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Winston Churchill
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THEIR FINEST HOUR

WINSTON CHURCHILL

Copyright

Their Finest Hour

Copyright copy 1949 by Winston Churchill

Cover art and eForeword to the electronic edition copyrightcopy 2002 by RosettaBooks LLC

All rights reserved No part of this book may be used orreproduced in any manner whatsoever without writtenpermission except in the case of brief quotations embodiedin critical articles and reviews

For information address EditorRosettaBookscom

First electronic edition published 2002 by RosettaBooksLLC New York

ISBN 0-7953-0642-3

Their Finest Hour 2

ContentseForewordPrefaceAcknowledgementBook OneThe Fall of France1 The National Coalition2 The Battle of France The First Week Gamelin3 The Battle of France The Second Week Weygand4 The March to the Sea5 The Deliverance of Dunkirk6 The Rush for the Spoils7 Back to France8 Home Defence June9 The French Agony10 The Bordeaux Armistice11 Admiral Darlan and the French Fleet Oran12 The Apparatus of Counter-Attack 194013 At Bay14 The Invasion Problem

Their Finest Hour 3

15 Operation Sea LionBook TwoAlone1 The Battle of Britain2 The Blitz3 ldquoLondon Can Take Itrdquo4 The Wizard War5 United States Destroyers and West Indian Bases6 Egypt and the Middle East 19407 The Mediterranean Passage8 September Tensions9 Dakar10 Mr Edenrsquos Mission11 Relations with Vichy and Spain12 Mussolini Attacks Greece13 Lend-Lease14 Germany and Russia15 Ocean Peril16 Desert VictoryPublisherrsquos NoteAppendicesNotesAbout the AuthorAbout this Title

Their Finest Hour 4

Changes in text received too late for inclusion in the firstedition are listed under the heading Publisherrsquos Note

Their Finest Hour 5

Maps and Diagrams

Battle of BritainDisposition of Main Fleets in Mediterranean June 14 1940Desert Victory December 1940 to January 1941

Their Finest Hour 7

eForewordOne of the most fascinating works of history ever writtenWinston Churchillrsquos monumental The Second World War isa six-volume account of the struggle of the Allied powers inEurope against Germany and the Axis Told through theeyes of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill TheSecond World War is also the story of one nationrsquos singularheroic role in the fight against tyranny Pride and patriotismare evident everywhere in Churchillrsquos dramatic account andfor good reason Having learned a lesson at Munich thatthey would never forget the British refused to make peacewith Hitler defying him even after France had fallen andafter it seemed as though the Nazis were unstoppableChurchill remained unbowed throughout as did the peopleof Britain in whose determination and courage he placedhis confidencePatriotic as Churchill was he managed to maintain abalanced impartiality in his description of the war What isperhaps most interesting and what lends the work itstension and emotion is Churchillrsquos inclusion of a significantamount of primary material We hear his retrospectiveanalysis of the war to be sure but we are also presentedwith memos letters orders speeches and telegrams thatgive a day-by-day account of the reactions-both mistakenand justified-to the unfolding drama Strategies andcounterstrategies develop to respond to Hitlerrsquos ruthlessconquest of Europe his planned invasion of England and

Their Finest Hour 8

his treacherous assault on Russia It is a mesmerizingaccount of the crucial decisions that have to be made withimperfect knowledge and an awareness that the fate of theworld hangs in the balanceIn Their Finest Hour the second volume of this workChurchill describes the German invasion of France and thegrowing sense of dismay on the part of the British andFrench leadership as it becomes clear that the German warmachine is simply too overpowering As the Frenchdefenses begin to crumble Churchill faces some bleakoptions should the British meet Francersquos desperate pleasfor reinforcements of troops ships and aircraft in the hopesof turning the tide or should they husband their resourcesin preparation for the inevitable German assault if FrancefallsIn the bookrsquos second half entitled ldquoAlonerdquo Churchilldiscusses Great Britainrsquos position as the last stronghold ofresistance against the German conquest The expectedevents are all included in fascinating detail the battle forcontrol of the skies over Britain the bombing of London thediplomatic efforts to draw the United States into the warand the spread of the conflict into Africa and the MiddleEast But we also hear of the contingency plans thespeculations about what will happen should Britain fall toHitler and how the far-flung reaches of its Empire couldturn to rescue the mother country The behind-the-scenesdeliberations the fears expressed and the possibilitiesconsidered continually remind us of exactly what was atstake and how grim the situation often seemedChurchill won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1953 due inno small part to this awe-inspiring workRosettaBooks is the leading publisher dedicated exclusivelyto electronic editions of great works of fiction and non-fiction

Their Finest Hour 9

that reflect our world RosettaBooks is a committed e-publisher maximizing the resources of the Web in openinga fresh dimension in the reading experience In thiselectronic reading environment each RosettaBook willenhance the experience through The RosettaBooksConnection This gateway instantly delivers to the readerthe opportunity to learn more about the title the author thecontent and the context of each work using the fullresources of the WebTo experience The RosettaBooks Connection for TheirFinest Hour

wwwRosettaBookscomTheirFinestHour

Their Finest Hour 10

PrefaceDURING THE PERIOD covered by this volume I bore aheavy burden of responsibility I was Prime Minister FirstLord of the Treasury Minister of Defence and Leader ofthe House of Commons After the first forty days we werealone with victorious Germany and Italy engaged in mortalattack upon us with Soviet Russia a hostile neutral activelyaiding Hitler and Japan an unknowable menace Howeverthe British War Cabinet conducting His Majestyrsquos affairswith vigilance and fidelity supported by Parliament andsustained by the Governments and peoples of the BritishCommonwealth and Empire enabled all tasks to beaccomplished and overcame all our foes

WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL

CHARTWELLWESTERHAMKENTJanuary 1 1949


AcknowledgmentsI MUST AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGE the assistance of those whohelped me with the previous volume namely Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall Commodore G R G AllenColonel F W Deakin and Sir Edward Marsh I must alsothank the very large number of others who have kindly readthese pages and commented upon themLord Ismay has continued to give me his aid as have myother friendsI again record my obligations to His Majestyrsquos Governmentfor permission to reproduce the text of certain officialdocuments of which the Crown copyright is legally vested inthe Controller of His Majestyrsquos Stationery Office At therequest of His Majestyrsquos Government on security grounds Ihave paraphrased some of the telegrams published in thisvolume These changes have not altered in any way thesense or substance of the telegrams


Moral of the Work

In War ResolutionIn Defeat Defiance

In Victory MagnanimityIn Peace Good Will


Theme of the Volume

How the British people held the fortALONE

till those whohitherto had been half blind

were half ready


Book OneThe Fall of France


1The National Coalition

The Beginning and the EndmdashThe Magnitude ofBritainrsquos Work for the Common CausemdashDivisionsin Contact with the Enemy Throughout the WarmdashThe Roll of Honour mdash The Share of the RoyalNavy mdash British and American Discharge of AirBombsmdashAmerican Aid in Munitions Magnifies OurWar EffortmdashFormation ofthe New CabinetmdashConservative Loyalty to Mr Chamberlain mdash TheLeadership of the House of CommonsmdashHeresy-hunting Quelled in Due CoursemdashMy Letter to MrChamberlain of May 11 mdash A Peculiar ExperiencemdashForming a Government in the Heat of Battle mdashNew Colleagues Clement Attlee Arthur Green-wood Archibald Sinclair Ernest Bevin MaxBeaverbrookmdashA Small War CabinetmdashStages inthe Formation of the Government May 10 to May16 mdash A Digression on PowermdashRealities andAppearances in the New War Direction mdashAlterations in the Responsibilities of the ServiceMinisters mdash War Direction Concentrated in VeryFew HandsmdashMy Personal Methodsmdash The WrittenWordmdashSir Edward BridgesmdashMy Relations withthe Chiefs of the Staff Committee mdash GeneralIsmay mdash Kindness and Confidence Shown by theWar CabinetmdashThe Office of Minister of Defence mdashIts Staff Ismay Hollis JacobmdashNo Change forFive Years mdash Stability of Chiefs of Staff CommitteemdashNo Changes from 1941 till 1945 Except One by


DeathmdashIntimate Personal Association ofPoliticians and Soldiers at the SummitmdashThePersonal CorrespondencemdashMy Relations withPresident RooseveltmdashMy Message to thePresident of May 15 mdashldquoBlood Toil Tears andSweatrdquo

NOW AT LAST the slowly gathered long-pent-up fury of thestorm broke upon us Four or five millions of men met eachother in the first shock of the most merciless of all the warsof which record has been kept Within a week the front inFrance behind which we had been accustomed to dwellthrough the long years of the former war and the openingphase of this was to be irretrievably broken Within threeweeks the long-famed French Army was to collapse in routand ruin and the British Army to be hurled into the sea withall its equipment lost Within six weeks we were to findourselves alone almost disarmed with triumphantGermany and Italy at our throats with the whole of Europein Hitlerrsquos power and Japan glowering on the other side ofthe globe It was amid these facts and looming prospectsthat I entered upon my duties as Prime Minister andMinister of Defence and addressed myself to the first taskof forming a Government of all parties to conduct HisMajestyrsquos business at home and abroad by whatevermeans might be deemed best suited to the national interestFive years later almost to a day it was possible to take amore favourable view of our circumstances Italy wasconquered and Mussolini slain The mighty German Armysurrendered unconditionally Hitler had committed suicideIn addition to the immense captures by GeneralEisenhower nearly three million German soldiers weretaken prisoners in twenty-four hours by Field MarshalAlexander in Italy and Field Marshal Montgomery in


Germany France was liberated rallied and revived Handin hand with our allies the two mightiest empires in theworld we advanced to the swift annihilation of Japaneseresistance The contrast was certainly remarkable Theroad across these five years was long hard and perilousThose who perished upon it did not give their lives in vainThose who marched forward to the end will always beproud to have trodden it with honour

LAND FORCES IN FIGHTING CONTACT WITH THEENEMYldquoEQUIVALENT DIVISIONSrdquo

In giving an account of my stewardship and in telling thetale of the famous National Coalition Government it is myfirst duty to make plain the scale and force of the


contribution which Great Britain and her Empire whomdanger only united more tensely made to what eventuallybecame the common cause of so many states and nationsI do this with no desire to make invidious comparisons orrouse purposeless rivalries with our greatest ally the UnitedStates to whom we owe immeasurable and enduringgratitude But it is to the combined interest of the English-speaking world that the magnitude of the British war-making effort should be known and realised I havetherefore had a table made which I print on this page whichcovers the whole period of the war This shows that up tillJuly 1944 Britain and her Empire had a substantially largernumber of divisions in contact with the enemy than theUnited States This general figure includes not only theEuropean and African spheres but also all the war in Asiaagainst Japan Up till the arrival in Normandy in the autumnof 1944 of the great mass of the American Army we hadalways the right to speak at least as an equal and usuallyas the predominant partner in every theatre of war exceptthe Pacific and Australasian and this remains also true upto the time mentioned of the aggregation of all divisions inall theatres for any given month From July 1944 thefighting front of the United States as represented bydivisions in contact with the enemy became increasinglypredominant and so continued mounting and triumphanttill the final victory ten months laterAnother comparison which I have made shows that theBritish and Empire sacrifice in loss of life was even greaterthan that of our valiant ally The British total dead andmissing presumed dead of the armed forces amounted to303240 to which should be added over 109000 from theDominions India and the colonies a total of over 412240This figure does not include 60500 civilians killed in the airraids on the United Kingdom nor the losses of our


merchant navy and fishermen which amounted to about30000 Against this figure the United States mourn thedeaths in the Army and Air Force the Navy Marines andCoastguard of 322188 I cite these sombre rolls of honourin the confident faith that the equal comradeship sanctifiedby so much precious blood will continue to command thereverence and inspire the conduct of the English-speakingworldOn the seas the United States naturally bore almost theentire weight of the war in the Pacific and the decisivebattles which they fought near Midway Island atGuadalcanal and in the Coral Sea in 1942 gained for themthe whole initiative in that vast ocean domain and openedto them the assault of all the Japanese conquests andeventually of Japan herself The American Navy could notat the same time carry the main burden in the Atlantic andthe Mediterranean Here again it is a duty to set down thefacts Out of 781 German and 85 Italian U-boats destroyedin the European theatre the Atlantic and Indian Oceans594 were accounted for by British sea and air forces whoalso disposed of all the German battleships cruisers anddestroyers besides destroying or capturing the wholeItalian Fleet


U-BOAT LOSSES

The table of U-boat losses is shown in the table on thispageIn the air superb efforts were made by the United States tocome into action mdash especially with their daylight Fortressbombers mdash on the greatest scale from the earliest momentafter Pearl Harbour and their power was used both againstJapan and from the British Isles against GermanyHowever when we reached Casablanca in January 1943it was a fact that no single American bomber plane had casta daylight bomb on Germany Very soon the fruition of thegreat exertions they were making was to come but up tillthe end of 1943 the British discharge of bombs uponGermany had in the aggregate exceeded by eight tons toone those cast from American machines by day or nightand it was only in the spring of 1944 that thepreponderance of discharge was achieved by the UnitedStates Here as in the armies and on the sea we ran thefull course from the beginning and it was not until 1944 thatwe were overtaken and surpassed by the tremendous wareffort of the United States


It must be remembered that our munitions effort from thebeginning of Lend-Lease in January 1941 was increasedby over one-fifth through the generosity of the UnitedStates Through the materials and weapons which theygave us we were actually able to wage war as if we were anation of fifty-eight millions instead of forty-eight In shippingalso the marvellous production of Liberty Ships enabled theflow of supplies to be maintained across the Atlantic Onthe other hand the analysis of shipping losses by enemyaction suffered by all nations throughout the war should beborne in mind Here are the figures

Of these losses eighty per cent were suffered in the AtlanticOcean including British coastal waters and the North SeaOnly five per cent were lost in the PacificThis is all set down not to claim undue credit but toestablish on a footing capable of commanding fair-mindedrespect the intense output in every form of war activity ofthe people of this small island upon whom in the crisis ofthe worldrsquos history the brunt fell

It is probably easier to form a cabinet especially a coalitioncabinet in the heat of battle than in quiet times The senseof duty dominates all else and personal claims recedeOnce the main arrangements had been settled with theleaders of the other parties with the formal authority of theirorganisations the attitude of all those I sent for was like


that of soldiers in action who go to the places assigned tothem at once without question The party basis beingofficially established it seemed to me that no sense of Selfentered into the minds of any of the very large number ofgentlemen I had to see If some few hesitated it was onlybecause of public considerations Even more did this highstandard of behaviour apply to the large number ofConservative and National Liberal Ministers who had toleave their offices and break their careers and at thismoment of surpassing interest and excitement to step outof official life in many cases foreverThe Conservatives had a majority of more than onehundred and twenty over all other parties in the Housecombined Mr Chamberlain was their chosen leader Icould not but realise that his supersession by me must bevery unpleasant to many of them after all my long years ofcriticism and often fierce reproach Besides this it must beevident to the majority of them how my life had beenpassed in friction or actual strife with the ConservativeParty that I had left them on Free Trade and had laterreturned to them as Chancellor of the Exchequer After thatI had been for many years their leading opponent on Indiaon foreign policy and on the lack of preparations for warTo accept me as Prime Minister was to them very difficult Itcaused pain to many honourable men Moreover loyalty tothe chosen leader of the party is the prime characteristic ofthe Conservatives If they had on some questions fallenshort of their duty to the nation in the years before the warit was because of this sense of loyalty to their appointedchief None of these considerations caused me the slightestanxiety I knew they were all drowned by the cannonadeIn the first instance I had offered to Mr Chamberlain andhe had accepted the leadership of the House of Commonsas well as the Lord Presidency Nothing had been


published Mr Attlee informed me that the Labour Partywould not work easily under this arrangement In a coalitionthe leadership of the House must be generally acceptable Iput this point to Mr Chamberlain and with his readyagreement I took the leadership myself and held it tillFebruary 1942 During this time Mr Attlee acted as mydeputy and did the daily work His long experience inOpposition was of great value I came down only on themost serious occasions These were however recurrentMany Conservatives felt that their party leader had beenslighted Everyone admired his personal conduct On hisfirst entry into the House in his new capacity (May 13) thewhole of his party mdash the large majority of the House mdash roseand received him in a vehement demonstration ofsympathy and regard In the early weeks it was from theLabour benches that I was mainly greeted But MrChamberlainrsquos loyalty and support was steadfast and I wassure of myselfThere was considerable pressure by elements of theLabour Party and by some of those many able and ardentfigures who had not been included in the new Governmentfor a purge of the ldquoguilty menrdquo and of Ministers who hadbeen responsible for Munich or could be criticised for themany shortcomings in our war preparation Among theseLord Halifax Lord Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare were theprincipal targets But this was no time for proscriptions ofable patriotic men of long experience in high office If thecensorious people could have had their way at least a thirdof the Conservative Ministers would have been forced toresign Considering that Mr Chamberlain was the leader ofthe Conservative Party it was plain that this movementwould be destructive of the national unity Moreover I hadno need to ask myself whether all the blame lay on oneside Official responsibility rested upon the Government of


the time But moral responsibilities were more widelyspread A long formidable list of quotations from speechesand votes recorded by Labour and not less by LiberalMinisters all of which had been stultified by events was inmy mind and available in detail No one had more right thanI to pass a sponge across the past I therefore resistedthese disruptive tendencies ldquoIf the presentrdquo I said a fewweeks later ldquotries to sit in judgment on the past it will losethe futurerdquo This argument and the awful weight of the hourquelled the would-be heresy-hunters

