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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCONTENTS

04. Middle Eastern quicksand: Why Russia got involved in SyriaBY IRINA zVYAgElSkAYA

08. Understanding Moscow’sstrategy in the Middle EastBY MAXIM SUCHkOV

14. Russia: Caught in the Middle East’s great gameBY MICHAEl kOFMAN

20. Interview with Gordon M. Hahn: The risks and implications of Russia’s military campaign in SyriaBY kSENIA zUBACHEVA, pAVEl kOSHkIN, RUSSIA dIRECT

22. How Russia returned to the Middle EastBY IAN pARMETER

24. Russia’s military campaign in Syria: The view from IsraelBY EYAl zISSER

28. Key takeaways and further reading

Russia’s military intervention in Syria has the potential to shift the long-term geostrategic outlook for the Middle East. With that in mind, this new RD report takes a closer look at why Russia got involved in Syria, elaborates on the charac-teristics of a more proactive Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, and weighs the potential risks and rewards of Russian involvement in Syria. As the report points out, an important factor to keep in mind is the changing narrative within Russia with regard to the Arab Spring and the rise of radical Islam within the Middle East. While Russia originally saw the events within the Arab world as a type of Western color revolution, that narra-tive has been revised to include a more nuanced view of the competing interests in the region and the role that ISIS plays in destabilizing states such as Syria. The long-term view is that radical Islam, if left unchecked, has the poten-tial to radicalize the Muslim population within Russia.How events play out in Syria will have important implica-tions not just for Russia, but also for the United States and important regional powers such as Iran, Israel and the Gulf monarchies. As part of the report, we also reached out to experts from the region to give us their take on how they see Russia’s role developing within the Middle East, how Russia might go about assembling an anti-ISIS coalition and what Russia’s future foreign policy in the region might entail. Even if the power and influence of the United States is curtailed in the region, the report suggests, Moscow will still need the help of Washington in devising a political and diplomatic end to the Syrian crisis. The report is careful to weigh the competing interests of both Russia and the U.S. in coming up with various scenarios for Syria and the Middle East region as a whole.

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Russia Direct is proud to present its October report on Russia’s new foreign policy in the middle east. With moscow’s recent military involvement in the fi ght against terrorism in syria, many seek to understand why Russian leadership decided to get involved and what the consequences might be for syria, the region, the Kremlin’s geopolitical struggle with the West, and for Russia itself. in this report, we seek to draw a full picture of Russia’s new strategy by delving into some of the most pressing geopolitical, security, domestic and economic concerns that shape moscow’s behavior in this part of the world. First, irina Zvyagelskaya of the Russian academy of sciences provides an overview of the current turbulent situation in the middle east in order to explain why Rus-sia has joined forces with syria, iraq and iran in the fi ght against terrorism. maxim suchkov of Pyatigorsk state Linguistic University then takes a deeper look at the new Russian strategy by explaining three main perceptions within the Russian decision-making and expert communities of the devel-opments in the middle east.michael Kofman of the Kennan institute elaborates on what america’s primary objective should be with regard

© Russia Direct 2015 All rights reserved. ISSN 2412-8171No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, or by any information storage and retrieval system. The views expressed are those of certain participants in the discussion and do not necessarily reflect the views of all participants or of Russia Direct.

FROMTHE EdITOR

Why has Russia changed its strategy in the Middle East?

Eugene Abov Chairman, Russia Direct, Deputy Director General, Rossiyskaya Gazeta Publishing House, Publisher, Russia Beyond The HeadlinesJulia Golikova Director for Development, Russia Direct, Deputy Publisher, Commercial and Foreign Partnership Director, Russia Beyond The HeadlinesEkaterina Zabrovskaya Editor-in-Chief Pavel Koshkin Executive Editor Dominic Basulto Executive Editor, U.S. Ksenia Zubacheva Managing Editor Alexey Khlebnikov Senior Editor Elena Potapova Head of Video and Mobile Yaroslav Cohen Digital Innovations Producer Pavel Inzhelevskiy Video Producer Olga Fastova Associate Publisher, Sales, Marketing, Events Maria Shashaeva Deputy Publisher, Circulation, Digital Strategy and Operations Olga Ivanova Senior Advisor Alexander Dmitrienko Production and Foreign Partnerships Manager Ekaterina Peregudova Production Finance Manager Ludmila Burenkova Accounts Payable Manager Antonina Steshina Director of Human Resources Ekaterina Belan Digital Marketing Manager Helen Borisenko Research Manager Anna Sergeeva Account Manager, NY Olga Guitchounts Account Manager, DC Maria Kleymenova Show and PR Director Andrey Shimarskiy Art Director Andrey Zaitsev Associate Art Director Alexander Kislov Designer Nikolay Korolev Photo Editor Ilya Ovcharenko Production Designer

Ekaterina Zabrovskaya, Editor-in-Chief

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to the confl ict. and ian Parmeter from australia and eyal Zisser from israel add their analysis of what Russia’s real motives might be and list potential threats of such an active involvement in the region.We invite you to read this thought-provoking report and share your opinions on the issue. all relevant comments will be passed to the authors and may be featured on the Russia Direct website with your permission. should you have any questions regarding this issue or our upcoming reports, please do not hesitate to e-mail me directly at [email protected]. thank you for being our subscriber.

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IRINA ZVYAGELSKAYA is a professor and chief researcher at the institute of Oriental studies at the Russian academy of sciences, a professor at the

moscow institute of international Relations (mgimO-University) and a professor at the insti-tute of african and asian studies at moscow state University. Her area of expertise includes

contemporary history, conflicts, international relations and security issues (mainly in the middle east and Central asia). she is a doctor of historical sciences.

MAXIM SUCHKOV, Ph.D. in political science, is an associate professor at Pyatigorsk state Linguistic University’s school of international Relations, an expert of the Russian international affairs Council and a columnist for al-monitor. Previously, he was a Fulbright visiting fellow at georgetown University and a visiting fellow at New york University. He is the author of “essays on Russian Foreign Policy, the Caucasus and the middle east.”

MICHAEL KOFMAN is a fellow at the Kennan institute of the Wilson Center and an analyst at CNa Corporation. His work focuses on Russian

military analysis and security issues in the post-soviet space. Previously he served as a fellow and program manager at National Defense University, U.s. Department of

Defense. His prior experience includes working at the U.s. institute of Peace, HsBC Bank, and the Diplomatic Courier.

IAN PARMETER is a former australian diplomat who had postings in egypt, saudi arabia, syria, Russia and Lebanon, the last as ambassador. He is currently a research scholar at the australian National University’s Centre for arab and islamic studies, where he works on a project examining Russian foreign policy in relation to the middle east.

EYAL ZISSER is the dean of the faculty of Humanities at tel aviv University. He was the director of the moshe Dayan Center for

middle eastern and african studies from 2007-2010, and the head of the Department of middle eastern and african History. He has written extensively on the history and the

modern politics of syria and Lebanon and the arab-israeli conflict.

AUTHORS


Middle Eastern quicksand: Why Russia got involved in Syria

in recent years, the middle east has been in a state of turbulence. in addition to intensifying systemic problems of socio-economic and political development, the arab spring failed to create conditions for solving them. Only tunisia can

be considered a success story of the arab spring. as for the other states, they either saw a restoration of the former regimes or

collapsed as a result of an outside intervention. there has been a surge of acti-vity of extremist islamic organizations, first of all the islamic state (isis), which put forth its own vision of building a global islamic Caliphate on the ruins of arab statehood.

a distinctive feature of developments in the region is the growing influence of both regional and global actors. the regional powers have tried, not with-out success, to influence the internal political development of particular states while containing their opponents and widening their domains of influence. thus, the rivalry between iran and the sunni monarchies, which has crossed from the inter-confessional to the geopolitical sphere, has put its stamp on many regional events.

For example, saudi troops invaded Bahrain where shiite unrest had occurred (by all appearances, not inspired by iran but nonetheless seen as a challenge by

For Moscow, the threats arising from the region are an issue not only of foreign policy, but of domestic policy as well.

IrIna Zvyagelskaya

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the sunni rulers). the struggle between saudi arabia and iran for influence over yemen has led to mas-sive bombings of the country and now threatens to destroy it. in syria, iran has backed the assad regime while the sunni monarchies support the islamic op-position and rebels.

the global powers have also contributed to the development of the situation by making it even less manageable. the problem of the majority of the mid-dle east states, with their strictly authoritarian or dic-tatorial regimes, is the lack of institutions capable of ensuring control and development if the ruling politi-cian leaves his position.

tunisia is an exception exactly because the institu-tions that had formed in the country proved more effective and stable. in the other arab countries, the model of a national state in its Western conception was just absent. even the most developed of those countries, egypt, has failed to transform its “hybrid political system” into a more pluralistic one. still, its military-bureaucratic regime has been able to survive the perturbations owing to the presence of some effective institutions and the absence of out-side interference.

Countries where the Western coalitions, acting for the sake of promoting democracy, overthrew the dictators (iraq, Libya), saw a collapse of the entire system that was overburdened, as everywhere in the middle east and Northern africa, by ethnic, intertrib-al, and inter-confessional contradictions.

On the whole, the middle east can be said to be dis-playing a tendency for the war of everyone against everyone. there are now the conditions for a proxy war in the region. Chaos favors the formation and development of terrorist groups capable of extend-ing their activity beyond the region while the states are losing their legitimate right to violence, which passes to militants of every hue.

millions of refugees and people seeking asylum have flooded the arab states and are moving in in-creasing numbers to europe. in other words, the cur-rent instability in the middle east puts it in the center of global politics.

