Post on 05-Mar-2018
This paper will survey and evaluate Locke’s analysis on the use and limits of the soul
as compared with the views of the soul from Rene Descartes and traditional Christianity.
Locke’s purpose in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is to evaluate the perimeter
of man’s knowledge. He establishes pioneering theories for eighteenth century philosophy of
mind. These theories include applying Baconian experimental philosophy to the topic of
understanding as well as examining the mind outside of the traditional means of natural and
logical philosophy.1 He notably claims that personal identity does not require the existence of
a single substance that is essentially ‘me’. Instead Locke makes a distinction between man
(comprised of a body and soul) and person (consciousness; that which defines an individual).
Through a series of thought experiments, Locke claims that the various present-day beliefs
for the definition of mankind are both insufficient and ambiguous for describing man. For
example, he postulates that if the soul defines a man, an individual ceases to change since he
obtains the same soul in the transition from birth to death. Locke suggests that man is
essentially an animal. The primary difference between humans and animals is the ability
humans obtain for rationality and logic. This similarity between man and animal leads to
Locke to formulate a separate definition for both man and person. He holds that a person “is
an intelligent thinking being that can know itself as itself the same thinking thing in different
times and places.”2 Locke boldly addresses the current Cartesian status of the immaterial soul
and proposes new theories to better address moral responsibility and moral accountability as
well as to reconcile human beings with scientific materialism.
Seventeenth century philosophers wrestled with the materiality of the soul. Both
Locke and Descartes accepted the Corpuscularian theory wherein matter involved small
particles. Hylarie Kochiras explains this theory in greater detail by saying, “the [orthodox
view of the] corpuscular hypothesis restricts those inherent properties to size, shape, number,
and motion, and holds that all other qualities and operations are explicable in terms of that
restricted set of properties. The orthodox version thus implies a proviso of strict mechanism
—that bodies causally interact only locally, by impact, such that action at a distance is
denied.”3 Locke held an atomist view of materials (in that these particles could not be further 1 The thoughts and ideas of this section are taken from R.W. Serjeantson, “The Soul.” Desmond Clarke
and Catherine Wilson. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 133.
2 William Uzgalis, "John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/locke/>. The thoughts and ideas on personhood and the distinction between man and person are taken from this source.
3 Hylarie Kochiras, "Locke's Philosophy of Science", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/locke-
1
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divided).4 He used this theory to assert that the soul is of material quality and is capable of
movement. Locke’s theory of the soul is more clearly understood through an examination and
critique of Cartesianism.
Descartes begins his treatise on Man by describing what it is that constitutes man. He
states, “These men will be composed, as we are, of a soul and a body.”5 Descartes could not
imagine himself without a mind, therefore there must be two parts to a person: the mind
(which he identified as an immaterial substance), and the body (a material substance which
exists by empirical verification; that is one can touch himself to confirm his existence). Thus
the relation of the mind with the body causes a duality of material substance interacting with
immaterial substance. Descartes’ mechanistic understanding of matter proposed that duality
worked so that the physical body would act like a machine and accept the commands of the
mind.6 Descartes assembled the feelings and sensations of the heart, mind, and spirit to define
the soul. He said that the soul’s purpose was primarily to think; referring to it as a rational
soul.7 He emphasized the soul over the body similarly following the thoughts of platonic
dualists (in which the mind and the soul are prioritized over the body). Descartes claimed the
location of the soul held was in the brain. He said that the soul obtained sensations and could
feel pain, hunger, thirst, etc. Foundationally, “Descartes therefore offered one important way
in which accounts of the soul derived from the De Anima were transmitted under the impact
of the mechanical philosophy into more strictly physiological studies on the one hand, and
towards more abstract questions of knowledge and of metaphysics on the other.”8 Descartes
was not limited by a mechanistic view of matter but addressed broader issues such as
personhood and morality.
Critics of the Cartesian view of the soul questioned the soul’s position and function
within human nature.9 Gassendi and Hobbes confronted Descartes’ theory of the soul which
philosophy-science/>.
