Post on 06-Mar-2021
THEIR FINEST HOUR
WINSTON CHURCHILL
Copyright
Their Finest Hour
Copyright copy 1949 by Winston Churchill
Cover art and eForeword to the electronic edition copyrightcopy 2002 by RosettaBooks LLC
All rights reserved No part of this book may be used orreproduced in any manner whatsoever without writtenpermission except in the case of brief quotations embodiedin critical articles and reviews
For information address EditorRosettaBookscom
First electronic edition published 2002 by RosettaBooksLLC New York
ISBN 0-7953-0642-3
Their Finest Hour 2
ContentseForewordPrefaceAcknowledgementBook OneThe Fall of France1 The National Coalition2 The Battle of France The First Week Gamelin3 The Battle of France The Second Week Weygand4 The March to the Sea5 The Deliverance of Dunkirk6 The Rush for the Spoils7 Back to France8 Home Defence June9 The French Agony10 The Bordeaux Armistice11 Admiral Darlan and the French Fleet Oran12 The Apparatus of Counter-Attack 194013 At Bay14 The Invasion Problem
Their Finest Hour 3
15 Operation Sea LionBook TwoAlone1 The Battle of Britain2 The Blitz3 ldquoLondon Can Take Itrdquo4 The Wizard War5 United States Destroyers and West Indian Bases6 Egypt and the Middle East 19407 The Mediterranean Passage8 September Tensions9 Dakar10 Mr Edenrsquos Mission11 Relations with Vichy and Spain12 Mussolini Attacks Greece13 Lend-Lease14 Germany and Russia15 Ocean Peril16 Desert VictoryPublisherrsquos NoteAppendicesNotesAbout the AuthorAbout this Title
Their Finest Hour 4
Changes in text received too late for inclusion in the firstedition are listed under the heading Publisherrsquos Note
Their Finest Hour 5
Maps and Diagrams
Battle of BritainDisposition of Main Fleets in Mediterranean June 14 1940Desert Victory December 1940 to January 1941
Their Finest Hour 7
eForewordOne of the most fascinating works of history ever writtenWinston Churchillrsquos monumental The Second World War isa six-volume account of the struggle of the Allied powers inEurope against Germany and the Axis Told through theeyes of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill TheSecond World War is also the story of one nationrsquos singularheroic role in the fight against tyranny Pride and patriotismare evident everywhere in Churchillrsquos dramatic account andfor good reason Having learned a lesson at Munich thatthey would never forget the British refused to make peacewith Hitler defying him even after France had fallen andafter it seemed as though the Nazis were unstoppableChurchill remained unbowed throughout as did the peopleof Britain in whose determination and courage he placedhis confidencePatriotic as Churchill was he managed to maintain abalanced impartiality in his description of the war What isperhaps most interesting and what lends the work itstension and emotion is Churchillrsquos inclusion of a significantamount of primary material We hear his retrospectiveanalysis of the war to be sure but we are also presentedwith memos letters orders speeches and telegrams thatgive a day-by-day account of the reactions-both mistakenand justified-to the unfolding drama Strategies andcounterstrategies develop to respond to Hitlerrsquos ruthlessconquest of Europe his planned invasion of England and
Their Finest Hour 8
his treacherous assault on Russia It is a mesmerizingaccount of the crucial decisions that have to be made withimperfect knowledge and an awareness that the fate of theworld hangs in the balanceIn Their Finest Hour the second volume of this workChurchill describes the German invasion of France and thegrowing sense of dismay on the part of the British andFrench leadership as it becomes clear that the German warmachine is simply too overpowering As the Frenchdefenses begin to crumble Churchill faces some bleakoptions should the British meet Francersquos desperate pleasfor reinforcements of troops ships and aircraft in the hopesof turning the tide or should they husband their resourcesin preparation for the inevitable German assault if FrancefallsIn the bookrsquos second half entitled ldquoAlonerdquo Churchilldiscusses Great Britainrsquos position as the last stronghold ofresistance against the German conquest The expectedevents are all included in fascinating detail the battle forcontrol of the skies over Britain the bombing of London thediplomatic efforts to draw the United States into the warand the spread of the conflict into Africa and the MiddleEast But we also hear of the contingency plans thespeculations about what will happen should Britain fall toHitler and how the far-flung reaches of its Empire couldturn to rescue the mother country The behind-the-scenesdeliberations the fears expressed and the possibilitiesconsidered continually remind us of exactly what was atstake and how grim the situation often seemedChurchill won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1953 due inno small part to this awe-inspiring workRosettaBooks is the leading publisher dedicated exclusivelyto electronic editions of great works of fiction and non-fiction
Their Finest Hour 9
that reflect our world RosettaBooks is a committed e-publisher maximizing the resources of the Web in openinga fresh dimension in the reading experience In thiselectronic reading environment each RosettaBook willenhance the experience through The RosettaBooksConnection This gateway instantly delivers to the readerthe opportunity to learn more about the title the author thecontent and the context of each work using the fullresources of the WebTo experience The RosettaBooks Connection for TheirFinest Hour
wwwRosettaBookscomTheirFinestHour
Their Finest Hour 10
PrefaceDURING THE PERIOD covered by this volume I bore aheavy burden of responsibility I was Prime Minister FirstLord of the Treasury Minister of Defence and Leader ofthe House of Commons After the first forty days we werealone with victorious Germany and Italy engaged in mortalattack upon us with Soviet Russia a hostile neutral activelyaiding Hitler and Japan an unknowable menace Howeverthe British War Cabinet conducting His Majestyrsquos affairswith vigilance and fidelity supported by Parliament andsustained by the Governments and peoples of the BritishCommonwealth and Empire enabled all tasks to beaccomplished and overcame all our foes
WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL
CHARTWELLWESTERHAMKENTJanuary 1 1949
Their Finest Hour 11
AcknowledgmentsI MUST AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGE the assistance of those whohelped me with the previous volume namely Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall Commodore G R G AllenColonel F W Deakin and Sir Edward Marsh I must alsothank the very large number of others who have kindly readthese pages and commented upon themLord Ismay has continued to give me his aid as have myother friendsI again record my obligations to His Majestyrsquos Governmentfor permission to reproduce the text of certain officialdocuments of which the Crown copyright is legally vested inthe Controller of His Majestyrsquos Stationery Office At therequest of His Majestyrsquos Government on security grounds Ihave paraphrased some of the telegrams published in thisvolume These changes have not altered in any way thesense or substance of the telegrams
Their Finest Hour 12
Moral of the Work
In War ResolutionIn Defeat Defiance
In Victory MagnanimityIn Peace Good Will
Their Finest Hour 13
Theme of the Volume
How the British people held the fortALONE
till those whohitherto had been half blind
were half ready
Their Finest Hour 14
Book OneThe Fall of France
Their Finest Hour 15
1The National Coalition
The Beginning and the EndmdashThe Magnitude ofBritainrsquos Work for the Common CausemdashDivisionsin Contact with the Enemy Throughout the WarmdashThe Roll of Honour mdash The Share of the RoyalNavy mdash British and American Discharge of AirBombsmdashAmerican Aid in Munitions Magnifies OurWar EffortmdashFormation ofthe New CabinetmdashConservative Loyalty to Mr Chamberlain mdash TheLeadership of the House of CommonsmdashHeresy-hunting Quelled in Due CoursemdashMy Letter to MrChamberlain of May 11 mdash A Peculiar ExperiencemdashForming a Government in the Heat of Battle mdashNew Colleagues Clement Attlee Arthur Green-wood Archibald Sinclair Ernest Bevin MaxBeaverbrookmdashA Small War CabinetmdashStages inthe Formation of the Government May 10 to May16 mdash A Digression on PowermdashRealities andAppearances in the New War Direction mdashAlterations in the Responsibilities of the ServiceMinisters mdash War Direction Concentrated in VeryFew HandsmdashMy Personal Methodsmdash The WrittenWordmdashSir Edward BridgesmdashMy Relations withthe Chiefs of the Staff Committee mdash GeneralIsmay mdash Kindness and Confidence Shown by theWar CabinetmdashThe Office of Minister of Defence mdashIts Staff Ismay Hollis JacobmdashNo Change forFive Years mdash Stability of Chiefs of Staff CommitteemdashNo Changes from 1941 till 1945 Except One by
Their Finest Hour 16
DeathmdashIntimate Personal Association ofPoliticians and Soldiers at the SummitmdashThePersonal CorrespondencemdashMy Relations withPresident RooseveltmdashMy Message to thePresident of May 15 mdashldquoBlood Toil Tears andSweatrdquo
NOW AT LAST the slowly gathered long-pent-up fury of thestorm broke upon us Four or five millions of men met eachother in the first shock of the most merciless of all the warsof which record has been kept Within a week the front inFrance behind which we had been accustomed to dwellthrough the long years of the former war and the openingphase of this was to be irretrievably broken Within threeweeks the long-famed French Army was to collapse in routand ruin and the British Army to be hurled into the sea withall its equipment lost Within six weeks we were to findourselves alone almost disarmed with triumphantGermany and Italy at our throats with the whole of Europein Hitlerrsquos power and Japan glowering on the other side ofthe globe It was amid these facts and looming prospectsthat I entered upon my duties as Prime Minister andMinister of Defence and addressed myself to the first taskof forming a Government of all parties to conduct HisMajestyrsquos business at home and abroad by whatevermeans might be deemed best suited to the national interestFive years later almost to a day it was possible to take amore favourable view of our circumstances Italy wasconquered and Mussolini slain The mighty German Armysurrendered unconditionally Hitler had committed suicideIn addition to the immense captures by GeneralEisenhower nearly three million German soldiers weretaken prisoners in twenty-four hours by Field MarshalAlexander in Italy and Field Marshal Montgomery in
Their Finest Hour 17
Germany France was liberated rallied and revived Handin hand with our allies the two mightiest empires in theworld we advanced to the swift annihilation of Japaneseresistance The contrast was certainly remarkable Theroad across these five years was long hard and perilousThose who perished upon it did not give their lives in vainThose who marched forward to the end will always beproud to have trodden it with honour
LAND FORCES IN FIGHTING CONTACT WITH THEENEMYldquoEQUIVALENT DIVISIONSrdquo
In giving an account of my stewardship and in telling thetale of the famous National Coalition Government it is myfirst duty to make plain the scale and force of the
Their Finest Hour 18
contribution which Great Britain and her Empire whomdanger only united more tensely made to what eventuallybecame the common cause of so many states and nationsI do this with no desire to make invidious comparisons orrouse purposeless rivalries with our greatest ally the UnitedStates to whom we owe immeasurable and enduringgratitude But it is to the combined interest of the English-speaking world that the magnitude of the British war-making effort should be known and realised I havetherefore had a table made which I print on this page whichcovers the whole period of the war This shows that up tillJuly 1944 Britain and her Empire had a substantially largernumber of divisions in contact with the enemy than theUnited States This general figure includes not only theEuropean and African spheres but also all the war in Asiaagainst Japan Up till the arrival in Normandy in the autumnof 1944 of the great mass of the American Army we hadalways the right to speak at least as an equal and usuallyas the predominant partner in every theatre of war exceptthe Pacific and Australasian and this remains also true upto the time mentioned of the aggregation of all divisions inall theatres for any given month From July 1944 thefighting front of the United States as represented bydivisions in contact with the enemy became increasinglypredominant and so continued mounting and triumphanttill the final victory ten months laterAnother comparison which I have made shows that theBritish and Empire sacrifice in loss of life was even greaterthan that of our valiant ally The British total dead andmissing presumed dead of the armed forces amounted to303240 to which should be added over 109000 from theDominions India and the colonies a total of over 412240This figure does not include 60500 civilians killed in the airraids on the United Kingdom nor the losses of our
Their Finest Hour 19
merchant navy and fishermen which amounted to about30000 Against this figure the United States mourn thedeaths in the Army and Air Force the Navy Marines andCoastguard of 322188 I cite these sombre rolls of honourin the confident faith that the equal comradeship sanctifiedby so much precious blood will continue to command thereverence and inspire the conduct of the English-speakingworldOn the seas the United States naturally bore almost theentire weight of the war in the Pacific and the decisivebattles which they fought near Midway Island atGuadalcanal and in the Coral Sea in 1942 gained for themthe whole initiative in that vast ocean domain and openedto them the assault of all the Japanese conquests andeventually of Japan herself The American Navy could notat the same time carry the main burden in the Atlantic andthe Mediterranean Here again it is a duty to set down thefacts Out of 781 German and 85 Italian U-boats destroyedin the European theatre the Atlantic and Indian Oceans594 were accounted for by British sea and air forces whoalso disposed of all the German battleships cruisers anddestroyers besides destroying or capturing the wholeItalian Fleet
Their Finest Hour 20
U-BOAT LOSSES
The table of U-boat losses is shown in the table on thispageIn the air superb efforts were made by the United States tocome into action mdash especially with their daylight Fortressbombers mdash on the greatest scale from the earliest momentafter Pearl Harbour and their power was used both againstJapan and from the British Isles against GermanyHowever when we reached Casablanca in January 1943it was a fact that no single American bomber plane had casta daylight bomb on Germany Very soon the fruition of thegreat exertions they were making was to come but up tillthe end of 1943 the British discharge of bombs uponGermany had in the aggregate exceeded by eight tons toone those cast from American machines by day or nightand it was only in the spring of 1944 that thepreponderance of discharge was achieved by the UnitedStates Here as in the armies and on the sea we ran thefull course from the beginning and it was not until 1944 thatwe were overtaken and surpassed by the tremendous wareffort of the United States
Their Finest Hour 21
It must be remembered that our munitions effort from thebeginning of Lend-Lease in January 1941 was increasedby over one-fifth through the generosity of the UnitedStates Through the materials and weapons which theygave us we were actually able to wage war as if we were anation of fifty-eight millions instead of forty-eight In shippingalso the marvellous production of Liberty Ships enabled theflow of supplies to be maintained across the Atlantic Onthe other hand the analysis of shipping losses by enemyaction suffered by all nations throughout the war should beborne in mind Here are the figures
Of these losses eighty per cent were suffered in the AtlanticOcean including British coastal waters and the North SeaOnly five per cent were lost in the PacificThis is all set down not to claim undue credit but toestablish on a footing capable of commanding fair-mindedrespect the intense output in every form of war activity ofthe people of this small island upon whom in the crisis ofthe worldrsquos history the brunt fell
It is probably easier to form a cabinet especially a coalitioncabinet in the heat of battle than in quiet times The senseof duty dominates all else and personal claims recedeOnce the main arrangements had been settled with theleaders of the other parties with the formal authority of theirorganisations the attitude of all those I sent for was like
Their Finest Hour 22
that of soldiers in action who go to the places assigned tothem at once without question The party basis beingofficially established it seemed to me that no sense of Selfentered into the minds of any of the very large number ofgentlemen I had to see If some few hesitated it was onlybecause of public considerations Even more did this highstandard of behaviour apply to the large number ofConservative and National Liberal Ministers who had toleave their offices and break their careers and at thismoment of surpassing interest and excitement to step outof official life in many cases foreverThe Conservatives had a majority of more than onehundred and twenty over all other parties in the Housecombined Mr Chamberlain was their chosen leader Icould not but realise that his supersession by me must bevery unpleasant to many of them after all my long years ofcriticism and often fierce reproach Besides this it must beevident to the majority of them how my life had beenpassed in friction or actual strife with the ConservativeParty that I had left them on Free Trade and had laterreturned to them as Chancellor of the Exchequer After thatI had been for many years their leading opponent on Indiaon foreign policy and on the lack of preparations for warTo accept me as Prime Minister was to them very difficult Itcaused pain to many honourable men Moreover loyalty tothe chosen leader of the party is the prime characteristic ofthe Conservatives If they had on some questions fallenshort of their duty to the nation in the years before the warit was because of this sense of loyalty to their appointedchief None of these considerations caused me the slightestanxiety I knew they were all drowned by the cannonadeIn the first instance I had offered to Mr Chamberlain andhe had accepted the leadership of the House of Commonsas well as the Lord Presidency Nothing had been
Their Finest Hour 23
published Mr Attlee informed me that the Labour Partywould not work easily under this arrangement In a coalitionthe leadership of the House must be generally acceptable Iput this point to Mr Chamberlain and with his readyagreement I took the leadership myself and held it tillFebruary 1942 During this time Mr Attlee acted as mydeputy and did the daily work His long experience inOpposition was of great value I came down only on themost serious occasions These were however recurrentMany Conservatives felt that their party leader had beenslighted Everyone admired his personal conduct On hisfirst entry into the House in his new capacity (May 13) thewhole of his party mdash the large majority of the House mdash roseand received him in a vehement demonstration ofsympathy and regard In the early weeks it was from theLabour benches that I was mainly greeted But MrChamberlainrsquos loyalty and support was steadfast and I wassure of myselfThere was considerable pressure by elements of theLabour Party and by some of those many able and ardentfigures who had not been included in the new Governmentfor a purge of the ldquoguilty menrdquo and of Ministers who hadbeen responsible for Munich or could be criticised for themany shortcomings in our war preparation Among theseLord Halifax Lord Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare were theprincipal targets But this was no time for proscriptions ofable patriotic men of long experience in high office If thecensorious people could have had their way at least a thirdof the Conservative Ministers would have been forced toresign Considering that Mr Chamberlain was the leader ofthe Conservative Party it was plain that this movementwould be destructive of the national unity Moreover I hadno need to ask myself whether all the blame lay on oneside Official responsibility rested upon the Government of
Their Finest Hour 24
the time But moral responsibilities were more widelyspread A long formidable list of quotations from speechesand votes recorded by Labour and not less by LiberalMinisters all of which had been stultified by events was inmy mind and available in detail No one had more right thanI to pass a sponge across the past I therefore resistedthese disruptive tendencies ldquoIf the presentrdquo I said a fewweeks later ldquotries to sit in judgment on the past it will losethe futurerdquo This argument and the awful weight of the hourquelled the would-be heresy-hunters
Early on the morning of May 11 I sent a message to MrChamberlain ldquoNo one changes houses for a monthrdquo Thisavoided petty inconveniences during the crisis of the battleI continued to live at Admiralty House and made its maproom and the fine rooms downstairs my temporaryheadquarters I reported to him my talk with Mr Attlee andthe progress made in forming the new Administration ldquoIhope to have the War Cabinet and the Fighting Servicescomplete tonight for the King The haste is necessitated bythe battlehellip As we [two] must work so closely together Ihope you will not find it inconvenient to occupy once againyour old quarters which we both know so well in Number11rdquo1 I added
I do not think there is any necessity for a Cabinettoday as the Armies and other Services are fighting inaccordance with prearranged plans I should be veryglad however if you and Edward [Halifax] would cometo the Admiralty War Room at 1230 PM so that wecould look at the maps and talk things over
British and French advanced forces are already onthe Antwerp-Namur line and there seem to be verygood hopes that this line will be strongly occupied bythe Allied armies before it can be assailed This should
Their Finest Hour 25
be achieved in about forty-eight hours and might bethought to be very important Meanwhile the Germanshave not yet forced the Albert Canal and the Belgiansare reported to be fighting well The Dutch also aremaking a stubborn resistance
My experiences in those first days were peculiar One livedwith the battle upon which all thoughts were centred andabout which nothing could be done All the time there wasthe Government to form and the gentlemen to see and theparty balances to be adjusted I cannot remember nor domy records show how all the hours were spent A BritishMinistry at that time contained between sixty and seventyMinisters of the Crown and all these had to be fitted in likea jigsaw puzzle in this case having regard to the claims ofthree Parties It was necessary for me to see not only all theprincipal figures but for a few minutes at least the crowdof able men who were to be chosen for important tasks Informing a Coalition Government the Prime Minister has toattach due weight to the wishes of the party leaders aboutwhom among their followers shall have the offices allottedto the Party By this principle I was mainly governed If anywho deserved better were left out on the advice of theirparty authorities or even in spite of that advice I can onlyexpress regret On the whole however the difficulties werefewIn Clement Attlee I had a colleague of war experience longversed in the House of Commons Our only differences inoutlook were about Socialism but these were swamped bya war soon to involve the almost complete subordination ofthe individual to the State We worked together with perfectease and confidence during the whole period of the
Their Finest Hour 26
Government Mr Arthur Greenwood was a wise counsellorof high courage and a good and helpful friendSir Archibald Sinclair as official leader of the Liberal Partyfound it embarrassing to accept the office of Air Ministerbecause his followers felt he should instead have a seat inthe War Cabinet But this ran contrary to the principle of asmall War Cabinet I therefore proposed that he should jointhe War Cabinet when any matter affecting fundamentalpolitical issues or party union was involved He was myfriend and had been my second-in-command when in 1916I commanded the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers at Ploegsteerte(ldquoPlug Streetrdquo) and personally longed to enter upon thegreat sphere of action I had reserved for him After no littleintercourse this had been amicably settled Mr Bevin withwhom I had made acquaintance at the beginning of thewar in trying to mitigate the severe Admiralty demands fortrawlers had to consult the Transport and GeneralWorkersrsquo Union of which he was secretary before he couldjoin the team in the most important office of Minister ofLabour This took two or three days but it was worth it TheUnion the largest of all in Britain said unanimously that hewas to do it and stuck solid for five years till we wonThe greatest difficulty was with Lord Beaverbrook Ibelieved he had services to render of a very high quality Ihad resolved as the result of my experiences in theprevious war to remove the Supply and Design of Aircraftfrom the Air Ministry and I wished him to become theMinister of Aircraft Production He seemed at first reluctantto undertake the task and of course the Air Ministry did notlike having their Supply Branch separated from them Therewere other resistances to his appointment I felt surehowever that our life depended upon the flow of new
Their Finest Hour 27
aircraft I needed his vital and vibrant energy and Ipersisted in my view
In deference to prevailing opinions expressed in Parliamentand the press it was necessary that the War Cabinet shouldbe small I therefore began by having only five members ofwhom one only the Foreign Secretary had a DepartmentThese were naturally the leading party politicians of the dayFor the convenient conduct of business it was necessarythat the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the leader of theLiberal Party should usually be present and as time passedthe number of ldquoconstant attendersrdquo grew But all theresponsibility was laid upon the five War Cabinet MinistersThey were the only ones who had the right to have theirheads cut off on Tower Hill if we did not win The rest couldsuffer for departmental shortcomings but not on account ofthe policy of the State Apart from the War Cabinet no onecould say ldquoI cannot take the responsibility for this or thatrdquoThe burden of policy was borne at a higher level Thissaved many people a lot of worry in the days which wereimmediately to fall upon usHere are the stages by which the National CoalitionGovernment was built up day by day in the course of thegreat battle
Their Finest Hour 28
THE WAR CABINET
Their Finest Hour 29
In my long political experience I had held most of the greatoffices of State but I readily admit that the post which hadnow fallen to me was the one I liked the best Power forthe sake of lording it over fellow-creatures or adding topersonal pomp is rightly judged base But power in anational crisis when a man believes he knows what ordersshould be given is a blessing In any sphere of action therecan be no comparison between the positions of numberone and number two three or four The duties and theproblems of all persons other than number one are quitedifferent and in many ways more difficult It is always amisfortune when number two or three has to initiate adominant plan or policy He has to consider not only themerits of the policy but the mind of his chief not only whatto advise but what it is proper for him in his station toadvise not only what to do but how to get it agreed andhow to get it done Moreover number two or three will haveto reckon with numbers four five and six or maybe somebright outsider number twenty Ambition not so much forvulgar ends but for fame glints in every mind There arealways several points of view which may be right and manywhich are plausible I was ruined for the time being in 1915over the Dardanelles and a supreme enterprise was castaway through my trying to carry out a major and cardinaloperation of war from a subordinate position Men are ill-advised to try such ventures This lesson had sunk into mynatureAt the top there are great simplifications An acceptedleader has only to be sure of what it is best to do or at leastto have made up his mind about it The loyalties whichcentre upon number one are enormous If he trips he mustbe sustained If he makes mistakes they must be coveredIf he sleeps he must not be wantonly disturbed If he is nogood he must be pole-axed But this last extreme process
Their Finest Hour 30
cannot be carried out every day and certainly not in thedays just after he has been chosen
The fundamental changes in the machinery of war directionwere more real than apparent ldquoA Constitutionrdquo saidNapoleon ldquoshould be short and obscurerdquo The existingorganisms remained intact No official personalities werechanged The War Cabinet and the Chiefs of the StaffCommittee at first continued to meet every day as they haddone before In calling myself with the Kingrsquos approvalMinister of Defence I had made no legal or constitutionalchange I had been careful not to define my rights andduties I asked for no special powers either from the Crownor Parliament It was however understood and acceptedthat I should assume the general direction of the warsubject to the support of the War Cabinet and of the Houseof Commons The key-change which occurred on my takingover was of course the supervision and direction of theChiefs of the Staff Committee by a Minister of Defence withundefined powers As this Minister was also the PrimeMinister he had all the rights inherent in that officeincluding very wide powers of selection and removal of allprofessional and political personages Thus for the first timethe Chiefs of Staff Committee assumed its due and properplace in direct daily contact with the executive Head of theGovernment and in accord with him had full control overthe conduct of the war and the armed forcesThe position of the First Lord of the Admiralty and of theSecretaries of State for War and Air was decisively affectedin fact though not in form They were not members of theWar Cabinet nor did they attend the meetings of the Chiefsof Staff Committee They remained entirely responsible for
Their Finest Hour 31
their Departments but rapidly and almost imperceptiblyceased to be responsible for the formulation of strategicplans and the day-to-day conduct of operations Thesewere settled by the Chiefs of Staff Committee acting directlyunder the Minister of Defence and Prime Minister and thuswith the authority of the War Cabinet The three ServiceMinisters very able and trusted friends of mine whom I hadpicked for these duties stood on no ceremony Theyorganised and administered the ever-growing forces andhelped all they could in the easy practical English fashionThey had the fullest information by virtue of theirmembership of the Defence Committee and constantaccess to me Their professional subordinates the Chiefsof Staff discussed everything with them and treated themwith the utmost respect But there was an integral directionof the war to which they loyally submitted There never wasan occasion when powers were abrogated or challengedand anyone in this circle could always speak his mind butthe actual war direction soon settled into a very few handsand what had seemed so difficult before became muchmore simple mdash apart of course from Hitler In spite of theturbulence of events and the many disasters we had toendure the machinery worked almost automatically andone lived in a stream of coherent thought capable of beingtranslated with great rapidity into executive action
Although the awful battle was now going on across theChannel and the reader is no doubt impatient to get thereit may be well at this point to describe the system andmachinery for conducting military and other affairs which Iset on foot and practised from my earliest days of power Iam a strong believer in transacting official business by The
Their Finest Hour 32
Written Word No doubt surveyed in the after-time muchthat is set down from hour to hour under the impact ofevents may be lacking in proportion or may not come true Iam willing to take my chance of that It is always betterexcept in the hierarchy of military discipline to expressopinions and wishes rather than to give orders Still writtendirectives coming personally from the lawfully constitutedHead of the Government and Minister specially chargedwith Defence counted to such an extent that though notexpressed as orders they very often found their fruition inactionTo make sure that my name was not used loosely I issuedduring the crisis of July the following minute
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay CIGS and Sir EdwardBridges
19VII40
Let it be very clearly understood that all directionsemanating from me are made in writing or should beimmediately afterwards confirmed in writing and that Ido not accept any responsibility for matters relating tonational defence on which I am alleged to have givendecisions unless they are recorded in writing
When I woke about 8 AM I read all the telegrams andfrom my bed dictated a continuous flow of minutes anddirectives to the Departments and to the Chiefs of StaffCommittee These were typed in relays as they were doneand handed at once to General Ismay Deputy Secretary(Military) to the War Cabinet and my representative on theChiefs of Staff Committee who came to see me early eachmorning Thus he usually had a good deal in writing to bringbefore the Chiefs of Staff Committee when they met at
Their Finest Hour 33
1030 They gave all consideration to my views at the sametime as they discussed the general situation Thus betweenthree and five orsquoclock in the afternoon unless there weresome difficulties between us requiring further consultationthere was ready a whole series of orders and telegramssent by me or by the Chiefs of Staff and agreed betweenus usually giving all the decisions immediately requiredIn total war it is quite impossible to draw any precise linebetween military and non-military problems That no suchfriction occurred between the Military Staff and the WarCabinet Staff was due primarily to the personality of SirEdward Bridges Secretary to the War Cabinet Not onlywas this son of a former Poet Laureate an extremelycompetent and tireless worker but he was also a man ofexceptional force ability and personal charm without atrace of jealousy in his nature All that mattered to him wasthat the War Cabinet Secretariat as a whole should servethe Prime Minister and War Cabinet to the very best of theirability No thought of his own personal position ever enteredhis mind and never a cross word passed between the civiland military officers of the SecretariatIn larger questions or if there were any differences of viewI called a meeting of the War Cabinet Defence Committeewhich at the outset comprised Mr Chamberlain Mr Attleeand the three Service Ministers with the Chiefs of the Staffin attendance These formal meetings got fewer after19412 As the machine began to work more smoothly Icame to the conclusion that the daily meetings of the WarCabinet with the Chiefs of Staff present were no longernecessary I therefore eventually instituted what came to beknown among ourselves as the ldquoMonday Cabinet ParaderdquoEvery Monday there was a considerable gathering mdash all theWar Cabinet the Service Ministers and the Minister of
Their Finest Hour 34
Home Security the Chancellor of the Exchequer theSecretaries of State for the Dominions and for India theMinister of Information the Chiefs of Staff and the officialhead of the Foreign Office At these meetings each Chief ofStaff in turn unfolded his account of all that had happenedduring the previous seven days and the Foreign Secretaryfollowed them with his story of any important developmentsin foreign affairs On other days of the week the WarCabinet sat alone and all important matters requiringdecision were brought before them Other Ministersprimarily concerned with the subjects to be discussedattended for their own particular problems The members ofthe War Cabinet had the fullest circulation of all papersaffecting the war and saw all important telegrams sent byme As confidence grew the War Cabinet intervened lessactively in operational matters though they watched themwith close attention and full knowledge They took almostthe whole weight of Home and Party affairs off myshoulders thus setting me free to concentrate upon themain theme With regard to all future operations ofimportance I always consulted them in good time but whilethey gave careful consideration to the issues involved theyfrequently asked not to be informed of dates and detailsand indeed on several occasions stopped me when I wasabout to unfold these to themI had never intended to embody the office of Minister ofDefence in a Department This would have requiredlegislation and all the delicate adjustments I havedescribed most of which settled themselves by personalgood will would have had to be thrashed out in a processof ill-timed constitution-making There was however inexistence and activity under the personal direction of thePrime Minister the Military Wing of the War CabinetSecretariat which had in pre-war days been the Secretariat
Their Finest Hour 35
of the Committee of Imperial Defence At the head of thisstood General Ismay with Colonel Hollis and Colonel Jacobas his two principals and a group of specially selectedyounger officers drawn from all three Services ThisSecretariat became the staff of the Office of the Minister ofDefence My debt to its members is immeasurable GeneralIsmay Colonel Hollis and Colonel Jacob rose steadily inrank and repute as the war proceeded and none of themwas changed Displacements in a sphere so intimate andso concerned with secret matters are detrimental tocontinuous and efficient despatch of businessAfter some early changes almost equal stability waspreserved in the Chiefs of Staff Committee On the expiry ofhis term as Chief of the Air Staff in September 1940 AirMarshal Newall became Governor-General of NewZealand and was succeeded by Air Marshal Portal whowas the accepted star of the Air Force Portal remained withme throughout the war Sir John Dill who had succeededGeneral Ironside in May 1940 remained CIGS until heaccompanied me to Washington in December 1941 I thenmade him my personal Military Representative with thePresident and head of our Joint Staff Mission His relationswith General Marshall Chief of Staff of the United StatesArmy became a priceless link in all our business and whenhe died in harness some two years later he was accordedthe unique honour of a resting-place in Arlington Cemeterythe Valhalla hitherto reserved exclusively for Americanwarriors He was succeeded as CIGS by Sir Alan Brookewho stayed with me till the endFrom 1941 for nearly four years the early part of whichwas passed in much misfortune and disappointment theonly change made in this small band either among theChiefs or in the Defence Staff was due to the death inharness of Admiral Pound This may well be a record in
Their Finest Hour 36
British military history A similar degree of continuity wasachieved by President Roosevelt in his own circle TheUnited States Chiefs of Staff mdash General Marshall AdmiralKing and General Arnold subsequently joined by AdmiralLeahy mdash started together on the American entry into thewar and were never changed As both the British andAmericans presently formed the Combined Chiefs of StaffCommittee this was an inestimable advantage for allNothing like it between allies has ever been known beforeI cannot say that we never differed among ourselves evenat home but a kind of understanding grew up between meand the British Chiefs of Staff that we should convince andpersuade rather than try to overrule each other This wasof course helped by the fact that we spoke the sametechnical language and possessed a large common bodyof military doctrine and war experience In this ever-changing scene we moved as one and the War Cabinetclothed us with ever more discretion and sustained us withunwearied and unflinching constancy There was nodivision as in the previous war between politicians andsoldiers between the ldquoFrocksrdquo and the ldquoBrass Hatsrdquomdashodious terms which darkened counsel We came very closetogether indeed and friendships were formed which Ibelieve were deeply valuedThe efficiency of a war administration depends mainly uponwhether decisions emanating from the highest approvedauthority are in fact strictly faithfully and punctuallyobeyed This we achieved in Britain in this time of crisisowing to the intense fidelity comprehension and whole-hearted resolve of the War Cabinet upon the essentialpurpose to which we had devoted ourselves According tothe directions given ships troops and aeroplanes movedand the wheels of factories spun By all these processesand by the confidence indulgence and loyalty by which I
Their Finest Hour 37
was upborne I was soon able to give an integral directionto almost every aspect of the war This was reallynecessary because times were so very bad The methodwas accepted because everyone realised how near weredeath and ruin Not only individual death which is theuniversal experience stood near but incomparably morecommanding the life of Britain her message and her glory
Any account of the methods of government whichdeveloped under the National Coalition would beincomplete without an explanation of the series of personalmessages which I sent to the President of the United Statesand the heads of other foreign countries and the DominionGovernments This correspondence must be describedHaving obtained from the Cabinet any specific decisionsrequired on policy I composed and dictated thesedocuments myself for the most part on the basis that theywere intimate and informal correspondence with friends andfellow-workers One can usually put onersquos thought better inonersquos own words It was only occasionally that I read thetext to the Cabinet beforehand Knowing their views I usedthe ease and freedom needed for the doing of my work Iwas of course hand-in-glove with the Foreign Secretary andhis Department and any differences of view were settledtogether I circulated these telegrams in some cases afterthey had been sent to the principal members of the WarCabinet and where he was concerned to the DominionsSecretary Before despatching them I of course had mypoints and facts checked departmentally and nearly allmilitary messages passed through Ismayrsquos hands to theChiefs of Staff This correspondence in no way ran counterto the official communications or the work of theAmbassadors It became however in fact the channel of
Their Finest Hour 38
much vital business and played a part in my conduct of thewar not less and sometimes even more important than myduties as Minister of DefenceThe very select circle who were entirely free to expresstheir opinion were almost invariably content with the draftsand gave me an increasing measure of confidenceDifferences with American authorities for instanceinsuperable at the second level were settled often in a fewhours by direct contact at the top Indeed as time went onthe efficacy of this top-level transaction of business was soapparent that I had to be careful not to let it become avehicle for ordinary departmental affairs I had repeatedly torefuse the requests of my colleagues to address PresidentRoosevelt personally on important matters of detail Hadthese intruded unduly upon the personal correspondencethey would soon have destroyed its privacy andconsequently its valueMy relations with the President gradually became so closethat the chief business between our two countries wasvirtually conducted by these personal interchanges betweenhim and me In this way our perfect understanding wasgained As Head of the State as well as Head of theGovernment Roosevelt spoke and acted with authority inevery sphere and carrying the War Cabinet with me Irepresented Great Britain with almost equal latitude Thus avery high degree of concert was obtained and the saving intime and the reduction in the number of people informedwere both invaluable I sent my cables to the AmericanEmbassy in London which was in direct touch with thePresident at the White House through special codingmachines The speed with which answers were receivedand things settled was aided by clock-time Any messagewhich I prepared in the evening night or even up to twoorsquoclock in the morning would reach the President before he
Their Finest Hour 39
went to bed and very often his answer would come back tome when I woke the next morning In all I sent him ninehundred and fifty messages and received about eighthundred in reply I felt I was in contact with a very greatman who was also a warmhearted friend and the foremostchampion of the high causes which we served
The Cabinet being favourable to my trying to obtaindestroyers from the American Government I drafted duringthe afternoon of May 15 my first message to PresidentRoosevelt since I became Prime Minister To preserve thecontinuity of our correspondence I signed myself ldquoFormerNaval Personrdquo and to this fancy I adhered almost withoutexception throughout the war