Why Russia is getting involved in syRia

For the Kremlin, the middle east is of particular im-portance. in this region, which is close to Russia’s boundaries, there exists a long-standing tradition of Russian (formerly soviet) military-political and eco-nomic interaction with many local states. For moscow,

the threats arising from this region are an issue not only of foreign policy, but of domestic policy as well.

the policy of regime change is of particular con-cern, whether it is implemented within the concept of “responsibility to protect” or by providing assis-tance to the internal opposition or using some other methods of intervention in internal affairs. the at-tempts to impart a universal character to the policy of regime change are a cause for concern to the Russian government. although Russia does not face any immediate threat of either military intervention or “color revolution,” instances of both have already occurred in the post-soviet space.

another obvious threat is the potential recruit-ment of Russian citizens into the ranks of islamic extre mists, the emergence of terrorist cells on Rus-sian territory, and the ideological brainwashing of participants. Neither should Central asia be neglect-ed where, too, isis is recruiting locals. at the same time, tension is growing on the borders with afghan-istan. Russia bears responsibility to ensure security in this region. moreover, considering the absence of a visa regime and transparency of the borders, the ex-tremists from Central asia have comparatively easy access to Russian territory.

By combining a ground operation with aerial sup-port, the Russian-created coalition introduced a new element to the fight against terrorists. as is well known, the U.s.-led coalition has been unable to or-ganize a ground operation. None of its participants was willing to provide troops without which no mili-tary success is possible. the Russian “boots on the ground” coalition includes the syrian army, iranian militia, Kurds, and Hezbollah. While the parties in-volved differ in their interests, they share the same enemy – the extremists.

However, such a composition of the coalition gives no joy to the sunnite population or militant oppo-sition groups. they are especially annoyed by the participation of Hezbollah, which has long been en-gaged in the civil war on the side of the regime.

The problem of the majority of the Middle East states, with their strictly

authoritarian or dictatorial regimes, is the lack of institutions capable of

ensuring control and development if the ruling politician leaves his position.


the Role of Russiait would be unproductive to reduce the role of Russia in the region to the current military operation. Russia has always been present in the middle east, although on a lesser scale than the soviet Union. in particular, it is active as a mediator in the context of the interna-tional effort in various middle east conflicts. Primarily, its role as a member of the middle east Quartet on the israeli-Palestinian conflict should be noted.

Due to the current dangerous military confronta-tion in the region, this conflict has temporarily with-drawn to the background. Nevertheless, it remains one of the factors of destabilization. Russia consi-ders it a priority to attain a peaceful settlement in syria, its military operation being aimed at breaking the situation out of deadlock by changing the ba-lance of forces.

For Russia, its activity in syria may have positive consequences as well as create new risks. Political gains may include the demonstration of the Krem-lin’s determination, the enhancement of Russia’s in-ternational role, and proof of its ability to interact in such a complex situation with various forces — the U.s., iran, iraq, egypt, israel, Hezbollah, the syrian

government and part of the syrian opposition (if with varying degrees of success).

Risks of Russian involvement in syRia

at the same time, there is a reverse side to the inter-vention in syria. isis is threatening to transfer the war to the Russian territory by staging terrorist acts. Rus-sia’s military involvement threatens to complicate its relations with turkey, which takes an anti-assad stand and prefers to bomb the Kurds rather than isis. also possible is the aggravation of relations with saudi ara-bia to which the composition of the Russia-proposed coalition as well as Russia’s actions are unacceptable.

moreover, some experts admit that following Rus-sia’s engagement in the syrian war, the countries that are in active opposition to assad’s regime may be trying to provide the militant opposition with portable air-defense systems and other means of striking aerial targets.

Finally, some breaches in Russia’s relations with iran may arise, too. today, iran and Russia are fighting on the same side, against a common enemy. However,

31%of Russians approve of Kremlin’s airstrikes in Syria, according to the Levada Center.

Russian airstrikes against Islamic State in Syria

sOURCe: Ria NOvOstiaLyONa RePKiNa

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the escalation of iranian presence in syria and the prospect of the emergence of what the media call a “state within a state” may put Russia, which supports syrian statehood, in a difficult position later on.

the strikes at the syrian armed opposition, with the proclaimed aims being those of struggling against isis, have provoked a negative reaction both within syria, whose population has painful sentiments over the very fact of the bombings, and among the lea-dership of the countries that have been providing support to that opposition. it is true, though, that Russia is changing its attitude towards the Free syr-ian army and expressing willingness to consider it as a participant of the anti-terrorist struggle and future negotiations.

speaking of the reaction to the air strikes, one should not disregard the propaganda war against moscow which had been started way before the military operation itself, including photos of people allegedly killed or wounded as a result of the Rus-sian raids. Wide dissemination of such materials in the media may contribute to the creation of a hostile background. Finally, Russia’s declarations of sup-port for assad’s regime do not win any points for it in syria where the population’s loyalty is primarily motivated by their apprehensions that the islamic radicals are an even greater evil.

in the war-ravaged syria, the government and army are practically the only remaining institutions, and there is no alternative but to rely on them in the struggle against terrorists. the problem is that the syrian regime has its own view of that struggle, and isis has always posed a lesser threat to it than the armed (both islamic and secular) opposition.

Russia also faces a problem in describing the syria situation to its own population. When discussing the situation in syria on state-owned Russian tv chan-nels, the emphasis should not be on the fact that “our armor is strong and our tanks are fast” but, rather, on the fact that, along with fighting terrorism, Russia’s main goal is a political settlement in syria, the preservation of it as a whole state, promotion of the dialogue between the warring sides and achieve-

ment of national consensus. Certain experts’ words about the “sacred” cha-

racter of the war in syria and their attempts to shift the confrontation to the cultural-religious level have met with an extremely negative reception. Under the existing circumstances, such an approach is pro-foundly wrong and is rejected by muslims.

On the whole, of special importance now is the co-ordination of the international effort, which should not fall hostage to the ambitions of particular politi-cians. it should be recognized that today, Russia is doing the bulk of the job of fighting isis and like-minded organizations. the coalition created by the U.s. is still operating within its limits.

evidently, the problems of delimiting the spheres of responsibility, establishing the channels for infor-mation exchange, and preventing any undesirable collisions are being addressed. Defending its inter-ests in syria, Russia acts on a par with the Western countries, which implies not only a demonstration of determination, but also responsibility on the part of those who cover the campaign.

tWo scenaRios foR the middle east

the Russian military operation should not assume a lingering character. syria will never become another afghanistan for Russia, but war has its own logic. so-called “black swans” can make their own danger-ous corrections to it, forcing the military and political leadership to react to breaking developments in an at-tempt to prevent losses.

along with risks, the events in syria offer some op-portunities. there is the potential for a breakthrough in settling the situation in the middle east, accom-panied by the weakening of the jihadists. Of course, negative scenarios are also possible, caused by mis-understanding, lack of trust, and differing interests. in syria, the world community is provided with the alternative choice of either rallying in the face of a common threat or putting their own geostrategic considerations first. Both options are now open.

Michael E. O’Hanlon, senior fellow, Brookings Institution

“ W e a l l n e e d a f r a m e w o r k / v i s i o n f o r t h e f u t u r e S y r i a t o w a r d s w h i c h w e c a n w o r k c o o p e r a t i v e l y . R i g h t n o w , t h a t i s l a c k i n g . “

Russia Direct Brief “The Middle East. The New Great Game.” Download at http://www.russia-direct.org/archive.

aLSo REaD


Understanding Moscow’s strategy in the Middle EastEver since the start of the Arab Spring, three major narratives have helped shape Russian foreign policy in the region.

The revolutionary changes of the Arab Spring that have transformed the Middle East since late 2010 can undoubtedly be considered a critical milestone for the history of the region. The impact they had

stretched far beyond the borders of the states that fell under the revolu-tionary surge and is still resounding in many ways to this day. The uprisings forced regional and foreign governments to react swiftly and decisively, which was a difficult task taking into account the speed, the span and the nature of the events. Nevertheless, the states that tend to position themselves as global or regional leaders couldn’t afford to be mere “in-nocent bystanders.”

As a country with a long history of a presence in the region and multiple interests, Russia has become one of the outsiders facing the Arab Spring challenge. Since the start of the Arab Spring there have been three major waves of perception of the phenomenon by Russian policymakers. Each wave included its own narrative and had its own sources.

The WesT and color revoluTions

The first narrative interpreted the Arab Spring as a phenomenon predomi-nantly driven by the West. The group of sympathizers of this idea differ-entiated in the degree of the role they believed Western organizations and

MAxiM Suchkov

REuTERS

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governments played. Some totally denied any grass-roots movements and insisted American NGOs staged the Arab Spring. Others acknowledged local initiative in conducting the protests but were absolutely posi-tive that local youth groups wouldn’t have ever been able to succeed if not fostered for years and guided in times of crisis by Western patrons. There was a vision that “Arab uprisings” are nothing but a project of the American government.

The source of this narrative was largely based in the “color revolutions” that took place across the post-Soviet space in the mid-2000s. Some of them – like in Georgia in 2003 or in ukraine in 2004 – succeeded in bringing to power anti-Russian governments striv-ing for a greater integration into Euro-Atlantic insti-tutions.

The liberal wing of the Russian expert community reiterated the widespread opinion in the West that such a vision by the Russian leadership was trig-gered by its serious concerns over a potential revo-lutionary change of government enforced from the outside. The argument has merit since the events of the Arab Spring were unfolding at a time when mass anti-Putin rallies took place in Russia itself.

However, it is hard to estimate how much of a driver these preoccupations were since Moscow had some real security challenges and economic interests at stake that it feared would be at risk if Washington managed to redraw the map of the Middle East to its own priorities.

In its turn, this concern bore a shadow of what can be called “a Soviet vision of the Middle Eastern state of affairs.” It implies that the region is a standoff zone between Russia and the West. This serves as a major driving force in Russia’s attempt to “save its allies” in the face of Western pressure on them and to find new partners in the changing environment.

However the whole narrative of the u.S. toppling “authoritarian governments” to install “puppet de-mocratic regimes” didn’t sit easy with those who believed that America had a much greater control of the Middle East in previous decades. Thus such an attempt was a tremendous miscalculation be-cause in this case Washington sawed the bough it was sitting on. Others preferred a different explana-tion where the u.S. was mislead by regional powers (primarily the Gulf monarchies), which were more interested in regime change in Egypt and Syria than the Americans.