4 William Uzgalis, "John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/locke/>.
5 Rene Descartes, Treatise of Man, Thomas Steele Hall, trans., (New York: Prometheus Books, 2003), 1.
6 Howard Robinson, "Dualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/dualism/>.
7 Serjeantson, 129.
8 Ibid., 133.
9 Ibid., 131.
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attributed equality to both humans and animals. They claimed he separated animals from
humanity only by a small degree (by virtue of human language). Descartes responded by
retreating to a prior view of the soul as ‘the principle form of man’ to clarify the distinctive
nature of humanity. 10 Other critics disputed Descartes’ emphasis of the soul over the body as
traditionally both were identified with equal significance. The body’s importance represented
life and vitality. A refusal to accept the worth of the body caused concerns for the ethics of
cremation, tattoos, voluntary plastic surgery, and other intentional treatments to alter or
damage the body. The Cartesian soul is especially inconvenient for Locke as he is trying to
develop a system of personal identity without dependence on God or religion. Descartes
forms his view of personal identity with the belief in God’s existence. In the brief book
Objections to Descartes’ Meditations, Hobbes questions how Descartes has an idea of the
soul if there is no idea of God. He states:
The whole of this inquiry collapses if there is no idea of God. It has not been proved that there is any such idea, and it does not seem that there is one. As for the idea of my own self, if we are talking about my body, I get it from looking at my body; and if we are talking about the soul, there is no idea of the soul at all. Rather, we deduce by reasoning that there is something internal to the human body, which gives it the animal motion by which it senses and moves. Whatever it is, we call it the ‘soul’, but without having any idea of it. [Descartes replies] The whole of this objection collapses if there is an idea of God—and it is obvious that there is such an idea. And when he goes on to say that there is no idea of the soul, but that it is deduced by reasoning, it is just as if he were to say that there is no image of it portrayed in the imagination, but that all the same there is what I myself have called an idea of it. 11
Descartes demonstrates that man’s perception of God also entails a perception the soul.
Hobbes was against the idea of a soul and instead discusses the faculty of the mind. Gassendi
echoed Hobbes’ assertions by retreating away from his previous defence of the soul’s
corporeality.12 Gassendi, Hobbes, and Locke fundamentally differs from Descartes in that
religion does not need the immateriality of the soul. Locke states,
All the great ends of Morality and Religion, are well enough secured without the philosophical Proofs of the Soul's Immateriality; since it is evident that he who, at first made us beings to subsist here, sensible intelligent Beings, and for several years 10 Ibid., 130-131. The thoughts and ideas of the objections to Descartes and his reply are taken from
this source. 11
Thomas Hobbes, Objections to Descartes’ Meditations with Descartes’ Replies, trans., George MacDonald Ross (1975-1999) http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/hmp/texts/modern/hobbes/objections/objects.html#o5 , Seventh Objection and Reply.
12 Serjeantston, 136. The thoughts and ideas on Hobbes and Gassendi are taken from this source.
4
continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to a like state of Sensibility in another World, and make us there capable to receive the Retribution he has designed to men, according to the doings in this life.13
Locke’s view of personal identity originates around consciousness while Descartes’ view
affirms both mind and soul for personhood. It is within these criticisms of the Cartesian view
of the soul that Locke proposes the advantages to a new status of the soul.
Unlike Descartes, Locke claims that there is a lack of knowledge concerning the soul.
His scepticism of the soul centers on its composition rather than its existence. He dismisses
the traditional naturalistic view of identifying the soul with transitory animal spirits.
Descartes claims that the pineal gland contained animal spirits which he described as a “very
fine wind, or rather a very lively or pure flame.”14 Locke instead proposes that the soul is not
limited to one human or animal body. The same soul can drift from one human body to a
different human or animal body during unconscious states such as sleep or death. This
fleeting nature of the soul dissembled personal identity as a feature of the soul’s
characteristics. Locke classifies the soul as material thinking matter. He states, “...‘tis but
defining the soul to be a substance, that always thinks, and the business is done.”15 He asserts
this new classification from the previous immaterial status of the soul. Locke also challenges
the current Cartesian status of the soul by asking whether the immaterial soul can think and
recall memories outside of the body. He questions why God has ordained that the immaterial
soul to must stay with the original body in order to retain memory and examines why the
body is important for the Last Judgment. 16
According to Locke, God equips a person’s consciousness with the ability to retain
the necessary experiences for moral responsibility and accountability at the Final Judgement.
If a person has forgotten an offense which merits punishment, Locke claims that God will
bring this memory to mind at the time of accountability. He does not think that morality is
linked with a human body. He affirms that consciousness can be transferred from one soul to
different soul during unconsciousness. Locke also rightly emphasizes the conscious’ ability to
13 John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch, ed., (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 533.
14 Gert-Jan Lokhorst, "Descartes and the Pineal Gland", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/pineal-gland/>.