Early on the morning of May 11 I sent a message to MrChamberlain ldquoNo one changes houses for a monthrdquo Thisavoided petty inconveniences during the crisis of the battleI continued to live at Admiralty House and made its maproom and the fine rooms downstairs my temporaryheadquarters I reported to him my talk with Mr Attlee andthe progress made in forming the new Administration ldquoIhope to have the War Cabinet and the Fighting Servicescomplete tonight for the King The haste is necessitated bythe battlehellip As we [two] must work so closely together Ihope you will not find it inconvenient to occupy once againyour old quarters which we both know so well in Number11rdquo1 I added

I do not think there is any necessity for a Cabinettoday as the Armies and other Services are fighting inaccordance with prearranged plans I should be veryglad however if you and Edward [Halifax] would cometo the Admiralty War Room at 1230 PM so that wecould look at the maps and talk things over

British and French advanced forces are already onthe Antwerp-Namur line and there seem to be verygood hopes that this line will be strongly occupied bythe Allied armies before it can be assailed This should


be achieved in about forty-eight hours and might bethought to be very important Meanwhile the Germanshave not yet forced the Albert Canal and the Belgiansare reported to be fighting well The Dutch also aremaking a stubborn resistance

My experiences in those first days were peculiar One livedwith the battle upon which all thoughts were centred andabout which nothing could be done All the time there wasthe Government to form and the gentlemen to see and theparty balances to be adjusted I cannot remember nor domy records show how all the hours were spent A BritishMinistry at that time contained between sixty and seventyMinisters of the Crown and all these had to be fitted in likea jigsaw puzzle in this case having regard to the claims ofthree Parties It was necessary for me to see not only all theprincipal figures but for a few minutes at least the crowdof able men who were to be chosen for important tasks Informing a Coalition Government the Prime Minister has toattach due weight to the wishes of the party leaders aboutwhom among their followers shall have the offices allottedto the Party By this principle I was mainly governed If anywho deserved better were left out on the advice of theirparty authorities or even in spite of that advice I can onlyexpress regret On the whole however the difficulties werefewIn Clement Attlee I had a colleague of war experience longversed in the House of Commons Our only differences inoutlook were about Socialism but these were swamped bya war soon to involve the almost complete subordination ofthe individual to the State We worked together with perfectease and confidence during the whole period of the


Government Mr Arthur Greenwood was a wise counsellorof high courage and a good and helpful friendSir Archibald Sinclair as official leader of the Liberal Partyfound it embarrassing to accept the office of Air Ministerbecause his followers felt he should instead have a seat inthe War Cabinet But this ran contrary to the principle of asmall War Cabinet I therefore proposed that he should jointhe War Cabinet when any matter affecting fundamentalpolitical issues or party union was involved He was myfriend and had been my second-in-command when in 1916I commanded the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers at Ploegsteerte(ldquoPlug Streetrdquo) and personally longed to enter upon thegreat sphere of action I had reserved for him After no littleintercourse this had been amicably settled Mr Bevin withwhom I had made acquaintance at the beginning of thewar in trying to mitigate the severe Admiralty demands fortrawlers had to consult the Transport and GeneralWorkersrsquo Union of which he was secretary before he couldjoin the team in the most important office of Minister ofLabour This took two or three days but it was worth it TheUnion the largest of all in Britain said unanimously that hewas to do it and stuck solid for five years till we wonThe greatest difficulty was with Lord Beaverbrook Ibelieved he had services to render of a very high quality Ihad resolved as the result of my experiences in theprevious war to remove the Supply and Design of Aircraftfrom the Air Ministry and I wished him to become theMinister of Aircraft Production He seemed at first reluctantto undertake the task and of course the Air Ministry did notlike having their Supply Branch separated from them Therewere other resistances to his appointment I felt surehowever that our life depended upon the flow of new


aircraft I needed his vital and vibrant energy and Ipersisted in my view

In deference to prevailing opinions expressed in Parliamentand the press it was necessary that the War Cabinet shouldbe small I therefore began by having only five members ofwhom one only the Foreign Secretary had a DepartmentThese were naturally the leading party politicians of the dayFor the convenient conduct of business it was necessarythat the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the leader of theLiberal Party should usually be present and as time passedthe number of ldquoconstant attendersrdquo grew But all theresponsibility was laid upon the five War Cabinet MinistersThey were the only ones who had the right to have theirheads cut off on Tower Hill if we did not win The rest couldsuffer for departmental shortcomings but not on account ofthe policy of the State Apart from the War Cabinet no onecould say ldquoI cannot take the responsibility for this or thatrdquoThe burden of policy was borne at a higher level Thissaved many people a lot of worry in the days which wereimmediately to fall upon usHere are the stages by which the National CoalitionGovernment was built up day by day in the course of thegreat battle


THE WAR CABINET


In my long political experience I had held most of the greatoffices of State but I readily admit that the post which hadnow fallen to me was the one I liked the best Power forthe sake of lording it over fellow-creatures or adding topersonal pomp is rightly judged base But power in anational crisis when a man believes he knows what ordersshould be given is a blessing In any sphere of action therecan be no comparison between the positions of numberone and number two three or four The duties and theproblems of all persons other than number one are quitedifferent and in many ways more difficult It is always amisfortune when number two or three has to initiate adominant plan or policy He has to consider not only themerits of the policy but the mind of his chief not only whatto advise but what it is proper for him in his station toadvise not only what to do but how to get it agreed andhow to get it done Moreover number two or three will haveto reckon with numbers four five and six or maybe somebright outsider number twenty Ambition not so much forvulgar ends but for fame glints in every mind There arealways several points of view which may be right and manywhich are plausible I was ruined for the time being in 1915over the Dardanelles and a supreme enterprise was castaway through my trying to carry out a major and cardinaloperation of war from a subordinate position Men are ill-advised to try such ventures This lesson had sunk into mynatureAt the top there are great simplifications An acceptedleader has only to be sure of what it is best to do or at leastto have made up his mind about it The loyalties whichcentre upon number one are enormous If he trips he mustbe sustained If he makes mistakes they must be coveredIf he sleeps he must not be wantonly disturbed If he is nogood he must be pole-axed But this last extreme process


cannot be carried out every day and certainly not in thedays just after he has been chosen

The fundamental changes in the machinery of war directionwere more real than apparent ldquoA Constitutionrdquo saidNapoleon ldquoshould be short and obscurerdquo The existingorganisms remained intact No official personalities werechanged The War Cabinet and the Chiefs of the StaffCommittee at first continued to meet every day as they haddone before In calling myself with the Kingrsquos approvalMinister of Defence I had made no legal or constitutionalchange I had been careful not to define my rights andduties I asked for no special powers either from the Crownor Parliament It was however understood and acceptedthat I should assume the general direction of the warsubject to the support of the War Cabinet and of the Houseof Commons The key-change which occurred on my takingover was of course the supervision and direction of theChiefs of the Staff Committee by a Minister of Defence withundefined powers As this Minister was also the PrimeMinister he had all the rights inherent in that officeincluding very wide powers of selection and removal of allprofessional and political personages Thus for the first timethe Chiefs of Staff Committee assumed its due and properplace in direct daily contact with the executive Head of theGovernment and in accord with him had full control overthe conduct of the war and the armed forcesThe position of the First Lord of the Admiralty and of theSecretaries of State for War and Air was decisively affectedin fact though not in form They were not members of theWar Cabinet nor did they attend the meetings of the Chiefsof Staff Committee They remained entirely responsible for


their Departments but rapidly and almost imperceptiblyceased to be responsible for the formulation of strategicplans and the day-to-day conduct of operations Thesewere settled by the Chiefs of Staff Committee acting directlyunder the Minister of Defence and Prime Minister and thuswith the authority of the War Cabinet The three ServiceMinisters very able and trusted friends of mine whom I hadpicked for these duties stood on no ceremony Theyorganised and administered the ever-growing forces andhelped all they could in the easy practical English fashionThey had the fullest information by virtue of theirmembership of the Defence Committee and constantaccess to me Their professional subordinates the Chiefsof Staff discussed everything with them and treated themwith the utmost respect But there was an integral directionof the war to which they loyally submitted There never wasan occasion when powers were abrogated or challengedand anyone in this circle could always speak his mind butthe actual war direction soon settled into a very few handsand what had seemed so difficult before became muchmore simple mdash apart of course from Hitler In spite of theturbulence of events and the many disasters we had toendure the machinery worked almost automatically andone lived in a stream of coherent thought capable of beingtranslated with great rapidity into executive action

Although the awful battle was now going on across theChannel and the reader is no doubt impatient to get thereit may be well at this point to describe the system andmachinery for conducting military and other affairs which Iset on foot and practised from my earliest days of power Iam a strong believer in transacting official business by The


Written Word No doubt surveyed in the after-time muchthat is set down from hour to hour under the impact ofevents may be lacking in proportion or may not come true Iam willing to take my chance of that It is always betterexcept in the hierarchy of military discipline to expressopinions and wishes rather than to give orders Still writtendirectives coming personally from the lawfully constitutedHead of the Government and Minister specially chargedwith Defence counted to such an extent that though notexpressed as orders they very often found their fruition inactionTo make sure that my name was not used loosely I issuedduring the crisis of July the following minute

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay CIGS and Sir EdwardBridges

19VII40

Let it be very clearly understood that all directionsemanating from me are made in writing or should beimmediately afterwards confirmed in writing and that Ido not accept any responsibility for matters relating tonational defence on which I am alleged to have givendecisions unless they are recorded in writing

When I woke about 8 AM I read all the telegrams andfrom my bed dictated a continuous flow of minutes anddirectives to the Departments and to the Chiefs of StaffCommittee These were typed in relays as they were doneand handed at once to General Ismay Deputy Secretary(Military) to the War Cabinet and my representative on theChiefs of Staff Committee who came to see me early eachmorning Thus he usually had a good deal in writing to bringbefore the Chiefs of Staff Committee when they met at


1030 They gave all consideration to my views at the sametime as they discussed the general situation Thus betweenthree and five orsquoclock in the afternoon unless there weresome difficulties between us requiring further consultationthere was ready a whole series of orders and telegramssent by me or by the Chiefs of Staff and agreed betweenus usually giving all the decisions immediately requiredIn total war it is quite impossible to draw any precise linebetween military and non-military problems That no suchfriction occurred between the Military Staff and the WarCabinet Staff was due primarily to the personality of SirEdward Bridges Secretary to the War Cabinet Not onlywas this son of a former Poet Laureate an extremelycompetent and tireless worker but he was also a man ofexceptional force ability and personal charm without atrace of jealousy in his nature All that mattered to him wasthat the War Cabinet Secretariat as a whole should servethe Prime Minister and War Cabinet to the very best of theirability No thought of his own personal position ever enteredhis mind and never a cross word passed between the civiland military officers of the SecretariatIn larger questions or if there were any differences of viewI called a meeting of the War Cabinet Defence Committeewhich at the outset comprised Mr Chamberlain Mr Attleeand the three Service Ministers with the Chiefs of the Staffin attendance These formal meetings got fewer after19412 As the machine began to work more smoothly Icame to the conclusion that the daily meetings of the WarCabinet with the Chiefs of Staff present were no longernecessary I therefore eventually instituted what came to beknown among ourselves as the ldquoMonday Cabinet ParaderdquoEvery Monday there was a considerable gathering mdash all theWar Cabinet the Service Ministers and the Minister of


Home Security the Chancellor of the Exchequer theSecretaries of State for the Dominions and for India theMinister of Information the Chiefs of Staff and the officialhead of the Foreign Office At these meetings each Chief ofStaff in turn unfolded his account of all that had happenedduring the previous seven days and the Foreign Secretaryfollowed them with his story of any important developmentsin foreign affairs On other days of the week the WarCabinet sat alone and all important matters requiringdecision were brought before them Other Ministersprimarily concerned with the subjects to be discussedattended for their own particular problems The members ofthe War Cabinet had the fullest circulation of all papersaffecting the war and saw all important telegrams sent byme As confidence grew the War Cabinet intervened lessactively in operational matters though they watched themwith close attention and full knowledge They took almostthe whole weight of Home and Party affairs off myshoulders thus setting me free to concentrate upon themain theme With regard to all future operations ofimportance I always consulted them in good time but whilethey gave careful consideration to the issues involved theyfrequently asked not to be informed of dates and detailsand indeed on several occasions stopped me when I wasabout to unfold these to themI had never intended to embody the office of Minister ofDefence in a Department This would have requiredlegislation and all the delicate adjustments I havedescribed most of which settled themselves by personalgood will would have had to be thrashed out in a processof ill-timed constitution-making There was however inexistence and activity under the personal direction of thePrime Minister the Military Wing of the War CabinetSecretariat which had in pre-war days been the Secretariat


of the Committee of Imperial Defence At the head of thisstood General Ismay with Colonel Hollis and Colonel Jacobas his two principals and a group of specially selectedyounger officers drawn from all three Services ThisSecretariat became the staff of the Office of the Minister ofDefence My debt to its members is immeasurable GeneralIsmay Colonel Hollis and Colonel Jacob rose steadily inrank and repute as the war proceeded and none of themwas changed Displacements in a sphere so intimate andso concerned with secret matters are detrimental tocontinuous and efficient despatch of businessAfter some early changes almost equal stability waspreserved in the Chiefs of Staff Committee On the expiry ofhis term as Chief of the Air Staff in September 1940 AirMarshal Newall became Governor-General of NewZealand and was succeeded by Air Marshal Portal whowas the accepted star of the Air Force Portal remained withme throughout the war Sir John Dill who had succeededGeneral Ironside in May 1940 remained CIGS until heaccompanied me to Washington in December 1941 I thenmade him my personal Military Representative with thePresident and head of our Joint Staff Mission His relationswith General Marshall Chief of Staff of the United StatesArmy became a priceless link in all our business and whenhe died in harness some two years later he was accordedthe unique honour of a resting-place in Arlington Cemeterythe Valhalla hitherto reserved exclusively for Americanwarriors He was succeeded as CIGS by Sir Alan Brookewho stayed with me till the endFrom 1941 for nearly four years the early part of whichwas passed in much misfortune and disappointment theonly change made in this small band either among theChiefs or in the Defence Staff was due to the death inharness of Admiral Pound This may well be a record in


British military history A similar degree of continuity wasachieved by President Roosevelt in his own circle TheUnited States Chiefs of Staff mdash General Marshall AdmiralKing and General Arnold subsequently joined by AdmiralLeahy mdash started together on the American entry into thewar and were never changed As both the British andAmericans presently formed the Combined Chiefs of StaffCommittee this was an inestimable advantage for allNothing like it between allies has ever been known beforeI cannot say that we never differed among ourselves evenat home but a kind of understanding grew up between meand the British Chiefs of Staff that we should convince andpersuade rather than try to overrule each other This wasof course helped by the fact that we spoke the sametechnical language and possessed a large common bodyof military doctrine and war experience In this ever-changing scene we moved as one and the War Cabinetclothed us with ever more discretion and sustained us withunwearied and unflinching constancy There was nodivision as in the previous war between politicians andsoldiers between the ldquoFrocksrdquo and the ldquoBrass Hatsrdquomdashodious terms which darkened counsel We came very closetogether indeed and friendships were formed which Ibelieve were deeply valuedThe efficiency of a war administration depends mainly uponwhether decisions emanating from the highest approvedauthority are in fact strictly faithfully and punctuallyobeyed This we achieved in Britain in this time of crisisowing to the intense fidelity comprehension and whole-hearted resolve of the War Cabinet upon the essentialpurpose to which we had devoted ourselves According tothe directions given ships troops and aeroplanes movedand the wheels of factories spun By all these processesand by the confidence indulgence and loyalty by which I


was upborne I was soon able to give an integral directionto almost every aspect of the war This was reallynecessary because times were so very bad The methodwas accepted because everyone realised how near weredeath and ruin Not only individual death which is theuniversal experience stood near but incomparably morecommanding the life of Britain her message and her glory

