Post on 29-Mar-2015
Zones of Peace, Zones of Chaos
Regional Trends in World Politics
A. Peace and Conflict
1. War and Peace “Clusters”
Conflicts in June 2012
2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1900-1925
2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1925-1950
2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1950-1975
2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1975-2000
3. Global Peace Index: 2008
3. Global Peace Index: 2010
3. Global Peace Index: 2012
4. Key Points
a. Certain areas are conflict-prone (clusters)
b. Others are peace-prone
c. Location of clusters changes over timeTherefore, cause must also be something that changes over time
B. Economics1. Poverty and Prosperity: GDP Per Capita
2. Social Welfarea. Hunger
b. Infant Mortality
3. Economic Systema. Today: Clustering of Property Rights (Capitalism)
4. Key points
a. Clusters on major economic indicators
b. Location changes over time: expansion and contraction around edges of clusters
c. Overlap between Economic / War clusters Related?
C. Government1. Democracy: Map of Freedom, 2012:
3. Corruption: Corruption Perceptions Index (2011)
D. Political Regions
1. “Zones of Chaos” – War-prone, poor, authoritarian, unstable, deadly
2. “Zones of Stability” – Peaceful, wealthy, healthy, democratic
3. Questions: How do these zones form and change?
A Clash of Civilizations? “The fundamental source of conflict in this new
world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”
Samuel P. Huntington
A. Assumptions
1. Conflict over values not power or resources!
2. Key value divide changes over timea. Colonialism and Nationalism: West vs. the Rest
b. 20th Century Ideologies: Fascism vs. Democracy, Communism vs. Capitalism
c. Post Cold War: Cultural Identities
3. Key actors = civilizations, not states
4. Culture Clash Internal / External Conflicta. Religion = Indivisible Stakes
b. Identity trumps other concerns
5. The Map of Civilizations
a. Religion determines some civilizational borders
Major religion(CIA Factbook 2001)
Buddhist (11)Hindu (3)Jewish (1)Muslim (49)Orthodox (11)Other (9)Protestant (46)Roman catholic (56)
World Religions
b. “Identity” determines the rest
West – Latin America divide: ethnicity?
Sinic civilization: Originally called “Confucian.” What is the basis for this bloc?
African civilization: Essentially what was left after drawing other civilizations
6. Alignments shape civilizational conflicts
7. Universalism = Conflicta. There are no “universal” political desires
b. Modernization ≠ Westernization
B. Implication: Internal Unity = Strength
1. Don’t be multicultural
a. Enemies will try to foment intra-societal conflict
b. Beware immigration from other civilizations
2. Test: Does Immigration Cause Internal Violence?
a. Europe
Does High % foreign-born cause more conflict?
b. US: Patterns of Immigrationi. 1966-1970 period of riots: unrelated
ii. Social Strife and Immigration, 1880-1914: relationship
c. Immigration by Region: Compare to Conflict Maps
d. Areas of inter-civilizational migration: Which civilizations should be weak?
C. Implication: Pushing Democracy and Capitalism = Civilizational Conflict
1.Democracy is Western value system: Separation of church and state, rule of law, social pluralism, representative bodies, individualism
2.Market capitalism is Western:Competition, property rights
3. Test: Is Democracy “Western”?a. World Values Survey – Questions about democracy, human rights, politics, religion, etc.
Key Dimensions
Democratic Performance:
• Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling
• Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order
Democratic Ideals:
• Democracy may have its problems but it is better than any other form of government
• I approve of having a democratic political system
b. Results – i. Democratic Performance/Ideals: No Difference!
Disa
ppro
val o
f dem
ocra
tic pe
rform
ance
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
5.1
4.4
5.2
4.9
4.5
5.05.05.1
4.54.5
Appr
oval
of de
mocr
atic i
deals
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
6.0
6.5
6.86.6
6.36.56.5
6.3
6.96.9
ii. Other surveys reveal…
Important differences do exist within Islamic civilization
c. What about “Asian Values?”
Asia vs. US/Canada: Support for Free Market Democracy
D. Implication: “Fault Lines” and Culture Clashes Predict Conflict
1. “Islam Has Bloody Borders and Bloody Innards”
a. Interstate War (Bloody Borders)
Middle East is unusually prone to war
Region is a better predictor than religion: non-Islamic ME states fight as much as Islamic ME states, and Islamic non-ME states fight as much as non-Islamic non-ME states
Interstate wars within civilizations (since 1950):– Sinic and Buddhist have more than expected by
chance– West has fewer than expected by chance– Islam and other civilizations are about average
Which civilizations fight the most?Islamic civilization has plenty of conflicts….
