This paper will survey and evaluate Locke’s analysis on the use and limits of the soul

as compared with the views of the soul from Rene Descartes and traditional Christianity.

Locke’s purpose in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is to evaluate the perimeter

of man’s knowledge. He establishes pioneering theories for eighteenth century philosophy of

mind. These theories include applying Baconian experimental philosophy to the topic of

understanding as well as examining the mind outside of the traditional means of natural and

logical philosophy.1 He notably claims that personal identity does not require the existence of

a single substance that is essentially ‘me’. Instead Locke makes a distinction between man

(comprised of a body and soul) and person (consciousness; that which defines an individual).

Through a series of thought experiments, Locke claims that the various present-day beliefs

for the definition of mankind are both insufficient and ambiguous for describing man. For

example, he postulates that if the soul defines a man, an individual ceases to change since he

obtains the same soul in the transition from birth to death. Locke suggests that man is

essentially an animal. The primary difference between humans and animals is the ability

humans obtain for rationality and logic. This similarity between man and animal leads to

Locke to formulate a separate definition for both man and person. He holds that a person “is

an intelligent thinking being that can know itself as itself the same thinking thing in different

times and places.”2 Locke boldly addresses the current Cartesian status of the immaterial soul

and proposes new theories to better address moral responsibility and moral accountability as

well as to reconcile human beings with scientific materialism.

Seventeenth century philosophers wrestled with the materiality of the soul. Both

Locke and Descartes accepted the Corpuscularian theory wherein matter involved small

particles. Hylarie Kochiras explains this theory in greater detail by saying, “the [orthodox

view of the] corpuscular hypothesis restricts those inherent properties to size, shape, number,

and motion, and holds that all other qualities and operations are explicable in terms of that

restricted set of properties. The orthodox version thus implies a proviso of strict mechanism

—that bodies causally interact only locally, by impact, such that action at a distance is

denied.”3 Locke held an atomist view of materials (in that these particles could not be further 1 The thoughts and ideas of this section are taken from R.W. Serjeantson, “The Soul.” Desmond Clarke

and Catherine Wilson. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 133.

2 William Uzgalis, "John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/locke/>. The thoughts and ideas on personhood and the distinction between man and person are taken from this source.

3 Hylarie Kochiras, "Locke's Philosophy of Science", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/locke-

1

2

divided).4 He used this theory to assert that the soul is of material quality and is capable of

movement. Locke’s theory of the soul is more clearly understood through an examination and

critique of Cartesianism.

Descartes begins his treatise on Man by describing what it is that constitutes man. He

states, “These men will be composed, as we are, of a soul and a body.”5 Descartes could not

imagine himself without a mind, therefore there must be two parts to a person: the mind

(which he identified as an immaterial substance), and the body (a material substance which

exists by empirical verification; that is one can touch himself to confirm his existence). Thus

the relation of the mind with the body causes a duality of material substance interacting with

immaterial substance. Descartes’ mechanistic understanding of matter proposed that duality

worked so that the physical body would act like a machine and accept the commands of the

mind.6 Descartes assembled the feelings and sensations of the heart, mind, and spirit to define

the soul. He said that the soul’s purpose was primarily to think; referring to it as a rational

soul.7 He emphasized the soul over the body similarly following the thoughts of platonic

dualists (in which the mind and the soul are prioritized over the body). Descartes claimed the

location of the soul held was in the brain. He said that the soul obtained sensations and could

feel pain, hunger, thirst, etc. Foundationally, “Descartes therefore offered one important way

in which accounts of the soul derived from the De Anima were transmitted under the impact

of the mechanical philosophy into more strictly physiological studies on the one hand, and

towards more abstract questions of knowledge and of metaphysics on the other.”8 Descartes

was not limited by a mechanistic view of matter but addressed broader issues such as

personhood and morality.

Critics of the Cartesian view of the soul questioned the soul’s position and function

within human nature.9 Gassendi and Hobbes confronted Descartes’ theory of the soul which

philosophy-science/>.