Any account of the methods of government whichdeveloped under the National Coalition would beincomplete without an explanation of the series of personalmessages which I sent to the President of the United Statesand the heads of other foreign countries and the DominionGovernments This correspondence must be describedHaving obtained from the Cabinet any specific decisionsrequired on policy I composed and dictated thesedocuments myself for the most part on the basis that theywere intimate and informal correspondence with friends andfellow-workers One can usually put onersquos thought better inonersquos own words It was only occasionally that I read thetext to the Cabinet beforehand Knowing their views I usedthe ease and freedom needed for the doing of my work Iwas of course hand-in-glove with the Foreign Secretary andhis Department and any differences of view were settledtogether I circulated these telegrams in some cases afterthey had been sent to the principal members of the WarCabinet and where he was concerned to the DominionsSecretary Before despatching them I of course had mypoints and facts checked departmentally and nearly allmilitary messages passed through Ismayrsquos hands to theChiefs of Staff This correspondence in no way ran counterto the official communications or the work of theAmbassadors It became however in fact the channel of


much vital business and played a part in my conduct of thewar not less and sometimes even more important than myduties as Minister of DefenceThe very select circle who were entirely free to expresstheir opinion were almost invariably content with the draftsand gave me an increasing measure of confidenceDifferences with American authorities for instanceinsuperable at the second level were settled often in a fewhours by direct contact at the top Indeed as time went onthe efficacy of this top-level transaction of business was soapparent that I had to be careful not to let it become avehicle for ordinary departmental affairs I had repeatedly torefuse the requests of my colleagues to address PresidentRoosevelt personally on important matters of detail Hadthese intruded unduly upon the personal correspondencethey would soon have destroyed its privacy andconsequently its valueMy relations with the President gradually became so closethat the chief business between our two countries wasvirtually conducted by these personal interchanges betweenhim and me In this way our perfect understanding wasgained As Head of the State as well as Head of theGovernment Roosevelt spoke and acted with authority inevery sphere and carrying the War Cabinet with me Irepresented Great Britain with almost equal latitude Thus avery high degree of concert was obtained and the saving intime and the reduction in the number of people informedwere both invaluable I sent my cables to the AmericanEmbassy in London which was in direct touch with thePresident at the White House through special codingmachines The speed with which answers were receivedand things settled was aided by clock-time Any messagewhich I prepared in the evening night or even up to twoorsquoclock in the morning would reach the President before he


went to bed and very often his answer would come back tome when I woke the next morning In all I sent him ninehundred and fifty messages and received about eighthundred in reply I felt I was in contact with a very greatman who was also a warmhearted friend and the foremostchampion of the high causes which we served

The Cabinet being favourable to my trying to obtaindestroyers from the American Government I drafted duringthe afternoon of May 15 my first message to PresidentRoosevelt since I became Prime Minister To preserve thecontinuity of our correspondence I signed myself ldquoFormerNaval Personrdquo and to this fancy I adhered almost withoutexception throughout the war

Although I have changed my office I am sure youwould not wish me to discontinue our intimate privatecorrespondence As you are no doubt aware the scenehas darkened swiftly The enemy have a markedpreponderance in the air and their new technique ismaking a deep impression upon the French I thinkmyself the battle on land has only just begun and Ishould like to see the masses engage Up to thepresent Hitler is working with specialised units in tanksand air The small countries are simply smashed upone by one like matchwood We must expect though itis not yet certain that Mussolini will hurry in to sharethe loot of civilisation We expect to be attacked hereourselves both from the air and by parachute and air-borne troops in the near future and are getting readyfor them If necessary we shall continue the war aloneand we are not afraid of that

But I trust you realise Mr President that the voiceand force of the United States may count for nothing ifthey are withheld too long You may have a completelysubjugated Nazified Europe established withastonishing swiftness and the weight may be more


than we can bear All I ask now is that you shouldproclaim nonbelligerency which would mean that youwould help us with everything short of actuallyengaging armed forces Immediate needs are First ofall the loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers tobridge the gap between what we have now and thelarge new construction we put in hand at the beginningof the war This time next year we shall have plentyBut if in the interval Italy comes in against us withanother one hundred submarines we may be strainedto breaking-point Secondly we want several hundredof the latest types of aircraft of which you are nowgetting delivery These can be repaid by those nowbeing constructed in the United States for us Thirdlyanti-aircraft equipment and ammunition of which againthere will be plenty next year if we are alive to see itFourthly the fact that our ore supply is being compro-mised from Sweden from North Africa and perhapsfrom Northern Spain makes it necessary to purchasesteel in the United States This also applies to othermaterials We shall go on paying dollars for as long aswe can but I should like to feel reasonably sure thatwhen we can pay no more you will give us the stuff allthe same Fifthly we have many reports of possibleGerman parachute or air-borne descents in IrelandThe visit of a United States Squadron to Irish portswhich might well be prolonged would be invaluableSixthly I am looking to you to keep the Japanese quietin the Pacific using Singapore in any way convenientThe details of the material which we have in hand willbe communicated to you separately

With all good wishes and respect

On May 18 a reply was received from the Presidentwelcoming the continuance of our private correspondenceand dealing with my specific requests The loan or gift ofthe forty or fifty older destroyers it was stated wouldrequire the authorisation of Congress and the moment wasnot opportune He would facilitate to the utmost the AlliedGovernments obtaining the latest types of United States


aircraft anti-aircraft equipment ammunition and steel Inall this the representations of our agent the highlycompetent and devoted Mr Purvis (presently to give his lifein an air accident) would receive most favourableconsideration The President would consider carefully mysuggestion that a United States Squadron might visit Irishports About the Japanese he merely pointed to theconcentration of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbour

On Monday May 13 I asked the House of Commonswhich had been specially summoned for a vote ofconfidence in the new Administration After reporting theprogress which had been made in filling the various officesI said ldquoI have nothing to offer but blood toil tears andsweatrdquo In all our long history no Prime Minister had everbeen able to present to Parliament and the nation aprogramme at once so short and so popular I endedIn response to You ask what is our policy I will say It is towage war by sea land and air with all our might and withall the strength that God can give us to wage war against amonstrous tyranny never surpassed in the darklamentable catalogue of human crime That is our policyYou ask What is our aim I can answer in one wordVictory mdash victory at all costs victory in spite of all terrorvictory however long and hard the road may be for withoutvictory there is no survival Let that be realised no survivalfor the British Empire no survival for all that the BritishEmpire has stood for no survival for the urge and impulseof the ages that mankind will move forward towards itsgoal But I take up my task with buoyancy and hope I feelsure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among menAt this time I feel entitled to claim the aid of all and I say


ldquoCome then let us go forward together with our unitedstrengthrdquoUpon these simple issues the House voted unanimouslyand adjourned till May 21

Thus then we all started on our common task Never did aBritish Prime Minister receive from Cabinet colleagues theloyal and true aid which I enjoyed during the next five yearsfrom these men of all Parties in the State Parliament whilemaintaining free and active criticism gave continuousoverwhelming support to all measures proposed by theGovernment and the nation was united and ardent asnever before It was well indeed that this should be sobecause events were to come upon us of an order moreterrible than anyone had foreseen


2The Battle of France Gamelin The

First Week May 10 to May 16

Plan DmdashThe German Order of BattlemdashGermanand French ArmourmdashFrench and British AdvanceThrough BelgiummdashHolland Overrun mdash TheBelgian ProblemmdashAccepted Primacy of France inthe Military ArtmdashThe Gap in the ArdennesmdashBritishDifficulties During the Twilight War Phase mdashProgress of Plan DmdashBad News of May 13 and 14mdashKleistrsquos Group of Armies Break the French FrontmdashHeavy British Air LossesmdashOur Final Limit forHome DefencemdashReynaud Telephones MeMorning of May 15 mdash Destruction of the FrenchNinth Army Opposite the Ardennes GapmdashldquoCeaseFirerdquo in Holland mdash The Italian MenacemdashI Fly toParismdashMeeting at the Quai DrsquoOrsaymdashGeneralGamelinrsquos StatementmdashNo Strategic ReserveldquoAucunerdquomdashProposed Attacks on the GermanldquoBulgerdquomdashFrench Demands for More British FighterSquadronsmdashMy Telegram to the Cabinet on theNight of May 16 mdash Cabinet Agrees to Send TenMore Fighter Squadrons

AT THE MOMENT in the evening of May 10 when I becameresponsible no fresh decision about meeting the Germaninvasion of the Low Countries was required from me orfrom my colleagues in the new and still unformedAdministration We had long been assured that the Frenchand British staffs were fully agreed upon General Gamelinrsquos


Plan D and it had already been in action since dawn Infact by the morning of the 11th the whole vast operationhad made great progress On the seaward flank GeneralGiraudrsquos Seventh French Army had already begun itsadventurous dash into Holland In the centre the Britisharmoured-car patrols of the 12th Lancers were upon theriver Dyle and to the south of our front all the rest ofGeneral Billottersquos First Group of Armies were hasteningforward to the Meuse The opinion of the Allied militarychiefs was that Plan D if successful would save anythingfrom twelve to fifteen divisions by shortening the frontagainst Germany and then of course there was theBelgian Army of twenty-two divisions besides the DutchArmy of ten divisions without which our total forces in theWest were numerically inferior I did not therefore in theslightest degree wish to interfere with the military plans andawaited with hope the impending shockNevertheless if in the after-light we look back upon thescene the important paper written by the British Chiefs ofStaff on September 181 1939 becomes prominent In thisit had been affirmed that unless the Belgians wereeffectively holding their front on the Meuse and the AlbertCanal it would be wrong for the British and French to rushto their aid but that they should rather stand firm on theFrench frontier or at the most swing their left hand slightlyforward to the line of the Scheldt Since those days ofSeptember 1939 agreement had been reached to carryout General Gamelinrsquos Plan D Nothing had howeverhappened in the interval to weaken the original view of theBritish Chiefs of Staff On the contrary much had happenedto strengthen it The German Army had grown in strengthand maturity with every month that had passed and theynow had a vastly more powerful armour The French Armygnawed by Soviet-inspired Communism and chilled by the


long cheerless winter on the front had actuallydeteriorated The Belgian Government staking theircountryrsquos life upon Hitlerrsquos respect for international law andBelgian neutrality had not achieved any effective jointplanning between their army chiefs and those of the AlliesThe anti-tank obstacles and defensive line which were tohave been prepared on the front Namur-Louvain wereinadequate and unfinished The Belgian Army whichcontained many brave and resolute men could hardlybrace itself for a conflict for fear of offending neutrality TheBelgian front had been in fact overrun at many points bythe first wave of German assault even before GeneralGamelin gave the signal to execute his long-prepared planThe most that could now be hoped for was success in thatvery ldquoencounter battlerdquo which the French High Commandhad declared itself resolved to avoidOn the outbreak of the war eight months before the mainpower of the German Army and Air Force had beenconcentrated on the invasion and conquest of PolandAlong the whole of the Western Front from Aix-la-Chapelleto the Swiss frontier there had stood 42 German divisionswithout armour After the French mobilisation France coulddeploy the equivalent of 70 divisions opposite to them Forreasons which have been explained it was not deemedpossible to attack the Germans then Very different was thesituation on May 10 1940 The enemy profiting by theeight monthsrsquo delay and by the destruction of Poland hadarmed equipped and trained about 155 divisions of whichten were armoured (ldquoPanzerrdquo) Hitlerrsquos agreement withStalin had enabled him to reduce the German forces in theEast to the smallest proportions Opposite Russiaaccording to General Halder the German Chief of Staffthere was ldquono more than a light covering force scarcely fitfor collecting customs dutiesrdquo Without premonition of their


own future the Soviet Government watched the destructionof that ldquoSecond Frontrdquo in the West for which they were soonto call so vehemently and to wait in agony so long Hitlerwas therefore in a position to deliver his onslaught onFrance with 126 divisions and the whole of the immensearmour weapon of ten Panzer divisions comprising nearlythree thousand armoured vehicles of which a thousand atleast were heavy tanksThese mighty forces were deployed from the North Sea toSwitzerland in the following order

Army Group B comprising 28 divisions underGeneral von Bock marshalled along the front from theNorth Sea to Aixla-Chapelle was to overrun Hollandand Belgium and thereafter advance into France asthe German right wing

Army Group A of 44 divisions under General vonRundstedt constituting the main thrust was rangedalong the front from Aix-la-Chapelle to the Moselle

Army Group C of 17 divisions under General vonLeeb held the Rhine from the Moselle to the Swissfrontier

The OKH (Supreme Army Command) Reserve consistedof about 47 divisions of which 20 were in immediatereserve bexhind the various Army Groups and 27 ingeneral reserveOpposite this array the exact strength and disposition ofwhich was of course unknown to us the First Group ofArmies under General Billotte consisting of 51 divisions ofwhich 9 were held in GQG (Grand Quartier GeacuteneacuteralReserve) including 9 British divisions stretched from theend of the Maginot Line near Longwy to the Belgian frontierand behind the frontiers to the sea in front of Dunkirk TheSecond and Third Groups of Armies under GeneralsPreacutetelat and Besson consisting with the reserves of 43


divisions guarded the French frontier from Longwy toSwitzerland In addition the French had the equivalent of 9divisions occupying the Maginot Line ndash a total of 103divisions If the armies of Belgium and Holland becameinvolved this number would be increased by 22 Belgianand 10 Dutch divisions As both these countries wereimmediately attacked the grand total of Allied divisions ofall qualities nominally available on May 10 was therefore135 or practically the same number as we now know theenemy possessed Properly organised and equipped welltrained and led this force should according to thestandards of the previous war have had a good chance ofbringing the invasion to a stopHowever the Germans had full freedom to choose themoment the direction and the strength of their attackMore than half of the French Army stood on the southernand eastern sectors of France and the fifty-one French andBritish divisions of General Billottersquos Army Group No 1 withwhatever Belgian and Dutch aid was forthcoming had toface the onslaught of upwards of seventy hostile divisionsunder Bock and Rundstedt between Longwy and the seaThe combination of the almost cannon-proof tank and dive-bomber aircraft which had proved so successful in Polandon a smaller scale was again to form the spearhead of themain attack and a group of five Panzer and threemotorised divisions under Kleist included in Germany ArmyGroup A was directed through the Ardennes on Sedan andMonthermeacuteTo meet such modern forms of war the French deployedabout 2300 tanks mostly light Their armoured formationsincluded some powerful modern types but more than halftheir total armoured strength was held in dispersedbattalions of light tanks for co-operation with the infantryTheir six armoured divisions with which alone they could


have countered the massed Panzer assault were widelydistributed over the front and could not be collectedtogether to operate in coherent action Britain thebirthplace of the tank had only just completed the formationand training of her first armoured division (328 tanks) whichwas still in EnglandThe German fighter aircraft now concentrated in the Westwere far superior to the French in numbers and quality TheBritish Air Force in France comprised the ten fightersquadrons (Hurricanes) which could be spared from vitalHome Defence eight squadrons of Battles six ofBlenheims and five of Lysanders Neither the French northe British air authorities had equipped themselves withdive-bombers which at this time as in Poland becameprominent and were to play an important part in thedemoralisation of the French infantry and particularly oftheir coloured troopsDuring the night of 910 May heralded by widespread airattacks against airfields communications headquartersand magazines all the German forces in the Bock andRundstedt Army Groups sprang forward towards Franceacross the frontiers of Belgium Holland and LuxembourgComplete tactical surprise was achieved in nearly everycase Out of the darkness came suddenly innumerableparties of well-armed ardent storm troops often with lightartillery and long before daybreak a hundred and fifty milesof front were aflame Holland and Belgium assaultedwithout the slightest pretext of warning cried aloud for helpThe Dutch had trusted to their water-line all the sluices notseized or betrayed were opened and the Dutch frontierguards fired upon the invaders The Belgians succeeded indestroying the bridges of the Meuse but the Germanscaptured intact two across the Albert Canal


