organ ic political unity, has onlyaccentuated their mutual an tipathy. Russia alone hasmanaged to solve the problem . The Tatars of theVolga-Khanates,1 conquered by her in the sixteenthcentury, were communities of peasants and merchantswith a tradition of culture, derived from Persia and

Baghdad, as strongly characterised as that which Russiaherself had drawn from Constantinople and the West ;yet now the Tatars, while remaining true to theirreligion, have become Russian in soul, and have foundboth the opportunity and the inclin ation to play a fullpart in the social and political life of the Russian nation .

This is a victory not of race but of civilisation, orrather, what is better sti ll, it is the blending of twocivilisations into a new harmony.

It is clear, then, that the Great Russian element hasthe power to weld the whole hundred millions into aconsolidated nation, and in the process not only Finns,Bashkirs and Tatars , but the more compact LittleRussian masses as well, will ultimately lose theirpecu liar individuality . It would be idle for the LittleRussians to complain at the prospect . If their lan guageis henceforth given as good an opportunity for selfassertion as the Moscow dialect, and still yields groundbefore the latter, the cause will no longer be human

1 Kazan and Astrakhan .


awoke in them an unexpected energy. Durin g thechaos in to which the Empire fell for three years, theytook the initiative . Repeated congresses of delegatesfrom the local dumas and Zemstvos evolved, in conference with the autocracy, the constitution of October1905, and the elective machinery of the first nationaldumas was modelled on the local plan . The provincial,district, and mun icipal councils have not let theirrecovered power slip again from their hands, and aphase of really constructive activity undoubtedly liesbefore them.

This, then, is the Russia of the future, whi ch wecan discern through the chrysalis of eighteenth centuryautocracy, from which the Russia of the present has beenso painft extricatin g herself. It is not a mere dreamof the imagin ation . The regime in possession fascinatesour attention, just as the royal murders in Serbia o ccupied the whole vision of the Magyar professor. Therepressive, unscrupulous police-government keeps usunpleasantly aware of its existence by the startlingechoes of its misdeeds that filter through into our press,and the hysterical, often criminal, intrigues of therevolutionists, who claim to represent the intelligenz ia,reveal a dearth of constructive ideas that almost justifiesthe government’s attitude . Yet beneath this sordidsurface a less melodramatic political activity has beenat work for a generation without attracting the world ’snotice . The exploitation of the Black Earth zone,the conciliation of the Moslems, and the evolution ofthe zemstvos are signs of the times .

EXPANSION 325

D . Expansion

We have not, however, completely an swered theGermans’ case . Granted,

”they will say, that

Russia has this liberal future before her, that nationalself-government will be attain ed by the different raceswithin the Empire, alien and Russian alike, and thatthe old ideal of Repression at home and aggressionabroad,

’ will be sloughed off together with her obsoleteeighteenth-century strong-government if we grantyou all this, you must allow us to turn again st you yourown weapon of historical an alogy . You have illustratedth e tendency of Russia’s growth by a comparison witheighteenth-century Fran ce . But France, after she hadachieved national self-government in the Revolution,proceeded to rob territory from other nations like themost vulgar-minded despotic conqueror. Perhaps youmay ascribe this conduct not to France herself, but tothe personal ambition of Napoleon ; or you may saythat, though the French nation a century ago did adoptunmodified the Bourbons ’ dynastic point of view, theIndustrial Revolution has intervened meanwhile andentirely changed the attitude of self-govern ing nationstowards their foreign policy—th at they do not now wagewar for territorial acquisition but for economic advantage, aimin g to add market to market, not province toprovince . If you take up this position, we can answeryou out of your own mouth .

Let us return to your comparison of Germany andRussia . You have proved that the present analogiesbetween them are deceptive : strong government inRussia did its work under Peter the Great, and is now afunctionless survival, while Bismarck had to rehab ituate


a cultured, peaceable people to blood and iron andput strong government in the foreground again, becausein Germany its primary task of consolidation had neverpreviously been achieved . But our new mi litarism didnot die with the accomplishment of the task for whichit had been called in to being : rightly or wrongly, weGermans have cherished it (as you have pointed out)precisely as a weapon in the modern economic battle,to snatch the industrial markets of the World from thenations established in possession of them. If you beatus in this war, we shall have failed, but when we fall,the Russian nation steps into our shoes . Like ourselvesthey will covet, and justly covet, a place in the Sun,

’

and do you im agine that, however liberal their idealsmay be, economic pressure will not in the end forcethem to S take their all on the same desperate throw forWorld Empire that we are makin g at this moment ?Think also of the analogies of the Future : economicenvironment is a stronger force than national disposition .

”

This is the German advocate ’s last and most dan gerouscounter-attack but we can meet it with a crushing reply,for it rests on an entire misconception of the RussianEmpire’s economic character. Germany, by thedensity of her population, th e nature of her physicalresources, and her geographical position and extent,inevitably came into line with the Western nations ofEurope, and was forced into industrial competitionwith them under exasperatingly disadvantageous conditions. The economic structure of the RussianEmpire belongs to a different type altogether.Beyond the densely-populated, highly-organised little

states of Europe, which at present focus in themselvesthe civilisation of the world by drawing all its raw


marks an epoch in the expansion of the Russian nationas important as that marked by the first trans-continental railways of North America for the expansionof the Anglo-Saxon race .During the seventeenth century, when the French

explorers were penetrating up the St . Lawrence intothe Great Lakes, and discovering portages to the OhioandMississippi that brought their canoes on to the riversystem of the Mexican gulf, Cossack adventurers hadalready crossed the Urals and worked their way alongthe equally magnificent water-routes of Northern Asia,up the Obi and Angara rivers , across Lake Baikal, andthen down the Amur to the shores of the Pacific .Like Great Britain, however, in Australia, the RussianGovernment at first found no better use for this vacan tland, that had fallen so casually into their han ds, than torelegate their convicts to the Siberian mines,1 and Siberiahas become the by-word for a desolate place of torment,like the frozen Zone in Dante ’s Hell . But in the nin eteenth century the expanding peasantry of Great Russiabegan to cross the m iddle Volga, and a current ofEastward migration set in among them as strong asthat which carried the American squatters across theA lleghanies into the prairies of theWest . Any one whohas read Tolstoy’s tale of the land-hungry peasant, whoabandoned one plot after another for still larger allotments further East, till at last he struck a bargain withthe wandering Bashkirs and fell a victim to his owngreed, will recognise the analogy at once, and mentallytranslate the scene into incidents of the ’forties, whenMormon settlers bought up the huntin g-groun ds ofRed Indian chiefs .

1 The only wealth of the country they th ought of exploiting, besidethe fur of its forest creatures.

EXPANSION 329

Here, as in America, colonisation has followed therailway, and now the peasant is establishing himself oneither side of the new line, right across Siberia . Theexperience of Canada has shown what human occupationcan achieve in the teeth of adverse conditions, how itcan even modify the rigour of climate and temperatureby introducing agriculture and breaking up the surfaceof the soil . Siberia will be the Canada of the twentiethcentury. A lready the well-watered grazing grounds ofthe steppe, which the railway traverses between the Uralsand the Yenisei, are exporting dairy produce to WesternEurope , and the plateaux of Irkutsk and Transb aikalia will yield greater wealth still when their timberand m ines are exploited to their full capacity .

The human wealth of the new territories is evenmore promising than their material prospects . Thecriminal convict has not proved a bad foundation forthe new Anglo-Saxon nation of the Australian commonwealth but a considerable proportion of the Siberianconvicts have been political offenders, that is, the mostindependent, energetic and intellectual members of theRussian urban class . Governmental selection has endowed Siberia with Russia’s fittest, and the descendantsof these exiles, granted their freedom on condition thatthey settled in the country for ever, have mingled withthe stock of the Cossack trappers and already produceda racial variety characterised by the same enterprisingqualities as distinguish the Westerner in the UnitedStates .The territories strung along the railway, then, haveas great a future before them as the Western provin cesof the Canadian Dominion . As they fill with a vigorouspopulation of Russian speech, they will gradually claimHome Rule, and take their place by the side of Holy


Russia herself and the lesser nationaliti es of theWestern border, as independent members of thedecentralised Empire . Just as in Canada, moreover,settlement and exploitation will push further Northfrom their base-line along the railway than is at presentconceived possible, moving down the course of the greatrivers till they reach an impassable limit in the frozentundras . That, however, will not be the end of Siberia

’sexpansion : she has already stretched out her handstoward the South .

The settlement after the Japanese War left underRussian control the Northern section of Manchuriathrough which her railway takes a direct line fromLake Baikal to Vladivostock, while the recent revolution in Chin a gave the pastoral tribes of Outer Mongoliaan opportunity to throw o ff Chinese suzerainty andplace themselves under Russian protection . It wouldbe a gain to civilisation if these territories were permanently and in formal terms annexed to the RussianEmpire . Chin a’s sole title to them is their conquest bythe Manchu dynasty two and a half centuries ago.

She has done nothing to improve their condition allthe time they have been in her power, and now thatshe has undertaken that task of internal reconstructionwhich will demand a century of devoted concentrationif it is to be carried through, they can be nothingbut a drag upon her ill-spared strength . In takin gthem over once for all, Russia would have the precedentof the United States, which compelled Mexico to cedeher neglected Northern territories in 1847. Theywere much criticised at the time for their conduct, buthave been completely justified by its results .Outer Mongolia is sundered from China by the broad

zone of the Gobi desert, while its frontier again st the


need the bloody vengeance of the Chinese armies tocrush the people’s soul ; it was bein g crushed alreadyby the losin g fight again st the physical environment.The Tarim basin is undergoing a long-drawn -outprocess of desiccation . Every year the streams thatflow inwards from the snow-covered mountain s penetrate less deep in to the basin ’s centre, and are stifled bythe desert after a shorter course while the sand, blownforward by the constan t North-East wind in great waveridges many miles long, engulf s every year a fresh village,and buries another patch of cultivation . The battleagain st the desert is beyond the native ’s strength, butboth he and his country are worth saving, and a vigorousEuropean government, with the material apparatus ofmodern civilisation at its command, could stem thesand waves by embankments and plan tations, eke outthe snow-water’s gift by subterranean irrigation, and insome measure restore the Basin to the prosperity of twothousand years ago, when the cultures of Greece, Indiaand China found in it their blending-ground . OnlyRussia can accomplish Turkestan ’s salvation, andGreat Britain would willingly allow her a free handthere, if she undertook in return to make Kuen-Lungthe limit of her Southward advance, and to leave Tibet,that lies beyond it, under the undisputed influence ofthe Indian Empire .Here is Russia’s field of expansion for the twentiethcentury . She has to fill these immense empty territories with the white population their temperate climateinvites

,and the achievement of the task will be a race

again st time . The population of the Empire may nowtotal 1 50 millions, but it is S till the most thinly-inhabitedof the European states, while South of the Gobi desertlies China, with perhaps three times as many millions

EXPANSION 333

crowded on to a space less than a quarter of Russia’

sextent.The first ripples of Chinese migration are alreadystriking upon the East Indies, Australia and the Pacificsea-board of North America, and the brutality withwhich these states are repelling this peaceful, casualinvasion shows how terribly they dread the pressure tocome . Forcible exclusion will succeed for the present,because Ch ina still lies in the grip of a thousand years ’

political paralysis ; but the power of movement isalready returning to her limbs . The fundamentalfactor of world-politics during the next century will bethe competition between China and the new commonwealths . China will strive to reorganise her nationallife, and to bring all her immeasurable latent strength tobear on the effort to win her place in the Sun (amore titanic struggle this than Germany’s presentendeavour) : the others will make haste to swell theranks of their white population till they can musterenough defenders to man the wide boundaries of theinheritance they have marked out for themselves, andbecome strong enough either to fling back China’s onsetor to deter her from making it at all . All the threatenednations— Canada, the U.S .A the South Americanrepublics, New Zealand and Australia— will drawtogether into a league, to preserve the Pacific fromChinese domination . Japan will probably join theirranks, for she is the Great Britain of the China Seas ,and, just like ourselves, would be menaced most seriouslyby the emergence of a World-power on the continentopposite her island country . Russia, who has noteven a strip of sea to protect her, but is China

’s immediate continental neighbour along a vast landfrontier, will actually be the chief promoter of this


defensive entente, for she will be exposed to the firstbrunt of the Chinese attack .

Under these circumstances it is quite inconceivablethat the German forecast should come true . The greatRussian army of 1914, when it has fulfilled its task ofcrushing militarism in Central Europe, will have nomore temptation to proceed to the warlike conquest ofthe world than th e American armies had, after theyhad vindicated the Union in the ’

S ixties . Like themit will disband, to answer the call of econom ic conquestfrom the steppes and forests of the great North-East .Nor will the Russian peasants, in the generation to come,flock into urban centres and exchange agriculture forindustry, as the German peasants have been doing sin ce1871 . Russia will send every surplus child bred in herhome villages to build up the new Russian villages inSiberia : she cannot spare a man for the towns . Yetif Russia does not contemplate an industrial career, then,however triumphant be her issue from th is war, shecannot possibly become a menace to the Industrialnations of Europe . Grant that her strength increasestill she has it in her power to overcome their unitedforces, she will still have no motive for doing so . Theonly spoils of victory would be the great tropical dependencies these nations maintain, primarily as sourcesof raw material and to a lesser degree as markets for theirown production : to a nation without manufactu resthere would be no value whatsoever in their possession .

These considerations finally dispose of that bug-bearwhich haunted British foreign policy during the nineteenth century, the danger to India of Russia

’s Eastward advance . The Indian Empire is the vastest, themost populous, and the most difficult to govern of alltropical dominions held by European powers : it is


it is she that will be the danger to others. The problemof Indian emigration is as serious as that

.

of Chinese,and the Khyber Pass, instead of being traversed byRussian armies march ing South, will become the highroad of Indian coolies migrating Northwards to labouron the irrigation of the Oxus and Jaxartes basins, andsettle upon the lands their industry will have reclaimedfrom the desert .Russia, then, has no booty to gain from the other

nations of Europe . But if this is so,” the German

will ask, why has she thrown herself into the presentstruggle with the German Empire and the DualMonarchy ? Why does she regard it, as she evidentlydoes, as a supreme crisis in her history, an issue of lifeor death f What is the meaning of her passionate intervention on Serbia

’s behalf f The answer to thesequestions demands a separate chapter .

RUSSIA ’S NEEDS 337

CHAPTER IX

RUSSIA’S NEEDS

WE have seen that the Russian Empire will never becomean industrial and commercial power ; but like everyoth er unit in the new international World she has needof a free outlet to the high seas, through which she maytransmit to foreign markets the raw produce of hervast continental hinterland, and supply herself with themanufactured goods of industrial countries in return .

Such outlets she has never yet obtained . Till theeighteenth century her only port was Archangel on theWhite Sea, and this perhaps sufficed her during theera of stagnant isolation at any rate the EnglishMerchant Adventurers found it worth their while totrade there, though it is ice-bound two-thirds of theyear.1 In the year 1700, the Baltic was a Swedish lake,and the Black Sea a Turkish one . Peter and Catherinebroke the maritime monopoly of these two powers, andgave Russia a sea-board on both waters . Odessa andRiga have grown in a century and a half to be m agnifi

cent ports, and would suffice in themselves for the needsof a Russia much more highly developed than thepresent . But they are no more in direct communicationwith the Oceanic highways of international commercethan are the ports of Milwaukee and Chicago on theGreat Lakes . By an unlucky fatality, both the naturalcoastlines of Russia only introduce her to land-lockedseas, and the narrow passage that connects each of themwith the great ocean-spaces beyond has in either case

1 From about October to May.

338 RUSSIA ’S NEEDS

remained till this day outside the frontiers of theRussian Empire, and must continue so to remain forcogent reasons .

(i.) The population of the shores in question, betweenwhich these narrow seas flow, namely, of the Danishpeninsula and islands on the one hand and of theBosphoru s and Dardanelles on the other, is alien toRussia in nationality, and would in neither case wish tobecome part of the Russian Empire .

(ii .) Even if these populations did consent, throughhope of economic advan tage, promise of politicalprivilege, or the like, to throw in their lot with Russia,the S ituation thus created would be still more unfairand disadvantageous to the smaller states that sharewith Russia these inland waters, than it is to Russia asit stands at present . It would place their commercecompletely at Russia’s mercy, whereas at present Russiais already formidable enough in strength and S ize tomake the powers in control of the straits respect her owncomm erce under ordinary circumstances .The solution indicated by these considerations is thatthe command of the entrances to both these seas shouldbe held in trust, without prejudice to the national selfgovernment of the populations through whi ch they flow,

for all parties, without distin ction, that are interestedin their use—primarily for all states possessing ports onthe inland seas in question, and secondarily for allpoliti cal and economic groups the World over that tradeupon the sea, since commerce is an international concernand will become so more and more as our civilisationdevelops .We Shall be able to discuss more effectively how thiscan be done, if we deal with the two regions separatelyand in detail .

340 RUSSIA 'S NEEDS

of the Gulf Stream . Its impetus carries it past theBritish Isles up the West coast of Norway, keeping the climate temperate and the sea perennially freefrom drift ice at least a dozen degrees further Northward than along any other meridian .

1 Unfortunately forRussia, Norwegian colonists , followin g the warm cu rrentand availing themselves of the easy coast-wise navigationfrom fjord to fjord, had already occupied the whole ofthis open littoral before the backwoodsmen of Novgorodhad made their laborious way overland to their illusorysea-board at Archangel . The whole coast-strip as faras the North Cape and round its corner to the VarangerFjord has become and remained Norwegian in nationality, and is now an inalienable portion of Norway’sterritory.

Between this important region and the Russim

frontier a broad barrier was interposed by Fin land, solong as she remained a Swedish provin ce, but thesettlement of 1814 endorsed an accomplished fact bybrin gin g Finland within the Russian Empire as a selfgoverning national state under the Imperial crown, withmuch the same status as the constitutional kingdom ofPoland . During the whole century that has elapsed,there has been a S ilent contest on Russia’s part to pressher way over Finland ’s carcase to a Norwegian port onthe open Atlantic, and on the part of th e Scandin avianpowers, backed by Great Britain , to maintain the existin garrangement of constitutions and frontiers .To fortify the Scandinavian penin sula against Russianencroachment, the Vienn a Congress linked its two dis

1 On the fu rther side of the Atlantic a co ld current setting down theGreenland coast carries th e vanguard of th e drift ice so far S ou th thatit endangers shipping plying on the rou tes between Europe and New

Y ork.

IN THE BALTIC 341

co rdan t nationalities together by a personal union . Thisexperiment had a more successful history than theUnited Kingdom of the Netherlands, which the sam eCongress welded together as a bulwark again st Francebut it collapsed finally, none the less, nine years ago,1

while on the other side Russia has been levelling herpath by a systematic attempt to cru sh Finnish nationality out of existence .In their politics and social life the Finns are one

of the most highly-civilised nations of Europe . Thesmallness of their population 2 and the unindustrialisedcharacter of their economics have simplified theproblems set them to solve, but within their modestdimensions th ey have solved them to perfection . Thetradition of their culture, and their Lutheran religion,both come from Sweden, and the town speople on thecoast are still largely Swedish in race and language ;but sin ce the political connection with Sweden has beenbroken, the native Finnish speech, which belongs to anon- Indo-European family, though enriched with manyprimitive Teutonic loan words, has raised its head andproved itself to possess enough vitality to become thevehicle of national development.With Russia Finland has no inward bonds of unionwhatsoever, neither of religion nor of language nor oftradition nor even of geography, for She lies away in acorner, and her sea-board, besides fronting merely uponthe Baltic, is much less accessible from the Russianhin terland than are the outlets upon the Baltic, WhiteSea and Black Sea which Russia possesses elsewhere .

1 In 1905 .

1 The census taken in 1901 showed a total o f includingFinnsSwedesothers.


Fin land has simply been the victim of Russia’s ambition for an open port on the Norwegian coast, becausethe eventual railway to that port must run through herterritory. It is a precise repetition of the relationsbetween the Magyars and Croatia . A small nationalityhas been inalienably endowed by Geography with thefatal function of standing between a powerful nationand a sea-board to which she ardently desires accessthe stronger power has been so stupid and barbarousas to imagin e no better mean s of satisfying her wan tsthan the destruction of the little nation that stands inthe way of their realisation ; and the latter, fightingdesperately for life, is looking round for some stronghelper who will bring the oppressor to his knees, sether free from all connection with him, and shatterfor ever his projects, for which she has suffered soterribly.

There would be poetical justice in such a consummation, for it would be the natural outcome of the bullyingpower’s behaviour but it would not solve the problemat issue, but only bring forth evil from evil, reversinginstead of eliminating the injustice and sowing the seedsof future war.We have seen that if we win this war, and the DualMonarchy collapses, Croatia will probably achievecomplete political freedom from Magyar tyranny, butthat she must not, in such an event, be allowed to useher advantage merely to take the offensive in th e racialfeud She must give Hungary facilities for realising allher legitimate political desires by entering into econom icco-operation with her . But the same issue of the war,for which we hope, will not effect the forcib le liberation of Finland, and this imposes all the more urgentlyupon us the duty of securing that, when the settlement


Hammerfest or both, according to the lie of the land,1

without interposing a customs-barrier at any point alongthis route between the Russian frontier and the opensea .

The Russophobe party in Sweden might still beinclin ed to take the View that Swedish nationalhonour could only be satisfied by obtainin g a Europeanguarantee of autonomy for Finland with in the RussianEmpire, in addition to that of integrity and independence for Sweden herself. The national self -government of Finland,

” they will say, is secured to her underthe terms by which she was incorporated in the Empirein 1814, yet it is gradually being nullified, by themachiavellian policy of the Imperial Government, tothe same dead level of absolutism to which constitu

tional Poland was reduced at a stroke in February 1832 .

Finnish liberty can only be res cued by interventionfrom outside .The facts in question are unfortunately true, but the

foundation upon them of such a proposal would beopen to very grave objections . In the first place itwould certainly be Utopian to expect that a victoriousRussia would submit to the imposition of a guaranteewhich would reflect upon her conduct in the past andthus imply her humiliation in the present . The caseof Fin land is radically different from that of Norwayand Sweden . The two latter countries are entirelyexternal to the Russian Empire, and the guarantee weare demanding for them in no way affects Russia’sinternal structure . It might be argued that it is levelledspecifically at Russia in fact if not in name, and wouldseriously limit her freedom in these two countries ’ regard

1 The last section of this railway will in anycase b ea difficu lt engineering problem : see map of European Nationalities (VIL) .

IN THE BALTIC

but the formulation in general instead of individualterms is of great importance for the psychology ofnational pride, and after all this potential check uponRussia’s free action against Norway and Sweden is onlyto be imposed in return for a substantial concessionon their part to Russia’s vital economic interests offacilities which by their very nature would give Russia,in addition to her fair economic gain, a wholly un

warrantable political leverage in this quarter, unlesssuch a result were deliberately guarded against by aprovision of the kind proposed .

Guarantees will never be stable so long as they areone-sided, for their ultimate sanction is not the will ofthe guarantors, but the mutual advantage of the partiesaffected . This explains how our previous requirement of a guarantee for the New Poland is consistentwith our present standpoint towards the Finnishquestion . Both Poland and Finland are to be membersof the Russian Empire ; but if the European Concertguaranteed the constitutional autonomy within thislarger group of the united Poland, it would only beimposing an obligation upon Russia in return for thesimultaneous extension of her imperial boundaries bythe reunion in the new constitutional state of the Polesat present subject to Prussia and Austria . Indeed, thesefragments of the Polish nation would be so unwilling toenter the Russian Empire without a European guaranteeto reassure them, that it would actually be in Russia

’sinterest to suggest such a guarantee herself even if noother party took the initiative, in order to make sure ofrallying to her flag the whole Polish nation . In thatcase she would be conceding autonomy to half anationality already subject to her, in order to obtain thewilling co-operation of the whole . Finland, however, has

346 RUSSIA’S NEEDS

no irredenta beyond the Russian frontier which couldbe made the basis of a bargain for the improved statuswithin that frontier of the whole nationality, and therefore a guarantee extorted from Russia in Finland’sfavour would not be set o ff by any correspondin g gainon Russia’s part . The element of reciprocity would belacking, and the swallowing of such an unsweetened pillwould implant a dangerous resentment in the heart ofthe Russian nation .

Yet even supposing that Russia would not onlysubmit in this question to the dictation of Europe butwould also recover from the resentment it at firstaroused, we learnt from our discussion of the Hungarianand Tchech problems that the intrusion of an international scaffoldin g in the structure of an independentpolitical unit, so far from being a salutary principle, isa dangerous extemporisation . It is only to be employedas a pis aller when some particular national house is tooseriously divided against itself to stand on its ownfoundations and cannot be allowed to collapse withoutinvolvin g the whole European block in its ruin .

The assumption underlying the federation of anumber of different nations within a sin gle politicalgroup like the Russian Empire is that, while they areseverally involved with one another too closely todisengage for thems elves a completely independentpolitical existence, they possess a common interest anda common unity which sharply sunder their development as a group from that of all other groups or unitsoutside their comm on frontier. If Russia and Finlandcannot adjust their diff erences entirely between themselves without theintervention of an external guarantee,the Empire in which they are nominally federatedbecomes an unreality, for the guarantee will prise its


Your proposed railway to the Atlantic, a criticwould object, will only provide a clumsy and circu itous chan nel of communication between Russia andthe outer World . Russia will always find the mostdirect, and by far the cheapest, passage for the flow oftrade between her own frontiers and the commercialhighways of the Atlantic, not by railway transit overlan dto a foreign port on the open Ocean, but by shipmentfrom the ports on her Balti c coast down the waterpassage that communicates with the North Sea throughthe Baltic’s narrow mouths . These entran ces of theBaltic, the natural outlet for the vast hinterland ofRussia, are at present at the mercy of the German navy .

I can answer o ff-hand the first of the two questionswhich gave rise to this chapter Russia has entered uponthis struggle against Germany with all her nationalmight to realise an object vital to her national existence,the liberation of the Baltic Sea from German control .Her relations with Scandinavia and Finland will certain ly require settlement, and you are right to devoteattention to them nevertheless, they are of altogethersecondary im portan ce . If our hopes are fulfilled, andthe Allies win this war, Russia

’s most just and mosturgent mandate to the Peace Conference will be theremoval from the strategical points of vantage in theBaltic of this German pirate, who menaces the peacefulcommerce of all other nations with ports upon theBaltic coastline .The satisfaction of Russia’s demand is the problem

before you, and till you have solved it, you will nothave quenched the well-spring of dissension betweenthe German and Russian nations . Again and again itwill spring up into war, while even your Atlantic railwaywill turn from an alleviation into a new danger. Russia,

IN THE BALTIC 349

if she is compelled once and for all to resign to Germanythe naval command of the Baltic, will not submit tothe lack of any naval sally-port whatsoever upon theWestern seas, but will attempt to repeat on her railwayto the Norwegian coast the policy She devised at thebeginning of the century in Man churia . She will seekto turn her free port into a fortified naval base, and thedanger of Tromso or Hammerfest developing into an

Atlan tic Port Arthur may fin ally wreck the good understanding between Russia and Great Britain, and involvethe latter power in a war for the stronghold ’s destructionas costly as the sieges of Sebastopol and of Port Arthuritself. Such may be the consequences of indecisionnow. In the question of the Baltic the future peace of allthe European powers is at stake .”

We cannot neglect our critic’s warning, for the considerations by which he supports it are unanswerable,but we shall be in a better position to give him satisfactionif we can persuade him first to set forth on his ownaccount what he considers the indispensable minimumof conditions necessary to ensure the liberation of theBaltic in the sense Russia intends . We will remindhim, however, before we let him speak, that such termsinevitably involve a serious alteration of the status quoto Germany’s detriment, and that it is therefore doublyimportan t in this instance sympathetically to bear inmind her national point of view, and scrupulously toavoid all wan ton offence to her honour and interest.He will probably accept our proposal with assurance,and launch out in to his disquisition with studiedmoderation .

In the first place, he will begin, the independence and neutrality of Denmark must be guaranteedby Europe, and the guarantors must further subsidise


her to a sufi cient extent to enable her to carry outher in ternational duties effectively. Her task is tofortify the three chann els 1 between the Danish islandsand the peninsulas of Jutland and Sweden, that connectthe waters of the Baltic with the North Sea, and also theapproaches to these chann els at either end, with suchformidable batteries on land and torpedo flo tillas onsea, that she will be able to move on any fleet thatattempts to blockade them or seal them up with mines .Denmark would have every reason for fulfilling this

task honourably and impartially. The national inde

pendence guaranteed her in consideration of it is theonly remaining object of her foreign poli cy, when onceshe has recovered her national unity by the restorationof Schleswig ; and the only event that could endangerthat guaran tee would be another attempt by a S inglepower to impose its dominion on the rest of Europe bywar. If any power planned such a stroke, Denmarkwould be the last state to enter in to collusion with thecriminal, and the knowledge of her incorruptibilitywould go far to discourage the design .