With time, however, the nature of the Arab Spring and the implications it had for regional dynamics turned out to be more complicated than was as-

sessed initially. Later developments have shown that the Arab Spring didn’t have a similar impact on all the countries where it occurred.

a mix of islamisT opposiTion groups

This led to the formation of a second narrative in Rus-sia to explain the Arab Spring. In this narrative, the Russian expert community became more diverse and nuanced in differentiating between the types of changes that occurred and the types of Islamists that came to power.

In the subsequent discourse they were roughly di-vided into three main categories: “Moderates” (“Mus-lim Brotherhood”); “Salafi groups” that operated in the political space and despite being radicalized, were fairly cooperative, formally acknowledging democratic procedures and institutions; and “Radical Jihadis” (Ansar Al Sharia in Libya) that staked their future on an armed struggle to disrupt the fragile formation of a democratic system.

Once the distinction was made, it was critical for Russian experts and diplomats to comprehend the motives of the respective groups and indicate their points of disagreements. Many in the Russian for-eign-policy decision-making community believed that contradictions within these fractions of the Is-lamic community will severely impact political pro-cesses in these countries.

The structuring of the newly formed alignment in the region diversified the stereotype that has domi-nated Russian discourse where the rise of radical Is-lamists was considered a principal outcome of the Arab Spring. However, it didn’t change the main fo-cus of concern for Moscow. The Russian Foreign Af-fairs Ministry insisted that by overthrowing regional regimes, it is jihadi extremists that get empo wered, not pro-democracy forces.

This trend in Russian attitude toward the Arab Spring was consolidated with the civil war in Syria. Russia’s support for Syrian President Bashar al-As-sad was rooted in fears that the fall of the president would open another Pandora’s box of radical Islamist movements. That could have had dreadful impact on the Middle Eastern turmoil and on Russia’s own “soft underbelly” – the North Caucasus. Choosing the best ideological solution to the problem, Russian officials have opted for promotion of “traditional Islam” as opposed to “radical (Salafi) Islam.” At the time, about 5 percent of Russian Muslims openly claimed to be Salafis, but that number was subject to rapid change.

Russia Direct Brief “The Rise and Fall of US-Russian Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.” Download at http://www.russia-direct.org/archive.

alSo ReaD


Therefore, any potential penetration of radical ideas from abroad was perceived in Moscow as ideological fuel to alarming trends that existed at the time. That would have meant more insecurity for the volatile North Caucasus but also for the Volga region, where these dangerous signals were observed as well.

The rise of isis

This to a great part entailed a third narrative in the Russian discourse of the Arab Spring and the Mid-dle East in general, which was further reinforced with the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS). Russian decision-makers and most of the ex-pert community interpreted the ISIS phenomenon as a combination of primarily two factors.

First, as an echo of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 which led to a virtual break-up of the coun-try and marginalization of many high-ranking offi-cials and military men serving under Saddam Hus-sein. Secondly, as an unfortunate output of the Arab Spring itself. It was an embodiment of initial suspi-cions Russians had that it was the radicals who man-aged to “ride the wave.”

Initially, the formation of ISIS split the North Cau-casus mujahedeen on the issue of support for vari-ous Islamist groups operating in the Middle East. It happened partly over personal loyalties to groups’ leaders and emirs, partly over ideological interpre-tation of what the “global jihad” means and how its philosophy should be implemented. In the spat be-tween Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, the top command of the Caucasus Emirate (CE) threw its support behind the latter, further solidifying channels linking the two groups.

Both ISIS and the CE operated in “grey zones” – not only in a physically but also in the informational space. Both were united in their goal of establishing a caliphate or other extreme form of Sharia-based state entity. The obvious difference was that the Caucasus Emirate was a regional group that claimed to be a part of “the global jihadist movement” while ISIS positioned itself as the centerpiece of the move-ment. In this respect, it was ISIS that needed more of the CE’s support in competing with its ideological rivals. A key link between the two was financial sup-port: In 2013, ISIS acknowledged receiving funds and fighters from then-leader of the CE Dokku umarov, who has since been presumed dead. Now that ISIS looked more powerful, it had the capacity to spon-sor its supporters in the North Caucasus. As Thomas de Waal of the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-

tional Peace cautioned, “Many of the leading jihad-ists of ISIS come from the Caucasus, including Omar al-Shishani, (an ethnic Chechen) who comes from Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. If even a fraction of the vast amounts of money ISIS is said to have seized in Iraq makes a way back to the North Caucasus, it could boost the militants there.”

The focus on the ethnic composition of the fight-ers has a rather emotional component. The strate-gic agenda of both ISIS and the CE is based upon religion, not ethnicity. This made the groups look more consolidated in substance and diverse in form. Besides, the global jihadi frontline is shifting its con-tours. Previously, it was radicals from the Arab world, Afghanistan and Pakistan that joined local extrem-ists to fight Russian forces in Chechnya and Dagest-an. Now, with Syria and Iraq being on the forefront of the battle, it was militants from the North Caucasus supporting their fellow brothers from ISIS and other groups. Eventually, the human factor became one of the important “bridges” between the radical groups, which further exacerbated Russia’s reactions to the situation in the Middle East.

Ironically, the rise of ISIS actually led to a net out-flow of Islamist fighters from the Caucasus. Accord-ing to different estimates, about 500-2,000 people from Russia are fighting for ISIS. As a result, it gave the country’s security forces an opportunity to re-shuffle its resources and for a couple of years ease the terrorist threat burden on national security. This was not the only factor but it certainly helped lower

Ironically, the rise of ISIS

actually led to a net

outflow of Islamist fighters

from the Caucasus.

AP

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the total number of “crimes of terrorist nature” to 78 in 2014 – which was three times less than in 2013 and four times less than in 2012.

Moscow wasn’t disillusioned, however, about the relative lull in terrorist activity. The fact that the flow of radicals was outbound didn’t mean they wouldn’t return to the North Caucasus, the urals and the Vol-ga Region more disgruntled and experienced. There was an understanding in the Russian security appa-ratus that terror networks, even those with no formal ties, are able to communicate informally.

In fact, terrorist attacks in the Chechen capital of Grozny in December 2014 were alleged to be the first instance of an ISIS attack on Russian soil. Even if it was not the case as some experts argued, it certainly heightened concerns about the Russian narrative of what the Arab Spring entailed and what kind of chal-lenges the regional dynamics could generate.

afTer The arab spring

When the dust of the Arab Spring settled down, Russia discovered its image in the region tarnished. Moscow’s foreign policy and its staunch support for Damascus met severe resistance, especially from the Gulf monarchies. While Moscow hoped that soft pow-er would be enough to improve its reputation across the Middle East, of all sub-regions, the Gulf seemed to be least receptive to the Russian narratives.

The list of divisive issues was and is still rather long. Both parties pursue diverging interests and support opposing forces. Both perceive each other as major troublemakers in the region. Although the Gulf mon-archies’ stance was barely a surprise to the Russian leadership, in 2015 Moscow was more willing to con-sider the concerns of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The source of the discord was now seen as more profound: It was not so much about the sup-port for opposing parties but rather about key un-derlying principles Russian foreign policy was based upon that many in the Arabian Peninsula disagreed with.

First, most of the current discourse on Russia-Gulf relations revolves around Syria. The arguments Rus-sian officials and the majority of political commenta-tors used to justify Moscow’s position on Syria were never accepted by the GCC states. For one, the GCC does not buy the idea of the importance of the Tar-tus naval facility, since its capacities are insufficient to support President al-Assad. The threat of Islam-ists taking over the country is an even more concrete prospect often put forward by Russia when discuss-

Professor, Middle Tennessee State University

The fact that Russia has at least 16 million Muslims and their numbers and share in the overall population is consistently growing due to both immigration and higher birth rates is exactly the reason justifying Rus-sia’s involvement in Syria. It means there could be politi-cal costs for the Kremlin. First of all, there is a relatively high probability of a new wave of terrorism developing on Russian territory. There may be tensions emerging in its relationships with political elites of Russia’s predominantly Islamic political units. The problem is that Russian media outlets have fallen into a trap designed in the West. This trap is based on the demonization of Assad and the personalization of this conflict to focus only on the Syrian leader. However, focusing too much on Assad overshadows the real essence of the conflict – a fierce struggle of the coa-lition of Alawis (essentially, Shias), Christians and some other minority groups for not simply retaining govern-mental control, but protecting their very physical exist-ence. The West has been thus far very reticent in mentioning this circumstance and discussing the political views of the Syrian Christians. From this perspective, the predominantly Sunni elites of Russian Muslims might also perceive Putin’s policies as being mostly anti-Sunni (and pro-Christian). Still, it is necessary to explain this systemic aspect of the crisis not only to Russians, but also to the West. ISIS currently represents an equal threat to Shias, Christians and Jews – and this justifies the formation of an alliance of those groups and their respective states. Essentially, it means the necessity for both Russia and the West to form an anti-ISIS coalition with Assad’s Syria and Iran – and there is simply no other option. The Rus-sian government understands this fairly well. The sign-ing of the Iran nuclear deal indicates that Obama himself also realizes that - but he cannot acknowledge this pub-licly for both foreign and domestic policy considerations. For the U.S., accepting the legitimacy and righteousness of the policies of Iran and Syria and even Russia seems to be unbearable – it would be de facto recognition of a total failure of its policies and strategic designs.

Andrei Korobkov

expeRT SiDe noTe


ing Syria. However, few in the GCC believe that a “handful of Islamist fighters” potentially returning to Russia are capable of wreaking havoc in “such a big country” and the GCC never realized why this factor trumps concerns about losing the Arab world.