Although I have changed my office I am sure youwould not wish me to discontinue our intimate privatecorrespondence As you are no doubt aware the scenehas darkened swiftly The enemy have a markedpreponderance in the air and their new technique ismaking a deep impression upon the French I thinkmyself the battle on land has only just begun and Ishould like to see the masses engage Up to thepresent Hitler is working with specialised units in tanksand air The small countries are simply smashed upone by one like matchwood We must expect though itis not yet certain that Mussolini will hurry in to sharethe loot of civilisation We expect to be attacked hereourselves both from the air and by parachute and air-borne troops in the near future and are getting readyfor them If necessary we shall continue the war aloneand we are not afraid of that
But I trust you realise Mr President that the voiceand force of the United States may count for nothing ifthey are withheld too long You may have a completelysubjugated Nazified Europe established withastonishing swiftness and the weight may be more
Their Finest Hour 40
than we can bear All I ask now is that you shouldproclaim nonbelligerency which would mean that youwould help us with everything short of actuallyengaging armed forces Immediate needs are First ofall the loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers tobridge the gap between what we have now and thelarge new construction we put in hand at the beginningof the war This time next year we shall have plentyBut if in the interval Italy comes in against us withanother one hundred submarines we may be strainedto breaking-point Secondly we want several hundredof the latest types of aircraft of which you are nowgetting delivery These can be repaid by those nowbeing constructed in the United States for us Thirdlyanti-aircraft equipment and ammunition of which againthere will be plenty next year if we are alive to see itFourthly the fact that our ore supply is being compro-mised from Sweden from North Africa and perhapsfrom Northern Spain makes it necessary to purchasesteel in the United States This also applies to othermaterials We shall go on paying dollars for as long aswe can but I should like to feel reasonably sure thatwhen we can pay no more you will give us the stuff allthe same Fifthly we have many reports of possibleGerman parachute or air-borne descents in IrelandThe visit of a United States Squadron to Irish portswhich might well be prolonged would be invaluableSixthly I am looking to you to keep the Japanese quietin the Pacific using Singapore in any way convenientThe details of the material which we have in hand willbe communicated to you separately
With all good wishes and respect
On May 18 a reply was received from the Presidentwelcoming the continuance of our private correspondenceand dealing with my specific requests The loan or gift ofthe forty or fifty older destroyers it was stated wouldrequire the authorisation of Congress and the moment wasnot opportune He would facilitate to the utmost the AlliedGovernments obtaining the latest types of United States
Their Finest Hour 41
aircraft anti-aircraft equipment ammunition and steel Inall this the representations of our agent the highlycompetent and devoted Mr Purvis (presently to give his lifein an air accident) would receive most favourableconsideration The President would consider carefully mysuggestion that a United States Squadron might visit Irishports About the Japanese he merely pointed to theconcentration of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbour
On Monday May 13 I asked the House of Commonswhich had been specially summoned for a vote ofconfidence in the new Administration After reporting theprogress which had been made in filling the various officesI said ldquoI have nothing to offer but blood toil tears andsweatrdquo In all our long history no Prime Minister had everbeen able to present to Parliament and the nation aprogramme at once so short and so popular I endedIn response to You ask what is our policy I will say It is towage war by sea land and air with all our might and withall the strength that God can give us to wage war against amonstrous tyranny never surpassed in the darklamentable catalogue of human crime That is our policyYou ask What is our aim I can answer in one wordVictory mdash victory at all costs victory in spite of all terrorvictory however long and hard the road may be for withoutvictory there is no survival Let that be realised no survivalfor the British Empire no survival for all that the BritishEmpire has stood for no survival for the urge and impulseof the ages that mankind will move forward towards itsgoal But I take up my task with buoyancy and hope I feelsure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among menAt this time I feel entitled to claim the aid of all and I say
Their Finest Hour 42
ldquoCome then let us go forward together with our unitedstrengthrdquoUpon these simple issues the House voted unanimouslyand adjourned till May 21
Thus then we all started on our common task Never did aBritish Prime Minister receive from Cabinet colleagues theloyal and true aid which I enjoyed during the next five yearsfrom these men of all Parties in the State Parliament whilemaintaining free and active criticism gave continuousoverwhelming support to all measures proposed by theGovernment and the nation was united and ardent asnever before It was well indeed that this should be sobecause events were to come upon us of an order moreterrible than anyone had foreseen
Their Finest Hour 43
2The Battle of France Gamelin The
First Week May 10 to May 16
Plan DmdashThe German Order of BattlemdashGermanand French ArmourmdashFrench and British AdvanceThrough BelgiummdashHolland Overrun mdash TheBelgian ProblemmdashAccepted Primacy of France inthe Military ArtmdashThe Gap in the ArdennesmdashBritishDifficulties During the Twilight War Phase mdashProgress of Plan DmdashBad News of May 13 and 14mdashKleistrsquos Group of Armies Break the French FrontmdashHeavy British Air LossesmdashOur Final Limit forHome DefencemdashReynaud Telephones MeMorning of May 15 mdash Destruction of the FrenchNinth Army Opposite the Ardennes GapmdashldquoCeaseFirerdquo in Holland mdash The Italian MenacemdashI Fly toParismdashMeeting at the Quai DrsquoOrsaymdashGeneralGamelinrsquos StatementmdashNo Strategic ReserveldquoAucunerdquomdashProposed Attacks on the GermanldquoBulgerdquomdashFrench Demands for More British FighterSquadronsmdashMy Telegram to the Cabinet on theNight of May 16 mdash Cabinet Agrees to Send TenMore Fighter Squadrons
AT THE MOMENT in the evening of May 10 when I becameresponsible no fresh decision about meeting the Germaninvasion of the Low Countries was required from me orfrom my colleagues in the new and still unformedAdministration We had long been assured that the Frenchand British staffs were fully agreed upon General Gamelinrsquos
Their Finest Hour 44
Plan D and it had already been in action since dawn Infact by the morning of the 11th the whole vast operationhad made great progress On the seaward flank GeneralGiraudrsquos Seventh French Army had already begun itsadventurous dash into Holland In the centre the Britisharmoured-car patrols of the 12th Lancers were upon theriver Dyle and to the south of our front all the rest ofGeneral Billottersquos First Group of Armies were hasteningforward to the Meuse The opinion of the Allied militarychiefs was that Plan D if successful would save anythingfrom twelve to fifteen divisions by shortening the frontagainst Germany and then of course there was theBelgian Army of twenty-two divisions besides the DutchArmy of ten divisions without which our total forces in theWest were numerically inferior I did not therefore in theslightest degree wish to interfere with the military plans andawaited with hope the impending shockNevertheless if in the after-light we look back upon thescene the important paper written by the British Chiefs ofStaff on September 181 1939 becomes prominent In thisit had been affirmed that unless the Belgians wereeffectively holding their front on the Meuse and the AlbertCanal it would be wrong for the British and French to rushto their aid but that they should rather stand firm on theFrench frontier or at the most swing their left hand slightlyforward to the line of the Scheldt Since those days ofSeptember 1939 agreement had been reached to carryout General Gamelinrsquos Plan D Nothing had howeverhappened in the interval to weaken the original view of theBritish Chiefs of Staff On the contrary much had happenedto strengthen it The German Army had grown in strengthand maturity with every month that had passed and theynow had a vastly more powerful armour The French Armygnawed by Soviet-inspired Communism and chilled by the
Their Finest Hour 45
long cheerless winter on the front had actuallydeteriorated The Belgian Government staking theircountryrsquos life upon Hitlerrsquos respect for international law andBelgian neutrality had not achieved any effective jointplanning between their army chiefs and those of the AlliesThe anti-tank obstacles and defensive line which were tohave been prepared on the front Namur-Louvain wereinadequate and unfinished The Belgian Army whichcontained many brave and resolute men could hardlybrace itself for a conflict for fear of offending neutrality TheBelgian front had been in fact overrun at many points bythe first wave of German assault even before GeneralGamelin gave the signal to execute his long-prepared planThe most that could now be hoped for was success in thatvery ldquoencounter battlerdquo which the French High Commandhad declared itself resolved to avoidOn the outbreak of the war eight months before the mainpower of the German Army and Air Force had beenconcentrated on the invasion and conquest of PolandAlong the whole of the Western Front from Aix-la-Chapelleto the Swiss frontier there had stood 42 German divisionswithout armour After the French mobilisation France coulddeploy the equivalent of 70 divisions opposite to them Forreasons which have been explained it was not deemedpossible to attack the Germans then Very different was thesituation on May 10 1940 The enemy profiting by theeight monthsrsquo delay and by the destruction of Poland hadarmed equipped and trained about 155 divisions of whichten were armoured (ldquoPanzerrdquo) Hitlerrsquos agreement withStalin had enabled him to reduce the German forces in theEast to the smallest proportions Opposite Russiaaccording to General Halder the German Chief of Staffthere was ldquono more than a light covering force scarcely fitfor collecting customs dutiesrdquo Without premonition of their
Their Finest Hour 46
own future the Soviet Government watched the destructionof that ldquoSecond Frontrdquo in the West for which they were soonto call so vehemently and to wait in agony so long Hitlerwas therefore in a position to deliver his onslaught onFrance with 126 divisions and the whole of the immensearmour weapon of ten Panzer divisions comprising nearlythree thousand armoured vehicles of which a thousand atleast were heavy tanksThese mighty forces were deployed from the North Sea toSwitzerland in the following order
Army Group B comprising 28 divisions underGeneral von Bock marshalled along the front from theNorth Sea to Aixla-Chapelle was to overrun Hollandand Belgium and thereafter advance into France asthe German right wing
Army Group A of 44 divisions under General vonRundstedt constituting the main thrust was rangedalong the front from Aix-la-Chapelle to the Moselle
Army Group C of 17 divisions under General vonLeeb held the Rhine from the Moselle to the Swissfrontier
The OKH (Supreme Army Command) Reserve consistedof about 47 divisions of which 20 were in immediatereserve bexhind the various Army Groups and 27 ingeneral reserveOpposite this array the exact strength and disposition ofwhich was of course unknown to us the First Group ofArmies under General Billotte consisting of 51 divisions ofwhich 9 were held in GQG (Grand Quartier GeacuteneacuteralReserve) including 9 British divisions stretched from theend of the Maginot Line near Longwy to the Belgian frontierand behind the frontiers to the sea in front of Dunkirk TheSecond and Third Groups of Armies under GeneralsPreacutetelat and Besson consisting with the reserves of 43
Their Finest Hour 47
divisions guarded the French frontier from Longwy toSwitzerland In addition the French had the equivalent of 9divisions occupying the Maginot Line ndash a total of 103divisions If the armies of Belgium and Holland becameinvolved this number would be increased by 22 Belgianand 10 Dutch divisions As both these countries wereimmediately attacked the grand total of Allied divisions ofall qualities nominally available on May 10 was therefore135 or practically the same number as we now know theenemy possessed Properly organised and equipped welltrained and led this force should according to thestandards of the previous war have had a good chance ofbringing the invasion to a stopHowever the Germans had full freedom to choose themoment the direction and the strength of their attackMore than half of the French Army stood on the southernand eastern sectors of France and the fifty-one French andBritish divisions of General Billottersquos Army Group No 1 withwhatever Belgian and Dutch aid was forthcoming had toface the onslaught of upwards of seventy hostile divisionsunder Bock and Rundstedt between Longwy and the seaThe combination of the almost cannon-proof tank and dive-bomber aircraft which had proved so successful in Polandon a smaller scale was again to form the spearhead of themain attack and a group of five Panzer and threemotorised divisions under Kleist included in Germany ArmyGroup A was directed through the Ardennes on Sedan andMonthermeacuteTo meet such modern forms of war the French deployedabout 2300 tanks mostly light Their armoured formationsincluded some powerful modern types but more than halftheir total armoured strength was held in dispersedbattalions of light tanks for co-operation with the infantryTheir six armoured divisions with which alone they could
Their Finest Hour 48
have countered the massed Panzer assault were widelydistributed over the front and could not be collectedtogether to operate in coherent action Britain thebirthplace of the tank had only just completed the formationand training of her first armoured division (328 tanks) whichwas still in EnglandThe German fighter aircraft now concentrated in the Westwere far superior to the French in numbers and quality TheBritish Air Force in France comprised the ten fightersquadrons (Hurricanes) which could be spared from vitalHome Defence eight squadrons of Battles six ofBlenheims and five of Lysanders Neither the French northe British air authorities had equipped themselves withdive-bombers which at this time as in Poland becameprominent and were to play an important part in thedemoralisation of the French infantry and particularly oftheir coloured troopsDuring the night of 910 May heralded by widespread airattacks against airfields communications headquartersand magazines all the German forces in the Bock andRundstedt Army Groups sprang forward towards Franceacross the frontiers of Belgium Holland and LuxembourgComplete tactical surprise was achieved in nearly everycase Out of the darkness came suddenly innumerableparties of well-armed ardent storm troops often with lightartillery and long before daybreak a hundred and fifty milesof front were aflame Holland and Belgium assaultedwithout the slightest pretext of warning cried aloud for helpThe Dutch had trusted to their water-line all the sluices notseized or betrayed were opened and the Dutch frontierguards fired upon the invaders The Belgians succeeded indestroying the bridges of the Meuse but the Germanscaptured intact two across the Albert Canal
Their Finest Hour 49
By Plan D the First Allied Army Group under GeneralBillotte with its small but very fine British army was fromthe moment when the Germans violated the frontier toadvance east into Belgium It was intended to forestall theenemy and stand on the line Meuse-Louvain-Antwerp Infront of that line along the Meuse and the Albert Canal laythe main Belgian forces Should these stem the firstGerman onrush the Army Group would support them Itseemed more probable that the Belgians would be at oncethrown back onto the Allied line And this in facthappened It was assumed that in this case the Belgianresistance would give a short breathing-space during whichthe French and British could organise their new positionExcept on the critical front of the French Ninth Army thiswas accomplished On the extreme left or seaward flankthe Seventh French Army was to seize the islandscommanding the mouth of the Scheldt and if possible toassist the Dutch by an advance toward Breda It wasthought that on our southern flank the Ardennes wereimpassable for large modern armies and south of thatagain began the regular fortified Maginot Line stretchingout to the Rhine and along the Rhine to Switzerland Alltherefore seemed to depend upon the forward left-handedcounterstroke of the Allied Northern Armies This againhung upon the speed with which Belgium could beoccupied Everything had been worked out in this way withthe utmost detail and only a signal was necessary to hurlforward the Allied force of well over a million men At 530 AM on May 10 Lord Gort received a message from GeneralGeorges ordering ldquoAlertes 1 2 and 3rdquo namely instantreadiness to move into Belgium At 645 AM GeneralGamelin ordered the execution of Plan D and the long-prepared scheme of the French High Command to which
Their Finest Hour 50
the British had subordinated themselves came at once intoaction
Their Finest Hour 51
Their Finest Hour 52
Mr Colijn when as Dutch Prime Minister he visited me in1937 had explained to me the marvellous efficiency of theDutch inundations He could he explained by a telephonemessage from the luncheon table at Chartwell press abutton which would confront an invader with impassablewater obstacles But all this was nonsense The power of agreat State against a small one under modern conditions isoverwhelming The Germans broke through at every pointbridging the canals or seizing the locks and water-controlsIn a single day all the outer line of the Dutch defences wasmastered At the same time the German Air Force began touse its might upon a defenceless country The Dutch hopethat they would be bypassed by the German right-handedswing as in the former war was vainThe case of Belgium requires more searching statementSeveral hundreds of thousands of British and Frenchgraves in Belgium mark the struggle of the previous warThe policy of Belgium in the years between the wars hadnot taken sufficient account of the past The Belgianleaders saw with worried eyes the internal weakness ofFrance and the vacillating pacifism of Britain They clung toa strict neutrality In the years before they were againinvaded their attitude towards the two mighty arrays whichconfronted each other was officially at any rate quiteimpartial Great allowance must be made for the fearfulproblems of a small State in such a plight but the FrenchHigh Command had for years spoken bitterly of the linetaken by the Belgian Government Their only chance ofdefending their frontier against a German attack lay in aclose alliance with France and Britain The line of the AlbertCanal and other water fronts was highly defensible andhad the British and French armies aided by the Belgian
Their Finest Hour 53
armies after the declaration of war been drawn up on theBelgian frontiers in good time a very strong offensive mighthave been prepared and launched from these positionsagainst Germany But the Belgian Government deemedthat their safety lay in the most rigid neutrality and theironly hope was founded on German good faith and respectfor treatiesEven after Britain and France had entered into war it wasimpossible to persuade them to rejoin the old alliance Theydeclared they would defend their neutrality to the deathand placed nine-tenths of their forces on their Germanfrontier while at the same time they strictly forbade theAnglo-French Army to enter their country and makeeffective preparations for their defence or for forestallingcounter-strokes The construction of new lines and the anti-tank ditch during the winter of 1939 by the British armieswith the French First Army on their right along the Franco-Belgian frontier had been the only measure open to us It isa haunting question whether the whole policy of Plan Dshould not have been reviewed upon this basis andwhether we would not have been wiser to stand and fighton the French frontier and amid these strong defencesinvite the Belgian Army to fall back upon them rather thanmake the hazardous and hurried forward leap to the Dyle orthe Albert Canal
No one can understand the decisions of that period withoutrealising the immense authority wielded by the Frenchmilitary leaders and the belief of every French officer thatFrance had the primacy in the military art France hadconducted and carried the main weight of the terrible landfighting from 1914 to 1918 She had lost fourteen hundred
Their Finest Hour 54
thousand men killed Foch had held the supremecommand and the great British and Imperial armies of sixtyor seventy divisions had been placed like the Americansunreservedly under his orders Now the BritishExpeditionary Army numbered but three or four hundredthousand men spread from the bases at Havre and alongthe coast forward to the line compared with nearly ahundred French divisions or over two million Frenchmenactually holding the long front from Belgium to SwitzerlandIt was natural therefore that we should place ourselvesunder their command and that their judgment should beaccepted It had been expected that General Georgeswould take full command of the French and British armiesin the field from the moment when war was declared andGeneral Gamelin was expected to retire to an advisoryposition on the French Military Council However GeneralGamelin was averse from yielding his control asGeneralissimo He retained the supreme direction Avexatious conflict of authority took place between him andGeneral Georges during the eight monthsrsquo lull GeneralGeorges in my opinion never had the chance to make thestrategic plan in its integrity and on his own responsibilityThe British General Staff and our headquarters in the fieldhad long been anxious about the gap between the northernend of the Maginot Line and the beginning of the Britishfortified front along the Franco-Belgian frontier Mr Hore-Belisha the Secretary of State for War raised the point inthe War Cabinet on several occasions Representationswere made through military channels Consideringhowever our relatively small contribution the Cabinet andour military leaders were naturally shy of criticising thosewhose armies were ten times as strong as our own TheFrench thought that the Ardennes were impassable forlarge modern armies Marshal Peacutetain had told the Senate
Their Finest Hour 55
Army Commission ldquoThis sector is not dangerousrdquo A greatdeal of field work was done along the Meuse but nothinglike a strong line of pillboxes and anti-tank obstacles suchas the British had made along the Belgian sector wasattempted Moreover General Coraprsquos Ninth French Armywas mainly composed of troops who were definitely belowthe French standards Out of its nine divisions two were ofcavalry partly mechanised one was a fortress division two(61st and 53d) belonged to a secondary category two (22dand 18th) were not much inferior to active divisions onlytwo were divisions of the permanent regular army Herethen from Sedan to Hirson on the Oise along a front of fiftymiles there were no permanent fortifications and only twodivisions of professional troopsOne cannot be strong everywhere It is often right andnecessary to hold long sectors of a frontier with lightcovering forces but this of course should be only with theobject of gathering larger reserves for counter-attacks whenthe enemyrsquos striking-points are revealed The spreading offorty-three divisions or half the mobile French army fromLongwy to the Swiss frontier the whole of which was eitherdefended by the Maginot Line forts or by the broad swift-flowing Rhine with its own fortress system behind it wasan improvident disposition The risks that have to be run bythe defender are more trying than those which an assailantwho is presumably the stronger at the point of attack mustdare Where very long fronts are concerned they can onlybe met by strong mobile reserves which can rapidlyintervene in a decisive battle A weight of opinion supportsthe criticism that the French reserves were inadequateand such as they were badly distributed After all the gapbehind the Ardennes opened the shortest road fromGermany to Paris and had for centuries been a famousbattleground If the enemy penetrated here the whole
Their Finest Hour 56
forward movement of the Northern Armies would bedeprived of its pivot and all their communications would beendangered equally with the capitalLooking back we can see that Mr Chamberlainrsquos WarCabinet in which I served and for whose acts or neglects Itake my full share of responsibility ought not to have beendeterred from thrashing the matter out with the French inthe autumn and winter of 1939 It would have been anunpleasant and difficult argument for the French at everystage could say ldquoWhy do you not send more troops of yourown Will you not take over a wider sector of the front Ifreserves are lacking pray supply them We have fivemillion men mobilised2 We follow your ideas about the warat sea we conform to the plans of the British AdmiraltyPray show a proper confidence in the French Army and inour historic mastery of the art of war on landrdquoNevertheless we ought to have done itHitler and his generals were in little doubt as to the militaryviews and general arrangements of their opponents Duringthis same autumn and winter the German factories hadpoured out tanks the plants for making which must havebeen well advanced at the Munich crisis in 1938 and boreabundant fruit in the eight months that had passed sincewar began They were not at all deterred by the physicaldifficulties of traversing the Ardennes On the contrary theybelieved that modern mechanical transport and vastorganised road-making capacity would make this regionhitherto deemed impassable the shortest surest andeasiest method of penetrating France and of rupturing thewhole French scheme of counter-attack Accordingly theGerman Supreme Army Command (OKH) planned theirenormous onrush through the Ardennes to sever the curlingleft arm of the Allied Northern Armies at the shoulder-joint
Their Finest Hour 57
The movement though on a far larger scale and withdifferent speeds and weapons was not unlike Napoleonrsquosthrust at the Plateau of Pratzen in the battle of Austerlitzwhereby the entire Austro-Russian turning move was cut offand ruined and their centre broken
At the signal the Northern Armies sprang to the rescue ofBelgium and poured forward along all the roads amid thecheers of the inhabitants The first phase of Plan D wascompleted by May 12 The French held the left bank of theMeuse to Huy and their light forces beyond the river werefalling back before increasing enemy pressure Thearmoured divisions of the French First Army reached theline Huy-Hannut-Tirle-mont The Belgians having lost theAlbert Canal were falling back to the line of the river Getteand taking up their prescribed position from Antwerp toLouvain They still held Lieacutege and Namur The FrenchSeventh Army had occupied the islands of Walcheren andSouth Beveland and were engaged with mechanised unitsof the German Eighteenth Army on the line Herenthals ndashBergen-op-Zoom So rapid had been the advance of theFrench Seventh Army that it had already outrun itsammunition supplies The superiority in quality though notin numbers of the British Air Force was already apparentThus up till the night of the 12th there was no reason tosuppose that the operations were not going well
Their Finest Hour 58
Their Finest Hour 59
However during the 13th Lord Gortrsquos Headquartersbecame aware of the weight of the German thrust on thefront of the French Ninth Army By nightfall the enemy hadestablished themselves on the west bank of the Meuse oneither side of Dinant and Sedan The French GQG (GrandQuartier General) were not yet certain whether the mainGerman effort was directed through Luxembourg againstthe left of the Maginot Line or through Maastricht towardsBrussels Along the whole front Louvain-Namur-Dinant toSedan an intense heavy battle had developed but underconditions which General Gamelin had not contemplatedfor at Dinant the French Ninth Army had no time to installthemselves before the enemy was upon them
During the 14th the bad news began to come in At first allwas vague At 7 PM I read to the Cabinet a messagereceived from M Reynaud stating that the Germans hadbroken through at Sedan that the French were unable toresist the combination of tanks and dive-bombing andasking for ten more squadrons of fighters to re-establish theline Other messages received by the Chiefs of Staff gavesimilar information and added that both Generals Gamelinand Georges took a serious view of the situation and thatGeneral Gamelin was surprised at the rapidity of theenemyrsquos advance In fact Kleistrsquos Group with its immensemass of armour heavy and light had completely scatteredor destroyed the French troops on their immediate frontand could now move forward at a pace never before knownin war At almost all points where the armies had come incontact the weight and fury of the German attack wasoverpowering They crossed the Meuse in the Dinant sectorwith two more armoured divisions To the north the fighting
Their Finest Hour 60
on the front of the French First Army had been mostsevere The First and Second British Corps were still inposition from Wavre to Louvain where our Third Divisionunder General Montgomery had had sharp fighting Farthernorth the Belgians were retiring to the Antwerp defencesThe French Seventh Army on the seaward flank wasrecoiling even quicker than it had advancedFrom the moment of the invasion we began ldquoOperationRoyal Marinerdquo the launching of the fluvial mines into theRhine and in the first week of the battle nearly 1700 wereldquostreamedrdquo3 They produced immediate results Practicallyall river traffic between Karlsruhe and Mainz wassuspended and extensive damage was done to theKarlsruhe barrage and a number of pontoon bridges Thesuccess of this device was however lost in the deluge ofdisasterAll the British air squadrons fought continuously theirprincipal effort being against the pontoon bridges in theSedan area Several of these were destroyed and othersdamaged in desperate and devoted attacks The losses inthe low-level attacks on the bridges from the German anti-aircraft artillery were cruel In one case of six aircraft onlyone returned from the successful task On this day alonewe lost a total of sixty-seven machines and being engagedprincipally with the enemyrsquos anti-aircraft forces accountedfor only fifty-three German aircraft That night thereremained in France of the Royal Air Force only 206serviceable aircraft out of 474This detailed information came only gradually to hand But itwas already clear that the continuance of fighting on thisscale would soon completely consume the British Air Forcein spite of its individual ascendancy The hard question ofhow much we could send from Britain without leaving
Their Finest Hour 61
ourselves defenceless and thus losing the power tocontinue the war pressed itself henceforward upon us Ourown natural promptings and many weighty militaryarguments lent force to the incessant vehement Frenchappeals On the other hand there was a limit and that limitif transgressed would cost us our lifeAt this time all these issues were discussed by the wholeWar Cabinet which met several times a day Air ChiefMarshal Dowding at the head of our metropolitan fightercommand had declared to me that with twenty-fivesquadrons of fighters he could defend the island against thewhole might of the German Air Force but that with less hewould be overpowered This would have entailed not onlythe destruction of all our airfields and our air power but ofthe aircraft factories on which our whole future hung Mycolleagues and I were resolved to run all risks for the sakeof the battle up to that limit ndash and those risks were verygreat ndash but not to go beyond it no matter what theconsequences might beAbout half-past seven on the morning of the 15th I waswoken up with the news that M Reynaud was on thetelephone at my bedside He spoke in English andevidently under stress ldquoWe have been defeatedrdquo As I didnot immediately respond he said again ldquoWe are beaten wehave lost the battlerdquo I said ldquoSurely it canrsquot have happenedso soonrdquo But he replied ldquoThe front is broken near Sedanthey are pouring through in great numbers with tanks andarmoured carsrdquondash or words to that effect I then said ldquoAllexperience shows that the offensive will come to an endafter a while I remember the 21st of March 1918 After fiveor six days they have to halt for supplies and theopportunity for counterattack is presented I learned all thisat the time from the lips of Marshal Foch himselfrdquo Certainlythis was what we had always seen in the past and what we
Their Finest Hour 62
ought to have seen now However the French Premiercame back to the sentence with which he had begun whichproved indeed only too true ldquoWe are defeated we havelost the battlerdquo I said I was willing to come over and have atalkOn this day the French Ninth Army Coraprsquos was in a stateof complete dissolution and its remnants were divided upbetween General Giraud of the Seventh French Army whotook over from Corap in the north and the headquarters ofthe Sixth French Army which was forming in the south Agap of some fifty miles had in fact been punched in theFrench line through which the vast mass of enemy armourwas pouring By the evening of the 15th German armouredcars were reported to be in Liart and Montcornet the lattersixty miles behind the original front The French First Armywas also pierced on a five-thousand yards front south ofLimal Farther north all attacks on the British were repulsedThe German attack and the retirement of the Frenchdivision on their right compelled the making of a Britishdefensive flank facing south The French Seventh Armyhad retreated into the Antwerp defences west of theScheldt and was being driven out of the islands ofWalcheren and South BevelandOn this day also the struggle in Holland came to an endOwing to the ldquoCease Firerdquo order given by the Dutch HighCommand at 11 AM only a very few Dutch troops couldbe evacuatedOf course this picture presented a general impression ofdefeat I had seen a good deal of this sort of thing in theprevious war and the idea of the line being broken evenon a broad front did not convey to my mind the appallingconsequences that now flowed from it Not having hadaccess to official information for so many years I did not
Their Finest Hour 63
comprehend the violence of the revolution effected sincethe last war by the incursion of a mass of fast-movingheavy armour I knew about it but it had not altered myinward convictions as it should have done There wasnothing I could have done if it had I rang up GeneralGeorges who seemed quite cool and reported that thebreach at Sedan was being plugged A telegram fromGeneral Gamelin also stated that although the positionbetween Namur and Sedan was serious he viewed thesituation with calm I reported Reynaudrsquos message andother news to the Cabinet at 11 AM the Chiefs of Staffbeing presentOn the 16th the German spearheads stood along the lineLa Capelle-Vervins-Marle-Laon and the vanguards of theGerman Fourteenth Corps were in support at Montcornetand Neufchacircteatl-sur-Aisne The fall of Laon confirmed thepenetration of over sixty miles inward upon us from thefrontier near Sedan Under this threat and the ever-increasing pressure on their own front the First FrenchArmy and the British Expeditionary Force were ordered towithdraw in three stages to the Scheldt Although none ofthese details were available even to the War Office and noclear view could be formed of what was happening thegravity of the crisis was obvious I felt it imperative to go toParis that afternoon My colleagues accepted the fact that Imust go and said they would look after everything at home
Their Finest Hour 64
We had to expect that the disastrous events on the frontwould bring new foes upon us Although there were noindications of a change in Italian policy the Minister ofShipping was given instructions to thin out the shipping inthe Mediterranean No more British ships were to comehomewards from Aden We had already diverted round theCape the first convoy carrying the Australian troops toEngland The Defence Committee were instructed toconsider action in the event of war with Italy particularlywith regard to Crete Schemes for evacuating civilians fromAden and Gibraltar were put into operation
At about 3 PM I flew to Paris in a Flamingo a Governmentpassenger plane of which there were three General Dill
Their Finest Hour 65
Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff came with me andIsmayIt was a good machine very comfortable and makingabout a hundred and sixty miles an hour As it wasunarmed an escort was provided but we soared off into arain-cloud and reached Le Bourget in little more than anhour From the moment we got out of the Flamingo it wasobvious that the situation was incomparably worse than wehad imagined The officers who met us told General Ismaythat the Germans were expected in Paris in a few days atmost After hearing at the Embassy about the position Idrove to the Quai drsquoOrsay arriving at 530 orsquoclock I wasconducted into one of its fine rooms Reynaud was thereDaladier Minister of National Defence and War andGeneral Gamelin Everybody was standing At no time didwe sit down around a table Utter dejection was written onevery face In front of Gamelin on a studentrsquos easel was amap about two yards square with a black ink linepurporting to show the Allied front In this line there wasdrawn a small but sinister bulge at SedanThe Commander-in-Chief briefly explained what hadhappened North and south of Sedan on a front of fifty orsixty miles the Germans had broken through The Frencharmy in front of them was destroyed or scattered A heavyonrush of armoured vehicles was advancing with unheard-of speed toward Amiens and Arras with the intentionapparently of reaching the coast at Abbeville orthereabouts Alternatively they might make for ParisBehind the armour he said eight or ten German divisionsall motorised were driving onwards making flanks forthemselves as they advanced against the two disconnectedFrench armies on either side The General talked perhapsfive minutes without anyone saying a word When hestopped there was a considerable silence I then asked
Their Finest Hour 66
ldquoWhere is the strategic reserverdquo and breaking into Frenchwhich I used indifferently (in every sense) ldquoOugrave est la massede manoeuvrerdquo General Gamelin turned to me and with ashake of the head and a shrug said ldquoAucunerdquoThere was another long pause Outside in the garden of theQuai drsquoOrsay clouds of smoke arose from large bonfiresand I saw from the window venerable officials pushingwheelbarrows of archives onto them Already therefore theevacuation of Paris was being preparedPast experience carries with its advantages the drawbackthat things never happen the same way again Otherwise Isuppose life would be too easy After all we had often hadour fronts broken before always we had been able to pullthings together and wear down the momentum of theassault But here were two new factors that I had neverexpected to have to face First the overrunning of thewhole of the communications and countryside by anirresistible incursion of the armoured vehicles and secondlyno strategic reserveldquoAucunerdquo I was dumbfounded Whatwere we to think of the great French Army and its highestchiefs It had never occurred to me that any commandershaving to defend five hundred miles of engaged front wouldhave left themselves unprovided with a mass ofmanoeuvre No one can defend with certainty so wide afront but when the enemy has committed himself to amajor thrust which breaks the line one can always haveone must always have a mass of divisions which marchesup in vehement counter-attack at the moment when the firstfury of the offensive has spent its forceWhat was the Maginot Line for It should have economisedtroops upon a large sector of the frontier not only offeringmany sally-ports for local counter-strokes but also enablinglarge forces to be held in reserve and this is the only way
Their Finest Hour 67
these things can be done But now there was no reserve Iadmit this was one of the greatest surprises I have had inmy life Why had I not known more about it even though Ihad been so busy at the Admiralty Why had the BritishGovernment and the War Office above all not known moreabout it It was no excuse that the French High Commandwould not impart their dispositions to us or to Lord Gortexcept in vague outline We had a right to know We oughtto have insisted Both armies were fighting in the linetogether I went back again to the window and the curlingwreaths of smoke from the bonfires of the State documentsof the French Republic Still the old gentlemen werebringing up their wheelbarrows and industriously castingtheir contents into the flamesThere was a considerable conversation in changing groupsaround the principals of which M Reynaud has published adetailed record I am represented as urging that thereshould be no withdrawal of the Northern Armies that on thecontrary they should counter-attack Certainly this was mymood But here was no considered military opinion4 Itmust be remembered that this was the first realisation wehad of the magnitude of the disaster or of the apparentFrench despair We were not conducting the operationsand our army which was only a tenth of the troops on thefront was serving under the French command I and theBritish officers with me were staggered at the evidentconviction of the French Commander-in-Chief and leadingMinisters that all was lost and in anything that I said I wasreacting violently against this There is however no doubtthat they were quite right and that the most rapid retreat tothe south was imperative This soon became obvious to allPresently General Gamelin was speaking again He wasdiscussing whether forces should now be gathered to strike
Their Finest Hour 68
at the flanks of the penetration or ldquoBulgerdquo as we calledsuch things later on Eight or nine divisions were beingwithdrawn from quiet parts of the front the Maginot Linethere were two or three armoured divisions which had notbeen engaged eight or nine more divisions were beingbrought from Africa and would arrive in the battle zoneduring the next fortnight or three weeks General Giraudhad been placed in command of the French army north ofthe gap The Germans would advance henceforwardthrough a corridor between two fronts on which warfare inthe fashion of 1917 and 1918 could be waged Perhaps theGermans could not maintain the corridor with its ever-increasing double flank guards to be built up and at thesame time nourish their armoured incursion Something inthis sense Gamelin seemed to say and all this was quitesound I was conscious however that it carried noconviction in this small but hitherto influential andresponsible company Presently I asked General Gamelinwhen and where he proposed to attack the flanks of theBulge His reply was ldquoInferiority of numbers inferiority ofequipment inferiority of methodrdquondashand then a hopelessshrug of the shoulders There was no argument there wasno need of argument And where were we British anywayhaving regard to our tiny contribution ndash ten divisions aftereight months of war and not even one modern tankdivision in actionThis was the last I saw of General Gamelin He was apatriotic well-meaning man and skilled in his professionand no doubt he has his tale to tell5
The burden of General Gamelinrsquos and indeed of all theFrench High Commandrsquos subsequent remarks was
Their Finest Hour 69
insistence on their inferiority in the air and earnestentreaties for more squadrons of the Royal Air Forcebomber as well as fighter but chiefly the latter This prayerfor fighter support was destined to be repeated at everysubsequent conference until France fell In the course of hisappeal General Gamelin said that fighters were needed notonly to give cover to the French Army but also to stop theGerman tanks At this I said ldquoNo It is the business of theartillery to stop the tanks The business of the fighters is tocleanse the skies (nettoyer le ciel) over the battlerdquo It wasvital that our metropolitan fighter air force should not bedrawn out of Britain on any account Our existence turnedon this Nevertheless it was necessary to cut to the boneIn the morning before I started the Cabinet had given meauthority to move four more squadrons of fighters toFrance On our return to the Embassy and after talking itover with Dill I decided to ask sanction for the despatch ofsix more This would leave us with only the twenty-fivefighter squadrons at home and that was the final limit Itwas a rending decision either way I told General Ismay totelephone to London that the Cabinet should assemble atonce to consider an urgent telegram which would be sentover in the course of the next hour or so Ismay did this inHindustani having previously arranged for an Indian Armyofficer to be standing by in his office This was my telegram
9 PM 16th May 1940I shall be glad if the Cabinet could meet immediately