…but other civilizations have more “civilizational” conflicts!
b. Internal War (Bloody Innards)
ME region is more likely to experience political terror and human rights violations BUT region again outperforms religion– Exception: Catholic countries experience higher levels
of repression than non-Catholic neighborsOil wealth correlates with both repression and civil war around the worldSome majority-Muslim countries are democracies (Turkey, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Lebanon) – but most are poor and poor countries tend to experience violence and repression
c. Demographics of Islam
• What percentage of Arabs are Muslim? • About 90%
• What percentage of Muslims are Arab?• About 20%
• The largest Muslim country is…• Indonesia
• Where do Muslims live?• Only 33% live in the Middle East• 25% in South Asia, 20% in Africa
d. Does Islam “Teach Violence?”
i. Violence not a necessary part of faith:Universal Brotherhood [49:13]
No Forced “Conversion” [2:256]
Peaceful Co-existence [60:8-9]
Jihad = multiple meanings
ii. Religion used to justify political actionsIranian clergy vs. elected officials
Osama bin Laden’s declaration of jihad
2. Statistical evidence on “Fault Lines”
a. Little evidence of cultural wars 1819-1989
b. Post-1989:i. States of different civilizations LESS likely to
fight than states of same civilizationsControls for contiguity, power, democracy
ii. Ethnic diversity ≠ civil warControls for economic growth
c. Did the end of the Cold War mark a new era of conflict?
i. Decrease in conflicts
ii. No change in ratio of “civilizational” to non-civilizational conflicts – and both have declined
d. Are inter-civilizational conflicts worse?
E. Implication: Balance of Power Shifting
a. West will decline: Demographics and Development (recall Power Transition predictions)
b. Beware an Islamic-Sinic alliance
F. Do people in different civilizations have important value differences?
1. West vs. Islam: Gender/Sexuality = Division, Not Religious Leadership!
2. Gender: West vs. the Rest
3. Categorizing major values a. Tradition vs. Secularism and
Survival vs. Self-Expression
b. Regional value differences exist…
c. …But Country Trumps Religion!
d. Simplest explanation: Income!
Contagion
How Local Problems Go Regional
A. Processes of Contagion in World Politics
1. Diffusion: Affinity, Alliances, or Spill-Over2. Emulation: Modeling or Harmonization3. Opportunism: Altered decision calculus
B. Contagious Conflicts
1. Diffusiona. Affinity: Ethnicity and War
i. Irredentism: Unite group in one state
ii. Secessionism: Separate group from state
iii. Examples:• Greece and Crete Revolts – “enosis”• Turkey and Kurds – “Mountain Turks”• Macedonia and Kosovo – “Greater Albania”
In Detail: Diffusion of War in Africa’s Great Lakes Region
In Depth: Diffusion of War in Africa’s Great Lakes Region
1950s-1970s: Hutu vs. Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi: Tutsi refugees to Uganda, Congo/Zaire
1980s: Civil war in Uganda – Tutsi exiles aid Ugandan rebels victory
Early 1990s: Tutsi exile army invades Rwanda with help from Uganda
1993: Arusha Accords – Agreement to share power between Hutu and Tutsi
1993: Massacres in Burundi – Hutu rebellion begins
1988: Tutsis Kill 20,000 Hutus1972: Tutsis Kill 100,000 Hutu Elites
1993: 50,000 Civilians Killed
1963: Invasion: 10,000 Tutsis Killed1959: Hutu Revolt Displaces Tutsis
1980-1988: Civil War: Tutsi Exiles Aid Rebels
1994: Genocide: Civil War Resumes1990-1993: Exile Invasion Civil War Cease-Fire
1994: Genocide in Rwanda
1994: Genocide in Rwanda
April 1994:- Assassination of Rwanda and Burundi
presidents (probably by Hutu extremists)- Hutu extremists kill moderate Hutus in
Rwanda, seize power, and systematically exterminate 80% of Tutsis (about 800,000 people)
- Tutsi rebels immediately restart civil war, take control of country
- Hutu militants, 2 million Hutu civilians flee to camps in Zaire
1994: Flight of the Interahamwe
Security Issues
- Interahamwe threaten Rwandan Tutsis: Control camp resources
- Zaire’s Tutsis (Banyamulenge) fear the Interahamwe
- Burundi Hutu rebels ally with Interahamwe- Zaire leader (Mobutu) sees an opportunity:
preserve power by using Interahamwe against enemies classifies Banyamulenge as “refugees” and revokes citizenship
1996-1997: The Zaire War
September 1996: South Kivu province orders all Banyamulenge / Tutsi to leave or be sent to “camps”
Rwanda sees opportunity: defend Tutsi in Zaire AND eliminate Interahamwe
October 1996: ADFL revoltRebels attack Hutu camps, force refugees back to
Rwanda. Zaire army melts away.May 1997: ADFL seizes power – factional
infighting begins
1996-1997: The Zaire War
DRC War: 1998 – 2000“Africa’s World War”
- 1997: Power struggle among ADFL elements Emergence of Kabila
- Early 1998: Kabila seeks independence from sponsors (Rwanda, Uganda)
- Kabila expels Rwandan forces / Banyamulenge Rebellion in Kivu (again)
