Post on 08-Aug-2018
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Presupposition
UCLA, Fall 2007
Philippe Schlenker
(UCLA & Institut Jean-Nicod)
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Presupposition
!Approximation: A presupposition of S is a condition thatmust be met for S to be true or false.
! Presuppositionsa. John knows that he is incompetent.
!: John is incompetent.b. Does John knows that he is incompetent?
!: John is incompetent
c. John doesnt know that he is incompetent.
!: John is incompetent.
! Entailmentsa. John is French. => John is European.
b. Is John French? "> John is European.
c. John isnt French. "> John is European.
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Why Study Presupposition ?
I. Presuppositions are ubiquitous
! John regrets that he is incompetent.!: John is incompetent.
! John has stopped smoking.!: John used to smoke.
! It is John who left.!: Someone left.
! What John drank was vodka.!: John drank something.
! She is clever!!: The person pointed at is female.
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! John too was jailed.!: Someone other than John was jailed.
! John was jailed again.!
: John was jailed before.
! Only John was jailed.!: Somebody was jailed.
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Why Study Presupposition ?
II. Presuppositions and Dynamic Semantics
! Static View of MeaningMeaning = Truth Conditions
! Dynamic View of Meaning (after the 1980s)Meaning = Context Change Potential
= potential to change beliefs
! Motivations for the dynamic viewa. Pronouns, e.g. Every man who has a donkey beats it.
b. Presuppositions.
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Why Study Presupposition ?
III. The Semantics vs. Pragmatics Divide
! Semantics = study of meaning as it is encoded in wordsJohn is an American student
=> John is a student
John is a former student
"> John is a student
! Pragmatics = study of the additional information thatcan be obtained by reasoning on the speakers motives
Mr. Smith is unfailingly polite and always on time
=> Smith is a bad student
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Semantics vs. Pragmatics
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Entailments vs. Implicatures
Difference 1:Entailments follow from what is
linguistically encoded. Implicatures do not.
Difference 2: Entailments satisfy the following test.Implicatures generally don't.
! To check whether p entails q, check whether:In every conceivable situation in which it is true that p, it
is true that q.
Difference 3: Implicatures can be cancelled. Entailments
cannot be.
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Scalar Implicatures
! a. Rick is a philosopher or he is a poet(B. Schwarz)
b. John will leave or Mary will leave.
c. Paris is pleasant or London is pleasant.
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Hypothesis 1.
Disjunction is unambiguously exclusive.
! [[ [i or i'] ]] = true iff exactly one of [[i]], [[i']] is true! Notational variant (with 1 = true, 0 = false)
[[ [i or i'] ]] = 1 iff exactly one of [[i]], [[i']] is equal to 1
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1. a is predicted to be a contradiction; it should have
the same status as b.! a. Rick is a philosopher or he is a poet. In fact, he is both.
b. #Rick is a philosopher or he is a poet but he is not both.
In fact, he is both.
2. Incorrect predictions
! a. Every Italian who is a philosopher or a poet is asocialist.b. Whenever I invite a philosopher or a poet to a party, it
ends up being a success.
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! Every Italian who is a philosopher or a poet is a socialist.i1, is a philosopher but not a poet, and he is a socialist.
i2, is a poet but not a philosopher, and he is a socialist.
i3, is both a philosopher and a poet, but he is not a socialist.
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Hypothesis 2.
Disjunction is ambiguous
1. Cross-linguistic morphology
2. The ambiguity theory predicts that a. could beunderstood as true in the situation we described earlier.
3. Ellipsis (Fox, crediting T. Stephenson)
! John read Chomsky or Montague. Mary did too. In fact,she read both
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General observation about ellipsis
!John went to the bank. Mary did too.bankis ambiguous:
bank1= slope near the side of a river
bank2= financial institution
Ok John went to the bank1. Mary went to the bank1too.
Ok John went to the bank2. Mary went to the bank2too.
* John went to the bank1. Mary went to the bank2too.
* John went to the bank2. Mary went to the bank1too.
! Ok John went to the bank1. Mary did go to the bank1too.Ok John went to the bank2. Mary did go to the bank2too.
* John went to the bank1. Mary did go to the bank2too.
* John went to the bank2. Mary did go to the bank1too.
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4. Yet another problem...
!a. It is certain that John will read Chomsky or Montague.b. Every student read Chomsky or Montague.
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Hypothesis 3.
Scalar Implicatures
! Hypothesis:(i) or is inclusive disjunction. (ii) animplicature is responsible for the not andinference.
!S said: F or G
! form a scale: F and Gentails F or G.! If S believed that F andG, it would have been more
cooperative to say: F and GPrimary Implicature: NOT S believes (F and G)
! If John is well informed and either believes or disbelieves(F and G), we also get:
Secondary Implicature: S believes NOT(F and G)
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I. Alternatives
!Alt(S)= {S': S' is a sentence obtained from S by replacingsimultaneously any number of occurrences of orby and
and any number of occurrences of andby or}.
! a. S1 = Rick is a philosopher or a poetAlt(S1) = {Rick is a philosopher or a poet, Rick is aphilosopher and a poet}
b. S2= Rick is a philosopher and a poet
Alt(S2) = Alt(S1) = {Rick is a philosopher or a poet, Rick is
a philosopher and a poet}
c. S3= I doubt that Rick is a philosopher and a poet
Alt(S3)={I doubt that Rick is a philosopher and a poet, I
doubt that Rick is a philosopher or a poet}
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II. Ordering and Cooperation
!Ordering
Let S be a sentence and let S' be a member of Alt(S).