to consider following Situation grave in the last degreeFurious German thrust through Sedan finds Frencharmies ill-grouped many in north others in Alsace Atleast four days required to bring twenty divisions tocover Paris and strike at the flanks of the Bulge whichis now fifty kilometres wide
Three [German] armoured divisions with two or threeinfantry divisions have advanced through gap and large
Their Finest Hour 70
masses hurrying forward behind them Two greatdangers therefore threaten First that BEF will belargely left in the air to make a difficult disengagementand retreat to the old line Secondly that the Germanthrust will wear down the French resistance before itcan be fully gathered
Orders given to defend Paris at all costs butarchives of the Quai drsquoOrsay already burning in thegarden I consider the next two three or four daysdecisive for Paris and probably for the French ArmyTherefore the question we must face is whether we cangive further aid in fighters above four squadrons forwhich the French are very grateful and whether alarger part of our long-range heavy bombers should beemployed tomorrow and the following nights upon theGerman masses crossing the Meuse and flowing intothe Bulge Even so results cannot be guaranteed butthe French resistance may be broken up as rapidly asthat of Poland unless this battle of the Bulge is won Ipersonally feel that we should send squadrons offighters demanded (ie six more) tomorrow andconcentrating all available French and British aviationdominate the air above the Bulge for the next two orthree days not for any local purpose but to give thelast chance to the French Army to rally its bravery andstrength It would not be good historically if theirrequests were denied and their ruin resulted Also nightbombardment by a strong force of heavy bombers canno doubt be arranged It looks as if the enemy was bynow fully extended both in the air and tanks We mustnot underrate the increasing difficulties of his advance ifstrongly counter-attacked I imagine that if all fails herewe could still shift what is left of our own air strikingforce to assist the BEF should it be forced towithdraw I again emphasise the mortal gravity of thehour and express my opinion as above Kindly informme what you will do Dill agrees I must have answer bymidnight in order to encourage the French Telephoneto Ismay at Embassy in Hindustani
Their Finest Hour 71
The reply came at about 1130 The Cabinet said ldquoYesrdquo Iimmediately took Ismay off with me in a car to MReynaudrsquos flat We found it more or less in darkness Afteran interval M Reynaud emerged from his bedroom in hisdressing-gown and I told him the favourable news Tenfighter squadrons I then persuaded him to send for MDaladier who was duly summoned and brought to the flatto hear the decision of the British Cabinet In this way Ihoped to revive the spirits of our French friends as muchas our limited means allowed Daladier never spoke a wordHe rose slowly from his chair and wrung my hand I gotback to the Embassy about 2 AM and slept well thoughthe cannon fire in petty aeroplane raids made one roll overfrom time to time In the morning I flew home and in spiteof other preoccupations pressed on with construction of thesecond level of the new Government
Their Finest Hour 72
Their Finest Hour 73
3The Battle of France The Second
Week Weygand May 17 to May 24
The Battle Crisis Grows mdash The Local DefenceVolunteers mdash Reinforcements from the East mdashMy Telegrams to President Roosevelt of May 18and May 20 mdashGeneral Gamelinrsquos Final Order No12 May 19 mdashGeneral Weygand Appointed mdashFrench Cabinet Changes mdash First Orders to theLittle Ships May 20 mdashldquoOperation DynamordquomdashWeygand Tours the Front mdash Billotte Killed in aMotor Accident mdash French Failure to Grapple withGerman Armour mdash Ironsidersquos Report May 21 mdashParliament Votes Extraordinary Powers to theGovernment mdash My Second Visit to Paris mdashWeygandrsquos Plan mdash Peril of the Northern Armiesmdash Fighting Round Arras mdash Correspondence withM Reynaud mdash Sir John Dill Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff
THE WAR CABINET met at 10 AM on the 17th and I gavethem an account of my visit to Paris and of the situation sofar as I could measure itI said I had told the French that unless they made asupreme effort we should not be justified in accepting thegrave risk to the safety of our country that we were incurringby the despatch of the additional fighter squadrons toFrance I felt that the question of air reinforcements wasone of the gravest that a British Cabinet had ever had toface It was claimed that the German air losses had been
Their Finest Hour 74
four or five times our own but I had been told that theFrench had only one-quarter of their fighter aircraft left Onthis day Gamelin thought the situation ldquolostrdquo and is reportedto have said ldquoI will guarantee the safety of Paris only fortoday tomorrow [the 18th] and the night followingrdquo InNorway it appeared that Narvik was likely to be captured byus at any moment but Lord Cork was informed that in thelight of the news from France no more reinforcements couldbe sent to himThe battle crisis grew hourly in intensity At the request ofGeneral Georges the British Army prolonged its defensiveflank by occupying points on the whole line from Douai toPeacuteronne thus attempting to cover Arras which was a roadcentre vital to any southward retreat That afternoon theGermans entered Brussels The next day they reachedCambrai passed St Quentin and brushed our smallparties out of Peacuteronne The French Seventh the Belgianthe British and the French First Army all continued theirwithdrawal to the Scheldt the British standing along theDendre for the day and forming the detachmentldquoPetreforcerdquo (a temporary grouping of various units underMajor General Petre) for the defence of ArrasAt midnight (May 18ndash19) Lord Gort was visited at hisheadquarters by General Billotte Neither the personality ofthis French general nor his proposals such as they wereinspired confidence in his allies From this moment thepossibility of a withdrawal to the coast began to presentitself to the British Commander-in-Chief In his despatchpublished in March 1941 he wrote ldquoThe picture was now[night of the 19th] no longer that of a line bent ortemporarily broken but of a besieged fortressrdquo
Their Finest Hour 75
As the result of my visit to Paris and the Cabinetdiscussions I already found it necessary to pose a generalquestion to my colleagues
Prime Minister to LordPresident
17V40
I am very much obliged to you for undertaking toexamine tonight the consequences of the withdrawal ofthe French Government from Paris or the fall of thatcity as well as the problems which would arise if it werenecessary to withdraw the BEF from France eitheralong its communications or by the Belgian andChannel ports It is quite understood that in the firstinstance this report could be no more than anenumeration of the main considerations which ariseand which could thereafter be remitted to the Staffs Iam myself seeing the military authorities at 630
The swift fate of Holland was in all our minds Mr Eden hadalready proposed to the War Cabinet the formation of LocalDefence Volunteers and this plan was energeticallypressed All over the country in every town and villagebands of determined men came together armed withshotguns sporting rifles clubs and spears From this a vastorganisation was soon to spring But the need of Regularswas also vital
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay for COS
18V40
Their Finest Hour 76
I cannot feel that we have enough trustworthy troopsin England in view of the very large numbers that maybe landed from air-carriers preceded by parachutists Ido not consider this danger is imminent at the presenttime as the great battle in France has yet to be decided
I wish the following moves to be considered with aview to immediate action
(1) The transports which brought the Aus-tralians to Suez should bring home eightbattalions of Regular infantry from Palestineproperly convoyed even at some risk bywhatever route is thought best I hope it will bepossible to use the Mediterranean
(2) The Australian fast convoy arrives early inJune with 14000 men
(3) These ships should be immediately filledwith eight battalions of Territorials and sent toIndia where they should pick up eight [more]Regular battalions The speed of this fast convoyshould be accelerated
2 Everything must be done to carry out therecommendations for the control of aliens put forwardby the Committee and minuted by me on anotherpaper Action should also be taken against Communistsand Fascists and very considerable numbers shouldbe put in protective or preventive internment includingthe leaders These measures must of course bebrought before the Cabinet before action
3 The Chiefs of Staff must consider whether itwould not be well to send only half of the so-calledArmoured Division to France One must always beprepared for the fact that the French may be offeredvery advantageous terms of peace and the wholeweight be thrown on us
Their Finest Hour 77
I also thought it necessary with the approval of mycolleagues to send the following grave telegrams toPresident Roosevelt in order to show how seriously theinterests of the United States would be affected by theconquest and subjugation not only of France but of GreatBritain The Cabinet pondered over these drafts for a whilebut made no amendment
Former Naval Personto President Roosevelt
18V40
I do not need to tell you about the gravity of whathas happened We are determined to persevere to thevery end whatever the result of the great battle ragingin France may be We must expect in any case to beattacked here on the Dutch model before very long andwe hope to give a good account of ourselves But ifAmerican assistance is to play any part it must beavailable soon
Former Naval Personto President Roosevelt
20V40
Lothian has reported his conversation with you Iunderstand your difficulties but I am very sorry aboutthe destroyers If they were here in six weeks theywould play an invaluable part The battle in France isfull of danger to both sides Though we have takenheavy toll of the enemy in the air and are clawing downtwo or three to one of their planes they have still aformidable numerical superiority Our most vital need istherefore the delivery at the earliest possible date ofthe largest possible number of Curtiss P-40 fightersnow in course of delivery to your Army
With regard to the closing part of your talk withLothian our intention is whatever happens to fight onto the end in this island and provided we can get thehelp for which we ask we hope to run them very close
Their Finest Hour 78
in the air battles in view of individual superiorityMembers of the present Administration would [be] likely[to] go down during this process should it resultadversely but in no conceivable circumstances will weconsent to surrender If members of the presentAdministration were finished and others came in toparley amid the ruins you must not be blind to the factthat the sole remaining bargaining counter withGermany would be the Fleet and if this country wasleft by the United States to its fate no one would havethe right to blame those then responsible if they madethe best terms they could for the surviving inhabitantsExcuse me Mr President putting this nightmarebluntly Evidently I could not answer for my successorswho in utter despair and helplessness might well haveto accommodate themselves to the German willHowever there is happily no need at present to dwellupon such ideas Once more thanking you for yourgood will hellip
Far-reaching changes were now made by M Reynaud inthe French Cabinet and High Command On the 18thMarshal Peacutetain was appointed Vice-President of theCouncil Reynaud himself transferring Daladier to ForeignAffairs took over the Ministry of National Defence and WarAt 7 PM on the 19th he appointed Weygand who had justarrived from the Levant to replace General Gamelin I hadknown Weygand when he was the right-hand man ofMarshal Foch and had admired his masterly intervention inthe Battle of Warsaw against the Bolshevik invasion ofPoland in August 1920 ndash an event decisive for Europe atthat time He was now seventy-three but was reported tobe efficient and vigorous in a very high degree GeneralGamelinrsquos final Order (No 12) dated 945 AM on May 19prescribed that the Northern Armies instead of letting
Their Finest Hour 79
themselves be encircled must at all costs force their waysouthward to the Somme attacking the Panzer divisionswhich had cut their communications At the same time theSecond Army and the newly forming Sixth were to attacknorthward towards Meacuteziegraveres These decisions were soundIndeed an order for the general retreat of the NorthernArmies southward was already at least four days overdueOnce the gravity of the breach in the French centre atSedan was apparent the only hope for the Northern Armieslay in an immediate march to the Somme Instead underGeneral Billotte they had only made gradual and partialwithdrawals to the Scheldt and formed the defensive flankto the right Even now there might have been time for thesouthward marchThe confusion of the northern command the apparentparalysis of the First French Army and the uncertaintyabout what was happening had caused the War Cabinetextreme anxiety All our proceedings were quiet andcomposed but we had a united and decided opinionbehind which there was silent passion On the 19th wewere informed (430 PM) that Lord Gort was ldquoexamining apossible withdrawal towards Dunkirk if that were forcedupon himrdquo The CIGS (Ironside) could not accept thisproposal as like most of us he favoured the southwardmarch We therefore sent him to Lord Gort with instructionsto move the British Army in a southwesterly direction and toforce his way through all opposition in order to join up withthe French in the south and that the Belgians should beurged to conform to this movement or alternatively thatwe would evacuate as many of their troops as possiblefrom the Channel ports He was to be told that we wouldourselves inform the French Government of what had beenresolved At the same Cabinet we sent Dill to GeneralGeorgesrsquo Headquarters with which we had a direct
Their Finest Hour 80
telephone He was to stay there for four days and tell us allhe could find out Contacts even with Lord Gort wereintermittent and difficult but it was reported that only fourdaysrsquo supplies and ammunition for one battle were available
At the morning War Cabinet of May 20 we again discussedthe situation of our Army Even on the assumption of asuccessful fighting retreat to the Somme I thought it likelythat considerable numbers might be cut off or driven backon the sea It is recorded in the minutes of the meetingldquoThe Prime Minister thought that as a precautionarymeasure the Admiralty should assemble a large number ofsmall vessels in readiness to proceed to ports and inlets onthe French coastrdquo On this the Admiralty acted immediatelyand with ever-increasing vigour as the days passed anddarkened Operational control had been delegated on the19th to Admiral Ramsay commanding at Dover whoseresources at that time comprised thirty-six personnelvessels of various sorts based on Southampton and DoverOn the afternoon of the 20th in consequence of the ordersfrom London the first conference of all concerned includingrepresentatives of the Shipping Ministry was held at Doverto consider ldquothe emergency evacuation across the Channelof very large forcesrdquo It was planned if necessary toevacuate from Calais Boulogne and Dunkirk at a rate often thousand men from each port every twenty-four hoursThirty craft of passenger-ferry type twelve naval driftersand six small coasters were provided as a first instalmentOn May 22 the Admiralty ordered forty Dutch skoots whichhad taken refuge with us to be requisitioned and mannedwith naval crews These were commissioned between May25 and May 27 From Harwich round to Weymouth sea-
Their Finest Hour 81
transport officers were directed to list all suitable ships up toa thousand tons and a complete survey was made of allshipping in British harbours These plans for what wascalled ldquoOperation Dynamordquo proved the salvation of theArmy ten days later
The direction of the German thrust had now become moreobvious Armoured vehicles and mechanised divisionscontinued to pour through the gap towards Amiens andArras curling westward along the Somme towards the seaOn the night of the 20th they entered Abbeacuteville havingtraversed and cut the whole communications of theNorthern Armies These hideous fatal scythes encounteredlittle or no resistance once the front had been broken TheGerman tanks ndash the dreaded ldquochars allemandsrdquondash rangedfreely through the open country and aided and supplied bymechanised transport advanced thirty or forty miles a dayThey had passed through scores of towns and hundreds ofvillages without the slightest opposition their officerslooking out of the open cupolas and waving jauntily to theinhabitants Eye-witnesses spoke of crowds of Frenchprisoners marching along with them many still carryingtheir rifles which were from time to time collected andbroken under the tanks I was shocked by the utter failureto grapple with the German armour which with a fewthousand vehicles was compassing the entire destructionof mighty armies and by the swift collapse of all Frenchresistance once the fighting front had been pierced Thewhole German movement was proceeding along the mainroads at no point on which did they seem to be blockedAlready on the 17th I had asked the Chief of the Air StaffldquoIs there no possibility of finding out where a column of
Their Finest Hour 82
enemy armoured vehicles harbours during the dark hoursand then bombing We are being ripped to pieces behindthe front by these wandering columnsrdquoI now telegraphed to Reynaud
21V40
Many congratulations upon appointing Weygand inwhom we have entire confidence here
It is not possible to stop columns of tanks frompiercing thin lines and penetrating deeply All ideas ofstopping holes and hemming in these intruders arevicious Principle should be on the contrary to punchholes Undue importance should not be attached to thearrival of a few tanks at any particular point What canthey do if they enter a town Towns should be held withriflemen and tank personnel should be fired uponshould they attempt to leave vehicles If they cannot getfood or drink or petrol they can only make a mess anddepart Where possible buildings should be blowndown upon them Every town with valuable cross-roadsshould be held in this fashion Secondly the tankcolumns in the open must be hunted down andattacked in the open country by numbers of smallmobile columns with a few cannon Their tracks mustbe wearing out and their energy must abate This is theone way to deal with the armoured intruders As for themain body which does not seem to be coming on veryquickly the only method is to drive in upon the flanksThe confusion of this battle can only be cleared bybeing aggravated so that it becomes a melee Theystrike at our communications we should strike at theirsI feel more confident than I did at the beginning of thebattle but all the armies must fight at the same timeand I hope the British will have a chance soon Aboveis only my personal view and I trust it will give nooffence if I state it to you
Every good wish
Their Finest Hour 83
Weygandrsquos first act was to cancel Gamelinrsquos Instruction No12 It was not unnatural that he should wish to see thesituation in the north for himself and to make contact withthe commanders there Allowances must be made for ageneral who takes over the command in the crisis of alosing battle But now there was no time He should nothave left the summit of the remaining controls and havebecome involved in the delays and strains of personalmovement We may note in detail what followed On themorning of the 20th Weygand installed in Gamelinrsquos placemade arrangements to visit the Northern Armies on the21st After learning that the roads to the north were cut bythe Germans he decided to fly His plane was attackedand forced to land at Calais The hour appointed for hisconference at Ypres had to be altered to 3 PM on the 21stHere he met King Leopold and General Billotte Lord Gortwho had not been notified of time and place was notpresent and the only British officer in attendance wasAdmiral Keyes who was attached to the King and had nomilitary command The King described this conference asldquofour hours of confused talkingrdquo It discussed the co-ordination of the three armies the execution of theWeygand plan and if that failed the retirement of the Britishand French to the Lys and the Belgians to the Yser At 8 PM General Weygand had to leave Lord Gort did not arrivetill eight when he received an account of the proceedingsfrom General Billotte Weygand drove back to Calaisembarked on a submarine for Dieppe and returned toParis Billotte drove off in his car to deal with the crisis andwithin the hour was killed in a motor collision Thus all wasagain in suspense
Their Finest Hour 84
On the 21st Ironside returned and reported that Lord Gorton receiving the Cabinet instructions had put the followingpoints to him(1) That the southward march would involve a rearguardaction from the Scheldt at the same time as an attack intoan area already strongly held by the enemy armoured andmobile formations During such a movement both flankswould have to be protected(2) That sustained offensive operations were difficult in viewof the administrative situation and(3) That neither the French First Army nor the Belgianswere likely to be able to conform to such a manoeuvre ifattemptedIronside added that confusion reigned in the French HighCommand in the north that General Billotte had failed tocarry out his duties of co-ordination for the past eight daysand appeared to have no plans that the BritishExpeditionary Force were in good heart and had so far hadonly about five hundred battle casualties He gave a vividdescription of the state of the roads crowded with refugeesscourged by the fire of German aircraft He had had a roughtime himselfTwo fearsome alternatives therefore presented themselvesto the War Cabinet The first the British Army at all costswith or without French and Belgian co-operation to cut itsway to the south and the Somme a task which Lord Gortdoubted its ability to perform the second to fall back onDunkirk and face a sea evacuation under hostile air attackwith the certainty of losing all the artillery and equipmentthen so scarce and precious Obviously great risks shouldbe run to achieve the first but there was no reason why allpossible precautions and preparations should not be taken
Their Finest Hour 85
for the sea evacuation if the southern plan failed Iproposed to my colleagues that I should go to France tomeet Reynaud and Weygand and come to a decision Dillwas to meet me there from General Georgesrsquo Headquarters
This was the moment when my colleagues felt it right toobtain from Parliament the extraordinary powers for which abill had been prepared during the last few days Thismeasure would give the Government practically unlimitedpower over the life liberty and property of all His Majestyrsquossubjects in Great Britain In general terms of law the powersgranted by Parliament were absolute The Act was toldquoinclude power by Order in Council to make such DefenceRegulations making provision for requiring persons to placethemselves their services and their property at thedisposal of His Majesty as appear to him to be necessary orexpedient for securing the public safety the defence of theRealm the maintenance of public order or the efficientprosecution of any war in which His Majesty may beengaged or for maintaining supplies or services essentialto the life of the communityrdquoIn regard to persons the Minister of Labour wasempowered to direct anyone to perform any servicerequired The regulation giving him this power included afair wages clause which was inserted in the Act to regulatewage conditions Labour supply committees were to be setup in important centres The control of property in thewidest sense was imposed in equal manner Control of allestablishments including banks was imposed under theauthority of Government orders Employers could berequired to produce their books and excess profits were tobe taxed at 100 per cent A Production Council to be
Their Finest Hour 86
presided over by Mr Greenwood was to be formed and aDirector of Labour Supply to be appointedThis bill was accordingly presented to Parliament on theafternoon of the 22d by Mr Chamberlain and Mr Attlee thelatter himself moving the second reading Both theCommons and the Lords with their immense Conservativemajorities passed it unanimously through all its stages in asingle afternoon and it received the Royal Assent that night
For Romans in Romersquos quarrelSpared neither land nor goldNor son nor wife nor limb nor lifeIn the brave days of old
Such was the temper of the hour
When I arrived in Paris on May 22 there was a new settingGamelin was gone Daladier was gone from the war sceneReynaud was both Prime Minister and Minister of War Asthe German thrust had definitely turned seaward Paris wasnot immediately threatened Grand Quartier Geacuteneacuteral (GQG) was still at Vincennes M Reynaud drove me downthere about noon In the garden some of those figures I hadseen round Gamelin ndash one a very tall cavalry officer ndash werepacing moodily up and down ldquoCrsquoest lrsquoancien reacutegimerdquoremarked the aide-de-camp Reynaud and I were broughtinto Weygandrsquos room and afterwards to the map roomwhere we had the great maps of the Supreme CommandWeygand met us In spite of his physical exertions and anight of travel he was brisk buoyant and incisive Hemade an excellent impression upon all He unfolded his
Their Finest Hour 87
plan of war He was not content with a southward march orretreat for the Northern Armies They should strikesoutheast from around Cambrai and Arras in the generaldirection of St Quentin thus taking in flank the Germanarmoured divisions at present engaged in what he calledthe St Quentin-Amiens pocket Their rear he thoughtwould be protected by the Belgian Army which would coverthem towards the east and if necessary towards the northMeanwhile a new French army under General Fregraverecomposed of eighteen to twenty divisions drawn fromAlsace from the Maginot Line from Africa and from everyother quarter were to form a front along the Somme Theirleft hand would push forward through Amiens to Arras andthus by their utmost efforts establish contact with the armiesof the north The enemy armour must be kept underconstant pressure ldquoThe Panzer divisions must notrdquo saidWeygand ldquobe allowed to keep the initiativerdquo All necessaryorders had been given so far as it was possible to giveorders at all We were now told that General Billotte towhom he had imparted his whole plan had just been killedin the motor accident Dill and I were agreed that we had nochoice and indeed no inclination except to welcome theplan I emphasised that ldquoit was indispensable to reopencommunications between the armies of the north and thoseof the south by way of Arrasrdquo I explained that Lord Gortwhile striking southwest must also guard his path to thecoast To make sure there was no mistake about what wassettled I myself dictated a reacutesumeacute of the decisions andshowed it to Weygand who agreed I reported accordinglyto the Cabinet and sent the following telegram to Lord Gort
22V40I flew to Paris this morning with Dill and others The
conclusions which were reached between ReynaudWeygand and ourselves are summarised below They
Their Finest Hour 88
accord exactly with general directions you havereceived from the War Office You have our bestwishes in the vital battle now opening towardsBapaume and Cambrai
It was agreed1 That the Belgian Army should withdraw to the line
of the Yser and stand there the sluices being opened2 That the British Army and the French First Army
should attack southwest towards Bapaume andCambrai at the earliest moment certainly tomorrow ndashwith about eight divisions ndash and with the BelgianCavalry Corps on the right of the British
3 That as this battle is vital to both armies and theBritish communications depend upon freeing Amiensthe British Air Force should give the utmost possiblehelp both by day and by night while it is going on
4 That the new French Army Group which isadvancing upon Amiens and forming a line along theSomme should strike northward and join hands with theBritish divisions who are attacking southward in thegeneral direction of Bapaume
It will be seen that Weygandrsquos new plan did not differexcept in emphasis from the cancelled Instruction No 12 ofGeneral Gamelin Nor was it out of harmony with thevehement opinion which the War Cabinet had expressedon the 19th The Northern Armies were to shoulder theirway southward by offensive action destroying if possiblethe armoured incursion They were to be met by a helpfulthrust through Amiens by the new French Army Groupunder General Fregravere This would be most important if itcame true In private I complained to M Reynaud that Gorthad been left entirely without orders for four consecutivedays Even since Weygand had assumed command threedays had been lost in taking decisions The change in theSupreme Command was right The resultant delay was evilI slept the night at the Embassy The air raids were trivialthe guns were noisy but one never heard a bomb Very
Their Finest Hour 89
different indeed were the experiences of Paris from theordeal which London was soon to endure I had a keendesire to go to see my friend General Georges at hisheadquarters at Compiegravegne Our liaison officer with himBrigadier Swayne was with me for some time and gave methe picture of the French armies so far as he knew it whichwas only part of the way I was persuaded that it would bebetter not to intrude at this time when this vast andcomplicated operation was being attempted in the teeth ofevery form of administrative difficulty and frequentbreakdowns in communicationIn the absence of any supreme war direction events andthe enemy had taken control On the 17th Gort had begunto direct troops to the line Ruyaulcourt-Arleux and togarrison Arras and was constantly strengthening hissouthern flank The French Seventh Army less theSixteenth Corps which had suffered heavily in theWalcheren fighting had moved south to join the FirstFrench Army It had traversed the British rear withoutserious disturbance On the 20th Gort had informed bothGenerals Billotte and Blanchard that he proposed to attacksouthward from Arras on May 21 with two divisions and anarmoured brigade and Billotte had agreed to co-operatewith two French divisions from the First French Army Thisarmy of thirteen divisions was gathered in an oblong somenineteen miles by ten ndash Maulde-Valenciennes-Denain-Douai The enemy had crossed the Scheldt on the 20tharound Oudenarde and the three British corps which stillfaced east withdrew on the 23d to the defences we haderected in the winter along the Belgian frontier from whichthey had advanced so eagerly twelve days before On thisday the BEF were put on half rations The impression ofFrench helplessness derived from many sources led me toprotest to Reynaud
Their Finest Hour 90
Their Finest Hour 91
Prime Minister to MReynaud (Copy toLord Gort)
23V40
Communications of Northern Armies have been cutby strong enemy armoured forces Salvation of thesearmies can only be obtained by immediate execution ofWeygandrsquos plan I demand the issue to the Frenchcommanders in north and south and Belgian GHQ ofthe most stringent orders to carry this out and turndefeat into victory Time is vital as supplies are short
I reported this message to the War Cabinet when they metat 1130 AM pointing out that the whole success of theWeygand plan was dependent on the French taking theinitiative which they showed no signs of doing We metagain at 7 PM
And the next day
Prime Minister to MReynaud for GeneralWeygand
24V40
General Gort wires that co-ordination of northernfront is essential with armies of three different nationsHe says he cannot undertake this co-ordination as heis already fighting north and south and is threatened onhis lines of communications At the same time SirRoger Keyes tells me that up to 3 PM today (23d)Belgian Headquarters and King had received nodirective How does this agree with your statement thatBlanchard and Gort are main dans la main Appreciatefully difficulties of communication but feel no effectiveconcert of operations in northern area against whichenemy are concentrating Trust you will be able torectify this Gort further says that any advance by himmust be in the nature of sortie and that relief mustcome from south as he has not (repeat not) ammuni-
Their Finest Hour 92
tion for serious attack Nevertheless we are instructinghim to persevere in carrying out your plan We have nothere even seen your own directive and have noknowledge of the details of your northern operationsWill you kindly have this sent through French Mission atearliest All good wishes
Some account of the small battle fought by the Britisharound Arras must be given here General Franklyn whocommanded intended to occupy the area Arras-Cambrai-Bapaume He had the 5th and 50th British Divisions andthe 1st Army Tank Brigade His plan was to attack with thisarmour and one brigade of each division the whole underGeneral Martel round the western and southern sides ofArras with an immediate objective on the river SenseacuteeThe French were to co-operate with two divisions on theeast to the Cambrai-Arras road The British divisionsconsisted of only two brigades each and the tanksnumbered sixty-five Mark I and eighteen Mark II all ofwhose tracks the life of which was short were wearing outThe attack began at 2 PM on May 21 and soon founditself engaged with much stronger opposition than wasexpected French support on the eastern flank did notmaterialise and on the western was limited to one lightmechanised division The enemy armour actually consistedof about four hundred tanks of the 7th and 8th GermanArmoured Divisions a general named Rommelcommanding the former
Their Finest Hour 93
At first the attack prospered and four hundred prisonerswere taken but the line of the river Senseacutee was notreached and the German counter-attack in overwhelmingnumbers with full air support caused heavy casualties The12th Lancers presently reported strong enemy columnsmoving towards St Pol and threatening to turn the westernflank During the night the Army Tank Brigade the 13thBrigade of the 5th Division and the 151st Brigade of the50th Division gradually withdrew to the river Scarpe Herethree British brigades stood until the afternoon of the 22dand in this neighbourhood repulsed various attacks We stillheld Arras but the enemy gradually tended to swing roundtowards Beacutethune The French light mechanised divisionguarding our western flank was forced from Mont St Eloi
Their Finest Hour 94
and the enemy tanks soon after approached Souchez By 7PM on the 23d the British eastern flank was under heavypressure and the enemy reaching Lens had encircled thewestern flank Thus the position was precarious We werehopelessly outnumbered beset by masses of armour andalmost surrounded At 10 PM General Franklyn informedGeneral Headquarters that unless his force was withdrawnduring the night its retirement would become impossibleHe was told that orders to withdraw had been sent himthree hours before The operation had some temporaryeffect on the enemy they recorded it at the time as ldquoheavyBritish counterattacks with armourrdquo which caused themconsiderable anxietyIn pursuance of the Weygand plan Gort proposed toGeneral Blanchard who now commanded the northerngroup that two British divisions one French division andthe French Cavalry Corps should attack southward betweenthe Canal du Nord and the Scheldt Canal Two Frenchdivisions had in fact twice previously reached the outskirtsof Cambrai but on each occasion they were bombed andwithdrew In all these days this was the only offensiveaction of the French First Army
In London we had no knowledge of the progress of thisforlorn attempt at Arras to break the encircling lineHowever during the 24th very reproachful telegramsarrived from Reynaud The shorter of his two messagestells the story
You wired me [he said] this morning that you hadinstructed General Gort to continue to carry out theWeygand plan General Weygand now informs methat according to a telegram from General Blanchardthe British Army had carried out on its own initiative a
Their Finest Hour 95
retreat of twenty-five miles towards the ports at a timewhen our troops moving up from the south are gainingground towards the north where they were to meettheir allies
This action of the British Army is in direct oppositionto the formal orders renewed this morning by GeneralWeygand This retreat has naturally obliged GeneralWeygand to change all his arrangements and he iscompelled to give up the idea of closing the gap andrestoring a continuous front I need not lay any stressupon the gravity of the possible consequences
Up to this time General Weygand had been counting onGeneral Fregraverersquos army advancing northward on AmiensAlbert and Peacuteronne They had in fact made no noticeableprogress and were still forming and assembling Thefollowing are my replies to M Reynaud
25V40My telegram last night told you all we knew over
here and we have still heard nothing from Lord Gort tocontradict it But I must tell you that a staff officer hasreported to the War Office confirming the withdrawal ofthe two divisions from the Arras region which yourtelegram to me mentioned General Dill who should bewith Lord Gort has been told to send a staff officer byair at the earliest moment As soon as we know whathas happened I will report fully It is clear howeverthat the Northern Army is practically surrounded andthat all its communications are cut except throughDunkirk and Ostend
25V40We have every reason to believe that Gort is still
persevering in southward move All we know is that hehas been forced by the pressure on his western flankand to keep communication with Dunkirk for indispens-able supplies to place parts of two divisions betweenhimself and the increasing pressure of the Germanarmoured forces which in apparently irresistible
Their Finest Hour 96
strength have successively captured Abbeacuteville andBoulogne are menacing Calais and Dunkirk and havetaken St Omer How can he move southward anddisengage his northern front unless he throws out thisshield on his right hand Nothing in the movements ofthe BEF of which we are aware can be any excusefor the abandonment of the strong pressure of yournorthward move across the Somme which we trust willdevelop
Secondly you complained of heavy materials beingmoved from Havre Only materials moved away weregas shells which it was indiscreet to leave Also someof the stores have been moved from the north to thesouth side of the river at Havre
Thirdly should I become aware that extremepressure of events has compelled any departure fromthe plan agreed I shall immediately inform you Dillwho was this morning wholly convinced that the solehope of any effective extrication of our Army lies in thesouthward move and in the active advance of GeneralFregravere is now with Gort You must understand thathaving waited for the southward move for a week afterit became obvious[ly necessary] we find ourselves nowripped from the coast by the mass of the enemyrsquosarmoured vehicles We therefore have no choice but tocontinue the southward move using such flank guardprotection to the westward as is necessary
General Spears will be with you tomorrow morningand it will probably be quickest to send him back whenthe position is clear
There was a very strong feeling in Cabinet and high militarycircles that the abilities and strategic knowledge of Sir JohnDill who had been since April 23 Vice-Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff should find their full scope in his appointmentas our principal Army adviser No one could doubt that his
Their Finest Hour 97
professional standing was in many ways superior to that ofIronsideAs the adverse battle drew to its climax I and mycolleagues greatly desired that Sir John Dill should becomeCIGS We had also to choose a Commander-in-Chief forthe British Island if we were invaded Late at night on May25 Ironside Dill Ismay myself and one or two others inmy room at Admiralty House were trying to measure theposition General Ironside volunteered the proposal that heshould cease to be CIGS but declared himself quitewilling to command the British Home Armies Consideringthe unpromising task that such a command was at the timethought to involve this was a spirited and selfless offer Itherefore accepted General Ironsidersquos proposal and thehigh dignities and honours which were later conferred uponhim arose from my appreciation of his bearing at thismoment in our affairs Sir John Dill became CIGS on May27 The changes were generally judged appropriate for thetime being
Their Finest Hour 98
4The March to the Sea May 24 to May 31
Review of the BattlemdashGeneral Halderrsquos Accountof Hitlerrsquos Personal Intervention mdash Halt of theGerman Armour mdash The Truth from the GermanStaff DiariesmdashA Separate Cause for the Halt atthe Decisive PointmdashThe Defence of Boulogne mdashThe Drama of Calais mdash The Consequences ofProlonged DefencemdashGort Abandons theWeygand PlanmdashHis Decision of May 25 mdash Fillingthe Belgian GapmdashWithdrawal of the British Armyto the Dunkirk BridgeheadsmdashExtrication of theFour British Divisions from LillemdashA Question tothe Chiefs of Staff mdash Their AnswermdashMy Messageto Lord Gort mdash And to Admiral KeyesmdashGeneralPownallrsquos Account of the Gort mdash BlanchardMeeting on the Morning of May 28 mdash Surrender ofthe Belgian Army May 28 mdash Decisive BattleFought by General Brooke and the Second CorpsMay 28 mdash Withdrawal to the BridgeheadmdashEscapeby Sea of Half the French First Army
WE MAY NOW REVIEW up to this point the course of thismemorable battleOnly Hitler was prepared to violate the neutrality of Belgiumand Holland Belgium would not invite the Allies in until shewas herself attacked Therefore the military initiative restedwith Hitler On May 10 he struck his blow The First ArmyGroup with the British in the centre instead of standing
Their Finest Hour 99
behind their fortifications leaped forward into Belgium on avain because belated mission of rescue The French hadleft the gap opposite the Ardennes ill fortified and weaklyguarded An armoured inroad on a scale never known inwar broke the centre of the French line of armies and inforty-eight hours threatened to cut all the northern armiesalike from their southern communications and from the seaBy the 14th at the latest the French High Command shouldhave given imperative orders to these armies to make ageneral retreat at full speed accepting not only risks butheavy losses of material This issue was not faced in itsbrutal realism by General Gamelin The French commanderof the northern group Billotte was incapable of taking thenecessary decisions himself Confusion reigned throughoutthe armies of the threatened left wingAs the superior power of the enemy was felt they fell backAs the turning movement swung round their right theyformed a defensive flank If they had started back on the14th they could have been on their old line by the 17th andwould have had a good chance of fighting their way out Atleast three mortal days were lost From the 17th onwardsthe British War Cabinet saw clearly that an immediatefighting march southward would alone save the BritishArmy They were resolved to press their view upon theFrench Government and General Gamelin but their owncommander Lord Gort was doubtful whether it waspossible to disengage the fighting fronts and still more tobreak through at the same time On the 19th GeneralGamelin was dismissed and Weygand reigned in his steadGamelinrsquos ldquoInstruction No 12rdquo his last order though fivedays late was sound in principle and also in conformitywith the main conclusions of the British War Cabinet andChiefs of Staff The change in the supreme command orwant of command led to another three daysrsquo delay The
Their Finest Hour 100
spirited plan which General Weygand proposed aftervisiting the northern armies was never more than a paperscheme In the main it was the Gamelin plan rendered stillmore hopeless by further delayIn the hideous dilemma which now presented itself weaccepted the Weygand plan and made loyal and persistentthough now ineffectual efforts to carry it out until the 25thwhen all the communications being cut our weak counter-attack being repulsed with the loss of Arras the Belgianfront being broken and King Leopold about to capitulate allhope of escape to the southward vanished There remainedonly the sea Could we reach it or must we be surroundedand broken up in the open field In any case the wholeartillery and equipment of our army irreplaceable for manymonths must be lost But what was that compared withsaving the army the nucleus and structure upon whichalone Britain could build her armies of the future LordGort who had from the 25th onwards felt that evacuationby sea was our only chance now proceeded to form abridgehead around Dunkirk and to fight his way into it withwhat strength remained All the discipline of the British andthe qualities of their commanders who included BrookeAlexander and Montgomery were to be needed Muchmore was to be needed All that man could do was doneWould it be enough