Second, the GCC states are very much irritated by the u.S.-Russian standoff in the region. Russian poli-cies indeed appear to be u.S.-centric and are often aimed at “balancing u.S. regional policies,” not to mention countering them in a faceoff. In any case, attempting to review the international system where the u.S. is the global leader feeds the argument of Russia being a “revisionist power.”

Recently, however, Russia and the u.S. found them-selves on the same page on the Iranian nuclear issue and countering ISIS operations in Iraq. The overall chilly atmosphere in bilateral relations will probably prevent Washington and Moscow from being out-spoken about their common interest on these two is-sues, but both states claim, whether sincerely or not, that they act out of pragmatism. The problem for Moscow is that it is not always capable of present-ing its motives adequately. Therefore, the GCC often finds American pragmatism more understandable, although not always acceptable, than that of Russia.

Third, misunderstanding between Russia and the GCC states can be observed when it comes to Mos-cow’s stance on Iran. The notion of Moscow being more sympathetic toward Tehran is the source of

another huge grudge Gulf countries hold against Russia. Indeed, Russia and Iran express similar con-cerns over the u.S.-led involvement in fighting ISIS in Syria, arguing it can only make matters worse and trigger the emergence of more terrorist groups.

Meanwhile, Russian and Iranian experts and the media go even further, speculating that the whole campaign against ISIS fighters in Syria may be used as a pretext for invading the country. Russia and Iran share a strategic vision of the South Caucasus as a zone free of military conflicts and a region impe-netrable to an external (i.e., Western and Israeli) presence. Another point to consider, when Russia found itself facing Western sanctions over the crisis in ukraine, it went on to refresh its relations with the country whose own experience of surviving massive sanctions would be useful.

While for the GCC states, concern over threats from Iran are tantamount, to Russia the challenge of Sunni extremism and terrorism ranks much higher. Moscow even views Tehran as a tactical ally in this “struggle.” In the 1990s, Tehran was one of a few Muslim states supporting Russia’s integrity during two Chechen wars and shared the Kremlin’s vision that the jihadist movements there were fueled from outside, includ-ing by some Arab states. understandably, this argu-ment looks sensible from the standpoint of Russia’s national security interests but it certainly would not be convincing enough for Gulf monarchies who

Vladimir Putin

and Crown Prince,

Deputy Chairman

of the Council of

Ministers, Defense

Minister of Saudi

Arabia Salman

bin Abdulaziz Al

Saud during a

meeting of heads of

delegations of G20

member states.

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know “another Iran” – the one fueling radical Shia groups across the region and undermining their own interests and security.

russia’s relaTionship WiTh iran

Russian-Iranian relations are fairly complicated and do not lack in mutual suspicion, stereotypes and conflict-ing interests. Iran perfectly understands the Russian Caucasus – the region where it rivaled Moscow for centuries – with its complex ethno-political and socio-religious mosaic. It silently projects its soft power on societies historically and culturally associated with the Persians (specifically North Ossetia). Moreover, it hasn’t given up on the idea of becoming a more influential power in the South Caucasus. So, despite the common vision that Russia is Iran’s main backer outside the region, the nature of their relationship is more of a classic Eastern-style game of speaking softly, disagreeing tacitly and dealing behind-the-scenes on issues of mutual long-term interest.

After the Arab Spring there was a call on the part of ruling elites in the Gulf for a new Russian approach to the region. Clearly, contemporary Russian policies do not fall in line with those of the GCC, and it is obvious that many in the region do not consider the Russian narrative persuasive. At the same time, there seems to be a broader consensus that Russia is viewed in the Middle East through the lens of Western mass media, which seriously fractures the perception of the Arabs.

Therefore, when Moscow considers implementa-tion of its regional policies, it should think about backing them up with arguments understandable for the Arab world. On their part, Arabs, including those from the GCC, are not always ready to acknowledge Russia’s concerns.

russia’s neW middle easT policy

The philosophy behind Russia’s Middle East policy is comprised of a set of national interests on the one hand and tactical motives on the other. Russian na-tional interests, including security concerns, drive ob-jectives of Russian policies while some of the tactical, even improvised, motivations shape the behavioral patterns of Moscow. Both factors define Russia’s cam-paign in the region and - specifically - in Syria at the moment.

Russian policymakers do not want to get dragged down with complicated political and security puz-zles. Even the Syria campaign is considered an oper-

ation that is limited in time and space and targeted in its goals. In order for Russia to be – or at least appear – victorious both domestically and internationally, its campaign should be short term, at a minimum cost, and status quo changing. But it is easier said than done.

Outside the Syrian track, Moscow keeps a high public profile in two other primary issues – the Ira-nian track on making sure the nuclear deal reached with Tehran is sustainable, and the Israeli-Palestinian “Big Four” negotiations. Its activity beyond institu-tional formats, however, is less declaratory.

In recent years, Moscow’s relations with two of America’s 15 major non-NATO allies have strength-ened. With Cairo, this is nothing new – arms and am-munitions sales have amounted to some $2 billion, and mutually encouraging rhetoric has helped forge personal ties between Vladimir Putin and Abdel Fat-tah al-Sisi. In February 2015, after seizing power in a coup, Sisi traveled to Russia as his first choice in for-eign destinations – a clear message to u.S. authori-ties that Egypt has “places to go” besides Washing-ton.

It would be premature to presume that Russia is eroding u.S. influence in the region, yet the public relations component is important here as well. Since Russia can’t boast huge popularity in the Gulf, ex-panding its economic and information presence in the region plays to Moscow’s advantage.

Above all, there are some domestic concerns for Russia in all of this. The majority of Russian Muslims are Sunnis, whereas Moscow’s cooperation with Iran and Syria makes observers assess Russian policies in the Middle East as “pro-Shiite.” Whether it’s a correct description or a failure to view Russia’s strategy from the right perspective, the Kremlin has to take the is-sue into account. Working along with Egypt and the Sunni leadership of Bahrain and Palestine not only expands Russian horizons but also helps consolidate support from its own Muslim constituency.

Finally, the deal with Iran may also become a game-changer in the region. The deal is not the culmination but the beginning of serious work for Moscow in its relationship with Tehran. As Iran’s influence is likely to grow with the lifting of sanctions, it may attempt to restore its presence in some of the niches Russia has filled over the years. Moscow will have to craft a strategy in order not to let the competition acquire an adversarial tint. In a nutshell, although Russian activities in the Middle East are oriented toward spe-cific countries, they aim for larger systemic effects from an overarching policy in the region.

68%of respondents in the Middle east had an unfavorable view of Russia (pew Research, 2014).


Russia: Caught in the Middle East’s great gameCapitalizing on U.S. policy failures in the region, Russia will still need American help in the end to contain the consequences of its campaign in Syria and settle the conflict with other parties involved.

Russia’s unwavering support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria preceding the conflict in Ukraine had long been a point of division with the West, but now these competing policies have come into

full relief. It is too early to judge whether this military operation will go down in history as Russia’s decisive use of force to achieve political ends, or strategic folly.

From the U.S. perspective, not only will Russia not come away un-scathed, but as the President Obama said, will trap itself in a “quagmire.” After four and half years of conflict, which have completely destroyed Syria as a country, Moscow cannot be ignorant of the realities on the ground. By injecting itself directly into this war to decide the fate of the Assad’s government, and what is left of the Syrian Army, Russia is wad-ing deep into a conflict that cuts across the Middle East, entangling itself with competing regional powers and challenging the U.S. to reconsider its policies.

Although Russia inherited Syria as a client state from the geopolitics of the Cold War, Moscow has been a consistent supporter of the Syrian state and its army, believing it is the only legitimate actor worth backing in the conflict. This vision is based on a firm conviction that there are no

miChAel kofmAn

AP

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Russian and U.S. economic ties with the Middle East (in $ million, data for 2014)

viable alternatives to the Syrian regime, independ-ent of whether or not it is led by Assad, and remov-ing him would only result in a Libya-like scenario, i.e. complete state implosion dividing power among ex-tremist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) and Jabhat Al-Nusra.

That policy had always resulted in an impasse with the U.S., which together with Turkey and Gulf allies insisted on Assad resigning as a precondition for any political transition in Syria. America’s approach is heavily colored by the interests of regional allies, namely Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who have gambled on Assad’s defeat, despite the doubts that anything positive may follow the Syrian leader’s downfall.

While the U.S. has demanded that Assad step down since 2011, it has objectively done little to pursue this goal. Washington has never been convinced in the efficacy of a more robust U.S. role in the Syrian con-flict, and in some respects has outsourced the defeat of Assad to others in the region. Those countries, particularly the Gulf States, have funded various groups of fighters, many of them Islamist or allied with Al-Nusra Front in the Army of Conquest.

Attrition has taken its toll on Assad’s forces, pushing Russia and Iran to decide whether or not they would allow the Syrian Army to be defeated, and with it lose their influence in the country, or intervene. Prior to Russia’s deployment, Assad’s downfall was almost inevitable. Now that a joint air and ground campaign has been launched by Russian, Syrian and Iranian

forces, it is the U.S. that must weigh its inte rests and options, while Turkey and Saudi Arabia consider whether or not to wage a fully fledged proxy war against Russia or hedge their bets.

Russia’s actions highlight a long running challenge for U.S. policy in this conflict; after all, backing fight-ers against Assad was always a policy viewed with skepticism in Washington. Those most combat effec-tive were often radicalized and destined to become a follow-on problem. Kurdish fighters represent the U.S. most viable and favored ally, but their battle is mainly with ISIS, far from Assad’s forces, and this front is more complementary to Russia’s campaign rather than contradictory.

Part of the insistence on Assad’s resignation is rooted in U.S. perception that he, and his regime, are beyond redemption after the atrocities they have committed, from using chemical weapons to barrel bombing his own people in this war. European lead-ers’ statements on September 12 after meetings in Paris suggest they are more amenable to seeing As-sad stay as part of a longer political transition, but the U.S. policymaking community remains less san-guine.