- Pro-rebel intervention: Uganda, Rwanda, and later Burundi (pro-Tutsi)
- Pro-government intervention: Angola (aiding its own civil war), Zimbabwe (preventing new regional power), Namibia, Sudan (anti-Uganda), Hutu rebels in Burundi, Interahamwe
- Other involvement: Both sides in Congo Republic war, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Sudan Ethiopia Eritrea), Chad
“Africa’s World War”
2000: Stalemate and the Rwanda-
Uganda Conflict
Affinity and the DRC War
Kinship matters: Uganda Tutsi exiles – Rwanda Tutsi –
Banyamulenge – Burundi Tutsi governmentVSRwanda Hutu government – Burundi Hutu
rebels – Hutu “Banyarwanda” in Zaire/DRCBUT... There are other reasons the war spread
(Banyamulenge massacre by Rwandan and Ugandan forces in 2002)
b. Alliances and War Escalation
Allies much more likely to intervene, though probability < 25%Angola allied with Kabila against both sides’ enemies (UNITA and Rwanda-Uganda)
War occurs… Allied Not Allied
Intervene, YES 25% 2%
Intervene, NO 75% 98%
c. Spill-Over• Refugees and “Negative Externalities”
• Bases and Safe Havens: Remember the Interahamwe?
2. Emulation
a. Institutions: Fear of new government systems
b. Learning: Wars as training grounds
Examples: “Liberation” movements (Cuba-Bolivia, China-Vietnam), Metternich’s “Holy Alliance”, Fear of “Red Spread”
3. Opportunism
Examples: Spanish Succession, Austrian Succession, French RevolutionLoot-seeking: Why did Rwanda and Uganda fight each other in the DRC?In Detail: Iran-Iraq War– 1979: Iranian Revolution– Late 1979: Moderate Iranians lose power struggle– Spring 1980: Attempted assassination of Aziz– September 1980: Iraq abrogates 1975 treaty– September-November 1980: Iraqi blitzkrieg offensive vs. Iranians– November 1980: Iraq offensive stalls
August 1988War ends with cease-fire
Up to 1 Million dead
C. Economic Contagion (and a Brief Introduction to
International Economics)
1. Diffusiona. Affinity: Tourism, Remittances, Immigration
b. Alliances: Incentive to trade more with allies than enemies
c. Spill-over: Alter economy of one state alter economies of neighbors
In Detail: East Asian Crisis(see also pp. 376-379)
May – July 1997: “Bahtulism” in Thailand– Thai businesses begin to default on
debts
Side Note: “Crony Capitalism” in the Mid-1990s in East Asia
Early entrepreneurs and politicians dominate financial policy in emerging market countries– Crony capitalism bad loans (not made by reasonable risk
assessment) – Crony interests wish to protect dollar value of assets pressure
on central banks and Ministries of Finance to maintain overvalued exchange rates
US/Japanese investment in East Asia in mid-1990s flood of cheap capital strengthens crony capitalism– Makes it easy to borrow dollars to defend currency if needed
(crony policy)– Banks run out of safe investments and seek to increase profits
by making riskier one (crony policy)– Corruption no real check on risks taken by local banks
In Detail: East Asian Crisis(see also pp. 376-379)
May – July 1997: “Bahtulism” in Thailand– Thai businesses begin to default on
debts– Government promises to “buy” the bad
loans but reneges; Thai banks begin to go under
Side Note: Banks and the EconomyBanks– Take in deposits.
Required by law to keep some “in the vault” to cover withdrawals (reserve ratio), free to invest/loan the rest for profit
– Create and destroy money. Banks loan more than they have in reserves. These loans are then spent by borrowers, which increases the total supply of money.
Customers and other lenders will tolerate the behavior only as long as they believe that the bank is reputable in this activity
Easy access to credit needed for consumer spending, investment in new enterprises, and profits for bankers
Credit crunch = money sucked out of economy, banks threatened by customer withdrawals/insufficient reserves no one invests or spends less economic output (recession or depression)
In Detail: East Asian Crisis(see also pp. 376-379)
May – July 1997: “Bahtulism” in Thailand– Thai businesses begin to default on
debts– Government promises to “buy” the bad
loans but reneges; Thai banks begin to go under;
– Fear of recession leads to beliefs that baht will be devalued
Side Note: Currency Devaluation
Money’s value determined by supply and demand
Some states choose “fixed” exchange rates and defend them to reassure investors and domestic elites
Fear of recession pressure to devalue
Devalue Increased exports, decreased imports, inflation more employment (Phillips Curve)
In Detail: East Asian Crisis(see also pp. 376-379)
May – July 1997: “Bahtulism” in Thailand– Thai businesses begin to default on
debts– Government promises to “buy” the bad
loans but reneges; Thai banks begin to go under
– Fear of recession leads to beliefs that baht will be devalued
– Attack on the baht: Foreign speculators exchange baht for dollars, betting they will get more baht for their dollars later.