“But Denmark cannot perform this function successfu lly so long as the Kiel Canal is at the disposalof the German navy, and therefore some permanentarrangement must be made that will put it in Denmark’spower, in the event of war, at once to hinder Germanwarships from passing through it .”

He will admit the fact which we have already established, that the whole province of Holstein, throughwhich the Canal ru ns, is German in nationality, andcannot be cut away from the United German state,and he will therefore hesitate to propose the Simplestsolution

,which would be to bring the territory on either

1 Great Belt, Little Belt, and S ound.


Nations, like indiv iduals, enter into competitionwith one another very un equally equipped, in respectboth of natural and of acquired advantages : likeindividuals, they must accept the conditions as th eyfind them, n either makin g th eir own lack a justificationfor robbing by force their neighbour’s superfluity, norusin g their own strength to tyrannise over their neighbour’s weakness . So far as the Kiel Canal givesGermany an economic pull in the commercial competition of the Bal tic, she has a right to make use of itRussia, if we win the war, must not be allowed to takethis advan tage from her but so far as it puts it in herpower by naval force to paralyse whenever she likes theentire commerce of other nations whose only outlet isthrough the Baltic, and the commerce of the wholeWorld in so far as it wishes to do business with thenations in question, it is a stumbling-block to Justiceand a menace to Peace .

We must devise a scheme, then, by which (a) theprovince of Holstein shall remain within the Germanfrontier, and (b) the economic control and profits of theCanal shall be left in Germany’s hands, but (c) thestrategic control shall be taken from her .”

Having thus explained his standpoint, he will proceedto formulate his proposals . We can destroy Germany’s naval command of the Can al completely byputtin g any single vital poin t along its course into thepossession of some alien military power. We mustchoose a poin t wh ich, while of decisive importance forthe Canal, affects as little as may be Germany

’

sinterests in other quarters . This rules out the Westernterminus , for the power which commands that cannothelp commanding likewise Germany’s chief artery ofOcean traff ic, the estuary of the Elbe . We are accord

IN THE BALTIC 353

ingly left with Kiel, and the right power to hold Kiel intrust for Europe is clearly the policeman Denmark.

Denmark must maintain, at Europe’s expense, a ring

of the heaviest fortifications covering Kiel itself andthe last section of the Canal where it enters Kiel Haven,enablin g her at any moment to block the Canal againstarmed German attack, and, if the attack presses her toohard before help arrives, to blow up if necessary canalmouth and fortifications together, and to mine all thesea approaches, thus putting the Canal out of gear foran indefinite period . This fortified area in Dan ishhands must be secured by a margin, broader than therange of the most powerful S iege artillery, which shallbe under the military authority of the Danish, and notof the German, general staff.The boundary of th is zone 1 should start from the

Dano German frontier you have already delimitedbetween Eckern fOrde Bay and the Eider, at a point justWest of the Schleswig-Rendsburg railway, and shouldproceed Southwards parallel to the railway, crossingthe Canal at a point just West of Rendsburg . Thenceit Should run South-East to the Brahm See, then Eastto the B othkamper See, then North-East through thePost and Selenter-Seen in a direct line to the Baltic,leaving the town of Preetz outside .The administration of the Canal itself, its upkeep and

its traff ic, both outside the zone and within it, must inany case remain in the hands of the German government,and if possible the population of the Zone should beincluded, no less than the rest of Holstein, within thepolitical organ isation of the German Empire for allpurposes of civil self government, in spite of theexceptional status of the territory in the military sphere .

1 See map facing p . 48.


But if such absolute separation between the military andthe civil control of a district is in practice impossible, andmilitary exigencies require that both administrationsShould be united in the hands of the same government

,

then th ere is no choice but to detach this strip ofHolstein altogether from the body of Germany, andallow a plebiscite of the population to decide betweendirect incorporation in Denmark, or Home Rule '

under the Danish government, always leaving in thehands of the German nation full property-rights overthe Can al throughout its whole length .

”

With these suggestions our critic will conclude, andit will be our turn once more to pass judgment . We mayfirst commend his fairn ess and moderation , and admitour conviction that he has herein stated the strictminimum of precautions necessary to ensure all theentrances to the Baltic Sea against any forcible attempton Germany’s part to seize the strategical command ofthem . As far as the freedom of the Baltic is concerned,it will under such an arran gement make no differencewhether Germany reverses her aggressive po licy orcontinues in her present courses . But the Baltic question is only one factor, however importan t, in theproblem of European peace . For that problem’sgeneral solution the future mood of Germany is of moredirect and vital importance still, and no Balti c settlement, however perfect in itself, is worth the cost ofdriving Germany into exasperation in the hour of herspiritual crisis, when other influences have so fair aprospect of in clin ing her in to the paths of peace .The Kiel Canal is really a military weapon, like aconscript army or a 42-centimetre gun . It is a part ofGermany’s national arm ament, and while we hope thatone of the results of the settlement will be a scaling


This would be to infli ct an injustice on one nationto the special advantage of another . It would beparallel to the Dual Monarchy’s treatment of theSouthern Slavs, to Russia

’s recent behaviour towardsFinland, and to all the other smouldering grievances ofnations, which have combined to ignite the present war .Just as those had caused war in the past, so, even werethey all elim inated in the settlement, this alone would bea new and most efficacious stimulus to war in the future .The spectacle of Kiel under the military control of

Denmark would be a perpetual incitement to Germanyto take up arms . The more intricate fortificationsDenmark threw up, and the heavier guns she placedin position beh in d them, the more grimly Germanywould toil to construct artillery heavier still, and to openlines of attack that would more than counter the Dan ishlines of defence, and the more bitterly she would hate theConcert of Europe that provided the Dan ish staffwiththe material means for carrying out its commission ,and that brought pressure to bear upon the Danishgovernment whenever the latter indicated its wish toresign an in ternational office which involved it in un

requited responsibility and danger . We should witnessa competition of armaments and an aggravation ofnational antagonism more naked and direct than anywehave experienced yet the crisis would be precipitatedby the harsh treatment of the German population atKiel

,provoked by their natural recalcitrance towards

Danish administration and their eager collusion withthe German Spy

-bureau, or else by the imminentcompletion of a Russian programme for building up,behind the Danish bulwark, a Baltic fleet more thanstrong enough to cope with the German naval force inthese in land waters now isolated strategically from its

IN THE BALTIC 357

sister squadron in the North Sea . Eith er or both ofthese causes would drive Germany to throw down thegauntlet once more to the rest of Europe, not this timein hope but in despair.The remedy, then, for the German command of theBaltic entrances would almost certainly be worse thanthe malady itself, and we find ourselves placed in adilemma : if we leave the Kiel Can al in the hands ofthe German navy we cheat Russia of one of the chiefobjects for which she fought this war, and fail to removea stumblin g-block to her peaceful progress in the futureif we take the Canal out of Germany’s strategic control,we cannot avoid measures that must exasperate her, andcreate a new obstacle to her spiritual conversion . Wehave, it seems, to choose the lesser of two evils .In this choice of dubious alternatives we have oneclear beacon . Mechanical manipulations of geographicalfrontiers and political statuses possess, we agree, but asecondary virtue the sure foundation of Peace lies inthe direct production of a healthy S tate of consciousnessin all the nations of Europe . If we adopt the formeralternative, and do not alter the present status of theCanal, we afford the German nation the most favourableconditions for throwing off the disease which nowvitiates its spirit but a reformed Germany would nolonger desire to use for aggressive purposes the weaponleft in her hands, and so this psychological change,when once it came about, would automatically removethe grounds of dissatisfaction on Russia’s part whichthe policy entails . To remove them immediately wemust adopt the other alternative, and turn Germanyout ofKiel, yet we can only do so at the price of aggravating instead of alleviating her diseased nationalism, whileRussia’s satisfaction, instead of providing a natural cure


for Germany’

s sickness, would obviously promote itS till further, in exact proportion to its own intensity .

We conclude, accordingly, that we shall best serve thecause of ultimate peace if we oppose ourselves to sucha drastic blow at Germany’s national strength and prideas the mi litary confiscation of Kiel . Our judgment istentative, but at least it seems to have logic on its S ide,for it is surely inconsistent to say to Germany in thesame breath Europe expects of you that you willchan ge your heart, because that is her only hope ofsecuring Peace for the future,

” and Europe regretsthat she is obliged to take measures for the security ofher Peace, in case you Should not change your heartafter all .” If we approach Germany in this insincerespirit our overtures are sure to prove futile .Russia , then, must be persuaded to forego herdemands in part . The guaranteeing of Denmark andher armament at international expense are both excellent proposals . She is one o i those small nations thatcontribute much to European civilisation , and herconservation Wi ll be a benefit to all Europe as well as apartial solution of th e Baltic question . But the transferto Denmark of Kiel, though necessary for the immediate solution o f that question in its entirety, must berejected, because it would impose upon Germany ahumiliation much less justifiable and much more acutethan that which we are proposing to spare Russia inthe case of Finland .

B . The Liberation of the B lack S ea

We have answered one of the questions With whichwe started this chapter : Russia is fighting Germanynow for the liberation of the Baltic from German naval


itself singularly obtuse to the psychology of nations .It has disastrously neglected the factor of Russia’sdisinterested national enthusiasm in its estimate ofmilitary forces . Human motives are always complex,and Germany was led into this miscalculation by concentrating her attention on a real, though subordin ate,aspect of Russia’s intervention in the Balkans . Theconcerted action in those quarters of Austrian andTurkish rule does not merely challenge Russia’s knighterrantry by blighting the growth of the small Balkannationalities it directly injures her economic interestsby blocking the exit from the Black Sea, while every stepthe Balkan nations gain with Russia’s assistance is afurther step forward for Russia herself on the road tothe open Mediterranean .

The Germans argue that Russia is preparingpatriarchal despotism under the cloak of fraternalco -operation and that, if they are beaten in th is war,the only result for the Balkans will be to substituteRussian for Austrian domination .

We will not deny,” they say, that Austria, in

declaring war, intended to seize the railway to Salonika,and annex the whole territory through which it runsas far as the .

lEgean but if Russia wins, She will annexthe whole Eastern coast of the Black Sea, and bothshores of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, While she Willincorporate Roumania and Bulgaria in her empire,in order to lead through them a railway of her own tothe Sea of Marmora or theE gean .

”

The persistent aloofness of both Roumania andBulgaria towards Russia’s advances, ever since theTreaty of Berlin, and the reserved attitude they havetaken up in the present crisis, prove that the Germanargument is not altogether groundless .

IN THE BLACK SEA 361

If the prophecy really came true, it would be a gravemisfortune both to Germany and the Balkan statesthemselves, and a violation of national rights and wishesfatal to the endurance of Peace, but we have alreadysketched a series of arrangements calculated to makeRussian and German hegemony in the Balkans alikeimpossible .

(i.) The grouping of the six Balkan states into aZollverein which may develop into a defensivealliance.

(ii .) The maintenance of this zollverein’s economic

links with Germany through Trieste, and the creationof new links with Russia through Odessa .

(iii .) The complete settlement of racial disputesbetween the Balkan League and the Russian Empire,by the cession of North-Western Bessarabia to Roumania.None of these arrangements will stand in the way of

Russia’s real objective, towards which hegemony overthe Balkans would be merely a means,— the Liberationof the Black Sea.The entrance to the Black Sea has been the strongest

naval position in the world through all history, butnever more so than at this day, when waterways can beblocked by mines capable of destroying instantaneouslythe most magnificent battleship .

The first section of the passage is the Bosphorus,a winding strait eighteen miles long, and varyingfrom 700 to 3500 yards in width, with a strongoutward current flowing through it, and steep bluffsoverhanging it on either side . At the further end ofits European shore the hills sink, and a splendid harbour,the Golden Horn,

” ru ns inland, protected from themore open waters of the Sea of Marmora by the peninsula on which Constantinople stands . The passage


of about 1 50 miles down the Sea of Marmora, from theGolden Horn to the beginning of the Dardanelles, formsthe second section ; the Dardanelles themselves arethe last . These straits are forty miles long : theiraverage breadth 1 is considerably greater than that ofthe Bosphoru s, but at the decisive strategical pointbetween Kilid - Bahr and Kaleh - i Sultaniyeh theynarrow to 1400 yards, and inside this line their amplerwindings provide good anchorage for large warshipsat Nagara and at Gallipoli . When you have put theDardanelles behind you, you have still to clear thechannel between Im bros and Tenedos islands , beforeyou really reach the open waters of the [Egean .

The free use of this extremely difficult waterway isof vital importance to all states possessing ports onthe Black Sea, principally, of course, to Russia, whodepends entirely on this route for the export of herWheat and her petroleum, but likewise to Roumaniaand Bulgaria in their degree . And yet control of thewhole passage remains in the hands of Turkey, the leastcivilised of all the Black Sea states and the only one ofthem who has no commerce of her own to give her alegitimate interest in the waterway’s economic utilisation . Moreover, she takes unscrupulous advantageof its incomparable strategic qualities to push a policyof adventure even more dangerous to the Peace ofEurope than the national chauvinism of Germans andMagyars . Turkish chauvinism has no ideas behind itor objectives in front of it, and is conducted with atravesty of opportunism by ignorant and ill-educatedmen .

The Turks have held th is waterway for five hundredyears . They seized it first by the right of strong

1 Three to four mi les.


not demand more than is just boilers only explode ifyou refuse to open the safety-valve .In the Black Sea, then, as in the Balti c, we have to

devise some organ for holding the entrance in trust forthe states that have ports on the Black Sea coast, andfor the commerce of the whole World . In one way thequestion is simpler here : there is no back-door, likethe Kiel Canal, between Black Sea and [Egean , and wehave only the single passage to consider. Turkey hassunk no capital in improvin g that, and we need haveno compunction in throwing her out, neck and crop,without compensation . In another way it is moredifficult . Turkey does not merely control the BlackSea as Germany controls the Baltic : she is in actualpossession of the strategical points, and there is here norespectable, impartial policeman like Denmark, waitingon the spot, and ready to take up his duties as soon as heis commissioned . Turkey cannot, without a Europeancatastrophe, be entrusted any longer with the poin ts inquestion, but when we eject her we shall have toorgan ise a brand-new administration in her stead letus begin by defin ing exactly the territories to beforfeited .

(i.) To control the Bosphorus, the NewAdministrationmust take over both its Shores, and also the Shores of theSea of Marmora and the Black Sea for a certain distancealong both the European and the Asiatic S ide of eitherentran ce to the Straits . The European territory shouldin clude the whole district of Constantinople, as far as itsboundary again st the vilayet of Adrianople, that is, upto a line leaving the Marmora coast midway betweenEregliand Silivri, crossing theAdrianople-Constantin oplerailway half-way between Chorlu and Chataldja, andproceeding North to the Black Sea coast between


Istrandja and Orm an lu . The frontier of the Asiaticterritory should start from Deredje, on the NorthernShore of the Gulf of Ismid, and run N .N.E . till it hitsthe Black Sea coast at Kilia.

(ii .) In the Sea of Marmora all the islands, and withthem the peninsula of Artaki (Kapu Dagh) should passto the New Administration .

(iii .) At the Dardanelles it should be given authorityon the Asiatic side over the whole district of Bigha

(the Troad West of a line S tarting from the Gulf ofEdremid at a point on its North shore on the samemeridian as Aivali, and passing first over the summit ofMount Ida and then in a general North-Easterly direction to the Marmora coast East of Demotika . Onthe European side it should be assigned, not onlythe Gallipoli Peninsula Thracian Chersonnesus

but sufficient hinterland to cover the peninsula’s neck,where it is lowest, narrowest, and strategically mostvulnerable . The line here should leave the lEgeanat Ivridje burun, on the North shore of the Gulf ofXeros, run North-East along the summit of the KuruDagh, cross the Sayan Dere just below Emerli, andthence proceed due East, over the summit of MountPyrgos to Ganos on the Marmora coast .

(iv.) In the [Egean the Administration Should receivethe islands of Imbros and Tenedos , which were left inTurkey’s possession by the Peace of London, becausethey play an essential part in the command of theDardanelles .The population of these districts is very diverse in

nationality. The peasants of the Troad, the largestcontinuous mass of land within the Territory, form asolid Turkish block, only broken by a few Greekenclaves along the shore of the Dardanelles and of the


Edremid Gulf. The islands, on the other hand, arepurely Greek, but their area is small . Constantinople,which, together with its suburbs, accounts for the greatmajority of the Territory’s inhabitants, is the mostcosmopolitan City in the World .

When the Turks conquered her in the fifteenthcentury, she was the focus of Greek nationality andcivilisation, and the modern kingdom of Hellas, whichregards itself as the Romaic Empire ’s heir, openlyaspires to raise its standard over the capital of the lastConstantine . But for four and a half centuries Constan tinople has harboured the government of thegreatest political power in Islam, and the honour of itslong-protracted presence has altered both her orientation and her character . She has drawn within herradius lands further East than the rule of her Romaicemperors ever extended, her population has beenenriched by all the races of the Ottoman Empire, andCommerce has combined with Government to swell hernumbers but in this steady growth the Greek element,handicapped by the Porte ’s disfavour, has not taken itsproportionate share . At present it stands at no morethan perhaps per cent . of the total popu lation

,

1 so that it is hardly superior numerically, whiledecidedly inferior in wealth, to the flourishing Armeniancolony .

It is true that the present Turkish majority is largely

1 The present popu lation of Constan tinople is estimated as fo llowsMoslemsGreeksArmenians

Foreign subjectsJewsOth ers

368 RUSSIA'S NEEDS

but its military importance for the rest of Europethat has led us to mark it off for special treatment .Here our difficulties begin, and we will consider thepossible solutions of them in turn .

(i.) We might simply demolish all existing fortifications, and organ ise no military force in the Territory atall . But to leave the Straits defenceless would be amere invitation to all powers interested and well armedto scramble for their occupation we could not offer amore potent apple of discord .

The freedom of vitally important internationalcommunications can only be secu red by a militarysanction so formidable that no individual nation willhave the means to challenge it, and it is Utopian toexpect that the several nations of Europe will consent tothat simultaneous reduction of armaments which is thegoal of our hopes . They will not do this till the balan ceof armaments has already shifted from national to international control and the military force of the individualstates has ceased to be (what it undeniably has been untilnow) the decisive factor in the political destiny of theWorld .

Artificial compacts cannot, in themselves, limit thecontracting parties ’ freedom of action . In the last resortthey will always break the agreement if they can , andtry to get their own way by summoning up all theresources they actually command . When Sparta andArgos proposed to settle their differences by a tournaybetween three hundred chosen champions from eithercity

,the Argive champions won ; but the result was

reversed when the Whole Spartan army rushed in to therescu e of their comrades, and took the more honourable Argive army o ff its guard. Fair play could onlyhave been secured if the lists had been commanded by


a dozen twentieth-century troops with a machine gun.

Contracts are only effective if there is a power in thebackground that makes it worth neither party

’s while tobreak their plighted word .

The necessary preliminary, then, to the reduction ofnational armaments in Europe is the establishment ofother armaments, controlled by some agency actingfrom an impartial, international point of view, at thestrategical keys of Europe— points which have suchmilitary strength innate in their geographical disposition, that a comparatively small force stationed therecan act more decisively, to bind or to loose, thanthe largest forces of which the separate European nationsor groups of nations dispose . We have proposed toinstall such a force at the mouth of the Baltic by guaranteeing Denmark and putting her in possession of thenecessary military positions, and we have a similarduty to discharge at the Black Sea Straits .

(ii .) Our problem, then, unfolds itself as the co

ordination o f a strong international military organisationwith the local Greek civil government of the StraitsTerritory. Obviously the most desirable solution wouldbe that the Autonomous State should be subsidised,like Denmark, to organise and maintain the militarydefence of its own territory. It is a restricted andunsatisfactory form of self-government that does notextend to the m ilitary sphere, and the friction betweenthe native civil adm inistration and the alien militaryauthorities, which we anticipated in the Kiel enclave,would be more serious here in proportion to the widerterritory and larger population affected . But unfortunately, while the interests of Denmark and Europecoincide, those of Europe and the proposed AutonomousGreek State do not . National self consciousness


makes Denmark wish for independence, and theguarantee, the territorial gains, and the armamentsubsidy give her the best means of securing it but thesame inspiration of national feeling will make theGreeks of the Straits Territory naturally and justlydesirous of union with, and absorption in, the Kingdomof Hellas .Th is is another instance where a minority must

suffer . If the Autonomous State had it in its powerto vote by plebiscite for union with the Kingdom

,a

majority would inevitably be secured for that motion,and either Russia or Turkey or both would make the acta casus belli against Greece or even against the wholeBalkan League, because it would falsify the expectations under which they had originally consented to theliberation and internationalisation of the Straits . Evenif war were averted for the moment, it would break outin the end . The acquisition by the Balkan League ofthis new asset would encourage it to start a policy ofadventure (the political sense of the Balkan people isstill in its infancy) , or worse sti ll, the enlarged Greecewould break off from the Zollverein , and begin a stillmore extravagant career on its own account . TheGreek population of the Straits Territory must accordingly suffer, and, while enjoying local autonomy, mustforego the consummation of its national ideal . Yet wecannot expect the Greek temperament to suffer gladly.

We have the experience of Krete to warn us, whereUnionist activity made itself a nuisance to Europe for adozen years , till union was achieved, and the fact thatseparation was a wantonly inflicted evil in that case andis a necessary evil in this, only makes it more imperativethat in this case the arrangement should be unswervin glymaintain ed . The fortification of the Straits is essential


to the policy of the several national governments, to

whom these contingents belong .A fortress demands the entire loyalty of its garrison,

the kindling in them of a common spirit as strong asthat of a warship ’s crew. It is essential to its efi ciencythat it Should work smoothly under centralised direction,and that knowledge of its organisation and functionin gshould be the directorate ’s monopoly. Yet this loyalty,which shows its colour most crudely in the militarysphere but is likewise the background of all social life, isin modern Europe monopolised by the national state,and men cannot serve two spiritual masters . Thesupreme commandant, supposing that the diplomati ccustom were followed as usual, and the appoin tmentdevolved automati cally upon the cloyen of the contingentcommanders, would feel that he held the post in trustfor his government (a point of view the other governments would not endorse) . Each member of his com

posite general stafl'

, instead of sharing a professionalenth usiasm for their common duty, would feel himselfto be an attaché retained on the spot by his parti culargovernment to report upon the secrets of his colleagues .The contingents themselves would feel little respect forth eir superiors , and would regard the various positionswith whi ch they were entrusted as precious additionsto the sacred soil of their respective fatherlands .

(iv.) A commandant, staff and personnel that hadno prior allegiance, would be relieved from this falseposition

,and it might seem possible, by recruiting

citizens of all European states individually, and offeringthem a life-long career, to build up a service with atradition and a professional pride of its own . Experience,however

,is discouraging . Since national loyalty still

holds the field,some form of national service will attract


the nation’s best men, and those that choose to bestowtheir energies elsewhere will probably have a discreditable reason for so doing . Soon after the beginningof British control in Egypt, the Egyptian governmentattempted, with our sanction, to raise a cosmopolitanforce, but dropped the idea after a short trial . TheFrench Foreign Legion in North Africa has a persistently evil reputation, and even the Papal Zouavesin the middle of last century were notorious for theirbad behaviour, though they were inspired not merelyby mercenary motives , but by a spiritual cause whichhad once no rival in Europe, and was then only inprocess of being supplanted by Nationality .

To find an auspicious precedent we must go backto the time when Christendom was struggling on thedefensive against the advance of Islam. In thethirteenth century each nationality guarded its sectionof curtain and tower along the walls of Acre,1 andmore than two centuries later national diversity wasstill, as King Stephen had conceived it, a strength andnot a weakness, a spur to emulation and not a paralysingblight, among the cosmopolitan Knights of St . Johnin their last heroic defence of Rhodes .2 Yet at thatvery time the Most Christian King of France was offering his harbour of Toulon to the Turkish fleet, becausethe Ottoman power was the greatest thorn in the sideof his nation’s Hapsburg enemy . The National Ideawas replacing (ecumenical anarchy by parochial peaceand-unity, and it was a symbolic incident when, in1798, the armada of the French Republic One andIndivisible, on its way to the conquest and conciliationof an enfeebled Egypt, extinguished the rule of theHospitallers’ Order in its final refuge, the island of Malta .

1 Fall of Acre, 1291 A .D.1 Fall of Rhodes, 1522 A .D.


We hope for the birth of a loyalty and an ideal thatshall overshadow Nationality in its prime even morecompletely than the Church overshadowed it in itsinfancy but such a spirit is not abroad among us yet,and it is useless to build up concrete cosmopolitanorganisations before its com ing, for they will have novirtue in them until they have received its baptism.

(v .) For the guardianship of the Black Sea Straits,then, we must fall back upon the services of somesingle existing national state . Though there is nonein this case that has a Special interest of its own identi calwith the general interest o f Europe, as Denmark hasin the Baltic, we may at least hope to fin d one with nospecial interest adverse to the interest of Europe, whichwe may induce to undertake the impartial conduct ofthe task for the general advantage .As the question is primarily a European concern,

it would be reasonable to choose a European statefor the commission ; and, since the Great Powersare ex hypothesi ruled out (the whole problem arisin gfrom their mutual rivalry) , our choice must lightupon some minor nation . But here, too, the precedents are disquieting . The Belgian customs-serviceand the Swedish gendarmerie, introduced into Persiato establish strong government, have not been equal totheir task there . They have no natural connection withthe country, and no power of influencing its destinyon their own initiative that power lies with Russia andIndia

,the great armed states immediately beyond its

frontiers . The Persian population realises this, andrightly regards the Belgian and Swedish administratorsas secondary agents, put in by Russia and GreatBritain as a S topgap , to shelve the settlement of theirown rival ambitions . The two services therefore lack


foreign policy to incur no political obligations acrossthe Atlantic, and they will be more eager than ever tomaintain this prin ciple, now that they have seen whatvolcanoes underlie Europe ’s smiling surface .Great Britain, however, has pursued for a century a

policy of precisely similar intention, keeping her eyesfixed upon her Empire and her social problems

,and

refusing to intervene on the continent across thechann el, and yet circumstances have been too strongfor her . In the present crisis we have been carriedinto the storm-centre of the struggle, and Americaherself, while she has avoided war, has by no meanses caped the effects of it . The financial business of NewYork, no less than that of London, is at a standstill .She must take to heart the lesson of this catastrophe,

and realise that for her, too, the phase of splendidisolation has come to an end . The present hurricanehas bereft the ship of International Peace of her watertight compartments : the next breach in her side willput the whole vessel in danger of foundering .

By taking this burden, then, upon their shoulders, theU .S .A. would be performing an act of internationalgenerosity wh ich would be the proudest record in theirhistory, but they would also be consulting their trueinterest, which is fundamentally identical with theinterest of united Europe . They would be helping toassure universal peace .From the objective point of view, there is no doubtthat they are admirably qualified to undertake the task .

They have no private interest in the Black Sea Straits ,and they are one of the strongest powers in the worldtheir decisions would therefore pass unchallenged byall parties affected, especially as the self-denying sideof the Monroe Doctrine a nd the attitude they are main


taining in the present war, have won the U.S .A . animperishable reputation for impartiality. Moreover,they have intimate connections with the population ofthe Territory. Since the close of last century the mostenterprising and able-bodied peasants all over EasternEurope have been finding their way across the Atlantic,undergoing the industrial metamorphosis, and returninghome with smart coats on their backs, strong boots ontheir feet, and hard money in their pockets, to preachthe good tidings of this Eldorado in the West . A mericais an even more present reality in the minds of the vastuneducated majority in Turkey and the Balkans thanare the powers of Europe in the calculations of the semieducated minority that controls their politics . YetAmerica has a strong footing among this importantclass as well, for the only thorough secondary education,up to the modern civilised standard, that the inhabitantsof these countries can obtain Without resorting to theforeign universities of Central and Western Europe, isgiven by Robert College, the famous American foundation on the European shore of the Bosphorus, whichopens its doors to S tudents of all religions and nationalities,1 and has been for years a beacon light amid aninconscionable welter of hatreds and particularisms .The relations, therefore, between the American administration and the autonomous population of the Territorywould be founded upon a strong tradition of respect andgood-will .We conclude that America is the only power in theworld capable of accomplishing this m ission, and thatthe omens are in favour of her accomplishing it well.

1 This foundation for men is supplemented by the American Co llegefor wom en on the Asiatic side of the S traits. It was originally openedf or Christian girls of all nationalities within the Turkish Empire, b utMoslem s, too , have recently begun to send their daughters there.


The true solution, then, of the Black Sea problem, wouldbe for Europe to throw herself on the United States ’

mercy, an d ask them to accept her comm ission, untilshe has built up among her various nationalities thatcommon European patriotism which alone can give herthe spiritual force to administer the trust herself. Thoseacquainted with the American political outlook willprobably object that it is Utopian to propose such anissue, however desirable it might be ; yet even if thelogical conclusion to which our argument has led us isno more than a reductio ad absurdum of the prevailingnational antagonisms of Europe, it will at least pointthe moral that Europe can only be saved by her ownefforts, and that if she does not find an occasion forsetting her house in order in the settlement after thiswar

,she will never be able thereafter to arrest its

progressive ru in .