A much-disputed episode must now be examined GeneralHalder Chief of the German General Staff has declaredthat at this moment Hitler made his only effective directpersonal intervention in the battle He became according tothis authority ldquoalarmed about the armoured formationsbecause they were in considerable danger in a difficult
Their Finest Hour 101
country honeycombed with canals without being able toattain any vital resultsrdquo He felt he could not sacrificearmoured formations uselessly as they were essential tothe second stage of the campaign He believed no doubtthat his air superiority would be sufficient to prevent a large-scale evacuation by sea He therefore according to Haldersent a message to him through Brauchitsch ordering ldquothearmoured formations to be stopped the points even takenbackrdquo Thus says Halder the way to Dunkirk was clearedfor the British Army At any rate we intercepted a Germanmessage sent in clear at 1142 AM on May 24 to the effectthat the attack on the line Dunkirk-Hazebrouck-Merville wasto be discontinued for the present Halder states that herefused on behalf of Supreme Army Headquarters tointerfere in the movement of Army Group Rundstedt whichhad clear orders to prevent the enemy from reaching thecoast The quicker and more complete the success herehe argued the easier it would be later to repair the loss ofsome tanks The next day he was ordered to go withBrauchitsch to a conferenceThe excited discussion finished with a definite order byHitler to which he added that he would ensure execution ofhis order by sending personal liaison officers to the frontKeitel was sent by plane to Army Group Rundstedt andother officers to the front command posts ldquoI have neverbeen ablerdquo says General Halder ldquoto figure how Hitlerconceived the idea of the useless endangering of thearmoured formations It is most likely that Keitel who wasfor a considerable time in Flanders in the First World Warhad originated these ideas by his talesrdquoOther German generals have told much the same storyand have even suggested that Hitlerrsquos order was inspired bya political motive to improve the chances of peace withEngland after France was beaten Authentic documentary
Their Finest Hour 102
evidence has now come to light in the shape of the actualdiary of Rundstedtrsquos headquarters written at the time Thistells a different tale At midnight on the 23d orders camefrom Brauchitsch at OKH placing the Fourth Army underRundstedt for ldquothe last actrdquo of ldquothe encirclement battlerdquo Nextmorning Hitler visited Rundstedt who represented to himthat his armour which had come so far and so fast wasmuch reduced in strength and needed a pause wherein toreorganise and regain its balance for the final blow againstan enemy who his staff diary says was ldquofighting withextraordinary tenacityrdquo Moreover Rundstedt foresaw thepossibility of attacks on his widely dispersed forces fromnorth and south in fact the Weygand Plan which if it hadbeen feasible was the obvious Allied counter-stroke Hitlerldquoagreed entirelyrdquo that the attack east of Arras should becarried out by infantry and that the mobile formationsshould continue to hold the line Lens-Beacutethune-Aire-StOmer-Gravelines in order to intercept the enemy forcesunder pressure from Army Group B in the northeast Healso dwelt on the paramount necessity of conserving thearmoured forces for further operations However very earlyon the 25th a fresh directive was sent from Brauchitsch asthe Commander-in-Chief ordering the continuation of theadvance by the armour Rundstedt fortified by Hitlerrsquosverbal agreement would have none of it He did not passon the order to the Fourth Army Commander Kluge whowas told to continue to husband the Panzer divisions Klugeprotested at the delay but it was not till next day the 26ththat Rundstedt released them although even then heenjoined that Dunkirk was not yet itself to be directlyassaulted The diary records that the Fourth Army protestedat this restriction and its Chief of Staff telephoned on the27th ldquoThe picture in the Channel ports is as follows Bigships come up the quayside boards are put down and the
Their Finest Hour 103
men crowd on the ships All material is left behind But weare not keen on finding these men newly equipped upagainst us laterrdquoIt is therefore certain that the armour was halted that thiswas done on the initiative not of Hitler but of RundstedtRundstedt no doubt had reasons for his view both in thecondition of the armour and in the general battle but heought to have obeyed the formal orders of the ArmyCommand or at least told them what Hitler had said inconversation There is general agreement among theGerman commanders that a great opportunity was lost
There was however a separate cause which affected themovements of the German armour at the decisive pointAfter reaching the sea at Abbeacuteville on the night of the 20ththe leading German armoured and motorised columns hadmoved northward along the coast by Etaples towardsBoulogne Calais and Dunkirk with the evident intention ofcutting off all escape by sea This region was lighted in mymind from the previous war when I had maintained themobile Marine Brigade operating from Dunkirk against theflanks and rear of the German armies marching on Paris Idid not therefore have to learn about the inundation systembetween Calais and Dunkirk or the significance of theGravelines waterline The sluices had already beenopened and with every day the floods were spreading thusgiving southerly protection to our line of retreat Thedefence of Boulogne but still more of Calais to the latesthour stood forth upon the confused scene and garrisonswere immediately sent there from England Boulogneisolated and attacked on May 22 was defended by twobattalions of the Guards and one of our few anti-tank
Their Finest Hour 104
batteries with some French troops After thirty-six hoursrsquoresistance it was reported to be untenable and Iconsented to the remainder of the garrison including theFrench being taken off by sea This was effected by eightdestroyers on the night of May 23ndash24 with a loss of only twohundred men I regretted this decisionSome days earlier I had placed the conduct of the defenceof the Channel ports directly under the Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff with whom I was in constant touch I nowresolved that Calais should be fought to the death and thatno evacuation by sea could be allowed to the garrisonwhich consisted of one battalion of the Rifle Brigade one ofthe 60th Rifles the Queen Victoria Rifles and a battalion ofthe Royal Tank Regiment with twenty-one Light and twenty-seven Cruiser tanks and an equal number of Frenchmen Itwas painful thus to sacrifice these splendid trained Regulartroops of which we had so few for the doubtful advantageof gaining two or perhaps three days and the unknownuses that could be made of these days The Secretary ofState for War and the CIGS agreed to this hard measureThe telegrams and minutes tell the tale
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay for CIGS
23V40
Apart from the general order issued I trust last nightby Weygand for assuring the southward movement ofthe armies via Amiens it is imperative that a clear lineof supply should be opened up at the earliest momentto Gortrsquos army by Dunkirk Calais or Boulogne Gortcannot remain insensible to the peril in which he is nowplaced and he must detach even a division orwhatever lesser force is necessary to meet our forcepushing through from the coast If the regiment of
Their Finest Hour 105
armoured vehicles including Cruiser tanks has actuallylanded at Calais this should improve the situation andshould encourage us to send the rest of the SecondBrigade of that Armoured Division in there This coastalarea must be cleaned up if the major operation ofwithdrawal is to have any chance The intruders behindthe line must be struck at and brought to bay Therefugees should be driven into the fields and parkedthere as proposed by General Weygand so that theroads can be kept clear Are you in touch with Gort bytelephone and telegraph and how long does it take tosend him a cyphered message Will you kindly tell oneof your staff officers to send a map to Downing Streetwith the position so far as it is known today of the nineBritish divisions Do not reply to this yourself
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay
24V40
I cannot understand the situation around Calais TheGermans are blocking all exits and our regiment oftanks is boxed up in the town because it cannot facethe field guns planted on the outskirts Yet I expect theforces achieving this are very modest Why then arethey not attacked Why does not Lord Gort attack themfrom the rear at the same time that we make a sortiefrom Calais Surely Gort can spare a brigade or two toclear his communications and to secure the suppliesvital to his army Here is a general with nine divisionsabout to be starved out and yet he cannot send a forceto clear his communications What else can be soimportant as this Where could a reserve be betteremployed
This force blockading Calais should be attacked atonce by Gort by the Canadians from Dunkirk and by asortie of our boxed-up tanks Apparently the Germanscan go anywhere and do anything and their tanks canact in twos and threes all over our rear and even whenthey are located they are not attacked Also our tanksrecoil before their field guns but our field guns do notlike to take on their tanks If their motorised artillery farfrom its base can block us why cannot we with the
Their Finest Hour 106
artillery of a great army block them hellip The responsibili-ty for cleansing the communications with Calais andkeeping them open rests primarily with the BEF
This did less than justice to our troops But I print it as Iwrote it at the time
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay
24V40
Vice Chief of the Naval Staff informs me that [an]order was sent at 2 AM to Calais saying thatevacuation was decided in principle but this is surelymadness The only effect of evacuating Calais wouldbe to transfer the forces now blocking it to DunkirkCalais must be held for many reasons but specially tohold the enemy on its front The Admiralty say they arepreparing twenty-four naval twelve-pounders whichwith SAP1 will pierce any tank Some of these will beready this evening
Prime Minister to CIGS
25V40
I must know at earliest why Gort gave up Arras andwhat actually he is doing with the rest of his army Is hestill persevering in Weygandrsquos plan or has he becomelargely stationary If the latter what do you considerthe probable course of events in the next few days andwhat course do you recommend Clearly he must notallow himself to be encircled without fighting a battleShould he [not] do this by fighting his way to the coastand destroying the armoured troops which standbetween him and the sea with overwhelming force ofartillery while covering himself and the Belgian frontwhich would also curl back by strong rearguardsTomorrow at latest this decision must be taken
It should surely be possible for Dill to fly home fromany aerodrome momentarily clear and RAF shouldsend a whole squadron to escort him
Their Finest Hour 107
Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar and CIGS
25V40
Pray find out who was the officer responsible forsending the order to evacuate Calais yesterday and bywhom this very lukewarm telegram I saw this morningwas drafted in which mention is made of ldquofor the sakeof Allied solidarityrdquo This is not the way to encouragemen to fight to the end Are you sure there is no streakof defeatist opinion in the General Staff
Prime Minister to CIGS
25V40
Something like this should be said to the Brigadierdefending Calais Defence of Calais to the utmost is ofthe highest importance to our country and our Armynow First it occupies a large part of the enemyrsquosarmoured forces and keeps them from attacking ourline of communication Secondly it preserves a sally-port from which portions of the British Army may maketheir way home Lord Gort has already sent troops toyour aid and the Navy will do all possible to keep yousupplied The eyes of the Empire are upon the defenceof Calais and His Majestyrsquos Government are confidentthat you and your gallant regiment will perform anexploit worthy of the British name
This message was sent to Brigadier Nicholson at about 2 PM on May 25The final decision not to relieve the garrison was taken onthe evening of May 26 Till then the destroyers were heldready Eden and Ironside were with me at the AdmiraltyWe three came out from dinner and at 9 PM did the deedIt involved Edenrsquos own regiment in which he had longserved and fought in the previous struggle One has to eatand drink in war but I could not help feeling physically sickas we afterwards sat silent at the table
Their Finest Hour 108
Here was the message to the BrigadierEvery hour you continue to exist is of the greatest
help to the BEF Government has therefore decidedyou must continue to fight Have greatest possibleadmiration for your splendid stand Evacuation will not(repeat not) take place and craft required for abovepurpose are to return to Dover Verity and Windsor tocover Commander minesweeping and his retirement
Calais was the crux Many other causes might haveprevented the deliverance of Dunkirk but it is certain thatthe three days gained by the defence of Calais enabled theGravelines waterline to be held and that without this evenin spite of Hitlerrsquos vacillations and Rundstedtrsquos orders allwould have been cut off and lost
Upon all this there now descended a simplifyingcatastrophe The Germans who had hitherto not pressedthe Belgian front severely on the 24th of May broke theBelgian line on either side of Courtrai which is but thirtymiles from Ostend and Dunkirk The King of the Belgianssoon considered the situation hopeless and preparedhimself for capitulationBy May 23 the First and Second Corps of the BritishExpeditionary Force withdrawn by stages from Belgiumwere back again on the frontier defences north and east ofLille which they had built for themselves during the winterThe German scythe-cut round our southern flank hadreached the sea and we had to shield ourselves from thisAs the facts forced themselves upon Gort and hisheadquarters troops had successfully been sent topositions along the canal line La Basseacutee-Beacutethune-Aire-StOmer-Watten These with elements of the French
Their Finest Hour 109
Sixteenth Corps touched the sea at the Gravelineswaterline The British Third Corps was responsible in themain for this curled-in flank facing south There was nocontinuous line but only a series of defended ldquostopsrdquo at themain crossings some of which like St Omer and Wattenhad already fallen to the enemy The indispensable roadsnorthward from Cassel were threatened Gortrsquos reserveconsisted only of the two British divisions the 5th and 50thwhich had as we have seen just been so narrowlyextricated from their southerly counterattack made at Arrasin forlorn fulfilment of the Weygand plan At this date thetotal frontage of the BEF was about ninety mileseverywhere in close contact with the enemyTo the south of the BEF lay the First French Army havingtwo divisions in the frontier defences and the remaindercomprising eleven divisions in no good shape cramped inthe area north and east of Douai This army was underattack from the southeast claw of the German encirclementOn our left the Belgian Army was being driven back fromthe Lys Canal at many places and with their retirementnorthward a gap was developing north of MeninIn the evening of the 25th Lord Gort took a vital decisionHis orders still were to pursue the Weygand plan of asoutherly attack towards Cambrai in which the 5th and50th Divisions in conjunction with the French were to beemployed The promised French attack northward from theSomme showed no sign of reality The last defenders ofBoulogne had been evacuated Calais still held out Gortnow abandoned the Weygand plan There was in his viewno longer hope of a march to the south and to the SommeMoreover at the same time the crumbling of the Belgiandefence and the gap opening to the north created a newperil dominating in itself A captured order of the GermanSixth Army showed that one corps was to march
Their Finest Hour 110
northwestward towards Ypres and another corps westwardtowards Wytschaete How could the Belgians withstand thisdouble thrustConfident in his military virtue and convinced of thecomplete breakdown of all control either by the British andFrench Governments or by the French Supreme CommandGort resolved to abandon the attack to the southward toplug the gap which a Belgian capitulation was about toopen in the north and to march to the sea At this momenthere was the only hope of saving anything from destructionor surrender At 6 PM he ordered the 5th and 50thDivisions to join the Second British Corps to fill theimpending Belgian gap He informed General Blanchardwho had succeeded Billotte in command of the First ArmyGroup of his action and this officer acknowledging theforce of events gave orders at 1130 PM for a withdrawalon the 26th to a line behind the Lys Canal west of Lille witha view to forming a bridgehead around DunkirkEarly on May 26 Gort and Blanchard drew up their plan forwithdrawal to the coast As the First French Army hadfarther to go the first movements of the BEF on the nightof May 2627 were to be preparatory and rearguards of theBritish First and Second Corps remained on the frontierdefences till the night of May 2728 In all this Lord Gort hadacted upon his own responsibility But by now we also athome with a somewhat different angle of information hadalready reached the same conclusions On the 26th atelegram from the War Office approved his conduct andauthorised him ldquoto operate towards the coast forthwith inconjunction with the French and Belgian armiesrdquo Theemergency gathering on a vast scale of naval vessels of allkinds and sizes was already in full swing
Their Finest Hour 111
The reader must now look at the diagram which shows thegeneral areas held on the night of May 2526 by the Britishdivisions
Their Finest Hour 112
Their Finest Hour 113
On the western flank of the corridor to the sea the positionremained largely unchanged during the 26th The localitiesheld by the 48th and 44th Divisions came under relativelylittle pressure The 2d Division however had heavy fightingon the Aire and La Basseacutee Canals and they held theirground Farther to the east a strong German attackdeveloped around Carvin jointly defended by British andFrench troops The situation was restored by thecounterattack of two battalions of the 50th Division whichwere in bivouac close by On the left of the British line the5th Division with the 143d Brigade of the 48th Divisionunder command had travelled through the night and atdawn took over the defence of the Ypres-Comines Canal toclose the gap which had opened between the British andBelgian armies They were only just in time Soon after theyarrived the enemy attacked and the fighting was heavy allday Three battalions of the 1st Division in reserve weredrawn in The 50th Division after bivouacking south of Lillemoved northward to prolong the flank of the 5th Divisionaround Ypres The Belgian Army heavily attackedthroughout the day and with their right flank driven inreported that they had no forces with which to regain touchwith the British line and also that they were unable to fallback to the line of the Yser Canal in conformity with theBritish movementMeanwhile the organisation of the bridgeheads aroundDunkirk was proceeding The French were to hold fromGravelines to Bergues and the British thence along thecanal by Furnes to Nieuport and the sea The variousgroups and parties of all arms which were arriving fromboth directions were woven into this line Confirming theorders of the 26th Lord Gort received from the War Office atelegram despatched at 1 PM on the 27th telling him thathis task henceforward was ldquoto evacuate the maximum force
Their Finest Hour 114
possiblerdquo I had informed M Reynaud the day before thatthe policy was to evacuate the British Expeditionary Forceand had requested him to issue corresponding orders Suchwas the breakdown in communications that at 2 PM on the27th the commander of the First French Army issued anorder to his corps ldquoLa bataille sera livreacutee sans esprit derecul sur la position de la LysrdquoFour British divisions and the whole of the First FrenchArmy were now in dire peril of being cut off around LilleThe two arms of the German encircling movement strove toclose the pincers upon them Although we had not in thosedays the admirable map rooms of more coherent periodsand although no control of the battle from London waspossible I had for three days past been harrowed by theposition of the mass of Allied troops around Lille includingour four fine divisions This however was one of those rarebut decisive moments when mechanical transport exercisesits rights When Gort gave the order all these four divisionscame back with surprising rapidity almost in a nightMeanwhile by fierce battles on either side of the corridorthe rest of the British army kept the path open to the seaThe pincer-claws which were delayed by the 2d Divisionand checked for three days by the 5th Division eventuallymet on the night of May 29 in a manner similar to the greatRussian operation round Stalingrad in 1942 The trap hadtaken two and a half days to close and in that time fourBritish divisions and a great part of the First French Armyexcept the Fifth Corps which was lost withdrew in goodorder through the gap in spite of the French having onlyhorse transport and in spite of the main road to Dunkirkbeing already cut and the secondary roads filled withretiring troops long trains of transport and many thousandsof refugees
Their Finest Hour 115
The question about our ability to go on alone which I hadasked Mr Chamberlain to examine with other Ministers tendays before was now put formally by me to our militaryadvisers I drafted the reference purposely in terms whichwhile giving a lead left freedom to the Chiefs of Staff toexpress their view whatever it might be I knew beforehandthat they were absolutely determined but it is wise to havewritten records of such decisions I wished moreover to beable to assure Parliament that our resolve was backed byprofessional opinion Here it is with the answer
We have reviewed our report on ldquoBritish Strategy ina Certain Eventualityrdquo in the light of the following termsof reference remitted to us by the Prime Minister
ldquoIn the event of France being unable to continue inthe war and becoming neutral with the Germansholding their present position and the Belgian armybeing forced to capitulate after assisting the BritishExpeditionary Force to reach the coast in the event ofterms being offered to Britain which would place herentirely at the mercy of Germany through disarmamentcession of naval bases in the Orkneys etc what arethe prospects of our continuing the war alone againstGermany and probably Italy Can the Navy and the AirForce hold out reasonable hopes of preventing seriousinvasion and could the forces gathered in this islandcope with raids from the air involving detachments notgreater than ten thousand men it being observed thata prolongation of British resistance might be verydangerous for Germany engaged in holding down thegreater part of Europerdquo
2 Our conclusions are contained in the followingparagraphs
3 While our Air Force is in being our Navy and AirForce together should be able to prevent Germanycarrying out a serious seaborne invasion of this country
Their Finest Hour 116
4 Supposing Germany gained complete airsuperiority we consider that the Navy could hold up aninvasion for a time but not for an indefinite period
5 If with our Navy unable to prevent it and our AirForce gone Germany attempted an invasion our coastand beach defences could not prevent German tanksand infantry getting a firm footing on our shores In thecircumstances envisaged above our land forces wouldbe insufficient to deal with a serious invasion
6 The crux of the matter is air superiority OnceGermany had attained this she might attempt tosubjugate this country by air attack alone
7 Germany could not gain complete air superiorityunless she could knock out our Air Force and theaircraft industries some vital portions of which areconcentrated at Coventry and Birmingham
8 Air attacks on the aircraft factories would be madeby day or by night We consider that we should be ableto inflict such casualties on the enemy by day as toprevent serious damage Whatever we do however byway of defensive measures ndash and we are pressing onwith these with all despatch ndash we cannot be sure ofprotecting the large industrial centres upon which ouraircraft industries depend from serious materialdamage by night attack The enemy would not have toemploy precision bombing to achieve this effect
9 Whether the attacks succeed in eliminating theaircraft industry depends not only on the materialdamage by bombs but on the moral effect on theworkpeople and their determination to carry on in theface of wholesale havoc and destruction
10 If therefore the enemy presses home nightattacks on our aircraft industry he is likely to achievesuch material and moral damage within the industrialarea concerned as to bring all work to a standstill
11 It must be remembered that numerically theGermans have a superiority of four to one Moreoverthe German aircraft factories are well dispersed andrelatively inaccessible
12 On the other hand so long as we have acounter-offensive bomber force we can carry outsimilar attacks on German industrial centres and by
Their Finest Hour 117
moral and material effect bring a proportion of them toa standstill
13 To sum up our conclusion is that prima facieGermany has most of the cards but the real test iswhether the morale of our fighting personnel and civilpopulation will counterbalance the numerical andmaterial advantages which Germany enjoys Webelieve it will
This report which of course was written at the darkestmoment before the Dunkirk Deliverance was signed notonly by the three Chiefs of Staff Newall Pound andIronside but by the three Vice-Chiefs Dill Phillips andPeirse Reading it in after years I must admit that it wasgrave and grim But the War Cabinet and the few otherMinisters who saw it were all of one mind There was nodiscussion Heart and soul we were together
I now addressed myself to Lord Gort27V40
At this solemn moment I cannot help sending youmy good wishes No one can tell how it will go Butanything is better than being cooped up and starvedout I venture these few remarks First cannon ought tokill tanks and they may as well be lost doing that asany other way Second I feel very anxious aboutOstend till it is occupied by a brigade with artilleryThird very likely the enemy tanks attacking Calais aretired and anyhow busy on Calais A column directedupon Calais while it is still holding out might have agood chance Perhaps they will be less formidablewhen attacked themselves
2 It is now necessary to tell the Belgians I amsending following telegram to Keyes but your personalcontact with the King is desirable Keyes will help Weare asking them to sacrifice themselves for us
Their Finest Hour 118
3 Presume [our] troops know they are cutting theirway home to Blighty Never was there such a spur forfighting We shall give you all that the Navy and AirForce can do Anthony Eden is with me now and joinshis good wishes to mine
[Enclosure]Prime Minister to Admiral KeyesImpart following to your friend [the King of the
Belgians] Presume he knows that British and Frenchare fighting their way to coast between Gravelines andOstend inclusive and that we propose to give fullestsupport from Navy and Air Force during hazardousembarkation What can we do for him Certainly wecannot serve Belgiumrsquos cause by being hemmed in andstarved out Our only hope is victory and England willnever quit the war whatever happens till Hitler is beat orwe cease to be a State Trust you will make sure heleaves with you by aeroplane before too late Shouldour operation prosper and we establish [an] effectivebridgehead we would try if desired to carry someBelgian divisions to France by sea Vitally importantBelgium should continue in war and safety [of] Kingrsquosperson essential
My telegram did not reach Admiral Keyes until after hisreturn to England on the 28th In consequence thisparticular message was not delivered to King Leopold Thefact is not however important because on the afternoon ofthe 27th between five and six orsquoclock Admiral Keyes spoketo me on the telephone The following passage is takenfrom his report
At about 5 PM on the 27th when the King told mehis Army had collapsed and he was asking for acessation of hostilities a cipher telegram was sent toGort and to the War Office by wireless The War Officereceived it at 554 PM I motored at once to La Panne
Their Finest Hour 119
and telephoned to the Prime Minister The PrimeMinister was not at all surprised in view of the repeatedwarnings but he told me that I must make everyendeavour to persuade the King and Queen to come toEngland with me and dictated a message which hesaid I ought to have received that afternoon
27V40ldquoBelgian Embassy here assumes from Kingrsquos
decision to remain that he regards the war as lost andcontemplates separate peace
ldquoIt is in order to dissociate itself from this that theconstitutional Belgian Government has reassembled onforeign soil Even if present Belgian Army has to laydown its arms there are two hundred thousandBelgians of military age in France and greaterresources than Belgium had in 1914 on which to fightback By present decision the King is dividing the nationand delivering it into Hitlerrsquos protection Please conveythese considerations to the King and impress upon himthe disastrous consequences to the Allies and toBelgium of his present choicerdquo
I gave King Leopold the Prime Ministerrsquos messagebut he said that he had made up his mind that he muststay with his Army and peoplehellip
At home I issued the following general injunction
(Strictly confidential) 28V40In these dark days the Prime Minister would be
grateful if all his colleagues in the Government as wellas important officials would maintain a high morale intheir circles not minimising the gravity of events butshowing confidence in our ability and inflexible resolve
Their Finest Hour 120
to continue the war till we have broken the will of theenemy to bring all Europe under his domination
No tolerance should be given to the idea that Francewill make a separate peace but whatever may happenon the Continent we cannot doubt our duty and weshall certainly use all our power to defend the Islandthe Empire and our Cause
During the morning of the 28th Lord Gort met GeneralBlanchard again I am indebted to General Pownall LordGortrsquos Chief of Staff for this record made by him at the time
Blanchardrsquos enthusiasm at the Cassel meeting hadevaporated when he visited us today He had noconstructive suggestions or plans We read to him thetelegram ordering us to proceed to the coast with aview to embarkation He was horrified And that wasstrange for what other reason did he think that he andGort had been ordered to form bridgeheads To whatelse could such a preliminary move lead We pointedout that we had both received similar instructionsregarding the bridgeheads What had happened nowwas that we had got from our Government the next andlogical step (which had no doubt been communicatedto the French Government) whereas he had receivedas yet no such corresponding order This pacified himsomewhat but by no means entirely Then we said thatwe too like him wanted to keep the British and theFirst French Army together in this their last phasePresumably therefore the First French Army wouldcontinue the retirement tonight keeping aligned withus Whereat he went completely off the deep end ndash itwas impossible he declared We explained to him asclearly as the human tongue can explain the factors inthe situation The threat from the Germans on ournortheastern flank would probably not develop instrength for the next twenty-four hours (though when itdid come it would be serious indeed) What was ofimmediate importance was the threat to our longsouthwestern flank There as he well knew advanceguards of German infantry divisions supported by
Their Finest Hour 121
artillery had made attacks yesterday at various pointsThough the main points Wormhould CasselHazebrouck had held there had been some penetra-tion The Germans might be relied upon to press theseadvantages and we could be sure that the main bodiesof the divisions would soon deploy and force them-selves right across our line of withdrawal to the sea (awithdrawal which had been ordered for us if not forhim) There was therefore not a moment to be lost ingetting back from the Lys and we must get backtonight at least to the line Ypres-Poperinghe-Cassel Towait till tomorrow night was to give two days to theGermans to get behind us an act of madness Wethought it unlikely that we could get even thirty per centof our forces away even if we reached the sea manyindeed in forward positions would never reach it Buteven if we could only save a small proportion of highlytrained officers and men it would be something usefulto the continuance of the war Everything possible musttherefore be done and the one thing that was possibleif only in part was to get back some way tonighthellip
Then came a liaison officer from General Priouxnow commanding the First Army The liaison officer toldBlanchard that Prioux had decided that he could notwithdraw any farther tonight and therefore intended toremain in the quadrangle of canals whose northeasterncorner is Armentiegraveres and southwestern cornerBeacutethune This seemed to decide Blanchard againstwithdrawal We begged him for the sake of the FirstArmy and of the Allied cause to order Prioux to bringback at least some of his army in line with us Not all ofthem could be so tired or so far away that it wasimpossible For every man brought back there was atleast some chance of embarkation whereas every manwho remained behind would certainly be eaten up Whynot try then There was nothing to be gained by nottrying for those who did try there was at least somehope But there was no shaking him He declared thatevacuation from the beach was impossible ndash no doubtthe British Admiralty had arranged it for the BEF butthe French Marine would never be able to do it for
Their Finest Hour 122
French soldiers It was therefore idle to try ndash the chancewasnrsquot worth the effort involved he agreed with Prioux
He then asked in terms whether it was thereforeGortrsquos intention to withdraw tonight to the line Ypres-Poperinghe-Cassel or not knowing that in doing soGort would be going without the French First Army Towhich Gort replied that he was going In the first placehe had been ordered to re-embark and to do sonecessitated immediate withdrawal To wait anothertwenty-four hours would mean that he would not beable to carry out his orders for the troops would be cutoff In the second place and apart from the formalaspect of obeying orders it was madness to leave thetroops forward in their present exposed positionsThere they would certainly be overwhelmed very soonFor these reasons therefore and with great regret itwas necessary for the BEF to withdraw even if theFirst French Army did not do sohellip
Their Finest Hour 123
Their Finest Hour 124
In the early hours of the 28th the Belgian Armysurrendered Lord Gort had intimation of this only one hourbefore the event but the collapse had been foreseen threedays earlier and in one fashion or another the gap wasplugged I announced this event to the House in far moremoderate terms than those M Reynaud had thought it rightto use
The House will be aware that the King of theBelgians yesterday sent a plenipotentiary to theGerman Command asking for a suspension of arms onthe Belgian front The British and French Governmentsinstructed their generals immediately to dissociatethemselves from this procedure and to persevere in theoperations in which they are now engaged Howeverthe German Command has agreed to the Belgianproposals and the Belgian Army ceased to resist theenemyrsquos will at four orsquoclock this morning
I have no intention of suggesting to the House thatwe should attempt at this moment to pass judgmentupon the action of the King of the Belgians in hiscapacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian ArmyThis army has fought very bravely and has bothsuffered and inflicted heavy losses The BelgianGovernment has dissociated itself from the action ofthe King and declaring itself to be the only legalGovernment of Belgium has formally announced itsresolve to continue the war at the side of the Allies
Concern was expressed by the French Government that myreference to King Leopoldrsquos action was in sharp contrast tothat of M Reynaud I thought it my duty when speaking inthe House on June 4 after a careful examination of thefuller facts then available and in justice not only to our
Their Finest Hour 125
French Ally but also to the Belgian Government now inLondon to state the truth in plain terms
At the last moment when Belgium was alreadyinvaded King Leopold called upon us to come to hisaid and even at the last moment we came He and hisbrave efficient Army nearly half a million strongguarded our left flank and thus kept open our only lineof retreat to the sea Suddenly without prior consulta-tion with the least possible notice without the advice ofhis Ministers and upon his own personal act he sent aplenipotentiary to the German Command surrenderedhis Army and exposed our whole flank and means ofretreat
All this day of the 28th the escape of the British Army hungin the balance On the front from Comines to Ypres andthence to the sea facing east and attempting to fill theBelgian gap General Brooke and his Second Corps foughta magnificent battle For two days past the 5th Division hadheld Comines against all attacks but as the Belgianswithdrew northward and then capitulated the gap widenedbeyond repair The protection of the flank of the BEF wasnow their task First the 50th Division came in to prolongthe line then the 4th and 3d Divisions newly withdrawnfrom east of Lille hastened in motor transports to extendthe wall of the vital corridor that led to Dunkirk The Germanthrust between the British and Belgian armies was not to beprevented but its fatal consequence an inward turn acrossthe Yser which would have brought the enemy onto thebeaches behind our fighting troops was foreseen andeverywhere forestalledThe Germans sustained a bloody repulse Orders weregiven to the British artillery both field and medium to fire
Their Finest Hour 126
off all their ammunition at the enemy and the tremendousfire did much to quell the German assault All the time onlyabout four miles behind Brookersquos struggling front vastmasses of transport and troops poured back into thedeveloping bridgehead of Dunkirk and were fitted withskilful improvisation into its defences Moreover within theperimeter itself the main east-west road was at one timecompletely blocked by vehicles and a one-way track wascleared only by bulldozers hurling them into the ditches oneither sideIn the afternoon of the 28th Gort ordered a generalwithdrawal to the bridgehead which now ran Gravelines-Bergues-Furnes-Nieuport On this front the British divisionsstood from right to left and from Bergues to the sea byNieuport in the following order 46th 42d 1st 50th 3dand 4th By the 29th a large part of the BEF had arrivedwithin the perimeter and by this time the naval measuresfor evacuation were beginning to attain their full effect OnMay 30 General Headquarters reported that all Britishdivisions or the remains of them had come inMore than half the First French Army found their way toDunkirk where the great majority were safely embarkedBut the line of retreat of at least five divisions was cut by theGerman pincer movement west of Lille On the 28th theyattempted to break out westward but in vain the enemyclosed in upon them from all sides All through the nextthree days the French in Lille fought on graduallycontracting fronts against increasing pressure until on theevening of the 31st short of food and with their ammunitionexhausted they were forced to surrender About fiftythousand men thus fell into German hands TheseFrenchmen under the gallant leadership of GeneralMolinieacute had for four critical days contained no less thanseven German divisions which otherwise could have joined
Their Finest Hour 127
in the assaults on the Dunkirk perimeter This was asplendid contribution to the escape of their more fortunatecomrades and of the British Expeditionary Force
It was a severe experience for me bearing so heavy anover-all responsibility to watch during these days inflickering glimpses this drama in which control wasimpossible and intervention more likely to do harm thangood There is no doubt that by pressing in all loyalty theWeygand plan of retirement to the Somme as long as wedid our dangers already so grave were increased ButGortrsquos decision in which we speedily concurred toabandon the Weygand plan and march to the sea wasexecuted by him and his staff with masterly skill and willever be regarded as a brilliant episode in British militaryannals
Their Finest Hour 128
5The Deliverance of Dunkirk May 26 to
June 4
ldquoHard and Heavy Tidingsrdquomdash A Demonstration ofMinisters mdashServiceof Intercession and Prayer mdashThe Gathering of the Little Ships mdash SevenHundred Vessels mdash Three Vital Factors mdash TheMosquito Armada mdash Bringing off the French mdashFinal Orders to Lord Gort mdash A Possible Conse-quence mdash Gort Transfers the Dunkirk Commandto Alexander mdash My Third Visit to Paris May 31 mdashGeneral Spears and Marshal Peacutetain mdash TheEvacuation Complete mdash My Statement toParliament June 4 mdashSignificance of the AirVictory mdash Britainrsquos Resolve
THERE WAS A SHORT SERVICE of intercession and prayerin Westminster Abbey The English are loth to expose theirfeelings but in my stall in the choir I could feel the pent-uppassionate emotion and also the fear of the congregationnot of death or wounds or material loss but of defeat andthe final ruin of Britain
It was Tuesday May 28 and I did not attend the Houseuntil that day week There was no advantage to be gainedby a further statement in the interval nor did Membersexpress a wish for one But everyone realised that the fateof our Army and perhaps much else might well be decided
Their Finest Hour 129
by then ldquoThe Houserdquo I said ldquoshould prepare itself for hardand heavy tidings I have only to add that nothing whichmay happen in this battle can in any way relieve us of ourduty to defend the world cause to which we have vowedourselves nor should it destroy our confidence in our powerto make our way as on former occasions in our historythrough disaster and through grief to the ultimate defeat ofour enemiesrdquo I had not seen many of my colleaguesoutside the War Cabinet except individually since theformation of the Government and I thought it right to havea meeting in my room at the House of Commons of allMinisters of Cabinet rank other than the War CabinetMembers We were perhaps twenty-five round the table Idescribed the course of events and I showed them plainlywhere we were and all that was in the balance Then I saidquite casually and not treating it as a point of specialsignificance ldquoOf course whatever happens at Dunkirk weshall fight onrdquoThere occurred a demonstration which considering thecharacter of the gathering ndash twenty-five experiencedpoliticians and Parliament men who represented all thedifferent points of view whether right or wrong before thewar ndash surprised me Quite a number seemed to jump upfrom the table and come running to my chair shouting andpatting me on the back There is no doubt that had I at thisjuncture faltered at all in the leading of the nation I shouldhave been hurled out of office I was sure that everyMinister was ready to be killed quite soon and have all hisfamily and possessions destroyed rather than give in Inthis they represented the House of Commons and almostall the people It fell to me in these coming days andmonths to express their sentiments on suitable occasionsThis I was able to do because they were mine also There
Their Finest Hour 130
was a white glow overpowering sublime which ranthrough our island from end to end
Accurate and excellent accounts have been written of theevacuation of the British and French armies from DunkirkEver since the 20th the gathering of shipping and smallcraft had been proceeding under the control of AdmiralRamsay who commanded at Dover On the evening of the26th (657 PM) an Admiralty signal put ldquoOperationDynamordquo into play and the first troops were brought homethat night After the loss of Boulogne and Calais only theremains of the port of Dunkirk and the open beaches nextto the Belgian frontier were in our hands At this time it wasthought that the most we could rescue was about 45000men in two days Early the next morning May 27emergency measures were taken to find additional smallcraft ldquofor a special requirementrdquo This was no less than thefull evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force It wasplain that large numbers of such craft would be required forwork on the beaches in addition to bigger ships whichcould load in Dunkirk Harbour On the suggestion of Mr HC Riggs of the Ministry of Shipping the various boatyardsfrom Teddington to Brightlingsea were searched byAdmiralty officers and yielded upwards of forty serviceablemotor-boats or launches which were assembled atSheerness on the following day At the same time lifeboatsfrom liners in the London docks tugs from the Thamesyachts fishing-craft lighters barges and pleasure-boats ndashanything that could be of use along the beaches ndash werecalled into service By the night of the 27th a great tide ofsmall vessels began to flow towards the sea first to ourChannel ports and thence to the beaches of Dunkirk andthe beloved Army