At this stage, everything rests on whether Russia is able to convince the U.S. that Assad and his forces will not be defeated with their support – the course of this military operation will weigh heavily on what America chooses to do. It is all about the facts on the ground.

SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL TRAdE CENTERALyONA REPKINA


Simply put, if Syrian forces become bogged down, there is little likelihood of changing perceptions in Washington, and no basis for reconsidering the existing policy. However, if Russia and Iran are able to make substantial gains on behalf of the Syrian Army, and hand a convincing defeat to forces backed by American allies, it would become clear that his rump state will at the very least survive for several more years.

So far, the Russian objective appears to be to en-able the Syrian Army to retake key regions lost in La-takia and Hama province, with Iranian support. Un-doubtedly Moscow has a political framework in mind for managing this conflict without committing to an indefinite military deployment in Syria, which is both expensive, and logistically difficult to sustain, given Russia’s limited resources for expeditionary opera-tions. In the U.S., jets comparable to Russian tactical aviation, like the F-16 and F-15, cost $22,000-$41,000 per flight hour to operate.

It is difficult to discern how Russia expects to po-litically end combat operations. As a result, the U.S. national security establishment is likely deliberating between two impulses: Compete against Moscow for Syria, or wait and see what comes of the Russian op-eration.

Russia’s Relations with otheR poweRs in the Region

While some have argued in the West that there is a grander vision here, entailing power projection in the Middle East, it is doubtful that Russia has plans be-yond a limited military campaign, let alone a concept for its role in the region. Far from being emblematic of a Russian strategy for the Middle East, this interven-tion is first and foremost to save Assad, and secure Moscow’s ability to determine the future of Syria on an equal basis with the West. By signaling a more per-manent military presence, and a complete political commitment to Syria, Russia seeks to disabuse the U.S. of any notion that it will walk away from this conflict and let Assad fall. In the process, Russia will

find itself navigating the complex and treacherous waters of the Middle East, a region the U.S. is not only more familiar with, but one where military force translates poorly into desired political outcomes.

In recent years Russia has revived some relevance in the region, in large part due to the consequenc-es of the Arab Spring, a seismic political wave that set the traditional relationships of U.S.-Arab rela-tions into flux. dissatisfaction among countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia with the American response, viewed as an abandonment of traditional allies, had spawned efforts among Arab autocrats to delever-age relations. Hence, Russia gained access to new arms markets, including deals worth $3.5 billion in Egypt and $4.2 billion in Iraq, while traditional clients like Algeria continue to purchase sizable amounts of weaponry, having bought more than $7.5 billion since 2006. Although these relationships are trans-actional in nature, Moscow is happy to be restored as a minor alternative player in the region and pocket the profits. Still, these are the boons of U.S. policy failures, on which Russia capitalized, rather than the product of a strategic approach to become a power player in the region.

More important is the Russian role in the geopo-litical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with its sectarian Sunni versus Shia dynamics. The U.S. demonstrated that it is comfortable with seeing popular movements overthrow traditionally backed dictators. Hence Middle Eastern allies now perceive it as a fair weather friend, especially after the nuclear agreement with Iran, leading to a dramatic increase in spending by Arab states. Saudi Arabia’s military spending is one of the highest in the world now, top-ping $50 billion, while even smaller Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were at $15-17 billion annually. Syria is far from the only war in the region. Egypt is preoccupied with the civil war in Libya, while Saudi Arabia and UAE are stuck fighting Houthi rebels in yemen, backed by Iran. Iraqi forces, with Iranian militia support and U.S. airpower, con-tinue to struggle against ISIS.

Russia has benefitted from the consequent arms

Andrei Tsygankov, professor, San Francisco State University

“ R u s s i a n s m a y e x p e r i e n c e c a s u a l t i e s , o r i n a d v e r t e n t l y h i t c i v i l i a n t a r g e t s , o r f e e l a d d i t i o n a l n e e d s t o r e i n f o r c e A s s a d ’ s a r m y . T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s m a y p u s h t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n a v e r y u n f o r t u n a t e d i r e c t i o n b y t u r n i n g i t i n t o a p r o l o n g e d w a r . “

More analysis on Russian foreign policy in the Middle East at http://www.russia-direct.org/tags/middle-east.

Also REAd

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sales opportunities these wars engender, and even in Syria the military support was hardly free. Arguably Russia has profited from every bit of supposed aid that was given to Assad’s forces.

Although Russian leaders often paint the Arab-Israeli conflict as the most important issue in the re-gion, and it is indeed important, the contest between Sunni Arab states and Shias led by Iran has be-come the more defining element. What semblance of a prospective reconciliation between Russia and Saudi Arabia may have existed in recent years, due to Saudi dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policy, will now vanish after Moscow’s operations in Syria. Rus-sia’s relations with Iran, Israel, and Turkey will also witness transformation, for better and worse. Mos-cow’s policy towards Tehran seemed mostly a pawn in its dealings with the U.S., until two years ago. The confrontation over Ukraine completely changed Rus-sian foreign policy considerations. Now that Russia’s animosity with the West outweighs other concerns, Iran is not only an opportunity for closer engage-ment, but could prove the most important player in the future of the region.

Hence in 2014 Russia has sought to make amends for a range of prior policies, from suspending the S-300 missile sale to agreeing to impose UN sanc-tions on Iran in 2010. Now their joint military opera-tion in Syria could prove demonstrative of a transfor-mation in Russian-Iranian relations. The two sides are fighting as full-fledged allies, alongside Syrian forces

and possibly Hezbollah. If successful, the crucible of the Syrian war will alter Russian-Iranian relations, but if the effort collapses recriminations will surely fol-low.

This campaign could be equally damaging for Mos-cow’s dealings with Turkey as it is beneficial for rela-tions with Iran. Not only is Turkish policy in Syria now in disarray, but Russia has added political embarrass-ment with airspace violations, signaling that it can muscle Ankara out of the conflict. Russia’s military is a far cry from U.S. capabilities, but not taken lightly by others. The bullying power is certainly there. That may prove to be a mistake, but Russia is prodding a political soft spot for NATO, whose members are pub-licly vocal but privately unenthused about supporting Turkey’s President, Tayyip Erdogan, and his less-than democratic policies. If Russia overplays its hand, it could lose a vital economic relationship with a strate-gically important country, at a time when it can ill af-ford it. Turkey has already stalled the development of the Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline, and is threat-

Although Russia often paints the Arab-Israeli conflict as the most important

issue in the region, the contest between Sunni Arab states and Shias led by Iran has become the more defining element.

AP


ening these energy infrastructure plans, along with leveraging other economic ties with Russia.

Russian-Israeli relations have traditionally been cor-dial, perhaps even warm following a deep and public falling out between Benjamin Netanyahu’s and Presi-dent Obama’s policies on Iran, settlements, and host of issues. Moscow benefits from defense cooperation with Israel in niche areas like drone technology, but beyond such transactions is perhaps a deeper politi-cal sympathy, built on years of accommodation of in-terests in the region.

In the Syrian civil war, Israel would prefer Assad’s regime on its borders to ISIS, the Al-Nusra Front, or any other conglomeration of jihadist fighters. Israel’s chief security concern is that no advanced weapons, particularly Russian air defense systems, fall into the hands of Hezbollah. In addition, Israel will want to retain the option to strike positions in or around Syria, and will have to coordinate these with Russia’s military leadership. Unlike its pitch to the U.S., Russia is genuinely interested and able to deconflict opera-tions with Israel’s much more limited requirements.

potential costs foR Russia

As Russia transitions from softening up targets with medium altitude bombing to direct air support for the Syrian offensive, it raises the risk to its military forces, particularly helicopters and any front line troops. The overall tempo of operations can lead to accidents and errors over time, resulting in the loss of aircraft and pilots. No war is without costs, though it is anyone’s guess if the Russian public is prepared to pay them until they materialize. By all appearances, Russia intends a time limited opera-tion, but how capable is the Syrian Army? This in-tervention could prove too little too late for the Syr-ian forces, especially if Assad’s opponents choose to drastically increase their support. Perhaps after a few quick victories the offensive will run aground, and with a relatively small air force presence, Russia cannot hope to completely compensate for the lack of land power. That scenario would devolve into a risky choice of further involvement or political re-treat.

Every action also has a reaction. A shoot out in Grozny, Chechnya on October 8 with three mem-bers of a terrorist cell affiliated with ISIS in Syria may be manageable for the local forces of the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, but Russia as a whole has often presented a soft target for terrorism. Without a good exit strategy, the Russian homeland may pay a price for this intervention that will shake domes-tic public support. Certainly Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states will not simply take Moscow’s interven-tion on the chin. Russia has changed the equation for these countries - to weaken Assad, they must now defeat Russia’s military either in Syria or the Russian government’s political support at home. A response is sure to follow, but what form it will take is the known unknown of this conflict.

implications foR the u.s.

As Russia seeks to create its own coalition that is less anti-ISIS and more pro-Syrian Army, the U.S. must consider either political retreat or a fresh approach to the conflict. A completely revamped strategy for Syria is unlikely. President Obama has consistently sought to pull the U.S. out of the Middle East, and offload more responsibility for the security there onto countries in the region. The prospect of launch-ing a new policy is also unrealistic this late in the administration’s political life. deconflicting military operations with Russia is also an irrelevancy, now

Russian public opinion on Kremlin’s involvement in Syria(Oct. 8, 2015)

SOURCE: LEvAdA CENTER

ALyONA REPKINA

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International participation in the U.S.-led coalition vs. Russia-led coalition

that it has become clear that the two countries will be operating in different parts of Syrian airspace or not at all. Indeed, Russia’s operations present a pres-ence of a near-peer power in the air domain that the U.S. is not only unaccustomed to, but simply has not dealt with in decades.