380 THE DISMANTLING OF TURKEY

is a sprinkling of Turkish villages throughout, and

a considerable Bulgarian element in its mountainousNorth-West corner, Greek Irredentism has naturally,and quite justly, kept the whole region inscribed onits book of claims . Most of those claims are alreadysatisfied or else in process of satisfaction, but Thrace isprobably destined to remain a bad debt . The decisivefactor here is Geography, and it assigns the territoryunmistakably to Bulgaria .The natural route of egress from the Bulgarian

hinterland to a door on the [Egean follows the lines ofthe Maritsa and its tributaries, from their sources andfrom over the watershed beyond, to their triple junctionat Adrianople, and then proceeds due Southwards alongthe united stream, to the ports of A inos and Dedeagatch

on the East and West flanks of its mouth .

Adrianople was built with the express strategicalpurpose of blocking this route . It was the bulwarkof the venerable Byzantine Empire against Bulgariain her Spring, and since the Berlin Treaty it has beenthe bulwark of a Turkey galvanised into life against aBulgaria miraculously re-arisen from the dead . Fora few months in 1913 , Bulgaria, for the first time in herhistory, held the coveted prize in her grip, to lose itagain by her own folly, when the Turkish army quietlyre-occupied the fortress during the war she had wantonlyprovoked with her former allies . The compromisewhich Turkey forced upon Bulgaria in her extremity,confirmed the retrocession of Adrianople and KirkKilisse (its strategic complement) to the TurkishEmpire

,and though Bulgaria retained the ZEgean coast

strip between the mouths of the Mesta and the Maritsa,for practical purposes her road to the sea was cut o ffagain as effectually as ever .

THRACE 381

Near the Western end of that coast there is the excellent harbour o f Porto Lagos, backed by the fertiletobacco-growing plain of Xanthi, but this districtis separated from the upper valley of the Maritsa bythe immense barrier of the Rhodope mountains, andthough from the port a narrow-gauge railway mightbe engineered across them through Gim irdjina, Kirdjali and Haskevi to Philippopolis, it could never, anymore than the Bosnian railway, become a main arteryof commerce . The main economic route must continue to skirt the course of the Maritsa, and in fact arailway already runs from Sofia over the watershed toPhi lippopolis, and thence along the Right bank of theriver all the way to Dedeagatch , the port westward of itsmouth .

This railway was purposely led by the Turkishmilitary authorities through the ring of the Adrianopleforts, and thus, though Dedeagatch itself has passed intoBulgaria’s possession together with the Right bank of theMaritsa below Adrianople, its railway communicationswith the Bulgarian interior are cut . It might seempossible to avoid Adrianople by constructing an allBulgarian loop-line from point to point on the Rightbank of the Maritsa well inside the Bulgarian frontierbut the low country suitable for railway engineeringbetween the river and the Eastern bastions of Rhodopeis narrow, andithe Turkish military authorities quitejustifiably insisted in including within their frontier, asrectified by the compromise, a wide radius of territorybeyond the Adrianople forts on the Right banks of theTundja and the Maritsa, on the ground that its possession was essential to the defence of Adrianopleitself. This zone stretches right up among the mountain spurs the loop-line would have to be carried by a


tour de force over the shoulder of Rhodope, and eventhen it could be cut at once, in the event of war, by aforce astride the natural line of communications atAdrian ople itself.This simply proves that Adrianople excellently fulfils

its object, and that so long as it remains in Turkey’s

hands, free communication with the ZEgean is deniedto Bulgaria . We proposed to meet the problem ofHungary’s railway to the Adriatic and Russia’s to theAtlantic by putting the politico-military and the economic control in different hands, but a similar solution isin th is case impossible, because the Turkish governmentis too uncivilised and uneducated to refrain on the leasttemptation from exploiting the brute force we should beleaving at its command . Unless She can prove somestrategical necessity more pressing than Bulgaria’seconomic need for an outlet on the .

lEgean , Turkeymust evacuate Adrianople altogether . Ti ll now shehas been able to allege the defence of the Dardanellesand Constantinople, but when we have relieved her ofthat duty by placing these positions in the keeping of apower, and under the sanction of a concert of powers,that neither Bulgaria nor the united Balkan Leaguewould venture to impugn, the case for her presence atAdrianople falls to the ground, and nothing remainsbut to rescue Thrace at once from that misgovernmentwhich Turkish chauvinism has aggravated during thepast year in its impotent thirst for revenge .The incorporation of Thrace in Bulgaria will not

benefit the latter country only : it will vastly improvethe condition of the whole population of Thrace . TheGreek elements will have to abandon their dream ofnational reunion, which, in the bitterness of the SecondBalkan War

,made them prefer the return of Turkish

THRACE 383

anarchy, because it is by nature transitory, to Bulgariangovernment that is too effi cient not to strike roots . Butmeanwhile the Turk has made them suffer for theirfine-drawn policy of possessing their souls in patience .He has goaded th em beyond human endurance, andgiven such a foil to the Bulgar that they may actuallyhail him once more as a deliverer, as they hailed h imfirst in the Autumn of 1912 .

Certainly if we can install Bulgarian government inThrace again with the good-will of the Greek population,it will make the future easier for all parties concerned,but after their atrocious behaviour in the Second BalkanWar, this is almost more than the Bulgarians deserve .

We must not rely on good feeling alone to settle theThracian question, but must safeguard the Greeksin the province by the strictest guarantees for theirnational individuality . In fact, this is the least wecan do to satisfy public opinion in the kingdom o f

Hellas, which has not yet risen to the insight of thecountry ’s political good-genius, the premier Venezelos.

He, indeed, recognises that the solution of all Balkanproblems lies in compromises rationally concludedand honourably observed, and was always willing toleave under Bulgarian rule the Greek population ofthe Maritsa basin, if Bulgaria in return agreed thatthe villages of her own nationality in the hinterland ofSalonika should pass to Greece . The result of Bul

garia’

s uncompromising nationalism was the SecondBalkan War, by which Greece got more than her due,and Bulgaria lost much of what she could justly claim .

The proposed arrangement would at last make thebalance even, and allow the two nations to forget theregrettable relations of the past .The Turkish elements would actually have less cause


for dreading the change than the Greek . The Turkhas found by experience that good government by theforeigner and the infidel is a happier lot than the DarkAge of his native regime and the Bulgars have been assuccessful in reconciling and assimilating their Moslemfellow-citizens, of whom there are large numbers in theNorth-Eastern parts of the country, as the Austrians havebeen in Bosnia or the Russians in Turkestan . Whenevery Christian peasant in Bulgaria was called to thecolours in the Summ er of 1912, the Moslem neighbour,whose services the Government did not demand for theTurkish war, undertook to gather in the harvest on thecampaigner’s fields . There is little doubt that if theMoslems of Thrace pass under Bulgarian administration, their loyalty to their new country will soon beequally intense .The Bulgarians have no incentive to treat thisminority ill : the battle of Lule Burgas settled oldscores, and after the joint occupation of Salonika theGreek eclipsed the Turk as the national rival . Protestswill come, not from the local Moslems, but from Turkishnationalism across the Straits . Adrianople was for acentury the capital of th e Ottoman State, and the tombsof the Sultans are there : th e sophisticated Ottomanclaims them as national monuments , and the city inwhi ch they stand as inalienable Ottoman soil . Noapter example could be found of the argument fromh istorical sentiment, and we have only to classify thisfallacy in order to dismiss it from consideration . Thedesire of a livin g population, and not the pride of deadconquerors

,must settle the destiny of Adrianople, and

it will not settle it in favour of the Turkish Empire . InBulgaria’s hands the tombs will be as well tended as theWhole province .


European group that has followed a very individualdevelopment of its own, and produced a voluminous,though chiefly ecclesiastical, literature . Fin ally there isthe common tradition of a political independence whichendured almost unbroken for twelve centuries, andoccasionally played a decisive part in the history of theWorld .

Unhappily this tradition was extinguished morethan eight centuries ago . Since then the only adm inistrative bond uniting the Armenian people has been theorganisation of their national Church, and the nation

’shistory has resembled that of the Jews . The Armenians in Dispersion have prospered exceedingly. Theyhave shown an adaptability capable of assimilatingEuropean ways of life, not merely the social superficialities achieved by the Young Turks, but the solidfoundations of spiritual ideas and technical skill ; andthey have found the energy to turn their acquisitionsto account by rivallin g and even outstripping theirEuropean teachers in the economic exploitation of theNearer East . Their recent evolution has bridged thegulf between Asiatic and European, and, like the riseof Japan, tends to prove that the contrast betweenOriental and Occidental does not express underlying difference of temperament so much as differenceof phase in an identi cal process of growth .

Japan, however, in her awakening has mainly utilisedthe politi cal line of advance, wh ile the political condition of the Armenian peasant who has stayed at homein his native mountain-valleys , has steadily been goingfrom bad to worse . Moslem government has giventhe advantage to his Moslem neighbours from the

Zagros mountains on the South-East, the quite barbarous nomadic Kurdish clans ; and during the last

ARMENIA

generation of the nineteenth century the regime ofAbdul Hamid converted this inevitable tendencytowards official partiality into a deliberate policy ofinflaming a racial feud, and destroying the Armeniannationality in the conflagration . The Kurdish chiefswere decorated with Ottoman military rank, and theirretainers enrolled as Ottoman irregular troops . Rifleswere distributed to these regiments in abundance,while the Armenian population was prohibited underthe severest penalties from carrying arms . Then theKurds were let loose on the Armenians, as the Albanians were let loose on the Serbs in the valley of theWhite Drin . Village after village of native peasants hasbeen laid desolate, that the intrusive Kurd may pitchhis tents and pasture his flocks over the abandonedfields the concerted massacres which have shocked usfrom time to time, are merely accentuations of a steadilypushed process, which is successfully annihilating themost civilised and industrious race in Western Asia, andreplacing it by the most idle, squalid and unruly.

The Armenian Dispersion lavishes its wealth inbuilding schools, supporting refugees, and stemmingwherever it can the tide of destruction, but it is powerlessagainst the brute force of Turkish government in possession . The situation is even worse under the newregime than under the old, for the administration cannoteasily recall rifles recklessly delivered into Kurdishhands, even if it has the will to do so, while YoungTurkish chauvinism looks askance at the Armenians’

success, and contemplates their disappearance withsatisfaction .

The civilised World cannot afford to let these outrages continue, and if the two Central European powersthat have so far secured Turkey impunity are defeated


in the present war, the whole territory where this stateof things prevails must be severed from the TurkishEmpire at once .The true solution of the Armenian question is for

tunately not diflicult to discern . There is no possib ility yet of national self-government : the Armenianpeasantry constitutes only one half of the populationin this region, it is defenceless, and it is crushed bypersecution. The first requisite is eflicient government, inexorably just and irresistibly strong, which willcarry out the serious military task of disarming andpacifying the Kurds, and proceed to establish law-andorder throughout the land . Under the shadow of sucha government both races would for the first time befree to increase, multiply, and inherit this portion ofthe earth , accordin g to their respective talents and

capacities .Strong government of just the kind required

exists already immediately across the frontier, anda large section of the Armenian population has longprospered under it . It has been the fashion inEngland to depreciate the Russian administration inthe Caucasus . It was imposed,

” we say, by re

len tless warfare against small native mountain tribesstrugglin g for their freedom, and this sacrifice of bloodhas not been justified by its results . On the one handorder is far from being perfectly established (we re

member the racial riots between Armenians and Tatarsat Baku in 1904 and on the other hand the nationaldevelopment, not only of savage mountaineers, but ofcivilised Georgian s and Armenians, has been stifled

1 Though they are not a fair exam ple to cite, since they were due tothe transitory phase of anarchy which swept during these years overthewho leRussian Empire, while against them must be setmany decadesof continuously efi cient administration .


decentral ised after enlargement at the expense ofthe Russian frontier ; but, as in Thrace, the Turksthemselves have effectually shattered such delusions,and there is not an Armenian now in the Turkishprovinces who does not pray for the coming of Russia.Etchmiadzin , the ecclesiastical capital of the nation,is already in Russian territory, and even wh ileArmenian political idealism still had a Turkish orientation, th e actual political centre of gravity was automatically shifting across the frontier. The Armenianhusbandman , when the barrenness of the mountain sand the ferociousness of the Kurds drive him to seekhis fortune abroad, naturally gravitates to the mostfavourable market for his energies . He has found it inRussian Caucasia, and this is the best testimony of allto the virtue of Russian rule . Tiflis, the an cientcapital of the Georgian nation, has become practicallyan Armenian city, boasting almost as large an Armeniancolony as Constantinople, while the population of thenative Armenian districts on the Russian side of thefrontier is now about a quarter as large again as theArmenian population in the Turkish provinces Eastof the Euphrates and North of the Tigris, though itoccupies a territory of less than half this area.1

We must, therefore, attempt to bring within theRussian frontier all Turkish territory where the fundamental population is Armenian , and where this popu lation ’s prosperity is being ru ined by the legalisedaggression of the Kurds .

1 Arm enian popu lation in TiflisArm enian popu lation in Constantin opleArm enian popu lation in Russian provinces A khaltsik,Kars, Alexandropo l, Erivan , Nachitchevan , S husa

A rmeman popu lation in Turkish territory Within limi tsSped fied 0 0 0 0 0 o o 0

ARMENIA 391

This territorial settlement 1 of the national questionmust take due account of the geographical factor, andit would begin by assigning Trebizond to the RussianEmpire, because a great caravan route starts from thatport across the mountains through Baiburt to Erzeroumin the Armenian interior . The Lazic population ofthe coast strip, though it is not itself Armenian, isnot Turkish either, but akin to the Georgians ofthe Caucasus .2 The frontier should accordingly startfrom Tireboli on the South coast of the Black Sea Westof Trebizond, and ru n due South, excluding Karahissarto the West, till it strikes the upper reach of the Kara SuWestern Euphrates at a point below Erzingan .

Thence it should follow the course of the EuphratesSouthwards, as far as Telek, where the river hits theTaurus range running East and West, and slashes itsway through the mountain barrier in a long, tortuousgorge, impassable for human traffic .The Armenian race is not confined to the Eastern

bank of the Euphrates . When the Turkish avalanchefrom Central Asia shattered the old kingdom ofArmenia in the eleventh century A .D., a considerablefragment of the nation migrated across the river andbeyond the open plateau of Malatia to the broken ribsof Taurus further West, where the Sihun (Sarus) and

Jihun (Pyramus) come down Southwards betweenparallel mountain-lines to the plain of Adana and thesea. Here they founded a kingdom of Little Armenia,which threw in its lot with the Latin principal itiescarved out by the first Crusade, and took its full sharein the losing battle against the returning tide of Islam.

1 See Map VI.1 D ifference o f religion, however, prevents Laze and Georgian from

sharing a comm on nationa l consciou sness. The Lazes areMoslem .


All the Christian states alike were extinguished inthe fourteenth century, but the population did not perishwith the kingdom, and the Armenians have held theirground to this day in their second home . They have

,

moreover, been reinforced by that more recent expansionfrom the original motherland, which has not affectedthis South-Eastern corner of Anatolia alone, but hasendowed the urban centres throughout the wholeEastern half of the peninsula with strong Armeniancolonies .Yet in spite of their vigour and their increasingnumbers, the Armenians have not made EasternAnatolia their own . The Turkish substratum remainsthe preponderant element West of Euphrates, as theArmenian East of the river, and though the memory ofthe terrible Adana massacres, perpetrated under theYoung Turkish regime in will cause us to takethe most stringent precautions for safeguardin g theArmenian nationality in the territories left under Turkishgovernment, it must not blind us to the actual numericalproportion between the two races in this region. Exceptwhere professional brigands are subsidised for the task,like the Kurds across the river, it is only very weakminorities that suffer massacre what tempted theTurkish masses to the crime, and justified it in theirown eyes, was the sense that they were in an immensemajority, and the hope that one determined stroke ofbrute violence might rid them altogether of these hated,progressive

,alien tares in their uniform Moslem field .

In execrating their action, we must not forget that thefacts on which they based it remain roughly true .Having reached the gorge of Telek, the new frontier

should leave the Left bank of the Euphrates, and proceed1 Less than a year after the proclam ation o f the Constitu tion .


the Mesopotamian plain, and the seat of their patriarch 1

has been established since then at Julamerk, on thehighest reach of the Greater Zab . Most of the refugees,however, have not tarried on the Western slope of themountains, but have crossed the watershed into the

Urumia basin, where they form th e exclusive populationof a compact distri ct on the West shore of the lake .Latterly the Chaldaeans have been exposed even morecruelly than the Armenians to Kurdish barbarity, andabout half their villages on Lake Urum ia have abandonedtheir allegiance to the patriarch at Julamerk, andaccepted the Orthodox creed, in order to secure theprotection of Russia. The inauguration of Russian“strong government is in fact as essential to thesurvival of the Chaldaeans as it is to that of theArmenians,and the only solution is to in clude within the Russianfrontier the whole area inhabited by this race, in additionto the Armenian plateau .

The distribution of the Chalda ans, however, com

pletely cuts across existing political divisions. WhileJulamerk is in Ottoman territory, the Urumia basin,the nation’s centre of gravity, belongs to Persia, and

the Turco-Persian frontier follows the summit of theZagros range . If, then, the whole Chaldxan nation isto be united under Russia

’s z gis, the Russian frontierwill have to be advanced at the expense of Persia, aswell as at the expense of Turkey.

Fortunately, there is no obstacle to this, for Azerbaij an, the North-Westernmost province of Persia,within which the Urumia basin lies, has no nationalconnection with the state in which it is at present 2

1 Like the Armenian Katho likos at Etchmiadzin , he is the po liticalas well as th e religious head of the nation .

1 During th e S ixteenth and seventeenth centuries it several tim es

changed hands between Persia and Turkey .

ARMENIA 395

politically incorporated. While the Chaldz ans occupythe Western side of the lake, the valleys that drain intoit from the East, one of which contains the importanttown of Tabriz, are inhabited

,

by an equally compactpopulation of Tatars, who were deposited there by theMongol dominion of the fourteenth century, and speaka variety of the wide-spread Turkish tongue . Thesehave as little sympathy as the Chaldxans with theirPersian masters on the South, whose Iranian languagethey do not understand, and whose Sh iah heresy theydetest. A ll their links are Northward, towards thevalley of the Aras, whence the railway is coming toTabriz from the present Russian railhead at Julfa, andtowards the broad steppes that fill the lower basin of theriver as far as Baku on the Caspian coast, where halftheir race is already living contentedly under Russianrule . The whole population of the province appreciatesthe strong government and the economic progresswhich the de facto Russian occupation 1 has begun togive them, and it would still further foster the advanceof civilisation here if the gift were assured by the formalannexation of Azerbaijan to the Russian Empire .At the gorge between the Tor-Abdin and Judi Dagh

ranges, the new Russian frontier should leave the courseof the Tigris, and proceed Eastward again along thesummit of the Judi Dagh, cross the Greater Zab belowJulamerk, where it makes an abrupt bend from aSouth -Westerly to a South Easterly direction, andcontinue Eastward along the Giaour Dagh, till it strikesthe present Turco-Persian frontier at a point on thesame parallel as the South end of Lake Urumia. After

1 S ince 1909, when the anarchy of the Persian Revo lution led_Russiato send a force across th e frontier into Azerbaijan, where the S ituationwas specially acute.


crossing the exis ting frontier-line it should run SouthEast, excludin g the whole basin of the Lesser Zab .

When it reaches the thirty-sixth parallel, it should turndue Eastward along the latter, till it h its the head-watersof the River Kisil Usun, whose course it should followdown continuously to its most Northerly poin t. Here,where the river turns at a sharp angle to the SouthEast, the frontier should break away again on a NorthEasterly course of its own, and maintain it till it hitsthe present Russo-Persian frontier a few miles beforeits terminus at Astara on the Caspian Sea.

The rectification of frontier we have just sketchedout to Russia’s profit and to Turkey’s and Persia’s loss,is unimpeachable from the point of view of the territoriesand populations immediately concerned .

(i.) It transfers nationaliti es, which, owing to theirgeographi cal interlacement and to the lawlessness whi chit stimulates, are in any case incapable for the presentof governing themselves, from a vicious incompetentgovernment whose only policy is to foster anarchy byencouraging the inferior elements to exterminate thehigher, to a civilised strong government which hasalready dealt successfully in the Caucasus with a similarproblem of even more serious dimensions . Thisgovernment, if we place it in control, will use its ex

perience to secure the most enterprising, receptive andindustrious races in the region from artificial repressionby brute force .After a few generations of good government, theArmenian peasant will have outstripped the Kurdishshepherd entir ely, not by another abuse of officialfavouritism, but by his innate superior qualities . Everypatch of soil will have been brought under cultivation inthe valley bottoms and on the terraced mountain-slopes


construction proceeds, the frontier will be found tomark a boundary between independent systems, thatwill only be crossed at a few points by trunk lines .In spite, however, of these undeniable merits, any

proposal for such an extension of the Russian frontierwill meet with a storm of protest from at least twoquarters .

(i.) Russophobes in Great Britain will have takenalarm already at the idea of ejecting the OttomanGovernment from the Black Sea Straits, and thissecond scheme for docking Turkey on her Easternfrontier as well, and installin g Russia in full possessionof the Armenian plateau, will put the last touch to theirfears . How,

” they will ask, can we expect Turkeyto act any longer as the bulwark of our Mediterraneanroute to India, if we wilfully break her strength 5It will be suflicient for the moment to take these

critics entirely on their own ground, and reply that, fromthe strategical point of view, size of territory is not theultimate criterion of strength . It is true that we shallhave advanced the Russian frontier half the distancefrom Kars to Iskanderun, but the other half stillremains , and Turkey, rid of her ulcers by the surgeon

’sknife and enabled to devote all her strength to buildingup her internal health, will erect a more formidablebarrier in this comparatively narrow strip of nativeterritory, than if she pushed a precarious, exhaustingdomination over intractable alien populations as far asthe very summit of the Caucasus .

(ii .) We have a much more serious opponent to convince in Panislamism, which, so far as it concerns us, isthe public opinion of the Moslem community in India .

PANISLAMISM 399

C . Panislamism

The Indian Moslems have developed in latter yearsa strong self-consciousness . Unlike most Mohammedan populations, they are in the position of a minority .

The Hindu and Tamil mass threatens more and more toengulf them, and in face of this danger they have puttheir trust in British rule . They have devoted themselves loyally to the support of our strong governmentin India, and adopted our ideal for the future of the“ Indian Empire . With the increase of educationamong themselves, and of means of communicationthroughout the world, their interest has extendedbeyond the limits of India to international politics, andhas naturally concentrated on the fortunes of Islam inother parts of the world .

The spectacle that meets their eyes is melancholy.

Everywhere Islam is receding and Europe triumphant .The battle for the penetration and possession of CentralAfrica has been fought out between them in the nineteenth century to Islam

’s loss . The whole continentis now partitioned among European powers, and eventhe ancient seats of Moslem civilisation along theMediterranean coast have passed under Europeansuzerainty, from Egypt to Morocco . In Central Asia,during the same period, Russia, which once obeyedthe Tatar Khans on the Volga, has subjected the lastindependent Khanates along the Oxus, and bridledthe freedom of the desert Turkomans .As they survey the Moslem World, the OttomanEmpire seems to them the only exception to the generaldebacle. It alone, in the face of all Europe, preservesthe old tradition that the Moslem is marked out by God


to be ruler, and the Christian to be his slave and whatis more importan t still to an orthodox Indian Sunni,cut off from his fellow-believers by a ring of heathenSikhs and Hindus, and of heretical Persians, the Ottoman state is the guardian of the holy cities of Islam,

and the Ottoman sultan, by legal inheritance, theofficial head of the whole Faith .

The grandeur of Turkey gives a concrete embodimentto the Indian Moslems ’ sentiment . They feel themselves to be a strong community, they have deservedwell of the British Empire, and in return they justlyclaim the right to make their voice heard in its counsels .There is no doubt that they will exert their influence infavour of the Ottoman Government’s poin t of view, and

uncompromisingly resist any proposal to interfere withthe integrity of the Ottoman Empire as it stands atpresent .We cannot neglect this attitude of Panislamism inIn dia . We must examine the ideals that underlie it,and the view of existing facts on which it is based andif we conclude that these ideals will not be realisedby the programme of supporting the present Turkishregime, because the real situation in Turkey does notcorrespond to the facts presupposed, we must franklydeclare our belief. We must try to convince Panislamism of its error by argument, just as we have grappledbefore with the attitude of Germany, or with the DualMonarchy’s raison d’étre.

The real desire of Panislamism is that the Moslempopu lations which have so far preserved their inde

pendence from Christian dominion should not succumb to the fate of the majority, but should on thecontrary so develop their material resources by economicenterprise

, and their spiritual wealth by education, as


oppression of Greek and Armenian is almost outbalanced by the suffering of the Moslem peasant onwhom falls the burden of holding them down by force .Turkey has only half the population

1 of the smallestof the six European powers ; She is infinitely poorerthan any of them, in economic and social developmentincomparably more backward ; yet no European stateexacts such a heavy blood tax from its citizens as Turkey,whose people can least aff ord it. The length of service,b oth with the colours in youth and with the variousclasses of reserve in later lif e, is in excess of most otherconscript armies,2 and mobilisation is far more frequent .On a partial scale, to combat the never outwearied unrestof the subject populations, it is practically chronic, and itoccurs on the grand scale whenever the breath of warbegin s to blow in Europe, even when, as in the presentcrisis, the interests in volved do not naturally affect theTurkish people at all . Th is happens because the sub

ject populations are ever ready for the final war ofliberation, and because the neighbouring states arealways waiting for the opportunity to assist them . Theyknow too well the Turkish government’s incurablepolicy of adventure, which will not face accomplishedfacts, but still dreams of recoverin g Mitylene and Khios,and perhaps of re-entering Salonika .Supposing that, through the triumph of the Central

European powers, the Porte were to recover all the

1 N o exact statistics have ever been taken , b ut since th e territo riallosses o f 1912—13 the numbers cannot m uch exceed

1 The term s of com pu lsory service for th e infantry are as fo llowsActive service With the co lours 3 years.

Active service in the reserve 6

Landwehr service gLandsturm service 2

Total service (from 20th to 4oth year of age) 20

PANISLAMISM 403

territories it held in Europe before the Autumn of 1912,this success would brin g the Turkish peasant nothing butadded misery. For him it would be a Shou ldering ofcast-off burdens he would once more spend years ofhis life garrisoning Macedonia far away from his familyand his Anatolian farm, to perish at last most probablyin some futile summer campaign to Ottomanise theuntamable Albanians . The Turkish peasan t is dumbhe has no education or cohesion, and therefore no publicopinion but if he could give expression to his will in aplebiscite, he would vote for being left in peace, and askfor some government which would not herd his folk outof their villages in thousands, and send them withoutcommissariat, munitions of war, or medical succour, toperish in the deserts of Tripoli or on the stricken field ofLule Burgas . Since he is too inarticulate to expressthis, it is surely the mission of Panislamism, which hasthe ear of the civilised world and knows how to addressitself to it, to speak for him and save him from his owngovernment, instead of encouraging that governmentto exploit him to the detriment of his neighbours, andthe danger of the general peace .The Porte claims the Indian Moslem’s allegiance as

the protector of th e Holy Cities . But here again lethim try his religious sentiment in the fire of reality, andimagine himself in the place of the unhappy Turkishconscript, tran sported from his temperate upland homein Anatolia to the m ilitary posts along that tropicalvolcanic plateau of Stony Arabia over which theHejaz railway runs from Dam ascus to Medin a, orworse still, dispatched by troop-ship down the Red Seato the terrible, interminable Yemen campaign fromwhich no soldier ever returns or let him think of theYemeni Arab himself. Heir to an archaic civilisation,


isolated to an unparalleled degree by the deserts, heis not norm ally aff ected for good or evil by the riseand fall of world-empires ; but now he is desperatelyat bay against the brutal, meaningless aggression ofTurkish Imperialism, which has no better gift for himthan for the Armenian or the Greek .

The Indian Moslem is misled by his own experience .In India Islam is a nationality. Its professors may havebeen Arab, Persian , Afghan or Mogul when they cameas conquerors to the coun try, yet now th ey are oneblood, bound togeth er by the common menace of Hindurace-hatred . Conditions are diff erent in the OttomanEmpire . The menace of the Unbeliever is here imperfectly realised, and national antagonism s find an arenawithin the Bulwark of Islam .

” Our educated IndianPanis lamist should talk to an educated Panarab fromEgypt, if he wishes to discover how Moslems of A rabspeech feel towards the political ambitions of theirTurkish co -religionists .The Egyptian will agree with the Indian emphati cally,

that the ru le of the European is a humiliation for Islam ,

and that British administration, however beneficial oreven necessary it may be for the moment,1 mu st be nomore than a transitory phase in the long history ofEgypt and In dia ; but he will tell him that he has experienced one thing worse than British occupation, and thatwas the tyranny of the Tu rkish ofi cial class, whichGreat Brita in ended just a generation ago . It isonly when I think what we suffered from the Turk,

”

he will conclude, that I can find it in my heart totolerate his British successor.”