S' is better than S if:
a. S' entails S and S does not entail S'
[terminology: we say that S' asymmetrically entails S]b. The speaker believes that S'
! CooperationA sentence S is not uttered cooperatively if for some S' in
Alt(S), S' is better than S.
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Scalar Implicatures
! a. Rick is a philosopher or a poetb.Alt(a)={Rick is a philosopher or a poet, Rick is a
philosopher and a poet}
c. __ and __ >> __ or __a. is not uttered cooperatively if the speaker believes that
Rick is a philosopher and a poet.
-Primary Implicature: If the speaker is cooperative, it's
not the case that the speaker believes that Rick is both a
philosopher and a poet.-Secondary Implicature: If the speaker has an opinion on
this matter, it must be that he believes that Rick is not both
a philosopher and poet.
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Scalar Implicatures
! a. Rick is a philosopher and a poetb.Alt(a)={Rick is a philosopher and a poet, Rick is a
philosopher or a poet}c. No member of Alt(a) asymmetrically entails a, so
nothing additional is inferred.
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'Scale Reversal'
! a. I doubt that Rick is a philosopher and a poetb.Alt(a)={I doubt that Rick is a philosopher or a poet, I
doubt Rick is a philosopher and a poet}c. I doubt that __ or __ >> I doubt that __ and __
a. is not uttered cooperatively if the speaker doubts that
Rick is a philosopher or a poet.
... hence if the speaker is cooperative, the speaker does not
doubt that Rick is a philosopher or a poet (i.e. he believes
that Rick is a philosopher or a poet)
a philosopher and poet.
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'Scale Reversal'
! a. Every Italian who is a philosopher or a poet is asocialist
=> no additional inference (because the version with and
would be less informative)b. Every Italian who is a philosopher and a poet is a
socialist.
=> its not the case that every Italian who is a philosopher
or a poet is a socialist,i.e. some Italian who is a philosopher or a poet (but not
both) is not a socialist.
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'Scale Reversal'
! a. Whenever John is next to Mary or Ann, he behaves likean idiot
=> no additional inference
b. Whenever John is next to Mary and Ann, he behaves
like an idiot.
=> It's not the case that whenever John is next to Mary or
Ann, he behaves like an idiot.
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Some, Most, Every
!a. Some of my friends are clever=> Not all of my friends are clever.
=> A minority of my friends are clever.
b. Some of my friends are clever. In fact, all of them are.
! a. Most of my friends are clever=> Not all of my friends are clever.b. Most of my friends are clever. In fact, all of them are.
! a. Whenever most of the students come to class, there is apleasant atmosphere.
b. Every student who read most of the articles on the
reading list will get an A.
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Extensions
!
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Why are Scales Necessary?
!a. John read some book.
b. John read exactly one book.
c. (b) is more informative than (a), therefore the speaker
was not in a position to assert (b)
d. Therefore it is likely that John didnt read exactly one
book.
!This is the oppositeof the result we want!
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Other Implicatures
! John is in Paris or he is in Rome=> it is not the case that:
a. the speaker believes that John is in Paris.b. the speaker believes that John is not in Paris.
c . the speaker believes that John is in Rome.
d. the speaker believes that John is not in Rome.
! If John is in Paris, he is there for business.=> the speaker takes it to be possible but not certain that
John is in Paris
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Experiment - Scalar Implicatures
(Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland)
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[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]
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31[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]
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32[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]
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[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]
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34[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]
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Children and Scalar Implicatures
! Children appear notto compute Scalar Implicatures insome environments where adults do.
! Paradox: children appear to be 'more logical' than adults!
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Scalar Implicatures Take Time
Noveck and Posada 2003
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Three Properties of Scalar Implicatures
! Unlike entailments, they can be cancelled.! They disappear in certain environments (and appear in
others).
! They are acquired relatively late by children.!
They take time to compute.
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Presuppositions
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Presuppositions vs. Entailments
! Difference 1 (dubious)If an entailment of S is false, S is false, not weird.
! -John is French.-No. He is South African.
! -John knows that he is going to be fired.-No. He doesnt know it.- No. He is going to keep his job.
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Presuppositions vs. Entailments
! Difference 2 (very clear)Presuppositions project differently from entailments.
! a. Is John French? "> John is Europeanb. John is not French. "> John is European
c. None of these 10 students is French"> Each of these 10 students is European
"> Some of these 10 students is European
! a. Does John know that he is incompetent?=> John is incompetent
b. John does not know that he is incompetent
=> John is incompetent
c. None of these 10 students knows that he is incompetent
=> Each of these 10 students is incompetent
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Presuppositions vs. Entailments
! a. Does John take care of his computer?=> John has a computer
b. John doesnt take care of his computer
=> John has a computer
c. None of these 10 students takes care of his computer
=> Each of these 10 students has a computer
! a. Did John stop smoking?=> John used to smoke.
b. John didnt stop smoking=> John used to smoke
c. None of these 10 students stopped smoking
=> Each of these 10 students used to smoke
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Presuppositions vs. Implicatures
! An analysis of presuppositions as implicaturesHypothesis:If pp is a clause described as having
presupposition p and assertion p:
(i) pp has as its meaning the conjunction of p and p
(ii) but forms a scale
! Examplesa.
b.
c.
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Predictions I
! pp entails p a. John knows that he is incompetent
=> John is incompetent
b. Ill invite John and Mary
=> Ill invite John or Mary
! not pp implicates p because (not p) is more informative than (not pp) !
a. John doesnt know that he is incompetent
implicates: John is incompetent
b. I wont invite (both) John and Mary
=> Ill invite John or Mary
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Predictions II
! No student PP implicates Some student Pbecause No student P
is more informative than No student PP
hence the inference that not No student P
i.e. Some student P
!