4 William Uzgalis, "John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/locke/>.

5 Rene Descartes, Treatise of Man, Thomas Steele Hall, trans., (New York: Prometheus Books, 2003), 1.

6 Howard Robinson, "Dualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/dualism/>.

7 Serjeantson, 129.

8 Ibid., 133.

9 Ibid., 131.

3

attributed equality to both humans and animals. They claimed he separated animals from

humanity only by a small degree (by virtue of human language). Descartes responded by

retreating to a prior view of the soul as ‘the principle form of man’ to clarify the distinctive

nature of humanity. 10 Other critics disputed Descartes’ emphasis of the soul over the body as

traditionally both were identified with equal significance. The body’s importance represented

life and vitality. A refusal to accept the worth of the body caused concerns for the ethics of

cremation, tattoos, voluntary plastic surgery, and other intentional treatments to alter or

damage the body. The Cartesian soul is especially inconvenient for Locke as he is trying to

develop a system of personal identity without dependence on God or religion. Descartes

forms his view of personal identity with the belief in God’s existence. In the brief book

Objections to Descartes’ Meditations, Hobbes questions how Descartes has an idea of the

soul if there is no idea of God. He states:

The whole of this inquiry collapses if there is no idea of God. It has not been proved that there is any such idea, and it does not seem that there is one. As for the idea of my own self, if we are talking about my body, I get it from looking at my body; and if we are talking about the soul, there is no idea of the soul at all. Rather, we deduce by reasoning that there is something internal to the human body, which gives it the animal motion by which it senses and moves. Whatever it is, we call it the ‘soul’, but without having any idea of it. [Descartes replies] The whole of this objection collapses if there is an idea of God—and it is obvious that there is such an idea. And when he goes on to say that there is no idea of the soul, but that it is deduced by reasoning, it is just as if he were to say that there is no image of it portrayed in the imagination, but that all the same there is what I myself have called an idea of it. 11

Descartes demonstrates that man’s perception of God also entails a perception the soul.

Hobbes was against the idea of a soul and instead discusses the faculty of the mind. Gassendi

echoed Hobbes’ assertions by retreating away from his previous defence of the soul’s

corporeality.12 Gassendi, Hobbes, and Locke fundamentally differs from Descartes in that

religion does not need the immateriality of the soul. Locke states,

All the great ends of Morality and Religion, are well enough secured without the philosophical Proofs of the Soul's Immateriality; since it is evident that he who, at first made us beings to subsist here, sensible intelligent Beings, and for several years 10 Ibid., 130-131. The thoughts and ideas of the objections to Descartes and his reply are taken from

this source. 11

Thomas Hobbes, Objections to Descartes’ Meditations with Descartes’ Replies, trans., George MacDonald Ross (1975-1999) http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/hmp/texts/modern/hobbes/objections/objects.html#o5 , Seventh Objection and Reply.

12 Serjeantston, 136. The thoughts and ideas on Hobbes and Gassendi are taken from this source.

4

continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to a like state of Sensibility in another World, and make us there capable to receive the Retribution he has designed to men, according to the doings in this life.13 

Locke’s view of personal identity originates around consciousness while Descartes’ view

affirms both mind and soul for personhood. It is within these criticisms of the Cartesian view

of the soul that Locke proposes the advantages to a new status of the soul.

Unlike Descartes, Locke claims that there is a lack of knowledge concerning the soul.

His scepticism of the soul centers on its composition rather than its existence. He dismisses

the traditional naturalistic view of identifying the soul with transitory animal spirits.

Descartes claims that the pineal gland contained animal spirits which he described as a “very

fine wind, or rather a very lively or pure flame.”14 Locke instead proposes that the soul is not

limited to one human or animal body. The same soul can drift from one human body to a

different human or animal body during unconscious states such as sleep or death. This

fleeting nature of the soul dissembled personal identity as a feature of the soul’s

characteristics. Locke classifies the soul as material thinking matter. He states, “...‘tis but

defining the soul to be a substance, that always thinks, and the business is done.”15 He asserts

this new classification from the previous immaterial status of the soul. Locke also challenges

the current Cartesian status of the soul by asking whether the immaterial soul can think and

recall memories outside of the body. He questions why God has ordained that the immaterial

soul to must stay with the original body in order to retain memory and examines why the

body is important for the Last Judgment. 16

According to Locke, God equips a person’s consciousness with the ability to retain

the necessary experiences for moral responsibility and accountability at the Final Judgement.

If a person has forgotten an offense which merits punishment, Locke claims that God will

bring this memory to mind at the time of accountability. He does not think that morality is

linked with a human body. He affirms that consciousness can be transferred from one soul to

different soul during unconsciousness. Locke also rightly emphasizes the conscious’ ability to

13 John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch, ed., (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 533.

14 Gert-Jan Lokhorst, "Descartes and the Pineal Gland", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/pineal-gland/>.