The founder of Islam was an Arab . He wrote his

1 Though, except for thework of the irrigation engineers, hewill havemuch less good to say of it than the 1nd


of the Hohenstaufen, and squandered the strength oftheir empire in pursuin g the will-o ’

-the-wisps of a deadworld ’s ideas .Meanwhile, the Arab revival has been paralysed by

this heroic sham , as Italy was paralysed by the visitationsof the mediaeval Emperors and if the encouragementof Indian Panislamism breathes mis chievous confidenceinto this sham once more, it will work as much woe toall Islam, Arab and Indian and Turk alike, as thetriumph of its accomplice, the renovated GermanImperialism, will work to Europe, if it wins this war.

Yet our Panis lamist (or his Young Turk prote'

ge'

,

speakin g through his mouth) , while admitting all thatwe have poin ted out, will still put up a plea of highernecessity for the existence and policy of th e presentTurkish regime . It will be very much like the apologiaof Prussianism, its ensamme. We confess,

” he willsadly begin , that Turkish Im perialism frustrates thematerial advancement of the Turkish peasan t, and stuntsthe national life of his Arab fellow-subject ; but it istheir common duty to bear these disadvantages patriotically for the sake of Islam . They must sacrifice themselves to support th eir government, because the OttomanEm pire is the one sovereign independent state left inIslam, and if this empire falls, the Moslem populationsit safeguards will be partitioned, like all their brethren ,among the Christian powers . Such an event might,quite probably, increase the economic prosperity andsocial well-bein g of the individual Moslem morerapidly, for the moment, than the continuance of theOttoman administration ; but even the Christians havea proverb that Man does not live by bread alone .’

For a mess of pottage the Moslem subjects of thePorte would be bartering away the birthright of Islam,

PANISLAMISM 407

making impossible the great ideal of the future, a self

govem ingMoslem nation that shall hold its head as highas the nations of Europe .”

If Panislamism takes up this position, we mustundeceive it still further. We do not call YoungTu rkey a sham merely because it taxes the strengthof the Turkish peasan t in order to maltreat weakChristian nationalities in defiance of strong Christianpowers , and to pose grotesquely as the successor of theArab Caliphate in the captaincy of Islam . In spendingthe blood-tax wrung from the peasan t upon objectsentirely alien to the peasan t’s in terest, the governmentof Turkey would be practising a fraud at least no grosserthan that committed by the two Central EuropeanEmpires against their industrial conscripts . Thesupreme sham is the strength and independence ofthe Ottoman Empire itself.The German government takes toll of blood and iron

from the German nation, to fashion from them a mailedfist, quivering with a vitality that gives government andnation enleagued not only security to walk their ownways unhindered, but power to take the initiative inevil aggression again st their neighbours . The militarism of the Porte, which impresses the Indian Moslemand ruins the Turkish peasant with its wars and

rumours of wars, has no effect whatsoever on the destinyof the Turkish Empire . Her army would not havesaved Turkey from annihilation sixty years ago , ifEngland and France had not fought the battle againstRussia in her behalf, and during the two generationsthat have passed since then, Turkey, threatened withdestruction again and again, has owed her preservationinvariably to the mutual jealousies of the Europeanpowers, and never to the strength of her own right


arm . In 1877 the defence of Plevna, gallan t though itwas , did not prevent the Russians from forcing theChataldja lines a diplomatic warnin g from the otherpowers kept them out of Constantinople when the fortswere down, and the Treaty of Berlin rescued for Turkeyhalf her territories in Eu rope .The Indian Moslems must face the fact that the Porte

is not the champion of Islam, but a parasite upon thenational rivalries of Europe . Turkey’s fate is not inher own hands, and whatever be the issue of the warthat is now bein g waged between the European powers ,it will in any case expose th e Turkish sham by puttin ga decisive end to Turkey’s present position .

But the Pan islamist who has studied the relationsbetween the Porte and the European nations duringthe last century, will be justified in forming the verylowest idea of European political morality . The actualsurvival of the Turkish regime until the present momentis the most crushing indictment of it and the attitudeof all the powers to the calamities Turkish chauvinismhas continued to cause, has been so uniformly selfishand cold-blooded, that even an impartial spectator mightplausibly ignore Turkey’s guilt, and lay the responsib ility at Europe

’s door. In discussing, then, with an

Indian Moslem the probable behaviour of these nationstowards Turkey af ter th e present war is over, we shallcarry greater conviction if we leave any possible factorof idealism out of the question, and assume that all alikewill follow motives of the strictest self-interest.What has Turkey to expect from the respective triumph

of the two rival groups of powers fEver since the rapprochement between France andRussia nearly twenty years ago, Germany has beenoffering her friendship to Turkey with increasing


Great Britain ’s work in Australia or New Zealand, andtransform them into German lands the vitality of thenew Anglo-Saxon nations we have founded there isalready too strong . Anatolia offers far better prospects .Its climate is equally temperate, while its populationis no match yet for Europeans in numbers , energy,civi lisation, or any other factors of survival . Turk andArab would vanish away before German immigrationas the Red Indian faded before the Anglo-Saxon onrushin North America, and the last hope of Islam would beblasted by the first realisation of the Pangerm an Idea .Turkey may be linked to Germany by commonantagonism towards the Entente, yet for the Moslemnationalities the result of Germany’s victory would beannihilation .

But what, our Panislamist will ask, if the Alliesare victorious f You have already spoken plain ly aboutdismantlin g the Turkish Empire, and if once you layviolent h ands on its integrity, I fear you will notstop till you have achieved its dismemberment . Youreassure your Russophobe by promising that his demands shall be satisfied, and reassure us by explainingthat the Russophobe’s standpoint is identical with ourown ,

but the flames of a war like this melt down theestablished policies of nations . You hope to forge inthis furnace a Concert of Europe . Suppose you succeed,and that England, France, and Russia pass beyond thestage of opportunist alliance and arrive at a profoundmutual understanding : the Russophobe's point of viewwill have become obsolete in a moment, and the unionof Europe will be cemented by the partition of theMoslem nationalities . The opiate of compensationdulls the ache of the most irreconcilable ambitions .France resigned her claims on Egypt when England

PANISLAMISM 41 1

secured her a free hand in Morocco, and we can easilyforecast how the Three Powers will carve the Arabicprovinces of Asia into spheres of influence,

’ andactually bring sullen, defeated Germany within theEuropean fold (if their statesmanship rises to theoccasion) by offering her the coveted Anatolia as aconsolation .

”

This is a shrewd interpellation, and it does even morethan justice to our lack of scruple ; but it fails toenvisage the fact that this war, though it may have beenprecipitated by the conflict between incompatibleapplications of the same crude nationalistic idea, isbeing fought out on the issue of incompatible ideals .The cause of the Allies does not stand for the triumphof one group of aggressively ambitious nations overanother, nor for the coalition of both groups in acriminal conspiracy against the rest of the world : wehave identified ourselves with the victory of three greatprinciples

(i.) That the general peace of the world is oursovereign interest, and that no political or economicadvantage of an individual kind is commensurate with it .

(ii .) That peace can only be secured by giving freeplay to every manifestation of the spirit of Nationality.

(iii .) That national self-government, so far from beinginimical to foreign economic interests in the countrywhere it obtains, is able to reconcile otherwise incompatible ambitions by giving them a neutral politicalmedium to work in .

The statement of these principles at last brings usout of the wood . The realisation of self-consciousness and self-government by the Arab and Turkishnationalities in the Nearer East is not merely theultimate object of Panislamism or the ephemeral


programme of English Russo phobia : it is one of themost important foundation-stones of that ideal stru ctu reof European harmony and international peace to whichGreat Britain and her allies stand publi cly pledged, andwhich we cannot betray without forfeiting the sympathyof neutrals in the present crisis, and destroying all

confidence in our honour for the future . The Panislam is t may assure himself that

.not even the most

brilliant opportunity of immediate material gain wouldtempt us thus to falsify our whole position, while thefact that adherence to these principles is the sole meansof winning the Panislamist’s trust and good-will, affordsa further proof to ourselves of the proposition fromwhich we started, that our own true interest lies in adisinterested effort to secure impartial justice to allour neighbours . It is our part, then, to proclaim oursolemn intention of laying this stone true, and to Sketchout a plan for fashioning it to fit its destined place .

D . TheNew A natolia

Anatolia is physiologically a part of Europe, thefourth of those mountain-ribbed peninsulas that reachout from the European mass, and bathe their feet inthe Mediterranean sea . It is an immense plateau ofthe same proportions and climatic character as Spain .

An arid central upland is embattled against the coast onNorth and South by parallel Sierras , clothed in forest,andri ch in streams which are all engulfed, after a briefcou rse, either by the sea on the outer flank or the steppewithin only towards the West does the plateau sinkin long, fertile river valleys to a clement, Shelteredcoastline .The aborigin al population of the region is a link


of the ZEgean and by the close proximity of Greekislands .Yet though the Anatolian race has been converted

to the speech of its Turkish conquerors as completelyas it was converted to Hellenism before, and has adoptedthe Moslem creed they carried with them, it has informed its new religion and nationality with its ownpeculiar spirit . The Ottoman peasan t thus produced has little in common with other populations thathold the same faith and speak the same tongue—Tatarsof Baku, Kirghiz nomads on the Central Asiatic steppe,or Kashgari villagers in Chinese Turkestan : we candiscern much more clearly his affin ity with the Phrygianor Cappadocian familiar to the ancient Greek. He hasthe same stolidity and lack of initiative (with theircomplementary virtues) , as antipathetic th en as now tothe Levantin e of the .

lEgean . He has even the sametrappings of material life, from his housing-system downto the conical-hat an d curly-toed boots that distinguishthe Hittites in Egyp tian b as-reliefs and beneath thisexterior crust burn the same volcanic fires of religiousfrenzy which gave the cult of Attis and the GreatMother to Hellenism, and have forced upon Islam,

since Anatolia entered the Moslem world, the revivalistic

” ecstasy of the “ Spinnin g dervish, so extraordinarily alien to Islam’s sober genius .The Anatolian, then, has amarked national character

he is also ripe for national self-government . To usthe Turkish Empire is a symbol of political ineptitude,but three centuries ago our ancestors looked upon theSublime Porte as the most eflicien t government inEurope, and admired the solidity of its paved highroads and nobly-arched bridges, the magnificence of itskaravansarais, mosques, and arsenals, the professional

ANATOLIA 415

ski ll of its fleets, artillery, and standing army, preciselyas Herodotus admired the far less ably organised empireof Darius . Sin ce then the Turk has been outstrippedby Europe, but if he has stood still, he has at any ratenot lost ground . To govern oneself, moreover, is aneasier task than to govern an empire, and if the Turknow confines himself to this, there is no reason whyhe should not succeed as well as his former subjectsin the Balkans .Anatolia will not become, any more than the Balkan s,an industrial country, and the Turk will always be alaborious peasant rather than a keen-witted busin essman, but the political problems set before him will beS imple . For four centuries the country has been inprofound peace, and law and order are as firmly rootedthere as in any state of Southern Europe, in strikingcontrast to the anarchy into which race hatred hasplunged Macedonia and Albania, so much nearer to thecentres of European civilisation. Abdul Hamid firstconceived the fiendish idea of spreadin g this infectionto his Asiatic subjects, yet unlike the chronic violenceof the bands in Macedonia, the massacres ofGreeks and Armenians in the Anatolian towns havenot become more than hideous violations of a normalharmony .

If oflicial chauvinism, by murder, forcible conversion, banishment, and that terrorism which leavesno real alternative to emigration, were to succeed in itsobje ct of eliminating these Christian populations fromAnatolia altogether, it would be dealing as fatal a blowto the country’s future prosperity as the Castiliangovernment dealt to Spain, when it robbed her of herMoors and Jews . At that period the Porte showed itssuperiority to contemporary Christendom not merely

o


in efficiency but in liberality of soul, by giving theSpanish Jews harbourage in its own commercial cities,to their contentment and to the advantage of theiradopted home . Since then Ottoman official circles,

"

in contradistinction to the Ottoman nation, havedeteriorated indeed . They are venting their fury fortheir Balkan defeats not only upon the Greeks of theThracian frontier, b u t upon the entirely unimplicatedGreek population of the West coast, and now that theyhave plunged their country into the great Europeanwar, they may be expected to instigate fresh massacresof their Christian subjects at any moment .This governing class, with the hopelessly debauched

tradition which has descended from Abdul Hamid tothe clique that overthrew him, must be swept awaybefore it can complete its disastrous work . TheArmenians and Greeks whom it is seeking to destroyare an indispensable element in the progress of thecountry. They possess all the qualities of brain thatthe native Anatolian lacks, and they have furtherimproved their brains by education . To begin with, atany rate, the new Anatolian national government willdepend largely upon them for its personnel, and theywill render faithful service to the alien country of theirbirth if she grants them the scope which their abilitiesdeserve . They are as able minded as are the classesof corresponding education in Europe, they havealways been employed in the subordin ate grades ofthe Ottoman administration, and the greatness of theEmpire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuriesfalls in large measure to their credit . The AnatolianChristian is the chosen vessel for th e fulfilment of thePanislamist’s prayer, the elevation of the Anatolian Turkto an equality with the nations of Europe .


of the central steppe cannot be made to yield corn again,as it did in the eleventh century A .D. before the Turkcame, till the mountain torrents have been made todeliver their last drop of water to the husbandman byirrigation-canals below and barrage-S torage in the highvalleys, and till reaping machinery has been importedfrom Lincoln or Chicago . Neither grain noréhm etal

can be brought within reach of consumers till mine andfield have been put into communication by rail with theport on the coast .These operations must be carried out before a single

atom of wealth can be extracted from the resourcesthey are intended to throw open, and their installationis very costly. They can therefore only be undertakenif some surplus has been saved from wealth previouslyproduced by another source or in another quarter .Such surpluses do not easily begin to accrue, but oncethey have started, their effect on the production ofwealth is so immense that they grow by geometricalprogression .

The nucleus of that capital which in little more thana century has transformed the face of the world, wasaccumulated by the middle class in the nations ofWestern Europe, after they had put wars of religion andconstitutional struggles behind them, and arrived at astrong national government which set them free to turntheir best energies into economic channels . The forcethat resides in capital, the magic power of transformingthe earth and of conjuring wealth from its bosom, hasplaced the rest of the world at Europe ’s feet ; but inTurkey

,as in other countries that have lagged behind

Europe in political advance, such accumulation hasnever been made . Aimless wars of adventure havecontinued to keep the peasant living from year to year

ANATOLIA 419

on the verge of ruin, and the Greek and Armenian town sfolk, who had the intellectual and moral capacity forachieving as much as the European middle class, havebeen’ singled out for repression by the Turkish government . Turkey must borrow the capital she requires,not from her own citizens, but from Europe ; andEurope, finding that she holds a monopoly of thiscommodity with which Turkey cannot dispense, is notdisposed to offer her a market on easy conditions .The history of exploitation in Anatolia centres round

the construction of her railways .1 Immediately afterthe Crimean War an English and a French companyacquired concessions for lines which started fromSmyrna, the natural capital of Anatolia on the middlepoint of the West coast, and worked Eastwards up theriver valleys on to the interior plateau . The Frenchline has now been pushed up the Hermus valley throughAla Shehr (Philadelphia) to A fiun Kara Hissar, andthe English line up the parallel Mmander valley to thesouth through Aidin to Chivril and Buldur .2 Germany,however, since she supplanted England and France inthe Porte ’s friendship, has blocked the further advanceof these two railways by securing the concession for arailway to Bagdad .

The German line starts from Skutari, the Asiaticsuburb of Constantinople in a remote corner of Anatolia,and makes its way Southwards past Ismid to theplateau level at Eski Shehr, across a very difficult seriesof mountain ranges among which the Sangarius windsin gorges . Thereafter the way is plain to A fiun KaraHissar, and the line proceeds South-East along the inner

-1 SeeMap VI.M 4

1 The two lines reached Kassaba and Aidin respectively in 1866 .

SeeMap VI.


edge of Taurus through Konia to B ulgharlu , a villageat the foot of the Bulghar Dagh, where the Tauru s wallbegins to turn North-East, and the railway, if it is tocontinue its course, must pierce it by a mighty tunnel .As far as this tunnel, the line has been in working order

for some years .1 Its achievement is a triumph of thatco-operation between individual capital and nationaldiplomacy by which modern Germany has effected somuch . Besides pointin g the way to the promised landbeyond the Taurus, it absorbs such internal trade asalready exists in the section of Anatolia to the NorthEast, except for the little that goes in and out by theBlack Sea coast . Connection with the French rail-headat A fiun Kara Hissar is carefully avoided, so thatall traffic which reaches that point from the East iscompelled to pass the whole way along the German lineto Skutari in stead of taking the natural route to Smyrna .This masterly railway is the most potent instrumentGermany has forged for diverting all new wealth tappedin Anatolia into German pockets, and finally turning thecountry itself into a German-peopled land. Yet thispolicy is not peculiar to Germany. It is only a particularly successful instance of what all European nationsattempt, with more or less singleness of aim and perseverance, so soon as a well-placed loan brings a more backward country into their power. It is usury in the mostS inister sense, conducted on a national scale.Honourable investment aims at an increase of wealth

1 The concession for th e extension to Bagdad was signed in January1902 . TheConstantinople-Ism id section was completed as early as 1872,and extended to Konia after 1888 by the A nato lian Railway Company.This was at first a combined Germano-British concern ; b ut th e

German grou p soon bou ght ou t th e British rights, and proceeded toobtain the B agdad concession . They then organised a new

“BagdadRailway Company to which the Anatolian Railway Companymadeover theexecution of th e contract.


Debt. Turkey’s allies in the Crimean War taught herhow to borrow in the European money market, and areckless period of extravagan ce followed . When itterminated towards the end of the ’

Seventies in theBalkan revolt and the disastrous Russian War, Turkeyfound the purse-strings closed again st her, and becameun able either to meet her past obligations out of herrevenue or to incur others to liquidate them. Theresult was the Decree of December 1881 , which consolidated the whole outstandin g debt, handed over theproblem of dealin g with it to a mixed committee, consisting of delegates from the bond-holders of all thein terested nationalities, and put at the absolute disposalof this committee, in which the Ottoman Governmentitself had no footin g, six classes of public revenue forthe debt’s service .This in ternational administration has wielded for a

generation a power far greater than any sin gle foreigngovernment has yet acquired in Turkey, or could everacquire without the virtual supersession of Turkishsovereignty ; but it has employed it entirely to thecountry’s benefit, just because it does not representthe sinister interest of national rivalry, but the commonin terest of bond-holders of all nationalities to co

operate with the Turkish people in order to promote theincrease of the country’s resources upon which all alikehave their respective claims . The commissioners havein terpreted their mandate in a liberal spirit, and someof the most fruitful economic developments that Turkeyhas experienced in the meanwhile have been initiatedin the spheres under their control, and fin an ced byfunds accumulated in their coffers . Whatever politi caltransformations the Ottoman Empire may undergo,the financial authority of the In ternational A dminis

ANATOLIA 423

tration must remain unimpaired, not only out ofjusti ce to the foreign bond-holders, but because itscontinued activity will be the New Anatolia ’s best bulwark against exploitation by individual nations, and thebest guarantee for the continuan ce of her economicprogress on lines primarily advantageous to her owncitizens .But th ere are other, and less legitimate, form s of

foreign privilege in Turkey which might well lapse withthe dismantling of the Empire, or at any rate be allowedto drag less heavily upon the freedom of the rejuvenatedAnatolia .

(i.) It is not enough to give the new Anatoliangovernment judicial independence by abolishin g theCapitulations, unless we give it fiscal independence aswell, and that is at present seriously limited by anumber of treaties with the various European powers ,which fix a maximum ad valorem import duty for theTurkish Customs . It m ight be argued that if Europeanthrift has been hit so heavily by Turkish insolvency,it is only fair that Europe should be given the chance ofrecouping herself by obtaining favoured treatment inTurkish trade . Yet European merchants have alreadygained infinitely more by the customs-treaties thanEuropean investors lost by the bankruptcy, while thelatter interest is actually prejudiced by the presentarrangement , for the Customs were one of the Six

revenues ceded to the Debt Adm inistration, and theiraugmentation would profit the European bond-holdersas well as the Anatolian government . Even in equity,then, the status quo has little justification, but legallythere is no case for it at all . Most of the treatieslapsed over twenty years ago, and have only beenmaintained in operation by the cynical refusal of the


powers concerned to discuss their modification . Infact, the Powers

’ attitude towards Turkish fin ance hasrested latterly on their ability to exercise coercion .

The time has now come to cry quits . In 1907 thefirst step was accomplished, when Turkey obtained permission to raise the import duty to 1 1 per cent., in orderto pay for the special administration of Macedoniademanded by the Powers themselves . This is a goodprecedent for compensating the Anatolian government

(and its European bond-holders) for the loss of theirmost importan t source of Customs revenue in theBlack Sea Straits, by setting them at liberty to fixtheir tariff at whatever rate they choose within thesanctuary of their reduced frontiers . The authorityof the Debt Admin istration gives security that the concession would be used with prudence, and even a mistaken fis cal policy would only injure Anatolia herself,and could be regarded with indiff eren ce by Europe, solong as the vitally important waterway to the Black Seawas excluded from its sphere of operation .

(ii .) The foreign railway companies, in framing theircontracts with the Government, have stipulated that thelatter shall guaran tee th em a certain minimum of ann ualprofit, calculated at so much per kilometre of permanentway in working order. The Go vernment has to makegood any deficits on this amount .Considering the poorness of the coun try and the

irresponsible character of the Government, which by itsprovocative foreign policy was capable of disorganisingat any moment such trade as there was, it was reasonable that Turkey should shoulder the econom ic conse

quences of any political folly she committed.

1 If,

1 The system was not applied to the earlier railway enterprises in theOttoman Empire. It was only initiated in 1888, when rai lway con

426 THE DISMA NTLING OF TURKEY

It would be feasible to demand that the Germancompany, in return for adequate compensation elsewhere, should resign its claim to the sections of therailway South-East of Konia . It is clear th at th esesections are not economically desirable in themselves .The first runs through a desolate strip between steppeand mountains, the second is the costly tunnel, whichwill eat up any profits the Adana section beyond itmay bring in . Their importance to Germany is political,and in asking her to resign them in exchange foreconom i cally more advantageous openings in anotherdirection the Anatolian government would be safeguarding its own interests without violating the legitimate interests o f Germany. The German companywould be more than compensated by receiving themonopoly of all construction in the well-watered butat present entirely undeveloped Cappadocian regionNorth-East of the central steppe, as far as the newRussian frontier. A branch has already thrust itselfEastward from Eski Shehr to Angora . Hence it couldbe carried across the Kizil Irmak River (Halys) andmight split thereafter into two arms . One would stretchE .S .E . through Kaisaria to Malatia on the West bankof Euphrates, skirtin g the ribs of Taurus on the Norththe oth er would work its way North-East throughYozgat and Amasia to the Black Sea port of Samsun .

1

What nation is to step into Germany’s shoes, and

1 The startling advan tage gain ed by Germany in the Anato lian Railway contract led Russia to obtain an agreem ent from Turkey reservingto her own en terprise th e construction of all railways in Anato lia thatshou ld debo uch on the Black S ea coast. A s yet, however, she hastaken no advantage of this concession , and if she gained th e proposedextension o f her Caucasian frontier to the Wes t and S outh she mightfairly b e asked to abandon economic interests in Anato lia outside thisnewd

yline, in exchange for complete po litica l and economic contro l11151 e It.

ANATOLIA 427

secure for its own investors the right to buy outthe German company’s interest in the Konia—Adanasection t Every consideration suggests Italy . Italyhas suffered even more than Germany by being handicapped in the European race . -Her Abyssinian adven

ture was disastrous ; her recent acquisition on theNorth African coast gives her a very lim ited field ; inthe interest of Balkan independence and Europeanpeace we have proposed to deny her expansion acrossthe mouth of the Adriatic into Albania, and finallywe have asked her to relinquish her aspirations to herIstrian and Triestine irredenta,

” in deference toGermany’s need for a neutral economic outlet uponthe Adriatic . If, then, the Anatolian government, forreasons of its own, decides to remove a certain regionfrom the sphere of German enterprise, Italy has surelythe best claim to fill the vacant place, and receive thecommission of opening up Anatolia’s resources in thisparticular direction .

Italy, moreover, is already in negotiation with theOttoman government for a railway concession in thehinterland of Adalia, the only port on the South coastof Anatolia to the West of the Adana district that haspracticable lines of communication through the Tauruswith the central plateau . One branch of the new Adaliarailway would run and meet the Englishcompany’s railhead at Buldur : another would workacross the mountains in a North-Easterly direction

,and

emerge after many detours at Konia . Konia wouldthus become the junction of three railway systems . TheGerman lines from the North would meet at this pointthe two railways leading to Adana and Adalia on theSouth coast, and it would be an obvious conveniencethat the latter should be under the same management .


We have suggested the partition of Anatolian railwayenterprise among companies of four different nationalities, French, English, German, and Italian, co-ordinating their spheres in such a way as to give no one of themthe opportunity of becoming a political power in theland . The bond-holders and th e governments behindthem, instead of regardin g their economic presence inAn atolia as the thin end of a political wedge, mustcount it all gain that they find scope for their enterprisethere at all, and resign themselves to see their holddiminish annually, as the country is gradually raisedby their agency towards the level of native wealth whichwill enable it in the end to dispense with their servicesaltogether . On the day when she has accumulatedenough capital to buy out all the foreign companies ata generous price, and enough human skill to administertheir enterprises with a national personnel of her own,Turkey will have reached her majority, and fulfilledthe Panislamist’s dream by takin g her stand on an equalfooting with the nations of Europe .We have now only to mark out the frontiers of the

rejuvenated Anatolian state, before we pass on toArabia . On the North-West towards the Black SeaStraits and on the North-East towards the RussianEmpire, they are already defined : we have still twoquestions to consider, the sovereignty of the Islandsand the frontier towards Arabia itself.

(i.) The islands off the Anatolian coast fall intothree divisions .

(a) The group along the Northern section of the Westcoast , which is entirely Greek in nationality, and wasconquered by the Kingdom of Hellas in the late BalkanWar. It consists of M itylini, Khios, Psara, Samosand Nikaria . In spite o f the Young Turk chauvinists,


Britain in June 1878, after the close of the RussoTurkish war and on the eve of the Berlin Congress.

The Russian victory had alarmed Great Britain forthe safety of her Mediterranean route to India . Shetherefore arranged with the Porte that if Russia retainedth e Armenian fortress of Kars in the settlement, theisland of Cyprus should be placed in British hands .The legal sovereignty was to remain with the Sultan,and Great Britain undertook in return to guarantee theintegrity of the Sultan ’s continental dominions in Asia ,within whatever frontiers were fixed at the impendingCongress .The terms of the Berlin Treaty brought these

provisional stipulations into force . Russia kept Kars ,but the British guarantee vetoed her further advancetowards the Levantine coast even should the guaranteeprove abortive, the occupation of Cyprus left GreatBritain in strategical comm and of the situation .

At the rupture of peace, however, th e Berlin Treatylapsed with all its corollaries, and Cyprus was formallyannexed to the British Empire . 1

Russophobes will rejoice at the step , because it bringsCyprus completely under our control . According toyour own proposals,

” they will say, the resettlementafter the present war is to advance the Russian frontierright across th e Armenian plateau , at least half thedistance towards the Mediterranean Shore . This makesthe retention of Cyprus more important to Great Britainthan ever it was before .”

Yet the problems of Cyprus and Armenia are com

pletely on a par . In both the national factor is at1 This transf er of legal sovereignty to the actual possessorwas parallel

to the Austrian annexation o f Bosnia in 1908. It was m erely a formalact. Austria, however, was at peace with Turkey when she took thestep, and therefore acted in Vio lation of valid obligations.

ANATOLIA 43 1

variance with such strategical considerations, and if inArmenia nationality is to prevail, we must defer to it inCyprus likewise . The war has set us free to dispose ofCyprus, as well as to retain it . We shall choose theformer alternative, if we are wise .The island has benefited much by our strong government (a process of disinfection which every countryneeds to go through, when it passes out of Turkish rule) ,but that phase is now almost past . The population isGreek in language and civilisation, and is becomingmore and more so in national aspiration .