Not only has Russia’s military operation divided the West on what to do, it has split American of-ficials on whether or not it is ultimately a negative development. Some in the U.S. would advocate that if Russia truly wants Syria, it is welcome to as much as it can take, and America would be best served by bowing out of the mess. That is not a broadly held view, but Russia’s military success is viewed as doubtful at best. It seems more that Russia may prove yet another ineffective actor and exhaust it-self in Syria, or if successful, reduce the complexity of the conflict for all concerned. Either way, Mos-cow’s only way out is political settlement and nego-tiations. Hence America’s primary objective should be to stay engaged as a player in the conflict, and be there when Russia inevitably needs a way out.

In this situation, there is no way for the U.S. to meet Russia half-way. The objectives of mutual al-lies, and proxies on the ground, have been and re-main completely exclusive. If the U.S. agreed to any cooperation it would be judged a reneging on the forces it sponsored, and an abandonment of re-gional allies. Meanwhile not only does the U.S. not need the Russian air force to tackle ISIS, most likely Moscow’s forces would only get in the way of coali-tion air support. It seems in retrospect vladimir Pu-tin understood this perfectly, and therefore offered cooperation more as a ploy to achieve political gains during his visit in America, as opposed to a serious proposition for cooperation.

The most disconcerting aspect of the current situation is not the potential interaction between U.S. and Russian forces, but factors and countries beyond either side’s control. Currently, the U.S. has no plan on how to move forward, while European leaders appear to see Russian involvement as a potential solution. The danger is that if America chooses to step away, then it also loses control over what Turkey or other countries may choose to do. despite a series of failed military interven-tions over the past decade of war, American politi-cal involvement in the Middle East on the whole has been stabilizing. In the end, Russia will likely need America to either help contain the consequences from its intervention in Syria, to withdraw, or settle the conflict.

70%of syrians oppose dividing up their country, according to oRB International.

Professor, Columbia University

Unless the U.S. and Russia can find a way to make their positions on a political settlement of the Syr-ian civil war more compatible, there is little chance that they can really cooperate in defeating ISIS. Perhaps there is some hope they can move in this direction, because the Obama Administration has dropped the precondition that Assad must go be-fore anything else, and now proposes a “managed transition” that would leave the government in place during negotiations among all parties. And Russia has made plain that it does not insist that Assad re-main in power, if alternative arrangements could be worked out by all parties. But it seems far-fetched that the warring parties can be brought to the ne-gotiating table. And the Russian proposal for all to join in a “grand coalition” to fight ISIS has about as much chance succeeding as if the U.S. proposed a “grand coalition” where Russia is invited to join forces with it, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the Syrian opposition. Russia will almost surely suc-ceed in shoring up the military position of the Assad government. But are the Russians willing to allow themselves to be drawn deeper in this civil war? If so, the somber, agonizing results of the Afghanistan wars, the Iraq war, and Libya war await them.

Robert Legvold

ExpERT sIdE noTE

U.S.-led Russia-led

In Iraq: Australia Canada

denmark FranceJordan

Netherlands UK

In Syria: Australia BahrainCanada France Jordan

Saudi Arabia Turkey

UAE

In Syria: Iran Iraq

Syria


Gordon m. hahn of the Geostrategic forecasting Corporation talks about the risks of Russia’s fight against iSiS. he also explains why Syria is not the next Afghanistan.

Russia Direct: Russia is home to about 16 million Muslims. To what extent might its military inter-vention in Syria aimed against ISIS in the Middle East provoke Muslim radicalization within Russia itself?

Gordon M. Hahn: There are two jihadi organiza-tions based in Russia’s North Caucasus at present: the Imarat Kavkaz (IK or Caucasus Emirate), which is allied with Al Qaeda and in Syria with Jabhat al-Nus-ra, and the vilaiyat Kavkaz Islamskogo Gosudarstva (vKIS or the Caucasus Province of the Islamic State), which is a direct affiliate and part of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS).

It can be expected that the latter has been and will continue to make extraordinary efforts to begin a campaign of suicide attacks and other forms of at-tack in dagestan, the North Caucasus, and Russia in general. This is because some of the top amirs in ISIS are Chechen Kists from Georgia with past con-nection to the Caucasus Emirate. The most famous are ISIS Northern Front amir Umar al-Shishani (born Tarkhan Batirashvili), Tarkhan’s deputy Abu Jihad, and Tarkhan’s brother, ISIS financial officer Tamaz.

They and others were originally sent to the Syrian mujahedin by the Caucasus Emirate in 2012 to gain combat experience and make contacts given the or-ganization’s shortage of weapons, and they planned and probably still plan to return in one way or anoth-er to Russia to carry out jihad. Tarkhan can “return” by helping the vKIS to organize, with financing, and

INTERVIEW

kSeniA ZUbAChevA, PAvel koShkin, RUSSiA DiReCt

The risks and implications of Russia’s military campaign in Syria

Advisory board member at the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation (Chicago, Ill.), adjunct professor at the Middlebury Institute for International studies at Monterey and senior associate at the Center for the study of Terrorism and Intelligence studies, Akribus Group. dr. Hahn has taught at Boston University, American University, stanford, san Jose state, and san Francisco state University.

GoRdon M. HAHn

making it more expansive. A vigorous vKIS will chal-lenge what remains of the original Caucasus Emirate for recruits and those mujhahedin returning from the Levant to the North Caucasus.

Therefore, if the Caucasus Emirate survives, it may resort to outdoing the vKIS by returning to suicide attacks and other high-profile tactics in order to compete with the vKIS. It is doubtful that Al Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra will be able to assist the Cau-casus Emirate to the level ISIS could potentially aid the vKIS. Nevertheless, the competition is likely to lead to an uptick in jihadi attacks in Russia, includ-ing suicide bombers. It must be said, however, that this would have been true and perhaps even truer, if Putin had not decided to intervene in Syria.

RD: What are the real implications of Russia’s at-tempts to create its own anti-ISIS coalition? Why has the U.S. refused to cooperate with Russia on fighting ISIS?

G.H.: The geopolitical implications are potentially profound. Russia has returned to the Middle East in a major way not seen since the Cold War, though it has completely different goals now. Those goals are to protect the Assad regime as much as possible ei-ther in staying in power or being eased out, thereby establishing Russia as a power to be reckoned with in the region. And also, in a region outside of Eurasia, it will help Russia weaken the global jihadi revolu-tionary movement, which threatens Russian national security and that of its neighbors, especially (but not only) Central Asia and Azerbaijan.

Another issue is what the response of a new U.S.

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administration will be 16 months from now. The likely Republican president will not be a semi-isolationist like Rand Paul or a maverick like donald Trump, but rather, an anti-Russian hawk like Senators Cruz or Rubio or Carly Fiorina. Another Bush administration is also unlikely to be very tolerant of Putin’s proac-tive foreign policy. So we can expect even worse U.S.-Russian and Western-Russian relations in about a year and a half, with unforeseeable and potentially far-reaching consequences.

Of course, U.S.-Russian relations are already at “rock bottom,” it would seem. President Obama de-spises Putin in whom he sees the worst, concentrat-ed form - almost a caricature - of a conservative Re-publican leader he and his party despise. More over, Obama does not make compromises, he only ap-pears to do so at times when he is forced to act from a position of weakness. He has never compromised with the Republican opposition in Congress in his seven years as president. His unpopularity at home and his leftist-liberal disdain for the use of American military power in regions of the Third world stay his hand. Thus, Obama rejected Putin’s offer of building a grand counter-jihad coalition to address the grow-ing threat of ISIS and the larger global jihadi revolu-tionary movement.

RD: To what extent might the Russia-led cam-paign in Syria be effective?

G.H.: I do not see the Russian air campaign being effective unless it is willing to undertake a major ef-fort to train, equip, inform with intelligence, and or-ganize a ground war coalition combining the Syrian and Iraqi militaries, Iranian forces, and the Kurdish Peshmerga, which is ripe for stealing away from its Western allies, who are so beholden to Turkey, which has actually been assisting ISIS and other jihadi groups. Putin’s effort could also expose the inadvert-ent Western and intentional Arab assistance from Qatar and Saudi Arabia going to ISIS, Jabhat al-Nus-ra and other jihadi groups in Syria. Could Russia win over members of the Western coalition? Possibly.

RD: What are the major risks that Moscow should take into account?

G.H.: The major risks are: falling into the tempta-tion to expand Russian efforts, including supplying advisors and special forces operations, leading to Russian casualties and further temptation, drawing Russia into a quagmire. Also, the financial burden on the country could be considerable and combined with continuing low oil prices and sanctions and a possible re-starting of the Ukrainian war, this could overwhelm the Russian treasury, creating problems in maintaining the ruling coalition or “Putin elite” and destabilizing the regime. The latter risk could be compounded by societal opposition to the war effort should it become costly in lives and treasure.

RD: Is it reasonable for the authorities in the Kremlin to directly meddle in the Syrian conflict given the negative Soviet experience in Afghani-stan in 1979?

G.H.: Any comparison with Afghanistan is for now misplaced. This time Russia is not sending in ground troops to fight and is limiting its operations to an air campaign. Russia also has the support of a small, co-alition that includes all the nearest regional players: Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Hezbollah. Egypt, China, India and perhaps others might join Russia’s effort to one degree or another if it proves to be more robust and effective than the American-led coalition. The U.S. efforts have been limited and its effectiveness has been poor, since ISIS has been expanding. It would be nice to see a division of labor with Russia’s coali-tion focusing mostly on Syria and the U.S. coalition focusing on Iraq, with cooperation or at least coordi-nation to avoid conflict between the coalitions.

It’d be nice to see a division of labor with Russia’s coalition focusing on Syria and the U.S. coalition focusing on Iraq.

REU

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How Russia returned to the Middle EastRussia has overcome its outsider status in the region through clarity of purpose and U.S. errors. but the intervention in Syria raises the stakes, and the risks, for moscow.