By Plan D the First Allied Army Group under GeneralBillotte with its small but very fine British army was fromthe moment when the Germans violated the frontier toadvance east into Belgium It was intended to forestall theenemy and stand on the line Meuse-Louvain-Antwerp Infront of that line along the Meuse and the Albert Canal laythe main Belgian forces Should these stem the firstGerman onrush the Army Group would support them Itseemed more probable that the Belgians would be at oncethrown back onto the Allied line And this in facthappened It was assumed that in this case the Belgianresistance would give a short breathing-space during whichthe French and British could organise their new positionExcept on the critical front of the French Ninth Army thiswas accomplished On the extreme left or seaward flankthe Seventh French Army was to seize the islandscommanding the mouth of the Scheldt and if possible toassist the Dutch by an advance toward Breda It wasthought that on our southern flank the Ardennes wereimpassable for large modern armies and south of thatagain began the regular fortified Maginot Line stretchingout to the Rhine and along the Rhine to Switzerland Alltherefore seemed to depend upon the forward left-handedcounterstroke of the Allied Northern Armies This againhung upon the speed with which Belgium could beoccupied Everything had been worked out in this way withthe utmost detail and only a signal was necessary to hurlforward the Allied force of well over a million men At 530 AM on May 10 Lord Gort received a message from GeneralGeorges ordering ldquoAlertes 1 2 and 3rdquo namely instantreadiness to move into Belgium At 645 AM GeneralGamelin ordered the execution of Plan D and the long-prepared scheme of the French High Command to which


the British had subordinated themselves came at once intoaction



Mr Colijn when as Dutch Prime Minister he visited me in1937 had explained to me the marvellous efficiency of theDutch inundations He could he explained by a telephonemessage from the luncheon table at Chartwell press abutton which would confront an invader with impassablewater obstacles But all this was nonsense The power of agreat State against a small one under modern conditions isoverwhelming The Germans broke through at every pointbridging the canals or seizing the locks and water-controlsIn a single day all the outer line of the Dutch defences wasmastered At the same time the German Air Force began touse its might upon a defenceless country The Dutch hopethat they would be bypassed by the German right-handedswing as in the former war was vainThe case of Belgium requires more searching statementSeveral hundreds of thousands of British and Frenchgraves in Belgium mark the struggle of the previous warThe policy of Belgium in the years between the wars hadnot taken sufficient account of the past The Belgianleaders saw with worried eyes the internal weakness ofFrance and the vacillating pacifism of Britain They clung toa strict neutrality In the years before they were againinvaded their attitude towards the two mighty arrays whichconfronted each other was officially at any rate quiteimpartial Great allowance must be made for the fearfulproblems of a small State in such a plight but the FrenchHigh Command had for years spoken bitterly of the linetaken by the Belgian Government Their only chance ofdefending their frontier against a German attack lay in aclose alliance with France and Britain The line of the AlbertCanal and other water fronts was highly defensible andhad the British and French armies aided by the Belgian


armies after the declaration of war been drawn up on theBelgian frontiers in good time a very strong offensive mighthave been prepared and launched from these positionsagainst Germany But the Belgian Government deemedthat their safety lay in the most rigid neutrality and theironly hope was founded on German good faith and respectfor treatiesEven after Britain and France had entered into war it wasimpossible to persuade them to rejoin the old alliance Theydeclared they would defend their neutrality to the deathand placed nine-tenths of their forces on their Germanfrontier while at the same time they strictly forbade theAnglo-French Army to enter their country and makeeffective preparations for their defence or for forestallingcounter-strokes The construction of new lines and the anti-tank ditch during the winter of 1939 by the British armieswith the French First Army on their right along the Franco-Belgian frontier had been the only measure open to us It isa haunting question whether the whole policy of Plan Dshould not have been reviewed upon this basis andwhether we would not have been wiser to stand and fighton the French frontier and amid these strong defencesinvite the Belgian Army to fall back upon them rather thanmake the hazardous and hurried forward leap to the Dyle orthe Albert Canal

No one can understand the decisions of that period withoutrealising the immense authority wielded by the Frenchmilitary leaders and the belief of every French officer thatFrance had the primacy in the military art France hadconducted and carried the main weight of the terrible landfighting from 1914 to 1918 She had lost fourteen hundred


thousand men killed Foch had held the supremecommand and the great British and Imperial armies of sixtyor seventy divisions had been placed like the Americansunreservedly under his orders Now the BritishExpeditionary Army numbered but three or four hundredthousand men spread from the bases at Havre and alongthe coast forward to the line compared with nearly ahundred French divisions or over two million Frenchmenactually holding the long front from Belgium to SwitzerlandIt was natural therefore that we should place ourselvesunder their command and that their judgment should beaccepted It had been expected that General Georgeswould take full command of the French and British armiesin the field from the moment when war was declared andGeneral Gamelin was expected to retire to an advisoryposition on the French Military Council However GeneralGamelin was averse from yielding his control asGeneralissimo He retained the supreme direction Avexatious conflict of authority took place between him andGeneral Georges during the eight monthsrsquo lull GeneralGeorges in my opinion never had the chance to make thestrategic plan in its integrity and on his own responsibilityThe British General Staff and our headquarters in the fieldhad long been anxious about the gap between the northernend of the Maginot Line and the beginning of the Britishfortified front along the Franco-Belgian frontier Mr Hore-Belisha the Secretary of State for War raised the point inthe War Cabinet on several occasions Representationswere made through military channels Consideringhowever our relatively small contribution the Cabinet andour military leaders were naturally shy of criticising thosewhose armies were ten times as strong as our own TheFrench thought that the Ardennes were impassable forlarge modern armies Marshal Peacutetain had told the Senate


Army Commission ldquoThis sector is not dangerousrdquo A greatdeal of field work was done along the Meuse but nothinglike a strong line of pillboxes and anti-tank obstacles suchas the British had made along the Belgian sector wasattempted Moreover General Coraprsquos Ninth French Armywas mainly composed of troops who were definitely belowthe French standards Out of its nine divisions two were ofcavalry partly mechanised one was a fortress division two(61st and 53d) belonged to a secondary category two (22dand 18th) were not much inferior to active divisions onlytwo were divisions of the permanent regular army Herethen from Sedan to Hirson on the Oise along a front of fiftymiles there were no permanent fortifications and only twodivisions of professional troopsOne cannot be strong everywhere It is often right andnecessary to hold long sectors of a frontier with lightcovering forces but this of course should be only with theobject of gathering larger reserves for counter-attacks whenthe enemyrsquos striking-points are revealed The spreading offorty-three divisions or half the mobile French army fromLongwy to the Swiss frontier the whole of which was eitherdefended by the Maginot Line forts or by the broad swift-flowing Rhine with its own fortress system behind it wasan improvident disposition The risks that have to be run bythe defender are more trying than those which an assailantwho is presumably the stronger at the point of attack mustdare Where very long fronts are concerned they can onlybe met by strong mobile reserves which can rapidlyintervene in a decisive battle A weight of opinion supportsthe criticism that the French reserves were inadequateand such as they were badly distributed After all the gapbehind the Ardennes opened the shortest road fromGermany to Paris and had for centuries been a famousbattleground If the enemy penetrated here the whole


forward movement of the Northern Armies would bedeprived of its pivot and all their communications would beendangered equally with the capitalLooking back we can see that Mr Chamberlainrsquos WarCabinet in which I served and for whose acts or neglects Itake my full share of responsibility ought not to have beendeterred from thrashing the matter out with the French inthe autumn and winter of 1939 It would have been anunpleasant and difficult argument for the French at everystage could say ldquoWhy do you not send more troops of yourown Will you not take over a wider sector of the front Ifreserves are lacking pray supply them We have fivemillion men mobilised2 We follow your ideas about the warat sea we conform to the plans of the British AdmiraltyPray show a proper confidence in the French Army and inour historic mastery of the art of war on landrdquoNevertheless we ought to have done itHitler and his generals were in little doubt as to the militaryviews and general arrangements of their opponents Duringthis same autumn and winter the German factories hadpoured out tanks the plants for making which must havebeen well advanced at the Munich crisis in 1938 and boreabundant fruit in the eight months that had passed sincewar began They were not at all deterred by the physicaldifficulties of traversing the Ardennes On the contrary theybelieved that modern mechanical transport and vastorganised road-making capacity would make this regionhitherto deemed impassable the shortest surest andeasiest method of penetrating France and of rupturing thewhole French scheme of counter-attack Accordingly theGerman Supreme Army Command (OKH) planned theirenormous onrush through the Ardennes to sever the curlingleft arm of the Allied Northern Armies at the shoulder-joint


The movement though on a far larger scale and withdifferent speeds and weapons was not unlike Napoleonrsquosthrust at the Plateau of Pratzen in the battle of Austerlitzwhereby the entire Austro-Russian turning move was cut offand ruined and their centre broken

At the signal the Northern Armies sprang to the rescue ofBelgium and poured forward along all the roads amid thecheers of the inhabitants The first phase of Plan D wascompleted by May 12 The French held the left bank of theMeuse to Huy and their light forces beyond the river werefalling back before increasing enemy pressure Thearmoured divisions of the French First Army reached theline Huy-Hannut-Tirle-mont The Belgians having lost theAlbert Canal were falling back to the line of the river Getteand taking up their prescribed position from Antwerp toLouvain They still held Lieacutege and Namur The FrenchSeventh Army had occupied the islands of Walcheren andSouth Beveland and were engaged with mechanised unitsof the German Eighteenth Army on the line Herenthals ndashBergen-op-Zoom So rapid had been the advance of theFrench Seventh Army that it had already outrun itsammunition supplies The superiority in quality though notin numbers of the British Air Force was already apparentThus up till the night of the 12th there was no reason tosuppose that the operations were not going well



However during the 13th Lord Gortrsquos Headquartersbecame aware of the weight of the German thrust on thefront of the French Ninth Army By nightfall the enemy hadestablished themselves on the west bank of the Meuse oneither side of Dinant and Sedan The French GQG (GrandQuartier General) were not yet certain whether the mainGerman effort was directed through Luxembourg againstthe left of the Maginot Line or through Maastricht towardsBrussels Along the whole front Louvain-Namur-Dinant toSedan an intense heavy battle had developed but underconditions which General Gamelin had not contemplatedfor at Dinant the French Ninth Army had no time to installthemselves before the enemy was upon them

During the 14th the bad news began to come in At first allwas vague At 7 PM I read to the Cabinet a messagereceived from M Reynaud stating that the Germans hadbroken through at Sedan that the French were unable toresist the combination of tanks and dive-bombing andasking for ten more squadrons of fighters to re-establish theline Other messages received by the Chiefs of Staff gavesimilar information and added that both Generals Gamelinand Georges took a serious view of the situation and thatGeneral Gamelin was surprised at the rapidity of theenemyrsquos advance In fact Kleistrsquos Group with its immensemass of armour heavy and light had completely scatteredor destroyed the French troops on their immediate frontand could now move forward at a pace never before knownin war At almost all points where the armies had come incontact the weight and fury of the German attack wasoverpowering They crossed the Meuse in the Dinant sectorwith two more armoured divisions To the north the fighting


on the front of the French First Army had been mostsevere The First and Second British Corps were still inposition from Wavre to Louvain where our Third Divisionunder General Montgomery had had sharp fighting Farthernorth the Belgians were retiring to the Antwerp defencesThe French Seventh Army on the seaward flank wasrecoiling even quicker than it had advancedFrom the moment of the invasion we began ldquoOperationRoyal Marinerdquo the launching of the fluvial mines into theRhine and in the first week of the battle nearly 1700 wereldquostreamedrdquo3 They produced immediate results Practicallyall river traffic between Karlsruhe and Mainz wassuspended and extensive damage was done to theKarlsruhe barrage and a number of pontoon bridges Thesuccess of this device was however lost in the deluge ofdisasterAll the British air squadrons fought continuously theirprincipal effort being against the pontoon bridges in theSedan area Several of these were destroyed and othersdamaged in desperate and devoted attacks The losses inthe low-level attacks on the bridges from the German anti-aircraft artillery were cruel In one case of six aircraft onlyone returned from the successful task On this day alonewe lost a total of sixty-seven machines and being engagedprincipally with the enemyrsquos anti-aircraft forces accountedfor only fifty-three German aircraft That night thereremained in France of the Royal Air Force only 206serviceable aircraft out of 474This detailed information came only gradually to hand But itwas already clear that the continuance of fighting on thisscale would soon completely consume the British Air Forcein spite of its individual ascendancy The hard question ofhow much we could send from Britain without leaving


ourselves defenceless and thus losing the power tocontinue the war pressed itself henceforward upon us Ourown natural promptings and many weighty militaryarguments lent force to the incessant vehement Frenchappeals On the other hand there was a limit and that limitif transgressed would cost us our lifeAt this time all these issues were discussed by the wholeWar Cabinet which met several times a day Air ChiefMarshal Dowding at the head of our metropolitan fightercommand had declared to me that with twenty-fivesquadrons of fighters he could defend the island against thewhole might of the German Air Force but that with less hewould be overpowered This would have entailed not onlythe destruction of all our airfields and our air power but ofthe aircraft factories on which our whole future hung Mycolleagues and I were resolved to run all risks for the sakeof the battle up to that limit ndash and those risks were verygreat ndash but not to go beyond it no matter what theconsequences might beAbout half-past seven on the morning of the 15th I waswoken up with the news that M Reynaud was on thetelephone at my bedside He spoke in English andevidently under stress ldquoWe have been defeatedrdquo As I didnot immediately respond he said again ldquoWe are beaten wehave lost the battlerdquo I said ldquoSurely it canrsquot have happenedso soonrdquo But he replied ldquoThe front is broken near Sedanthey are pouring through in great numbers with tanks andarmoured carsrdquondash or words to that effect I then said ldquoAllexperience shows that the offensive will come to an endafter a while I remember the 21st of March 1918 After fiveor six days they have to halt for supplies and theopportunity for counterattack is presented I learned all thisat the time from the lips of Marshal Foch himselfrdquo Certainlythis was what we had always seen in the past and what we


ought to have seen now However the French Premiercame back to the sentence with which he had begun whichproved indeed only too true ldquoWe are defeated we havelost the battlerdquo I said I was willing to come over and have atalkOn this day the French Ninth Army Coraprsquos was in a stateof complete dissolution and its remnants were divided upbetween General Giraud of the Seventh French Army whotook over from Corap in the north and the headquarters ofthe Sixth French Army which was forming in the south Agap of some fifty miles had in fact been punched in theFrench line through which the vast mass of enemy armourwas pouring By the evening of the 15th German armouredcars were reported to be in Liart and Montcornet the lattersixty miles behind the original front The French First Armywas also pierced on a five-thousand yards front south ofLimal Farther north all attacks on the British were repulsedThe German attack and the retirement of the Frenchdivision on their right compelled the making of a Britishdefensive flank facing south The French Seventh Armyhad retreated into the Antwerp defences west of theScheldt and was being driven out of the islands ofWalcheren and South BevelandOn this day also the struggle in Holland came to an endOwing to the ldquoCease Firerdquo order given by the Dutch HighCommand at 11 AM only a very few Dutch troops couldbe evacuatedOf course this picture presented a general impression ofdefeat I had seen a good deal of this sort of thing in theprevious war and the idea of the line being broken evenon a broad front did not convey to my mind the appallingconsequences that now flowed from it Not having hadaccess to official information for so many years I did not


comprehend the violence of the revolution effected sincethe last war by the incursion of a mass of fast-movingheavy armour I knew about it but it had not altered myinward convictions as it should have done There wasnothing I could have done if it had I rang up GeneralGeorges who seemed quite cool and reported that thebreach at Sedan was being plugged A telegram fromGeneral Gamelin also stated that although the positionbetween Namur and Sedan was serious he viewed thesituation with calm I reported Reynaudrsquos message andother news to the Cabinet at 11 AM the Chiefs of Staffbeing presentOn the 16th the German spearheads stood along the lineLa Capelle-Vervins-Marle-Laon and the vanguards of theGerman Fourteenth Corps were in support at Montcornetand Neufchacircteatl-sur-Aisne The fall of Laon confirmed thepenetration of over sixty miles inward upon us from thefrontier near Sedan Under this threat and the ever-increasing pressure on their own front the First FrenchArmy and the British Expeditionary Force were ordered towithdraw in three stages to the Scheldt Although none ofthese details were available even to the War Office and noclear view could be formed of what was happening thegravity of the crisis was obvious I felt it imperative to go toParis that afternoon My colleagues accepted the fact that Imust go and said they would look after everything at home


We had to expect that the disastrous events on the frontwould bring new foes upon us Although there were noindications of a change in Italian policy the Minister ofShipping was given instructions to thin out the shipping inthe Mediterranean No more British ships were to comehomewards from Aden We had already diverted round theCape the first convoy carrying the Australian troops toEngland The Defence Committee were instructed toconsider action in the event of war with Italy particularlywith regard to Crete Schemes for evacuating civilians fromAden and Gibraltar were put into operation