Side Note: Currency AttacksTake out loans in target currency, backed by dollars (secured loans)
Demand dollars from government until it begins to run out (if currency actually overvalued) government forced to devalue
Now exchange dollars for baht at the new, better rate
Pay back loan in baht and keep the profit (in dollars or baht)
In Detail: East Asian Crisis(see also pp. 376-379)
May – July 1997: “Bahtulism” in Thailand– Thai businesses begin to default on
debts– Government promises to “buy” the bad
loans but reneges; Thai banks begin to go under
– Fear of recession leads to beliefs that baht will be devalued
– Attack on the baht: Foreign speculators exchange baht for dollars, betting they will get more baht for their dollars later.
– June 19: “We will never devalue the baht.” Repeated June 30.
– July 2: Devaluation of the baht
July 1997: Devaluation Spreads• Investor fears (similar
problems in neighbors’ economies) and competitive pressure (need to devalue to save export industries)• 2nd: Attack on the
Philippine peso devaluation on 11th
• 8th: Attack on Malaysian ringgit devaluation on 14th
• 11th: Attack on Indonesian rupiah devaluation August 14th
• 14th: Singaporean dollar devalued
• 24th: Currency meltdown.
From Devaluation to Recession• August-September 1997: Fears of
recession Actual slowdowns• October: Vietnam, Taiwan devalue
Hong Kong stock market crashes global plunge in stock markets (Dow Jones posts biggest single-day loss, trading suspended)
From Devaluation to Recession• August-September 1997: Fears of
recession Actual slowdowns• October: Vietnam, Taiwan devalue
Hong Kong stock market crashes global plunge in stock markets (Dow Jones posts biggest single-day loss, trading suspended)
• November: South Korean won and Japanese yen depreciate vs. US dollars new round of stock market crashes as investors pull out of South Korea and Japan
• Crashes Banks call in loans Failing businesses, unemployment recessions in East Asia
Exporting Recession
2. Emulation
a. Institutions: Dollarization, Euros, WTO/IMF standards, convergence theory
b. Learning: Copy success stories
3. Opportunism
“Beggar Thy Neighbor” and the Great Depression
3. Opportunism
“Beggar Thy Neighbor” and the Great Depression
Free-Riding
3. Opportunism
“Beggar Thy Neighbor” and the Great Depression
Free-Riding
“Race to the Bottom”
D. Problems with Contagion
1. Why some regions rather than others?
2. Modeling, Opportunism or Diffusion?
3. Uncertain regional boundaries
4. Few specific predictions
Security Communities
A Recipe for Regional Transformation?
A. Requirements of a Security Community
1. Expectation of Nonviolence: Trust, Predictability, Knowledge
2. “We-feeling”
3. Shared long-term interests Reciprocity
4. Security Communities Institutions, not the other way around
B. Emergence
1. Democratic Peace? No democracy vs. democracy wars expectation of peaceful interaction
2. Interdependence? Creates common interests incentives for reciprocity
3. Regime stability? Creates predictability
4. Interaction? Creates “we-feeling”?
C. Evidence: Regional Economic Organizations
1. ASEAN: Attempt to build a security community – only minimal political conflict
2. European Union: Expansion of a Security Community
3. APEC: Too big?
Very little authority
4. Mercosur
Little real coordination, but regular interaction
5. Major Trade Blocs
6. US FTAs: Trade Policy or Security Policy?Year Country % US Exp % US Imp
1985 Israel 1 1
1989 Canada 23 18
1994 Mexico (NAFTA) + 14 + 12
2001 Jordan trivial trivial
2003 Chile < 1 < 1
2003 Singapore 2 1
2004 Morocco trivial trivial
2005 Australia 2 1
2006 Central America (DR-CAFTA) 2 1
2006 Bahrain trivial trivial
2007 Peru < 1 < 1
2010? South Korea, Colombia, Panama varies varies
D. Evidence: Alliance Networks
1. Must be focused on external threat
2. Collective security provisions a plus
3. Examples: NATO, ANZUS, ???
E. Problems with Security Communities
1. Causality not established2. Eurocentric: projects other regions will
follow path of Europe3. 19th-Century European Peace: security
community was absent4. Parsimony: The “Liberal Peace” thesis
(democracy/trade/IOs peace) explains war better, and peace trade