Their Finest Hour 131
The Admiralty did not hesitate to give full rein to thespontaneous movement which swept the seafaringpopulation of our south and southeastern shores Everyonewho had a boat of any kind steam or sail put out forDunkirk and the preparations fortunately begun a weekearlier were now aided by the brilliant improvisation ofvolunteers on an amazing scale The numbers arriving onthe 29th were small but they were the forerunners of nearlyfour hundred small craft which from the 31st were destinedto play a vital part by ferrying from the beaches to the off-lying ships almost a hundred thousand men In these days Imissed the head of my Admiralty map room Captain Pimand one or two other familiar faces They had got hold of aDutch schuit which in four days brought off eight hundredsoldiers Altogether there came to the rescue of the Armyunder the ceaseless air bombardment of the enemy abouteight hundred and fifty vessels of which nearly sevenhundred were British and the rest Allied
Here is the official list in which ships not engaged inembarking troops are omitted
Their Finest Hour 132
BRITISH SHIPS
ALLLIED SHIPS
Meanwhile ashore around Dunkirk the occupation of theperimeter was effected with precision The troops arrivedout of chaos and were formed in order along the defenceswhich even in two days had grown Those men who were inbest shape turned about to form the line Divisions like the2d and 5th which had suffered most were held in reserveon the beaches and were then embarked early In the firstinstance there were to be three corps on the front but bythe 29th with the French taking a greater share in the
Their Finest Hour 133
defences two sufficed The enemy had closely followed thewithdrawal and hard fighting was incessant especially onthe flanks near Nieuport and Bergues As the evacuationwent on the steady decrease in the number of troops bothBritish and French was accompanied by a correspondingcontraction of the defence On the beaches among thesand dunes for three four or five days scores ofthousands of men dwelt under unrelenting air attackHitlerrsquos belief that the German Air Force would renderescape impossible and that therefore he should keep hisarmoured formations for the final stroke of the campaignwas a mistaken but not unreasonable view
Their Finest Hour 134
Their Finest Hour 135
Three factors falsified his expectations First the incessantair-bombing of the masses of troops along the seashore didthem very little harm The bombs plunged into the softsand which muffled their explosions In the early stagesafter a crashing air raid the troops were astonished to findthat hardly anybody had been killed or woundedEverywhere there had been explosions but scarcelyanyone was the worse A rocky shore would have producedfar more deadly results Presently the soldiers regarded theair attacks with contempt They crouched in the sand duneswith composure and growing hope Before them lay thegrey but not unfriendly sea Beyond the rescuing ships andndash HomeThe second factor which Hitler had not foreseen was theslaughter of his airmen British and German air quality wasput directly to the test By intense effort Fighter Commandmaintained successive patrols over the scene and foughtthe enemy at long odds Hour after hour they bit into theGerman fighter and bomber squadrons taking a heavy tollscattering them and driving them away Day after day thiswent on till the glorious victory of the Royal Air Force wasgained Wherever German aircraft were encounteredsometimes in forties and fifties they were instantlyattacked often by single squadrons or less and shot downin scores which presently added up into hundreds Thewhole Metropolitan Air Force our last sacred reserve wasused Sometimes the fighter pilots made four sorties a dayA clear result was obtained The superior enemy werebeaten or killed and for all their bravery mastered or evencowed This was a decisive clash Unhappily the troops onthe beaches saw very little of this epic conflict in the airoften miles away or above the clouds They knew nothingof the loss inflicted on the enemy All they felt was thebombs scourging the beaches cast by the foes who had
Their Finest Hour 136
got through but did not perhaps return There was even abitter anger in the Army against the Air Force and some ofthe troops landing at Dover or at Thames ports in theirignorance insulted men in Air Force uniform They shouldhave clasped their hands but how could they know InParliament I took pains to spread the truthBut all the aid of the sand and all the prowess in the airwould have been vain without the sea The instructionsgiven ten or twelve days before had under the pressure andemotion of events borne amazing fruit Perfect disciplineprevailed ashore and afloat The sea was calm To and frobetween the shore and the ships plied the little boatsgathering the men from the beaches as they waded out orpicking them from the water with total indifference to the airbombardment which often claimed its victims Theirnumbers alone defied air attack The Mosquito Armada asa whole was unsinkable In the midst of our defeat glorycame to the island people united and unconquerable andthe tale of the Dunkirk beaches will shine in whateverrecords are preserved of our affairsNotwithstanding the valiant work of the small craft it mustnot be forgotten that the heaviest burden fell on the shipsplying from Dunkirk Harbour where two-thirds of the menwere embarked The destroyers played the predominantpart as the casualty lists show Nor must the great partplayed by the personnel ships with their mercantile crewsbe overlooked
The progress of the evacuation was watched with anxiouseyes and growing hope On the evening of the 27th LordGortrsquos position appeared critical to the Naval authoritiesand Captain Tennant RN from the Admiralty who had
Their Finest Hour 137
assumed the duties of Senior Naval Officer at Dunkirksignalled for all available craft to be sent to the beachesimmediately as ldquoevacuation tomorrow night isproblematicalrdquo The picture presented was grim evendesperate Extreme efforts were made to meet the call anda cruiser eight destroyers and twenty-six other vesselswere sent The 28th was a day of tension which graduallyeased as the position on land was stabilised with thepowerful help of the Royal Air Force The naval plans werecarried through despite severe losses on the 29th whenthree destroyers and twenty-one other vessels were sunkand many others damagedThere was never any question of our leaving the Frenchbehind Here was my order before any request or complaintfrom the French was received
Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar CIGS andGeneral Ismay
29V40
(Original to CIGS)It is essential that the French should share in such
evacuations from Dunkirk as may be possible Nor mustthey be dependent only upon their own shippingresources Arrangements must be concerted at oncewith the French Missions in this country or ifnecessary with the French Government so that noreproaches or as few as possible may arise It mightperhaps be well if we evacuated the two Frenchdivisions from Dunkirk and replaced them pro tem withour own troops thus simplifying the command But letme have the best proposals possible and advise mewhether there is any action I should take
Their Finest Hour 138
Prime Minister toGeneral Spears (Paris)
29V40
Following for Reynaud for communication toWeygand and Georges
We have evacuated nearly 50000 from Dunkirk andbeaches and hope another 30000 tonight Front maybe beaten in at any time or piers beaches andshipping rendered unusable by air attack and also byartillery fire from the southwest No one can tell howlong present good flow will last or how much we cansave for future We wish French troops to share inevacuation to fullest possible extent and Admiraltyhave been instructed to aid French Marine as requiredWe do not know how many will be forced to capitulatebut we must share this loss together as best we canand above all bear it without reproaches arising frominevitable confusion stresses and strains
As soon as we have reorganised our evacuatedtroops and prepared forces necessary to safeguard ourlife against threatened and perhaps imminent invasionwe shall build up a new BEF from St Nazaire I ambringing Regulars from India and Palestine Australiansand Canadians are arriving soon At present we areremoving equipment south of Amiens beyond what isneeded for five divisions But this is only to get intoorder and meet impending shock and we shall shortlysend you new scheme for reinforcement of our troopsin France I send this in all comradeship Do nothesitate to speak frankly to me
On the 30th I held a meeting of the three Service Ministersand the Chiefs of Staff in the Admiralty War Room Weconsidered the events of the day on the Belgian coast Thetotal number of troops brought off had risen to 120000including only 6000 French 850 vessels of all kinds were atwork A message from Admiral Wake Walker at Dunkirk
Their Finest Hour 139
said that in spite of intense bombardment and air attack4000 men had been embarked in the previous hour Healso thought that Dunkirk itself would probably be untenableby the next day I emphasised the urgent need of getting offmore French troops To fail to do so might do irreparableharm to the relations between ourselves and our ally I alsosaid that when the British strength was reduced to that of acorps we ought to tell Lord Gort to embark and return toEngland leaving a corps commander in charge The BritishArmy would have to stick it out as long as possible so thatthe evacuation of the French could continueKnowing well the character of Lord Gort I wrote out in myown hand the following order to him which was sentofficially by the War Office at 2 PM on the 30th
Continue to defend the present perimeter to theutmost in order to cover maximum evacuation nowproceeding well Report every three hours through LaPanne If we can still communicate we shall send youan order to return to England with such officers as youmay choose at the moment when we deem yourcommand so reduced that it can be handed over to acorps commander You should now nominate thiscommander If communications are broken you are tohand over and return as specified when your effectivefighting force does not exceed the equivalent of threedivisions This is in accordance with correct militaryprocedure and no personal discretion is left you in thematter On political grounds it would be a needlesstriumph to the enemy to capture you when only a smallforce remained under your orders The corpscommander chosen by you should be ordered to carryon the defence in conjunction with the French andevacuation whether from Dunkirk or the beaches butwhen in his judgment no further organised evacuationis possible and no further proportionate damage can beinflicted on the enemy he is authorised in consultation
Their Finest Hour 140
with the senior French commander to capitulateformally to avoid useless slaughter
It is possible that this last message influenced other greatevents and the fortunes of another valiant commanderWhen I was at the White House at the end of December1941 I learned from the President and Mr Stimson of theapproaching fate of General MacArthur and the Americangarrison at Corregidor I thought it right to show them theway in which we had dealt with the position of aCommander-in-Chief whose force was reduced to a smallfraction of his original command The President and MrStimson both read the telegram with profound attentionand I was struck by the impression it seemed to make uponthem A little later in the day Mr Stimson came back andasked for a copy of it which I immediately gave him It maybe (for I do not know) that this influenced them in the rightdecision which they took in ordering General MacArthur tohand over his command to one of his subordinate generalsand thus saved for all his future glorious services the greatCommander who would otherwise have perished or passedthe war as a Japanese captive I should like to think thiswas true
On the 30th members of Lord Gortrsquos staff in conferencewith Admiral Ramsay at Dover informed him that daylighton June 1 was the latest time up to which the easternperimeter might be expected to hold Evacuation wastherefore pressed on with the utmost urgency to ensure sofar as possible that a British rearguard of no more than
Their Finest Hour 141
about four thousand men would then remain ashore Laterit was found that this number would be insufficient todefend the final covering positions and it was decided tohold the British sector until midnight June 12 evacuationproceeding meanwhile on the basis of full equality betweenFrench and British forcesSuch was the situation when on the evening of May 31 LordGort in accordance with his orders handed over hiscommand to Major-General Alexander and returned toEngland
To avoid misunderstandings by keeping personal contact itwas necessary for me to fly to Paris on May 31 for ameeting of the Supreme War Council With me in the planecame Mr Attlee and Generals Dill and Ismay I also tookGeneral Spears who had flown over on the 30th with thelatest news from Paris This brilliant officer and Member ofParliament was a friend of mine from the First Great WarHalf French by birth liaison officer between the left of theFrench and the right of the British Armies he had taken meround the Vimy Ridge in 1916 and had made me friendswith General Fayolle who commanded the Thirty-ThirdFrench Corps Speaking French with a perfect accent andbearing five wound stripes on his sleeve he was apersonality at this moment fitted to our anxious relationsWhen Frenchmen and Englishmen are in trouble togetherand arguments break out the Frenchman is often volubleand vehement and the Englishman unresponsive or evenrude But Spears could say things to the high Frenchpersonnel with an ease and force which I have never seenequalled
Their Finest Hour 142
This time we did not go to the Quai drsquoOrsay but to MReynaudrsquos room at the War Office in the Rue Saint-Dominique Attlee and I found Reynaud and Marshal Peacutetainopposite to us as the only French Ministers This was thefirst appearance of Peacutetain now Vice-President of theCouncil at any of our meetings He wore plain clothes OurAmbassador Dill Ismay and Spears were with us andWeygand and Darlan Captain de Margerie head ofReynaudrsquos private office and a M Baudouin of theSecretariat represented the FrenchThe first question was the position in Norway I said that theBritish Government was of the considered opinion that theNarvik area should be evacuated at once Our troops therethe destroyers involved and a hundred anti-aircraft gunswere badly wanted elsewhere We therefore proposed anevacuation beginning on June 2 The British Navy wouldtransport and repatriate the French forces the King ofNorway and any Norwegian troops who wished to comeReynaud said that the French Government agreed with thispolicy The destroyers would be urgently required in theMediterranean in the event of war with Italy The sixteenthousand men would be very valuable on the line of theAisne and the Somme This matter was therefore settledI then turned to Dunkirk The French seemed to have nomore idea of what was happening to the northern armiesthan we had about the main French front When I told themthat 165000 men of whom 15000 were French had beentaken off they were astonished They naturally drewattention to the marked British preponderance I explainedthat this was due largely to the fact that there had beenmany British administrative units in the back area who hadbeen able to embark before fighting troops could be sparedfrom the front Moreover the French up to the present had
Their Finest Hour 143
had no orders to evacuate One of the chief reasons why Ihad come to Paris was to make sure that the same orderswere given to the French troops as to the British The threeBritish divisions now holding the centre would cover theevacuation of all the Allied forces That and the sea-transport would be the British contribution to offset theheavy Allied losses which must now be faced His MajestyrsquosGovernment had felt it necessary in the dire circumstancesto order Lord Gort to take off fighting men and leave thewounded behind If present hopes were confirmed 200000able-bodied troops might be got away This would bealmost a miracle Four days ago I would not have wageredon more than 50000 as a maximum I dwelt upon ourterrible losses in equipment Reynaud paid a handsometribute to the work of the British Navy and Air Force forwhich I thanked him We then spoke at some length uponwhat could be done to rebuild the British forces in FranceMeanwhile Admiral Darlan had drafted a telegram toAdmiral Abrial at Dunkirk
(1) A bridgehead shall be held round Dunkirk withthe divisions under your command and those underBritish command
(2) As soon as you arc convinced that no troopsoutside the bridgehead can make their way to thepoints of embarkation the troops holding thebridgehead shall withdraw and embark the Britishforces embarking first
I intervened at once to say that the British would notembark first but that the evacuation should proceed onequal terms between the British and the French ndashldquoBras-dessus bras-dessousrdquo The British would form therearguard This was agreedThe conversation next turned to Italy I expressed theBritish view that if Italy came in we should strike at her at
Their Finest Hour 144
once in the most effective manner Many Italians wereopposed to war and all should be made to realise itsseverity I proposed that we should strike by air-bombing atthe northwestern industrial triangle enclosed by the threecities of Milan Turin and Genoa Reynaud agreed that theAllies must strike at once and Admiral Darlan said he had aplan ready for the naval and aerial bombardment of Italyrsquosoil supplies largely stored along the coast between thefrontier and Naples The necessary technical discussionswere arrangedI then mentioned my desire that more Ministers of theAdministration I had just formed should become acquaintedwith their French opposite numbers as soon as possibleFor instance I should like Mr Bevin the Minister of Labourand trade-union leader to visit Paris Mr Bevin wasshowing great energy and under his leadership the Britishworking class was now giving up holidays and privileges toa far greater extent than in the last war Reynaud cordiallyassentedAfter some talk about Tangier and the importance ofkeeping Spain out of the war I spoke on the generaloutlook I said
The Allies must maintain an unflinching front againstall their enemieshellip The United States had been rousedby recent events and even if they did not enter the warwould soon be prepared to give us powerful aid Aninvasion of England if it took place would have a stillmore profound effect on the United States England didnot fear invasion and would resist it most fiercely inevery village and hamlet It was only after her essentialneed of troops had been met that the balance of herarmed forces could be put at the disposal of her Frenchallyhellip I was absolutely convinced we had only to carryon the fight to conquer Even if one of us should bestruck down the other must not abandon the struggleThe British Government were prepared to wage war
Their Finest Hour 145
from the New World if through some disaster Englandherself were laid waste If Germany defeated either allyor both she would give no mercy we should bereduced to the status of vassals and slaves forever Itwould be better far that the civilisation of WesternEurope with all its achievements should come to atragic but splendid end than that the two greatdemocracies should linger on stripped of all that madelife worth living
Mr Attlee then said that he entirely agreed with my viewThe British people now realise the danger with
which they are faced and know that in the event of aGerman victory everything they have built up will bedestroyed The Germans kill not only men but ideasOur people are resolved as never before in their history
Reynaud thanked us for what we had said He was surethat the morale of the German people was not up to thelevel of the momentary triumph of their army If Francecould hold the Somme with the help of Britain and ifAmerican industry came in to make good the disparity inarms then we could be sure of victory He was mostgrateful he said for my renewed assurance that if onecountry went under the other would not abandon thestruggleThe formal meeting then endedAfter we rose from the table some of the principals talkedtogether in the bay window in a somewhat differentatmosphere Chief among these was Marshal PeacutetainSpears was with me helping me out with my French andspeaking himself The young Frenchman Captain deMargerie had already spoken about fighting it out in AfricaBut Marshal Plainrsquos attitude detached and sombre gaveme the feeling that he would face a separate peace Theinfluence of his personality his reputation his serene
Their Finest Hour 146
acceptance of the march of adverse events apart from anywords he used was almost overpowering to those underhis spell One of the Frenchmen I cannot remember whosaid in their polished way that a continuance of militaryreverses might in certain eventualities enforce amodification of foreign policy upon France Here Spearsrose to the occasion and addressing himself particularly toMarshal Peacutetain said in perfect French ldquoI suppose youunderstand M le Mareacutechal that that would meanblockaderdquo Someone else said ldquoThat would perhaps beinevitablerdquo But then Spears to Peacutetainrsquos face ldquoThat wouldnot only mean blockade but bombardment of all Frenchports in German handsrdquo I was glad to have this said I sangmy usual song we would fight on whatever happened orwhoever fell out
Again we had a night of petty raids and in the morning Ideparted Here was the information that awaited me on myreturn
Prime Minister toGeneral Weygand
1VI40
Crisis in evacuation now reached Five FighterSquadrons acting almost continuously is the most wecan do but six ships several filled with troops sunk bybombing this morning Artillery fire menacing onlypracticable channel Enemy closing in on reducedbridgehead By trying to hold on till tomorrow we maylose all By going tonight much may certainly be savedthough much will be lost Nothing like numbers ofeffective French troops you mention believed inbridgehead now and we doubt whether such largenumbers remain in area Situation cannot be fully
Their Finest Hour 147
judged by Admiral Abrial in the fortress nor by you norby us here We have therefore ordered GeneralAlexander commanding British sector of bridgehead tojudge in consultation with Admiral Abrial whether to tryto stay over tomorrow or not Trust you will agree
May 31 and June 1 saw the climax though not the end atDunkirk On these two days over 132000 men were safelylanded in England nearly one-third of them having beenbrought from the beaches in small craft under fierce airattack and shell fire On June 1 from early dawn onward theenemy bombers made their greatest efforts often timedwhen our own fighters had withdrawn to refuel Theseattacks took heavy toll of the crowded shipping whichsuffered almost as much as in all the previous week Onthis single day our losses by air attack by mines E-boatsor other misadventure were thirty-one ships sunk andeleven damagedThe final phase was carried through with much skill andprecision For the first time it became possible to planahead instead of being forced to rely on hourlyimprovisations At dawn on June 2 about four thousandBritish with seven antiaircraft guns and twelve anti-tankguns remained with the considerable French forces holdingthe contracting perimeter of Dunkirk Evacuation was nowpossible only in darkness and Admiral Ramsay determinedto make a massed descent on the harbour that night withall his available resources Besides tugs and small craftforty-four ships were sent that evening from Englandincluding eleven destroyers and fourteen minesweepersForty French and Belgian vessels also participated Beforemidnight the British rearguard was embarkedThis was not however the end of the Dunkirk story Wehad been prepared to carry considerably greater numbersof French that night than had offered themselves The
Their Finest Hour 148
result was that when our ships many of them still emptyhad to withdraw at dawn great numbers of French troopsmany still in contact with the enemy remained ashore Onemore effort had to be made Despite the exhaustion ofshipsrsquo companies after so many days without rest or respitethe call was answered On June 4 26175 Frenchmen werelanded in England over 21000 of them in British ships
BRITISH AND ALLIED TROOPS LANDED IN ENGLAND
Finally at 223 PM that day the Admiralty in agreementwith the French announced that ldquoOperation Dynamordquo wasnow completed
Parliament assembled on June 4 and it was my duty to laythe story fully before them both in public and later in secretsession The narrative requires only a few extracts from myspeech which is extant It was imperative to explain notonly to our own people but to the world that our resolve tofight on was based on serious grounds and was no meredespairing effort It was also right to lay bare my ownreasons for confidence
Their Finest Hour 149
We must be very careful not to assign to thisdeliverance the attributes of a victory Wars are not wonby evacuations But there was a victory inside thisdeliverance which should be noted It was gained bythe Air Force Many of our soldiers coming back havenot seen the Air Force at work they saw only thebombers which escaped its protective attack Theyunderrate its achievements I have heard much talk ofthis that is why I go out of my way to say this I will tellyou about it
This was a great trial of strength between the Britishand German Air Forces Can you conceive a greaterobjective for the Germans in the air than to makeevacuation from these beaches impossible and to sinkall these ships which were displayed almost to theextent of thousands Could there have been anobjective of greater military importance and significancefor the whole purpose of the war than this They triedhard and they were beaten back they were frustratedin their task We got the Army away and they havepaid fourfold for any losses which they have inflictedhellipAll of our types and all our pilots have been vindicatedas superior to what they have at present to face
Their Finest Hour 150
When we consider how much greater would be ouradvantage in defending the air above this islandagainst an overseas attack I must say that I find inthese facts a sure basis upon which practical andreassuring thoughts may rest I will pay my tribute tothese young airmen The great French Army was verylargely for the time being cast back and disturbed bythe onrush of a few thousands of armoured vehiclesMay it not also be that the cause of civilisation itself willbe defended by the skill and devotion of a fewthousand airmen
We are told that Herr Hitler has a plan for invadingthe British Isles This has often been thought of beforeWhen Napoleon lay at Boulogne for a year with his flat-bottomed boats and his Grand Army he was told bysomeone ldquoThere are bitter weeds in Englandrdquo Thereare certainly a great many more of them since theBritish Expeditionary Force returned
The whole question of Home Defence againstinvasion is of course powerfully affected by the factthat we have for the time being in this island incompa-rably stronger military forces than we have ever had atany moment in this war or the last But this will notcontinue We shall not be content with a defensive warWe have our duty to our Ally We have to reconstituteand build up the British Expeditionary Force onceagain under its gallant Commander-in-Chief Lord GortAll this is in train but in the interval we must put ourdefences in this island into such a high state oforganisation that the fewest possible numbers will berequired to give effective security and that the largestpossible potential of offensive effort may be realisedOn this we are now engaged
I ended in a passage which was to prove as will beseen a timely and important factor in United Statesdecisions
Even though large tracts of Europe and many old
and famous States have fallen or may fall into the gripof the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazirule we shall not flag or fail We shall go on to the endwe shall fight in France we shall fight in the seas and
Their Finest Hour 151
oceans we shall fight with growing confidence andgrowing strength in the air we shall defend our islandwhatever the cost may be we shall fight on thebeaches we shall fight on the landing-grounds weshall fight in the fields and in the streets we shall fightin the hills we shall never surrender and even if whichI do not for a moment believe this island or a large partof it were subjugated and starving then our Empirebeyond the seas armed and guarded by the BritishFleet would carry on the struggle until in Godrsquos goodtime the New World with all its power and might stepsforth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old
Their Finest Hour 152
6The Rush for the Spoils
Traditional British and Italian Friendship mdashAdvantages to Italy and Mussolini of Neutrality mdashMy Message to Mussolini on Becoming PrimeMinister mdash His Hard Response mdash Reynaudrsquos Visitto London of May 26 mdash France and Britain InvitePresident Roosevelt to Intervene mdash My TelegramConveying the Cabinet Decision of May 28 mdashPreparations to Strike at Italy Should She DeclareWar mdash Italy and Yugoslavia mdash The ItalianDeclaration of War mdash The Attack on the AlpineFront Stopped by the French Army mdash CianorsquosLetter to Me of December 23 1943 mdash PresidentRooseveltrsquos Denunciation of Italy mdash My Telegramto Him of June 11 mdash Anglo-Soviet Relations mdashMolotovrsquos Congratulations upon German Victoriesmdash Sir Stafford Cripps Appointed Ambassador toMoscow mdash My Letter to Stalin of June 25 1940 mdashThe Soviet Share of the Spoil
THE FRIENDSHIP between the British and Italian peoplessprang from the days of Garibaldi and Cavour Every stagein the liberation of Northern Italy from Austria and everystep towards Italian unity and independence hadcommanded the sympathies of Victorian Liberalism Thishad bred a warm and enduring response The declarationin the original Treaty of Triple Alliance between ItalyGermany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire stipulated thatin no circumstances should Italy be drawn into war with
Their Finest Hour 153
Great Britain British influence had powerfully contributed tothe Italian accession to the Allied cause in the First WorldWar The rise of Mussolini and the establishment ofFascism as a counter to Bolshevism had in its early phasesdivided British opinion on party lines but had not affectedthe broad foundations of good will between the peoplesWe have seen that until Mussolinirsquos designs againstAbyssinia had raised grave issues he had ranged himselfwith Great Britain in opposition to Hitlerism and Germanambitions I have told in the previous volume the sad tale ofhow the Baldwin-Chamberlain policy about Abyssiniabrought us the worst of both worlds how we estranged theItalian dictator without breaking his power and how theLeague of Nations was injured without Abyssinia beingsaved We have also seen the earnest but futile effortsmade by Mr Chamberlain Sir Samuel Hoare and LordHalifax to win back during the period of appeasementMussolinirsquos lost favour And finally there was the growth ofMussolinirsquos conviction that Britainrsquos sun had set and thatItalyrsquos future could with German help be founded on theruins of the British Empire This had been followed by thecreation of the Berlin-Rome Axis in accordance with whichItaly might well have been expected to enter the waragainst Britain and France on its very first dayIt was certainly only common prudence for Mussolini to seehow the war would go before committing himself and hiscountry irrevocably The process of waiting was by nomeans unprofitable Italy was courted by both sides andgained much consideration for her interests manyprofitable contracts and time to improve her armamentsThus the twilight months had passed It is an interestingspeculation what the Italian fortunes would have been if thispolicy had been maintained The United States with itslarge Italian vote might well have made it clear to Hitler that
Their Finest Hour 154
an attempt to rally Italy to his side by force of arms wouldraise the gravest issues Peace prosperity and growingpower would have been the prize of a persistent neutralityOnce Hitler was embroiled with Russia this happy statemight have been almost indefinitely prolonged with ever-growing benefits and Mussolini might have stood forth inthe peace or in the closing year of the war as the wiseststatesman the sunny peninsula and its industrious andprolific people had known This was a more agreeablesituation than that which in fact awaited himAt the time when I was Chancellor of the Exchequer underMr Baldwin in the years after 1924 I did what I could topreserve the traditional friendship between Italy and BritainI made a debt settlement with Count Volpi which contrastedvery favourably with the arrangements made with France Ireceived the warmest expressions of gratitude from theDuce and with difficulty escaped the highest decorationMoreover in the conflict between Fascism and Bolshevismthere was no doubt where my sympathies and convictionslay On the two occasions in 1927 when I met Mussolini ourpersonal relations had been intimate and easy I wouldnever have encouraged Britain to make a breach with himabout Abyssinia or roused the League of Nations againsthim unless we were prepared to go to war in the lastextreme He like Hitler understood and in a way respectedmy campaign for British rearmament though he was veryglad British public opinion did not support my viewIn the crisis we had now reached of the disastrous Battle ofFrance it was clearly my duty as Prime Minister to do myutmost to keep Italy out of the conflict and though I did notindulge in vain hopes I at once used what resources andinfluence I might possess Six days after becoming Head ofthe Government I wrote at the Cabinetrsquos desire the appeal
Their Finest Hour 155
to Mussolini which together with his answer was publishedtwo years later in very different circumstances
Prime Minister toSignor Mussolini
16V40
Now that I have taken up my office as Prime Ministerand Minister of Defence I look back to our meetings inRome and feel a desire to speak words of good will toyou as Chief of the Italian nation across what seems tobe a swiftly widening gulf Is it too late to stop a river ofblood from flowing between the British and Italianpeoples We can no doubt inflict grievous injuries uponone another and maul each other cruelly and darkenthe Mediterranean with our strife If you so decree itmust be so but I declare that I have never been theenemy of Italian greatness nor ever at heart the foe ofthe Italian lawgiver It is idle to predict the course of thegreat battles now raging in Europe but I am sure thatwhatever may happen on the Continent England willgo on to the end even quite alone as we have donebefore and I believe with some assurance that we shallbe aided in increasing measure by the United Statesand indeed by all the Americas
I beg you to believe that it is in no spirit of weaknessor of fear that I make this solemn appeal which willremain on record Down the ages above all other callscomes the cry that the joint heirs of Latin and Christiancivilisation must not be ranged against one another inmortal strife Hearken to it I beseech you in all honourand respect before the dread signal is given It willnever be given by us
The response was hard It had at least the merit of candour
Signer Mussolini toPrime Minister
18V40
Their Finest Hour 156
I reply to the message which you have sent me inorder to tell you that you are certainly aware of gravereasons of an historical and contingent character whichhave ranged our two countries in opposite campsWithout going back very far in time I remind you of theinitiative taken in 1935 by your Government to organiseat Geneva sanctions against Italy engaged in securingfor herself a small space in the African sun withoutcausing the slightest injury to your interests andterritories or those of others I remind you also of thereal and actual state of servitude in which Italy findsherself in her own sea If it was to honour yoursignature that your Government declared war onGermany you will understand that the same sense ofhonour and of respect for engagements assumed in theItalian-German Treaty guides Italian policy today andtomorrow in the face of any event whatsoever
From this moment we could have no doubt of Mussolinirsquosintention to enter the war at his most favourable momentHis resolve had in fact been made as soon as the defeat ofthe French armies was obvious On May 13 he had toldCiano that he would declare war on France and Britainwithin a month His official decision to declare war on anydate suitable after June 5 was imparted to the Italian Chiefsof Staff on May 29 At Hitlerrsquos request the date waspostponed to June 10
On May 26 while the fate of the Northern Armies hung inthe balance and no one could be sure that any wouldescape Reynaud flew over to England to have a talk withus about this topic which had not been absent from ourminds The Italian declaration of war must be expected atany moment Thus France would burn upon another frontand a new foe would march hungrily upon her in the SouthCould anything be done to buy off Mussolini That was the
Their Finest Hour 157
question posed I did not think there was the slightestchance and every fact that the French Premier used as anargument for trying only made me surer there was no hopeHowever Reynaud was under strong pressure at homeand we on our side wished to give full consideration to ourAlly whose one vital weapon her Army was breaking inher hand M Reynaud has published a full account of hisvisit and especially of his conversations1 Lord Halifax MrChamberlain Mr Attlee and Mr Eden were also at ourmeetings Although there was no need to marshal thegrave facts M Reynaud dwelt not obscurely upon thepossible French withdrawal from the war He himself wouldfight on but there was always the possibility that he mightsoon be replaced by others of a different temperWe had already on May 25 at the instance of the FrenchGovernment made a joint request to President Roosevelt tointervene In this message Britain and France authorisedhim to state that we understood Italy had territorialgrievances against them in the Mediterranean that wewere disposed to consider at once any reasonable claimsthat the Allies would admit Italy to the Peace Conferencewith a status equal to that of any belligerent and that wewould invite the President to see that any agreementreached now would be carried out The President actedaccordingly but his addresses were repulsed by the Italiandictator in the most abrupt manner At our meeting withReynaud we had already this answer before us The FrenchPremier now suggested more precise proposals Obviouslyif these were to remedy Italyrsquos ldquostate of servitude in her ownseardquo they must affect the status both of Gibraltar and SuezFrance was prepared to make similar concessions aboutTunis
Their Finest Hour 158
We were not able to show any favour to these ideas Thiswas not because it was wrong to examine them or becauseit did not seem worth while at this moment to pay a heavyprice to keep Italy out of the war My own feeling was that atthe pitch in which our affairs lay we had nothing to offerwhich Mussolini could not take for himself or be given byHitler if we were defeated One cannot easily make abargain at the last gasp Once we started negotiating forthe friendly mediation of the Duce we should destroy ourpower of fighting on I found my colleagues very stiff andtough All our minds ran much more on bombing Milan andTurin the moment Mussolini declared war and seeing howhe liked that Reynaud who did not at heart disagreeseemed convinced or at least content The most we couldpromise was to bring the matter before the Cabinet andsend a definite answer the next day Reynaud and Ilunched alone together at the Admiralty The followingtelegram the greater part of which is my own wordingembodies the conclusions of the War Cabinet
Prime Minister to MReynaud
28V40
I have with my colleagues examined with the mostcareful and sympathetic attention the proposal for anapproach by way of precise offer of concessions toSignor Mussolini that you have forwarded to me todayfully realising the terrible situation with which we areboth faced at this moment
2 Since we last discussed this matter the new factwhich has occurred namely the capitulation of theBelgian Army has greatly changed our position for theworse for it is evident that the chance of withdrawingthe armies of Generals Blanchard and Gort from theChannel ports has become very problematical The firsteffect of such a disaster must be to make it impossible
Their Finest Hour 159
at such a moment for Germany to put forward anyterms likely to be acceptable and neither we nor youwould be prepared to give up our independence withoutfighting for it to the end
3 In the formula prepared last Sunday by LordHalifax it was suggested that if Signor Mussolini wouldco-operate with us in securing a settlement of allEuropean questions which would safeguard ourindependence and form the basis of a just and durablepeace for Europe we should be prepared to discuss hisclaims in the Mediterranean You now propose to addcertain specific offers which I cannot suppose wouldhave any chance of moving Signor Mussolini andwhich once made could not be subsequently with-drawn in order to induce him to undertake the rocircle ofmediator which the formula discussed on Sundaycontemplated
4 I and my colleagues believe that Signor Mussolinihas long had it in mind that he might eventually fill thisrocircle no doubt counting upon substantial advantages forItaly in the process But we are convinced that at thismoment when Hitler is flushed with victory andcertainly counts on early and complete collapse ofAllied resistance it would be impossible for SignorMussolini to put forward proposals for a conferencewith any success I may remind you also that thePresident of the USA has received a wholly negativereply to the proposal which we jointly asked him tomake and that no response has been made to theapproach which Lord Halifax made to the ItalianAmbassador here last Saturday
5 Therefore without excluding the possibility of anapproach to Signor Mussolini at some time we cannotfeel that this would be the right moment and I ambound to add that in my opinion the effect on themorale of our people which is now firm and resolutewould be extremely dangerous You yourself can bestjudge what would be the effect in France
6 You will ask then how is the situation to beimproved My reply is that by showing that after theloss of our two [Northern] armies and the support of ourBelgian ally we still have stout hearts and confidence in
Their Finest Hour 160
ourselves we shall at once strengthen our hands innegotiations and draw the admiration and perhaps thematerial help of the USA Moreover we feel that aslong as we stand together our undefeated Navy andour Air Force which is daily destroying German fightersand bombers at a formidable rate afford us the meansof exercising in our common interest a continuouspressure upon Germanyrsquos internal life
7 We have reason to believe that the Germans tooare working to a time-table and that their losses andthe hardships imposed on them together with the fearof our air raids is undermining their courage It wouldindeed be a tragedy if by too hasty an acceptance ofdefeat we threw away a chance that was almost withinour grasp of securing an honourable issue from thestruggle
8 In my view if we both stand out we may yet saveourselves from the fate of Denmark or Poland Oursuccess must depend first on our unity then on ourcourage and endurance
This did not prevent the French Government from making afew days later a direct offer of their own to Italy of territorialconcessions which Mussolini treated with disdain ldquoHe wasnot interestedrdquo said Ciano to the French Ambassador onJune 3 ldquoin recovering any French territories by peacefulnegotiation He had decided to make war on Francerdquo2 Thiswas only what we had expected
I now gave daily a series of directions to make sure that ifwe were subjected to this odious attack by Mussolini weshould be able to strike back at once
Their Finest Hour 161
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay
28V40
Pray bring the following before the COS Commit-tee
What measures have been taken in the event ofItalyrsquos going to war to attack Italian forces in Abyssiniasending rifles and money to the Abyssinian insurgentsand generally to disturb that country
I understand General Smuts has sent a Unionbrigade to East Africa Is it there yet When will it beWhat other arrangements are made What is thestrength of the Khartoum garrison including troops inthe Blue Nile Province This is the opportunity for theAbyssinians to liberate themselves with Allied help