At about 3 PM I flew to Paris in a Flamingo a Governmentpassenger plane of which there were three General Dill


Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff came with me andIsmayIt was a good machine very comfortable and makingabout a hundred and sixty miles an hour As it wasunarmed an escort was provided but we soared off into arain-cloud and reached Le Bourget in little more than anhour From the moment we got out of the Flamingo it wasobvious that the situation was incomparably worse than wehad imagined The officers who met us told General Ismaythat the Germans were expected in Paris in a few days atmost After hearing at the Embassy about the position Idrove to the Quai drsquoOrsay arriving at 530 orsquoclock I wasconducted into one of its fine rooms Reynaud was thereDaladier Minister of National Defence and War andGeneral Gamelin Everybody was standing At no time didwe sit down around a table Utter dejection was written onevery face In front of Gamelin on a studentrsquos easel was amap about two yards square with a black ink linepurporting to show the Allied front In this line there wasdrawn a small but sinister bulge at SedanThe Commander-in-Chief briefly explained what hadhappened North and south of Sedan on a front of fifty orsixty miles the Germans had broken through The Frencharmy in front of them was destroyed or scattered A heavyonrush of armoured vehicles was advancing with unheard-of speed toward Amiens and Arras with the intentionapparently of reaching the coast at Abbeville orthereabouts Alternatively they might make for ParisBehind the armour he said eight or ten German divisionsall motorised were driving onwards making flanks forthemselves as they advanced against the two disconnectedFrench armies on either side The General talked perhapsfive minutes without anyone saying a word When hestopped there was a considerable silence I then asked


ldquoWhere is the strategic reserverdquo and breaking into Frenchwhich I used indifferently (in every sense) ldquoOugrave est la massede manoeuvrerdquo General Gamelin turned to me and with ashake of the head and a shrug said ldquoAucunerdquoThere was another long pause Outside in the garden of theQuai drsquoOrsay clouds of smoke arose from large bonfiresand I saw from the window venerable officials pushingwheelbarrows of archives onto them Already therefore theevacuation of Paris was being preparedPast experience carries with its advantages the drawbackthat things never happen the same way again Otherwise Isuppose life would be too easy After all we had often hadour fronts broken before always we had been able to pullthings together and wear down the momentum of theassault But here were two new factors that I had neverexpected to have to face First the overrunning of thewhole of the communications and countryside by anirresistible incursion of the armoured vehicles and secondlyno strategic reserveldquoAucunerdquo I was dumbfounded Whatwere we to think of the great French Army and its highestchiefs It had never occurred to me that any commandershaving to defend five hundred miles of engaged front wouldhave left themselves unprovided with a mass ofmanoeuvre No one can defend with certainty so wide afront but when the enemy has committed himself to amajor thrust which breaks the line one can always haveone must always have a mass of divisions which marchesup in vehement counter-attack at the moment when the firstfury of the offensive has spent its forceWhat was the Maginot Line for It should have economisedtroops upon a large sector of the frontier not only offeringmany sally-ports for local counter-strokes but also enablinglarge forces to be held in reserve and this is the only way


these things can be done But now there was no reserve Iadmit this was one of the greatest surprises I have had inmy life Why had I not known more about it even though Ihad been so busy at the Admiralty Why had the BritishGovernment and the War Office above all not known moreabout it It was no excuse that the French High Commandwould not impart their dispositions to us or to Lord Gortexcept in vague outline We had a right to know We oughtto have insisted Both armies were fighting in the linetogether I went back again to the window and the curlingwreaths of smoke from the bonfires of the State documentsof the French Republic Still the old gentlemen werebringing up their wheelbarrows and industriously castingtheir contents into the flamesThere was a considerable conversation in changing groupsaround the principals of which M Reynaud has published adetailed record I am represented as urging that thereshould be no withdrawal of the Northern Armies that on thecontrary they should counter-attack Certainly this was mymood But here was no considered military opinion4 Itmust be remembered that this was the first realisation wehad of the magnitude of the disaster or of the apparentFrench despair We were not conducting the operationsand our army which was only a tenth of the troops on thefront was serving under the French command I and theBritish officers with me were staggered at the evidentconviction of the French Commander-in-Chief and leadingMinisters that all was lost and in anything that I said I wasreacting violently against this There is however no doubtthat they were quite right and that the most rapid retreat tothe south was imperative This soon became obvious to allPresently General Gamelin was speaking again He wasdiscussing whether forces should now be gathered to strike


at the flanks of the penetration or ldquoBulgerdquo as we calledsuch things later on Eight or nine divisions were beingwithdrawn from quiet parts of the front the Maginot Linethere were two or three armoured divisions which had notbeen engaged eight or nine more divisions were beingbrought from Africa and would arrive in the battle zoneduring the next fortnight or three weeks General Giraudhad been placed in command of the French army north ofthe gap The Germans would advance henceforwardthrough a corridor between two fronts on which warfare inthe fashion of 1917 and 1918 could be waged Perhaps theGermans could not maintain the corridor with its ever-increasing double flank guards to be built up and at thesame time nourish their armoured incursion Something inthis sense Gamelin seemed to say and all this was quitesound I was conscious however that it carried noconviction in this small but hitherto influential andresponsible company Presently I asked General Gamelinwhen and where he proposed to attack the flanks of theBulge His reply was ldquoInferiority of numbers inferiority ofequipment inferiority of methodrdquondashand then a hopelessshrug of the shoulders There was no argument there wasno need of argument And where were we British anywayhaving regard to our tiny contribution ndash ten divisions aftereight months of war and not even one modern tankdivision in actionThis was the last I saw of General Gamelin He was apatriotic well-meaning man and skilled in his professionand no doubt he has his tale to tell5

The burden of General Gamelinrsquos and indeed of all theFrench High Commandrsquos subsequent remarks was


insistence on their inferiority in the air and earnestentreaties for more squadrons of the Royal Air Forcebomber as well as fighter but chiefly the latter This prayerfor fighter support was destined to be repeated at everysubsequent conference until France fell In the course of hisappeal General Gamelin said that fighters were needed notonly to give cover to the French Army but also to stop theGerman tanks At this I said ldquoNo It is the business of theartillery to stop the tanks The business of the fighters is tocleanse the skies (nettoyer le ciel) over the battlerdquo It wasvital that our metropolitan fighter air force should not bedrawn out of Britain on any account Our existence turnedon this Nevertheless it was necessary to cut to the boneIn the morning before I started the Cabinet had given meauthority to move four more squadrons of fighters toFrance On our return to the Embassy and after talking itover with Dill I decided to ask sanction for the despatch ofsix more This would leave us with only the twenty-fivefighter squadrons at home and that was the final limit Itwas a rending decision either way I told General Ismay totelephone to London that the Cabinet should assemble atonce to consider an urgent telegram which would be sentover in the course of the next hour or so Ismay did this inHindustani having previously arranged for an Indian Armyofficer to be standing by in his office This was my telegram

9 PM 16th May 1940I shall be glad if the Cabinet could meet immediately

to consider following Situation grave in the last degreeFurious German thrust through Sedan finds Frencharmies ill-grouped many in north others in Alsace Atleast four days required to bring twenty divisions tocover Paris and strike at the flanks of the Bulge whichis now fifty kilometres wide

Three [German] armoured divisions with two or threeinfantry divisions have advanced through gap and large


masses hurrying forward behind them Two greatdangers therefore threaten First that BEF will belargely left in the air to make a difficult disengagementand retreat to the old line Secondly that the Germanthrust will wear down the French resistance before itcan be fully gathered

Orders given to defend Paris at all costs butarchives of the Quai drsquoOrsay already burning in thegarden I consider the next two three or four daysdecisive for Paris and probably for the French ArmyTherefore the question we must face is whether we cangive further aid in fighters above four squadrons forwhich the French are very grateful and whether alarger part of our long-range heavy bombers should beemployed tomorrow and the following nights upon theGerman masses crossing the Meuse and flowing intothe Bulge Even so results cannot be guaranteed butthe French resistance may be broken up as rapidly asthat of Poland unless this battle of the Bulge is won Ipersonally feel that we should send squadrons offighters demanded (ie six more) tomorrow andconcentrating all available French and British aviationdominate the air above the Bulge for the next two orthree days not for any local purpose but to give thelast chance to the French Army to rally its bravery andstrength It would not be good historically if theirrequests were denied and their ruin resulted Also nightbombardment by a strong force of heavy bombers canno doubt be arranged It looks as if the enemy was bynow fully extended both in the air and tanks We mustnot underrate the increasing difficulties of his advance ifstrongly counter-attacked I imagine that if all fails herewe could still shift what is left of our own air strikingforce to assist the BEF should it be forced towithdraw I again emphasise the mortal gravity of thehour and express my opinion as above Kindly informme what you will do Dill agrees I must have answer bymidnight in order to encourage the French Telephoneto Ismay at Embassy in Hindustani


The reply came at about 1130 The Cabinet said ldquoYesrdquo Iimmediately took Ismay off with me in a car to MReynaudrsquos flat We found it more or less in darkness Afteran interval M Reynaud emerged from his bedroom in hisdressing-gown and I told him the favourable news Tenfighter squadrons I then persuaded him to send for MDaladier who was duly summoned and brought to the flatto hear the decision of the British Cabinet In this way Ihoped to revive the spirits of our French friends as muchas our limited means allowed Daladier never spoke a wordHe rose slowly from his chair and wrung my hand I gotback to the Embassy about 2 AM and slept well thoughthe cannon fire in petty aeroplane raids made one roll overfrom time to time In the morning I flew home and in spiteof other preoccupations pressed on with construction of thesecond level of the new Government



3The Battle of France The Second

Week Weygand May 17 to May 24

The Battle Crisis Grows mdash The Local DefenceVolunteers mdash Reinforcements from the East mdashMy Telegrams to President Roosevelt of May 18and May 20 mdashGeneral Gamelinrsquos Final Order No12 May 19 mdashGeneral Weygand Appointed mdashFrench Cabinet Changes mdash First Orders to theLittle Ships May 20 mdashldquoOperation DynamordquomdashWeygand Tours the Front mdash Billotte Killed in aMotor Accident mdash French Failure to Grapple withGerman Armour mdash Ironsidersquos Report May 21 mdashParliament Votes Extraordinary Powers to theGovernment mdash My Second Visit to Paris mdashWeygandrsquos Plan mdash Peril of the Northern Armiesmdash Fighting Round Arras mdash Correspondence withM Reynaud mdash Sir John Dill Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff

THE WAR CABINET met at 10 AM on the 17th and I gavethem an account of my visit to Paris and of the situation sofar as I could measure itI said I had told the French that unless they made asupreme effort we should not be justified in accepting thegrave risk to the safety of our country that we were incurringby the despatch of the additional fighter squadrons toFrance I felt that the question of air reinforcements wasone of the gravest that a British Cabinet had ever had toface It was claimed that the German air losses had been


four or five times our own but I had been told that theFrench had only one-quarter of their fighter aircraft left Onthis day Gamelin thought the situation ldquolostrdquo and is reportedto have said ldquoI will guarantee the safety of Paris only fortoday tomorrow [the 18th] and the night followingrdquo InNorway it appeared that Narvik was likely to be captured byus at any moment but Lord Cork was informed that in thelight of the news from France no more reinforcements couldbe sent to himThe battle crisis grew hourly in intensity At the request ofGeneral Georges the British Army prolonged its defensiveflank by occupying points on the whole line from Douai toPeacuteronne thus attempting to cover Arras which was a roadcentre vital to any southward retreat That afternoon theGermans entered Brussels The next day they reachedCambrai passed St Quentin and brushed our smallparties out of Peacuteronne The French Seventh the Belgianthe British and the French First Army all continued theirwithdrawal to the Scheldt the British standing along theDendre for the day and forming the detachmentldquoPetreforcerdquo (a temporary grouping of various units underMajor General Petre) for the defence of ArrasAt midnight (May 18ndash19) Lord Gort was visited at hisheadquarters by General Billotte Neither the personality ofthis French general nor his proposals such as they wereinspired confidence in his allies From this moment thepossibility of a withdrawal to the coast began to presentitself to the British Commander-in-Chief In his despatchpublished in March 1941 he wrote ldquoThe picture was now[night of the 19th] no longer that of a line bent ortemporarily broken but of a besieged fortressrdquo


As the result of my visit to Paris and the Cabinetdiscussions I already found it necessary to pose a generalquestion to my colleagues

Prime Minister to LordPresident

17V40

I am very much obliged to you for undertaking toexamine tonight the consequences of the withdrawal ofthe French Government from Paris or the fall of thatcity as well as the problems which would arise if it werenecessary to withdraw the BEF from France eitheralong its communications or by the Belgian andChannel ports It is quite understood that in the firstinstance this report could be no more than anenumeration of the main considerations which ariseand which could thereafter be remitted to the Staffs Iam myself seeing the military authorities at 630

The swift fate of Holland was in all our minds Mr Eden hadalready proposed to the War Cabinet the formation of LocalDefence Volunteers and this plan was energeticallypressed All over the country in every town and villagebands of determined men came together armed withshotguns sporting rifles clubs and spears From this a vastorganisation was soon to spring But the need of Regularswas also vital

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay for COS

18V40


I cannot feel that we have enough trustworthy troopsin England in view of the very large numbers that maybe landed from air-carriers preceded by parachutists Ido not consider this danger is imminent at the presenttime as the great battle in France has yet to be decided

I wish the following moves to be considered with aview to immediate action

(1) The transports which brought the Aus-tralians to Suez should bring home eightbattalions of Regular infantry from Palestineproperly convoyed even at some risk bywhatever route is thought best I hope it will bepossible to use the Mediterranean

(2) The Australian fast convoy arrives early inJune with 14000 men

(3) These ships should be immediately filledwith eight battalions of Territorials and sent toIndia where they should pick up eight [more]Regular battalions The speed of this fast convoyshould be accelerated

2 Everything must be done to carry out therecommendations for the control of aliens put forwardby the Committee and minuted by me on anotherpaper Action should also be taken against Communistsand Fascists and very considerable numbers shouldbe put in protective or preventive internment includingthe leaders These measures must of course bebrought before the Cabinet before action

3 The Chiefs of Staff must consider whether itwould not be well to send only half of the so-calledArmoured Division to France One must always beprepared for the fact that the French may be offeredvery advantageous terms of peace and the wholeweight be thrown on us


I also thought it necessary with the approval of mycolleagues to send the following grave telegrams toPresident Roosevelt in order to show how seriously theinterests of the United States would be affected by theconquest and subjugation not only of France but of GreatBritain The Cabinet pondered over these drafts for a whilebut made no amendment

Former Naval Personto President Roosevelt

18V40

I do not need to tell you about the gravity of whathas happened We are determined to persevere to thevery end whatever the result of the great battle ragingin France may be We must expect in any case to beattacked here on the Dutch model before very long andwe hope to give a good account of ourselves But ifAmerican assistance is to play any part it must beavailable soon


20V40

Lothian has reported his conversation with you Iunderstand your difficulties but I am very sorry aboutthe destroyers If they were here in six weeks theywould play an invaluable part The battle in France isfull of danger to both sides Though we have takenheavy toll of the enemy in the air and are clawing downtwo or three to one of their planes they have still aformidable numerical superiority Our most vital need istherefore the delivery at the earliest possible date ofthe largest possible number of Curtiss P-40 fightersnow in course of delivery to your Army

With regard to the closing part of your talk withLothian our intention is whatever happens to fight onto the end in this island and provided we can get thehelp for which we ask we hope to run them very close


in the air battles in view of individual superiorityMembers of the present Administration would [be] likely[to] go down during this process should it resultadversely but in no conceivable circumstances will weconsent to surrender If members of the presentAdministration were finished and others came in toparley amid the ruins you must not be blind to the factthat the sole remaining bargaining counter withGermany would be the Fleet and if this country wasleft by the United States to its fate no one would havethe right to blame those then responsible if they madethe best terms they could for the surviving inhabitantsExcuse me Mr President putting this nightmarebluntly Evidently I could not answer for my successorswho in utter despair and helplessness might well haveto accommodate themselves to the German willHowever there is happily no need at present to dwellupon such ideas Once more thanking you for yourgood will hellip