15 Locke, 116.
16 Serjeantson, 134.
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recall memories necessary for personal identity. He addresses the Cartesian status of the soul
by saying, “But taking, as we ordinarily do [...] the Soul of a man, for immaterial substance,
independent from Matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the Nature of things,
be no Absurdity at all, to suppose, that the same Soul may, at different times be united to
different Bodies, and with them make up for that time one Man.”17 He further says, “a part of
a Sheep’s body yesterday should be part of a Man’s Body to-morrow, and in that union make
a vital part of Meliboeus himself, as well as it did of his Ram.”18 Locke’s tactic in this
passage enables him to controversially dissemble the personal identity associated with an
immaterial soul. Locke instead defines personal identity with consciousness alone. This
contrasts with the previously theory wherein Descartes attributed personal identity with a
duality of body and immaterial soul. Locke accepts minimal concern for role of the human
body in moral accountability issues and is indifferent towards the body’s link with personal
identity at the Final Judgment. He claims that the Last Judgement will solely assess thoughts
and actions. This view, Locke assumes, is the only fair measurement of identifying
punishment and reward. He advocates that there must be a system which enables a person to
remember each action he committed.
Locke’s view of the soul fundamentally disregards the characteristics of immateriality
and personal identity. Though he does not directly deny that the soul is an immaterial
substance, he does not see its necessity. Locke eliminates the soul’s previous link with
personal identity and moral discernment and replaces it with consciousness. One of his
journal entries affirms his lack of satisfaction with the current status of the soul. He states,
“The usuall physicall proofe (as I may soe call it) of the immortality of the soul is this, Matter
cannot thinke ergo the soule is immateriall, noe thing can naturally destroy an immaterial
thing ergo the soul is naturally immortall.”19 Locke further claimed this “proved ‘noe other
immortality of the soule then what belongs to one of Epicurus’s atoms, viz. That it
perpetually exists but has noe sense either of happynesse or misery.’”20 He suggests that there
is rational thought in matter which moves.21 Locke attempts to improve Descartes’ discussion
17 Locke, 27. The thoughts is this section are taken from Stewart Goez, A Brief History of the Soul, (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 133.
18 Serjeantson, 134. The thoughts and ideas of this section are taken from this source.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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of the soul by advising that the soul could be material.22 Locke’s new status of the soul
addresses the criticisms of Descartes’ theory by enabling a material soul to exist in the
afterlife. Previously the characteristic of immateriality was the assumed theory for binding
the soul to immortality. He argues that theorizing the soul in a different way improves the
ethical equality of moral responsibility before the law and the accountability during Final
Judgement.
This claim also positively enables Locke to avoid accounting for the location of the
soul during the unconscious state of bodily death prior to the Last Judgement. A Cartesian
view of the soul assumes that material substances cease to exist with bodily death. Thus their
status of the soul requires an immaterial substance in order to participate in the Last
Judgment and unavoidably causes an inadequate location for the soul after death. Cartesians
also advocate that the immaterial nature of the soul empowers it to continually and
indestructibly exist. Locke claims that a material soul would cease to exist at the death of the
body, but reappear at the Last Judgment. Philosopher Robert Herbert likens this reappearance
to an intermission of a theatrical play. The characters leave from the first act (as in the death
of the body) and take a short break (death) then re-enter again for the final act (Last
Judgement).23 Since God has not given full disclosure on the status of the soul, Locke advises
that a material thinking soul adequately complies with God’s moral instructions and
accountability within Last Judgement. He advocates that a material soul retains the ability to
rationally discern the memories essential for moral responsibility before the law. Locke
claims that God will bring to mind the memories during drunkenness, madness, and other
states of unconsciousness which necessitate justice.
Locke assumes that an immaterial substance view of the soul is not able to provide for
personal identity in the Last Judgment. Willaim Uzgalis argues that “Locke is skeptical about
our ability to reidentify the same soul over time. He claims that if we were always awake, we
could be certain that we had the same soul. But consciousness has natural gaps in it, such as
periods during which we are asleep. Locke claims that there is no way of knowing that one
soul has not been substituted for another during this period of absence of consciousness.”24
Cartesians assumed a link between immateriality and immortality. Locke recommends that a
22 Ibid., 133-134.
23 This idea is taken from Robert Herbert, “One Short Sleep Past?” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 40, No. 2 (Oct., 1996), 93.