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Presuppositions vs. Entailments:
An Experiment (French, Chemla 2007)
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Experimental Conditions
! Triggers Presuppositions
attitude verbs: know, be unaware
change of state: start, stop
definite descriptions: his computer
Implicatures: , ,
! Environments-Inferences: universal-like and implicature-like
-Operators: John ___, I doubt that John ___, More than 3of these 10 students ___ , Each of the 10 students ___,
None of these 10 students ___, Exactly 3 of these 10
students ____.
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Examples
! Less than 3 of these 10 students know that their father isabout to receive a congratulation letter.
=>? The father of eachof these students is about to receive
a congratulation letter.
=>? The father ofat least 3students is about to receive acongratulation letter.
! None of these 10 students read the handout and did anexercise.
=>? Eachof these 10 students did (at least) one or the other
=>? At least 1of these 10 students did (at least) one or the
other
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Main Results (Chemla 2007)
! Presuppositions display a different a behavior fromscalar implicatures under no:
-Non-universal inferences for implicatures
-Universal implicatures for presuppositions
! Not all quantifiers behave on a par:at least 3, more than 3, exactly 3display an intermediate
behavior (universal inferences half the time).
! Not computing a presupposition takes time.
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NOand Universal Inferences
Left, from left to right
1.Every student stoppedsmoking => every student
smoked
2.No student stopped
smoking => at least one
student smoked
3.No student stoppedsmoking => every student
smoked
Right, from left to right1.Every student did A and
B => every student did (at
least) one2.No student student did A
and B => at least one
student did (at least) one
3.No student did A and B
=> every student did (at
least one
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NOand Universal Inferences
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Less than threeand Universal Inferences
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Universal Inferences for Various Quantifiers
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Reaction Times: Universal Inferences
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Questions
! Triggering ProblemWhy do some elementary clauses have presuppositions?
a. John knows that it is raining
!: It is raining.
b. John rightly believes that it is raining!: none, or possibly: John believes that it is raining.
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Questions
! Projection ProblemHow do the presuppositions of elementary clauses get
transmitted to complex clauses ?
a. If John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent.
!: John is incompetent
b. If John is an idiot, he knows that he incompetent
!: none, or possibly: if John is an idiot, he is incompetent
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Questions
! Architectural QuestionWhere do presuppositions belong in the architecture orlanguage?
Are they a semantic or a pragmatic phenomenon?
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The Projection Problem
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Conjunction
! a. John knows that he is incompetentb. Is it true that John knows that he is incompetent?
!: John is incompetent
c. I doubt that John knows that he is incompetent
!: John is incompetent
d. None of these 10 students knows that he is incompetent.!: Each of these 10 students is incompetent.
! a. John is incompetent and knows that he is.b. Is it true that John is incompetent and knows that he is?!: none
c. I doubt that John is incompetent and knows that he is.
!: none
d. None of these 10 students is incompetent and knows it.
!: none
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Conjunction
! a. John is depressed and his boss knows that he isincompetent
b. Is it true that John is depressed and that his boss knows
that he is incompetent?
!: John is incompetent
c. I doubt that John is depressed and that his boss knowsthat he is incompetent.
! a. John is an idiot and his boss knows that he isincompetent.
b. Is it true that John is an idiot and that his boss knows that
he incompetent?
!: if John is an idiot, he is incompetent (?)
c. I doubt that John is an idiot and that his boss knows that
he is incompetent.
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Conjunction
! p and qq presupposes p q(... to be refined)
! John is incompetent and he knows it / that he is!: none
! John is an idiot and he knows that he is incompetent!: if John is an idiot, he is incompetent
! John is depressed and his boss knows that he isincompetent
Predicted !: If John is depressed, he is incompetent
Actual !: John is incompetent
Maybe because:the most plausible way to make the
conditional true is to assume that its consequent is!
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Conditionals
! a. If John is incompetent, he knows that he is.b. Is it true that if John is incompetent, he knows that he is?
c. I doubt that if John is incompetent, he knows that he is.
! a. If John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent.b. Is it true that if John is realistic, he knows that he isincompetent?
c. I doubt that if John is realistic, he knows that he is
incompetent.
! a. If John is over 65, he knows he cant apply.b. Is it true that if John is over 65, he knows he cant apply?
c. I doubt that if John is over 65, he knows he cant apply.
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Conditionals
! a. If John knows that he is overqualified, he wont apply.b. Is it true that if John knows that he is overqualified, he
wont apply?
c. I doubt that if John knows that he is overqualified, he
wont apply.
! a. If John knows that he is overqualified, he is depressedb. Is it true that if John knows that he is overqualified, he is
depressed?
c. I doubt that if John knows that he is overqualified, he is
depressed.
! a. if p, qq presupposes p qb. if pp, q presupposes p
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Disjunctions
! a. If John is incompetent, he knows that he is.b. Either John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.
! a. If John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent.b.Either John is not realistic,or he knows he is incompetent.
! a. If John is over 65, he knows he cant apply.b. Either John isnt over 65, or he knows he cant apply
! a. If John knows that he is overqualified, he wont apply.b. Either John doesnt know that he is over qualified, or hewont apply.
! a. p or qq presupposes (not p) qb. pp or q presupposes p
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Stalnakers Pragmatic Analysis
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A Pragmatic Analysis
! p and qq presupposes p q...when a speaker says something of the formA and B, he
may take it for granted thatA (or at least that his audience
recognizes that heaccepts that A) after he has said it.The
proposition thatAwill be added to the background of common
assumptions before the speaker asserts thatB.