To fully understand why Russia has intervened militarily in Syria, it’s necessary to examine how the competition between Moscow and Washington in the Middle East over the past 60 years has shaped

Russia’s interests there. during the Cold War, though the U.S.-Soviet rivalry was most intense in

Europe, in the Middle East it played out initially in Egypt. But the Soviet investment in Egypt failed disastrously when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat expelled Soviet military advisers in 1972 and turned to the U.S. As the U.S. consolidated its grip on the Middle East, Syria became Moscow’s sole significant ally there.

Moscow maintained its interests in Syria after the collapse of the Soviet Un-ion in 1991. But Syria was a “sleeping asset” as Moscow focused on its domes-tic political, economic and social turmoil. Russia’s weakness enabled NATO to expand to include former Soviet bloc states – despite Moscow’s protests.

Coming to the Russian presidency in 2000, vladimir Putin brought greater administrative discipline to Russia’s governance – and a determi-nation to redress Russia’s decline in international status.

In this environment the Middle East again attracted substantial Russian interest, primarily because it was a region where Russia could counter U.S. policies, providing a potential bargaining chip over U.S. and Western policies in Eastern Europe.

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Moreover, Russia’s revived interest was given impe-tus by a number of unforced U.S. errors in Washing-ton’s dealings with the region – with the invasion of Iraq the most egregious.

President Obama picked up on the Bush adminis-tration’s last justification for the invasion – to pro-mote democracy in the Middle East – and made it the focus of his landmark speech in Cairo in 2009, addressed to all Arabs.

That alone would have alarmed Washington’s con-servative and autocratic Arab allies. But in the ad-dress he also made promises that proved difficult to keep – particularly his undertaking to direct his administration’s energies to resolving the Israeli- Palestinian conflict.

When the Syrian uprising started in 2011, the U.S. proclaimed that Assad had to go, but Obama ap-peared unwilling to take action to force this. In this situation Russia made huge strides in the Middle East by proving itself more adept at problem-solving di-plomacy in the region by striking a deal with Assad to remove and destroy his chemical weapons arsenal.

the shifting balance of poweR in the middle east

In early 2011 Russia at face value had more to lose than the U.S. if the Syrian uprising had proved successful. The fall of the Assad regime would have completely eliminated Moscow as a player in the region. By com-parison, Syria was not crucial to U.S. foreign policy in-terests in the Middle East.

But perceived U.S. failure in Syria had a decidedly negative impact on broader U.S. standing in the re-gion. The U.S. had the capacity to intervene milita-rily in Syria at any point in the civil war if it was de-termined to use all means available to it to remove Assad. But Obama was restrained in his use of the military option by U.S. weariness after the Iraq and Afghanistan involvements. This had wider effects across a region where use of hard power is a fact of life, as he was perceived by pro- and anti-U.S. inte-rests as weak and vacillating.

By comparison, Russia made considerable ground by presenting itself as determined, purposeful and capable of achieving results. For a range of reasons as the 2000s progressed, Putin chose to adopt a foreign policy opposed to an international order de-fined by the U.S. This became evident in the Middle East through Putin’s determination to ensure the survival of the Assad regime.

The final irony for the U.S. at the present stage of

the civil war is that Assad’s removal would not now be in Washington’s interests, given that the most likely replacement would be a hard-line Islamist re-gime hostile to the West. The U.S. now seems to be contemplating Assad remaining as temporary head of a unity government that would include opposi-tion elements, but remains adamant that he cannot be part of a lasting solution for Syria – again raising questions in the region about what exactly Obama’s policy is.

pRoblems facing Russia as it expands influence in the Region

This does not mean that Russia has now replaced the U.S. as the major external power in the Middle East. The U.S. still has substantial ties to the region in terms of both hard and soft power.

And the contradictions underlying Russia’s sup-port for Assad and its broader aims in the Middle East were evident – even before last month’s inter-vention – at the Arab summit in Cairo in March 2015. Egyptian President Sisi as host read a letter from Putin expressing Russian support for resolution of the problems of the Middle East without any exter-nal interference. Saudi Arabia’s then-Foreign Minis-ter, Saud al-Faisal, reacted sharply, saying he would prefer that Russia played a more helpful role in the region by refraining from arming the Syrian regime.

But Russia has been able to play a weak hand in the region very well in order to improve its standing there vis-à-vis the U.S. and ensure that Washington will have more difficulty in using the region strategi-cally against Russia.

Russia’s military intervention in Syria in September has raised the stakes for Moscow. If the intervention goes well, Moscow may be able to link a compromise with the West on Syria to a reduction in sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 following its actions in Ukraine.

However, if the intervention goes poorly – particu-larly if the current limited Russian involvement is unable to turn the tide for Assad – Moscow may be tempted into mission creep. That would place Russia at risk of being drawn into the sort of quagmire the U.S. experienced in Iraq.

Russia’s military intervention in Syria in September has raised the stakes

for Moscow.


Russia’s military campaign in Syria: The view from IsraelRussia’s bet on Syrian leader Bashar Assad could lead to victory, but it could also drag Russia into a protracted and violent domestic struggle similar to the one it faced in Afghanistan.

In the winter of 2010 the Arab world experienced an upheaval that was named the “Arab Spring.” The term expressed the hope in the West that the turmoil in the Middle East would advance the Arab societies into an

era of positive growth and, consequently, democracy. However, it soon be-came clear that this was not necessarily an “Arab Spring,” but rather an “Islamic Winter.” This conclusion was drawn due to the rise to power – usually by way of democratic elections – of Islamist movements in many Arab countries. In the summer of 2014, a hot “Islamic State Summer” sup-planted the “Arab Spring” and the “Islamic Winter” as the organization took control over large areas in northern Iraq and eastern Syria.

The origins of Iraq’s and Syria’s collapse can be traced to prior events in those countries. In Iraq the major factor was the conquest of the country by the U.S. army in 2003, which shattered the country’s state institutions. In Syria the major factor was the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, which was part of the broad shock wave striking the whole region at that time.

As events unfolded, Syria sank into a treacherous swamp of bloody conflict and even turned into a theater of jihad for Jihadists from all over the world. Soon Syria had been divided into small sub-states: an Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) in eastern Syria and west-ern Iraq, a Baath stronghold under the Assad dynasty in central Syria, and autonomous enclaves of rebel groups fighting against both the Syrian regime and ISIS.

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The international challenge of the Syrian refugee crisis

As long as the turmoil and chaos were confined to the Middle East itself, the nations of the world re-mained onlookers. This was especially so after the EU-led intervention in Libya, backed by the U.S. in 2011. The Western states came out against Muammar Gaddafi’s regime and in support of those rebelling against him. Gaddafi was indeed overthrown, but then a state of chaos developed that allowed the rise to power of radical elements, some of which became affiliated with ISIS. It thus turned out that the end result of the Western intervention was the de facto dissolution of the Libyan state.

over the years, however, it became clear that the chaos was not confining itself to the Middle East, but threatened to spread beyond the disaster-stricken countries and areas of that region. In this regard, a number of looming threats can be identified.

Three primary ThreaTs To The region

The first danger is the volunteers who have flowed into the region in droves from all over the world to join the jihadist war in Syria and Iraq. It is estimated that so far 15,000-20,000 volunteers have come, and per-haps even more. It seems likely that these fighters will one day return to their places of origin, bringing skills they have acquired in carrying out combat operations together with an extremist Islamist ideology.

The second danger is the phenomenon of ISIS that has proved itself more effective than its predeces-sors and competitors, since it has managed to take control of large areas in Iraq and Syria. ISIS is a dan-ger to regional stability and to countries such as Jor-dan, and perhaps even Israel, as well as Egypt and Lebanon.

Finally, the third danger is the refugee crisis the consequences of which have been felt during the summer of 2015. How will it be possible, if at all, to absorb and settle such large immigrant communities in Europe in such a way that they and their children will not become centers of distress, poverty, and frustration that will give rise to violence all over the continent?

In face of all this, the international community finds itself in a predicament for which it has no solu-tion; it has no overall vision about how to deal with the crisis in the Middle East or about how to contain it and prevent it from trickling over into Europe and the rest of the world. It is important to emphasize that, above all, there is a noticeable absence of any political or military factor capable of imposing or-der and guaranteeing rationality and stability in the region.

The role of the U.S. should also be mentioned. In the past it was perceived as the leading power in the Middle East, but in recent years it had manifested weakness, an inability to act, and, in particular, a re-luctance to intervene in the problems of the region. This became especially apparent after the painful and costly involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq.

russia’s role in The middle easT

The process being undergone by the Arab world posed a threat to russian interests, since the rise of the radical Islamist forces weakened russia’s tradi-tional allies, the secular regimes in the region. The spread of extremism also threatened russia’s security, since among the volunteers streaming into the region were thousands of Muslims from russia. Concern increased in Moscow that the extremism might also spread to the Muslim communities in russia.

Moscow has a long tradition of acting in the Middle East arena and as it returns to playing a major role in the international arena, the Middle East will serve as an arena of competing interests.

russia has indeed demonstrated its skill in act-ing and maneuvering in the region while exploiting the U.S. weaknesses that wanted simply to disen-gage from the region and refrain from becoming

Will Russia contribute to solving Syria’s refugee crisis? Read more at http://www.russia-direct.org/tags/syria.

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involved there. The displays of weakness by the U.S. not only created a vacuum, but they also left many of Washington’s allies feeling disillusioned and frustrated, and even unprotected in light of regional developments.

russia’s intervention in the Middle East was first expressed by its taking the side of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. As early as 2012 and 2013 Moscow acted to block any Un Security Council resolution aimed at providing an umbrella or international legitimacy to moves against Bashar. In September 2013, russia achieved an agreement on the question of Syria’s chemical weapons. This agreement enabled the U.S. and president Bashar al-Assad to de-escalate a very volatile situation.

The support the russians gave to the regime of General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt after he over-threw the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood and took over the presidency in June 2013, also proved to be important. The new Egyptian regime needed inter-national support in light of the cold shoulder the Americans gave it, so it greatly appreciated the rus-sian aid.