Far-reaching changes were now made by M Reynaud inthe French Cabinet and High Command On the 18thMarshal Peacutetain was appointed Vice-President of theCouncil Reynaud himself transferring Daladier to ForeignAffairs took over the Ministry of National Defence and WarAt 7 PM on the 19th he appointed Weygand who had justarrived from the Levant to replace General Gamelin I hadknown Weygand when he was the right-hand man ofMarshal Foch and had admired his masterly intervention inthe Battle of Warsaw against the Bolshevik invasion ofPoland in August 1920 ndash an event decisive for Europe atthat time He was now seventy-three but was reported tobe efficient and vigorous in a very high degree GeneralGamelinrsquos final Order (No 12) dated 945 AM on May 19prescribed that the Northern Armies instead of letting


themselves be encircled must at all costs force their waysouthward to the Somme attacking the Panzer divisionswhich had cut their communications At the same time theSecond Army and the newly forming Sixth were to attacknorthward towards Meacuteziegraveres These decisions were soundIndeed an order for the general retreat of the NorthernArmies southward was already at least four days overdueOnce the gravity of the breach in the French centre atSedan was apparent the only hope for the Northern Armieslay in an immediate march to the Somme Instead underGeneral Billotte they had only made gradual and partialwithdrawals to the Scheldt and formed the defensive flankto the right Even now there might have been time for thesouthward marchThe confusion of the northern command the apparentparalysis of the First French Army and the uncertaintyabout what was happening had caused the War Cabinetextreme anxiety All our proceedings were quiet andcomposed but we had a united and decided opinionbehind which there was silent passion On the 19th wewere informed (430 PM) that Lord Gort was ldquoexamining apossible withdrawal towards Dunkirk if that were forcedupon himrdquo The CIGS (Ironside) could not accept thisproposal as like most of us he favoured the southwardmarch We therefore sent him to Lord Gort with instructionsto move the British Army in a southwesterly direction and toforce his way through all opposition in order to join up withthe French in the south and that the Belgians should beurged to conform to this movement or alternatively thatwe would evacuate as many of their troops as possiblefrom the Channel ports He was to be told that we wouldourselves inform the French Government of what had beenresolved At the same Cabinet we sent Dill to GeneralGeorgesrsquo Headquarters with which we had a direct


telephone He was to stay there for four days and tell us allhe could find out Contacts even with Lord Gort wereintermittent and difficult but it was reported that only fourdaysrsquo supplies and ammunition for one battle were available

At the morning War Cabinet of May 20 we again discussedthe situation of our Army Even on the assumption of asuccessful fighting retreat to the Somme I thought it likelythat considerable numbers might be cut off or driven backon the sea It is recorded in the minutes of the meetingldquoThe Prime Minister thought that as a precautionarymeasure the Admiralty should assemble a large number ofsmall vessels in readiness to proceed to ports and inlets onthe French coastrdquo On this the Admiralty acted immediatelyand with ever-increasing vigour as the days passed anddarkened Operational control had been delegated on the19th to Admiral Ramsay commanding at Dover whoseresources at that time comprised thirty-six personnelvessels of various sorts based on Southampton and DoverOn the afternoon of the 20th in consequence of the ordersfrom London the first conference of all concerned includingrepresentatives of the Shipping Ministry was held at Doverto consider ldquothe emergency evacuation across the Channelof very large forcesrdquo It was planned if necessary toevacuate from Calais Boulogne and Dunkirk at a rate often thousand men from each port every twenty-four hoursThirty craft of passenger-ferry type twelve naval driftersand six small coasters were provided as a first instalmentOn May 22 the Admiralty ordered forty Dutch skoots whichhad taken refuge with us to be requisitioned and mannedwith naval crews These were commissioned between May25 and May 27 From Harwich round to Weymouth sea-


transport officers were directed to list all suitable ships up toa thousand tons and a complete survey was made of allshipping in British harbours These plans for what wascalled ldquoOperation Dynamordquo proved the salvation of theArmy ten days later

The direction of the German thrust had now become moreobvious Armoured vehicles and mechanised divisionscontinued to pour through the gap towards Amiens andArras curling westward along the Somme towards the seaOn the night of the 20th they entered Abbeacuteville havingtraversed and cut the whole communications of theNorthern Armies These hideous fatal scythes encounteredlittle or no resistance once the front had been broken TheGerman tanks ndash the dreaded ldquochars allemandsrdquondash rangedfreely through the open country and aided and supplied bymechanised transport advanced thirty or forty miles a dayThey had passed through scores of towns and hundreds ofvillages without the slightest opposition their officerslooking out of the open cupolas and waving jauntily to theinhabitants Eye-witnesses spoke of crowds of Frenchprisoners marching along with them many still carryingtheir rifles which were from time to time collected andbroken under the tanks I was shocked by the utter failureto grapple with the German armour which with a fewthousand vehicles was compassing the entire destructionof mighty armies and by the swift collapse of all Frenchresistance once the fighting front had been pierced Thewhole German movement was proceeding along the mainroads at no point on which did they seem to be blockedAlready on the 17th I had asked the Chief of the Air StaffldquoIs there no possibility of finding out where a column of


enemy armoured vehicles harbours during the dark hoursand then bombing We are being ripped to pieces behindthe front by these wandering columnsrdquoI now telegraphed to Reynaud

21V40

Many congratulations upon appointing Weygand inwhom we have entire confidence here

It is not possible to stop columns of tanks frompiercing thin lines and penetrating deeply All ideas ofstopping holes and hemming in these intruders arevicious Principle should be on the contrary to punchholes Undue importance should not be attached to thearrival of a few tanks at any particular point What canthey do if they enter a town Towns should be held withriflemen and tank personnel should be fired uponshould they attempt to leave vehicles If they cannot getfood or drink or petrol they can only make a mess anddepart Where possible buildings should be blowndown upon them Every town with valuable cross-roadsshould be held in this fashion Secondly the tankcolumns in the open must be hunted down andattacked in the open country by numbers of smallmobile columns with a few cannon Their tracks mustbe wearing out and their energy must abate This is theone way to deal with the armoured intruders As for themain body which does not seem to be coming on veryquickly the only method is to drive in upon the flanksThe confusion of this battle can only be cleared bybeing aggravated so that it becomes a melee Theystrike at our communications we should strike at theirsI feel more confident than I did at the beginning of thebattle but all the armies must fight at the same timeand I hope the British will have a chance soon Aboveis only my personal view and I trust it will give nooffence if I state it to you

Every good wish


Weygandrsquos first act was to cancel Gamelinrsquos Instruction No12 It was not unnatural that he should wish to see thesituation in the north for himself and to make contact withthe commanders there Allowances must be made for ageneral who takes over the command in the crisis of alosing battle But now there was no time He should nothave left the summit of the remaining controls and havebecome involved in the delays and strains of personalmovement We may note in detail what followed On themorning of the 20th Weygand installed in Gamelinrsquos placemade arrangements to visit the Northern Armies on the21st After learning that the roads to the north were cut bythe Germans he decided to fly His plane was attackedand forced to land at Calais The hour appointed for hisconference at Ypres had to be altered to 3 PM on the 21stHere he met King Leopold and General Billotte Lord Gortwho had not been notified of time and place was notpresent and the only British officer in attendance wasAdmiral Keyes who was attached to the King and had nomilitary command The King described this conference asldquofour hours of confused talkingrdquo It discussed the co-ordination of the three armies the execution of theWeygand plan and if that failed the retirement of the Britishand French to the Lys and the Belgians to the Yser At 8 PM General Weygand had to leave Lord Gort did not arrivetill eight when he received an account of the proceedingsfrom General Billotte Weygand drove back to Calaisembarked on a submarine for Dieppe and returned toParis Billotte drove off in his car to deal with the crisis andwithin the hour was killed in a motor collision Thus all wasagain in suspense


On the 21st Ironside returned and reported that Lord Gorton receiving the Cabinet instructions had put the followingpoints to him(1) That the southward march would involve a rearguardaction from the Scheldt at the same time as an attack intoan area already strongly held by the enemy armoured andmobile formations During such a movement both flankswould have to be protected(2) That sustained offensive operations were difficult in viewof the administrative situation and(3) That neither the French First Army nor the Belgianswere likely to be able to conform to such a manoeuvre ifattemptedIronside added that confusion reigned in the French HighCommand in the north that General Billotte had failed tocarry out his duties of co-ordination for the past eight daysand appeared to have no plans that the BritishExpeditionary Force were in good heart and had so far hadonly about five hundred battle casualties He gave a vividdescription of the state of the roads crowded with refugeesscourged by the fire of German aircraft He had had a roughtime himselfTwo fearsome alternatives therefore presented themselvesto the War Cabinet The first the British Army at all costswith or without French and Belgian co-operation to cut itsway to the south and the Somme a task which Lord Gortdoubted its ability to perform the second to fall back onDunkirk and face a sea evacuation under hostile air attackwith the certainty of losing all the artillery and equipmentthen so scarce and precious Obviously great risks shouldbe run to achieve the first but there was no reason why allpossible precautions and preparations should not be taken


for the sea evacuation if the southern plan failed Iproposed to my colleagues that I should go to France tomeet Reynaud and Weygand and come to a decision Dillwas to meet me there from General Georgesrsquo Headquarters

This was the moment when my colleagues felt it right toobtain from Parliament the extraordinary powers for which abill had been prepared during the last few days Thismeasure would give the Government practically unlimitedpower over the life liberty and property of all His Majestyrsquossubjects in Great Britain In general terms of law the powersgranted by Parliament were absolute The Act was toldquoinclude power by Order in Council to make such DefenceRegulations making provision for requiring persons to placethemselves their services and their property at thedisposal of His Majesty as appear to him to be necessary orexpedient for securing the public safety the defence of theRealm the maintenance of public order or the efficientprosecution of any war in which His Majesty may beengaged or for maintaining supplies or services essentialto the life of the communityrdquoIn regard to persons the Minister of Labour wasempowered to direct anyone to perform any servicerequired The regulation giving him this power included afair wages clause which was inserted in the Act to regulatewage conditions Labour supply committees were to be setup in important centres The control of property in thewidest sense was imposed in equal manner Control of allestablishments including banks was imposed under theauthority of Government orders Employers could berequired to produce their books and excess profits were tobe taxed at 100 per cent A Production Council to be


presided over by Mr Greenwood was to be formed and aDirector of Labour Supply to be appointedThis bill was accordingly presented to Parliament on theafternoon of the 22d by Mr Chamberlain and Mr Attlee thelatter himself moving the second reading Both theCommons and the Lords with their immense Conservativemajorities passed it unanimously through all its stages in asingle afternoon and it received the Royal Assent that night

For Romans in Romersquos quarrelSpared neither land nor goldNor son nor wife nor limb nor lifeIn the brave days of old

Such was the temper of the hour

When I arrived in Paris on May 22 there was a new settingGamelin was gone Daladier was gone from the war sceneReynaud was both Prime Minister and Minister of War Asthe German thrust had definitely turned seaward Paris wasnot immediately threatened Grand Quartier Geacuteneacuteral (GQG) was still at Vincennes M Reynaud drove me downthere about noon In the garden some of those figures I hadseen round Gamelin ndash one a very tall cavalry officer ndash werepacing moodily up and down ldquoCrsquoest lrsquoancien reacutegimerdquoremarked the aide-de-camp Reynaud and I were broughtinto Weygandrsquos room and afterwards to the map roomwhere we had the great maps of the Supreme CommandWeygand met us In spite of his physical exertions and anight of travel he was brisk buoyant and incisive Hemade an excellent impression upon all He unfolded his


plan of war He was not content with a southward march orretreat for the Northern Armies They should strikesoutheast from around Cambrai and Arras in the generaldirection of St Quentin thus taking in flank the Germanarmoured divisions at present engaged in what he calledthe St Quentin-Amiens pocket Their rear he thoughtwould be protected by the Belgian Army which would coverthem towards the east and if necessary towards the northMeanwhile a new French army under General Fregraverecomposed of eighteen to twenty divisions drawn fromAlsace from the Maginot Line from Africa and from everyother quarter were to form a front along the Somme Theirleft hand would push forward through Amiens to Arras andthus by their utmost efforts establish contact with the armiesof the north The enemy armour must be kept underconstant pressure ldquoThe Panzer divisions must notrdquo saidWeygand ldquobe allowed to keep the initiativerdquo All necessaryorders had been given so far as it was possible to giveorders at all We were now told that General Billotte towhom he had imparted his whole plan had just been killedin the motor accident Dill and I were agreed that we had nochoice and indeed no inclination except to welcome theplan I emphasised that ldquoit was indispensable to reopencommunications between the armies of the north and thoseof the south by way of Arrasrdquo I explained that Lord Gortwhile striking southwest must also guard his path to thecoast To make sure there was no mistake about what wassettled I myself dictated a reacutesumeacute of the decisions andshowed it to Weygand who agreed I reported accordinglyto the Cabinet and sent the following telegram to Lord Gort

22V40I flew to Paris this morning with Dill and others The

conclusions which were reached between ReynaudWeygand and ourselves are summarised below They


accord exactly with general directions you havereceived from the War Office You have our bestwishes in the vital battle now opening towardsBapaume and Cambrai

It was agreed1 That the Belgian Army should withdraw to the line

of the Yser and stand there the sluices being opened2 That the British Army and the French First Army

should attack southwest towards Bapaume andCambrai at the earliest moment certainly tomorrow ndashwith about eight divisions ndash and with the BelgianCavalry Corps on the right of the British

3 That as this battle is vital to both armies and theBritish communications depend upon freeing Amiensthe British Air Force should give the utmost possiblehelp both by day and by night while it is going on

4 That the new French Army Group which isadvancing upon Amiens and forming a line along theSomme should strike northward and join hands with theBritish divisions who are attacking southward in thegeneral direction of Bapaume

It will be seen that Weygandrsquos new plan did not differexcept in emphasis from the cancelled Instruction No 12 ofGeneral Gamelin Nor was it out of harmony with thevehement opinion which the War Cabinet had expressedon the 19th The Northern Armies were to shoulder theirway southward by offensive action destroying if possiblethe armoured incursion They were to be met by a helpfulthrust through Amiens by the new French Army Groupunder General Fregravere This would be most important if itcame true In private I complained to M Reynaud that Gorthad been left entirely without orders for four consecutivedays Even since Weygand had assumed command threedays had been lost in taking decisions The change in theSupreme Command was right The resultant delay was evilI slept the night at the Embassy The air raids were trivialthe guns were noisy but one never heard a bomb Very


different indeed were the experiences of Paris from theordeal which London was soon to endure I had a keendesire to go to see my friend General Georges at hisheadquarters at Compiegravegne Our liaison officer with himBrigadier Swayne was with me for some time and gave methe picture of the French armies so far as he knew it whichwas only part of the way I was persuaded that it would bebetter not to intrude at this time when this vast andcomplicated operation was being attempted in the teeth ofevery form of administrative difficulty and frequentbreakdowns in communicationIn the absence of any supreme war direction events andthe enemy had taken control On the 17th Gort had begunto direct troops to the line Ruyaulcourt-Arleux and togarrison Arras and was constantly strengthening hissouthern flank The French Seventh Army less theSixteenth Corps which had suffered heavily in theWalcheren fighting had moved south to join the FirstFrench Army It had traversed the British rear withoutserious disturbance On the 20th Gort had informed bothGenerals Billotte and Blanchard that he proposed to attacksouthward from Arras on May 21 with two divisions and anarmoured brigade and Billotte had agreed to co-operatewith two French divisions from the First French Army Thisarmy of thirteen divisions was gathered in an oblong somenineteen miles by ten ndash Maulde-Valenciennes-Denain-Douai The enemy had crossed the Scheldt on the 20tharound Oudenarde and the three British corps which stillfaced east withdrew on the 23d to the defences we haderected in the winter along the Belgian frontier from whichthey had advanced so eagerly twelve days before On thisday the BEF were put on half rations The impression ofFrench helplessness derived from many sources led me toprotest to Reynaud



Prime Minister to MReynaud (Copy toLord Gort)

23V40

Communications of Northern Armies have been cutby strong enemy armoured forces Salvation of thesearmies can only be obtained by immediate execution ofWeygandrsquos plan I demand the issue to the Frenchcommanders in north and south and Belgian GHQ ofthe most stringent orders to carry this out and turndefeat into victory Time is vital as supplies are short

I reported this message to the War Cabinet when they metat 1130 AM pointing out that the whole success of theWeygand plan was dependent on the French taking theinitiative which they showed no signs of doing We metagain at 7 PM