15 Locke, 116.

16 Serjeantson, 134.

5

recall memories necessary for personal identity. He addresses the Cartesian status of the soul

by saying, “But taking, as we ordinarily do [...] the Soul of a man, for immaterial substance,

independent from Matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the Nature of things,

be no Absurdity at all, to suppose, that the same Soul may, at different times be united to

different Bodies, and with them make up for that time one Man.”17 He further says, “a part of

a Sheep’s body yesterday should be part of a Man’s Body to-morrow, and in that union make

a vital part of Meliboeus himself, as well as it did of his Ram.”18 Locke’s tactic in this

passage enables him to controversially dissemble the personal identity associated with an

immaterial soul. Locke instead defines personal identity with consciousness alone. This

contrasts with the previously theory wherein Descartes attributed personal identity with a

duality of body and immaterial soul. Locke accepts minimal concern for role of the human

body in moral accountability issues and is indifferent towards the body’s link with personal

identity at the Final Judgment. He claims that the Last Judgement will solely assess thoughts

and actions. This view, Locke assumes, is the only fair measurement of identifying

punishment and reward. He advocates that there must be a system which enables a person to

remember each action he committed.

Locke’s view of the soul fundamentally disregards the characteristics of immateriality

and personal identity. Though he does not directly deny that the soul is an immaterial

substance, he does not see its necessity. Locke eliminates the soul’s previous link with

personal identity and moral discernment and replaces it with consciousness. One of his

journal entries affirms his lack of satisfaction with the current status of the soul. He states,

“The usuall physicall proofe (as I may soe call it) of the immortality of the soul is this, Matter

cannot thinke ergo the soule is immateriall, noe thing can naturally destroy an immaterial

thing ergo the soul is naturally immortall.”19 Locke further claimed this “proved ‘noe other

immortality of the soule then what belongs to one of Epicurus’s atoms, viz. That it

perpetually exists but has noe sense either of happynesse or misery.’”20 He suggests that there

is rational thought in matter which moves.21 Locke attempts to improve Descartes’ discussion

17 Locke, 27. The thoughts is this section are taken from Stewart Goez, A Brief History of the Soul, (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 133.

18 Serjeantson, 134. The thoughts and ideas of this section are taken from this source.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

6

of the soul by advising that the soul could be material.22 Locke’s new status of the soul

addresses the criticisms of Descartes’ theory by enabling a material soul to exist in the

afterlife. Previously the characteristic of immateriality was the assumed theory for binding

the soul to immortality. He argues that theorizing the soul in a different way improves the

ethical equality of moral responsibility before the law and the accountability during Final

Judgement.

This claim also positively enables Locke to avoid accounting for the location of the

soul during the unconscious state of bodily death prior to the Last Judgement. A Cartesian

view of the soul assumes that material substances cease to exist with bodily death. Thus their

status of the soul requires an immaterial substance in order to participate in the Last

Judgment and unavoidably causes an inadequate location for the soul after death. Cartesians

also advocate that the immaterial nature of the soul empowers it to continually and

indestructibly exist. Locke claims that a material soul would cease to exist at the death of the

body, but reappear at the Last Judgment. Philosopher Robert Herbert likens this reappearance

to an intermission of a theatrical play. The characters leave from the first act (as in the death

of the body) and take a short break (death) then re-enter again for the final act (Last

Judgement).23 Since God has not given full disclosure on the status of the soul, Locke advises

that a material thinking soul adequately complies with God’s moral instructions and

accountability within Last Judgement. He advocates that a material soul retains the ability to

rationally discern the memories essential for moral responsibility before the law. Locke

claims that God will bring to mind the memories during drunkenness, madness, and other

states of unconsciousness which necessitate justice.

Locke assumes that an immaterial substance view of the soul is not able to provide for

personal identity in the Last Judgment. Willaim Uzgalis argues that “Locke is skeptical about

our ability to reidentify the same soul over time. He claims that if we were always awake, we

could be certain that we had the same soul. But consciousness has natural gaps in it, such as

periods during which we are asleep. Locke claims that there is no way of knowing that one

soul has not been substituted for another during this period of absence of consciousness.”24

Cartesians assumed a link between immateriality and immortality. Locke recommends that a

22 Ibid., 133-134.

23 This idea is taken from Robert Herbert, “One Short Sleep Past?” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 40, No. 2 (Oct., 1996), 93.