Now suppose that B expresses a proposition that would, for
some reason, be inappropriate to assert except in a context
whereA, or something entailed byA, is presupposed.Even ifAis not presupposed initially, one may still assert A and B
since by the time one gets to saying that B, the context has
shifted, and it is by then presupposed thatA.
Stalnaker, Pragmatic Presuppositions, 1974
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Assumptions
! Assumption 1:Sentences may be true, false or #! Assumption 2:A sentence S is a presupposition failure if it
has the value # with respect to at least oneof the states of
affairs compatible with what the speech act participants
take for granted.
Definition 1:Common Ground = what the speech act
participants take for granted.
Definition 2:Context Set = set of worlds compatible with
what the speech act participants take for granted.
! Assumption 3:The Context Set is updated incrementallyin discourse and in conjunctions.
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Possible Worlds
! A possible world w = a complete specification of what isgoing on. It determines for every sentence S whether
[[ S ]] w= true, [[ S ]] w= false, or [[ S ]] w= #.
! Different clauses give rise to different functions, e.g.:The President of
France is Chirac
w1" false
w2" truew3" #
w4" #
...
The US
President is Bush
w1" true
w2" falsew3" true
w4"#
...
Two plus two
is four
w1" true
w2" truew3" truew4" true
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Further Conditions
! Non-ContradictionA sentence S uttered in a Context Set C is deviant if S is
true in no world of C.
! Non-TrivialityA sentence S uttered in a Context Set C is deviant if S is
true in every world of C.
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Stalnakers Analysis
! John knows that he is incompetentis:-true in w if John is incompetent and believes that he is-false in w if John is incompetent and doesnt believe he is
-# in w if John is not incompetent.
! Suppose that the speech act participants do not knowwhether John is or isnt incompetent. Suppose further that
the Context Set C is C = {w1, w2, w3, w4}
w1
: John is incompetent and believes that he is
w2: John is incompetent and believes he isnt
w3: John is not incompetent but believes he is
w4: John is not incompetent and believes he isnt
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Stalnakers Analysis
! T =John knows that he is incompetentuttered in C is apresupposition failure because this sentence is # in w3andw4, which both belong to C
! Suppose that the speech act participants do not knowwhether John is or isnt incompetent. Suppose further that
the Context Set C is C = {w1, w2, w3, w4}
w1: John is incompetent and believes that he is
w2: John is incompetent and believes he isntw3: John is not incompetent but believes he is
w4: John is not incompetent and believes he isnt
S l k A l i
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Stalnakers Analysis
! S =John is incompetentis:-true in w if John is incompetent in w.-false in w in all other cases
(i.e. the sentence does not have a presupposition)
! a. AcceptabilityClearly,John is incompetentuttered in C is notapresupposition failure.
b. Update
-Initially, the Context Set was C = {w1, w2, w3, w4}
-After S is uttered,
the new Context Set is: C = {w1, w2}
(i.e. only the worlds compatible with S are retained)
S l k A l i
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Stalnakers Analysis
! John is incompetent. He knows it.= S. T.
! Step 1.-The initial Context Set is C = {w1, w2, w3, w4}
-After the first sentence is uttered,the new Context Set is C = {w1, w2}
! Step 2.-The second sentence is evaluated with respect to C
-By construction, in each world in C, T has a valuedifferent from #. So T is nota presupposition failure in C.
! Step 3.C is updated to C = {w1}.
St l k A l i
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Stalnakers Analysis
! Conjunctiona. Treat S and Tin the same way as the discourse S. T: the
assertion of a conjunction is a succession of two assertions.
b. Beautiful analysis of presupposition projection:every world in C that satisfies S must satisfy T.
In other words: C |= S!T
! Limitationsa. How does the analysis extend to other operators?
b. How does the analysis extend to embedded
conjunctions?
e.g.None of my students is rich and proud of it.
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Heims Semantic Analysis
(following in part Karttunen 1974)
K tt I Th Li it f B t F
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Karttunen I: The Limits of Brute Force
K tt II Ad itt C diti
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Karttunen II: Admittance Conditions
! a. Brute Force Methoddefine recursively the (complex!) rules by which thepresuppositions of complex sentences are computed on the
basis of the presuppositions of their parts.
b. Admittance Conditions
(i) take as primitive the notion of a context satisfying thepresuppositions of an elementary clause.
(ii) extend recursively the notion of satisfaction.
H i S th i
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Heims Synthesis
! KarttunenSeparate specification of:(i) admittance conditions
(ii) truth-conditional (assertive) content.
Gazdars critique (of Karttunen & Peters): this is not
explanatory!
! Heima. The context change potential of an expression cannot
be derived from its assertive content.
b. But its assertive content cannot be derived from its
context-change potential.
(... once one has the rightcontext change potential!!!)
H i S th i
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Heims Synthesis
! Heim vs. Stalnakera. Keep from Stalnakers analysis-the idea of an update
-the analysis of presupposition projection in conjunctions
b. Drop the pragmatic derivation of Stalnakers analysis.
! Heim vs. Karttunen-In Karttunens system, admittance conditions are specified
separately from the assertive content of expressions.
-For Heim, Context Change Potentials do double duty.
! The Dynamic Conception of Meaning-Old conception: meanings as truth conditions
-New conception: meanings as Context Change Potentials,
i.e. as functions from Context Sets to Context Sets.