2 If France is still our ally after an Italian declarationof war it would appear extremely desirable that thecombined fleets acting from opposite ends of theMediterranean should pursue an active offensiveagainst Italy It is important that at the outset collisionshould take place both with the Italian Navy and AirForce in order that we can see what their quality reallyis and whether it has changed at all since the last warThe purely defensive strategy contemplated byCommander-in-Chiepound Mediterranean ought not to beaccepted Unless it is found that the fighting qualities ofthe Italians are high it will be much better that the Fleetat Alexandria should sally forth and run some risks thanthat it should remain in a posture so markedlydefensive Risks must be run at this juncture in alltheatres
3 I presume that the Admiralty have a plan in theevent of France becoming neutral
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay (andothers)
29V40
We must have eight battalions from Palestine homeat the earliest moment I regard the Mediterranean asclosed to troopships The choice is therefore between
Their Finest Hour 162
the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf Let this alternativeroute [across the desert to the Gulf] be examined thisafternoon and Admiralty be consulted and report tome on relative times and safety The Australians can beleft in Palestine for the moment but the HighCommissioner like others must conform to thesupreme requirements of the State
Admiralty should say whether it would be possible topick these men up at the Cape in the big liners for extraspeed
Prime Minister to FirstLord of the Admiralty
30V40
What measures have been taken to seize all Italianships at the moment of war How many are there inBritish ports and what can be done about them on theseas or in foreign ports Will you kindly pass this to theproper Department immediately
At the Supreme War Council in Paris on May 31 which hasalready been described it was agreed that the Allies shouldundertake offensive operations against selected objectivesin Italy at the earliest possible moment and that the Frenchand British naval and air staffs should concert their plansWe had also agreed that in the event of Italian aggressionagainst Greece of which there were indications we shouldmake sure that Crete did not fall into enemy hands Ipursued the same theme in my minutes
Prime Minister toSecretary of State forAir and Chief of AirStaff
2VI40
It is of the utmost importance in view of the[possible] raids on Lyons and Marseilles that weshould be able to strike back with our heavy bombers at
Their Finest Hour 163
Italy the moment she enters the war I considertherefore that these squadrons should be flown to theiraerodromes in Southern France at the earliest momentwhen French permission can be obtained and when theservicing units are ready for their reception
Pray let me know at our meeting tonight what youpropose
Prime Minister to S ofS for Air and CAS
6VI40
It is of the highest importance that we should strikeat Italy the moment war breaks out or an overbearingultimatum is received Please let me know the exactposition of the servicing units which are on their way tothe southern aerodromes in France
An early Italian plan favoured particularly by Ciano hadbeen that Italian action in Europe should be confined to thelaunching of an attack on Yugoslavia thus consolidatingItalyrsquos power in Eastern Europe and strengthening herpotential economic position Mussolini himself was for atime won over to this idea Graziani records that at the endof April the Duce told him ldquoWe must bring Yugoslavia toher knees we have need of raw materials and it is in hermines that we must find them In consequence my strategicdirective is ndash defensive in the west (France) and offensive inthe east (Yugoslavia) Prepare a study of the problemrdquo3Graziani claims that he advised strongly against committingthe Italian armies short as they were of equipmentparticularly of artillery to a repetition of the Isonzocampaign of 1915 There were also political argumentsagainst the Yugoslav plan The Germans were anxious atthis moment to avoid disturbing Eastern Europe Theyfeared it would provoke British action in the Balkans and
Their Finest Hour 164
might inadvertently tempt Russia to further activity in theEast I was not aware of this aspect of Italian policy
Prime Minister toSecretary of State forForeign Affairs
6VI40
I have hitherto argued against going to war with Italybecause she attacked [ie if she were to attack]Yugoslavia and have wished to see whether it was aserious attack upon Yugoslavian independence ormerely taking some naval bases in the AdriaticHowever this situation has changed Italy is continuallythreatening to go to war with England and France andnot by ldquothe back doorrdquo We are so near a break withItaly on grounds which have nothing to do withYugoslavia that it would seem that our main aim mightwell be now to procure this Balkan mobilisation Willyou think this over
In spite of the extreme efforts made by the United States ofwhich Mr Hull has given an impressive account in hismemoirs4 nothing could turn Mussolini from his courseOur preparations to meet the new assault and complicationwere well advanced when the moment came On June 10at 445 PM the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs informedthe British Ambassador that Italy would consider herself atwar with the United Kingdom from 1 PM the next day Asimilar communication was made to the FrenchGovernment When Ciano delivered his note to the FrenchAmbassador M Franccedilois-Poncet remarked as he reachedthe door ldquoYou too will find the Germans are hard mastersrdquoThe British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine received the
Their Finest Hour 165
announcement with perfect composure and apparentindifference He asked only one question Was Cianorsquosstatement early news or was it in fact the declaration ofwar Ciano replied it was the latter Loraine then made aformal bow and left the room without another word5 Fromhis balcony in Rome Mussolini announced to well-organisedcrowds that Italy was at war with France and Britain It wasas Ciano is said to have apologetically remarked later onldquoA chance which comes only once in five thousand yearsrdquoSuch chances though rare are not necessarily goodForthwith the Italians attacked the French troops on theAlpine front and Great Britain reciprocally declared war onItaly The five Italian ships detained at Gibraltar were seizedand orders were given to the Navy to intercept and bringinto controlled ports all Italian vessels at sea On the nightof the 12th our bomber squadrons after a long flight fromEngland which meant light loads dropped their first bombsupon Turin and Milan We looked forward however to amuch heavier delivery as soon as we could use the Frenchairfields at MarseillesIt may be convenient at this point to dispose of the briefFranco-Italian campaign The French could only musterthree divisions with fortress troops equivalent to three moreto meet invasion over the Alpine passes and along theRiviera coast by the western group of Italian armies Thesecomprised thirty-two divisions under Prince UmbertoMoreover strong German armour rapidly descending theRhone Valley soon began to traverse the French rearNevertheless the Italians were still confronted and evenpinned down at every point on the new front by the FrenchAlpine units even after Paris had fallen and Lyons was inGerman hands When on June 18 Hitler and Mussolini metat Munich the Duce had little cause to boast A new Italian
Their Finest Hour 166
offensive was therefore launched on June 21 The FrenchAlpine positions however proved impregnable and themajor Italian effort towards Nice was halted in the suburbsof Mentone But although the French army on thesoutheastern borders saved its honour the German marchto the south behind them made further fighting impossibleand the conclusion of the armistice with Germany waslinked with a French request to Italy for the cessation ofhostilities
My account of this Italian tragedy may fittingly be closedhere by the letter which the unlucky Ciano wrote me shortlybefore his execution at the orders of his father-in-law
Verona December 23 1943Signer ChurchillYou will not be surprised that as I approach the hour
of my death I should turn to you whom I profoundlyadmire as the champion of a crusade though you did atone time make an unjust statement against me
I was never Mussolinirsquos accomplice in that crimeagainst our country and humanity that of fighting sideby side with the Germans Indeed the opposite is thetruth and if last August I vanished from Rome it wasbecause the Germans had convinced me that mychildren were in imminent danger After they hadpledged themselves to take me to Spain they deportedme and my family against my will to Bavaria Now Ihave been nearly three months in the prisons of Veronaabandoned to the barbarous treatment of the SS Myend is near and I have been told that in a few days mydeath will be decided which to me will be no more norless [than] a release from this daily martyrdom And Iprefer death to witnessing the shame and irreparabledamage of an Italy which has been under Hundomination
Their Finest Hour 167
The crime which I am now about to expiate is that ofhaving witnessed and been disgusted by the coldcruel and cynical preparation for this war by Hitler andthe Germans I was the only foreigner to see at closequarters this loathsome clique of bandits preparing toplunge the world into a bloody war Now in accordancewith gangster rule they are planning to suppress adangerous witness But they have miscalculated foralready a long time ago I put a diary of mine andvarious documents in a safe place which will provemore than I myself could the crimes committed bythose people with whom later that tragic and vilepuppet Mussolini associated himself through his vanityand disregard of moral values
I have made arrangements that as soon as possibleafter my death these documents of the existence ofwhich Sir Percy Loraine was aware at the time of hisMission in Rome should be put at the disposal of theAllied Press
Perhaps what I am offering you today is but little butthat and my life are all I can offer to the cause of libertyand justice in the triumph of which I fanatically believe
This testimony of mine should be brought to light sothat the world may know may hate and may rememberand that those who will have to judge the future shouldnot be ignorant of the fact that the misfortune of Italywas not the fault of her people but due to the shamefulbehaviour of one man
Yours sincerelyG CLANO
A speech from President Roosevelt had been announcedfor the night of the 10th About midnight I listened to it witha group of officers in the Admiralty War Room where I stillworked When he uttered the scathing words about Italy
Their Finest Hour 168
ldquoOn this tenth day of June 1940 the hand that held thedagger has struck it into the back of its neighborrdquo there wasa deep growl of satisfaction I wondered about the Italianvote in the approaching presidential election but I knewthat Roosevelt was a most experienced American partypolitician although never afraid to run risks for the sake ofhis resolves It was a magnificent speech instinct withpassion and carrying to us a message of hope While theimpression was strong upon me and before going to bed Iexpressed my gratitude
Former Naval Personto President Roosevelt
11VI40
We all listened to you last night and were fortified bythe grand scope of your declaration Your statementthat the material aid of the United States will be given tothe Allies in their struggle is a strong encouragement ina dark but not unhopeful hour Everything must bedone to keep France in the fight and to prevent anyidea of the fall of Paris should it occur becoming theoccasion of any kind of parley The hope with whichyou inspire them may give them the strength topersevere They should continue to defend every yardof their soil and use the full fighting force of their ArmyHitler thus baffled of quick results will turn upon usand we are preparing ourselves to resist his fury anddefend our island Having saved the BEF we do notlack troops at home and as soon as divisions can beequipped on the much higher scale needed forContinental service they will be despatched to FranceOur intention is to have a strong army fighting in Francefor the campaign of 1941 I have already cabled youabout aeroplanes including flying-boats which are soneedful to us in the impending struggle for the life ofGreat Britain But even more pressing is the need fordestroyers The Italian outrage makes it necessary forus to cope with a much larger number of submarines
Their Finest Hour 169
which may come out into the Atlantic and perhaps bebased on Spanish ports To this the only counter isdestroyers Nothing is so important as for us to havethe thirty or forty old destroyers you have already hadreconditioned We can fit them very rapidly with ourAsdics and they will bridge the gap of six monthsbefore our wartime new construction comes into playWe will return them or their equivalents to you withoutfail at six monthsrsquo notice if at any time you need themThe next six months are vital If while we have to guardthe East Coast against invasion a new heavy German-Italian submarine attack is launched against ourcommerce the strain may be beyond our resourcesand the ocean traffic by which we live may bestrangled Not a day should be lost I send you myheartfelt thanks and those of my colleagues for all youare doing and seeking to do for what we may nowindeed call the Common Cause
The rush for the spoils had begun But Mussolini was notthe only hungry animal seeking prey To join the Jackalcame the BearI have recorded in the previous volume the course of Anglo-Soviet relations up till the outbreak of war and the hostilityverging upon an actual breach with Britain and Francewhich arose during the Russian invasion of FinlandGermany and Russia now worked together as closely astheir deep divergences of interest permitted Hitler andStalin had much in common as totalitarians and theirsystems of government were akin M Molotov beamed onthe German Ambassador Count Schulenburg on everyimportant occasion and was forward and fulsome in hisapproval of German policy and praise for Hitlerrsquos militarymeasures When the German assault had been made uponNorway he had said (April 7) that ldquothe Soviet Government
Their Finest Hour 170
understood the measures which were forced uponGermany The English had certainly gone much too farThey had disregarded completely the rights of neutralnationshellip We wish Germany complete success in herdefensive measuresrdquo6 Hitler had taken pains to informStalin on the morning of May 10 of the onslaught he hadbegun upon France and the neutral Low Countries ldquoI calledon Molotovrdquo wrote Schulenburg ldquoHe appreciated the newsand added that he understood that Germany had to protectherself against Anglo-French attack He had no doubt of oursuccessrdquo7
Although these expressions of their opinion were of courseunknown till after the war we were under no illusions aboutthe Russian attitude We nonetheless pursued a patientpolicy of trying to re-establish relations of a confidentialcharacter with Russia trusting to the march of events andto their fundamental antagonisms to Germany It wasthought wise to use the abilities of Sir Stafford Cripps asAmbassador to Moscow He willingly accepted this bleakand unpromising task We did not at that time realisesufficiently that Soviet Communists hate extreme left-wingpoliticians even more than they do Tories or Liberals Thenearer a man is to Communism in sentiment the moreobnoxious he is to the Soviets unless he joins the partyThe Soviet Government agreed to receive Cripps asAmbassador and explained this step to their Naziconfederates ldquoThe Soviet Unionrdquo wrote Schulenburg toBerlin on May 29 ldquois interested in obtaining rubber and tinfrom England in exchange for lumber There is no reasonfor apprehension concerning Crippsrsquos mission since thereis no reason to doubt the loyal attitude of the Soviet Uniontowards us and since the unchanged direction of Sovietpolicy towards England precludes damage to Germany orvital German interests There are no indications of any kind
Their Finest Hour 171
here for belief that the latest German successes causealarm or fear of Germany in the Soviet Governmentrdquo8
The collapse of France and the destruction of the Frencharmies and of all counter-poise in the West ought to haveproduced some reaction in Stalinrsquos mind but nothingseemed to warn the Soviet leaders of the gravity of theirown peril On June 18 when the French defeat was totalSchulenburg reported ldquoMolotov summoned me thisevening to his office and expressed the warmestcongratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendidsuccess of the German armed forcesrdquo9 This was almostexactly a year from the date when these same armedforces taking the Soviet Government by complete surprisefell upon Russia in cataracts of fire and steel We now knowthat only four months later in 1940 Hitler definitely decidedupon a war of extermination against the Soviets and beganthe long vast stealthy movement of these much-congratulated German armies to the East No recollectionof their miscalculation and former conduct ever preventedthe Soviet Government and its Communist agents andassociates all over the world from screaming for a SecondFront in which Britain whom they had consigned to ruinand servitude was to play a leading partHowever we comprehended the future more truly thanthese cold-blooded calculators and understood theirdangers and their interest better than they did themselves Inow addressed myself for the first time to Stalin
Prime Minister toMonsieur Stalin
25VI40
At this time when the face of Europe is changinghourly I should like to take the opportunity of your
Their Finest Hour 172
receiving His Majestyrsquos new Ambassador to ask thelatter to convey to you a message from myself
Geographically our two countries lie at the oppositeextremities of Europe and from the point of view ofsystems of government it may be said that they standfor widely differing systems of political thought But Itrust that these facts need not prevent the relationsbetween our two countries in the international spherefrom being harmonious and mutually beneficial
In the past ndash indeed in the recent past ndash ourrelations have it must be acknowledged beenhampered by mutual suspicions and last August theSoviet Government decided that the interests of theSoviet Union required that they should break offnegotiations with us and enter into a close relation withGermany Thus Germany became your friend almost atthe same moment as she became our enemy
But since then a new factor has arisen which Iventure to think makes it desirable that both ourcountries should re-establish our previous contact sothat if necessary we may be able to consult together asregards those affairs in Europe which must necessarilyinterest us both At the present moment the problembefore all Europe ndash our two countries included ndash is howthe States and peoples of Europe are going to reacttowards the prospect of Germany establishing ahegemony over the Continent
The fact that both our countries lie not in Europe buton her extremities puts them in a special position Weare better enabled than others less fortunately placedto resist Germanyrsquos hegemony and as you know theBritish Government certainly intend to use theirgeographical position and their great resources to thisend
In fact Great Britainrsquos policy is concentrated on twoobjects ndash one to save herself from German dominationwhich the Nazi Government wishes to impose and theother to free the rest of Europe from the dominationwhich Germany is now in process of imposing on it
The Soviet Union is alone in a position to judgewhether Germanyrsquos present bid for the hegemony ofEurope threatens the interests of the Soviet Union and
Their Finest Hour 173
if so how best these interests can be safeguarded But Ihave felt that the crisis through which Europe andindeed the world is passing is so grave as to warrantmy laying before you frankly the position as it presentsitself to the British Government This I hope willensure that in any discussion that the Soviet Govern-ment may have with Sir S Cripps there should be nomisunderstanding as to the policy of His MajestyrsquosGovernment or of their readiness to discuss fully withthe Soviet Government any of the vast problemscreated by Germanyrsquos present attempt to pursue inEurope a methodical process by successive stages ofconquest and absorption
There was of course no answer I did not expect one SirStafford Cripps reached Moscow safely and even had aninterview of a formal and frigid character with M Stalin
Meanwhile the Soviet Government was busy collecting itsspoils On June 14 the day Paris fell Moscow had sent anultimatum to Lithuania accusing her and the other BalticStates of military conspiracy against the USSR anddemanding radical changes of government and militaryconcessions On June 15 Red Army troops invaded thecountry and the President Smetona fled into East PrussiaLatvia and Estonia were exposed to the same treatmentPro-Soviet Governments must be set up forthwith andSoviet garrisons admitted into these small countriesResistance was out of the question The President of Latviawas deported to Russia and Mr Vyshinsky arrived tonominate a Provisional Government to manage newelections In Estonia the pattern was identical On June 19Zhdanov arrived in Tallinn to instal a similar regime OnAugust 36 the pretense of pro-Soviet friendly and
Their Finest Hour 174
democratic Governments was swept away and the Kremlinannexed the Baltic States to the Soviet UnionThe Russian ultimatum to Rumania was delivered to theRumanian Minister in Moscow at 10 PM on June 26 Thecession of Bessarabia and the northern part of the provinceof Bukovina was demanded and an immediate replyrequested by the following day Germany though annoyedby this precipitate action of Russia which threatened hereconomic interests in Rumania was bound by the terms ofthe German-Soviet pact of August 1939 which recognisedthe exclusive political interest of Russia in these areas ofSoutheast Europe The German Government thereforecounselled Rumania to yield
Their Finest Hour 175
7Back to France June 4 to June 12
High Morale of the ArmymdashMy First Thoughts andDirective June 2 1940 mdash The Lost Equipment mdashThe President General Marshall and MrStettiniusmdashAn Act of Faith mdash The DoubleTensions of JunemdashReconstitution of the BritishArmymdashIts Fearful Lack of Modern WeaponsmdashDecision to Send Our Only Two Well-ArmedDivisions to FrancemdashThe Battle of France FinalPhasemdashDestruction of the Fifty-First HighlandDivision June 1112 mdashldquoAuld Scotland Stands forSomething StillrdquomdashMy Fourth Visit to France BriaremdashWeygand and PeacutetainmdashGeneral GeorgesSummonedmdashMussolini Strikes mdash My Discussionwith WeygandmdashThe French Prevent the Royal AirForce from Bombing Milan and TurinmdashTheGermans Enter Paris mdash Renewed ConferenceNext MorningmdashAdmiral Darlanrsquos Promise mdashFarewell to GQG mdash Our Journey HomemdashMyReport to the War Cabinet of the Conference
WHEN IT WAS KNOWN how many men had been rescuedfrom Dunkirk a sense of deliverance spread in the islandand throughout the Empire There was a feeling of intenserelief melting almost into triumph The safe home-comingof a quarter of a million men the flower of our Army was amilestone in our pilgrimage through years of defeat Theachievement of the Southern Railway and the Movements
Their Finest Hour 176
Branch of the War Office of the staffs at the ports in theThames Estuary and above all at Dover where over twohundred thousand men were handled and rapidlydistributed throughout the country is worthy of the highestpraise The troops returned with nothing but rifles andbayonets and a few hundred machine guns and wereforthwith sent to their homes for seven daysrsquo leave Theirjoy at being once again united with their families did notovercome a stern desire to engage the enemy at theearliest moment Those who had actually fought theGermans in the field had the belief that given a fair chancethey could beat them Their morale was high and theyrejoined their regiments and batteries with alacrityAll the Ministers and departmental officers permanent ornewly chosen acted with confidence and vigour night andday and there are many tales to be told besides this onePersonally I felt uplifted and my mind drew easily and freelyfrom the knowledge I had gathered in my life I wasexhilarated by the salvation of the Army I present for whatthey are worth the directives to the Departments andsubmissions to the War Cabinet which I issued day by dayIsmay carried them to the Chiefs of Staff and Bridges tothe War Cabinet and the Departments Mistakes werecorrected and gaps filled Amendments and improvementswere often made but in the main to the degree perhaps ofninety per cent action was taken and with a speed andeffectiveness which no dictatorship could rivalHere were my first thoughts at the moment when it becamecertain that the Army had escaped
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay
2VI40
Their Finest Hour 177
Notes for COS etc by the Minister of DefenceThe successful evacuation of the BEF has
revolutionised the Home Defence position As soon asthe BEF units can be reformed on a Home Defencebasis we have a mass of trained troops in the countrywhich would require a raid to be executed on aprohibitively large scale Even 200000 men would notbe beyond our compass The difficulties of a descentand its risks and losses increase with every addition tothe first 10000 We must at once take a new view ofthe situation Certain questions must be consideredchiefly by the War Office but also by the Joint Staffs
1 What is the shortest time in which the BEF canbe given a new fighting value
2 Upon what scheme would they be organised Willit be for service at Home in the first instance and onlysecondarily despatch to France On the whole I preferthis
3 The BEF in France must immediately bereconstituted otherwise the French will not continue inthe war Even if Paris is lost they must be adjured tocontinue a gigantic guerrilla A scheme should beconsidered for a bridgehead and area of disembarka-tion in Brittany where a large army can be developedWe must have plans worked out which will show theFrench that there is a way through if they will only besteadfast
4 As soon as the BEF is reconstituted for HomeDefence three divisions should be sent to join our twodivisions south of the Somme or wherever the Frenchleft may be by then It is for consideration whether theCanadian Division should not go at once Pray let mehave a scheme
5 Had we known a week ago what we now knowabout the Dunkirk evacuation Narvik would havepresented itself in a different light Even now thequestion of maintaining a garrison there for someweeks on a self-contained basis should be reconsid-ered I am deeply impressed with the vice and peril ofchopping and changing The letter of the Minister ofEconomic Warfare as well as the telegram of some
Their Finest Hour 178
days ago from the C-in-C must however receive onefinal weighing
6 Ask Admiralty to supply a latest return of the stateof the destroyer flotillas showing what reinforcementshave arrived or are expected within the month of Juneand how many will come from repair
7 It should now be possible to allow the eightRegular battalions in Palestine to be relieved by theeight native battalions from India before they arebrought home as brought home they must be toconstitute the cadres of the new BEF
8 As soon as the Australians land the big shipsshould be turned round and should carry eight or tenTerritorial battalions to Bombay They should bring backa second eight Regular battalions from India andafterwards carry to India a second eight or tenTerritorial battalions from England It is for considera-tion how far the same principle should be applied tobatteries in India
9 Our losses in equipment must be expected todelay the fruition of our expansion of the BEF fromthe twenty divisions formerly aimed at by Z l + 12months to no more than fifteen divisions by Z + 18 butwe must have a project to put before the French Theessence of this should be the armoured division the51st the Canadians and two Territorial divisions underLord Gort by mid-July and the augmenting of this forceby six divisions formed from the twenty-four Regularbattalions in conjunction with Territorials a secondCanadian division an Australian division and twoTerritorial divisions by Z + 18 Perhaps we may even beable to improve on this
10 It is of the highest urgency to have at least half adozen Brigade groups formed from the Regulars of theBEF for Home Defence
11 What air co-operation is arranged to cover thefinal evacuation tonight It ought to be possible toreduce the pressure on the rearguard at this criticalmoment
I close with a general observation As I havepersonally felt less afraid of a German attempt at
Their Finest Hour 179
invasion than of the piercing of the French line on theSomme or Aisne and the fall of Paris I have naturallybelieved the Germans would choose the latter Thisprobability is greatly increased by the fact that they willrealise that the armed forces in Great Britain are nowfar stronger than they have ever been and that theirraiding parties would not have to meet half-trainedformations but the men whose mettle they havealready tested and from whom they have recoiled notdaring seriously to molest their departure The next fewdays before the BEF or any substantial portion of itcan be reorganised must be considered as still critical
There was of course a darker side to Dunkirk We had lostthe whole equipment of the Army to which all the firstfruitsof our factories had hitherto been given
7000 tons of ammunition90000 rifles
2300 Guns120000 vehicles
8000 Bren guns400 anti-tank rifles
Many months must elapse even if the existing programmeswere fulfilled without interruption by the enemy before thisloss could be repairedHowever across the Atlantic in the United States strongemotions were already stirring in the breasts of its leadingmen A precise and excellent account of these events isgiven by Mr Stettinius2 the worthy son of my old Munitionscolleague of the First World War one of our truest friends
Their Finest Hour 180
It was at once realised that the bulk of the British Army hadgot away only with the loss of all their equipment As earlyas June 1 the President sent out orders to the War andNavy Departments to report what weapons they couldspare for Britain and France At the head of the AmericanArmy as Chief of Staff was General Marshall not only asoldier of proved quality but a man of commanding visionHe instantly directed his Chief of Ordnance and hisAssistant Chief of Staff to survey the entire list of theAmerican reserve ordnance and munitions stocks In forty-eight hours the answers were given and on June 3Marshall approved the lists The first list comprised half amillion 30 calibre rifles out of two million manufactured in1917 and 1918 and stored in grease for more than twentyyears For these there were about 250 cartridges apieceThere were 900 soixante-quinze field guns with a millionrounds 80000 machine guns and various other items Inhis excellent book about American supplies Mr Stettiniussays ldquoSince every hour counted it was decided that theArmy should sell (for 37 million dollars) everything on thelist to one concern which could in turn resell immediately tothe British and Frenchrdquo The Chief of Ordnance Major-General Wesson was told to handle the matter andimmediately on June 3 all the American Army depots andarsenals started packing the material for shipment By theend of the week more than six hundred heavily loadedfreight cars were rolling towards the Army docks at RaritanNew Jersey up the river from Gravesend Bay By June 11a dozen British merchant ships moved into the bay andanchored and loading from lighters beganBy these extraordinary measures the United States leftthemselves with the equipment for only 1800000 men theminimum figure stipulated by the American ArmyMobilisation Plan All this reads easily now but at that time
Their Finest Hour 181
it was a supreme act of faith and leadership for the UnitedStates to deprive themselves of this very considerablemass of arms for the sake of a country which many deemedalready beaten They never had need to repent of it As willpresently be recounted we ferried these precious weaponssafely across the Atlantic during July and they formed notonly a material gain but an important factor in allcalculations made by friend or foe about invasion
Mr Cordell Hull has a passage in his memoirs 3 which isrelevant at this point
In response to Reynaudrsquos almost pitiful pleas forbacking the President urged Mr Churchill to sendplanes to France but the Prime Minister refused Bullitt[the United States Ambassador in Paris] outraged bythis decision communicated to the President and meon June 5 his fear that the British might be conservingtheir Air Force and Fleet so as to use them asbargaining points in negotiations with Hitler ThePresident and I however thought differently Francewas finished but we were convinced that Britain underChurchillrsquos indomitable leadership intended to fight onThere would be no negotiations between London andBerlin Only the day before Bullittrsquos telegram Churchillhad made his magnificent speech in the House ofCommons The President and I believed Mr Churchillmeant what he said Had we had any doubt of Britainrsquosdetermination to keep on fighting we would not havetaken the steps we did to get material aid to her Therewould have been no logic in sending arms to Britain ifwe had thought that before they arrived thereChurchillrsquos Government would surrender to Germany
Their Finest Hour 182
The month of June was particularly trying to all of usbecause of the dual and opposite stresses to which in ournaked condition we were subjected by our duty to Franceon the one hand and the need to create an effective armyat home and to fortify the island on the other The doubletension of antagonistic but vital needs was most severeNevertheless we followed a firm and steady policy withoutundue excitement First priority continued to be given tosending whatever trained and equipped troops we had inorder to reconstitute the British Expeditionary Force inFrance After that our efforts were devoted to the defenceof the island first by re-forming and re-equipping theRegular Army secondly by fortifying the likely landing-places thirdly by arming and organising the population sofar as was possible and of course by bringing homewhatever forces could be gathered from the Empire At thistime the most imminent dangers seemed to be the landingof comparatively small but highly mobile German tankforces which would rip us up and disorganise our defenceand also parachute descents In close contact with the newSecretary of State for War Anthony Eden I busied myselfon all thisThe following scheme was devised by the Secretary ofState and the War Office for reconstituting the Army inaccordance with the directives which had been issuedSeven mobile brigade groups were already in existenceThe divisions returned from Dunkirk were reconstituted re-equipped as fast as possible and took up their stations Intime the seven brigade groups were absorbed into the re-formed divisions There were available fourteen Territorialdivisions of high-quality men who had been nine monthsardently training under war conditions and were partlyequipped One of these the 52d was already fit for serviceoverseas There was a second armoured division and four
Their Finest Hour 183
Army tank brigades in process of formation but withouttanks There was the 1st Canadian Division fully equippedIt was not men that were lacking but arms Over eightythousand rifles were retrieved from the communicationsand bases south of the Seine and by the middle of Juneevery fighting man in the Regular forces had at least apersonal weapon in his hand We had very little fieldartillery even for the Regular Army Nearly all the new 25-pounders had been lost in France There remained aboutfive hundred 18-pounders 45-inch and 6-inch howitzersThere were only 103 cruiser 132 infantry and 252 lighttanks Fifty of the infantry tanks were at home in a battalionof the Royal Tank Regiment and the remainder were intraining-schools Never has a great nation been so nakedbefore her foes
From the beginning I kept in the closest contact with my oldfriends now at the head of the Governments of Canada andSouth Africa
Prime Minister to MrMackenzie King
5VI40
British situation vastly improved by miraculousevacuation of BEF which gives us an army in theisland more than capable when re-equipped of copingwith any invading force likely to be landed Alsoevacuation was a main trial of strength between Britishand German Air Forces Germans have been unable toprevent evacuation though largely superior in numbersand have suffered at least three times our loss Fortechnical reasons British Air Force would have manymore advantages in defending the air above the island
Their Finest Hour 184
than in operating overseas Principal remaining dangeris of course air[craft] factories but if our air defence isso strong that enemy can only come on dark nightsprecision will not be easy I therefore feel solidconfidence in British ability to continue the war defendthe island and the Empire and maintain the blockade
I do not know whether it will be possible to keepFrance in the war or not I hope they will even at theworst maintain a gigantic guerrilla We are reconstitut-ing the BEF out of other units
We must be careful not to let Americans view toocomplacently prospect of a British collapse out ofwhich they would get the British Fleet and theguardianship of the British Empire minus Great BritainIf United States were in the war and England [were]conquered locally it would be natural that eventsshould follow the above course But if Americacontinued neutral and we were overpowered I cannottell what policy might be adopted by a pro-Germanadministration such as would undoubtedly be set up
Although President is our best friend no practicalhelp has [reached us] from the United States as yetWe have not expected them to send military aid butthey have not even sent any worthy contribution indestroyers or planes or by a visit of a squadron of theirFleet to southern Irish ports Any pressure which youcan apply in this direction would be invaluable
We are most deeply grateful to you for all your helpand for [the four Canadian] destroyers which havealready gone into action against a U-boat Kindestregards
Smuts far off in South Africa and without the latestinformation upon the specialised problems of Insular AirDefence naturally viewed the tragedy of France accordingto orthodox principles ldquoConcentrate everything at thedecisive pointrdquo I had the advantage of knowing the factsand of the detailed advice of Air Marshal Dowding head ofFighter Command If Smuts and I had been together forhalf an hour and I could have put the data before him we
Their Finest Hour 185
should have agreed as we always did on large militaryissues
Prime Minister toGeneral Smuts
9VI40
We are of course doing all we can both from the airand by sending divisions as fast as they can beequipped to France It would be wrong to send the bulkof our fighters to this battle and when it was lost as isprobable be left with no means of carrying on the war Ithink we have a harder longer and more hopeful dutyto perform Advantages of resisting German air attackin this island where we can concentrate very powerfulfighter strength and hope to knock out four or fivehostiles to one of ours are far superior to fighting inFrance where we are inevitably outnumbered andrarely exceed two to one ratio of destruction and whereour aircraft are often destroyed at exposed aero-dromes This battle does not turn on the score or so offighter squadrons we could transport with their plant inthe next month Even if by using them up we held theenemy Hitler could immediately throw his whole [air]strength against our undefended island and destroy ourmeans of future production by daylight attack Theclassical principles of war which you mention are in thiscase modified by the actual quantitative data Isee onlyone way through now to wit that Hitler should attackthis country and in so doing break his air weapon Ifthis happens he will be left to face the winter withEurope writhing under his heel and probably with theUnited States against him after the presidential electionis over
Am most grateful to you for cable Please alwaysgive me your counsel my old and valiant friend
Their Finest Hour 186
Apart from our last twenty-five Fighter Squadrons on whichwe were adamant we regarded the duty of sending aid tothe French Army as paramount The movement of the 52dDivision to France under previous orders was due to beginon June 7 These orders were confirmed The 3d Divisionunder General Montgomery was put first in equipment andassigned to France The leading division of the CanadianArmy which had concentrated in England early in the yearand was well armed was directed with the full assent ofthe Dominion Government to Brest to begin arriving thereon June 11 for what might by this time already be deemeda forlorn hope The two French light divisions evacuatedfrom Norway were also sent home together with all theFrench units and individuals we had carried away fromDunkirkThat we should have sent our only two formed divisionsthe 52d Lowland Division and the 1st Canadian Divisionover to our failing French ally in this mortal crisis when thewhole fury of Germany must soon fall upon us must be setto our credit against the very limited forces we had beenable to put in France in the first eight months of warLooking back on it I wonder how when we were resolvedto continue the war to the death and under the threat ofinvasion and France was evidently falling we had thenerve to strip ourselves of the remaining effective militaryformations we possessed This was only possible becausewe understood the difficulties of the Channel crossingwithout the command of the sea or the air or the necessarylanding craft
We had still in France behind the Somme the 51stHighland Division which had been withdrawn from the
Their Finest Hour 187
Maginot Line and was in good condition and the 52dLowland Division which was arriving in Normandy Therewas also our 1st (and only) Armoured Division less thetank battalion and the support group which had been sentto Calais This however had lost heavily in attempts tocross the Somme as part of Weygandrsquos plan By June 1 itwas reduced to one-third of its strength and was sent backacross the Seine to refit At the same time a compositeforce known as ldquoBeauman Forcerdquo was scraped togetherfrom the bases and lines of communication in France Itconsisted of nine improvised infantry battalions armedmainly with rifles and very few anti-tank weapons It hadneither transport nor signalsThe Tenth French Army with this British contingent tried tohold the line of the Somme The 51st Division alone had afront of sixteen miles and the rest of the army was equallystrained On June 4 with a French division and Frenchtanks they attacked the German bridgehead at Abbevillebut without successOn June 5 the final phase of the Battle of France beganThe French front consisted of the Second Third andFourth Groups of Armies The Second defended the Rhinefront and the Maginot Line the Fourth stood along theAisne and the Third from the Aisne to the mouth of theSomme This Third Army Group comprised the SixthSeventh and Tenth Armies and all the British forces inFrance formed part of the Tenth Army All this immenseline in which there stood at this moment nearly one and ahalf million men or perhaps sixty-five divisions was now tobe assaulted by one hundred and twenty-four Germandivisions also formed in three army groups namelyCoastal Sector Bock Central Sector Rundstedt EasternSector Leeb These attacked on June 5 June 9 and June15 respectively On the night of June 5 we learned that a
Their Finest Hour 188
German offensive had been launched that morning on aseventy-mile front from Amiens to the Laon-Soissons roadThis was war on the largest scaleWe have seen how the German armour had been hobbledand held back in the Dunkirk battle in order to save it forthe final phase in France All this armour now rolled forwardupon the weak and improvised or quivering French frontbetween Paris and the sea It is here only possible to recordthe battle on the coastal flank in which we played a partOn June 7 the Germans renewed their attack and twoarmoured divisions drove towards Rouen so as to split theTenth French Army The left French Ninth Corps includingthe Highland Division two French infantry divisions andtwo cavalry divisions or what was left of them wereseparated from the rest of the Tenth Army front ldquoBeaumanForcerdquo supported by thirty British tanks now attempted tocover Rouen On June 8 they were driven back to theSeine and that night the Germans entered the city The51st Division with the remnants of the French Ninth Corpswas cut off in the Rouen-Dieppe cul-de-sac
Their Finest Hour 189
We had been intensely concerned lest this division shouldbe driven back to the Havre peninsula and thus beseparated from the main armies and its commander Major-General Fortune had been told to fall back if necessary inthe direction of Rouen This movement was forbidden bythe already disintegrating French command Repeatedurgent representations were made by us but they were ofno avail A dogged refusal to face facts led to the ruin of theFrench Ninth Corps and our 51st Division On June 9 whenRouen was already in German hands our men had butnewly reached Dieppe thirty-five miles to the north Onlythen were orders received to withdraw to Havre A forcewas sent back to cover the movement but before the mainbodies could move the Germans interposed Striking fromthe east they reached the sea and the greater part of the51st Division with many of the French was cut off It was a