24 William, Uzgalis, "John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/locke/>.

7

material soul can still sufficiently offer eternal security. Locke does not believe that the soul

is a necessary part of personal identity. He thinks that a person is identified by their

consciousness, and that different souls (and lower animals) can inhabit the same

consciousness (person) as it is may be distributed from one soul to another. If a person does

not recall the wrong action which he is being punished for (perhaps his soul was in a different

body when the act was committed), Locke would consider this unfair and a wretched state for

the one receiving the unjust sentence. His system escapes the inequality of a multiple person

soul by attributing moral responsibility with a consciousness that belongs to only one person.

In the discussion of personal identity, Locke shows that the soul’s purpose is to change itself

to enable the indwelling of consciousness; or to house a person. This distinctive view of

personhood places a high emphasis on the mind and deemphasizes the soul.

According to Locke, the soul has little purpose, especially in regards to spiritual

importance. One philosopher aptly comments:

The key elements of this programme [Essay Concerning Human Understanding] were: (a) an emphasis on the role of the ideas of an afterlife and an omniscient judge in strengthening moral resolve and enhancing moral conduct; (b) the elaboration of a phenomenological theory of personal identity that did not required a substantial and incorporeal soul to serve as a target of divine reward and punishment. Even if we are hedonistic machines, Locke thought, we are machines with the ability to act for our long-term happiness, once we acquire the relevant ideas.25

Locke suspects that man will be held morally accountable from the events that have occurred

in his consciousness. If those memories are not available, God will bring to mind the

necessary memories needed for judgement. The worry for Locke concerns the uncertainty of

inhabiting the same soul during unconsciousness (consider when one is drunk or asleep and is

unaware of his surroundings). Locke claims that it is impossible to identify the same soul as

there are unconscious gaps in time. He states, “I do not say there is no Soul in a Man, because

he is not sensible of it in his sleep; But I do say, he cannot think at any time waking or

sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but

our thoughts, and to them it is and to them it always will be necessary, til we can think

without being conscious of it.”26 Here Locke clarifies that if a man were always awake he

could be certain that he has the same soul, but since he falls asleep, he cannot be certain when

25

Catherine Wilson, “Matter, Morality, and the Changing Ideal of Science,” Scientia in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Tom Sorell, G.A.J. Rogers, and Jill Kraye Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 24, (London: Springer, 2010), 49.

26 Locke, 109.

8

he wakes up that the same soul remains within him. Since there are spaces of

unconsciousness, Locke does not attribute personal identity to the soul. This innovative

system of personhood radically differs from religious beliefs of the soul.

Traditional Christian doctrine differs from Locke’s status of the soul in that the soul is

the instrument which accepts salvation. The 1646 Westminster Confession states, “He created

man, male and female, with reasonable and immortal souls, endued with knowledge,

righteousness, and true holiness, after His own image; having the law of God written in their

hearts, and power to fulfil it; and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the

liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change... whereby the elect are enabled to

believe to the saving of their souls.”27 The phrase soul competency explains the belief that the

soul is the means through which man is held accountable for his sins. 28 According to the

Christianity, eternal security in heaven requires moral perfection from each soul in the earthly

life. Since all persons do not meet this requirement of perfection, God sent Jesus to take the

punishment necessary for condemned souls. If a person accepts Jesus’ gift on his behalf

before the Final Judgement, God will accept Christ’s righteousness for that soul. Those who

do not accept the gift will be separated eternally from God. Unlike Locke’s view of the Final

Judgement, the Christianity affirms that most liberating view for the soul accepts the

righteousness of Christ rather than utilizing consciousness’ attempts to merit punishment and

reward. Fernando Vidal elaborates on this contrast by saying, “...the central problem of the

Christian discourse about the resurrection is personal identity and particularly the relationship

between self and body.”29 Christianity promotes a same body resurrection view whereas

Locke assumes that man will have a body in the Last Judgment (but he does not link self

identification with the resurrected body). Unlike Christianity, Locke does not use the soul for

religious purposes. It appears that Locke makes the soul obsolete but prefers to avoid making

that bold of a claim. Locke separates the soul from consciousness and makes accountability

in the Final Judgment centered on the actions which man remembers.

An Evaluation of Locke’s View of the Soul

27 Westminster Confession of Faith 1646; Chapter IV, of Creation; and Chapter XIV, of Faith.

28 Serjeantson, 134.

29 Fernando Vidal, Brains, Bodies, Selves, and Science: Anthropologies of Identity and the Resurrection of the Body, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Summer 2002), 933.