H i S th i
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Heims Synthesis
! Notation: C[F] = update of the Context Set C with F! Elementary Clauses
a. C[John is incompetent]
= # iff C = #
= {w#C: John is incompetent in w} otherwiseb. C[John knows that he is incompetent]
= # iff C=# or for some w#C, John is not incompetent in w
= {w#C: John believes he is incompetent in w}, otherwise
! TruthIf C[S] "# and w#C, then: S is true at w iff w C[S]
! ConjunctionC[F and G] = C[F][G]
Heims Synthesis
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Heims Synthesis
! NegationC[not F] = # iff C[F] = #
= C - C[F] otherwise
! a. not F = John doesnt know that he is incompetent.b. C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #, iff for some w#C, John is notincompetent in w
= C - C[F] otherwise,
i.e. = C - {w#C: John believes he is incompetent in w}
F
Heims Synthesis
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Heims Synthesis
! NegationC[not F] = # iff C[F] = #
= C - C[F] otherwise
! a. not F = John doesnt know that he is incompetent.b. C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #, iff for some w#C, John is notincompetent in w
= C - C[F] otherwise,
i.e. = C - {w#C: John believes he is incompetent in w}
F
This means that
not(pp)resu oses that
Heims Synthesis
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Heims Synthesis
! NegationC[not F] = # iff C[F] = #
= C - C[F] otherwise
! a. not F = John doesnt know that he is incompetent.b. C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #, iff for some w#C, John is notincompetent in w
= C - C[F] otherwise,
i.e. = C - {w#C: John believes he is incompetent in w}
F
Heims Synthesis
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Heims Synthesis
! Conditionals (analyzed as material implications)C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = #
= C - C[F][not G], otherwise
GF
Worlds that
refuteif F, G
Heims Synthesis
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Heims Synthesis
! Conditionals (analyzed as material implications)C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = #
= C - C[F][not G], otherwise
GF
Worlds that
refuteif F, G
This means that if pp, q presupposes that p,and that if p, qq, presupposes if p, q
Heims Synthesis
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Heim s Synthesis
! Conditionals (analyzed as material implications)C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = #
= C - C[F][not G], otherwise
GF
Worlds that
refuteif F, G
Heims Synthesis
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Heim s Synthesis
! if F, G = If John is incompetent, he knows it! C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = #
But C[F] "# and furthermore
C[F] = {w#C: John is incompetent in w}
C[F][not G] = # iff C[F][G] = #, which is not the case (byconstruction). Furthermore,
C[F][not G] = {w#C: John is incompetent in w}[not G]
= {w#C: John is incompetent in w}
- {w#C: John is incompetent in w and John believes he isincompetent in w}
= {w#C: John is incompetent but doesnt believe it in w}
C[if F, G] = C - {w#C: John is incompetent but doesnt
believe it in w}
Summary
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Summary
! Meaning of an elementary clause = a CCP! Conjunction
C[F and G] = C[F][G]
! NegationC[not F] = # iff C[F] = #; = C - C[F] otherwise
! ConditionalsC[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = #
= C - C[F][not G], otherwise
! DisjunctionC[F or G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[not F][G] = #
= C[F] $C[not F][G], otherwise
Disjunctions
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Disjunctions
! a. If John is incompetent, he knows that he is.b. Either John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.
! a. If John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent.b.Either John is not realistic,or he knows he is incompetent.
! a. If John is over 65, he knows he cant apply.b. Either John isnt over 65, or he knows he cant apply
! a. If John knows that he is overqualified, he wont apply.b. Either John doesnt know that he is over qualified, or hewont apply.
! a. p or qq presupposes (not p) qb. pp or q presupposes p
Heims Analysis
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Heim s Analysis
! DisjunctionC[F or G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[not F][G] = #
= C[F] $C[not F][G] otherwise.
! a. John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.b. C[not I or K] = # iff C[not I] = # or C[not not I][K] = #,
i.e. iff C[I] = # or C[I][K] = #, which is never the case.
Thus C[not I or K] = C[not I]$
C[I][K]
G
F
Heims Analysis
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Heim s Analysis
! DisjunctionC[F or G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[not F][G] = #
= C[F] $C[not F][G] otherwise.
! a. John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.b. C[not I or K] = # iff C[not I] = # or C[not not I][K] = #,
i.e. iff C[I] = # or C[I][K] = #, which is never the case.
Thus C[not I or K] = C[not I] $C[I][K]
G
F
This means that
pp or q pre-
supposes that p,and that p or
qqpresupposesif (not p), q
Heims Analysis
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Heim s Analysis
! DisjunctionC[F or G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[not F][G] = #
= C[F] $C[not F][G] otherwise.
! a. John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.b. C[not I or K] = # iff C[not I] = # or C[not not I][K] = #,
i.e. iff C[I] = # or C[I][K] = #, which is never the case.
Thus C[not I or K] = C[not I] $C[I][K]
G
F
Heims Analysis
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Heim s Analysis
! Definition of TruthIf w#C,
a. F is # in w relative to C iff C[F] = #
b. If "#, F is true in w relative to C iff w#C[F]
! John is incompetent. He knows it.= S. T.
C = {w1, w2, w3, w4}
C[S] = C = {w1, w2}
C[S][T] = C = {w1}.