And the next day

Prime Minister to MReynaud for GeneralWeygand

24V40

General Gort wires that co-ordination of northernfront is essential with armies of three different nationsHe says he cannot undertake this co-ordination as heis already fighting north and south and is threatened onhis lines of communications At the same time SirRoger Keyes tells me that up to 3 PM today (23d)Belgian Headquarters and King had received nodirective How does this agree with your statement thatBlanchard and Gort are main dans la main Appreciatefully difficulties of communication but feel no effectiveconcert of operations in northern area against whichenemy are concentrating Trust you will be able torectify this Gort further says that any advance by himmust be in the nature of sortie and that relief mustcome from south as he has not (repeat not) ammuni-


tion for serious attack Nevertheless we are instructinghim to persevere in carrying out your plan We have nothere even seen your own directive and have noknowledge of the details of your northern operationsWill you kindly have this sent through French Mission atearliest All good wishes

Some account of the small battle fought by the Britisharound Arras must be given here General Franklyn whocommanded intended to occupy the area Arras-Cambrai-Bapaume He had the 5th and 50th British Divisions andthe 1st Army Tank Brigade His plan was to attack with thisarmour and one brigade of each division the whole underGeneral Martel round the western and southern sides ofArras with an immediate objective on the river SenseacuteeThe French were to co-operate with two divisions on theeast to the Cambrai-Arras road The British divisionsconsisted of only two brigades each and the tanksnumbered sixty-five Mark I and eighteen Mark II all ofwhose tracks the life of which was short were wearing outThe attack began at 2 PM on May 21 and soon founditself engaged with much stronger opposition than wasexpected French support on the eastern flank did notmaterialise and on the western was limited to one lightmechanised division The enemy armour actually consistedof about four hundred tanks of the 7th and 8th GermanArmoured Divisions a general named Rommelcommanding the former


At first the attack prospered and four hundred prisonerswere taken but the line of the river Senseacutee was notreached and the German counter-attack in overwhelmingnumbers with full air support caused heavy casualties The12th Lancers presently reported strong enemy columnsmoving towards St Pol and threatening to turn the westernflank During the night the Army Tank Brigade the 13thBrigade of the 5th Division and the 151st Brigade of the50th Division gradually withdrew to the river Scarpe Herethree British brigades stood until the afternoon of the 22dand in this neighbourhood repulsed various attacks We stillheld Arras but the enemy gradually tended to swing roundtowards Beacutethune The French light mechanised divisionguarding our western flank was forced from Mont St Eloi


and the enemy tanks soon after approached Souchez By 7PM on the 23d the British eastern flank was under heavypressure and the enemy reaching Lens had encircled thewestern flank Thus the position was precarious We werehopelessly outnumbered beset by masses of armour andalmost surrounded At 10 PM General Franklyn informedGeneral Headquarters that unless his force was withdrawnduring the night its retirement would become impossibleHe was told that orders to withdraw had been sent himthree hours before The operation had some temporaryeffect on the enemy they recorded it at the time as ldquoheavyBritish counterattacks with armourrdquo which caused themconsiderable anxietyIn pursuance of the Weygand plan Gort proposed toGeneral Blanchard who now commanded the northerngroup that two British divisions one French division andthe French Cavalry Corps should attack southward betweenthe Canal du Nord and the Scheldt Canal Two Frenchdivisions had in fact twice previously reached the outskirtsof Cambrai but on each occasion they were bombed andwithdrew In all these days this was the only offensiveaction of the French First Army

In London we had no knowledge of the progress of thisforlorn attempt at Arras to break the encircling lineHowever during the 24th very reproachful telegramsarrived from Reynaud The shorter of his two messagestells the story

You wired me [he said] this morning that you hadinstructed General Gort to continue to carry out theWeygand plan General Weygand now informs methat according to a telegram from General Blanchardthe British Army had carried out on its own initiative a


retreat of twenty-five miles towards the ports at a timewhen our troops moving up from the south are gainingground towards the north where they were to meettheir allies

This action of the British Army is in direct oppositionto the formal orders renewed this morning by GeneralWeygand This retreat has naturally obliged GeneralWeygand to change all his arrangements and he iscompelled to give up the idea of closing the gap andrestoring a continuous front I need not lay any stressupon the gravity of the possible consequences

Up to this time General Weygand had been counting onGeneral Fregraverersquos army advancing northward on AmiensAlbert and Peacuteronne They had in fact made no noticeableprogress and were still forming and assembling Thefollowing are my replies to M Reynaud

25V40My telegram last night told you all we knew over

here and we have still heard nothing from Lord Gort tocontradict it But I must tell you that a staff officer hasreported to the War Office confirming the withdrawal ofthe two divisions from the Arras region which yourtelegram to me mentioned General Dill who should bewith Lord Gort has been told to send a staff officer byair at the earliest moment As soon as we know whathas happened I will report fully It is clear howeverthat the Northern Army is practically surrounded andthat all its communications are cut except throughDunkirk and Ostend

25V40We have every reason to believe that Gort is still

persevering in southward move All we know is that hehas been forced by the pressure on his western flankand to keep communication with Dunkirk for indispens-able supplies to place parts of two divisions betweenhimself and the increasing pressure of the Germanarmoured forces which in apparently irresistible


strength have successively captured Abbeacuteville andBoulogne are menacing Calais and Dunkirk and havetaken St Omer How can he move southward anddisengage his northern front unless he throws out thisshield on his right hand Nothing in the movements ofthe BEF of which we are aware can be any excusefor the abandonment of the strong pressure of yournorthward move across the Somme which we trust willdevelop

Secondly you complained of heavy materials beingmoved from Havre Only materials moved away weregas shells which it was indiscreet to leave Also someof the stores have been moved from the north to thesouth side of the river at Havre

Thirdly should I become aware that extremepressure of events has compelled any departure fromthe plan agreed I shall immediately inform you Dillwho was this morning wholly convinced that the solehope of any effective extrication of our Army lies in thesouthward move and in the active advance of GeneralFregravere is now with Gort You must understand thathaving waited for the southward move for a week afterit became obvious[ly necessary] we find ourselves nowripped from the coast by the mass of the enemyrsquosarmoured vehicles We therefore have no choice but tocontinue the southward move using such flank guardprotection to the westward as is necessary

General Spears will be with you tomorrow morningand it will probably be quickest to send him back whenthe position is clear

There was a very strong feeling in Cabinet and high militarycircles that the abilities and strategic knowledge of Sir JohnDill who had been since April 23 Vice-Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff should find their full scope in his appointmentas our principal Army adviser No one could doubt that his


professional standing was in many ways superior to that ofIronsideAs the adverse battle drew to its climax I and mycolleagues greatly desired that Sir John Dill should becomeCIGS We had also to choose a Commander-in-Chief forthe British Island if we were invaded Late at night on May25 Ironside Dill Ismay myself and one or two others inmy room at Admiralty House were trying to measure theposition General Ironside volunteered the proposal that heshould cease to be CIGS but declared himself quitewilling to command the British Home Armies Consideringthe unpromising task that such a command was at the timethought to involve this was a spirited and selfless offer Itherefore accepted General Ironsidersquos proposal and thehigh dignities and honours which were later conferred uponhim arose from my appreciation of his bearing at thismoment in our affairs Sir John Dill became CIGS on May27 The changes were generally judged appropriate for thetime being


4The March to the Sea May 24 to May 31

Review of the BattlemdashGeneral Halderrsquos Accountof Hitlerrsquos Personal Intervention mdash Halt of theGerman Armour mdash The Truth from the GermanStaff DiariesmdashA Separate Cause for the Halt atthe Decisive PointmdashThe Defence of Boulogne mdashThe Drama of Calais mdash The Consequences ofProlonged DefencemdashGort Abandons theWeygand PlanmdashHis Decision of May 25 mdash Fillingthe Belgian GapmdashWithdrawal of the British Armyto the Dunkirk BridgeheadsmdashExtrication of theFour British Divisions from LillemdashA Question tothe Chiefs of Staff mdash Their AnswermdashMy Messageto Lord Gort mdash And to Admiral KeyesmdashGeneralPownallrsquos Account of the Gort mdash BlanchardMeeting on the Morning of May 28 mdash Surrender ofthe Belgian Army May 28 mdash Decisive BattleFought by General Brooke and the Second CorpsMay 28 mdash Withdrawal to the BridgeheadmdashEscapeby Sea of Half the French First Army

WE MAY NOW REVIEW up to this point the course of thismemorable battleOnly Hitler was prepared to violate the neutrality of Belgiumand Holland Belgium would not invite the Allies in until shewas herself attacked Therefore the military initiative restedwith Hitler On May 10 he struck his blow The First ArmyGroup with the British in the centre instead of standing


behind their fortifications leaped forward into Belgium on avain because belated mission of rescue The French hadleft the gap opposite the Ardennes ill fortified and weaklyguarded An armoured inroad on a scale never known inwar broke the centre of the French line of armies and inforty-eight hours threatened to cut all the northern armiesalike from their southern communications and from the seaBy the 14th at the latest the French High Command shouldhave given imperative orders to these armies to make ageneral retreat at full speed accepting not only risks butheavy losses of material This issue was not faced in itsbrutal realism by General Gamelin The French commanderof the northern group Billotte was incapable of taking thenecessary decisions himself Confusion reigned throughoutthe armies of the threatened left wingAs the superior power of the enemy was felt they fell backAs the turning movement swung round their right theyformed a defensive flank If they had started back on the14th they could have been on their old line by the 17th andwould have had a good chance of fighting their way out Atleast three mortal days were lost From the 17th onwardsthe British War Cabinet saw clearly that an immediatefighting march southward would alone save the BritishArmy They were resolved to press their view upon theFrench Government and General Gamelin but their owncommander Lord Gort was doubtful whether it waspossible to disengage the fighting fronts and still more tobreak through at the same time On the 19th GeneralGamelin was dismissed and Weygand reigned in his steadGamelinrsquos ldquoInstruction No 12rdquo his last order though fivedays late was sound in principle and also in conformitywith the main conclusions of the British War Cabinet andChiefs of Staff The change in the supreme command orwant of command led to another three daysrsquo delay The


spirited plan which General Weygand proposed aftervisiting the northern armies was never more than a paperscheme In the main it was the Gamelin plan rendered stillmore hopeless by further delayIn the hideous dilemma which now presented itself weaccepted the Weygand plan and made loyal and persistentthough now ineffectual efforts to carry it out until the 25thwhen all the communications being cut our weak counter-attack being repulsed with the loss of Arras the Belgianfront being broken and King Leopold about to capitulate allhope of escape to the southward vanished There remainedonly the sea Could we reach it or must we be surroundedand broken up in the open field In any case the wholeartillery and equipment of our army irreplaceable for manymonths must be lost But what was that compared withsaving the army the nucleus and structure upon whichalone Britain could build her armies of the future LordGort who had from the 25th onwards felt that evacuationby sea was our only chance now proceeded to form abridgehead around Dunkirk and to fight his way into it withwhat strength remained All the discipline of the British andthe qualities of their commanders who included BrookeAlexander and Montgomery were to be needed Muchmore was to be needed All that man could do was doneWould it be enough

A much-disputed episode must now be examined GeneralHalder Chief of the German General Staff has declaredthat at this moment Hitler made his only effective directpersonal intervention in the battle He became according tothis authority ldquoalarmed about the armoured formationsbecause they were in considerable danger in a difficult


country honeycombed with canals without being able toattain any vital resultsrdquo He felt he could not sacrificearmoured formations uselessly as they were essential tothe second stage of the campaign He believed no doubtthat his air superiority would be sufficient to prevent a large-scale evacuation by sea He therefore according to Haldersent a message to him through Brauchitsch ordering ldquothearmoured formations to be stopped the points even takenbackrdquo Thus says Halder the way to Dunkirk was clearedfor the British Army At any rate we intercepted a Germanmessage sent in clear at 1142 AM on May 24 to the effectthat the attack on the line Dunkirk-Hazebrouck-Merville wasto be discontinued for the present Halder states that herefused on behalf of Supreme Army Headquarters tointerfere in the movement of Army Group Rundstedt whichhad clear orders to prevent the enemy from reaching thecoast The quicker and more complete the success herehe argued the easier it would be later to repair the loss ofsome tanks The next day he was ordered to go withBrauchitsch to a conferenceThe excited discussion finished with a definite order byHitler to which he added that he would ensure execution ofhis order by sending personal liaison officers to the frontKeitel was sent by plane to Army Group Rundstedt andother officers to the front command posts ldquoI have neverbeen ablerdquo says General Halder ldquoto figure how Hitlerconceived the idea of the useless endangering of thearmoured formations It is most likely that Keitel who wasfor a considerable time in Flanders in the First World Warhad originated these ideas by his talesrdquoOther German generals have told much the same storyand have even suggested that Hitlerrsquos order was inspired bya political motive to improve the chances of peace withEngland after France was beaten Authentic documentary


evidence has now come to light in the shape of the actualdiary of Rundstedtrsquos headquarters written at the time Thistells a different tale At midnight on the 23d orders camefrom Brauchitsch at OKH placing the Fourth Army underRundstedt for ldquothe last actrdquo of ldquothe encirclement battlerdquo Nextmorning Hitler visited Rundstedt who represented to himthat his armour which had come so far and so fast wasmuch reduced in strength and needed a pause wherein toreorganise and regain its balance for the final blow againstan enemy who his staff diary says was ldquofighting withextraordinary tenacityrdquo Moreover Rundstedt foresaw thepossibility of attacks on his widely dispersed forces fromnorth and south in fact the Weygand Plan which if it hadbeen feasible was the obvious Allied counter-stroke Hitlerldquoagreed entirelyrdquo that the attack east of Arras should becarried out by infantry and that the mobile formationsshould continue to hold the line Lens-Beacutethune-Aire-StOmer-Gravelines in order to intercept the enemy forcesunder pressure from Army Group B in the northeast Healso dwelt on the paramount necessity of conserving thearmoured forces for further operations However very earlyon the 25th a fresh directive was sent from Brauchitsch asthe Commander-in-Chief ordering the continuation of theadvance by the armour Rundstedt fortified by Hitlerrsquosverbal agreement would have none of it He did not passon the order to the Fourth Army Commander Kluge whowas told to continue to husband the Panzer divisions Klugeprotested at the delay but it was not till next day the 26ththat Rundstedt released them although even then heenjoined that Dunkirk was not yet itself to be directlyassaulted The diary records that the Fourth Army protestedat this restriction and its Chief of Staff telephoned on the27th ldquoThe picture in the Channel ports is as follows Bigships come up the quayside boards are put down and the


men crowd on the ships All material is left behind But weare not keen on finding these men newly equipped upagainst us laterrdquoIt is therefore certain that the armour was halted that thiswas done on the initiative not of Hitler but of RundstedtRundstedt no doubt had reasons for his view both in thecondition of the armour and in the general battle but heought to have obeyed the formal orders of the ArmyCommand or at least told them what Hitler had said inconversation There is general agreement among theGerman commanders that a great opportunity was lost

There was however a separate cause which affected themovements of the German armour at the decisive pointAfter reaching the sea at Abbeacuteville on the night of the 20ththe leading German armoured and motorised columns hadmoved northward along the coast by Etaples towardsBoulogne Calais and Dunkirk with the evident intention ofcutting off all escape by sea This region was lighted in mymind from the previous war when I had maintained themobile Marine Brigade operating from Dunkirk against theflanks and rear of the German armies marching on Paris Idid not therefore have to learn about the inundation systembetween Calais and Dunkirk or the significance of theGravelines waterline The sluices had already beenopened and with every day the floods were spreading thusgiving southerly protection to our line of retreat Thedefence of Boulogne but still more of Calais to the latesthour stood forth upon the confused scene and garrisonswere immediately sent there from England Boulogneisolated and attacked on May 22 was defended by twobattalions of the Guards and one of our few anti-tank


batteries with some French troops After thirty-six hoursrsquoresistance it was reported to be untenable and Iconsented to the remainder of the garrison including theFrench being taken off by sea This was effected by eightdestroyers on the night of May 23ndash24 with a loss of only twohundred men I regretted this decisionSome days earlier I had placed the conduct of the defenceof the Channel ports directly under the Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff with whom I was in constant touch I nowresolved that Calais should be fought to the death and thatno evacuation by sea could be allowed to the garrisonwhich consisted of one battalion of the Rifle Brigade one ofthe 60th Rifles the Queen Victoria Rifles and a battalion ofthe Royal Tank Regiment with twenty-one Light and twenty-seven Cruiser tanks and an equal number of Frenchmen Itwas painful thus to sacrifice these splendid trained Regulartroops of which we had so few for the doubtful advantageof gaining two or perhaps three days and the unknownuses that could be made of these days The Secretary ofState for War and the CIGS agreed to this hard measureThe telegrams and minutes tell the tale