1 It cannotbe separated permanently from the Greek nationalstate . At some moment Great Britain must gracefullyretire, and we should allay irritation if we were toproclaim forthwith under what circumstances we shouldconsent to do so . The natural term to fix would be themoment when Anatolia buys out her foreign railways .When she has so far recruited her native economicS trength, she will aff ord such an effective strategicalbulwark for the British route to India that the Russo

phob e will S leep in peace at last .Thus all the islands o ff the Anatolian coast would

pass eventually into the hands of Greece, and thecontinental state might justly complain that if Greecewere allowed to fortify them and convert their harboursinto naval bases at her pleasure, Anatolia would virtually b e subjected to a continuous blockade . The passage from Smyrna itself to the open sea would be liableat any moment to be closed by flotillas acting fromMitylini and Khios on either flank . In handing over,therefore, to Greece the islands nowin Italian occupation ,

Europe should stipulate that not only they, but thoseacquired by Greece in 1912 , and also Cyprus whenever

1 The popu lation was in 1901 , of whom 22% wereMoslem .


she may acquire it, shall be neutralised from the militarypoint of view Greece on her part must prom ise Europeto leave them unfortified, and Europe on hers mustguarantee their perpetual political union with Greece.When this is done, it will be both needless and uselessfor Anatolia to covet the possession of the islands anylonger .

(ii .) In drawing the frontier between Anatolia andArabia, we must compromise, as usual, between nationaldistribution and th e configuration of the country. Theline 1 should start from the Mediterran ean coast at Rasal Hanzir, the cape that contains the Gulf of Iskanderunon the South-East . It should run first North-East andthen North along the summit of the A m anus range,parallel to the coast of the gulf and only a few m ilesdistant from it, thus assignin g Iskanderun itself toAnatolia . When it reaches the latitude of the mostNortherly poin t in the gulf, it should turn East, crossthe valley of the Kara Su , and proceed North-East againalong the summit of the Kurt Dagh . Thence it shouldfollow the divide between the Pyramus and Euphratesbasins in the same direction, till it reached the latitudein which the Euphrates makes its great bend from aWesterly to a Southerly course, below Samsat . At thispoin t it should turn due East and head for the Euphrates,striking it just at the bend .

This lin e leaves a fringe of Turkish population outside,but the distri cts this minority inhabits are geographically dependent on the great Arabic city of Aleppo, andcannot be sundered from it politically.

1 See Map VI .


of the In land Sea to surrender it in life-giving rain whenth ey strike Lebanon and the Hill country of Judahon its extreme shore . Syria shares the climate andvegetation of Southern Europe, but the Hejaz, whichcontinues the line of Syria towards the South-East,is backed by nothin g better th an the Red Sea, a sultrycreek separated from the Atlantic by the vast breadthof the Sahara . Here the desert has no redeemingWestern frin ge, and the strip of coast beneath the mountain wall, along which lie the ports of the Holy Citiesof Islam, is the most cruel country in the whole region .

In this stern theatre has been played the world—dramaof the Semitic Race . Bred in the keen air of the pitilessplateaux, which gives men the fire of vitality without thefuel to maintain it, the Semitic nations in wave afterwave have surged down in to the arena of Irak, or beatenupwards again st the breakwater of the Syrian mountains,to scatter themselves in spray over all the Mediterraneanshores . The last and mightiest of these cataclysmswas Islam, whose tide in the seventh century A .D . sweptout from the Hejaz over th e world and, though it haslong since receded from its furthest marks , it has settledpermanently over this origin al Semitic area, and givenit its final colour both in religion and nationality.

In Spite of a few surviving outcrops of earlier strata,the present population of the region is as homogeneousas its permanent geographical structu re . Arabic Speechand Moslem faith provide an adequate basis for a newnational life, and materials for the superstructure itselfare ready to hand . The civilised urban class of theSyrian town s has sent representatives of considerablepolitical ability to the Ottoman parliament, and is noless capable than the Anatolian Turk of carryin g on thefunctions of self-government on its own account . Its

ARABIA 435

own constructive efforts will be immensely reinforcedby the co -operation of talented and highly-educatedvolunteers from Arabic lands like Egypt and Algeria,whose populations have enjoyed the benefit of Europeanstrong government,

” and will welcome the oppor

tunity of propagating its fruits without its thorns in thisnew independent focus of Arabic tradition . Moreover,the New Arabia will not be the spiritual centre ofthe Arab race alone . By taking over from the OttomanEmpire the guardianship of the Holy Cities, it willinherit from it the primacy of the whole Moslem world .

The sovereign of the new state will become the officialhead of Islam, and Arabia would do well to elect asits first constitutional sultan some prince of the reigningOttoman house, who would inherit by birth the personalclaim to the Caliphate won by his ancestor Selim, andtransmit it to his heirs . This junior branch of theOttoman line would soon eclipse its cousins who continued to rule over Anatolia, and the Arab would oustthe Turk again from the dominant place amongMohammedan nations .Yet however much assistance the new nation mayreceive from the loyal sympathy and service of allIslam, th e task before it is not easy. The Arabianswill inherit more evil than good from the OttomanEmpire .Europe must, of course, free them from the bondage

of the Capitulations and the customs-treaties, with thesame liberality for which we have appealed in the caseof Anatolia ; but they will have to shoulder a heavyburden in their proportionate Share of the Ottomannational debt, and will pay for the follies of a rulingclass for which they are even less responsible than theAnatolian peasant .


The revenues ceded, by the decree of 1881 , to theinternational Administration of the Debt must be left,as heretofore, under the Administration

’s control,in

spite of the break in political continuity . The surv eillance o f an expert European executive over the chieffactors of native finance will indeed be as great a boonto the New Arabia for many years to come as it has beento the moribund Ottoman Empire during the lastgeneration . The native government will be able to

devote itself to internal problems of nationality, whichare ultimately of more importance and immediatelymore within its scope .

(i.) The Christian minority falls into several groups,of which the Maronites in Lebanon are considerably the most important . Descended from the olderSyriac race , they have preserved their dialect and

religion ever sin ce the Arabs brought Islam in to theland . In the eighteenth century they entered into fullcommunion with the Roman Church, and came therebyinto relation with France , already the leadin g Catholicpower . The French influence was confirmed by theresult of the Crimean War . In 1864, not many yearsafter peace had been made, there was a rising of theMaronites in defence of their prescriptive autonomy,and France insisted upon the erection of an autonomousLebanon-vilayet, which was placed under a Christiangovernor nominated by the Porte, but was also guaranteed by Europe . The Maronites constitute about th reefif ths of the population in this favoured area.1 Thanksto th eir native h istory and to the French missions, theyare at once the most vigorous an d the most intelligentelement in Syria, and however optimistic we may be

1 There are abou t of them in the Leban on, and perhapshalf a million in the who le of Syria.


able still, and their reduction presents the problem ofthe Caucasus or the North-West Frontier of India ona small scale . The task here will be lightened by thefact that by far the larger section of the Kurdish racefalls within the sphere we have assigned to Russia,so that the section left to A rabia will already be hemmedin by the strong Russian military frontier in the Northand East, when the Arabian gendarmerie attempts topenetrate it from the South-West. Even so, the operation may prove beyond the new state’S powers, inwhich case Europe must give Russia the mandate ofacting here on Arabia’s behalf, with the S trict understanding th at temporary military occupation o f a distri ctgives her no permanent political claims to it.

(iii .) When Christian communities have been reconciled by some measure of devolution, and when Kurdsand Druses have been chastised, the new Arabianadministration will find itself in effective possession ofthe whole Northern portion of its territory, from theSyrian coast to the head of th e Persian Gulf. This isthe only part that counts from the economic point ofview, but the uninviting South cannot simply be leftto its own devices . It is no use establishing law andorder in the cultivated lands and among the mountainfastnesses in their midst, if the Bedawin of the desertare S till suffered to raid them at their pleasure, and

un less the government effectively polices the pilgrimroutes to the Holy Cities, which lie in the very heartof the South , it will forfeit altogether the esteem of theMoslem world . Its duty is to achieve th ese two objectswith the least possible expenditure of effort .A pilgrim railway, surveyed by Moslem engineers,

built by Moslem labour, and fin an ced by the offeringsof the Faithful, was completed from Damascus as far

ARABIA 439

as Medina in and will be carried forward as soonas possible to Mekka : a further line will link Mekkawith the port of Jidda on the Red Sea coast, a wayof approach already much more frequented than theDamascus route . The railway does not merely makethe journey easier for the pilgrims it greatly simplifiesthe government’s task of securing their safe passage,for it gives organised troops a strategical advantagethat more than counterbalances the B edawi’s superioradaptation to his native desert.2 To keep its garrisonsat Jidda, Mekka and Medina in touch with their Syrianbase, the government need only patrol the railway, andthrow strong military detachments into the nearestoasis-towns, like Teima and Kaibar, on the railway

’sEastern flank . Further North it should occupy the

oasis of Jof, half-way between Akaba and Basra,where the Northward trail from Nejd emerges outof the Great Nefud sand-waste into the steppe landbetween Damascus and Euphrates . A chain of fortsheld in Al Hasa, the province along the Arabian shoreof the Persian Gulf, would protect Koweit and Basrafrom South-Western raiders .Havin g thus secured the routes to the Holy Cities

and the borders of the Northern provinces, the newstate would be well advised to treat the remainder ofthe Arabian peninsula as we have recommended theAlbanian government to treat its mountain clans : itshould take the responsibilities of sovereignty as lightlyas it can .

Nejd, the heart of the plateau South of the GreatNefud, is divided at present into several principalities

1 It was begu n in 1901 .

1 Compare the usemade o f rai lways in theAnglo-Egyptian reconquestof the S oudan .


Hayyil, Kasim, Er-riad—whose rulers govern the population of the. cases, and exercise a shadowy control overthe Bedawin tribes, which would starve if they could notsupplement the miserable produce of th eir flocks withthe dates of the oases ’ palm-groves . The country isbuilt on so vast a scale, and the means of life and comm unication are so scan ty, that permanent occupation,even by a power that had u nlimited blood and treasureto waste upon an unprofitable adventure, wouldcertainly prove an impossibility, and the prophetMohammed himself was the first and last sovereign toattempt it, till the seizure of the Holy Cities by theWahabi sectaries led Ibrahim Pasha, the brilliant son ofMehem et Ali, to make a compaign of reprisal . For afew years the whole of Central Arabia was held down byEgyptian garrisons,1 but the strain was too great, andupon the first weakening of Mehem et

’

s prestige, hisArabian Empire vanished in to thin air. The newArabian government will be promotin g its own interestbest if it leaves B edawi-sheikh and oasis-prince to keepeach other in check, satisfied that so long as it holdsJidda, Basra and Damascus in its own hand, all Nejd isultimately amenable to its sovereignty. Except throughthese three gates the region can have no intercourse withthe outer world, and can neither sell its dates andcamels abroad, nor import arms or other goods ofcivilised manufacture, without the government

’s knowledge and san ction .

The same policy of non-in tervention should be appliedto Asir, the Red Sea provin ce immediately South ofHejaz . The population is strongly tinged with Shiism,

in spite of its proximity to the hearths of Moslem

1 Th e Egyptian occupation o f Nejd lasted altogether, in varyingdegrees of effectiveness, from 1818 to 1842 .


peninsula to the Persian Gu lf, reaching it at latitude25 near the head of the Bahrein bay between A 1Hofufand the peninsula of Katar.In mere extent of territory the state whose frontiers

we have now delim ited would contain an enormouspreponderance of irreclaimable land inhabited byintractable populations, yet as we prophesied in thecase of Armenia, the continuous action of good government will shift the true centre of gravity more and moredecisively from the desert to the sown .

” Arabiahas a more splendid economic asset than any thatAlbania, Armenia or even the Anatolian plateau possess .The great alluvial plain of Irak is potentially one

of the most favourable environments for human lifein the world, and has actually rivalled the valley of theNile and the great Chinese rivers in bringing the earliestcivilisation to flower, but its value to Man dependsupon Man ’s own mastery of it. Left to themselves,the Tigris and Euphrates allow half the plain to crumbleinto the dust of the desert, and turn th e other half intomalarial swamp, as unfriendly to human habitation asthe unreclairned Egyptian delta . Only civilised forethought and organisation , regulating the river-systemby a network of canals, can distribute the water in betterproportion , and enable Irak to realise its destin y as acornland of marvellous capacity.

From the dawn of history in the fourth millenniumB .C. ,

un til Babylon was crushed by the leaden yoke ofDarius ’ empire, the irrigation of Irak was perfect andits ferti lity the wonder of the world . Again under theAbbasid caliphs, who ruled from this centre a realmbroader than Darius ’, and revived the glories of Babylonin their new city of Bagdad on the Tigris, theprovin ce enjoyed a second lease of prosperity nearly

ARABIA 443

five centuries long, till the Mongol invasion devastatedit in the thirteenth century A .D. Since then Irak haslain desolate, like a symbol of Islamic civilisation itself.The canal-system is derelict : only a few of the mainarteries are kept in working order. The population hasdwindled : there are more Bedawin in the land thanhusbandmen . Nature has assumed her primitive face,as it was when Oannes, the Sumerian culture-god,first arose from the sea ; but Nature cannot be leftunchallenged by the twentieth century, with its vastmaterial power and its still vaster in crease of popu lation that threatens to outstrip that power’s capacity toprovide for it . The Young Turk government hasalready negotiated a contract for irrigation work on amodest scale, and the New Arabia must throw herselfinto the task in the grand manner. There is thepossibility of recovering for cultivation as many acres inIrak as British engineering has won back in th e Punjabduring the two generations we have ruled there . Thechief need will be human labour, to dig the channels,cast up the embankments, and till the new fields createdby these operations, and a vast reservoir of men existsin the twenty-four million Moslems of Bengal . Theyare already hard pressed for some avenue of expansion

,

and their religion would accommodate them withoutdifficulty to the country.

When the fertility of Irak has been restored, it mustbe put in communication by railway with Arabia’s chiefports .

(i.) Bagdad has heretofore communicated with theMediterranean by circuitous routes to the North-West,which cling to the tiny ribbon of moisture and vegetationdeposited across the Northern section of the steppe bythe Tigris and Euphrates, in their descent from the


Armenian mountains towards the Gulf. The harvestsof Irak, when they are reaped once more, will fullyrepay the construction of a railway from Bagdad toDamascus, which will cross Euphrates and run due Westover th e steppe . The distance is under five hundredmiles , less by one-third than the course the Germancompany has surveyed from Bagdad to Iskanderun, andDamascus, lying on the inner rim of the Syrian retainingwall near the middle point of its extent, is the naturalrailway-centre of Arabia . Besides being the S tartingpoint of the pilgrim-line to Medina, it is already connected by a full-gauge railway With Haifa, the harbourunder Carmel ’s shadow, and by a narrow-gauge lineover Lebanon With Beirut, the greatest port on the

Syrian coast .

(ii .) Immediately after it has put Euphrates behindit, this new Bagdad-Damascus railway will detach abranch to the South, which will pass through Kerbela,Skirt the Eastern foot of the plateau parallel withEuphrates ’ course, touch the Shatt-al-Arab at Basra,and find its terminus on the Persian Gulf at

Koweit .1

(iii .) Direct connection between Bagdad and Europewill be established by a lin e 2 followin g up th e Rightbank of th e Tigris as far as Mosul . There it will changedirection from North-West to West, and run across thehead-waters of the Khab ou r, between the Sinjar andTor-Abdin h ills . After passing through Harran, it willstrike the Euphrates, cross it by a bridge at Jerab is, andcontinue in the same westerly direction through thehilly country between Aleppo and Aintab, up to the wall

1 Th is line Will b e identical with th e last section of the pro jectedGerman railway to th e Gu lf.

2 This embodies another part of the German company’s idea.


Anatolia ? There are strong reasons for rejecting sucha proposal .In Anatolia most of the work in contemplation has

already been put in hand on the national-syndicatesystem, and the majority of these contracts have beencarried to their conclusion the still unexploited areasare appropriated by claims like the Italian, wh ichcannot be disregarded . Arabia is in a diff erent position .

Even the most importan t operation, the irrigation ofIrak, has not yet been taken up in earnest . No railwayenterprises have been pledged to foreigners, except thefew stretches in Syria already constructed by a Frenchcompany, and the A m anus-Mosul-Bagdad concessionacquired by the Germ an group . The latter would certain ly be an important fact if it were a fait accompli,but so far only an insign ificant section has been built,and most of the course remains unsurveyed . Arabia,then, has still a comparatively clean state .There is always a lurking danger that commercialspheres may

develop a political character. Thiswould be serious enough in Anatolia, but in Arabiait would be absolutely fatal to a good understandin gbetween the nations concerned, because in this quartertheir politi cal ambitions and jealousies are in finitelymore in tense .If the French railways and missions succeeded in

tran sforming Syria in to a dependency of France, theBritish position in Egypt would be severed from thePersian Gu lf by a strong military power, which couldlead a bran ch from the Hejaz railway to Akaba, andestablish there not merely a port in rivalry with Suez,as Arabia will doubtless do herself, but a naval base todispute the control of the Red Sea . If, on the otherhand

,Great Britain eliminated France, which she could

ARAB IA 447

hardly do without a permanent breach in the twonations ’ friendship, and extended her influence fromDamascus to Bagdad and then to Koweit, she wouldbe cutting across the path of Germany. Even if GreatBritain and Germany effected a compromise, theywould both be threatened in turn by an attempt onRussia ’s part to penetrate to the Mediterranean from theArmenian plateau through Diarbekr, Jerab is and Aleppo .

Here are seeds of war indeed, and their detection showsthat we must discover some other basis than the nationalgroup for the conduct of these enterprises .A precedent is given by the action of four powers in

1910 with regard to the Sse-Chuan railway concessionin China. The governments concerned first arrangedamong themselves what proportion of the loan Should beallotted to the investors of their respective nations, andthen allowed the private financiers of these nations tosubscribe in this ratio 1 the total capital required .

In the case before us the Concert of Europe should goa step further. It should not only determine the shareof the several nations beforehand, but should draw upa compulsory formula for the charters of all the com

panies to be constituted . The chief principle of thisformula should be that each company must containshareholders of all the nations concerned in the proportion agreed upon . If any company is floated in defianceof these terms, its contract with the Arabian government should not receive the Concert’s sanction, and incase of disagreement between the two contracting parties ,the Concert should withhold its own support, and likewise restrain individual powers from intervention .

Even the contracts already concluded with national1 The four powers were Great Britain, France, Germany, and the

U .S .A . the am ount o f capital to b e issued was and theyagreed to take equal shares.


groups, like the French railway in Syria or the Germanconcession to Mosul, Bagdad and Basra, should beinternationalised on the same principle . The Arabiangovernment should buy out the present bond-holderson favourable terms with capital supplied by the newinternational loan .

1 In compensation the two nationswhich these bond-holders represent should be allowedto subscribe to the general stock of this new loan anexcess upon the shares respectively allotted to themequal to the capital of the two national companies th usiqu idated .

The new Arabia will not lack investors : her economicprospects are too good . Yet if their enterprises areorganised on some such scheme as this, she will nothave to make th e cruel choice between political inde

pendence and material well-being . She will see hernational self-government and her national wealthprosper together, and will close to the nations of Europeanother arena of deadly strife .

1 The loss incu rred by Arabia in this transfer shou ld b e made goodby thePowers o f Europe in the interests of European peace.

450 PERSIA

The Iranians have twice expressed the racial antipathywhich generations of border-warfare and the vicissi

tudes of empire and subjugation have aroused, in thecreation of a national religion . While the nativereligious developments of the European nations losttheir savour, and succumbed one by one to a universalreligion of Semitic origin , the Iran ian, like the Hindu,found a prophet in his own country, and, unlike theHindu, possessed the insight to pay him honour .Zarathustra probably lived under the great Darius, inthe latter half of the sixth century B .C., about twogenerations before the incarnation of the Buddha. Thereformed faith whi ch he founded grew, like the Y awehism o f the Hebrew prophets, to be the distinctive markof his nation, and the restored national kingdom, whichput an end to the interlude of Greek predominance inthe third century A .D., incorporated its religion in ahighly-organised national church .

For four centu ries the national church and state ofIran battled with the (ecumenical religion and empireof the Roman world without any decisive issue . Thenthe avalan che of Islam overwhelmed them both, and Iranwas utterly submerged . Zoroastrianism was proscribed 1

and the new-born Arabic civilisation dominated thenation even more strongly than the Greek had donebefore, yet Persian nationality had enough vitality toassert itself again . When Turk and Mongol broketheir way into the Moslem world, the Arab went downbefore them, but Iran, over whose corpse they trod theirroad to Bagdad and Anatolia, found in the general ruinan opportunity for her own revival .The schism concernin g the succession to the

1 Its faithfu l votaries found refuge in Western India, where they stil lsurvive as the prosperous Parsee sect.

PERSIA 45 1

Caliphate, which rent Islam in the second generationof its existence, had been trenchantly settled againstthe house of A li by the sword, but a minority of steadfast heretics handed down the tradition of Ali ’s claims,and Persia gradually became the stronghold of theiropinion . In the sixteenth century A .D. a native Persiandynasty, the Sufi, which adhered to this sect, sweptaway the Turkish princelings who had divided Iranbetween them since the Mongol era . The plateau wasunited once more in a national S tate, and once moreagain the renaissance of Iran expressed itself in religion .

The heresy of its kings became the belief of the nation,and under the banner of Shiism, Persia kept at baythe hated Turkish powers which hemmed her in onevery side and uniformly professed the orthodoxSunni ” faith Ottoman Turks on the West, UzbegKhans upon the Oxus in the North, and the Uzbegs

’

Mogul cousins, who had carved themselves a mightyempire in India upon Persia’s Eastern flank .

The feeling has lasted on both S ides to this day.

Persia is outcast from the legitimate family of Islam,

and at the same time she has developed the mostvigorous national consciousness in the Moslem world,for the very reason that racial distinction is in this caseemphasised by religious cleavage, instead of beingoverridden by the sense of religious community.

This magnificent national history has not failed to

enshrine itself in tradition . It is true that the Avestas,the sacred scriptures of Zoroastrian ism, have been lostto the Persian nation , and become the heritage of anIndian sect . The memory of the Achaemenid kings,whose figures impressed themselves so deeply upon themind of the Greeks, has likewise perished among theirown successors . Their Empire always remained a

452 PERSIA

second-hand imitation of the Semitic world of Babylon,and stood in Iran for the hegemony of one province,1

and that not Zarathustra’s homeland, over the rest.

Yet in the eleventh century A .D. the great Arabic civilisation that had been growing up at Bagdad awakenedanother Semitic echo on the Iranian plateau, which ledto the birth of a native culture .The new Persian literature then called into being has

become the common inheritance of the whole Moslemworld . It draws its inspiration not only from Philosophy and Love, but from the national memory of thegreat Sassanian dynasty which fought with Rome beforeIslam came, and it has created from this source a noblestyle of historical epic and historical prose . The banupon Persian heresy has never been extended to Persianletters , and they have remained the foundation ofMoslem humanism .

Persian nationality, then, is S trong in every element,and, reviewin g the facts , we can see that this nationalvitality has ultimately been due to the large size andeffective physical frontiers of the country, which havefitted it by natu re to be an independent fo cus of humanlife . Yet S ize and impenetrability are only relativefactors, and modern mechanical power has revolution isedthe scale of the world . Persia, once a centre of wealth,civilisation and empire, has sunk to be the buffer-statebetween mightier units , and will fin d its significance forthe future as th e economic high road for these unitstowards th eir own in evitable goals .During the last fifty years, Persia has seen the robber

tribes on her Northern frontier replaced by the RussianEmpire, a unified political organism stretching Northand North-East all the way to the Polar Circle . A s

1 Fars, o r Persis .

454 PERSIA

the plateau-steppe slightly North of Kom . Thence itwill follow the river ’s course up into the Zagros till itreaches Hamadan . Here it will be joined by a line fromTabriz, working through Maragha and Sakkys over theextreme Southern watershed of the Urumia basin , Westof the Demirli Dagh, and directly linking Hamadanwith Europe through the Caucasus .The united line, which will thus concentrate trafi c

for the Indian Ocean from all quarters of the RussianEmpire, will negotiate the Zagros defiles along thewell-known caravan route, past the mountain ofElwend, past the battlefield of Nehavend where theSassanian made his last stand again st the Moslemin vader, past the rock of Behistun, whereon Dariu sin scrib ed the triumphs of his strong government,

”to

the town of Kirmanshah . Here a bran ch will take aneasy course South-West to Bagdad, linking togetherth e Persian and Arabian systems , while the trunk lin ewill turn South and South-East, and follow the riverKercha through the foothills beneath Zagros

’ outerbastions, to Dizful in the plain of Khuzistan . Then itwill bif urcate again, sending one arm Southward downthe Karu n river to the moderately good port of Mohammera on the Shatt-al-Arab, almost opposite Basra,and another in the original South-Easterly directionbeneath Zagros and along the Burning Coast, tothe magnificent harbour of Bushire, on the PersianGulf.This railway would relieve Russia of the last Shackle

upon her commerce her door on the Pacific, and thenew doors we have deman ded for her on the Norwegiancoast and through the Baltic and Black Sea Straits ,would be supplemented by an outlet upon the SouthernOcean .

PERSIA 455

Russia, however, is not the only foreign empire thathas vital interests in Iran .

The region contains a great zone of mineral-o ildeposits, extending North and South from Baku on theCaspian as far as Khuzistan on the Persian Gulf, which,taken as a whole, is perhaps the richest petroleum field inthe world . The Northern section of this zone , at Bakuand in Azerbaijan, has long been opened up underRussian auspices, but the Southern section, like mostnatural resources within the Persian frontier, has neveryet been tapped . When, therefore, the recent adoptionof petrol as fuel for warships vastly increased the totaldemand, and made the question of its supply a pressingconcern to the governments of naval powers, this virginfield in Persia acquired sudden significance . Onlylast year a company was formed to exploit it on a verybig scale, and the British government bought a majorinterest in its share-capital .This company may play as important a part in British

foreign policy during the immediate future as the EastIndia Company played in the eighteenth century, and itgives us a stake in Persia at least as great as Russia

’srailway-interests . Great Britain has already concludeda railway agreement with Russia for a line that will linkIndia, first with these oil fields, and ultimately, throughthe Russian system, with Europe .The road (of Indian gauge) will start from Karachi,

the port of the Indus-basin ,and run along the Mekran

coast through Gwadar and Jask to Bunder Abbas, thePersian port on the Hormuz Straits . Hence it will turninland, and mount through the tiers of the Fars mountain s, which continue the line of Zagros along the borderof the Gulf. When it attains the level of the plateau, itwill take a line due North-West, between the mountain

456 PERSIA

lakes and tangled peaks of Fars on the left, and the Kohrud range (a parallel outwork of Zagros towards theKevir) on the right, till it reaches Ispahan, the secondcity of Persia . From this point it will probably take itsway through the mountains to Khunsar, and thencedown a river-defile to Kom, which will be its junctionwith the Russian railway .

These immense enterprises will not bring advantagemerely to the foreign powers which are pressin g forpermission to carry them out they offer the only hopefor the restoration of Persia’s own economic prosperity.The terrible Mongol invasions, which ultimately gaveher the means of recovering her national independence,cost her the material wealth which centuries of strongSassanian and Arab government had built up . Inthe thirteenth century A .D. Khorassan, her Northernmost provin ce, was one of the most flourishing industrialcountries in the world : the Mongols in a few cam

paigns reduced it to a desolation from which it has neverrecovered, and the shock of the calamity brought uponthe whole nation a chronic economic paralysis which itwill not throw off by its own efforts .From a purely economic poin t of View, then, the oil

and railway concessions will be mutually advantageousto both parties in the contract, to Great Britain and

Russia on the one hand, and to Persia herself on theother ; but in discussin g the future of Anatolia and

A r abia we recognised the fact that, when a backwardnation delivers into the hands of an advanced nationthe monopoly over its exploitation, the influx of theforeign state ’s capital almost inevitably leads on to‘

the establishment of its political sovereignty over theexploited area . The Mongol invasion brought oneboon only at the cost of another will the An glo

458 PERS IA

of communication between the Gulf and the Plateau .

The imm ense, straggling Southern provinces that borderon the Gulf have been cut o ff by this zone of unrestfrom the central government

’s support, and underambitious viceroys have taken the path towards secession . The national parliament at Teheran, torn byfaction and threatened with extinction by reactionaryrebels, has been driven to place its cause in the handsof hardly more estimable military adventurers, andto buy the good-will of B aktiyari chiefs and Southerngovernors by never refusing their demands .This is not an encouraging record, and it looks

blacker still in contrast with the British and Russianachievements . A century ago the Persian Gulf wasinfested with Arab pirates the British Navy has sweptthem out of every creek, surveyed the coast, laid downbuoys at the harbo ur entrances and in the channel ofthe Shatt-al-Arab, and opened the whole of SouthernPersia to international trade . Fifty years ago, allNorthern Persia was overrun by the Turkomans of thesteppe, who made their livelihood by systematic raids,plunderin g, burning and carryin g captive withoutresistan ce : Russia has razed the Turkoman strongholds,and bu ilt the Transcaspian railway through their steppe,close along the Persian frontier, thereby bringingNorthern Persia into easy communication with Europeand converting it in to the most orderly region in thecountry. The two foreign empires have already donemore for strong government in Persia, without settingfoot within its borders, than the Persian nation hasaccomplished for itself.Recently we have taken a momentous step forward .