! a. Relative to w1, C, the discourse is true, since w1#C[S][T]b. Relative to w2, C, the discourse is false , since
w2%C[S][T]
Heims Explanatory Problem
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Heim s Explanatory Problem
! Problem: is the account explanatory? (Soames 1989)C[F and G] = (C[F])[G]
C[F and* G] = (C[G])[F]
When F and G are not presuppositional,
C[F and G]=C[F and* G]={w#C: F is true in w and G is
true in w}
Heims Explanatory Problem
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Heim s Explanatory Problem
! There are many ways to define the CCP of or...C[F or1G] = C[F] $C[G], unless one of those is #
C[F or2G] = C[F] $C[not F][G], unless one of those is #
C[F or3G] = C[not G][F] $C[G], unless one of those is #
GF
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Gazdars Account
Reminder 1: Non-Triviality
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Reminder 1: Non Triviality
! Non-ContradictionA sentence S uttered in a Context Set C is deviant if S is
true in no world of C.
! Non-TrivialityA sentence S uttered in a Context Set C is deviant if S is
true in every world of C.
Reminder 2: Other Implicatures
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Reminder 2: Other Implicatures
! John is in Paris or he is in Rome=> it is not the case that:
a. the speaker believes that John is in Paris.
b. the speaker believes that John is not in Paris.c . the speaker believes that John is in Rome.
d. the speaker believes that John is not in Rome.
!If John is in Paris, he is there for business.=> the speaker takes it to be possible but not certain that
John is in Paris
An Explanatory Account ?
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An Explanatory Account ?
! Step 1: Compute the various implicatures of a sentence! Step 2: Keep only those presuppositions that are
consistent with all implicatures.
! John is incompetent and he knows that he is.! a. Implicature: IfJohn is incompetentis uttered, it
cannot be trivial that John is incompetent,
i.e. C |"John is incompetent
b. Potential Presupposition: the second conjunct triggers
the potential presupposition thatJohn is incompetent.
c. Filtering:The presupposition is filtered outbecause it
is inconsistent with the implicature.
An Explanatory Account ?
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An Explanatory Account ?
! John is depressed and he knows that he is incompetent.! a. Implicature: IfJohn is depressedis uttered, it cannot
be trivial that John is depressed,
i.e. C |"John is depressed
b. Potential Presupposition: the second conjunct triggersthe potential presupposition thatJohn is incompetent.
c. Filtering:The presupposition is notfiltered out because
it is consistentwith the implicature.
Note:Gazdar thus predicts that the entire sentence
presupposes that John is depressed. Stalnaker and Heim
predict: if John is depressed, he is incompetent.
Most examples go in Gazdars direction.
An Explanatory Account ?
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An Explanatory Account ?
! If John is incompetent, he knows it.! a. Implicature: The speaker cannot utterIf F, G
felicitously if he knows that Fis true. If we represent as S
the set of worlds compatible with what the speaker believes
S |"
John is incompetentfrom which it follows that
C |"John is incompetent.
b. Potential Presupposition: the main clause triggers the
potential presupposition thatJohn is incompetent.
c. Filtering:The presupposition is filtered outbecause it
is inconsistent with the implicature.
Reminder: Other Implicatures
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e de : O e p ca u es
! John is in Paris or he is in Rome=> it is not the case that:
a. the speaker believes that John is in Paris.
b. the speaker believes that John is not in Paris.c . the speaker believes that John is in Rome.
d. the speaker believes that John is not in Rome.
!If John is in Paris, he is there for business.=> the speaker takes it to be possible but not certain that
John is in Paris
An Explanatory Account ?
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p y
! Either John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.a. Implicature: The speaker cannot utter F or Gfelicitously if he believes that Fis false
S |"John is incompetent
from which it follows that
C |"John is incompetent.b. Potential Presupposition: the second clause triggers the
potential presupposition thatJohn is incompetent.
c. Filtering:The presupposition is filtered outbecause it
is inconsistent with the implicature.Note:Gazdar thus predicts that the entire sentence
presupposes that John is depressed. Stalnaker and Heim
predict: if John is depressed, he is incompetent.
An Explanatory Account ?
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p y
! If John is depressed, he knows that he is incompetent.! a. Implicature: S |"John is depressed
from which it follows that
C |"John is depressed
b. Potential Presupposition: the main clause triggers thepotential presupposition thatJohn is incompetent.
c. Filtering:The presupposition is notfiltered out because
it is consistentwith the implicature.
Note:Gazdar thus predicts that the entire sentencepresupposes that John is depressed. Stalnaker and Heim
predict: if John is depressed, he is incompetent.
Most examples go in Gazdars direction - but not all do!
Problem for Gazdars Account
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! If John is French, he must know that he can travel withinthe European Union without a passport.a.Gazdars prediction:!= John can travel within the
European Union without a passport.
b. Actual presupposition: probably none.
! a. Implicature: S |"John is Frenchfrom which it follows that C |"John is French
b. Potential Presupposition: the main clause triggers the
potential presupposition thatJohn can travel within the
European Union without a passport.
c. Filtering:The presupposition is notfiltered out because
it is consistentwith the implicature!
! If John has twins, then Mary will not like his children.
A Very Partial History
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y y
! 1973-1974-Stalnakers analysis: pragmatics + local contexts.-Karttunens analysis: recursive admittance conditions +
local contexts.
!1970s-Karttunen & Peters
-Gazdars recursive pragmatics
! 1980s-Heims theory of presupposition projection-Overgeneration problem (Soames, Rooth).
! 1990svan der Sandt & Geurtss critique of Heim. DRT analysis
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Back to Heims Account!
Accommodation
Global Accommodation
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! My sister is pregnant.! '... it's not as easy as you might think to say something that
will be unacceptable for lack of required presuppositions.