Their Finest Hour 190
case of gross mismanagement for this very danger wasvisible a full three days beforeOn the 10th after sharp fighting the division fell backtogether with the French Ninth Corps to the perimeter of StValeacutery expecting to be evacuated by sea Meanwhile allour other forces in the Havre peninsula were embarkingspeedily and safely During the night of the 11th and 12thfog prevented the ships from evacuating the troops from StValeacutery By morning on the 12th the Germans had reachedthe sea cliffs to the south and the beach was under directfire White flags appeared in the town The French corpscapitulated at eight orsquoclock and the remains of the HighlandDivision were forced to do so at 1030 AM Only 1350British officers and men and 930 French escaped eightthousand fell into German hands I was vexed that theFrench had not allowed our division to retire on Rouen ingood time but had kept it waiting till it could neither reachHavre nor retreat southward and thus forced it to surrenderwith their own troops The fate of the Highland Division washard but in after years not unavenged by those Scots whofilled their places re-created the division by merging it withthe 9th Scottish and marched across all the battlefieldsfrom Alamein to final victory beyond the RhineSome lines of Dr Charles Murrayrsquos written in the FirstWorld War came into my mind and it is fitting to print themhere
Half-mast the castle banner droopsThe Lairdrsquos lament was played yestreenAnrsquo mony a widowed cottar wifeIs greetinrsquo at her shank aleen
Their Finest Hour 191
In Freedomrsquos cause for ane that farsquosWersquoll glean the glens anrsquo send them threeTo clip the reivinrsquo eaglersquos clawsAnrsquo drook his feathers irsquo the seaFor gallant loons in brochs anrsquo toonsAre leavinrsquo shop anrsquo yaird anrsquo millArsquo keen to show baith friend anrsquo foeAuld Scotland counts for something still
About eleven orsquoclock the morning of June 11 there was amessage from Reynaud who had also cabled to thePresident The French tragedy had moved and sliddownward For several days past I had pressed for ameeting of the Supreme Council We could no longer meetin Paris We were not told what were the conditions thereCertainly the German spearheads were very close I hadhad some difficulty in obtaining a rendezvous but this wasno time to stand on ceremony We must know what the
Their Finest Hour 192
French were going to do Reynaud now told me that hecould receive us at Briare near Orleacuteans The seat ofgovernment was moving from Paris to Tours GrandQuartier Geacuteneacuteral was near Briare He specified the airfieldto which I should come Nothing loth I ordered theFlamingo to be ready at Hendon after luncheon and havingobtained the approval of my colleagues at the morningCabinet we started about two orsquoclock Before leaving Icabled to the President
Former Naval Personto President Roosevelt
11VI40
The French have sent for me again which meansthat crisis has arrived Am just off Anything you cansay or do to help them now may make the difference
We are also worried about Ireland An AmericanSquadron at Berehaven would do no end of good I amsure
This was my fourth journey to France and since militaryconditions evidently predominated I asked the Secretary ofState for War Mr Eden to come with me as well asGeneral Dill now CIGS and of course Ismay TheGerman aircraft were now reaching far down into theChannel and we had to make a still wider sweep Asbefore the Flamingo had an escort of twelve HurricanesAfter a couple of hours we alighted at a small landing-ground There were a few Frenchmen about and soon acolonel arrived in a motor-car I displayed the smilingcountenance and confident air which are thought suitablewhen things are very bad but the Frenchman was dull andunresponsive I realised immediately how very far things
Their Finest Hour 193
had fallen even since we were in Paris a week before Afteran interval we were conducted to the chateau where wefound M Reynaud Marshal Peacutetain General Weygand theAir General Vuillemin and some others including therelatively junior General de Gaulle who had just beenappointed Under-Secretary for National Defence Hard byon the railway was the Headquarters train in which some ofour party were accommodated The chacircteau possessed butone telephone in the lavatory It was kept very busy withlong delays and endless shouted repetitionsAt seven orsquoclock we entered into conference GeneralIsmay kept a record I merely reproduce my lastingimpressions which in no way disagree with it There wereno reproaches or recriminations We were all up againstbrute facts We British did not know where exactly the frontline lay and certainly there was anxiety about some dart bythe German armour ndash even upon us In effect thediscussion ran on the following lines I urged the FrenchGovernment to defend Paris I emphasised the enormousabsorbing power of the house-to-house defence of a greatcity upon an invading army I recalled to Marshal Peacutetain thenights we had spent together in his train at Beauvais afterthe British Fifth Army disaster in 1918 and how he as I putit not mentioning Marshal Foch had restored the situationI also reminded him how Clemenceau had said ldquoI will fightin front of Paris in Paris and behind Parisrdquo The Marshalreplied very quietly and with dignity that in those days hehad a mass of manoeuvre of upwards of sixty divisionsnow there was none He mentioned that there were thensixty British divisions in the line Making Paris into a ruinwould not affect the final eventThen General Weygand exposed the military position sofar as he knew it in the fluid battle proceeding fifty or sixtymiles away and he paid a high tribute to the prowess of the
Their Finest Hour 194
French Army He requested that every reinforcementshould be sent ndash above all that every British fighter airsquadron should immediately be thrown into the battleldquoHererdquo he said ldquois the decisive point Now is the decisivemoment It is therefore wrong to keep any squadrons backin Englandrdquo But in accordance with the Cabinet decisiontaken in the presence of Air Marshal Dowding whom I hadbrought specially to a Cabinet meeting I replied ldquoThis isnot the decisive point and this is not the decisive momentThat moment will come when Hitler hurls his Luftwaffeagainst Great Britain If we can keep command of the airand if we can keep the seas open as we certainly shallkeep them open we will win it all back for yourdquo4 Twenty-five fighter squadrons must be maintained at all costs forthe defence of Britain and the Channel and nothing wouldmake us give up these We intended to continue the warwhatever happened and we believed we could do so for anindefinite time but to give up these squadrons woulddestroy our chance of life At this stage I asked that GeneralGeorges the Commander-in-Chief of the NorthwesternFront who was in the neighbourhood should be sent forand this was accordingly donePresently General Georges arrived After being apprised ofwhat had passed he confirmed the account of the Frenchfront which had been given by Weygand I again urged myguerrilla plan The German Army was not so strong asmight appear at their points of impact If all the Frencharmies every division and brigade fought the troops ontheir front with the utmost vigour a general standstill mightbe achieved I was answered by statements of the frightfulconditions on the roads crowded with refugees harried byunresisted machine-gun fire from the German aeroplanesand of the wholesale flight of vast numbers of inhabitantsand the increasing breakdown of the machinery of
Their Finest Hour 195
government and of military control At one point GeneralWeygand mentioned that the French might have to ask foran armistice Reynaud at once snapped at him ldquoThat is apolitical affairrdquo According to Ismay I said ldquoIf it is thoughtbest for France in her agony that her Army shouldcapitulate let there be no hesitation on our accountbecause whatever you may do we shall fight on forever andever and everrdquo When I said that the French Army fightingon wherever it might be could hold or wear out a hundredGerman divisions General Weygand replied ldquoEven if thatwere so they would still have another hundred to invadeand conquer you What would you do thenrdquo On this I saidthat I was not a military expert but that my technicaladvisers were of opinion that the best method of dealingwith German invasion of the island of Britain was to drownas many as possible on the way over and knock the otherson the head as they crawled ashore Weygand answeredwith a sad smile ldquoAt any rate I must admit you have a verygood anti-tank obstaclerdquo These were the last striking wordsI remember to have heard from him In all this miserablediscussion it must be borne in mind that I was haunted andundermined by the grief I felt that Britain with her forty-eightmillion population had not been able to make a greatercontribution to the land war against Germany and that sofar nine-tenths of the slaughter and ninety-nine-hundredthsof the suffering had fallen upon France and upon FrancealoneAfter another hour or so we got up and washed our handswhile a meal was brought to the conference table In thisinterval I talked to General Georges privately andsuggested first the continuance of fighting everywhere onthe home front and a prolonged guerrilla in themountainous regions and secondly the move to Africawhich a week before I had regarded as ldquodefeatistrdquo My
Their Finest Hour 196
respected friend who although charged with much directresponsibility had never had a free hand to lead the Frencharmies did not seem to think there was much hope ineither of theseI have written lightly of the happenings of these days buthere to all of us was real agony of mind and soul
At about ten orsquoclock everyone took his place at the dinner Isat on M Reynaudrsquos right and General de Gaulle was onmy other side There was soup an omelette or somethingcoffee and light wine Even at this point in our awfultribulation under the German scourge we were quitefriendly But presently there was a jarring interlude Thereader will recall the importance I had attached to strikinghard at Italy the moment she entered the war and thearrangement that had been made with full Frenchconcurrence to move a force of British heavy bombers tothe French airfields near Marseilles in order to attack Turinand Milan All was now in readiness to strike Scarcely hadwe sat down when Air Vice-Marshal Barratt commandingthe British Air Force in France rang up Ismay on thetelephone to say that the local authorities objected to theBritish bombers taking off on the grounds that an attack onItaly would only bring reprisals upon the South of Francewhich the British were in no position to resist or preventReynaud Weygand Eden Dill and I left the table andafter some parleying Reynaud agreed that orders shouldbe sent to the French authorities concerned that thebombers were not to be stopped But later that night AirMarshal Barratt reported that the French people near theairfields had dragged all kinds of country carts and lorries
Their Finest Hour 197
onto them and that it had been impossible for the bombersto start on their missionPresently when we left the dinner table and sat with somecoffee and brandy M Reynaud told me that Marshal Peacutetainhad informed him that it would be necessary for France toseek an armistice and that he had written a paper upon thesubject which he wished him to read ldquoHe has notrdquo saidReynaud ldquohanded it to me yet He is still ashamed to do itrdquoHe ought also to have been ashamed to support eventacitly Weygandrsquos demand for our last twenty-fivesquadrons of fighters when he had made up his mind thatall was lost and that France should give in Thus we allwent unhappily to bed in this disordered chateau or in themilitary train a few miles away The Germans entered Parison the 14th
Early in the morning we resumed our conference AirMarshal Barratt was present Reynaud renewed his appealfor five more squadrons of fighters to be based in Franceand General Weygand said that he was badly in need ofday bombers to make up for his lack of troops I gave theman assurance that the whole question of increased airsupport for France would be examined carefully andsympathetically by the War Cabinet immediately I got backto London but I again emphasised that it would be a vitalmistake to denude the United Kingdom of its essentialHome defencesTowards the end of this short meeting I put the followingspecific questions
(1) Will not the mass of Paris and its suburbspresent an obstacle dividing and delaying the enemy asin 1914 or like Madrid
Their Finest Hour 198
(2) May this not enable a counter-stroke to beorganised with British and French forces across thelower Seine
(3) If the period of co-ordinated war ends will thatnot mean an almost equal dispersion of the enemyforces Would not a war of columns and [attacks] uponthe enemy communications be possible Are theenemy resources sufficient to hold down all thecountries at present conquered as well as a large partof France while they are fighting the French Army andGreat Britain
(4) Is it not possible thus to prolong the resistanceuntil the United States come in
General weygand while agreeing with the conception of thecounter-stroke on the lower Seine said that he hadinadequate forces to implement it He added that in hisjudgment the Germans had got plenty to spare to holddown all the countries at present conquered as well as alarge part of France Reynaud added that the Germans hadraised fifty-five divisions and had built four thousand to fivethousand heavy tanks since the outbreak of war This wasof course an immense exaggeration of what they had builtIn conclusion I expressed in the most formal manner myhope that if there was any change in the situation theFrench Government would let the British Government knowat once in order that they might come over and see themat any convenient spot before they took any final decisionswhich would govern their action in the second phase of thewarWe then took leave of Peacutetain Weygand and the staff of GQG and this was the last we saw of them Finally I tookAdmiral Darlan apart and spoke to him alone ldquoDarlan youmust never let them get the French Fleetrdquo He promisedsolemnly that he would never do so
Their Finest Hour 199
The morning was cloudy thus making it impossible for thetwelve Hurricanes to escort us We had to choose betweenwaiting till it cleared up or taking a chance in the FlamingoWe were assured that it would be cloudy all the way It wasurgently necessary to get back home Accordingly westarted alone calling for an escort to meet us if possibleover the Channel As we approached the coast the skiescleared and presently became cloudless Eight thousandfeet below us on our right hand was Havre burning Thesmoke drifted away to the eastward No new escort was tobe seen Presently I noticed some consultations going onwith the captain and immediately after we dived to ahundred feet or so above the calm sea where aeroplanesare often invisible What had happened I learned later thatthey had seen two German aircraft below us firing at fishing-boats We were lucky that their pilots did not look upwardThe new escort met us as we approached the Englishshore and the faithful Flamingo alighted safely at Hendon
At five orsquoclock that evening I reported to the War Cabinetthe results of my missionI described the condition of the French armies as it hadbeen reported to the conference by General Weygand Forsix days they had been fighting night and day and theywere now almost wholly exhausted The enemy attacklaunched by one hundred and twenty divisions withsupporting armour had fallen on forty French divisionswhich had been outmanoeuvred and outmatched at everypoint The enemyrsquos armoured forces had caused greatdisorganisation among the headquarters of the higher
Their Finest Hour 200
formations which were unwieldy and when on the moveunable to exercise control over the lower formations TheFrench armies were now on the last line on which theycould attempt to offer an organised resistance This linehad already been penetrated in two or three places and ifit collapsed General Weygand would not be responsible forcarrying on the struggleGeneral Weygand evidently saw no prospect of the Frenchgoing on fighting and Marshal Peacutetain had quite made uphis mind that peace must be made He believed thatFrance was being systematically destroyed by theGermans and that it was his duty to save the rest of thecountry from this fate I mentioned his memorandum to thiseffect which he had shown to Reynaud but had not left withhim ldquoThere could be no doubtrdquo I said ldquothat Peacutetain was adangerous man at this juncture he had always been adefeatist even in the last warrdquo On the other hand MReynaud had seemed quite determined to fight on andGeneral de Gaulle who had attended the conference withhim was in favour of carrying on a guerrilla warfare Hewas young and energetic and had made a very favourableimpression on me I thought it probable that if the presentline collapsed Reynaud would turn to him to takecommand Admiral Darlan also had declared that he wouldnever surrender the French Navy to the enemy in the lastresort he had said he would send it over to Canada but inthis he might be overruled by the French politiciansIt was clear that France was near the end of organisedresistance and a chapter in the war was now closing TheFrench might by some means continue the struggle Theremight even be two French Governments one which madepeace and one which organised resistance from theFrench colonies carrying on the war at sea through theFrench Fleet and in France through guerrillas It was too
Their Finest Hour 201
early yet to tell Though for a period we might still have tosend some support to France we must now concentrateour main efforts on the defence of our island
Their Finest Hour 202
8Home Defence June
Intense British Effort mdash Imminent Dangers mdash TheQuestion of ldquoCommandosrdquomdash Local DefenceVolunteers Renamed ldquoHome Guardrdquomdash Lack ofMeans of Attacking Enemy Tanks mdash MajorJefferisrsquo Experimental Establishment mdash TheldquoStickyrdquo Bomb mdash Help for de Gaullersquos Free Frenchmdash Arrangements for Repatriation of Other FrenchTroops mdash Care of French Wounded mdash FreeingBritish Troops for Intensive Training mdash The Pressand Air Raids mdash Danger of German Use ofCaptured European Factories mdash QuestionsArising in the Middle East and India mdash Question ofArming the Jewish Colonists in Palestine mdashProgress of Our Plan of Defence mdash The GreatAnti-Tank Obstacle and Other Measures
THE READER OF THESE PAGES in future years shouldrealise how dense and baffling is the veil of the UnknownNow in the full light of the after-time it is easy to see wherewe were ignorant or too much alarmed where we werecareless or clumsy Twice in two months we had beentaken completely by surprise The overrunning of Norwayand the breakthrough at Sedan with all that followed fromthese proved the deadly power of the German initiativeWhat else had they got ready ndash prepared and organised tothe last inch Would they suddenly pounce out of the bluewith new weapons perfect planning and overwhelming
Their Finest Hour 203
force upon our almost totally unequipped and disarmedisland at any one of a dozen or score of possible landing-places Or would they go to Ireland He would have beena very foolish man who allowed his reasoning howeverclean-cut and seeming sure to blot out any possibilityagainst which provision could be madeldquoDepend upon itrdquo said Doctor Johnson ldquowhen a manknows he is going to be hanged in a month it concentrateshis mind wonderfullyrdquo I was always sure we should win butnevertheless I was highly geared-up by the situation andvery thankful to be able to make my views effective June 6seems to have been for me an active and not barren dayMy minutes dictated as I lay in bed in the morning andpondered on the dark horizon show the variety of topicsupon which it was necessary to give directionsFirst I called upon the Minister of Supply (Mr HerbertMorrison) for an account of the progress of various devicesconnected with our rockets and sensitive fuzes for useagainst aircraft on which some progress had been madeand upon the Minister of Aircraft Production (LordBeaverbrook) for weekly reports on the design andproduction of automatic bomb-sights and low-altitude RDF (Radio Direction Finding) and AI (Air Interception) I didthis to direct the attention of these two new Ministers withtheir vast departments to those topics in which I hadalready long been especially interested I asked theAdmiralty to transfer at least fifty trained and half-trainedpilots temporarily to Fighter Command Fifty-five actuallytook part in the great air battle I called for a plan to beprepared to strike at Italy by air raids on Turin and Milanshould she enter the war against us I asked the War Officefor plans for forming a Dutch Brigade in accordance withthe desires of the exiled Netherlands Government andpressed the Foreign Secretary for the recognition of the
Their Finest Hour 204
Belgian Government apart from the prisoner King as thesole constitutional Belgian authority and for theencouragement of mobilisation in Yugoslavia as a counterto Italian threats I asked that the aerodromes atBardufosse and Skaarnlands which we had constructed inthe Narvik area and were about to abandon should bemade unusable for as long as possible by means ofdelayed-action bombs buried in them I remembered howeffectively the Germans had by this method delayed ouruse in 1918 of the railways when they finally retreatedAlas we had no bombs of long-delay in any numbers I wasworried about the many ships lying in Malta Harbour undervarious conditions of repair in view of impending Italianhostility I wrote a long minute to the Minister of Supplyabout timber felling and production at home This was oneof the most important methods of reducing the tonnage ofour imports Besides we should get no more timber fromNorway for a long time to come Many of these minutes willbe found in the AppendixI longed for more Regular troops with which to rebuild andexpand the Army Wars are not won by heroic militias
Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar
6VI40
1 It is more than a fortnight since I was told thateight battalions could leave India and arrive in thiscountry in forty-two days from the orderrsquos being givenThe order was given Now it is not till June 6 [ietoday] that the first eight battalions leave India on theirvoyage round the Cape arriving only July 25
2 The Australians are coming in the big ships butthey seem to have wasted a week at Capetown andare now only proceeding at eighteen knots instead of
Their Finest Hour 205
the twenty I was assured were possible It is hopedthey will be here about the 15th Is this so At any ratewhenever they arrive the big ships should beimmediately filled with Territorials ndash the more the betterndash preferably twelve battalions and sent off to India atfull speed As soon as they arrive in India they shouldembark another eight Regular battalions for thiscountry making the voyage again at full speed Theyshould then take another batch of Territorials to IndiaFuture transferences can be discussed laterhellip All I amasking now is that the big ships should go to and fro atfull speed
3 I am very sorry indeed to find the virtual deadlockwhich local objections have imposed upon thebattalions from Palestine It is quite natural that GeneralWavell should look at the situation only from his ownviewpoint Here we have to think of building up a goodarmy in order to make up as far as possible for thelamentable failure to support the French by anadequate BEF during the first year of the war Do yourealise that in the first year of the late war we broughtforty-seven divisions into action and that these weredivisions of twelve battalions plus one Pioneerbattalion not nine as now We are indeed the victimsof a feeble and weary departmentalism
4 Owing to the saving of the BEF I have beenwilling to wait for the relief of the eight battalions fromPalestine by eight native Indian battalions providedthese latter were sent at once but you give me no time-table for this I have not yet received any report onwhether it is possible to send these British battalionsand their Indian relief via Basra and the Persian GulfPerhaps you would very kindly let me have this in thefirst instance
5 I am prepared also to consider as an alternativeor an immediate step the sending home [ie to Britain]of the rest of the Australian Corps Perhaps you will letme have a note on this showing especially dates atwhich the moves can be made
6 You must not think I am ignoring the position inthe Middle East On the contrary it seems to me thatwe should draw upon India much more largely and that
Their Finest Hour 206
a ceaseless stream of Indian units should be passinginto Palestine and Egypt via Bombay and [by] Karachiacross the desert route India is doing nothing worthspeaking of at the present time In the last war not onlydid we have all the [British] Regular troops out [of India]in the first nine months (many more than are therenow) but also an Indian Corps fought by Christmas inFrance Our weakness slowness lack of grip and driveare very apparent on the background of what was donetwenty-five years ago I really think that you Lloyd andAmery ought to be able to lift our affairs in the East andMiddle East out of the catalepsy by which they aresmitten
This was a time when all Britain worked and strove to theutmost limit and was united as never before Men andwomen toiled at the lathes and machines in the factories tillthey fell exhausted on the floor and had to be draggedaway and ordered home while their places were occupiedby newcomers ahead of time The one desire of all themales and many women was to have a weapon TheCabinet and Government were locked together by bondsthe memory of which is still cherished by all The sense offear seemed entirely lacking in the people and theirrepresentatives in Parliament were not unworthy of theirmood We had not suffered like France under the Germanflail Nothing moves an Englishman so much as the threatof invasion the reality unknown for a thousand years Vastnumbers of people were resolved to conquer or die Therewas no need to rouse their spirit by oratory They were gladto hear me express their sentiments and give them goodreasons for what they meant to do or try to do The onlypossible divergence was from people who wished to do
Their Finest Hour 207
even more than was possible and had the idea that frenzymight sharpen actionOur decision to send our only two well-armed divisions backto France made it all the more necessary to take everypossible measure to defend the island against directassault Our most imminent dangers at home seemed to beparachute descents or even worse the landing ofcomparatively small but highly mobile German tank forceswhich would rip up and disorganise our defence as theyhad done when they got loose in France In close contactwith the new Secretary of State for War my thoughts anddirections were increasingly concerned with Home DefenceThe fact that we were sending so much to France made itall the more necessary to make the best of what we had leftfor ourselves
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay
18VI40
I should like to be informed upon (1) the coastalwatch and coastal batteries (2) the gorging of theharbours and defended inlets (ie the making of thelandward defences) (3) the troops held in immediatesupport of the foregoing (4) the mobile columns andbrigade groups (5) the General Reserve
Someone should explain to me the state of thesedifferent forces including the guns available in eacharea I gave directions that the 8th Tank Regimentshould be immediately equipped with the supply ofinfantry and cruiser tanks until they have fifty-two newtanks all well armoured and well gunned What hasbeen done with the output of this month and lastmonth Make sure it is not languishing in depots butpasses swiftly to troops General Carr is responsible forthis Let him report
What are the ideas of C-in-C HF about StormTroops We have always set our faces against this
Their Finest Hour 208
idea but the Germans certainly gained in the last warby adopting it and this time it has been a leading causeof their victory There ought to be at least twentythousand Storm Troops or ldquoLeopardsrdquo [eventually calledldquoCommandosrdquo] drawn from existing units ready tospring at the throat of any small landings or descentsThese officers and men should be armed with the latestequipment tommy guns grenades etc and should begiven great facilities in motor-cycles and armoured cars
Mr Edenrsquos plan of raising Local Defence Volunteers whichhe had proposed to the Cabinet on May 13 met with animmediate response in all parts of the country
Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar
22VI40
Could I have a brief statement of the LDV positionshowing the progress achieved in raising and armingthem and whether they are designed for observation orfor serious fighting What is their relationship to thepolice the Military Command and the RegionalCommissioners From whom do they receive theirorders and to whom do they report It would be a greatcomfort if this could be compressed on one or twosheets of paper
I had always hankered for the name ldquoHome Guardrdquo I hadindeed suggested it in October 1939
Their Finest Hour 209
Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar
26VI40
I donrsquot think much of the name ldquoLocal DefenceVolunteersrdquo for your very large new force The wordldquolocalrdquo is uninspiring Mr Herbert Morrison suggested tome today the title ldquoCivic Guardrdquo but I think ldquoHomeGuardrdquo would be better Donrsquot hesitate to change onaccount of already having made armlets etc if it isthought the title of Home Guard would be morecompulsive
Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar
27VI40
I hope you like my suggestion of changing the nameldquoLocal Defence Volunteersrdquo which is associated withLocal Government and Local Option to ldquoHome GuardrdquoI found everybody liked this in my tour yesterday
The change was accordingly made and the mightyorganisation which presently approached one and a halfmillion men and gradually acquired good weapons rolledforward
In these days my principal fear was of German tankscoming ashore Since my mind was attracted to landingtanks on their coasts I naturally thought they might havethe same idea We had hardly any anti-tank guns orammunition or even ordinary field artillery The plight towhich we were reduced in dealing with this danger may bemeasured from the following incident I visited our beachesin St Margaretrsquos Bay near Dover The Brigadier informedme that he had only three anti-tank guns in his brigade
Their Finest Hour 210
covering four or five miles of this highly menaced coastlineHe declared that he had only six rounds of ammunition foreach gun and he asked me with a slight air of challengewhether he was justified in letting his men fire one singleround for practice in order that they might at least knowhow the weapon worked I replied that we could not affordpractice rounds and that fire should be held for the lastmoment at the closest rangeThis was therefore no time to proceed by ordinary channelsin devising expedients In order to secure quick action freefrom departmental processes upon any bright idea orgadget I decided to keep under my own hand as Ministerof Defence the experimental establishment formed by MajorJefferis at Whitchurch While engaged upon the fluvialmines in 1939 I had had useful contacts with this brilliantofficer whose ingenious inventive mind proved as will beseen fruitful during the whole war Lindemann was in closetouch with him and me I used their brains and my powerMajor Jefferis and others connected with him were at workupon a bomb which could be thrown at a tank perhapsfrom a window and would stick upon it The impact of avery high explosive in actual contact with a steel plate isparticularly effective We had the picture in mind thatdevoted soldiers or civilians would run close up to the tankand even thrust the bomb upon it though its explosion costthem their lives There were undoubtedly many who wouldhave done it I thought also that the bomb fixed on a rodmight be fired with a reduced charge from rifles
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay
6VI40
It is of the utmost importance to find some projectilewhich can be fired from a rifle at a tank like a rifle
Their Finest Hour 211
grenade or from an anti-tank rifle like a trench-mortarbomb The ldquostickyrdquo bomb seems to be useful for the firstof these but perhaps this is not so Anyhow concen-trate attention upon finding something that can be firedfrom anti-tank rifles or from ordinary rifles
I pressed the matter hard
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay
16VI40
Who is responsible for making the ldquostickyrdquo bomb Iam told that a great sloth is being shown in pressingthis forward Ask General Carr to report today upon theposition and to let me have on one sheet of paper theback history of the subject from the moment when thequestion was first raised
The matter is to be pressed forward from day to dayand I wish to receive a report every three days
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay
24VI40
I minuted some days ago about the ldquostickyrdquo bombsAll preparations for manufacture should proceed inanticipation that the further trials will be successful Letme have a time-table showing why it is that delay hascrept into all this process which is so urgent
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay
24VI40
I understand that the trials were not entirelysuccessful and the bomb failed to stick on tanks whichwere covered with dust and mud No doubt some moresticky mixture can be devised and Major Jefferisshould persevere
Any chortling by officials who have been slothful inpushing this bomb over the fact that at present it has
Their Finest Hour 212
not succeeded will be viewed with great disfacour byme
In the end the ldquostickyrdquo bomb was accepted as one of ourbest emergency weapons We never had to use it at homebut in Syria where equally primitive conditions prevailed itproved its value
We had evidently to do our utmost to form French forceswhich might aid General de Gaulle in keeping the truepersonification of France alive
Prime Minister to FirstLord of the Admiraltyand other ServiceMinisters
27VI40
1 The French naval personnel at Aintree Campnumbering 13600 equally with the 5530 military atTrentham Park the 1900 at Arrow Park and the detailsat Blackpool are to be immediately repatriated toFrench territory ie Morocco in French ships now inour hands
2 They should be told we will take them to FrenchAfrica because all French metropolitan ports are inGerman hands and that the French Government willarrange for their future movements
3 If however any wish to remain here to fightagainst Germany they must immediately make thisclear Care must be taken that no officer or man is sentback into French jurisdiction against his will Theshipping is to be ready tomorrow The troops shouldmove under their own officers and carry their personalarms but as little ammunition as possible Somearrangements should be made for their pay TheFrench material on board ships from Narvik will be
Their Finest Hour 213
taken over by us with the ammunition from theLombardy and other ships as against expenses towhich we are put
4 Great care is to be taken of the French woundedAll who can be moved without danger should be sentback direct to France if possible The French Govern-ment should be asked where they wish them deliveredand if at French metropolitan ports should arrange withthe Germans for their safe entry otherwise Casablan-ca All dangerous cases must be dealt with here
5 Apart from any volunteers in the above groups ofpersonnel who may wish to stay there must be manyindividuals who have made their way here hoping tocontinue to fight These also should be given the optionof returning to France or serving in the French unitsunder General de Gaulle who should be told of ourdecisions and given reasonable facilities to collect hispeople I have abandoned the hope that he couldaddress the formed bodies as their morale hasdeteriorated too fast
My desire that our own Army should regain its poise andfighting quality was at first hampered because so manytroops were being absorbed in fortifying their own localitiesor sectors of the coast
Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar
25VI40
It is shocking that only 57000 men [civilians] arebeing employed on all these [defence] worksMoreover I fear that the troops are being used in largenumbers on fortifications At the present stage theyshould be drilling and training for at least eight hours aday including one smart parade every morning All the
Their Finest Hour 214
labour necessary should be found from civilian sourcesI found it extremely difficult to see even a singlebattalion on parade in East Anglia during my visit Thefighting troops in the Brigade Groups should neither beused for guarding vulnerable points nor for makingfortifications Naturally a change like this cannot bemade at once but let me have your proposals forbringing it about as soon as possible
Prime Minister toMinister of Information
26VI40
The press and broadcast should be asked to handleair raids in a cool way and on a diminishing tone ofpublic interest The facts should be chronicled withoutundue prominence or headlines The people should beaccustomed to treat air raids as a matter of ordinaryroutine Localities affected should not be mentionedwith any precision Photographs showing shatteredhouses should not be published unless there issomething very peculiar about them or to illustrate howwell the Anderson shelters work It must be clear thatthe vast majority of people are not at all affected by anysingle air raid and would hardly sustain any evilimpression if it were not thrust before them Everyoneshould learn to take air raids and air-raid alarms as ifthey were no more than thunderstorms Pray try toimpress this upon the newspaper authorities andpersuade them to help If there is difficulty in this Iwould myself see the Newspaper ProprietorsrsquoAssociation but I hope this will not be necessary Thepress should be complimented on their work so far inthis matter
Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar
27VI40
Their Finest Hour 215
Enclosed [dates of troop convoys from India] makeme anxious to know how you propose to use theseeight fine Regular battalions Obviously they will be areinforcement for your shock troops One wouldsuppose they might make the infantry of two divisionswith five good Territorial battalions added to eachdivision total eighteen Should they not also yield up acertain number of officers and NCOrsquos to stiffen theTerritorial battalions so attached You would thus havesix brigades of infantry quite soon Alas I fear theartillery must lag behind but not I trust for long
As rumours grew of peace proposals and a message wassent to us from the Vatican through Berne I thought it rightto send the following minute to the Foreign Secretary
28VI40I hope it will be made clear to the Nuncio that we do
not desire to make any inquiries as to terms of peacewith Hitler and that all our agents are strictly forbiddento entertain any such suggestions
But here is the record of a qualm
Prime Minister toProfessor Lindemann
29VI40
While we are hastening our preparations for airmastery the Germans will be organising the wholeindustries of the captured countries for air productionand other war production suitable [for use] against us Itis therefore a race They will not be able to get thecaptured factories working immediately and meanwhilewe shall get round the invasion danger through thegrowth of our defences and Army strength But whatsort of relative outputs must be faced next year unlesswe are able to bomb the newly acquired Germanplants Germany also being relieved from the need ofkeeping a gigantic army in constant contact with the
Their Finest Hour 216
French Army must have spare capacity for the air andother methods of attacking us Must we not expect thiswill be very great How soon can it come into playHitherto I have been looking at the next three monthsbecause of the emergency but what about 1941 Itseems to me that only immense American supplies canbe of use in turning the corner
As the month of June ground itself out the sense ofpotential invasion at any moment grew upon us all
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay
30VI40
The Admiralty charts of tides and state of the moonHumber Thames Estuary Beachy Head should bestudied with a view to ascertaining on which daysconditions will be most favourable to a sea-bornelanding The Admiralty view is sought
A landing or descent in Ireland was always a deep anxietyto the Chiefs of Staff But our resources seemed to me toolimited for serious troop movements
Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay
30VI40
It would be taking an undue risk to remove one ofour only two thoroughly equipped divisions out of GreatBritain at this juncture Moreover it is doubtful whetherthe Irish situation will require the use of divisionalformations complete with their technical vehicles as iffor Continental war The statement that it would taketen days to transport a division from this country toIreland even though every preparation can be made
Their Finest Hour 217
beforehand is not satisfactory Schemes should beprepared to enable two or three lightly equippedbrigades to move at short notice and in not more thanthree days into Northern Ireland Duplicate transportshould be sent on ahead It would be a mistake to sendany large force of artillery to Ireland It is not at all likelythat a naval descent will be effected there Air-bornedescents cannot carry much artillery Finally nothingthat can happen in Ireland can be immediately decisive
In bringing home the troops from Palestine I had difficultieswith both my old friends the Secretary of State for IndiaMr Amery and the Secretary of State for the ColoniesLord Lloyd who was a convinced anti-Zionist and pro-ArabI wished to arm the Jewish colonists Mr Amery at the IndiaOffice had a different view from mine about the part whichIndia should play I wanted Indian troops at once to comeinto Palestine and the Middle East whereas the Viceroyand the India Office were naturally inclined to a long-termplan of creating a great Indian Army based upon Indianmunition factories
Prime Minister toSecretary of State forIndia (Mr Amery)
22VI40
1 We have already very large masses of troops inIndia of which no use is being made for the generalpurposes of the war The assistance of India this time isincomparably below that of 1914-18hellip It seems to mevery likely that the war will spread to the Middle Eastand the climates of Iraq Palestine and Egypt are wellsuited to Indian troops I recommend their organisationin brigade groups each with a proportion of artillery on
Their Finest Hour 218
the new British model I should hope that six or eight ofthese groups could be ready this winter They shouldinclude some brigades of Gurkhas
2 The process of liberating the Regular Britishbattalions must continue and I much regret that afortnightrsquos delay has become inevitable in returning youthe Territorial battalions in exchange You shouldreassure the Viceroy that it is going forward
Prime Minister toSecretary of State forthe Colonies (LordLloyd)
28VI40
The failure of the policy which you favour is provedby the very large numbers of sorely needed troops you[we] have to keep in Palestine
6 battalions of infantry9 regiments of yeomanry8 battalions of Australian infantry
ndash the whole probably more than twenty thousand
men This is the price we have to pay for the anti-Jewish policy which has been persisted in for someyears Should the war go heavily into Egypt all thesetroops will have to be withdrawn and the position of theJewish colonists will be one of the greatest dangerIndeed I am sure that we shall be told we cannotwithdraw these troops though they include some of ourbest and are vitally needed elsewhere If the Jewswere properly armed our forces would becomeavailable and there would be no danger of the Jewsattacking the Arabs because they are entirelydependent upon us and upon our command of theseas I think it is little less than a scandal that at a time
Their Finest Hour 219
when we are fighting for our lives these very largeforces should be immobilised in support of a policywhich commends itself only to a section of theConservative Party
I had hoped you would take a broad view of thePalestine situation and would make it an earnestobjective to set the British garrison free I couldcertainly not associate myself with such an answer asyou have drawn up for me I do not at all admit thatArab feeling in the Near East and India would beprejudiced in the manner you suggest Now that wehave the Turks in such a friendly relationship theposition is much more secure