The agreement concluded by Sir Edward Grey with theRussian Government in 1907 assigned to each power a

PERSIA 459

political sphere of influence inside the Persian frontier 1

the intervening zone was left as common ground, whereboth powers were at liberty to pursue their interestsside by side .This policy leads straight to partition .

That is after all a lesser evil,” its defenders will say,

for the Persian nation has tried the experiment ofgovernin g itself, and proved incapable it is thereforeits own interest to submit to being governed by its bigneighbours, whose capability is proven .

”

We must answer that it is useless to cure present evilby laying up evil for the future . Inasmuch as all thepotential factors of nationality are conspicuously presentin Persia, a very few years of strong government,whether it be introduced from within or from without,will suffice to kindle the spark and raise the flame .Economic prosperity will do for Persia what it has donefor Poland : it will bring the native population intobetter proportion with the area of the country, and confront the two vulture empires with a nationalist movement of vast dimensions .But,

” the defendant will reply, the ultimateinterests and desires of the Persian nation are not thereal issue . By its present incompetence it has forfeitedany claim to future consideration . Political dismemberment may become very irksome to it, but it will atany rate not endanger the peace of the world on the

1 See Map VI. The S ou th-Eastern boundary of the RussianS phere Starts from the m eeting-poin t o f the Russian , Persian , and

Afghan frontiers, m akes a straight course to Y ezd, a town S ou th of theSalt Desert on the inner flank of Fats, and then turns North-West,

heading directly for Kasr-i-S hirin on the Turco-Persian fron tier. Thisleaves Ispahan and Khuzistan within the neutral zone. The NorthWestern boundary of the British Sphere starts from Gazik, near thePerso-Afghan frontier, and runs through B irjend and Kerm an City toBunder Abbas on theHormuz straits.

460 PERSIA

contrary, a common interest in keeping Persia quiet willprovide Russia and Great Britain with the very bondthat they have lacked heretofore, and if this happens atPersia

’

s expense, Persia will only be one of your minorities that must in evitably suffer.’

This really begs the question by assumin g thata scheme of territorial partition can be devised thatwill give equal satisfaction to the individual in terestsof Russia and Great Britain . That is the necessarypreliminary to their having an interest in common, yetthe authors of the present agreement, at any rate, do n otseem to have been very sanguine as to its possibility .

All the points where the interests of the two empires arereally vital have been left by them within the debatableZone . Neither the routes along which the Russianrailways must pass to the head of the Gulf, nor the oilfields in which the British Adm iralty has S ince acquireda predominant commercial interest, have been appro

priated by their respective claimants .It is easy to see the reason for this there is no means

of disentangling these in terests on the basis of territorialsovereignty. If Russian sovereignty is to followRussian railways over the plateau to the sea, Russia willobtain a port of her own on the Indian Ocean , whichshe will be able to fortify, if she likes, as a base for a newfleet

,and Great Britain could not possibly tolerate a

naval rival in Indian waters . If, on the other hand,British sovereignty follows British trade along all thecoasts of the Gulf, and up into the oil fields of Khuzistanat its head, Russia will finally be cut off from her outletupon the Southern Sea by the territory of a rival powershe will enjoy her free railways to the coast and her freeport in which they are to terminate, merely on GreatBritain ’s sufferance, and such a position would be no

462 PERSIA

Persia, and will grow not less but more importan t proportionally as the whole country advances along thepath of good government and prosperity.

Such an authority can only be established by thesan ction of all Europe . Already we have found thesolution of many problems in the intervention of aEuropean Concert, but in no case has the need for itbeen so urgent as in this, or the danger to which Europeanpeace is exposed by the lack of it more irremediable .We cannot much longer postpone the supreme problem ofour whole discussion how this Concert of Europe canbe brought in to permanent, active existence . Meanwhile, no such Concert exists to help us, and till we havecalled it into being, we must palliate the situation inPersia as best we can .

(i.) The private understandin g between Great Britainand Russia must be superseded by a collective agreementof all the European powers, definin g the frontiers ofPersia, and then guaranteeing her independence andintegrity within these lim its .

(ii .) The system of administering public services by a

personnel drawn from lesser European nationalities mustbe persevered with, and, if possible, extended in ran ge,and the states of Europe must make themselves responsiblecollectively both for the good behaviour of these officialsand for their just treatment.

(iii .) The fin ancial support, without which no attemptat political reform can be carried forward, must come infuture from all Europe, and not, as heretofore, from theTwo Powers .An arrangement must be made by wh ich the Europeangovernments shall give facilities to the Persian government for borrowin g in their respective money marketssuch capital as it may require for public purpo ses, in the

PERSIA 463

same proportion as shall have been agreed upon for commercial investments in Arabia. If private investorshesitate to take up any particular loan, but the governments approve the purpose for which it is being issued,the latter should either guarantee the loan to theirinvesting publics, or else subscribe the capital in theagreed proportion out of their own public funds onmoderate terms . It is only fair that if the nationsof Europe enjoy the advantage of being the world’scapitalists, they should accept the responsibilities of theposition as well, the more so as their failure to intervenemay lead to a breakdown involving the world in war andthemselves in ruin .

(iv.) The railway and oil enterprises will inevitablypass under Russia’s and Great Britain

’s exclusive control,and draw many oth er subsidiary commercial concessionsin their wake . But it would clearly be beneficial, as tending to counteract the commercial predomin ance of thesetwo powers, if all economic developments independentof these were thrown open to international finance, onthe same principles as we proposed in the case of Arabia .These suggestions do not claim to be more than Stop

gaps . They are designed to give the Persian nation thebest chan ce possible of keeping pace in its growth towardsmaturity with the progress of British and Russian powerin the country. It is the vital interest not only ofPersia herself but of the two neighbour empires that sheshould finally become strong enough to hold her ownagainst them both, and so to maintain the balance impartially between them. Yet the haven is still below thehorizon, and while the Ship of Persia is struggling painfully towards it, her safe passage depends entirely on theself-control, good will, and good understanding of Russiaand Great Britain . Such an understanding will best be

464 PERSIA

brought about by a satisfactory settlement of the Persianfrontiers, under the san ction of Europe .

(i.) Great Britain at present commands the PersianGu lf, because till now She has been the only efficientpower in the neighbourhood but when the New Arabiaand Persia begin to come into line with the nations ofEurope, and when the Greater Russia East of the Uralfinds its economic outlet through Persian ports

,the

freedom of the Gulf will become as urgent a necessityfor the states bordering on its coast and for international commerce as the freedom of the Baltic and theBlack Sea. Unless Great Britain modifies her policyto meet the new situation she will become as intolerableto her neighbours in the Gulf as Germany and theOttoman Empire have become to theirs in the BlackSea and the Baltic .Our only justification for commandin g the Gulf is that

we police it. As soon as Arabia and Persia are capableof undertakin g the task, we must retire in their favour,only stipu latin g that they Shall main tain a flotilla neith erless nor more than sufficient to patrol the coasts, and shallnot build, or allow to be built, any base for a battle fleetupon their shores .The evacuation of the Gulf would involve the cession

of Bahrein Island to Arabia, and the abandonment of ourprotectorate over the Su ltanate of Oman . Oman is astraggling territory with a long coast-line, iso lated fromthe rest of the Arabian peninsula by the great Roba-alHali desert in its hinterland . It controls the entranceto the Gulf at the Straits of Hormuz, and the liberationof the Gulf would not be a reality unless this state wereneutralised and guaranteed by all the powers .

(ii .) In fixing the frontiers of Persia herself, we shouldrelieve her of all territory alien in population, and incor

466 PERSIA

integrity of a state which occupies a considerably lessim portant economic and strategical position than Persia,and whi ch lacks all internal cohesion .

Af ghanistan is a typieal example of those mushroomOriental empires that spread their shadow in a day andvanish in the night. Its nucleus is the upper Kabulvalley, which offers the best route across the Hindu Kushrange from the Oxus-plain of Central Asia to the Indusplain of the Punjab . The dynasty entrenched in KabulCity commands the South-Eastern issue of the pass, and,taking advan tage of their geographies"position, the amirsof Kabul have extended their suzerain ty over a territoryon both sides of the great mountain-barrier, slightlylarger in its total area than the Austro-Hun garianMonarchy.

The mountains cover the major part of the country, andthe population of four and a half millions, spread thinlyover it, beggars the Dual Monarchy itself in its motleydiversity : Pachtu-speaking Afghans in the South-East,scattered through the vast tangle of valleys that feeds theWest bank of the Indus and the North bank of theHelm und Persians in the West, in the Seistan basin andat Herat Mongol-descended Hazaras in the fastnessesof Hindu Kush itself Turkish-speakin g Uzbegs in theplain between the mountain-barrier and the Southernbank of Oxus, and Iranian Tajiks on the Pamir plateau,whose snows feed the head-waters of Oxus and theNorthern tributaries of the Kabul . Th is last populationis so isolated from the world by the great mountainbastions on which it struggles to live, that it has not evenbeen touched by the advance of Islam, and remains aprimitive island of Indo-European paganism in themidst of the Moslem Ocean, like the pagan Lithuanianswho resisted Christendom till the fourteenth century A .D.

PERSIA 467

This precarious empire, founded in the latter half ofthe eighteenth century in a reaction against Persianaggression, would have fallen to pieces again in theeighteen-forties,

”had not the British government in

India interfered . A generation of half measures followed,which cost several disasters and brought no tangibleresults, while all the while the Russian Empire

’s advancetowards Afghanistan ’s North-Western frontier continned without intermission up the Oxus and Jaxartes . The relation between Afghanistan and theIndian Empire was finally settled by Lord Robert’smasterly campaigns in 1879 and 1880 . The Afghangovernment submitted its foreign policy to Britishcontrol, and was granted in return a subsidy (whichhas never been claimed) and a territorial guarantee .Accordingly, when the annexation of Merv in 1884brought Russia into direct touch with the Afghanmarches, she found not merely the Amir but theBritish government barring her further advance, andafter an interval of extreme tension between the twoprincipals, a definitive frontier between Afghanistanand the Russian Empire was laid down by an AngloRussian boundary commission in 1885.

The conventions with Afghan istan in 1880 and withRussia in 1885 are still looked upon in this country as themain bulwark of India’s defence, but it is most improbable that this bulwark will continue to be effective .We may keep the Kabul government under our thumb,and even prevent foreign powers from tamperin g withits subjects, but we cannot save the government fromdestruction at the hands of those subjects themselves .Strong governments come into existence in order togive cohesion to populations which cannot effect it forthemselves, and they only remain S trong so long as they

468 PERSIA

promote the interests of the populations they govern bycarryin g this cohesion still further. During the lastthirty-fou r years the governm ent of Kabul has maintained itself by British support in the in terests of theIndian Empire : its slow petrifaction, which from thepoint of view of British diplomacy has been such a satisfactory sign of the growing stability of the situation, hasbecome in its subjects’ eyes a patent indication of itsbankruptcy. A few months ago ominous rumours foundtheir way in to the papers that the Amir’s writ had ceasedto run among the chief Pachtu tribes of the South, theonly popu lations in the whole territory that are bound tothe governm ent by racial kinship . A family quarrel inthe dyn asty or the emergence of a mad mu llah (theAfghans are fanatical Moslems) may burst the diplomaticbubble in a moment, and explode the carefully tendedbuffer-state between the Indian and Russian Empires ina blaze of anarchy.

Sooner or later the explosion is bound to come, andif it is to discharge itself harmlessly into the air, GreatBritain and Russia must arrive at a frank understandingbeforehand as to how they will dispose of the ruins . Itis possible that the eventual dismantling of Afghanistanis already the subject of a secret treaty between the twopowers ; but if it is not, it is an essential measure of precaution that they shall provide for it by a public treaty assoon as possible, in some such terms as these

(i.) Sin ce Afghanistan is merely a geographical areacorresponding to no national reality, it is expedient that,so soon as the present government becomes incapable ofdischarging its functions, the territory should be partitioned between neighbourin g states capable of governing it efliciently.

(ii .) That the partition should follow natural physical

470 PERSIA

onto the Pam ir plateau between the very head-waters ofthe latter systems, till it reached the present frontier ofChinese Turkestan .

This division would unite the Turkish-speaking elements to their brethren in Russian Central Asia,1 andassign the Pach tu populations to India, which alreadyincludes their kinsmen in the North-West frontierprovince . The Iranians of the Pamirs would be splitbetween the two states, but they would hardly be awareof their misfortune, for racial bonds become meanin glessin face of such mountain barriers , and the stru ggle for lifeagain st the physical environment ousts all other interests .We cannot propose the naval evacuation of the Gulfand the dismemberment of Afghanistan without en

countering a last desperate assault from the Russophobe.We have repeatedly challenged his general policy,but here we are trampling under foot the perfecteddetails of his strategical dispositions . It is a fundamental principle o f his faith that the Indian Empiremust be sundered from foreign powers by a zone ofneutral territories on land and of British waters on seahaving established such a zone, he is indifferent to whatgoes on beyond its limits . This passive, mechanicalattitude is really untenable in face of th e momentouschanges that are happening both in India herself and inthe countries beyond the neutral pale .British statesmanship in the nineteenth centuryregarded India as a Sleeping Beauty,

” whom Britainhad a prescriptive right to woo when she awoke, so ithedged with thorns the garden where she lay, to safeguardher from marauders prowling in the desert without.Now the princess is awake, and is claiming the right to

1 They have been severed from them m erely by the accident of

Afghan conquest in the eighteen th century.

PERSIA 471

dispose of her own hand, while the marauders have transformed themselves in to respectable gentlemen di ligentlyoccupied in turning their desert into a garden too, butgrievously impeded by the British thorn-hedge . Whenthey politely request us to remove it, we shall do well toconsent, for they will not make the demand till they feelthemselves strong enough to enforce it, and in the tusslethat will follow if we refuse, the sympathies of the Indianprincess will not be on our S ide . Now that she is awake,she wishes to walk abroad among her neighboursshe feels herself capable of reb u ffing without our countenance any blandishments or threats they may offer her,and she is becoming as weary as they of the thorn-hedgethat confines her to her garden .

If we treat her with tact, India will never wish tosecede from the spiritual broth erhood of the BritishEmpire, but it is inevitable th at she Should lead a moreand more independent lif e of her own, and follow theexample of the Anglo-Saxon commonwealths by establishing direct relations with her neighbours . If theserelations are to be good, India must neither encroachprovocatively beyond her proper bounds, nor retiretimidly behind them . Her interest in the Persian Gulfwill continue to be important but cease to be paramount,and she must be careful to yield her neighbours in thatquarter th eir just place in the Sun in A f ghanistan ,

on the other hand, She must advance beyond her zariba,and boldly put herself into touch with the Russian Empireon the other side of it.The real fun ction of Kabul is not to divide India fromCentral Asia, but to link her to it. For Bengal and thePun jab, as for Khorassan, the natural route to Europe istheTranscaspian railway. The Indian trunk-road systemcannot halt forever at the Khyber Pass some day it must

472 PERSIA

push up the valley to Kabul, and over the great passescommanded by Kabul to Kunduz and Balkh on theOxus-plain and where the high road leads, the rai lwaywill ultimately follow. The Hindu Kush will one daybe pierced by a tunnel more stupendous th an thosewhich already penetrate the A lps and are penetrating theTaurus, and express trains will run straight throughfrom Calcu tta to Krasnovodsk .

The Russophobe will shake his head over the omen .

By these passes, he will recollect, the great conquerorsof India have marched in , from Alexander the Great toBabar the Lion . Yet such precedents are no longervalid . Then India was in the position of the civilisedman unarmed, while her invaders from the North-West

possessed arms and nothin g else, so that the spoils ofwar were their only livelihood now the civilised rule ofRussia in Central Asia is fast obliteratin g the contrastbetween life on opposite sides of the Hindu Kush, and anew Russia is growing up there which places its treasure,no less than India does, in the works of peace . Whatwe said of Germany at the outset is no less true of theRussian Empire the destiny before her is to become acommunity of workers,

” and she has already put behindher th e phase of bein g a mere nation in arms .” Russiaand India will make each other’s acquain tance across thepasses of Hin du Kush, and acquaintance will ripen intofriendship as each grows to maturity. They will meeton an equality, and develop on parallel lines .If, however, we must contend with the Russophobe

on his chosen ground, we can show that from thestrategical point of view it makes little diff erence whetherthe political frontiers of Russia and India march withone another along the summit of the Hin du Kush, orwhether they are artificially separated by a buffer-terri

474 PERSIA

basin . Here its progress would be impeded by the longand difficult barrier of the Hamun , and this would be thepoint where it would encounter the Indian army ofdefence.This front has long monopolised the attention of theIndian General Staff, and in order to make the criticalarea accessible to the Indian army, they have built anarrow-gauge railway, the costliness of which may beestimated by the difficulties its engineers had to overcome . It Starts from the Indus-plain in the North ofSind, climbs N .N .W . th rough the Bolan pass to Quetta,and then negotiates the Chodjak pass beyond, whichbrings it into the basin of the Helm und River, the greatfeeder of the Seistan swamp from the East. This railway is the key to th e defence of India, because from itstermin us Indian troops can be poured into Seistan fromthe East quicker than Russian troops, starting from theTranscaspian railway, can reach it from the North-West.Seistan is, and will remain, the m ilitary door betweenRussia and India, though little commercial traffic isever likely to pass through it, an d conversely the passesof Kabul, though they will probably become the mostdirect economic thoroughf are between India and Europe,will never lend themselves to the passage of armies .Our proposed partition of Afghanistan, therefore,

does not affect the strategic defence of India in theslightest degree, except that it brings the whole ofSeistan up to the Hamun under the direct control of theIndian government, and so gives it the power of extending the Quetta railway to the East bank of the HarudRiver, if it likes, and of masking the present line ofdefence by an exterior lin e thrown more than threehundred miles forward . From the limited point of viewof strategy as well as from the more general point of view

PERSIA 475

of economic expansion, Persia, not Af ghanistan, is themine beneath the feet of Russia and Great Britain, whichthreatens, if either makes one false step, to explodebetween them and perhaps to shatter them both .

It would be foolish to blind ourselves to this dangertrue wisdom bids us face it and seek its cause . Whenwe look steadfastly, we see that this fearful cloud uponthe future , no less than the war that is at this momentcrucifying Europe , is due to the lack of an internationalpower, stronger handed and wider minded than theindividual national states .If a Concert of Europe could arise, skilled enough to

bu ild up national self-government in Persia, Russia andGreat Britain would never come into conflict over theirinterests th ere, and even if the Concert could not musterthe initiative for this, but were merely strong enough inauthority to maintain its external guarantee of Persia’sneutrality against all comers, Russia and Great Britain ,

though they might quarrel over in terests inextricablytangled by Persia’s anarchy, could not push their quarrelto war . Their only practicable battle-ground liesathwart Persian soil, and by the European guaranteethis arena would be closed against them .

The present war would probably never have beenfought if the violation of Belgian neutrality had automatically mobilised against Germany the active intervention of every other European state . If we learn nolesson from the present catastrophe, and allow thenational S tate hereafter the same unbridled licence that ithas enjoyed before, then this war will not be the last andmost terrible in the world, but the prelude to a cycle ofincreasing horror, til l the nations of Europe are groundto powder, and the national idea perishes simultaneouslywith European civilisation itself.

476 NATIONALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY

CHAPTER XI I

NATIONALITY A ND SOVEREIGNTY

WE have completed our survey of national problems inthe area aff ected by the war .We entered upon it with an ideal before our mindsthe sovereign national state of the West . How farhave we found this ideal applicable to the rest of Europeand to the Nearer EastAs we proceeded Eastwards, the national atom proved

less and less capable of adoption as the political unit .In Central Europe, we discovered, the Tchechs willbe unable to work out their national salvation as anindependent state the economic factor necessitatestheir politi cal in corporation in the German Empire .1

In the Balkans the political disentanglement of onenationality from another is only possible if all alikeconsent to economic federation in a general zollverein .

2

In the North-East, geographical conditions decree thatnational individuality shall express itself by devolutionwithin the bond of the Russian Empire?In all these cases the political unit reveals itself not as

a single nation but as a group of nationalities yet eventhese groups cannot be entirely sovereign or selfcontained . Like the Chemist’s molecules , they arewoven out of relations between atoms , and are boundin their turn to enter into relation with one another.The nationalities O f the South-East coalesce in a

Balkan Zollverein ; the Zollverein as a whole is involved1 Ch. VI. 1 Ch. IV. S ection C.

3 Ch. VI II.

478 NATIONALITY A ND SOVEREIGNTY

brought it into being at all—and successively theyhave been cast upon the scrap-heap . One generation passed, and the Concert was shattered bythe convulsion of 1848 ; a second, and Europe wasdivided into two camps by the Triple Alliance 1

now the third has passed and Guaranteed Neutrality,

”the most solid of all the international links our

great-grandfathers forged, has snapped at the firstshock Of battle between the marshalled hosts .Guarantee"The formula coined in 1814 rings

ironical to-day. Belgium was guaranteed in order tosecure the stability of Europe, yet on account of thatguarantee Great Britain and Germany, two of thegreatest sovereign units in the European complexus,are at this moment engaged in a life-and-death struggle .Germany violated the Belgian guarantee deliberately inher attempt to destroy the European system by war.The effect O f the guarantee may still prove momentousit has drawn us into the war, and our intervention mayturn the scale . Yet even if the A llies are victorious, andthe new Europe is fashioned by them after their ownhearts and not by Germany after hers , this will not savethe credit of the guarantee itself. Germany may bepunished for her work, but the work cannot be undone .Europe must drink the cup of war to the dregs—thepain, the hate, the waste, the pure evil that is notdiminished one drop by cause or consequence . Theguarantee was invented to avert that catastrophe fromEurope . The catastrophe has happened and theinvention is bankrupt .The old Europe is dead, the old vision vanished, and

we are wrestling in agony for new in spiration . That

1 Italy joined Germ any and Austria-Hungary in 1882, three yearsaf ter they had jo in ed each o ther.

NATIONALITY A ND SOVEREIGNTY 479

has been the motive of this book. And yet, thereader will say, you return to the discredited fetishonce more ? With the crash of the Belgian guaranteeabout our ears, you propose to regulate by guaranteethe future relation of Norway and the Russian Empire,and replace the snapped link by a hundred others morebrittle than itself The objection is just, and wemust meet it .We must beware of putting our new wine into old

bottles . While guarantees hold, they conserve theircharge : when they break, the destruction is worsethan if they had never existed . Unless we can ensurethat the sovereign states of Europe respect Europeanguarantees hereafter in other fashion than Germany atthe present crisis, we must modify the formula or elsediscard it altogether .Can the mechanism of the European system be

safeguarded against its individual members ? Severalmeans have been mooted to this end .

(i.) One means is Disarmament . We discussedit in connection with the Russo-German frontier inPoland 1 and with the military control of the KielCanal,2 but in both cases we found it Utopian . Awar may be just or unjust, defensive or aggressive, yetwhen once a nation is at war, its existence is at stakeGermany is fighting for her life no less than the powersshe has attacked . Armament is self-preservation, andself-preservation is the last sovereign right that asovereign state will surrender .

(ii .) Disarmament by Compulsion thus presupposes the complete suppression o f individual sovereignty,and no one seriously proposes it as a means of breaking in the untamed sovereign state Voluntary

1 Ch. I I. Section D .

1 Ch. IX. Section A.

"


Disarmament is the catchword, yet the difficultyinvolved is just the same . Nations may promiseto disarm, but war is a question of life-and-death atthe whisper of war they will break their word

,and who

is to call th em to account

(iii .) Limitation of Armaments would prove evenmore ineffectual . It would save men ’s pockets inpeace time, but it would not save Peace itself. Theessence of the idea is to make the reduction proportional :ex hypothesi there would still be the same balance offorces, and therefore the same calculations on the partof sovereign governments, upon which the possibilityof war depends .A rmament is self-preservation, and living creatures,

whether individual men or individual states, will safeguard their existence with all their soul and all theirstrength . There is no other limit than their capacity,and limitation of armaments in peace time would meanat most that each nation would arm to the uttermostafter war had broken out, as Great Britain is doingnow, instead of arming to the uttermost before its outbreak, as Germany and most other European powershave done hitherto .

In practice it would not even mean that . A rtificiallimitation would set a premium upon dishonesty . Oneextra submarine concealed in a canal, one extra howitzerin a cellar, and the stipulated balance would be upset,the calculations invalidated, and the offending stateensured against defeat . After all, the offenderswould say to themselves, what is to determine ourrightful proportion except our own willingness to spendour strength Our neighbours wrote them selves O ffat nine guns, we at ten if we can make the effort tobuild an eleventh, that alters the real proportion between


sovereignty superior to its own . If we are to maintainthe mechanism of European society by compulsion, wemust swear in as special constables the individualmembers themselves .This policy may answer under very favourablecircumstances Denmark may take charge of the BalticStraits and faithft execute her comm ission,1 yet assoon as we pass to the Black Sea Straits the methodbreaks down . We foresaw 1 that here our chosen candidates would fail us, and that we should have to consignthe task to Russia. To instal Russia at the Bosphorusand Dardanelles or to leave Great Britain in control ofthe Persian Gulf or Suez Canal is much like posting abrigand to guard his professional haunts . Set a thiefto catch a thief ” : apply it to guarantees and we aredriven back upon the O ld system, neither more nor lessthe system that one of the wolves in sheep ’s clothin g hasjust discredited by violatin g the guaranteed independence of Belgium .

We have asked our question and must accept theanswer . It is useless to fortify our new Europeanorganism by guarantees of the old order, because wecannot fortify such guarantees themselves again st thesovereign national state . Whenever it chooses , thesovereign unit can shatter the international mechanismby war . We are powerless to prevent it : all we cando is to abandon our direct attack, and look for thecauses which impel states to a choice as terrible forthemselves as for their victims .You ask,

” the Germans say, why we broke ourcontract towards Belgium It would be more pertinentto ask how we were ever committed to such a contractat all .

1 Ch. IX . Section A. Ch. IX . Section B .

NATIONALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY 483

The heart of modern Germany is the industrialworld of the Rhineland and Westphalia . The Belgianfrontier and the Belgian tariff-wall rob this region of itsnatural outlet at Antwerp , yet the contract expresslyforbids us to right this econom ic and geographicalwrong by uniting the sea-port to its hinterland .

The chief need of modern Germany is a source ofraw produce and a market for her finished products inthe tropical zone . Belgium has staked out for herselfthe one important region in Africa which was notalready occupied by France or Great Britain . She cando nothing with it, while we but this contractexpressly forbids us to kick the Belgian dog out ofthe manger .“Because of this Belgian guarantee we must go in

want of almost everything we need, yet meanwhile ourgreat neighbours on either flank have conspired totake from us even the little we possess already. Thestruggle with France and Russia on which we are nowengaged has been impending for years, and on our partit is a struggle for existence, but even here the sameremorseless contract operates to paralyse our eff orts .On the scale of modern warfare the Western battlefront must extend from Switzerland to the North Sea,yet the greater part of this immense Zone is neutralisedby natural and artificial obstacles on either side . FromSwitzerland to the Ardennes there will be stalemate :the decision will be reached in the open country betweenthe Ardennes and the coast . Here, as soon as warbroke out, France and our own fatherland had to concentrate the terrific energy of their armaments, yet wehad contracted away our initiative in this vital area, forit lies with in the frontiers of thef

’

iB elgian state . Thegovernment we had

'

guaranteed might prepare the ground


for France and ruin it for ourselves, yet because of theguarantee we must look on passively at the digging ofour grave .“Why, then, had we suffered ourselves to be bound

hand and foot We had not : our grandfathers hadentailed the bonds upon us . When they signed thecontract in 1839, they knew not what they did . Atthat time Germany had no industry, Belgium had nocolonies, and the Franco-German frontier between theArdennes and the Jura was not closed to field operationsby two continuous lines of Opposing fortifications .Had their S ignature been demanded in 1914, they wouldhave refused it as indignantly as we should have refusedit ourselves . To us no choice was offered, and if wehave asserted for ourselves the right to choose, whodares in his heart to condemn us Who will impose achan geless law upon a changing worldThis is Germany’s argument about Belgium . Her

facts may be true or false, the arguments she buildson them valid or fallacious .1 That is not the poin t .Behind arguments and facts there looms an idea thatcan inspire an individual nation to make war on Europe .We must do justice to this idea, if it is not to play thesame havoc again .

Humanity has an instinctive craving for somethingeternal, absolute, petrified . This seems to be a fundamental factor in our psychology it has obtruded itselfequally in spheres as diverse as religion and politi cs ,but it has been especially dominant in diplomacy.

1 For instance, the argument does not justify in the least the proceedure by which Germany actually asserted her freedom . If th esituation had altered so vastly that she felt herself no longer bound by theguarantee, she ought to have denounced it form al ly in tim e of peace.

By professing observance of it up to the last m om ent, and only breakingit by thed eclaration o f war, she obtained a grave military advantage.

Thatwas"

downright dishonesty.


our energy of thought and will to the racial and economicproblems of Europe we have to solve each one of them,

and solve it to a nicety, yet when the work seems doneand its result stands embodied in map and treaty, wemust confess that we are unprofitable servants, and

recognise that we are only at the beginn ing of our task .