Say something that requires a missing presupposition, and
straightway that presupposition springs into existence,making what you said acceptable after all.' I said that
presupposition evolves in a more or less rule-governed way
during a conversation. Now we can formulate one
important governing rule: call it the
Rule of accommodation for presuppositionIf at time t something is said that requires presupposition P
to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t,
then - ceteris paribusand within certain limits -
presupposition P comes into existence at t."
Local Accommodation
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! a. The king of France is not wise because there is no king ofFrance.b. None of my students takes good care of his car because
none of my students has a car!
c. John doesn't know that he is incompetent because he just
isn't incompetent!
! a. It's not the casethere is a king of France andhe is wisebecause ...
b. None of my studentshas a car andtakes good care of it
because...c. It's not the case thatJohn is incompetentand knows it ...
! Question:can we do without Local Accommodation byappealing to meta-linguistic uses of various operators?
Global vs. Local Accommodation
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!C[not F]= # iff C[F]=#= C - C[F], otherwise.
!Global Accommodation:C' = {c#C: France is a monarchy at the time and in the
world of c}.We then compute C'[the king of France is not powerful].
! Local Accommodation:Instead of computingC - C[F] (which wouldn't even be defined, since C[F]=#),
we compute:
C - C'[F], where C'={c#C: France is a monarchy at the time
and in the world of c} (as in A.)
Directions
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! Allow for local accommodation whenever globalaccommodation would contradict
a. the literal meaning of a sentence
b. or an implicature of a sentence [or possibly: certain typesof implicatures, e.g. primary implicatures]
! In effect, this allows us to capture the good properties ofGazdars system within Heims dynamic semantics.
Summary
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! Presuppositions cannot be analyzed as implicatures.! The dilemma of dynamic semantics
a. Stalnakers approach is explanatory but not general
Update the context set in time as you process a sentence.
b. Heims approach is general but not explanatoryThe meaning of words is dynamic from the start, i.e. their
lexical entries specify how they change the context set.
! Gazdars account was explanatory and general butincorrect(i) Compute the implicatures of a sentence.
(ii) Project those potential presuppositions that dont
contradict the entire sentence or one of its implicatures.
The Proviso Problem
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! a. If the problem was easy, it is not John who solved it.b. John knows that if the problem was easy, someone
solved it (Geurts 1999)
! Predicted presupposition of (a) and (b):If the problem was easy, someone solved itActual presupposition of (a)
Someone solved the problem
Actual presupposition of (b)
If the problem was easy, someone solved it
The Proviso Problem
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! John is an idiot and he knows that he is incompetent!: if John is an idiot, he is incompetent
! John is depressed and he knows that he is incompetentPredicted !: If John is depressed, he is incompetent
Actual!
: John is incompetentMaybe this is becausethe most plausible way to make
the conditional true is to assume that its consequent is!
... but this kind of reasoning fails to addressthe minimal
difference between:-If the problem was easy, it is not John who solved it
-John knows that if the problem was easy, someone solved
it (Geurts 1999).
The Proviso Problem
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! Direction 1(van der Sandt 1992, Geurts 1999)-This problem refutesthe standard dynamic approaches -as well as all approaches that make similar predictions.
-A different analysis must be proposed, in which
presuppositions are treated in a more syntactic fashion
(Discourse Representation Theory)This is a major contenderamong current theories.
! Direction 2(still promissory)With enough pragmatic reasoning, we can stick to Heims
predictions - which in any event seem to be correct in othercases, e.g.
If John is over 65, he must know that he is too old to apply
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Back to Heims Account!
Quantification
Replacing Worlds with Contexts
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Example1. An amnesiac gets lost...
An amnesiac, Rudolf Lingens, is lost in the Stanford library. He
reads a number of things in the library, including a biography of
himself, and a detailed account of the library in which he is lost...
He still wont know who he is, and where he is, no matter how
much knowledge he piles up, until that moment when he is ready tosay, This place is aisle five, floor six, of Main Library, Stanford. I
am Rudolf Lingens. [Perry 1977]
It seems that the Stanford library has plenty of books, but no
helpful little maps with a dot marked location of this map. Book
learning will help Lingens locate himself in logical space. (...) But
none of this, by itself, can guarantee that he knows where in the
world he is. He needs to locate himself not only in logical space but
also in ordinary space. [Lewis 1979 p. 138]
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Standford Harvard
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Standford Harvard
Example 2. 'My pants are on fire'
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!If I see, reflected in a window, the image of a man whosepants appear to be on fire, my behavior is sensitive to
whether I think, His pants are on fire, or My pants are on
fire, though the object of thought may be the same'
(Kaplan)
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Referential Uncertainty
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!Situation: Lingens, who is lost in the Stanford library, knowseverything there is to know about the world.I wear a coat. My coat is black.
![Lingens, a well-read amnesiac, knows everything there is toknow about the world; but he does not know whether he is
Alfred, who is having a conversation withBerenice, or
Charles, who is having a conversation withDenise.
Berenice used to smoke but Denise never did]
Compare:
Did you stop smoking?
You are Berenice. Did you stop smoking?
Referential Uncertainty
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!Situation: Lingens, who is lost in the Stanford library, knowseverything there is to know about the world.I wear a coat. My coat is black.
![Lingens, a well-read amnesiac, knows everything there is toknow about the world; but he does not know whether he is
Alfred, who is pointing towardsBerenice, or
Charles, who is pointing towardsDenise.
Berenice used to smoke but Denise never did]
Compare:
Did she stop smoking?
She is Berenice. Did she stop smoking?