24 William, Uzgalis, "John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/locke/>.
7
material soul can still sufficiently offer eternal security. Locke does not believe that the soul
is a necessary part of personal identity. He thinks that a person is identified by their
consciousness, and that different souls (and lower animals) can inhabit the same
consciousness (person) as it is may be distributed from one soul to another. If a person does
not recall the wrong action which he is being punished for (perhaps his soul was in a different
body when the act was committed), Locke would consider this unfair and a wretched state for
the one receiving the unjust sentence. His system escapes the inequality of a multiple person
soul by attributing moral responsibility with a consciousness that belongs to only one person.
In the discussion of personal identity, Locke shows that the soul’s purpose is to change itself
to enable the indwelling of consciousness; or to house a person. This distinctive view of
personhood places a high emphasis on the mind and deemphasizes the soul.
According to Locke, the soul has little purpose, especially in regards to spiritual
importance. One philosopher aptly comments:
The key elements of this programme [Essay Concerning Human Understanding] were: (a) an emphasis on the role of the ideas of an afterlife and an omniscient judge in strengthening moral resolve and enhancing moral conduct; (b) the elaboration of a phenomenological theory of personal identity that did not required a substantial and incorporeal soul to serve as a target of divine reward and punishment. Even if we are hedonistic machines, Locke thought, we are machines with the ability to act for our long-term happiness, once we acquire the relevant ideas.25
Locke suspects that man will be held morally accountable from the events that have occurred
in his consciousness. If those memories are not available, God will bring to mind the
necessary memories needed for judgement. The worry for Locke concerns the uncertainty of
inhabiting the same soul during unconsciousness (consider when one is drunk or asleep and is
unaware of his surroundings). Locke claims that it is impossible to identify the same soul as
there are unconscious gaps in time. He states, “I do not say there is no Soul in a Man, because
he is not sensible of it in his sleep; But I do say, he cannot think at any time waking or
sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but
our thoughts, and to them it is and to them it always will be necessary, til we can think
without being conscious of it.”26 Here Locke clarifies that if a man were always awake he
could be certain that he has the same soul, but since he falls asleep, he cannot be certain when
25
Catherine Wilson, “Matter, Morality, and the Changing Ideal of Science,” Scientia in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Tom Sorell, G.A.J. Rogers, and Jill Kraye Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 24, (London: Springer, 2010), 49.
26 Locke, 109.
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he wakes up that the same soul remains within him. Since there are spaces of
unconsciousness, Locke does not attribute personal identity to the soul. This innovative
system of personhood radically differs from religious beliefs of the soul.
Traditional Christian doctrine differs from Locke’s status of the soul in that the soul is
the instrument which accepts salvation. The 1646 Westminster Confession states, “He created
man, male and female, with reasonable and immortal souls, endued with knowledge,
righteousness, and true holiness, after His own image; having the law of God written in their
hearts, and power to fulfil it; and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the
liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change... whereby the elect are enabled to
believe to the saving of their souls.”27 The phrase soul competency explains the belief that the
soul is the means through which man is held accountable for his sins. 28 According to the
Christianity, eternal security in heaven requires moral perfection from each soul in the earthly
life. Since all persons do not meet this requirement of perfection, God sent Jesus to take the
punishment necessary for condemned souls. If a person accepts Jesus’ gift on his behalf
before the Final Judgement, God will accept Christ’s righteousness for that soul. Those who
do not accept the gift will be separated eternally from God. Unlike Locke’s view of the Final
Judgement, the Christianity affirms that most liberating view for the soul accepts the
righteousness of Christ rather than utilizing consciousness’ attempts to merit punishment and
reward. Fernando Vidal elaborates on this contrast by saying, “...the central problem of the
Christian discourse about the resurrection is personal identity and particularly the relationship
between self and body.”29 Christianity promotes a same body resurrection view whereas
Locke assumes that man will have a body in the Last Judgment (but he does not link self
identification with the resurrected body). Unlike Christianity, Locke does not use the soul for
religious purposes. It appears that Locke makes the soul obsolete but prefers to avoid making
that bold of a claim. Locke separates the soul from consciousness and makes accountability
in the Final Judgment centered on the actions which man remembers.
An Evaluation of Locke’s View of the Soul
27 Westminster Confession of Faith 1646; Chapter IV, of Creation; and Chapter XIV, of Faith.
28 Serjeantson, 134.
29 Fernando Vidal, Brains, Bodies, Selves, and Science: Anthropologies of Identity and the Resurrection of the Body, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Summer 2002), 933.