9

Locke’s view of the soul obtains many positive attributes which help to better

articulate personal identity and to understand the location for moral decision-making. Locke

improves Descartes’ status of the soul by separating personal identity from the soul and

attributing it to a person’s consciousness. This advances the previous condition of injustice in

the Last Judgement whereby individuals were wrongly punished for sins they did not commit

(as the fleeting soul could drift from person to person). Locke’s view of personal identity is

notable for its ability to create a just system for accounting one’s moral choices.

Consciousness is not shared among persons but limited to one individual. Locke claimed that

Descartes’ status of the soul was unethical as a person could be penalised for an act a

different person committed while sharing the same soul. Locke’s material status of the soul

enhances the previous immaterial nature by dismissing the obligation to describe the location

of the soul after bodily death. Christian tradition assumed that the body was linked to

personhood in the Final Judgement. Locke was concerned for how to assess an example

wherein two bodies occupied the same soul (if the soul inhabited a different body during an

unconscious state). His view of personhood allows the body to escape moral accountability

(since a person’s identity rests within their memory of their right and wrong choices). Locke

also considered the problems of a bodily personal identity and its effects on the resurrection.

He claims that attributing consciousness to personal identity eliminates the problem for

discerning which body should be returned to which possessor (the original or the cannibal)

for appearing in the resurrection. Thus,

Locke explicitly tells us that the [hypothetical] case of the prince and the cobbler shows us the resolution of the problem of the resurrection. The case is one in which the soul of the prince with all of its princely thoughts is transferred from the body of the prince to the body of the cobbler, the cobbler's soul having departed. The result of this exchange, is that the prince still consider himself the prince, even though he finds himself in an altogether new body. Locke's distinction between man and person makes it possible for the same person to show up in a different body at the resurrection and yet still be the same person.30

However his claims on the soul also contain numerous concerns to consider.

Locke seems to be radical in his attempts to create a fair system for the final

judgment. His emphasis on consciousness as a source for moral responsibility lacks equitable

justice. Human memory is not accurate (i.e. the state of drunkenness, tiredness, or

forgetfulness) but a just system of ethics requires moral accountability for states of both

30 Uzgalis, William, "John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/locke/>.

10

consciousness and unconsciousness.31 Consider the drunken man who is caught stealing. He

is morally responsible for the wrong actions he committed during his unconsciousness. There

are also flaws in human memory. Locke assumes that God would bring to mind the memories

which man needs to be reminded of for punishment and reward. His system of moral

accountability must clarify the means for determining how man is held accountable in an

ultimate sense. Locke does not explain whether man or God sets the standard for

accountability. Further, he lacks explaining where a person’s memories reside until God

decides to bring them back to recollection. He must also address how God brings these

memories to a person’s mind. Locke’s attempt to remodel the Final Judgement to his

understanding of equality indirectly requires God to adhere to Locke’s view of consciousness

for moral accountability. He also theorizes a new way of materially viewing the soul from

the traditional Christianity’s immaterial substance commitment. Locke’s theory on the

material soul damages the traditional view of the soul by eliminating the personal identity

from the soul. This is a drastic move for Locke to innovate a new status of the soul from

within his personal ideas rather than formulating a theory solely from a result of research and

investigation within the biblical texts he affirms for morality. He clarifies that his material

status of the soul will coordinate with Christianity’s view for moral responsibility and the

Last Judgment. It seems more consistent to disregard the Christian account altogether if he

wants to propose a philosophical system for morality and final accountability.

Locke’s view of personal identity also causes problems for discerning the beginning

and ending of personal identity. Since Locke claims that identity is from consciousness, a

person begins to identify themselves when they first experience consciousness. It is difficult

to discern whether Locke extends personal identity (from when consciousness begins and

ends) or shortens the time frame when compared with a personal identity of the soul

(beginning when the soul exists and ceases). Though traditional theories of ensoulment have

varied (wherein the soul is received at either conception or quickening) most affirm that man

receives a soul before he is born or shortly thereafter. Locke says that a person is “a thinking

intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same

thinking thing, in different times and places.”32 Locke does not clarify whether a baby in the

womb obtains personal identity. His views on personhood contain concerning ethical

31This idea is taken from Uzgalis, William, "John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/locke/>.