Israel also seeks to maintain good relations with russia. These ties have a special character as Israel is home to a large community of russian immigrants who constitute the largest russian-speaking com-munity outside russia’s borders. Another special as-pect of Israel’s relations with russia is the coolness prevailing in the relations between Israeli prime Min-ister Benjamin netanyahu and U.S. president obama. In any event, Israel refrained from criticizing russia on the Crimean and Ukrainian issues, and it did not join the series of steps taken against russia by Euro-pean states and the U.S.

The conTexT for The russian inTervenTion in syriarussia’s intervention in Syria represents a dramatic development that could have a decisive impact on the results of the Syrian conflict. during the past year president al-Assad found himself with his back to the wall in face of the rebels’ successes on all the battlefronts, and it seemed as if only a miracle could save him. now, however, russian aircrafts joined by members of the Iranian revolutionary Guards, sent to render aid to Bashar’s regime, guarantee his sur-vival in power. By this intervention Moscow vividly demonstrated that russia, in contrast to obama’s America, stands beside its allies and does not aban-don them, as the U.S. abandoned Egyptian president

Hosni Mubarak when the “Arab Spring” broke out in his country in 2011.

The russian and Iranian forces are at present not strong enough to return control over most of the country to Bashar, especially in the areas of eastern Syria that are in the hands of ISIS. However, the inter-ventionist forces do have enough strength to enable Bashar, or whoever might replace him from within the regime, to hold on to the Syrian coastal areas, where a large Alawite population lives. The loyalty of this population to the regime is guaranteed under any conditions and at any price.

The danger of sinking in The syrian quagmire

What is needed is a force on the ground capable of confronting ISIS directly and taking control over the areas it now holds. no such force is in sight, especially since U.S. allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia have no de-sire to send their military forces against ISIS.

In the light of all this, russia’s plan becomes clear. only a strong and stable state can subdue ISIS, and since that organization developed as a result of the collapse of Iraq and Syria, those states need to be rehabilitated so they can cope with it. In the case of Syria, the task confronting russia would seem to be somewhat easier, because russia’s presence in Syria has a long tradition, and because Syria’s state insti-tutions are still functioning and they could serve as a nucleus for rebuilding the state. From this comes the

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will to help Bashar stand on his feet and overcome his enemies, so that in the long term he will be able to prevail over ISIS.

The problem is that russia’s actions may be sink-ing it into the quagmire of Syria’s bloody civil war, in which large parts of the Syrian people have come out against Bashar al-Assad and now see themselves as fighting a battle to the bitter end against him. rus-sia’s bet on Bashar makes sense, but it is still a “bet.” It could lead to victory, but it could also drag russia into a domestic struggle like the one it faced in Af-ghanistan. russia’s undertaking will only be able to succeed if it becomes part of a broad international enterprise, and for this russia needs to enlist interna-tional support, especially Western and Arab support. With patience and successes on the ground, this is possible, even if not guaranteed.

In regard to the internal situation in Syria, it should be remembered that the sides fighting are exhaust-ed, and they are more dependent than ever on for-eign intervention, whether it be russia and Iran on the side of Bashar, or Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the side of the rebels. After all, it is Turkey that makes possible the passage of volunteers to the Islamic or-ganizations active in Syria, and it is also possible that Turkey is buying oil from ISIS. If all the factors can be enlisted to help find a solution to the Syrian problem, then such a solution will be found in the end.

russian involvement in Syria was bolstered by re-gional developments in recent months, starting with the death of Saudi king Abdullah in January. Abdul-lah’s half-brother and successor, king Salman, as one of his first initiatives in power, changed the political and military leadership responsible for the Saudi in-volvement in the Syrian civil war.

In addition to changes in Saudi Arabia, Turkey’s par-liamentary elections in June weakened the authority of president recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has been responsible for Turkey’s intervention in Syria. Finally, in July, Iran signed a nuclear deal with the p5+1 that changed the nature of the relationship between Teh-ran and Washington.

So here is the challenge: Is it possible, for the in-ternational community to reach a negotiated solu-tion to the Syrian crisis? or could it be that Syria is doomed to continue the war indefinitely?

If indeed the war continues, the russian-Iranian intervention may prove to be the ingredient that ex-tends the fighting and deepens the human tragedy unfolding in Syria as the price for obtaining the lim-ited achievement of preserving Bashar’s regime on one-fourth of Syria’s territory. If this comes to pass, it

will guarantee the disintegration of the Syrian state, smashing it to pieces.

could israel reach an undersTanding wiTh russia on syria?In contrast to the 1970s, russia today is not a rival of Israel, and its intervention in Syria is not intended to aid Bashar in fighting against Israel. Still, active rus-sian involvement in Syria will undoubtedly limit Isra-el’s ability to act. Until recently Israel made it a rule to attack targets in Syria any time it suspected that the Syrians were transferring advanced weapons to Hezbollah. now Israel is concerned that some of the advanced russian weapons being given to Bashar al-Assad will be passed on to his Iranian and Hezbollah allies.

However, it is a fact that until now Israel has re-frained from becoming involved in the war in Syria; it has formulated no solution it would like to see there; and it has no preferred outcome. This is because Is-rael does not want to see the spread of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria. Bashar is the enemy Israel knows well, and, like his father before him, he has kept the peace along the Israeli-Syrian border, making that quiet a phenomenon extending over four decades. In contrast to this, the arrival of ISIS at the border would mean chaos, extremism, and terrorist acts that Israel would have difficulty in containing.

This being the situation, Israeli-russian understand-ings can easily be reached, such as those netanyahu and putin evidently achieved during their meeting in Moscow in mid-September 2015. These understand-ings, it seems, dealt with coordination in order to pre-vent friction between russian and Israeli aircraft.

The question is: Will it be possible to reach a broa-der understanding that will include Hezbollah and Iran? This is something that Israel is quite concerned about. Moscow’s great advantage, from Israel’s point of view, is that it has ties with all the players and speaks with all of them, and since it displays no hos-tility to Israel, it can exert a moderating and calming influence.

In sum, only time will tell where events are lead-ing, since the war in Syria has a dynamic of its own, as do events in the Middle East in general. And, as we know, this arena constitutes just one piece on the global chessboard, where other arenas have impli-cations for and influence over what happens in the Middle East.

57%

65%

of Syrians say things are heading in the wrong direction, according to oRB International.

of Syrians believe that diplomatic solution is possible, according to oRB International.


1. dmitry Adamsky. “putin’s Syria Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, october 1, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-10-01/putins-syria-strategy.

2. nikolay Soukhov. “International Coalition against ISIS – Can Common Evil Unite Us?”, russian International Affairs Council, September 30, 2015. http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=6632.

3. vitaly naumkin. “The Middle East: The new Great Game,” russia direct report, September 10, 2013. http://www.russia-direct.org/archive/september-monthly-memo-middle-east-new-great-game.

4. John McHugo. Syria: A recent History. London: Saqi Books, 2015.

5. Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. new york: regan Arts, 2015.

6. yevgeny primakov. russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the present. new york: Basic Books, 2009.

7. Andrei Tsygankov. The kremlin’s Syria Gamble Is risky, but Could Have a Big payoff. russia direct, october 3, 2015. http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/kremlins-syria-gamble-risky-could-have-big-payoff.

8. daniel Byman. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone needs to know. new york: oxford University press, 2015.

9. Talal nizameddin. putin’s new order in the Middle East. London: C.Hurst & Co. (publishers) Ltd., 2013.

10. Sergey Markedonov. Syria 2015: Echoes of Afghanistan 1979? russia direct, october 1, 2015. http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/syria-2015-echoes-afghanistan-1979.

books and articles on russian foreign policy in the middle east

@mod_russia daily updates on russia’s involvement in the region from the russian Ministry of defense. (Tweets in russian)

@mfa_russia official Twitter account of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the russian Federation.

@valdaiclub valdai discussion Club provides expert insight and research on russian foreign policy, including the Middle East.

@tassagency_en news on russia’s involvement in Syria from the russian state information agency TASS.

@alarabiya_eng news provided by the Arab news channel Al Arabiya news.

@almonitor Al-Monitor features reporting and analysis from journalists and experts on the Middle East.

@jadaliyya Jadaliyya, an independent electronic magazine produced by the Arab Studies Institute, offers insight and critical analysis on the Arab world.

@mestrate Middle East Strategic perspectives is a political risk consultancy located in Beirut.

@middleeastinst The Middle East Institute is the oldest Washington-based institution dedicated to the study of the Middle East.

@Theeiu_mena Tweets from the Economist Intelligence Unit focusing on important developments in the Middle East and north Africa.

twitter accounts for russian foreign policy in the #middleeast

fuRTheR ReadIng

key takeaways from the debate on russian strategy in the middle eastfRom The edIToRS

1 Since the start of the Arab Spring there have been three major waves of perception of the

phenomenon by russian policymakers. Each wave included its own narrative and had its own sources.

2 russia’s support for Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad was rooted in deep-seated fears

that the fall of the president would open another pandora’s box of radical Islamic movements.

3 In war-ravaged Syria, the government and army are practically the only remaining institutions,

and there is no alternative but to rely on them in the struggle against terrorists.

4 political gains from russia’s campaign may include the demonstration of the kremlin’s

determination, the enhancement of russia’s global role, and proof of its ability to interact in such a complex situation with various forces.

5 The U.S. national security establishment is likely deliberating between two impulses:

Compete against Moscow for Syria, or wait and see what comes of the russian operation,

6 Contemporary russian policies do not fall in line with those of the GCC states, and it is

obvious that many in the region do not consider the russian narrative persuasive enough.

7 The sides fighting in Syria are exhausted, and they are more dependent than ever on foreign

intervention, whether it be russia and Iran on the side of Assad, or Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the side of rebels.

8 russia’s undertaking will only be able to succeed if it becomes part of a broad

international enterprise, and for this russia needs to enlist Western and Arab support.

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