Our real work will be to regulate this immediatesettlement so that it varies in harmony with the sub sequent growth of Europe and modifies its structure andmechanism to meet the organism’s chan ging needs .We have now discovered the flaw in guarantees of the

old order . They were framed for rigidity, and therefore were doomed to crack . Our new guarantees mustbe elastic they must be forged of steel not cast in iron .

How can we frame guarantees Of this malleablecharacter ? We may shed light on the problem byanalysing into classes the actual guaran tees we haveproposed in our survey.

(i.) Firstly, we have proposed gu arantees of politicalindependence and integrity in the case of the threeScandinavian states ,1 the Slovene Unit,1 the Greekislands off Anatolia,3 Persia,

4 and the Sultanate ofOman .

4 The autonomy guaranteed to Poland withinthe Russian Empire 5 comes under the same head.

(ii .) Secondly, we have proposed to guaranteeeconomic rights-o f-way to one state across the politicalterritory of another . Instances of this type are theRussian railway through Norway to the Atlanti c 1

and through Persia to the Indian Ocean ; 7 Poland’s

title to free trade down the Vistula, and to the enjoyment

1 Ch. IX. Section A.1 Ch. V.

1 Ch. X. S ection D . S trictly speaking, we pro posed to guarantee theKingdom of Greece to the exten t of this portion of its territory.

1 Ch. X I. 5 Ch. VIII. Section A.

Ch . Di . Section A.

7 Ch. XI.


of a free port at Danzig 1 and Germany’s S im ilar claimto an unhampered outlet at Trieste .1

Both these classes of guarantee are adapted from theinternational machinery invented during the NineteenthCentury. The first class is an extension of the politicalguarantee given to Belgium in 1839, the second of theeconomic right-Of-way secured to her through Dutchwaters, in order to furnish the commerce of Antwerpwith a free passage down the estuary of the Scheldtto the open sea.Our standpoint towards these two classes is inevitably

prejudiced by their associations . We envisage themas embodied once for all,

” like their nineteenthcentury precedents, in a contract, and like nineteenthcentury diplomacy we tend to regard such contractsas so many girders in a permanent settlement .”

(iii .) There is a third class, however, which has noprecedent in the past, and which will react upon ourstandpoint in the very opposite direction our proposedguarantee of alien minorities within the national state .We have resorted to this formula more often than toeither of the others . The German populations transferred with Schleswig to Denmark and with theEastern frontier-Zone to Autonomous Poland ; 4 thePoles abandoned to Germany in West Prussia theGermans and Slovaks who cannot be disentangled fromHungary ; 5 the Christian elements in Anatolia ‘1 andArabia 7—these are a few out of many instances, andeach one of them is a refutation of finality.

”

The fact that such minorities must inevitably be lefton our hands compels us to recognise that beyond a

1 Ch. I I. Section D .

1 Ch. V.

1 Ch. II . Section C.

1 Ch. II. Section D.

“Ch . IV . Section A.

1 Ch. X . Section D .

7 Ch. X. Section E .


certain degree the economic and the national factor arenot commensurable . Here is an essential imperfectionin the best settlement we can possibly devise .The fact that these minorities require a guarantee

reveals a deficiency still more grave than the other, inasmuch as it is not environmental but psychological . Itmeans that hardly a sin gle national society in Europehas yet become capable of national toleration . Justas people were persecuted for their religious beliefs inthe sixteenth century and for their politi cal Opinions inthe nin eteenth, so they are still in the twentieth centuryalmost universally exposed to persecution for theirnational individuality. In this sphere the social evo lution of Europe is exceptionally backward, and theproblem of nationality will never be solved till thispsychological incongruity is removed .

This at once reduces to their proper proportion boththe immediate geographical settlement Of the problemwhich we have elaborated in this book and that guaranteeof alien minorities wh ich we have found to be itsnecessary supplement. In this light, the contracts inwhich such guarantees are enshrined appear as thetransitory scaffolding they are . Weakened by themorbid hypertrophy of nationalism which has beenpreying upon her for years , exhausted by the convu lsion O f war in which the malady has culminated,Europe must walk on crutches now or else collapse ;yet she will not be a cripple for ever . Relieved bythese guarantees from the immediate strain of unmitigated national friction, she wi ll be able to concentrateall her energy upon her spiritual convalescence. Assoon as She has trained herself to national toleration,She will discard the guarantees and walk unaided .

So far from constituting a permanent settlement,


of the In ternational Conference it can only be met bythe appointment of a standing international committeewith executive powers, empowered, that is , to administerand interpret the contracts to which the membersof the Conference have originally subscribed .

1 Ourthird type of guarantee has thus presented us with theclue we sought . The letter of international law hasproved in effective hitherto because it has lacked theinspiration of a living spirit, and this spirit can only bebreathed into it by a human organ of internationalauthority.

Supposing that such an organ were called intoexistence, what kind of international relations wouldnaturally fall within its scope We can analyse itsprobable sphere of activity into several departments .

(i.) The first branch would of course be thosegu arantees of national minorities which have justtaught us the necessity for its existence .

(ii .) The second branch would include the twosubjects of guarantee we dealt with first, namelyPolitical Independence and Rights of Way.

We can see now that their administration by a representative international executive would eliminate thatdefect of rigidity which has always proved fatal to themheretofore .Between them these two branches would cover all

the machinery we have suggested for our regeneratedEuropean organism. Are there any further spheres of

1 Itwou ld b e premature to discuss theconstitutional relation betweenthis representative international organ and the individual nationalstates from which its delegated authority wou ld b e derived. We

cannot yet con jecture how m uch discretion its sovereign constituents

wou ld b e willing to grant it. Its reference wou ld probably include afree hand to interpret in the widest sense, b ut on the question of

emending the actual letter of the contract, our executive organ wou ldalmost certainly b e required to refer back to its prinCipals.

NATIONALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY 491

national interaction over which our international organmight properly assume control ? It would be logicalto assign to it, if possible, all relations between sovereign national states which are peculiarly subject tochange .Change is a harmonisation of two rhythms—Growth

and Decay . Some sovereign units are continuallywaxing in population, material wealth and spiritualenergy : such are Great Britain and Germany, Franceand the Russian Empire . Others, like the OttomanEmpire or Spain, are as continually waning in respectof the same factors .This ebb and flow in the current of life causes, and

must cause, a perpetual readjustment of the relationsbetween units in the two complementary phases . Unitsin the positive phase inevitably absorb the fibres andtrespass upon the environment of those which havepassed over into the negative rhythm . We cannot arrestthis process any more than we can abolish changeitself : what we can do is to regulate it on the lines Ofcivilisation, instead of letting it run riot in a blindstruggle for existence .The current radiates in an almost infinite variety of

interactions . Great Britain , Germany, and India aredischarging surplus population into the empty landsof the New World ; Great Britain and France areapplying surplus wealth to evoke the latent resources ofcountries with no surplus of their own Great Britainand Russia are putting forth spiritual energy to inspireprim itive peoples with the vitality of civilisation .

Our international organ can handle no more than afraction of this world-wide interchange .

(i.) We may exclude at once from its competenceevery interaction that is confined within the limits


of a single sovereign unit . Within the BritishEmpire, for example, it is patently impracticable tointernationalise the problems of Indian emigrationto Vancouver or the Transvaal, of the closure of theAustralian labour-market again st labour from theBritish Isles, of commercial exploitation in Nigeria orRhodesia, of autonomy in Ireland or the Asiatic Dependencies . The Empire may handle its own problemswell or ill, but it will never consent to waive its sovereignty in respect of them . We should regard theproposition of international intervention as a menaceto the Empire ’s existence . We should undoubtedlyfight rather than submit to it, and every other sovereignstate would do the same under sim ilar circumstances .In purely internal affairs international authority willnever obtain a footin g at the expense of the individualunit .

(ii .) We may hkewise exclude interactions betweentwo or more sovereign states in spheres that fall entirelywithin their respective sovereignty . The Dominionof Canada or the U .S .A . would never submit tointernational regulation the question of Japan eseimmigration along their Pacific seaboard . If Russiawished to float a loan, she would never allow our international organ to decide where and in what proportionsit should be placed : she would in sist on keeping herhands free, and making the best bargain for herselfboth from the fin ancial and the political poin t of view .

Italy and the Argentine would never relinquish theirrespective sovereign rights over the Italian labourerswho cross the Atlantic every year to reap the So uthAmerican harvests . International authority would beflouted as uncompromisingly in these instan ces as inthe former .


take in hand . We shall frankly repeat our confessionthat active politi cal construction of this kind will bebeyond the capacity of any international organ whichthe immediate settlement may bring to birth after thepresent war . Europe will not be reborn in the fuln essof her strength like Athena she will strengthen herselfin pain and sorrow, advancing laboriously from smallthin gs to great . The assertion of international sovereign ty in Persia and at Constantinople will not be thefirst step in international organisation : it is the goalOf our hopes , the extreme horizon that our vision canwrest from Utopia .

We have now established the nature of that international force which is to regulate the relation betweensovereign national molecules, and we can abstract ourconclusion in two formulas .

(i.) There is no virtue in lifeless contracts , unlessthey are administered by a living organ with executive ,or in other words with sovereign, authority .

(ii .) On the other hand this international sovereign tymust scrupulously confine itself to the adjustment ofthe equilibrium between individual units, and to theapportionment among them of untenanted areas .It cannot encroach upon individual sovereignty in

any way that effects , or is deemed to affect, the sovereign right Of self-preservation in parti cular, it cannotaspire to the regulation of War, and it is waste of in

genu ity to propound any international machinery forthis purpose . The best-conceived arbitration or conciliation is bound to break down , when once a sovereignstate has made up its mind that the surrender of its willon a parti cular issue is equivalent to annihilation . Nointernational authority could ever prevent parleys like


those of last July from resolving themselves into aconflict of arms .1

The reader may feel this distinction of spherescasuistical . I adm it,

” he may say, that each comb atan t has staked his existence on the result of thestruggle, but surely he has staked it for a cause Theissues of the war are certain concrete problem sMorocco, the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire—all ofwhich conspicuously fall within the sphere you proposeto internationalise . Have you not been making adistinction without a difference ? If you cannot re

gu late war itself, how can you regulate the relationsthat precipitate it In July 1914 your

‘ internationalorgan would have proved just as ineffective in thesphere you reserve to it as in any other .”

Yes, we must an swer, if it had only been called intoexistence that very month no, if it had already beenin comm ission during the Moroccan crises of 1905 and191 1 , or had been there to take in hand the Balkanproblem in 1875, the moment when the revolt of Bosniaagainst the Ottoman Government opened that chain ofevents which has culminated actually in the presentcatastrophe .Morocco, the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire— the

present war is not really being waged to settle theseproblems : it is being waged because they have beensettled already, and settled on such unjust and injudicious lines that all parties concerned have found itworth while to stake their existence for the reversal ofthe settlement . No one need have been involved bysuch problems in a struggle for life . They were allproblems of expansion, and their solution ought at

1 All the belligerents m aintain that they took up arms for selfpreservation, and they all Speak truth—it is a truism .


wo rst to have disappoin ted the expectation of immoderate gains it ought never, as it has done , to havethreatened the parties with the loss of what theypossessed already before the problems were probed .

Why has the contrary occurred ? Because, just forlack of that international executive with the sovereignauthority we postulate , these issues that were not vitalhave been fought out, like issues of life and death, bywar—not by the war of arms which has descendedupon us now like some recurrent plague, in to which werelapse at rarer and rarer intervals as we advance incivilisation, but by the unobtrusive, unremittent warof diplomacy which is being waged year in and yearout between the sovereign states of Europe, and whichhas increased appallingly in violence durin g the lastgeneration .

In this disastrous diplomatic warfare our opponentsin the present war of arms have been uniformly theaggressors . If Austria-Hungary is now strugglin gfor existence, it is because she deliberately embarkednearly forty years ago upon a diplomatic campaign ofaggrandisement against South-Slavoni c nationality .

1 IfGermany is fighting back to back with her in the sameghastly struggle, it is because Germany has wieldeddiplomatic weapons still more ruthlessly against herother European neighbours .For the terrible embitterment of the diplomatic

contest Germany herself is entirely responsible, but shehas inevitably exposed herself to reprisals as severe asher own provo cative blows . She open ed the battleover Morocco by forcibly intruding upon a spherewhere she had no shadow of claim to expansion

1 In Ch. IV. Section B we have traced the history of this campaignat wearisome length.

498 NATIONALITY A ND SOVERE IGNTY

monster’

s teeth, we shall no longer be troubled by itssti ll more monstrous offspring—War .

Attack diplomacy the reader will exclaimStated in these terms, your scheme takes on a morerevolutionary aspect . You are really demanding thatthe sovereign national state shall delegate to yourinternational executive its en tir e sovereignty in thediplomatic sphere . When it grasps your intention, willit not shrink from the sacrifice after allOur answer can be no more than a prophecy, and we

shall frame it best on the analogy of that associationamong individuals of which every sovereign stateconsists .In the philosophy of the individual society it is a

common-place that liberty and political organisationincrease in a direct ratio to one another . Mankindhas never lived in the State of Nature,

” for if ourprogenitors had not evolved the Herd already, theywould never have been able to evolve the Soul . Thelife of Ishmael, which sovereign states are lead ing still ,is a discredited myth in the individual’s historynevertheless, when first he comes within our ken , hehas not committed himself entirely to the So cialContract .”

The most prim itive individual so cieties we know arestill in the phase of transition . In almost every sphereof life their members have already discovered the valueof pohtical co-Operation, but there is one anarchictradition they have not yet brought themselves toabandon—the Blood-feud .

” Yet the Blood-feud toois doomed, and we watch it die out as the individual

’spoliti cal sense develops . The increasing politicalregulation of all other relations between man and maneliminates occasions for the shedding of blood, and


instead of being an everyday necessity, murder becomesa last resort . The individual begins to think of it as adreadful exception to the normal reign of Law : hemisses here the liberty which Law has elsewhere givenhim, and longs here also to abandon unlimited rightsin order to cast off the burden of unlimited duties . Thenthe Blood-feud dies o u t, and Law wins undisputedsovereignty within the state .Why Should not the State itself repeat the history ofthe Individual ? If the evolution of individual societieswas compatible with the survival of the Blood-feud,surely we need not despair of organising sovereign statesinto a still greater political association merely becausethey are unwilling to abandon the sovereign right ofWar ; and if once this international organisation isaccomplished, surely we can look forward with hope tothe eventual disappearance of War also . States likeindividuals must eventually discover that the Bloodfeud is a burden, and that the sovereign right to wageit is not Liberty but a mockery of it we shall be pastteaching indeed, if the present catastrophe is not asuffi cient object-lesson for us . If sovereignty meansfreedom of choice, when were the nations of Europeever less free to exercise their will than in the summer of1914 ? No choice was open to them . One and allthey were compelled to turn aside from the pressingtask of social reconstruction upon which their heart isset, and take up in self-defence—poor sovereign puppets—that task of mutual destruction for which they haveno heart at all .The political philosophy of Modern Germany

vehemently repudiates this analogy of ours . It refusesto regard the State and the Individual as homologousorganisms . The Individual—his function is to merge


himself in the society to which he belongs the Statethat is the politi cal Absolute . For the State there isno law, no vision of a wider society .

”

This dogma may be true or false that the future willshow, yet this much we can proclaim at once If it istrue, then European Civilisation is a failure .The function of Society,

” says Aristotle, is not tomake life possible, but to make it worth living .

” Thissaying, at least, applies not only to individuals but tostates . Hitherto the national states of Europe havebeen absorbed in the prehm inary struggle to securetheir existence . If they can profit by the present crisisto liberate their energy for h igher ends, then theKingdom of Heaven is at hand if inspiration fails themin this hour, then we are witnessing the beginning ofgreat evils for Hellas ,

” and the Sovereign Nations ofEurope are doomed to the same destruction as theSovereign Cities of Greece .

502 THE MA P OF EUROPE

are included, besides the predominant English-speaking population of Great Britain, the considerable Welshand Gaelic minorities, because, though their Kelticspeech is entirely alien, an d the Welsh, at any rate, havea special literary and religious group-consciousness oftheir own , they are all entirely fused into one politi calorganism .

In Ireland, on the other hand, the conqueringEnglish tongue has triumphed far more universally thanin the larger island, and has almost reduced the nativeKeltic dialect to extinction, yet religion has been potentenough to implant in three quarters of the Irish popu lation a national consciousness totally distinct from theBritish, although the vast majority of the Catholic-Irishnation speaks English as its native tongue . In thisisland the only adherents of the British nationality arethe Protestants of Ulster, and they are the most fanati calpartisans it possesses , because they are a minority, or astheir enemies call them a garrison,

” planted on theterritory of another nation, and continually threatenedwith ejection or forcible assimilation at the hands ofthe latter .1 This explains why the distribution ofstipples in the British Isles is considerably different fromthat which would be presented on a linguistic map,where the Erse-speaking Irish Catholi cs , for instance,would be distinguished from their English-speakingco -nationalists, while no distinction would be madebetween the latter and the Uster Protestan ts of identi calspeech but violently antipathetic national feeling .

(2) B elfast, though the capital of Ulster, has attractedby its immense mercantile and industrial developmenta large urban immigration from the rural districts ofCatholic Ireland, so that a strong m inority of its present

1 Compare the position of the Germans in Bohemia.

THE MAP OF EUROPE 503

population monopolising solid blocks ofstreets, is intensely Nationalist . It is of course impossible to separate out this Catholic population ofBelfast from the rest of Ulster by any territorial frontier,and they are one of those m inorities that must inevitablyremain unsatisfied .

(3) A Welshman resident in Jersey once told theauthor that he was able to carry on aKeltic conversationwith the B reton peasant women who came over from themainland for a fair yet though the Welsh and Bretondialects are so little differentiated, there is no commonconsciousness whatever between the populations thatspeak them .

The Breton is as good a Frenchman as the Welshman is a Britisher . The Welshman is distinguishedwithin the general British mass not so much by hislanguage as by his Nonconformity, which he shareswith an important class of the whole English-speakingpopulation the Breton is a clerical, like his Frenchspeaking Vende

'

an neighbour, not because of his Kelticspeech, but because he is a peasant and inhabits adistrict remote from the centres of French national life .

(4) The French-speaking Belgians or Walloons have,unlike the Keltic-speaking Bretons, been left blank,because, though they have several times in the pastbeen incorporated by conquest in the French state,they have never till lately shown any active desire forits membership .

1 If they ever break away from theFlemings, their secession will be due far less tosympathy with the neighbour nation with which theyshare a common language, than to the antipathy of

1 In contrast to the French-speakin g popu lation of a district likeFranche-Compté, which till the seventeenth century lay outside thepo litical frontier of France, yet has been completely welded into theFrench nation .

504 THE MAP OF EUROPE

socialists and free-thinkers towards the conservatismand clericalism of Flanders . The heroic struggle forfreedom again st the Germans is more likely, however, tofuse Walloons and Flemings into a really living Belgiannationality .

(5) The Flemings, who, together with the Walloons ,constitute, or will constitute in the future, the Belgiannation, speak a Low-German dialect hardly distinguishab le from the Dutch, but since the decline ofmedie val Flemish civilisation in the sixteenth century,French has ousted the native idiom as the medium ofeducation and literature . The Flemish literary revivalis a movement of very recent growth the Dutch, onthe other hand, b egan to raise their patois into a culturelanguage during the same sixteenth century, and havewon it a permanent place beside French and HighGerman .

The gulf between Fleming and Dutchman has furtherbeen accentuated by Religion the Dutch becameardent Calvinists, while the Flemings were capturedby the Counter-Reformation . Thus there remains nofactor capable of inspiring a common national consciousness, and it is unlikely that such will arise in thefuture, unless the Young-Flemish revival reallypervades the whole Flemish people, and brings linguisticconsciousness to the forefront .

(6) The Dutch themselves (as well as their Flemishneighbours) are claimed by Pan-Germans as truantmembers of the German nation, because they speak

(like ourselves1) a Low-German dialect . It is true

that the peasant of the Zuider Zee polders and thepeasant on the Baltic co ast preserved a close dialectical

Bread, bu tter, and cheeseA re good English and good Fries.


France they would perhaps choose, if they could, tobe left to their insular anarchy, and would certainlyrepent their choice before long, if they did . National,as opposed to local, sentiment is hardly more strongin Sardinia and Sicily than in Corsica, and it is moreby chance than conscious will that two out of thethree islands have become united with the continentalspeakers of their language in the Italian national state .Sicily has revolted more than once since Garibaldi wonit for Italy in 1860 .

(10) Trieste is a city with an Italian nucleus and afringe of Slovene suburbs , inhabited by the industrialsand dock-hands whom the commercial developmentof the port has attracted from the countryside . TheItalian element has kept its hold upon the civic ad

ministration by preventing the new Sloven e quartersfrom incorporating themselves in the municipal area .The population of “oflicial Trieste is andis predominantly Italian the population of GreaterTrieste, that is, of the whole urban complexus centredin the port, totals nearly a hundred thousan d more .Reckonin g on this wider basis , the Slovenes can claimover 18 per cent . of the total population, and the proportion is always shifting in their favour . Theiradmission to joint control of the municipality is on lya question of time, and Trieste is essentially a b i

national city.

(1 1 ) The S lovenes them selves are left blank .

Common Slavdom may incline them to enter the SouthSlavonic union , but their dialect diff ers from that oftheir South-Slavonic neighbours , and has never developed a literature . Their culture is German and

Italian, and there are strong German and Italianelements in the population of the country . If these

THE MAP OF EUROPE 507

influences prevail, the Slovene Unit will prefer to standby itself.

(12) The S lovaks along the Northern border ofHungary speak the same dialect as the Tchechs inAustria, but their history has proceeded on entirelyindependent lines . Their case is the same as that ofthe Croats and Serbs . The stress of common persecution awakened the consciousness of South-Slavonicnationality, and the same causes may produce the sameeffects upon Tchechs and Slovaks . There is no indication, however, that this has happened yet, and the twopeoples are therefore distinguished on the map .

(13) Pdszony (Pressburg) is a Hungarian townsituated on the North bank of the Danube, at the pointwhere the Little Carpathian range descends to theriver . It is the meeting-place of German, Magyar andSlovak, but the German element predominates in thepopulation 1 of the town itself.

(14) The Masurians are Poles in language, butculture, religion and tradition link them to their Germanneighbours in East Prussia, and make their nationalfeeling unpredictable . They are therefore left blank .

The Wends of Lusatia are left blank for the samereason . They are the remnant of a Slavonic tribe, theSorab s, cut off by German expansion from their kinsmenfurther East .

(15) The Pomaks inhabit the Rhodope Mountainsin Thrace . Linguistically they are Bulgarian Slavs,but like their South-Slavonic kinsmen in Bosnia theyhave been converted to Islam, and the bond of religionhas prevailed over the bond of speech . During thecampaign of 1912 they were violent partisans of theTurks, and their guerilla bands harassed the communi

1 at the census of 1900.


cations of the Bulgarian army . National consciousnesswill probably be kindled in them, as in the Bosniaks ,by the spread of education, but under present circumstances it would be misleading to represent them as

Bulgars, and accordingly they have been left blank .

(16) The Tatars in B ulgaria are descended fromrefugees transplanted by the Ottoman Government tothe South bank of the Danube when Russia annexedthe Bessarabian steppes . Since the Turkish frontierretreated sti ll further in 1878, the Tatars have beenleft stranded under Bulgarian rule

,but though they are

sundered from the Bulgars by speech as well as religion,they have become completely reconciled to the newsituation . While the Bulgar-speaking Pomaks inRhodope were fighting for the Turks, the Turkishspeakin g Tatars in Bulgaria were tending the fields oftheir Christian neighbours who had been mobilised forthe Turkish war . They are another instance in whichlangu age is no criterion of national feeling .

(17) In Constantinople the Turkish element at presentpossesses a majority over all the other elements comb ined, but it will sink to the level of the Greek, A rmenianand Frank colonies, as so on as the city is liberatedfrom Ottoman Sovereignty. Constantinople is essentially a cosmopolitan trading-centre like Shanghai, andhas no nationality of its own .

(18) In 1913 Greece and Bulgaria fought for theownership of S alonika, yet on grounds Of nationalityneither Of them has any claim to rule there, for theGreek and Bulgar elements in the city are negligible .

Two-thirds of the population 1 are Spanish Jews ,welcomed by the Ottoman Government after their

1 Approximately out o f Exact statistics have neveryet been taken .


(23) More than half the population of Smyrna1 is

Greek, the remainder is cosmopolitan . Geographically,the city is the chief commercial centre of the Anatolianpeninsula, and is marked out to be the capital of adiminished Turkey. The Smyrniots are one of therichest, most cultured, and most influential Greekcommunities in the World, but if Smyrna were annexedto the Kingdom of Hellas and detached from its continental hinterland, they would be ru ined .

(24) The Maronite and Druse communities in theLebanon speak Arabic like their Moslem neighbours

,

but difference of religion and a tradition of localautonomy have combined to implant in each of them acorporate feeling of their own . Druse and Maronitevillages are so intri cately intermingled that it hasbeen impossible to distinguish one community fromthe other on the map .

(25) The Georgians are a Caucasian people whoremained loyal to the Orthodox Church when all theirneighbours adopted Islam . They developed a strongsense of nationality during their struggle for inde

pendence against Persia and Turkey, the great Moslempowers, but about a century ago they placed themselvesunder the protection of their Russian co-religionists ,and since then they have rapidly become Russianised .

Their nationalism has thus been conditioned by religionand not by language, and they have no feeling ofbrotherhood with their Lazic neighbours, who speakan identical diale ct but are devout Moslems . TheLazes on their part sympathise with the Turks, andwhen the Ottoman armies penetrated beyond the Russianfrontier in

'

January 1915, the Lazic population flockedto their standard .

1 Total popu lation about

THE MAP OF EUROPE 51 1

(26) Tiflis was the capital of the Georgian nationalkingdom, but under the Russian regime it has attracteda large Armenian population, and has even become thechief Asiatic focus of Armenian national life .

(27) The Kalmucks of the Cis-Caucasian steppe aredistinguished from their nomadic neighbours by bothlanguage and religion . They are a community ofMongol Buddhists which sought refuge within theRussian frontier when the Man chus conquered Mongoliain the seventeenth century . The Russian Governmenttransplanted them to this distant quarter of the Empire ,to hold the Turkish-speaking Moslem tribes in check .

5 14

Austria Hungary,Mona rch yAustrian Crown Lan ds ’

Parh am en t

(Reich srath ) , 17, 5 3 , 126 , 137, 194,201 , 220, 266 -8 , 3 12Austrian Kustenlan d , 214, 248 -9A uls

fi'

ian Lloyd S team sh ip Lin e, 109Austr ian Mili tary Frontiers, 174Au strian S u ccessmn , W ar o f , 114Au strian S u db ahn , 25 8Avlona , 227, 229, 23 3 , 23 6 , 254-5A z erb auan , 3 94-6 , 455 , 465

see Hapsburg

BBabar th e Lion , 472B ab en b erg , Hou se o f , 104Babylon , 442, 452Baden , 83 , 87Bagda d, 322, 393 , 442-4, 447, 450,452, 454, 497Bag dad Railway, 37, 419, 420, 425 -7,446 , 448Bah rein Islan d , 464Baikal , Lake, 328 , 3 30-1B aktiyaris , 457

-8Baku , 395 , 414 , 455Baku , ri ots at, 388Balkans, 52, 122, IV 279, 281 , 296 ,3 60-1 , 36 3 , 3 83 , 504 -5Balk an ”

,W ar First , 232.