32 Locke, 335.

11

implications. If a baby in the womb does not reason and reflect then according to Locke, the

baby is not a person. Perhaps Locke could hold that a baby is a man who occupies a

particular case wherein he is in the process of becoming a person. This claim would enable

him to avoid accounting for the legality of abortion. It does not adequately account for how to

address individuals in a vegetative state, coma, mental retardation, etc.33 Locke’s claim of

personhood lacks a helpful clarification for the preservation of the life of a man when

personal identity (by Locke’s definition) is no longer present in the body.

Locke’s view of the separation of the body for personal identity foundationally

concerns adherents of the Christian Tradition. Christianity assumes that humans were

originally created from the material substance of dust. Genesis 2:7 confirms, “Then the

LORD God formed a man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the

breath of life, and the man became a living being.” Human reproduction continues to

demonstrate the material nature of life that is tied to the earth. Man was formed materially

and his bodily life on earth concludes when his human body stops working. For Locke to

advocate a separation between man and person (where personhood ignores the human body)

contradicts the natural evolution of human existence. Similarly, the resurrection will

commence on earth, thus confirming man’s tie to a human body. Locke’s view of personhood

more richly clarifies the identity of an individual with the addition of the body.

Consider the following thought experiment: a woman is physically injured in a car

wreck and slips into a coma. When she awakes she is completely unaware of her previous

life. According to Locke, her body does not define her personal identity. Due to the impact of

the injury, she considers herself a different person since her consciousness does not recollect

any of her past experiences prior to the car wreck. However, her fiancée would certainly look

at her body and know her identity as the woman he loved previous to the car wreck. Though

it would be concerning if her fiancée only remained engaged for her body, it is equally

worrisome if he rejected the engagement because her conscious is no longer active. The

illustration demonstrates the tension when idolizing either the body or the mind for personal

identity. It does clarify that a system of personal identity which solely includes the mind

seems to be lacking the bodily quality which most persons consider to be a part of what it is

that defines themselves. Locke does agree that the body is important but he does not employ

the body for personal identity. This example shows that Locke’s view of personal identity

inadequately articulates personhood for the woman in the coma. Further, Locke’s view of 33 See further notes on this matter at: Eric T. Olson, "Personal Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/identity-personal/>

12

personhood affirms that she could wake up in a completely different body. Locke must

address how the fiancée would try to find his bride if her personal identity is not linked with a

body (i.e. whether, if it is possible, if he should look for her in another body or try to find her

consciousness). Locke should additionally discuss why there is not a current phenomenon of

souls changing from one body to another during unconscious states. Locke claims that the

soul is in motion enabling it to move during states of unconsciousness, thus this occurrence

should be presently observable.

Locke’s view of personhood also improves the implications for moral accountability

when the addition of the body is added to consciousness for identity. A person utilizes the

human body for the completion of right and wrong actions. For example, if one consciously

chooses to steal, he uses the hands of his body to grab the item to perform the act. Locke

positively demonstrates that a person’s consciousness is essential for moral decision making

and accountability. His view of moral responsibility would better account for moral

accountability if the body were included in his system. The body primarily executes right or

wrong actions from the decisions of the consciousness. He advocates a deficient view of

moral responsibility to eliminate the vessel by which morality is accomplished.

Locke’s bold attempts to theorize about a material soul greatly contrast with the

immaterial status of the soul advocated by Cartesians and traditional Christianity. He

postulates a new argument against the current immaterial soul risking the hope of eternal

security and an indestructible personal identity. Locke chooses to ignore the implications

associated with an immaterial soul in order to create a view of personal identity that

demonstrates an improvement of justice for moral accountability in the final judgment. He

assumes that the soul could change from one body to different human or animal body during

unconsciousness. This causes an unfair system of moral accountability as a individual

person’s soul was being charged with the sins committed by others who also occupied the

same soul. Locke claimed that consciousness was the only way to distinguish personal

identity for an individual and create a just system in the Last Judgement. He claims he

improves the status of the soul by attributing the characteristics of motion and materiality.

Locke clarifies that the physical nature of the soul more accurately accounts for the transitory

nature of the soul. Though his emphasis on consciousness did spark innovative study on the

mind for eighteenth century philosophy, it did not help to resolve the personal identity

concerns as he had hoped. Locke’s view of personal identity fails to account for the

significance of the body and its necessity for personal identity, morality and the resurrection.

Locke effectively eliminates the use of the soul and replaces it with consciousness. Locke’s

13

efforts to use the mind reshape the status of the soul helps to clarify the problems with

Cartesianism but lacks to efficiently improve the previous views of the soul.

References

Clarke, Desmond M. and Catherine Wilson. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early

Modern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

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