9
Locke’s view of the soul obtains many positive attributes which help to better
articulate personal identity and to understand the location for moral decision-making. Locke
improves Descartes’ status of the soul by separating personal identity from the soul and
attributing it to a person’s consciousness. This advances the previous condition of injustice in
the Last Judgement whereby individuals were wrongly punished for sins they did not commit
(as the fleeting soul could drift from person to person). Locke’s view of personal identity is
notable for its ability to create a just system for accounting one’s moral choices.
Consciousness is not shared among persons but limited to one individual. Locke claimed that
Descartes’ status of the soul was unethical as a person could be penalised for an act a
different person committed while sharing the same soul. Locke’s material status of the soul
enhances the previous immaterial nature by dismissing the obligation to describe the location
of the soul after bodily death. Christian tradition assumed that the body was linked to
personhood in the Final Judgement. Locke was concerned for how to assess an example
wherein two bodies occupied the same soul (if the soul inhabited a different body during an
unconscious state). His view of personhood allows the body to escape moral accountability
(since a person’s identity rests within their memory of their right and wrong choices). Locke
also considered the problems of a bodily personal identity and its effects on the resurrection.
He claims that attributing consciousness to personal identity eliminates the problem for
discerning which body should be returned to which possessor (the original or the cannibal)
for appearing in the resurrection. Thus,
Locke explicitly tells us that the [hypothetical] case of the prince and the cobbler shows us the resolution of the problem of the resurrection. The case is one in which the soul of the prince with all of its princely thoughts is transferred from the body of the prince to the body of the cobbler, the cobbler's soul having departed. The result of this exchange, is that the prince still consider himself the prince, even though he finds himself in an altogether new body. Locke's distinction between man and person makes it possible for the same person to show up in a different body at the resurrection and yet still be the same person.30
However his claims on the soul also contain numerous concerns to consider.
Locke seems to be radical in his attempts to create a fair system for the final
judgment. His emphasis on consciousness as a source for moral responsibility lacks equitable
justice. Human memory is not accurate (i.e. the state of drunkenness, tiredness, or
forgetfulness) but a just system of ethics requires moral accountability for states of both
30 Uzgalis, William, "John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/locke/>.
10
consciousness and unconsciousness.31 Consider the drunken man who is caught stealing. He
is morally responsible for the wrong actions he committed during his unconsciousness. There
are also flaws in human memory. Locke assumes that God would bring to mind the memories
which man needs to be reminded of for punishment and reward. His system of moral
accountability must clarify the means for determining how man is held accountable in an
ultimate sense. Locke does not explain whether man or God sets the standard for
accountability. Further, he lacks explaining where a person’s memories reside until God
decides to bring them back to recollection. He must also address how God brings these
memories to a person’s mind. Locke’s attempt to remodel the Final Judgement to his
understanding of equality indirectly requires God to adhere to Locke’s view of consciousness
for moral accountability. He also theorizes a new way of materially viewing the soul from
the traditional Christianity’s immaterial substance commitment. Locke’s theory on the
material soul damages the traditional view of the soul by eliminating the personal identity
from the soul. This is a drastic move for Locke to innovate a new status of the soul from
within his personal ideas rather than formulating a theory solely from a result of research and
investigation within the biblical texts he affirms for morality. He clarifies that his material
status of the soul will coordinate with Christianity’s view for moral responsibility and the
Last Judgment. It seems more consistent to disregard the Christian account altogether if he
wants to propose a philosophical system for morality and final accountability.
Locke’s view of personal identity also causes problems for discerning the beginning
and ending of personal identity. Since Locke claims that identity is from consciousness, a
person begins to identify themselves when they first experience consciousness. It is difficult
to discern whether Locke extends personal identity (from when consciousness begins and
ends) or shortens the time frame when compared with a personal identity of the soul
(beginning when the soul exists and ceases). Though traditional theories of ensoulment have
varied (wherein the soul is received at either conception or quickening) most affirm that man
receives a soul before he is born or shortly thereafter. Locke says that a person is “a thinking
intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same
thinking thing, in different times and places.”32 Locke does not clarify whether a baby in the
womb obtains personal identity. His views on personhood contain concerning ethical
31This idea is taken from Uzgalis, William, "John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/locke/>.