Static Account with worlds
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! [[ it is raining ]] w= false[[ PS is in Los Angeles ]] w= true,
[[ the British President is happy]] w= #
! Rule[[ Pro VP ]] w= true if and only if [[ Pro ]]w#[[VP ]]+w
where [[VP ]]+wis the set of things of which VP is true in w
[[ Pro VP ]] w= false if and only if [[ Pro ]]w#[[VP ]]-wwhere [[VP ]]-wis the set of things of which VP is false in w
[[ Pro VP ]] w= # in all other cases!
Static Account with contexts
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! A context = ! [[ I smoke ]]
= true if and only if PS smokes in w
= false if and only PS does not smoke in w
! [[ She2smokes]] = true if and only if Mary smokes in w
= false if and only Mary does not smoke in w
! [[ She2stopped smoking]] = true if and only if Mary used to smoke but doesnt now in w
= false if and only Mary used to smoke and still does in w
= # if and only if Mary didnt use to smoke.
Dynamic Account with contexts
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! The rules are exactly the same as before, replacingworlds with... contexts!
! Elementary Clauses [now C is a set of contexts]We write as cwthe world of c, as c(1) the denotation of pro1
a. C[John is incompetent]
= # iff C = #
= {c#C: John is incompetent in cw} otherwise
b. C[John knows that he is incompetent]
=# iff C = # or for some c#C, John is not incompetent in cw
= {c#C: John believes he is incompetent in cw}, otherwise.c. C[she2stopped smoking]
= # iff C = # or for some c#C, c(2) didnt smoke in cw
= {c#C: c(2) doesnt smoke in cw}, otherwise.
Quantification in a Static Setting
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! [[ [no x1: x1student]x1smokes]] "# iff for every d which is a student in w,
[[x1smokes ]]
"#.
If "#,
= true iff for no d which is a student in w,
[[x1 smokes]]= true.
= false iff for some d which is a student in w,
[[x1smokes]]= true.
Quantification in a Static Setting
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! [[[no x1: x1student]x1stopped smoking]]"# iff for every d which is a student in w,
[[x1
stopped smoking]]
"#.
If "#,
= true iff for no d which is a student in w,
[[x1stopped smoking ]]= true.
= false iff for some d which is a student in w,
[[x1stopped smoking ]]= true.
Quantification in a Dynamic Setting
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! Notationsc[i"d] = that context which is exactly like c except that proidenotes d
C[i"d] = {c[i"d]: c#C}
!C[[no xi: xiNP]xiVP]= # iffC = # or {c[i"d]: c#C and d is an object}[xiNP] = #or {c[i"d]: c#C and c[i"d] #C[i"d][xiNP]} [xiVP] = #.
If "#, C[[no xi: xiNP]xiVP] = {c: c#C and for noobject
d, c[i"
d]#
C[i"
d][xiNP] and c[i"
d]#
C[i"
d][xiNP][xiVP]}
!C[[every xi: xiNP]xiVP]: same thing as for no ..., replacingnowith every.
Quantification in a Dynamic Setting
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! [no x1: x1 student]x1 smokesLet us assume that C "#. Then:
C[[no x1: x1student]x1smokes] "# because
C = #, {c[1"d]: c#C and d is an object}[x1student] "#,
and {c[1"d]: c#C and c[1"d] #C[1"d][x1student]} [x1smokes] "#. Furthermore,
C[[no x1: x1student]x1smokes]
= {c: c#C and for no object d, c[1"d] #C[1"d][x1
student] and c[1"d] #C[1"d][x1student][x1smokes]}
= {c: c#C and for no object d, d is a student in cwand d
smokes in cw}
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! [no x1: x1student]x1smokesLet us assume that C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}and for each i, ci= , with:
w1: All students used to smoke. All students still smoke.
w2: All students used to smoke. One doesnt any more.
w3: One student didnt use to smoke. No student smokes.w4: One student didnt use to smoke. One student smokes.
C[[no x1: x1student]x1smokes]
= {ci: i #{1, 2, 3, 4} and for no object d, # {: i #{1, 2, 3, 4}}[x1student] and
#{: i #{1, 2, 3,
4}}[x1student][x1smokes]}
= {ci: i #{1, 2, 3, 4} and for no object d, d is a student in
wi and d smokes in wi} = {c3}
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! [no x1: x1student]x1stopped smokingLet us assume that C "#. Then:
C[[no x1: x1student]x1stopped smoking] = #
iff {c[1"d]: c#C and d is an object}[x1student] = #,
or {c[1"d]: c#C and c[1"d] #C[1"d][x1student]} [x1stopped smoking] = #,
iff {c[1"d]: c#C and c[1"d] #C[1"d][x1student]} [x1
stopped smoking] = #
iff for some c#C, for some d, d is a student in cw
and d
didnt use to smoke in cw.
If "#,
= {c: c#C and for no object d, d is a student in cwand d
stopped smoking in cw}
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! [no xi: xistudent]xistopped smokingLet us assume that C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}
(with c1, c2, c3, c4defined as before)
C[[no x1: x1student]x1stopped smoking] = # because{c[1"d]: c#C and c[1"d] #C[1"d][x1student]} [x1
stopped smoking]
= {: i #{1, 2, 3, 4} and d is a student in
wi} [x1stopped smoking]
= # because in w3and w4there are students who didnt use
to smoke.
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! [no xi: xistudent]xistopped smokingLet us now assume that C = {c1, c2}
(with c1and c2defined as before)
It can be shown C[[no x1: x1student]x1smokes]"
#.
Furthermore, C[[no x1: x1student]x1stopped smoking]
= {c: c#C and for no object d, d is a student in cwand d
stopped smoking in cw}
= {c1}