For the first time in a hundred and twenty-five years apowerful enemy was now established across the narrowwaters of the English Channel Our re-formed RegularArmy and the larger but less well-trained Territorials had tobe organised and deployed to create an elaborate systemof defences and to stand ready if the invader came todestroy him ndash for there could be no escape It was for bothsides ldquoKill or Curerdquo Already the Home Guard could beincluded in the general framework of defence On June 25General Ironside Commander-in-Chief Home Forcesexposed his plans to the Chiefs of Staff They were ofcourse scrutinised with anxious care by the experts and Iexamined them myself with no little attention On the wholethey stood approved There were three main elements inthis early outline of a great future plan first an entrenchedldquocrustrdquo on the probable invasion beaches of the coastwhose defenders should fight where they stood supportedby mobile reserves for immediate counter-attack secondlya line of anti-tank obstacles manned by the Home Guardrunning down the east centre of England and protecting
Their Finest Hour 220
London and the great industrial centres from inroads byarmoured vehicles thirdly behind that line the mainreserves for major counter-offensive actionCeaseless additions and refinements to this first plan wereeffected as the weeks and months passed but the generalconception remained All troops if attacked should standfirm not in linear only but in all-round defence whilst othersmoved rapidly to destroy the attackers whether they camefrom sea or air Men who had been cut off from immediatehelp would not have merely remained in position Activemeasures were prepared to harass the enemy from behindto interfere with his communications and to destroymaterial as the Russians did with great results when theGerman tide flowed over their country a year later Manypeople must have been bewildered by the innumerableactivities all around them They could understand thenecessity for wiring and mining the beaches the anti-tankobstacles at the defiles the concrete pillboxes at thecrossroads the intrusions into their houses to fill an atticwith sandbags onto their golf-courses or most fertile fieldsand gardens to burrow out some wide anti-tank ditch Allthese inconveniences and much more they accepted ingood part But sometimes they must have wondered ifthere was a general scheme or whether lesser individualswere not running amok in their energetic use of newlygranted powers of interference with the property of thecitizenThere was however a central plan elaborate co-ordinated and all-embracing As it grew it shaped itselfthus the over-all command was maintained at GeneralHeadquarters in London All Great Britain and NorthernIreland were divided into seven commands these againinto areas of corps and divisional commands Commandscorps and divisions were each required to hold a proportion
Their Finest Hour 221
of their resources in mobile reserve only the minimumbeing detailed to hold their own particular defencesGradually there were built up in rear of the beaches zonesof defence in each divisional area behind these similarcorps zones and command zones the whole systemamounting in depth to a hundred miles or more And behindthese was established the main anti-tank obstacle runningacross Southern England and northward intoNottinghamshire Above all was the final reserve directlyunder the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces This itwas our policy to keep as large and mobile as possibleWithin this general structure were many variations Each ofour ports on the east and south coasts was a special studyDirect frontal attack upon a defended port seemed anunlikely contingency and all were made into strong-pointsequally capable of defence from the landward or theseaward side It astonishes me that when this principle offortifying the gorges was so universally accepted andrigorously enforced by all military authorities at home nosimilar measures were adopted at Singapore by thesuccession of high officers employed there But this is alater story Obstacles were placed on many thousandsquare miles of Britain to impede the landing of air-bornetroops All our aerodromes radar stations and fuel depotsof which even in the summer of 1940 there were threehundred and seventy-five needed defence by specialgarrisons and by their own airmen Many thousands ofldquovulnerable pointsrdquondash bridges power-stations depots vitalfactories and the like ndash had to be guarded day and nightfrom sabotage or sudden onset Schemes were ready forthe immediate demolition of resources helpful to the enemyif captured The destruction of port facilities the cratering ofkey roads the paralysis of motor transport and oftelephones and telegraph stations of rolling stock or
Their Finest Hour 222
permanent way before they passed out of our control wereplanned to the last detail Yet despite all these wise andnecessary precautions in which the civilian departmentsgave unstinted help to the military there was no question ofa ldquoscorched-earth policyrdquo England was to be defended byits people not destroyed
Their Finest Hour 223
9The French Agony
Telegram to President RooseveltmdashMy Visit toToursmdashIncreasing DegenerationmdashM BaudouinmdashThe Great MandelmdashConversation with ReynaudmdashMy Refusal to Release France from the Obligationof March 28 1940 mdash Resolute Attitude of MMHerriot and Jeanneney mdashldquoLrsquoHomme du DestinrdquomdashFrench Government Decide to Move to BordeauxmdashPresident Roosevelt to M Reynaud June 13 mdashMy Telegram to the PresidentmdashAnd to ReynaudmdashldquoIndissoluble Union of France and BritainrdquomdashDisappointing Telegram from the PresidentmdashMyTelegram to the President of June 1415 mdash AGrave SuggestionmdashGreat Battle of June 9 Alongthe AisnemdashDefeat of the FrenchmdashForlornResistance on the Maginot LinemdashOur SlenderContributionmdashGeneral Brookersquos New Commandmdash Talk of a Bridgehead in BrittanymdashBrookeDeclares the Military Situation HopelessmdashI AgreemdashOur Troops Withdraw and Re-embark June1617 mdash The Peacutetain Government Asks for anArmisticemdashA Second Dunkirk EvacuationmdashAHundred and Fifty Thousand British and Forty-twoThousand Poles Carried to BritainmdashThe ldquoLancas-triardquo HorrormdashMy Message of June 16 to theDominion Prime MinistersmdashMy Hopes of the AirBattle over Britain
Their Finest Hour 224
FUTURE GENERATIONS may deem it noteworthy that thesupreme question of whether we should fight on alonenever found a place upon the War Cabinet agenda It wastaken for granted and as a matter of course by these menof all parties in the State and we were much too busy towaste time upon such unreal academic issues We wereunited also in viewing the new phase with good confidenceIt was decided to tell the Dominions the whole facts I wasinvited to send a message in the same sense to PresidentRoosevelt and also to sustain the determination of theFrench Government and assure them of our utmost support
Former Naval Personto President Roosevelt
12VI40
I spent last night and this morning at the French GQG where the situation was explained to me in thegravest terms by Generals Weygand and Georges Youhave no doubt received full particulars from Mr BullittThe practical point is what will happen when and if theFrench front breaks Paris is taken and GeneralWeygand reports formally to his Government thatFrance can no longer continue what he calls ldquoco-ordinated warrdquo The aged Marshal Peacutetain who wasnone too good in April and July 1918 is I fear readyto lend his name and prestige to a treaty of peace forFrance Reynaud on the other hand is for fighting onand he has a young General de Gaulle who believesmuch can be done Admiral Darlan declares he willsend the French Fleet to Canada It would bedisastrous if the two big modern ships fell into badhands It seems to me that there must be manyelements in France who will wish to continue thestruggle either in France or in the French colonies or inboth This therefore is the moment for you tostrengthen Reynaud the utmost you can and try to tipthe balance in favour of the best and longest possible
Their Finest Hour 225
French resistance I venture to put this point beforeyou although I know you must understand it as well asI do
On June 13 I made my last visit to France for four yearsalmost to a day The French Government had nowwithdrawn to Tours and tension had mounted steadily Itook Edward Halifax and General Ismay with me and MaxBeaverbrook volunteered to come too In trouble he isalways buoyant This time the weather was cloudless andwe sailed over in the midst of our Hurricane squadronmaking however a rather wider sweep to the southwardthan before Arrived over Tours we found the airport hadbeen heavily bombed the night before but we and all ourescort landed smoothly in spite of the craters Immediatelyone sensed the increasing degeneration of affairs No onecame to meet us or seemed to expect us We borrowed aservice car from the Station Commander and motored intothe city making for the preacutefecture where it was said theFrench Government had their headquarters No one ofconsequence was there but Reynaud was reported to bemotoring in from the country and Mandel was also to arrivesoonIt being already nearly two orsquoclock I insisted uponluncheon and after some parleyings we drove throughstreets crowded with refugeesrsquo cars most of them with amattress on top and crammed with luggage We found acafeacute which was closed but after explanations we obtaineda meal During luncheon I was visited by M Baudouin anofficial of the French Foreign Office whose influence hadrisen in these latter days He began at once in his soft silkymanner about the hopelessness of the French resistance If
Their Finest Hour 226
the United States would declare war on Germany it mightbe possible for France to continue What did I think aboutthis I did not discuss the question further than to say that Ihoped America would come in and that we should certainlyfight on He afterwards I was told spread it about that I hadagreed that France should surrender unless the UnitedStates came inWe then returned to the preacutefecture where Mandel Ministerof the Interior awaited us This faithful former secretary ofClemenceau and a bearer forward of his lifersquos messageseemed in the best of spirits He was energy and defiancepersonified His luncheon an attractive chicken wasuneaten on the tray before him He was a ray of sunshineHe had a telephone in each hand through which he wasconstantly giving orders and decisions His ideas weresimple fight on to the end in France in order to cover thelargest possible movement into Africa This was the lasttime I saw this valiant Frenchman The restored FrenchRepublic rightly shot to death the hirelings who murderedhim His memory is honoured by his countrymen and theirAlliesPresently M Reynaud arrived At first he seemeddepressed General Weygand had reported to him that theFrench armies were exhausted The line was pierced inmany places refugees were pouring along all the roadsthrough the country and many of the troops were indisorder The Generalissimo felt it was necessary to ask foran armistice while there were still enough French troops tokeep order until peace could be made Such was themilitary advice He would send that day a further messageto Mr Roosevelt saying that the last hour had come andthat the fate of the Allied cause lay in Americarsquos handHence arose the alternative of armistice and peace
Their Finest Hour 227
M Reynaud proceeded to say that the Council of Ministershad on the previous day instructed him to inquire whatwould be Britainrsquos attitude should the worst come Hehimself was well aware of the solemn pledge that noseparate peace would be entered into by either allyGeneral Weygand and others pointed out that France hadalready sacrificed everything in the common cause Shehad nothing left but she had succeeded in greatlyweakening the common foe It would in thosecircumstances be a shock if Britain failed to concede thatFrance was physically unable to carry on if France was stillexpected to fight on and thus deliver up her people to thecertainty of corruption and evil transformation at the handsof ruthless specialists in the art of bringing conqueredpeoples to heel That then was the question which he hadto put Would Great Britain realise the hard facts with whichFrance was facedThe official British record reads as follows
Mr Churchill said that Great Britain realised howmuch France had suffered and was suffering Her ownturn would come and she was ready She grieved tofind that her contribution to the land struggle was atpresent so small owing to the reverses which had beenmet with as a result of applying an agreed strategy inthe North The British had not yet felt the German lashbut were aware of its force They nevertheless had butone thought to win the war and destroy HitlerismEverything was subordinate to that aim no difficultiesno regrets could stand in the way He was well assuredof British capacity for enduring and persisting forstriking back till the foe was beaten They wouldtherefore hope that France would carry on fightingsouth of Paris down to the sea and if need be fromNorth Africa At all costs time must be gained Theperiod of waiting was not limitless a pledge from theUnited States would make it quite short The alternative
Their Finest Hour 228
course meant destruction for France quite as certainlyHitler would abide by no pledges If on the other handFrance remained in the struggle with her fine Navy hergreat Empire her Army still able to carry on guerrillawarfare on a gigantic scale and if Germany failed todestroy England which she must do or go under ifthen Germanyrsquos might in the air was broken then thewhole hateful edifice of Nazidom would topple overGiven immediate help from America perhaps even adeclaration of war victory was not so far off At allevents England would fight on She had not and wouldnot alter her resolve no terms no surrender Thealternatives for her were death or victory That was hisanswer to M Reynaudrsquos question
M Reynaud replied that he had never doubtedEnglandrsquos determination He was however anxious toknow how the British Government would react in acertain contingency The French Government ndash thepresent one or another ndash might say ldquoWe know you willcarry on We would also if we saw any hope of avictory But we see no sufficient hopes of an earlyvictory We cannot count on American help There is nolight at the end of the tunnel We cannot abandon ourpeople to indefinite German domination We mustcome to terms We have no choicehelliprdquo It was alreadytoo late to organise a redoubt in Brittany Nowherewould a genuine French Government have a hope ofescaping capture on French soilhellip The question toBritain would therefore take the form ldquoWill youacknowledge that France has given her best her youthand life-blood that she can do no more and that she isentitled having nothing further to contribute to thecommon cause to enter into a separate peace whilemaintaining the solidarity implicit in the solemnagreement entered into three months previouslyrdquo
Mr Churchill said that in no case would Britainwaste time and energy in reproaches and recrimina-tions That did not mean that she would consent toaction contrary to the recent agreement The first stepought to be M Reynaudrsquos further message putting thepresent position squarely to President Roosevelt Let
Their Finest Hour 229
them await the answer before considering anythingelse If England won the war France would be restoredin her dignity and in her greatness
All the same I thought the issue raised at this point was soserious that I asked to withdraw with my colleagues beforeanswering it So Lords Halifax and Beaverbrook and therest of our party went out into a dripping but sunlit gardenand talked things over for half an hour On our return Irestated our position We could not agree to a separatepeace however it might come Our war aim remained thetotal defeat of Hitler and we felt that we could still bring thisabout We were therefore not in a position to releaseFrance from her obligation Whatever happened we wouldlevel no reproaches against France but that was a differentmatter from consenting to release her from her pledge Iurged that the French should now send a new appeal toPresident Roosevelt which we would support from LondonM Reynaud agreed to do this and promised that theFrench would hold on until the result of his final appeal wasknownBefore leaving I made one particular request to MReynaud Over four hundred German pilots the bulk ofwhom had been shot down by the RAF were prisoners inFrance Having regard to the situation they should behanded over to our custody M Reynaud willingly gave thispromise but soon he had no power to keep it TheseGerman pilots all became available for the Battle of Britainand we had to shoot them down a second time
At the end of our talk M Reynaud took us into theadjoining room where MM Herriot and Jeanneney thePresidents of the Chamber and Senate respectively were
Their Finest Hour 230
seated Both these French patriots spoke with passionateemotion about fighting on to the death As we went downthe crowded passage into the courtyard I saw General deGaulle standing stolid and expressionless at the doorwayGreeting him I said in a low tone in French ldquoLrsquohomme dudestinrdquo He remained impassive In the courtyard theremust have been more than a hundred leading Frenchmenin frightful misery Clemenceaursquos son was brought up tome I wrung his hand The Hurricanes were already in theair and I slept sound on our swift and uneventful journeyhome This was wise for there was a long way to go beforebedtime
After our departure from Tours at about half-past five MReynaud met his Cabinet again at Cangeacute They were vexedthat I and my colleagues had not come there to join themWe should have been very willing to do so no matter howlate we had to fly home But we were never invited nor didwe know there was to be a French Cabinet meetingAt Cangeacute the decision was taken to move the FrenchGovernment to Bordeaux and Reynaud sent off histelegram to Roosevelt with its desperate appeal for theentry on the scene at least of the American FleetAt 1015 PM I made my new report to the Cabinet Myaccount was endorsed by my two companions While wewere still sitting Ambassador Kennedy arrived withPresident Rooseveltrsquos reply to Reynaudrsquos appeal of June 10
President Roosevelt toM Reynaud
13VI40
Their Finest Hour 231
Your message of June 10 has moved me verydeeply As I have already stated to you and to MrChurchill this Government is doing everything in itspower to make available to the Allied Governments thematerial they so urgently require and our efforts to dostill more are being redoubled This is so because ofour faith in and our support of the ideals for which theAllies are fighting
The magnificent resistance of the French and BritishArmies has profoundly impressed the American people
I am personally particularly impressed by yourdeclaration that France will continue to fight on behalfof Democracy even if it means slow withdrawal evento North Africa and the Atlantic It is most important toremember that the French and British Fleets continue[in] mastery of the Atlantic and other oceans also toremember that vital materials from the outside world arenecessary to maintain all armies
I am also greatly heartened by what Prime MinisterChurchill said a few days ago about the continuedresistance of the British Empire and that determinationwould seem to apply equally to the great FrenchEmpire all over the world Naval power in world affairsstill carries the lessons of history as Admiral Darlanwell knows
We all thought the President had gone a very long way Hehad authorised Reynaud to publish his message of June10 with all that that implied and now he had sent thisformidable answer If upon this France decided to endurethe further torture of the war the United States would bedeeply committed to enter it At any rate it contained twopoints which were tantamount to belligerence first apromise of all material aid which implied active assistancesecondly a call to go on fighting even if the Governmentwere driven right out of France I sent our thanks to thePresident immediately and I also sought to commend thePresidentrsquos message to Reynaud in the most favourableterms Perhaps these points were stressed unduly but it
Their Finest Hour 232
was necessary to make the most of everything we had orcould get
Former Naval Personto President Roosevelt
13VI40
Ambassador Kennedy will have told you about theBritish meeting today with the French at Tours of whichI showed him our record I cannot exaggerate its criticalcharacter They were very nearly gone Weygand hadadvocated an armistice while he still has enough troopsto prevent France from lapsing into anarchy Reynaudasked us whether in view of the sacrifices andsufferings of France we would release her from theobligation about not making a separate peaceAlthough the fact that we have unavoidably been out ofthis terrible battle weighed with us I did not hesitate inthe name of the British Government to refuse consentto an armistice or separate peace I urged that thisissue should not be discussed until a further appeal hadbeen made by Reynaud to you and the United Stateswhich I undertook to second Agreement was reachedon this and a much better mood prevailed for themoment in Reynaud and his Ministers
Reynaud felt strongly that it would be beyond hispower to encourage his people to fight on without hopeof ultimate victory and that that hope could only bekindled by American intervention up to the extreme limitopen to you As he put it they wanted to see light at theend of the tunnel
While we were flying back here your magnificentmessage was sent and Ambassador Kennedy broughtit to me on my arrival The British Cabinet wereprofoundly impressed and desire me to express theirgratitude for it but Mr President I must tell you that itseems to me absolutely vital that this message shouldbe published tomorrow June 14 in order that it mayplay the decisive part in turning the course of worldhistory It will I am sure decide the French to denyHitler a patched-up peace with France He needs this
Their Finest Hour 233
peace in order to destroy us and take a long stepforward to world mastery All the far-reaching plansstrategic economic political and moral which yourmessage expounds may be still-born if the French cutout now Therefore I urge that the message should bepublished now We realise fully that the moment Hitlerfinds he cannot dictate a Nazi peace in Paris he willturn his fury onto us We shall do our best to withstandit and if we succeed wide new doors are open uponthe future and all will come out even at the end of theday
To M Reynaud I sent this message13VI40
On returning here we received a copy of PresidentRooseveltrsquos answer to your appeal of June 10 Cabinetis united in considering this magnificent document asdecisive in favour of the continued resistance of Francein accordance with your own declaration of June 10about fighting before Paris behind Paris in a provinceor if necessary in Africa or across the Atlantic Thepromise of redoubled material aid is coupled withdefinite advice and exhortation to France to continuethe struggle even under the grievous conditions whichyou mentioned If France on this message of PresidentRooseveltrsquos continues in the field and in the war wefeel that the United States is committed beyond recallto take the only remaining step namely becoming abelligerent in form as she already has constitutedherself in fact Constitution of United States makes itimpossible as you foresaw for the President to declarewar himself but if you act on his reply now receivedwe sincerely believe that this must inevitably follow Weare asking the President to allow publication of themessage but even if he does not agree to this for aday or two it is on the record and can afford the basisfor your action I do beg you and your colleagueswhose resolution we so much admired today not tomiss this sovereign opportunity of bringing about theworld-wide oceanic and economic coalition which must
Their Finest Hour 234
be fatal to Nazi domination We see before us a definiteplan of campaign and the light which you spoke ofshines at the end of the tunnel
Finally in accordance with the Cabinetrsquos wishes I sent aformal message of good cheer to the French Governmentin which the note of an indissoluble union between our twocountries was struck for the first time
Prime Minister to MReynaud
13VI40
In this solemn hour for the British and Frenchnations and for the cause of Freedom and Democracyto which they have avowed themselves His MajestyrsquosGovernment desire to pay to the Government of theFrench Republic the tribute which is due to the heroicfortitude and constancy of the French armies in battleagainst enormous odds Their effort is worthy of themost glorious traditions of France and has inflicteddeep and long-lasting injury upon the enemyrsquos strengthGreat Britain will continue to give the utmost aid in herpower We take this opportunity of proclaiming theindissoluble union of our two peoples and of our twoEmpires We cannot measure the various forms oftribulation which will fall upon our peoples in the nearfuture We are sure that the ordeal by fire will only fuzethem together into one unconquerable whole Werenew to the French Republic our pledge and resolve tocontinue the struggle at all costs in France in thisisland upon the oceans and in the air wherever it maylead us using all our resources to the utmost limit andsharing together the burden of repairing the ravages ofwar We shall never turn from the conflict until Francestands safe and erect in all her grandeur until thewronged and enslaved states and peoples have beenliberated and until civilisation is freed from thenightmare of Nazidom That this day will dawn we are
Their Finest Hour 235
more sure than ever It may dawn sooner than we nowhave the right to expect
All these three messages were drafted by me before I wentto bed after midnight on the 13th They were writtenactually in the small hours of the 14thThe next day arrived a telegram from the Presidentexplaining that he could not agree to the publication of hismessage to Reynaud He himself according to MrKennedy had wished to do so but the State Departmentwhile in full sympathy with him saw the gravest dangersThe President thanked me for my account of the meeting atTours and complimented the British and FrenchGovernments on the courage of their troops He renewedthe assurances about furnishing all possible material andsupplies but he then said he had told AmbassadorKennedy to inform me that his message of the 14th was inno sense intended to commit and did not commit theGovernment of the United States to military participationThere was no authority under the American Constitutionexcept Congress which could make any commitment of thatnature He bore particularly in mind the question of theFrench Fleet Congress at his desire had appropriated fiftymillion dollars for the purpose of supplying food andclothing to civilian refugees in France Finally he assuredme that he appreciated the significance and weight of whatI had set forth in my messageThis was a disappointing telegramAround our table we all fully understood the risks thePresident ran of being charged with exceeding hisconstitutional authority and consequently of being defeatedon this issue at the approaching election on which our fateand much more depended I was convinced that he wouldgive up life itself to say nothing of public office for the
Their Finest Hour 236
cause of world freedom now in such awful peril But whatwould have been the good of that Across the Atlantic Icould feel his suffering In the White House the torment wasof a different character from that of Bordeaux or LondonBut the degree of personal stress was not unequalIn my reply I tried to arm the President with somearguments which he could use to others about the dangerto the United States if Europe fell and Britain failed Thiswas no matter of sentiment but of life and death
Former NavalPerson toPresidentRoosevelt
14-15VI40
I am grateful to you for your telegram and I havereported its operative passages to Reynaud to whom Ihad imparted a rather more sanguine view He will Iam sure be disappointed at non-publication Iunderstand all your difficulties with American publicopinion and Congress but events are movingdownward at a pace where they will pass beyond thecontrol of American public opinion when at last it isripened Have you considered what offers Hitler maychoose to make to France He may say ldquoSurrender theFleet intact and I will leave you Alsace-Lorrainerdquo oralternatively ldquoIf you do not give me your ships I willdestroy your townsrdquo I am personally convinced thatAmerica will in the end go to all lengths but thismoment is supremely critical for France A declarationthat the United States will if necessary enter the warmight save France Failing that in a few days Frenchresistance may have crumpled and we shall be leftalone
Although the present Government and I personallywould never fail to send the Fleet across the Atlantic ifresistance was beaten down here a point may be
Their Finest Hour 237
reached in the struggle where the present Ministers nolonger have control of affairs and when very easy termscould be obtained for the British island by theirbecoming a vassal state of the Hitler Empire A pro-German Government would certainly be called intobeing to make peace and might present to a shatteredor a starving nation an almost irresistible case for entiresubmission to the Nazi will The fate of the British Fleetas I have already mentioned to you would be decisiveon the future of the United States because if it werejoined to the fleets of Japan France and Italy and thegreat resources of German industry overwhelming seapower would be in Hitlerrsquos hands He might of courseuse it with a merciful moderation On the other hand hemight not This revolution in sea power might happenvery quickly and certainly long before the United Stateswould be able to prepare against it If we go down youmay have a United States of Europe under the Nazicommand far more numerous far stronger far betterarmed than the New World
I know well Mr President that your eye will alreadyhave searched these depths but I feel I have the rightto place on record the vital manner in which Americaninterests are at stake in our battle and that of France
I am sending you through Ambassador Kennedy apaper on destroyer strength prepared by the NavalStaff for your information If we have to keep as weshall the bulk of our destroyers on the East Coast toguard against invasion how shall we be able to copewith a German-Italian attack on the food and trade bywhich we live The sending of the thirty-five destroyersas I have already described will bridge the gap until ournew construction comes in at the end of the year Hereis a definite practical and possibly decisive step whichcan be taken at once and I urge most earnestly thatyou will weigh my words
Their Finest Hour 238
Meanwhile the situation on the French front went from badto worse The German operations northwest of Paris inwhich our 51st Division had been lost had brought theenemy by June 9 to the lower reaches of the Seine andthe Oise On the southern banks the dispersed remnants ofthe Tenth and Seventh French Armies were hastilyorganising a defence they had been riven asunder and toclose the gap the garrison of the capital the so-calledArmeacutee de Paris had been marched out and interposedFarther to the east along the Aisne the Sixth Fourth andSecond Armies were in far better shape They had hadthree weeks in which to establish themselves and to absorbsuch reinforcements as had been sent During all the periodof Dunkirk and of the drive to Rouen they had been leftcomparatively undisturbed but their strength was small forthe hundred miles they had to hold and the enemy hadused the time to concentrate against them a great mass ofdivisions to deliver the final blow On June 9 it fell Despitea dogged resistance for the French were now fighting withgreat resolution bridgeheads were established south of theriver from Soissons to Rethel and in the next two daysthese were expanded until the Marne was reachedGerman Panzer divisions which had played so decisive apart in the drive down the coast were brought across to jointhe new battle Eight of these in two great thrusts turnedthe French defeat into a rout The French armiesdecimated and in confusion were quite unable to withstandthis powerful assembly of superior numbers equipmentand technique In four days by June 16 the enemy hadreached Orleacuteans and the Loire while to the east the otherthrust had passed through Dijon and Besanccedilon almost tothe Swiss frontier
Their Finest Hour 239
West of Paris the remains of the Tenth Army theequivalent of no more than two divisions had been pressedback south-westward from the Seine towards Alenccedilon Thecapital fell on the 14th its defending armies the Seventhand the Armeacutee de Paris were scattered a great gap nowseparated the exiguous French and British forces in thewest from the rest and the remains of the once proud Armyof FranceAnd what of the Maginot Line the shield of France and itsdefenders Until June 14 no direct attack was made andalready some of the active formations leaving behind thegarrison troops had started to join if they could the fast-withdrawing armies of the centre But it was too late Onthat day the Maginot Line was penetrated beforeSaarbruecken and across the Rhine by Colmar theretreating French were caught up in the battle and unableto extricate themselves Two days later the Germanpenetration to Besanccedilon had cut off their retreat More thanfour hundred thousand men were surrounded without hope
Their Finest Hour 240
of escape Many encircled garrisons held out desperatelythey refused to surrender until after the armistice whenFrench officers were despatched to give them the orderThe last forts obeyed on June 30 the commanderprotesting that his defences were still intact at every pointThus the vast disorganised battle drew to its conclusion allalong the French front It remains only to recount theslender part which the British were able to play
General Brooke had won distinction in the retreat toDunkirk and especially by his battle in the gap opened bythe Belgian surrender We had therefore chosen him tocommand the British troops which remained in France andall reinforcements until they should reach sufficientnumbers to require the presence of Lord Gort as an ArmyCommander Brooke had now arrived in France and on the14th he met Generals Weygand and Georges Weygandstated that the French forces were no longer capable oforganised resistance or concerted action The French Armywas broken into four groups of which its Tenth Army wasthe westernmost Weygand also told him that the AlliedGovernments had agreed that a bridgehead should becreated in the Brittany peninsula to be held jointly by theFrench and British troops on a line running roughly northand south through Rennes He ordered him to deploy hisforces on a defensive line running through this townBrooke pointed out that this line of defence was a hundredand fifty kilometres long and required at least fifteendivisions He was told that the instructions he was receivingmust be regarded as an orderIt is true that on June 11 at Briare Reynaud and I hadagreed to try to draw a kind of ldquoTorres Vedras linerdquo across
Their Finest Hour 241
the foot of the Brittany peninsula Everything however wasdissolving at the same time and the plan for what it wasworth never reached the domain of action In itself the ideawas sound but there were no facts to clothe it with realityOnce the main French armies were broken or destroyedthis bridgehead precious though it was could not havebeen held for long against concentrated German attack Buteven a few weeksrsquo resistance here would have maintainedcontact with Britain and enabled large French withdrawalsto Africa from other parts of the immense front now torn toshreds If the battle in France was to continue it could beonly in the Brest peninsula and in wooded or mountainousregions like the Vosges The alternative for the French wassurrender Let none therefore mock at the conception of abridgehead in Brittany The Allied armies underEisenhower then an unknown American colonel bought itback for us later at a high priceGeneral Brooke after his talk with the French commandersand having measured from his own headquarters a scenewhich was getting worse every hour reported to the WarOffice and by telephone to Mr Eden that the position washopeless All further reinforcements should be stopped andthe remainder of the British Expeditionary Force nowamounting to a hundred and fifty thousand men should bere-embarked at once On the night of June 14 as I wasthought to be obdurate he rang me up on a telephone linewhich by luck and effort was open and pressed this viewupon me I could hear quite well and after ten minutes Iwas convinced that he was right and we must go Orderswere given accordingly He was released from Frenchcommand The back-loading of great quantities of storesequipment and men began The leading elements of theCanadian Division which had landed got back into theirships and the 52d Division which apart from its 157th
Their Finest Hour 242
Brigade had not yet been committed to action retreated onBrest No British troops operating under the Tenth FrenchArmy were withdrawn but all else of ours took to the shipsat Brest Cherbourg St Malo and St Nazaire On June 15our troops were released from the orders of the TenthFrench Army and next day when it carried out a furtherwithdrawal to the south they moved towards CherbourgThe 157th Brigade after heavy fighting was extricated thatnight and retiring in their lorries embarked during the nightof June 1718 On June 17 it was announced that thePeacutetain Government had asked for an armistice ordering allFrench forces to cease fighting without evencommunicating this information to our troops GeneralBrooke was consequently told to come away with all menhe could embark and any equipment he could saveWe repeated now on a considerable scale though withlarger vessels the Dunkirk evacuation Over twentythousand Polish troops who refused to capitulate cut theirway to the sea and were carried by our ships to Britain TheGermans pursued our forces at all points In the Cherbourgpeninsula they were in contact with our rearguard ten milessouth of the harbour on the morning of the 18th The lastship left at 4 PM when the enemy were within three milesof the port Very few prisoners were caughtIn all there were evacuated from all French harbours136000 British troops and 310 guns a total with the Polesof 156000 men This reflects great credit on GeneralBrookersquos embarkation staff of whom the chief General deFonblanque a British officer died shortly afterwards as theresult of his exertionsAt Brest and the Western ports the evacuations werenumerous The German air attack on the transports washeavy One frightful incident occurred on the 17th at St
Their Finest Hour 243
Nazaire The 20000-ton liner Lancastria with five thousandmen on board was bombed and set on fire just as she wasabout to leave A mass of flaming oil spread over the waterround the ship and upwards of three thousand menperished The rest were rescued under continued air attackby the devotion of the small craft When this news came tome in the quiet Cabinet Room during the afternoon Iforbade its publication saying ldquoThe newspapers have gotquite enough disaster for today at leastrdquo I had intended torelease the news a few days later but events crowdedupon us so black and so quickly that I forgot to lift the banand it was some years before the knowledge of this horrorbecame public
To lessen the shock of the impending French surrender itwas necessary at this time to send a message to theDominion Prime Ministers showing them that our resolve tocontinue the struggle although alone was not based uponmere obstinacy or desperation and to convince them bypractical and technical reasons of which they might well beunaware of the real strength of our position I thereforedictated the following statement on the afternoon of June16 a day already filled with much business
Prime Minister to thePrime Ministers ofCanada AustraliaNew Zealand andSouth Africa
16VI40
[After some sentences of introduction particular toeach]
Their Finest Hour 244
I do not regard the situation as having passedbeyond our strength It is by no means certain that theFrench will not fight on in Africa and at sea butwhatever they do Hitler will have to break us in thisisland or lose the war Our principal danger is hisconcentrated air attack by bombing coupled withparachute and air-borne landings and attempts to runan invading force across the sea This danger hasfaced us ever since the beginning of the war and theFrench could never have saved us from it as he couldalways switch onto us Undoubtedly it is aggravated bythe conquests Hitler has made upon the Europeancoast close to our shores Nevertheless in principle thedanger is the same I do not see why we should not beable to meet it The Navy has never pretended toprevent a raid of five or ten thousand men but we donot see how a force of say eighty to a hundredthousand could be transported across the sea and stillless maintained in the teeth of superior sea power Aslong as our Air Force is in being it provides a powerfulaid to the Fleet in preventing sea-borne landings andwill take a very heavy toll of air-borne landings
Although we have suffered heavy losses byassisting the French and during the Dunkirk evacuationwe have managed to husband our air-fighter strength inspite of poignant appeals from France to throw itimprovidently into the great land battle which it couldnot have turned decisively I am happy to tell you that itis now as strong as it has ever been and that the flowof machines is coming forward far more rapidly thanever before in fact pilots have now become the limitingfactor at the moment Our fighter aircraft have beenwont to inflict a loss of two or two and a half to oneeven when fighting under the adverse conditions inFrance During the evacuation of Dunkirk which was asort of No Manrsquos Land we inflicted a loss of three orfour to one and often saw German formations turnaway from a quarter of their numbers of our planes Butall air authorities agree that the advantage in defendingthis country against an oversea air attack will be stillgreater because first we shall know pretty well by ourvarious devices where they are coming and because
Their Finest Hour 245
our squadrons lie close enough together to enable usto concentrate against the attackers and provideenough to attack both the bombers and the protectingfighters at the same time All their shot-down machineswill be total losses many of ours and our pilots will fightagain Therefore I do not think it by any meansimpossible that we may so maul them that they will finddaylight attacks too expensive
The major danger will be from night attack on ouraircraft factories but this again is far less accuratethan daylight attack and we have many plans forminimising its effect Of course their numbers are muchgreater than ours but not so much greater as todeprive us of a good and reasonable prospect ofwearing them out after some weeks or even months ofair struggle Meanwhile of course our bomber forcewill be striking continually at their key points especiallyoil refineries and air factories and at their congestedand centralised war industry in the Ruhr We hope ourpeople will stand up to this bombardment as well as theenemy It will on both sides be on an unprecedentedscale All our information goes to show that theGermans have not liked what they have got so far
It must be remembered that now that the BEF ishome and largely rearmed or rearming if not upon aContinental scale at any rate good enough for Homedefence we have far stronger military forces in thisisland than we have ever had in the late war or in thiswar Therefore we hope that such numbers of theenemy as may be landed from the air or by sea-borneraid will be destroyed and be an example to those whotry to follow No doubt we must expect novel forms ofattack and attempts to bring tanks across the sea Weare preparing ourselves to deal with these as far as wecan foresee them No one can predict or guarantee thecourse of a life-and-death struggle of this character butwe shall certainly enter upon it in good heart
I have given you this full explanation to show youthat there are solid reasons behind our resolve not toallow the fate of France whatever it may be to deter usfrom going on to the end I personally believe that thespectacle of the fierce struggle and carnage in our
Their Finest Hour 246
island will draw the United States into the war andeven if we should be beaten down through the superiornumbers of the enemyrsquos Air Force it will always bepossible as I indicated to the House of Commons in mylast speech to send our fleets across the oceanswhere they will protect the Empire and enable it tocontinue the war and the blockade I trust in conjunc-tion with the United States until the Hitler reacutegimebreaks under the strain We shall let you know at everystage how you can help being assured that you will doall in human power as we for our part are entirelyresolved to do
I composed this in the Cabinet Room and it was typed as Ispoke The door to the garden was wide open and outsidethe sun shone warm and bright Air Chief Marshal Newallthe Chief of the Air Staff sat on the terrace meanwhile andwhen I had finished revising the draft I took it out to him incase there were any improvements or corrections to bemade He was evidently moved and presently said heagreed with every word I was comforted and fortifiedmyself by putting my convictions upon record and when I
Their Finest Hour 247
read the message over the final time before sending it off Ifelt a glow of sober confidence This was certainly justifiedby what happened All came true
Their Finest Hour 248