32 Locke, 335.
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implications. If a baby in the womb does not reason and reflect then according to Locke, the
baby is not a person. Perhaps Locke could hold that a baby is a man who occupies a
particular case wherein he is in the process of becoming a person. This claim would enable
him to avoid accounting for the legality of abortion. It does not adequately account for how to
address individuals in a vegetative state, coma, mental retardation, etc.33 Locke’s claim of
personhood lacks a helpful clarification for the preservation of the life of a man when
personal identity (by Locke’s definition) is no longer present in the body.
Locke’s view of the separation of the body for personal identity foundationally
concerns adherents of the Christian Tradition. Christianity assumes that humans were
originally created from the material substance of dust. Genesis 2:7 confirms, “Then the
LORD God formed a man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the
breath of life, and the man became a living being.” Human reproduction continues to
demonstrate the material nature of life that is tied to the earth. Man was formed materially
and his bodily life on earth concludes when his human body stops working. For Locke to
advocate a separation between man and person (where personhood ignores the human body)
contradicts the natural evolution of human existence. Similarly, the resurrection will
commence on earth, thus confirming man’s tie to a human body. Locke’s view of personhood
more richly clarifies the identity of an individual with the addition of the body.
Consider the following thought experiment: a woman is physically injured in a car
wreck and slips into a coma. When she awakes she is completely unaware of her previous
life. According to Locke, her body does not define her personal identity. Due to the impact of
the injury, she considers herself a different person since her consciousness does not recollect
any of her past experiences prior to the car wreck. However, her fiancée would certainly look
at her body and know her identity as the woman he loved previous to the car wreck. Though
it would be concerning if her fiancée only remained engaged for her body, it is equally
worrisome if he rejected the engagement because her conscious is no longer active. The
illustration demonstrates the tension when idolizing either the body or the mind for personal
identity. It does clarify that a system of personal identity which solely includes the mind
seems to be lacking the bodily quality which most persons consider to be a part of what it is
that defines themselves. Locke does agree that the body is important but he does not employ
the body for personal identity. This example shows that Locke’s view of personal identity
inadequately articulates personhood for the woman in the coma. Further, Locke’s view of 33 See further notes on this matter at: Eric T. Olson, "Personal Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/identity-personal/>
12
personhood affirms that she could wake up in a completely different body. Locke must
address how the fiancée would try to find his bride if her personal identity is not linked with a
body (i.e. whether, if it is possible, if he should look for her in another body or try to find her
consciousness). Locke should additionally discuss why there is not a current phenomenon of
souls changing from one body to another during unconscious states. Locke claims that the
soul is in motion enabling it to move during states of unconsciousness, thus this occurrence
should be presently observable.
Locke’s view of personhood also improves the implications for moral accountability
when the addition of the body is added to consciousness for identity. A person utilizes the
human body for the completion of right and wrong actions. For example, if one consciously
chooses to steal, he uses the hands of his body to grab the item to perform the act. Locke
positively demonstrates that a person’s consciousness is essential for moral decision making
and accountability. His view of moral responsibility would better account for moral
accountability if the body were included in his system. The body primarily executes right or
wrong actions from the decisions of the consciousness. He advocates a deficient view of
moral responsibility to eliminate the vessel by which morality is accomplished.
Locke’s bold attempts to theorize about a material soul greatly contrast with the
immaterial status of the soul advocated by Cartesians and traditional Christianity. He
postulates a new argument against the current immaterial soul risking the hope of eternal
security and an indestructible personal identity. Locke chooses to ignore the implications
associated with an immaterial soul in order to create a view of personal identity that
demonstrates an improvement of justice for moral accountability in the final judgment. He
assumes that the soul could change from one body to different human or animal body during
unconsciousness. This causes an unfair system of moral accountability as a individual
person’s soul was being charged with the sins committed by others who also occupied the
same soul. Locke claimed that consciousness was the only way to distinguish personal
identity for an individual and create a just system in the Last Judgement. He claims he
improves the status of the soul by attributing the characteristics of motion and materiality.
Locke clarifies that the physical nature of the soul more accurately accounts for the transitory
nature of the soul. Though his emphasis on consciousness did spark innovative study on the
mind for eighteenth century philosophy, it did not help to resolve the personal identity
concerns as he had hoped. Locke’s view of personal identity fails to account for the
significance of the body and its necessity for personal identity, morality and the resurrection.
Locke effectively eliminates the use of the soul and replaces it with consciousness. Locke’s
13
efforts to use the mind reshape the status of the soul helps to clarify the problems with
Cartesianism but lacks to efficiently improve the previous views of the soul.
References
Clarke, Desmond M. and Catherine Wilson. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early
Modern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
14
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