240, 255 , 3 71 ,Balkan W ar , S econ d , 9, 206 , 224,236 , 23 8, 277, 3 79, 382-3 , 508Baltic Provm ces, 301-3Baltic S ea , 49, 6 6 , 71-2, 76 -7, 288,297, 3 10-11 , 318, 337, m . A, 3 64,3 69, 3 74, 454, 464, 482Balu ch i tribes, 465Bash k irs, 308, 321 , 322, 328Basra

,439, 440, 454

Batoum , 109Bavaria , 21, 82-3 , 87, 92, 103 , 261Beiru t, 429, 444Belfast, 502-3Belgium , 5 6 , 6 3 , 101 , 103 , 273 , 275

475 , 478, 482-4, 487,

Belgrade, 164 , 16 7-8 , 172, 180, 196

201, 204 , 207, 225 , 289Belgrade, Peace of , 144, 172Belt, Great an d In ttle, 3 50Berch to ld , Coun t, 205 -210B erh n , Congress o f , 13 9,187-8, 190, 23 1-2, 279, 3 60, 3 80408 , 430Bessarabia , 306 -8 , 3 6 1, 508Beu th en , 6 8 , 89Bism arck , 25 , 81 , 90-1 , 93 , 100, 103 ,108, 132, 244, 265 , 272, 274-5287, 303 , 325Black Forest , 101 , 103Black Sea , 101 , 13 8 , 168 , 194, IV. C,283 , 284, 288 , 297, 310, 3 18 , 3 37,

3 39, IX . B , 3 89, 3 91, 3 97, 420, 426Black Sea S traits, 190, 203 , 223 , 23 6 ,

NATIONALITY AND THE WAR

3 38, 3 41 , IX . B , 385 , 3 98, 417,424-5 , 428 , 454, 464 , 481-2, 493

B ogumfls (Pau licians ) , 170, 218Bo h em i a , 6 6

-7, 92, 98, 106 , 111 -2,

125 -137, 141 , 147, 25 8, V. 281 , 502Bom bay, 109Bosn a R iver, 167, 170Bosm a , 100, 112, 144, IV . B , 1982

89,210-6 , 23 2, 43 0, 495 ,

O

B o sm aks, IV. B , 508B ogs

sn

i

an B a l lway , 196 204,

Bo sph orus (see Black S ea S tra its) ,23 6 , 3 3 8 , IX . B , 482Bothn ian Gulf , 343Bourbons, 3 25Boyan a R iver , 204, 230Boyn e, Battle o f th e, 150Boxers, 3 71Brachyceph alism , 413Brah ui tr1b es, 465Brail a , 224Bran den burg, 21 104, 261Brem en , 88Breslau , 6 4, 70, 26 1Bretons, 15 1 , 503B I'l Ildl S I , 227Brom berg, 73 , 79Bu da-Pest, 106 , 118 , 140, 141, 143 ,179, 180, 183 , 217, 220Bu ddh ism ,

Buk arest, 237Buk arest, Treaty o f , 206 , 223 , 225 ,23 6 242

B uk ovm a , 305 , 307Bul dur , 419, 427Bulgaria , 10, 15 , 106 , 188-9, 194,198 , 203 , 206

-8 , 223 , 226 , 23 6 -242,

251 , 277, 307, 3 60, 3 62, X . A, 508B ugga

r

g, 16 8, 182, 191, 237

-242, 306 ,

Bun der Abbas , 46 5Burgun dy, 8Byzantin e Em pire, 52 380

CCali ph ate, 404

-5 , 407, 435 , 45 1Calvm ism , 149, 504-5Cafgé

l a , 3 5 , 321 , 327, 3 29, 330, 333 ,

Cape-to -Cairo Ra ilway , 3 3Ca

‘fét

éul ations 111 Turkey, 417, 423 ,

Cappadocia , 413 , 426Capp o d oman s, 414Caroh n e Islands , 3 6Carpath ian Moun ta ins , 6 6 , 76 , 104,

IV . A , 167, 169, 216 -7, 219, 247,

365,284, 288, 292, 3 05 , 307, 3 10,

Carpathian s, Little, 104, 507CaSp ian S ea , 3 18, 3 89, 3 95 -7, 449,

455 , 473Cath erm e, Em press of Russia , 175 ,

513 190, 297, 3 3 7

INDEX

Cattaro Fj ord , 110, 173 , 182, 204,214 , 230, 23 2, 254Caucasus, 109, 3 20, 3 88 -9, 3 90-1 ,3 96 -7, 449, 455 , 473Caul dron o f th e N o rth , 33 1Cavour , 209Ceylon , 109Ch aldaeans (Assyrians ) , 393 -5 , 437Ch arlem agne, 40, 405Ch arles o f Luxem bourg, 262Ch arles th e Bold, 275Chfgg

l d j a Lin es, 182, 203 , 208 , 3 64

Ch erem i sses, 321Cherm gov , 3 1501141

71

3, 28 , 3 17, 327, 330-5 , 442, 447,

Chrobats, 169Ch uvash es, 321Cil ician Tunn el , 425Constan tin e Palai ologos, 3 66Constan tin e P orp hyrogenn eto s, 103Constan tin ople, 169, 170, 182, 23 5 -6 ,

245 , 295 , 3 22, IX . B , 3 82, 390, 408 ,419, 420, 437, 494 , 508

Constanz , Coun ci l o f , 262Corfu , 109, 249Corin thi an Gulf , 228CorS ica , 253 , 505 -6Cossacks, 283 , 3 28-9Costanza , 224Cour land , 301-3Cracow, 76 , 13 2, 285 -6Crim ea , 3 16Crim ean W ar , 298 , 419, 422, 43 6Croatia -S lavoni a , 145 , 157, 166 , IV .

B , 248 , 260, 3 43Croats, 145 , IV . B , 507Cru sade, First , 3 91Cu stoz za , Battle o f , 99Cuxh aven , 88Cypru s, 429-43 1 , 509

D

Daélil

éatl a , 110, 120, 144, IV . B 247,

Damascu s, 403 , 437-9, 440, 444-5 ,

Danu be R iver, 66 , III 125 , IV 258 ,26 1 , 3 06 -7, 3 85 , 507

-8Danu be, n avi gati on o f , 224Danu bian Prin cipalities,R oum ani a

DanSZ Ig , 71 , 74 , 76 , 83 , 88 , 272, 288 ,

4 7Dardanell es (see Black S ea Straits) ,170, 3 3 8 , IX . B , 3 82, 482

Dariel , Pass o f , 3 89Dariu s th e Great, 415 , 442, 450, 454Dark Ages, 8 , 21-2, 374, 3 84, 405Deak , 120Dedeagatch , 3 80-1Denm ark , 25 , 48 , 81 , 3 3 8 , IX . A,

364 , 3 69, 370, 3 74 , 482, 486 -7D iarbekr, 43 7, 447

5 15

East In d ia Com pany, 455East Indi es, 3 03 , 505Edessa , 3 93dward VII . , 197

Egnatia V ia , 228Egypt, 109, 3 73 , 3 99, 404-5 , 410,43 5 , 442, 446

E gyp tians , 404E igh teen -th irteen , 23

E lbe R iver , 23 , 49, 82, 88 , 264, 3 39,3 5 1-2

Em s Telegram , 202Epirus, 110, 23 3 -5 , 509Erse Lan guag e, 502E rz Gebirge, 67, 69, 264Esth lan d , 302-3E tch nn az rn , 3 90, 394Euphrates R iver, 390, 3 92-3 , 401 ,432, X . E .

Eu ph rates, Eastern , 393Euphrates, Western (Kara Su ) , 391

Fars (Persis) , 45 2, 455 -6 , 459Ferdin an d , Em peror o f Au stria , 98Fife, 6 7Fiiil5

a

3n d , 321, 340-8, 3 56 , 3 58 , 397,

Finlan d , Gulf o f , 301-2Finlan d , Swedes in , 3 41a s, 308 , 3 22Fium e, 109, 179, 180, 204, 214, 217,222, 224 , 509

Fium e, R eso lu tion s o f , 194-5Flem ings, 503 -4

Flensburg, 50Foreign Legi on , French , 373Forth , Firth o f , 6 7

’Forty-E igh t,” 87, 98 , 117, 478

Diggi

ic Alps, 16 7, 169, 172, 179, 186 ,

Disraeh , 183 , 23 2Dni epr R iver, 284 , 3 10Dni estr R iver , 306 -7, 3 10Do b ru dJ a , 237Don R iver , 16 5 , 3 10Draga ,"u een o f S erbia , 192Drgén

sg n ach O sten , 109, 114, IV . B ,

Drave Ri ver , 106 , 140, 142, 146 , 16 6 ,IV. B , 247, 25 8

-9Drin R iver , 205 , 228 , 230Drin , Wh i te, 229, 230, 3 87Drin a Ri ver , 16 7, 176 , 199, 204Dru ses, 43 7

-8 , 5 10Du bli n Strike, 13Dulcign o , 230-3 , 235Dun a R iver , 283 , 301Durazzo , 205 , 207, 228 -9 , 23 5

-6Du tch gen darm erie in A lb am a , 375Du tch in S . Af rica , 32

5 16 NATIONALITY AND THE WAR

Francis-Ferdin an d , Arch duk e o fAustria , 13 6 , 209

Francis-Joseph , 99, 117-8 , 127, 136 ,

155 -7, 175 . 181Frank furt, 93Frederick II . , Hoh enstauf en , 90Frederick th e Great, 23 , 91French R evo lu tion , 9 , 115 , 286 , 325

Fn ed Jun g Trial , 200-2

Gaels , 6 7, 502

Gah eia , 5 3 , 5 7-8 , 60, 100 16 6 , 247,267, 284 , 288 , 290-1 , 293 , 306

-7

3 11-5 , 3 18Gallipo li , 170, 203 , 3 62, 3 65Garibal di , 212, 253 , 506Gen o a , 25 2, 257Geo rgians , 3 88 , 390-1 , 5 10Germ an Conf ederati on , 48-9Germ ans in Austria , 90, 92, 94-7,III . , 102, 112, 123

-137, 148 -9, 177220, 246 -7 , VI 502

erm ans in Hungary, 142, IV . Aerm ans in Rus5 1a , 302

-3 , 306 , 3 16Glad sto ne , 23 2Gleiwitz , 6 8G obi Desert , 3 30-2Goths , 3 85Gottsch ee, 248 , 250Grado , 25 8Grau denz , 6 4, 80Gravosa , 110Greece,

Kin gdom o f , 203 , 207, 223 -6 ,229, 23 3 -5 , 237-9 , 241 , 3 32, 3 6 6 ,

3 78,3 83 , 3 97, 428

-432, 486 , 508

5 1Greeks , 15 , 191 , 23 8 -9, 509

Greeks m Turkey , 3 6 5-378 , 401

-3 , X

D , 508Grey, S ir Edward , 45 8 , 46 1Gulf S tream , 340

Hadram au t , 441H afi , th e, 6 6Haifa , 444H al ys, see Ki z il Irm ak

H a

zmzb urg , 49, 88 , 113 , 122, 13 3 , 264

Hamm erfest, 244, 349Han over , 81Hansa Town s , 88Hapsburg Dyn asty , 25 , 6 7, 91 , 93

£13 ,118, 13 6 , 146 , 148 , 171 . 252,

Hapsburg M on arch y (Austria or

Austria -Hun gary ) , 21 , 5 1 -2, 90,95 , III 144 , 16 5 , 246 , 46 6 , 496ap sb urg Mon arch y ’

s Al li anceGerm any , 113 , 132, 478

Hasa , al , 43 9Hazaras , 46 6Hein e, 286

Hej az, 434 , 438, 440, 446Hej az Railway, 403 , 43 7, 444, 446Helgo lan d , 88ell as , 296 , 500

Helm un d R iver , 46 6 , 474Henry VII . , 273Herat , 466 , 46 9, 473B en R u d , 452, 469, 473Hesse Darmstad t , 92Hin du Ku sh , 3 88, 46 6 , 469, 473Hi n dus, 3 99, 400, 404, 449, 450Hi ttites, 414Ho h enstau fen Dyn asty, 21 , 406H o

l

lae

inz o ll ern Dyn asty, 81 , 93 , 94,

Ho ll an d , 26 , 262, 273 , 275 , 297, 3 5 1,487, 504 -5Ho lstein , 3 50, 3 53 -8Ho ly R om an Em pire, 49, 90, 405 -6Ho spitallers , see Kn i gh ts o f S t JohnHorm u z S tra its , 45 5 , 45 9, 464-5Hun dred Years’ W ar , 275Hun gary , 6 6 , 98 , 111 , 118-125 ,

13 5 , IV 3 05 , 3 16 , 3 46 , 45 3 , 487,489, 507Hun s, 449Huss, John , 262

I

Ibrahim Pash a , 440Il lyricum , 142Im bros Islan d , 3 62, 3 6 5Indi a , 34 , 109 , 3 27, 3 3 2, 3 34-5 , 3 74,X . C, XL , 491

India , British rou te to , 183 , 279, 3 6 3 ,3 98, 430

-1In di a , Moslem s in , 398 , X . C, 443Indi a , N W . Fron tier o f , 209, 3 89,43 7, 470In di an Ocean , 441 , 454 , 460, 486In dus Ri ver , 45 5 , 466 , 474In du strial R evo lu tion , 11 , 27, 67,

127, 130, 132, 274, 287,O

In terregn um , Great, 90Iom an Islands , 249Ipek , 230Irak Ar abi , X . E , 449, 493Iran , Plateau o f , 3 95 , 43 3 , X I .

Irelgéi d , 12, 14, 210, 224,

5In sh Cath oh e N ation alists, 18 , 134,

Ii on Gates, 140

Iskan deru n , 3 98 , 425 , 429, 432, 444 5Iskan derun , Gu lf o f , 397, 43 2Islam ,

X C , 413 434 6 ,

450-2,

Islaéi

g,éH o ly Cities o f , 400, 403 , 434 5 ,

4

Ispah an , 456Istria , 210 217. 248-9,Italian m anu factur es , 25 2

Italian s in Austria , 102, V . , 264, 267

5 18 NATIONALITY AND THE WAR

Malatia , 3 91, 426 Mo sell e R iver , 44, 93Malta , 3 73 , Moska10p hi ls , 3 12Mam luk s, 405 Mosul , 43 7, 444-6Man ch ester S ch oo l , 127 Mul h au sen , 47

-8Man ch u Dyn asty, 330, 5 11 Murad S u , see E uph rates, EasternManch uria , 3 3 0, 349 Mur R iver , 167, 214, 259Marburg, 217, 25 9, 260 Murzsteg Program m e

, 191 -2, 196Marchf eld, 104-5 , 168 Muscovi tes, see Russian s, GreatMarch R iver , 104 , 140, 141. 26 1 Myslowitz , 6 8Maria Th eresa , 91 , 115 , 144, 174Maritsa R iver, 23 8-9, X . AMarm ora , S ea o f , IX . B , 3 85Marom tes, 43 6 -7, 5 10Maro s R iver, 142, 164Marsh all Islan ds, 3 6Masaryk , Pro fesso r , 201-2Masurian Lakes, 77Masurians , 78 , 80, 302, 507Mecklenbu rg, 49Meh em et A li , 440Meissen , 26 1Mek ran , 455

Mem el, 79Merch ant Adven tu rers, 3 37Mersm a , 425 , 445

Merv , 45 3 , 46 7Mesopotam i a , 3 93Messageries Maritim es S team sh ipLin e, 109Mesta R iver, 23 8 -9 , 380Metk ov 1tch , 204 , 214

Metoya , 229, 23 5Metterm ch , Prin ce, 98, 175Metz , 44Mexi co , 3 30Mexico , Gul f o f , 3 28Milan (City ) , 101 , 211Mil an O b ren OV itch , 188-190, 192

Mirdi tes, 509Ml B SlS Sl pp l Ri ver , 3 20, 328Mi trovitza Ra ilway, 196 , 242Mityh ni Islan d, 23 5 , 402, 428, 431Mogul Dyn asty, 405 , 451Moh acs, Battle o f , 143 , 171Moh amm ad th e Proph et, 405 , 440Moldavi a , 142, 307Mon astir , 190, 225 , 228 -9, 241-2Mongona , 413 , 5 11Mongona , O u ter , 3 30

-1Mongols, 284 , 296 , 309-10, 3 93 , 395 ,443 , 449, 450-1 , 45 6 , 466 O b i R iver , 328

Mon oph ysites, 437 O der R iver , 6 6 -9, 71-2, 83 , 26 1

Monroe Doctrine , 244 , 376 O dessa , 288, 306-7, 3 16 , 3 18 , 3 37,

Mo n ten egro , 110, 182, 185 , 1 87-8 , 3 6 1

190, 192, 199, 203 , 204, 211 , 213-5 , Ohr ida , 15 , 228 , 242

229-233 O lm u tz , Convention o f , 99

Moors in S pain , 415 Om an , 464 , 486Morava Ri ver , 164, IV . B , 225 , 23 7 Oppeln , 6 8

-9

Moravia , 106 , 111 , 141 , V . O rien tal Ra ilway, 237Moravian Gap , 6 6 , 6 8

-9, 168 , 26 1, O rsm i , 209

264-5 Orth odox Ch urch , 169, 170, 213 , 215 ,Mordvm s, 321 234 , 3 11 , 394, 5 10

Morm ons, 328 O st-E lb isch er Ju n ker, 82, 84, 87,Morea , 110 90Morocco , 3 99, 411 Othm an , House o f , 405

Morocco crises, 5 , 209, 495-6 O tran to , S traits o f , 245

Moscow, 3 09, 3 11 Otto I . and II Ho ly R om an

Mo scow Dialect, 309, 3 19 Em pero rs, 103

N aples, 101N apo leon I 9, 22-3 64, 75 , 98 , 1734 , 25 3 , 286

Napo leon III . , 99, 209N aren ta Ri v er , 169, 204 , 214N ef u d Desert , Great, 439N ej d , 439, 440N em anya Dyn asty, 170N esto rian s, see Ch aldaean sN eth erlan ds, 8, 341 , 3 5 1N etze R iver , 71 , 73N eu e Frees P resse, 200N eu Pom in ern , 3 6N ew Guin ea , 3 5N ew York , 340, 3 76N ew Zealan d, 3 5 , 3 3 3 , 410N ich o las , Tsar , 99, 117, 197, 240N ich olas, Proclam ation o f Gran dDuk e, 5 6 , 74, 282

N iem en R iver , 77-80, 283 . 292N ik aria Islan d , 428N ish , 237, 239, 242N izza , 253N ogai Tatars, 3 15N orm ans , 11 , 21N o rth S ea , 49, 5 1 , 88, 113 , 3 3 9, 3 48 ,350-1 , 3 57, 483

N orway , 16 9, 340-5 , 347, 349, 45 3 -4,477, 486

N ovara , Battle o f , 99N ovgorod , 3 09, 3 11 , 321 , 340N ovgorod, N ij ni , 3 21

INDEX

O ttom an , see Turk ishO xus Ri ver , 3 3 1 , 3 3 6 , 399, 451466 -7, 46 9, 472-3

PPach tu tribes, 46 6 , 46 8, 470PaCific Ocean , 35 , 3 28, 454Palatin ate, 93Pamir Plateau , 3 3 1 , 466 , 470Pagi

ogfrm am sm , 5 6 , 113

-4 , 122, 410

Pan slaVi sm , 5 6 , VII . , 3 59Papacy, 25 , 212, 215 , 405 , 481Papal Zou aves, 3 73Parsees, 450Patm os Islan d, 429Patras, 227Pauli cian s, see B ogum il sPek in Legations , reh ef o f , 3 71Pella , 15 "Persia , 322, 394, 396 , XL , 477, 486 ,493 -4, 5 10 "u etta Ra ilway, 474Persia , Belgian Custom s S ervme in ,

3 74, 46 1Pefii

ii , Swed ish Gen darm erie in , 3 74,

PerS ian Gu lf , 113 , 122, 13 3 , 3 97, 43 343 8-9, 442, 444, 446 , XI 482, 497Persian R evo lution , 395 , 457Persian s, 3 95 , 404, XI .Pesh awar , 473Peter th e Great, 296 , 3 25 , 3 3 76

301

5KarageorgeV itch , 194, 209,

1Petersburg, 54, 132, 297, 3 11Petrograd, 3 18 , 343Ph alsbourg , 45 , 47Phi li p o f Macedon , 296Ph i lippopo li s , 23 6 , 3 81Phrygians , 414Piedm on t, 212Piedm ontese, 99Pig IVar , 196

Pili tza R iver , 5 9Plevn a , S iege o f , 408P 0 R iver , 98 , 252Po do lia , 3 15Po la , 111 , 254

Po lan d, 132, 219, 26 1 , 26 4 , VIII . A300, 302

-3 , 3 08 , 3 10, 3 40, 3 44-5 ,3 97, 459, 486 , 487Po lan d , Partition s o f , 8 , 9, 190, VIII .A , 301 , 3 12, 279Po les in Au stria , 53 , 102, 123 , 127,129, 267, 3 12, 3 45Po les in Pruss1a , 24 , II D , 80, 15 8269, 271 , 345 , 3 89, 479, 487Po ltava , 3 15

Pom aks , 507-8P om eram a , 83 , 244Port Arth ur , 349Porte, th e, see Turkish Em pirePortugal , 274, 276Posen (City ) , 71-2, 293Po sen (Prov mce) , 5 4, 60, 64, 69, 71 -3 ,77, 91 , 286

5 19

Pesz ony (Pressburg) , 98 , 104, 141,146 -7 , 220, 507Prag , 98 , 126 , 13 2, 262-3Prag Uni versity , 262Pressburg, see PeszonyPripet Marsh es, 284Prisren , 230Protestan t Reform ation , 21, 23 , 52,262, 302Prussia , E ast, 76 -80, 292, 301 , 507Pr

li

giia, West, 5 4, 60, 73

-7, 269, 285 ,

Pru ssian Lan dtag, 70, 87Pru ssian Zo llverein , 24Pru ssians, aborigin al , 23 , 77, 78Pruth R iver , 3 06 -7Psara Islan d, 428Psk ov , Lake o f , 302Pu n Jab , 443 , 466 , 471

Radetzky , 99R agu sa , 173 , 204, 214Ra tibor, 68-9, 292Ranch , Baron Pau l , 198. 200, 202R ed In dian s, 321 , 3 28 , 410R ed S ea , 403 , 434 , 439, 440, 446R eform Bill , Great British , 127, 153R eich en berg , 106 , 112R e

l

it

lfléstag , Germ an Im perial . 106 ,

R eva l Programm e, 197

R evo lu tion , G loriou s, 1483 121

41

46 Ri ver , 21, 45 -7, 82-3 , 93 , 101,

R hi nelan d, 24, 44, 82, 93 , 275 , 483R h odes Islan d, 373 , 429Rh odope Mou n tain s, 3 81-2 507R iga , 3 87R iga , Gul f o f , 302R IV IGI'a , Italian , 252R oba -a l-Mah , 441. 464R obert Co llege, 3 77R oberts, Lord, 209, 46 7R o dosto , 3 85R om a ic, see Byzan tineR om an Ch u rch , 5 2, 78, 116 . 126 -7,129, 130, 132, 149, 16 9, 215 , 262,3 74, 43 6

R om an Em p n'

e, 15 , 170, 211 , 405 ,450, 452

R om an tic Movem ent , 24R otten Borou gh s, 153 reR oum an ia Danu b ian Prm cip alities) ,101-2, 106 , 142, 16 2-4, 206 , 208 ,223 -5 , 236 -7, 23 9, 305 -8 , 3 60-2

R oum ans in Hu ngarv . 102, 142, 145 ,149, 150, 16 2-4 , 166

R oum elia , E astern , 198 , 297Ru dolf o f Hapsburg , 100Ru SS ia , Wh ite, 79, 284-5 , 308-9, 3 11

520 NATIONALITY A ND THE WA R

R u SS ian corn lan ds, 264, 297, 3 15 -6320, 324

R u ssian Im perial Dum a , 3 19Ru ssians , Great (Muscowtes ) , 284308 -3 11 , 3 16 , 318, 3 20-3 , 3 28

R u ssians , Little, see R u th en es

R usso -Japan ese W ar, 112, 192, 195 ,199, 298 , 323 , 327, 3 30

Ru th en es, 53 , 102, 143 , 145 , 149

£83?267, 284, 291, 293 , 308 -3 19,

S aa r Ri ver , 44S aa rb ou rg , 45 , 47Saa rgem un d, 45 , 47, 93S ah ara , 434S t . Joh n , Kni gh ts o f , 3 73S alona , 16 8S alonika , 10, 190, 192, 196 , 206 , 208224 -5 , 228 , 23 3 , 23 7, 23 9, 242, 3 60,3 83 -4, 402, 508

S alonik a Ra ilway, 196 , 207, 225 -6239-242

Sa lzburg, 169, 218 , 25 8, 264S am o a , 3 6S am os Islan d, 428S an Gi ovann i di Medua , 230S an S teph an o , Treaty o f , 182-3 , 188S an ti"u aran ta , 233Sarayevo , 13 7, 204, 209S ardini a , 506

Sa s en o Islan d , 25 5S assani d Dyn asty, 3 93 , 450, 452454 , 45 6

S atan -worshi ppers, 43 7Save R iver , 144, IV . B , 258-9Sa xony, 6 7, 89, 92, 106 , 26 1S ch eldt R iver , 487S ch l eswig (town ) , 50, 3 53S chleswig or Schl esm g

-Ho lstein , II .

C, 5 1 , 81 , 91, 269, 271, 3 50, 487S ch u l -V ereni , Deu tsch e, 13 2S cotch High lan ders, 14, 210S cotch Lowlan ders, 6 7S ebastopo l , 349S eb em co , 110, 254S eill e Ri ver , 44S eistan , 46 5 -6 , 474S eiis

7

t

gu

i1Swam p (Ham un ) , 465 , 469,

S elim I S ul tan o f Turkey, 405 , 435S em i tes, 3 93 , 434 , 449, 450, 45 2S erb Ch urch in Hu n gary, 174, 202S erbia , 10, 101-2, 106 , 112, IV. B ,C , 25 1, 281, 296 , 3 3 6 , 3 5 9S erbs, IV. B , 3 87, 507S erb s m Hun gary, 145 , 147-9, 164-6 ,177, 182

S erfs, em ancipati on o f Hu man , 3 16S erres, 242S even Years’ W ar , 114 , 298S even Weeks

’ W ar, 90S h an tu ng, 35 TS h att-a l-Arab , 444, 454, 458S h i ah Heresy, 3 95 , 440, XI . Taa ff e,

Coun t, 130, 13 3S h in ar, see Irak Arabi Taborites, 262

S iberia , 328-330, 3 34S icily, 101 . 211 . 506S ilesia , 6 6 -71 , 77, 83 -4, 89. 106 , 115 ,

261 , 264 . 266 , 269S ilistria , 23 7S illein (S z o lna ) , 6 8 , 80, 292S imar Hills , 43 7, 444

S k odra , 186 , 230-3 , 3 71S k odra , Lake o f , 230-3S k op lye, see Usku bS kutari , see S k odraS ku tari on th e Bo sph orus , 419, 420S 105y

(

r

)a

7ks, 102, IV. A, 220, 278, 487 .

S loven es , 102, 116 , 127, 133 , 1 68, V267, 3 11 , 486 , 506 -7

Sm yrna , 234 , 413 , 419, 420, 431 , 5 10S ofia , 23 6 , 239, 240, 3 81S olom on Islan ds , 3 6S orab s, 16 9, 507S ou da n , Ang lo -Egyptian , 109, 43 9S oun d , th e, 3 50S ou th African Comm onwea lth , 3 2S ou th Am erica , 3 3 3 , 492S ou th ern S lavs, 102, 112, 1 6 6 , IV.

278, 3 5 6 , 3 59, 45 3 , 496 ,

S ou th -S lav om c Federation , 210-6 ,IV. C , 250-1 , 254 , 506

S pfasi

si

), 101, 274, 276 , 412, 415 , 491 ,

S pala ik ov itch , D octor, 201S palato , 110, 204Spam sh languag e, 26 , 509Spamsh S u ccession , W ar o f , 298S pezz1a , 227S piz za , 214

S porades Islan ds , 429S se-Ch u an Railway, 447S tem , 23S teph en , Crown o f S t 118 , 120, 123 ,

125 , 128 , 13 7, IV . A, 16 6 , 178

223,188, 194-5 , 197, 214, 222,

S teph en Dush an , 170teph en , Ki n g o f Hungary, 3 73S trasbu rg , 45 , 47

-8

S trum a R iver , 23 8 -9, 242

S tyria , 100, 104 , 106 , 110, 128 , 141,25 9, 264

S u ez (Port ) , 446S u ez Can al , 482S uf i Dyn asty , 45 1S u nn i S ect, 400, 451Swabia , 145

Sweden , 244 , 297, 302, 3 37, 33 9, 341 ,

3 43 -5 , 347, 3 50, 486Swgg

z

s

erlan d , 8 , 146 , 211 , 375 , 483 ,

S yr i a , X . E .

Syryens , 3 21

S zekels, 163 , 166

522 NATIONALITY A ND THE WA R

Y agiell on , 74

3352232453 26 Yannina", 227, 233 , 235 , 254

Wal lach i a 223Yem en , 403 -4 , 441 -2

Wallo ons ,’

5 3 -40 Yemsel Ri vgr , 329Warsaw, 52, 5 6 , 59, 76 , 285 , 288

“7 37911 , 220 , 239-242

n s

‘

s

Gaw , Gran d Du ch y o f , 59, 64,

ZW ei -h ai-W ei, 3 6Wekerle, Dr 157 Z ab Ri ver , Greater , 394-5 , 437Westphalia , 83 -4, 89, 275 , 288, Z ab R iver , Lesser, 3 96 , 437483 Zabern , 45 -6Wh igs, 149, 150Wh i te S ea , 3 18, 3 21, 3 37, 3 39 Z agros Moun ta in s, 3 86 , 3 93 -4, 437341 449, 454-7Wien er Wald, 104-5 Zara , 249, 508Wilh elmsh aven , 88 I Zara , Con ference o f , 195Wilson , President, 3 75 Z arath ush tra , 450

-2Wurtem burg, 83 , 87 Zemstvos, 3 23 -4W yclif , 262 Zoroastrianism (see Parsees) , 393

N C

T€ M PL€ PitsGN GLA N D

· PREFA CE THIS book is an attempt to review the problems of Nationality in the area affected by...

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