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay for CIGS

23V40

Apart from the general order issued I trust last nightby Weygand for assuring the southward movement ofthe armies via Amiens it is imperative that a clear lineof supply should be opened up at the earliest momentto Gortrsquos army by Dunkirk Calais or Boulogne Gortcannot remain insensible to the peril in which he is nowplaced and he must detach even a division orwhatever lesser force is necessary to meet our forcepushing through from the coast If the regiment of


armoured vehicles including Cruiser tanks has actuallylanded at Calais this should improve the situation andshould encourage us to send the rest of the SecondBrigade of that Armoured Division in there This coastalarea must be cleaned up if the major operation ofwithdrawal is to have any chance The intruders behindthe line must be struck at and brought to bay Therefugees should be driven into the fields and parkedthere as proposed by General Weygand so that theroads can be kept clear Are you in touch with Gort bytelephone and telegraph and how long does it take tosend him a cyphered message Will you kindly tell oneof your staff officers to send a map to Downing Streetwith the position so far as it is known today of the nineBritish divisions Do not reply to this yourself

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay

24V40

I cannot understand the situation around Calais TheGermans are blocking all exits and our regiment oftanks is boxed up in the town because it cannot facethe field guns planted on the outskirts Yet I expect theforces achieving this are very modest Why then arethey not attacked Why does not Lord Gort attack themfrom the rear at the same time that we make a sortiefrom Calais Surely Gort can spare a brigade or two toclear his communications and to secure the suppliesvital to his army Here is a general with nine divisionsabout to be starved out and yet he cannot send a forceto clear his communications What else can be soimportant as this Where could a reserve be betteremployed

This force blockading Calais should be attacked atonce by Gort by the Canadians from Dunkirk and by asortie of our boxed-up tanks Apparently the Germanscan go anywhere and do anything and their tanks canact in twos and threes all over our rear and even whenthey are located they are not attacked Also our tanksrecoil before their field guns but our field guns do notlike to take on their tanks If their motorised artillery farfrom its base can block us why cannot we with the


artillery of a great army block them hellip The responsibili-ty for cleansing the communications with Calais andkeeping them open rests primarily with the BEF

This did less than justice to our troops But I print it as Iwrote it at the time


24V40

Vice Chief of the Naval Staff informs me that [an]order was sent at 2 AM to Calais saying thatevacuation was decided in principle but this is surelymadness The only effect of evacuating Calais wouldbe to transfer the forces now blocking it to DunkirkCalais must be held for many reasons but specially tohold the enemy on its front The Admiralty say they arepreparing twenty-four naval twelve-pounders whichwith SAP1 will pierce any tank Some of these will beready this evening

Prime Minister to CIGS

25V40

I must know at earliest why Gort gave up Arras andwhat actually he is doing with the rest of his army Is hestill persevering in Weygandrsquos plan or has he becomelargely stationary If the latter what do you considerthe probable course of events in the next few days andwhat course do you recommend Clearly he must notallow himself to be encircled without fighting a battleShould he [not] do this by fighting his way to the coastand destroying the armoured troops which standbetween him and the sea with overwhelming force ofartillery while covering himself and the Belgian frontwhich would also curl back by strong rearguardsTomorrow at latest this decision must be taken

It should surely be possible for Dill to fly home fromany aerodrome momentarily clear and RAF shouldsend a whole squadron to escort him


Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar and CIGS

25V40

Pray find out who was the officer responsible forsending the order to evacuate Calais yesterday and bywhom this very lukewarm telegram I saw this morningwas drafted in which mention is made of ldquofor the sakeof Allied solidarityrdquo This is not the way to encouragemen to fight to the end Are you sure there is no streakof defeatist opinion in the General Staff


25V40

Something like this should be said to the Brigadierdefending Calais Defence of Calais to the utmost is ofthe highest importance to our country and our Armynow First it occupies a large part of the enemyrsquosarmoured forces and keeps them from attacking ourline of communication Secondly it preserves a sally-port from which portions of the British Army may maketheir way home Lord Gort has already sent troops toyour aid and the Navy will do all possible to keep yousupplied The eyes of the Empire are upon the defenceof Calais and His Majestyrsquos Government are confidentthat you and your gallant regiment will perform anexploit worthy of the British name

This message was sent to Brigadier Nicholson at about 2 PM on May 25The final decision not to relieve the garrison was taken onthe evening of May 26 Till then the destroyers were heldready Eden and Ironside were with me at the AdmiraltyWe three came out from dinner and at 9 PM did the deedIt involved Edenrsquos own regiment in which he had longserved and fought in the previous struggle One has to eatand drink in war but I could not help feeling physically sickas we afterwards sat silent at the table


Here was the message to the BrigadierEvery hour you continue to exist is of the greatest

help to the BEF Government has therefore decidedyou must continue to fight Have greatest possibleadmiration for your splendid stand Evacuation will not(repeat not) take place and craft required for abovepurpose are to return to Dover Verity and Windsor tocover Commander minesweeping and his retirement

Calais was the crux Many other causes might haveprevented the deliverance of Dunkirk but it is certain thatthe three days gained by the defence of Calais enabled theGravelines waterline to be held and that without this evenin spite of Hitlerrsquos vacillations and Rundstedtrsquos orders allwould have been cut off and lost

Upon all this there now descended a simplifyingcatastrophe The Germans who had hitherto not pressedthe Belgian front severely on the 24th of May broke theBelgian line on either side of Courtrai which is but thirtymiles from Ostend and Dunkirk The King of the Belgianssoon considered the situation hopeless and preparedhimself for capitulationBy May 23 the First and Second Corps of the BritishExpeditionary Force withdrawn by stages from Belgiumwere back again on the frontier defences north and east ofLille which they had built for themselves during the winterThe German scythe-cut round our southern flank hadreached the sea and we had to shield ourselves from thisAs the facts forced themselves upon Gort and hisheadquarters troops had successfully been sent topositions along the canal line La Basseacutee-Beacutethune-Aire-StOmer-Watten These with elements of the French


Sixteenth Corps touched the sea at the Gravelineswaterline The British Third Corps was responsible in themain for this curled-in flank facing south There was nocontinuous line but only a series of defended ldquostopsrdquo at themain crossings some of which like St Omer and Wattenhad already fallen to the enemy The indispensable roadsnorthward from Cassel were threatened Gortrsquos reserveconsisted only of the two British divisions the 5th and 50thwhich had as we have seen just been so narrowlyextricated from their southerly counterattack made at Arrasin forlorn fulfilment of the Weygand plan At this date thetotal frontage of the BEF was about ninety mileseverywhere in close contact with the enemyTo the south of the BEF lay the First French Army havingtwo divisions in the frontier defences and the remaindercomprising eleven divisions in no good shape cramped inthe area north and east of Douai This army was underattack from the southeast claw of the German encirclementOn our left the Belgian Army was being driven back fromthe Lys Canal at many places and with their retirementnorthward a gap was developing north of MeninIn the evening of the 25th Lord Gort took a vital decisionHis orders still were to pursue the Weygand plan of asoutherly attack towards Cambrai in which the 5th and50th Divisions in conjunction with the French were to beemployed The promised French attack northward from theSomme showed no sign of reality The last defenders ofBoulogne had been evacuated Calais still held out Gortnow abandoned the Weygand plan There was in his viewno longer hope of a march to the south and to the SommeMoreover at the same time the crumbling of the Belgiandefence and the gap opening to the north created a newperil dominating in itself A captured order of the GermanSixth Army showed that one corps was to march


northwestward towards Ypres and another corps westwardtowards Wytschaete How could the Belgians withstand thisdouble thrustConfident in his military virtue and convinced of thecomplete breakdown of all control either by the British andFrench Governments or by the French Supreme CommandGort resolved to abandon the attack to the southward toplug the gap which a Belgian capitulation was about toopen in the north and to march to the sea At this momenthere was the only hope of saving anything from destructionor surrender At 6 PM he ordered the 5th and 50thDivisions to join the Second British Corps to fill theimpending Belgian gap He informed General Blanchardwho had succeeded Billotte in command of the First ArmyGroup of his action and this officer acknowledging theforce of events gave orders at 1130 PM for a withdrawalon the 26th to a line behind the Lys Canal west of Lille witha view to forming a bridgehead around DunkirkEarly on May 26 Gort and Blanchard drew up their plan forwithdrawal to the coast As the First French Army hadfarther to go the first movements of the BEF on the nightof May 2627 were to be preparatory and rearguards of theBritish First and Second Corps remained on the frontierdefences till the night of May 2728 In all this Lord Gort hadacted upon his own responsibility But by now we also athome with a somewhat different angle of information hadalready reached the same conclusions On the 26th atelegram from the War Office approved his conduct andauthorised him ldquoto operate towards the coast forthwith inconjunction with the French and Belgian armiesrdquo Theemergency gathering on a vast scale of naval vessels of allkinds and sizes was already in full swing


The reader must now look at the diagram which shows thegeneral areas held on the night of May 2526 by the Britishdivisions



On the western flank of the corridor to the sea the positionremained largely unchanged during the 26th The localitiesheld by the 48th and 44th Divisions came under relativelylittle pressure The 2d Division however had heavy fightingon the Aire and La Basseacutee Canals and they held theirground Farther to the east a strong German attackdeveloped around Carvin jointly defended by British andFrench troops The situation was restored by thecounterattack of two battalions of the 50th Division whichwere in bivouac close by On the left of the British line the5th Division with the 143d Brigade of the 48th Divisionunder command had travelled through the night and atdawn took over the defence of the Ypres-Comines Canal toclose the gap which had opened between the British andBelgian armies They were only just in time Soon after theyarrived the enemy attacked and the fighting was heavy allday Three battalions of the 1st Division in reserve weredrawn in The 50th Division after bivouacking south of Lillemoved northward to prolong the flank of the 5th Divisionaround Ypres The Belgian Army heavily attackedthroughout the day and with their right flank driven inreported that they had no forces with which to regain touchwith the British line and also that they were unable to fallback to the line of the Yser Canal in conformity with theBritish movementMeanwhile the organisation of the bridgeheads aroundDunkirk was proceeding The French were to hold fromGravelines to Bergues and the British thence along thecanal by Furnes to Nieuport and the sea The variousgroups and parties of all arms which were arriving fromboth directions were woven into this line Confirming theorders of the 26th Lord Gort received from the War Office atelegram despatched at 1 PM on the 27th telling him thathis task henceforward was ldquoto evacuate the maximum force


possiblerdquo I had informed M Reynaud the day before thatthe policy was to evacuate the British Expeditionary Forceand had requested him to issue corresponding orders Suchwas the breakdown in communications that at 2 PM on the27th the commander of the First French Army issued anorder to his corps ldquoLa bataille sera livreacutee sans esprit derecul sur la position de la LysrdquoFour British divisions and the whole of the First FrenchArmy were now in dire peril of being cut off around LilleThe two arms of the German encircling movement strove toclose the pincers upon them Although we had not in thosedays the admirable map rooms of more coherent periodsand although no control of the battle from London waspossible I had for three days past been harrowed by theposition of the mass of Allied troops around Lille includingour four fine divisions This however was one of those rarebut decisive moments when mechanical transport exercisesits rights When Gort gave the order all these four divisionscame back with surprising rapidity almost in a nightMeanwhile by fierce battles on either side of the corridorthe rest of the British army kept the path open to the seaThe pincer-claws which were delayed by the 2d Divisionand checked for three days by the 5th Division eventuallymet on the night of May 29 in a manner similar to the greatRussian operation round Stalingrad in 1942 The trap hadtaken two and a half days to close and in that time fourBritish divisions and a great part of the First French Armyexcept the Fifth Corps which was lost withdrew in goodorder through the gap in spite of the French having onlyhorse transport and in spite of the main road to Dunkirkbeing already cut and the secondary roads filled withretiring troops long trains of transport and many thousandsof refugees


The question about our ability to go on alone which I hadasked Mr Chamberlain to examine with other Ministers tendays before was now put formally by me to our militaryadvisers I drafted the reference purposely in terms whichwhile giving a lead left freedom to the Chiefs of Staff toexpress their view whatever it might be I knew beforehandthat they were absolutely determined but it is wise to havewritten records of such decisions I wished moreover to beable to assure Parliament that our resolve was backed byprofessional opinion Here it is with the answer

We have reviewed our report on ldquoBritish Strategy ina Certain Eventualityrdquo in the light of the following termsof reference remitted to us by the Prime Minister

ldquoIn the event of France being unable to continue inthe war and becoming neutral with the Germansholding their present position and the Belgian armybeing forced to capitulate after assisting the BritishExpeditionary Force to reach the coast in the event ofterms being offered to Britain which would place herentirely at the mercy of Germany through disarmamentcession of naval bases in the Orkneys etc what arethe prospects of our continuing the war alone againstGermany and probably Italy Can the Navy and the AirForce hold out reasonable hopes of preventing seriousinvasion and could the forces gathered in this islandcope with raids from the air involving detachments notgreater than ten thousand men it being observed thata prolongation of British resistance might be verydangerous for Germany engaged in holding down thegreater part of Europerdquo

2 Our conclusions are contained in the followingparagraphs

3 While our Air Force is in being our Navy and AirForce together should be able to prevent Germanycarrying out a serious seaborne invasion of this country


4 Supposing Germany gained complete airsuperiority we consider that the Navy could hold up aninvasion for a time but not for an indefinite period

5 If with our Navy unable to prevent it and our AirForce gone Germany attempted an invasion our coastand beach defences could not prevent German tanksand infantry getting a firm footing on our shores In thecircumstances envisaged above our land forces wouldbe insufficient to deal with a serious invasion

6 The crux of the matter is air superiority OnceGermany had attained this she might attempt tosubjugate this country by air attack alone

7 Germany could not gain complete air superiorityunless she could knock out our Air Force and theaircraft industries some vital portions of which areconcentrated at Coventry and Birmingham

8 Air attacks on the aircraft factories would be madeby day or by night We consider that we should be ableto inflict such casualties on the enemy by day as toprevent serious damage Whatever we do however byway of defensive measures ndash and we are pressing onwith these with all despatch ndash we cannot be sure ofprotecting the large industrial centres upon which ouraircraft industries depend from serious materialdamage by night attack The enemy would not have toemploy precision bombing to achieve this effect

9 Whether the attacks succeed in eliminating theaircraft industry depends not only on the materialdamage by bombs but on the moral effect on theworkpeople and their determination to carry on in theface of wholesale havoc and destruction

10 If therefore the enemy presses home nightattacks on our aircraft industry he is likely to achievesuch material and moral damage within the industrialarea concerned as to bring all work to a standstill

11 It must be remembered that numerically theGermans have a superiority of four to one Moreoverthe German aircraft factories are well dispersed andrelatively inaccessible

12 On the other hand so long as we have acounter-offensive bomber force we can carry outsimilar attacks on German industrial centres and by


moral and material effect bring a proportion of them toa standstill

13 To sum up our conclusion is that prima facieGermany has most of the cards but the real test iswhether the morale of our fighting personnel and civilpopulation will counterbalance the numerical andmaterial advantages which Germany enjoys Webelieve it will

This report which of course was written at the darkestmoment before the Dunkirk Deliverance was signed notonly by the three Chiefs of Staff Newall Pound andIronside but by the three Vice-Chiefs Dill Phillips andPeirse Reading it in after years I must admit that it wasgrave and grim But the War Cabinet and the few otherMinisters who saw it were all of one mind There was nodiscussion Heart and soul we were together

I now addressed myself to Lord Gort27V40

At this solemn moment I cannot help sending youmy good wishes No one can tell how it will go Butanything is better than being cooped up and starvedout I venture these few remarks First cannon ought tokill tanks and they may as well be lost doing that asany other way Second I feel very anxious aboutOstend till it is occupied by a brigade with artilleryThird very likely the enemy tanks attacking Calais aretired and anyhow busy on Calais A column directedupon Calais while it is still holding out might have agood chance Perhaps they will be less formidablewhen attacked themselves

2 It is now necessary to tell the Belgians I amsending following telegram to Keyes but your personalcontact with the King is desirable Keyes will help Weare asking them to sacrifice themselves for us


3 Presume [our] troops know they are cutting theirway home to Blighty Never was there such a spur forfighting We shall give you all that the Navy and AirForce can do Anthony Eden is with me now and joinshis good wishes to mine

[Enclosure]Prime Minister to Admiral KeyesImpart following to your friend [the King of the

Belgians] Presume he knows that British and Frenchare fighting their way to coast between Gravelines andOstend inclusive and that we propose to give fullestsupport from Navy and Air Force during hazardousembarkation What can we do for him Certainly wecannot serve Belgiumrsquos cause by being hemmed in andstarved out Our only hope is victory and England willnever quit the war whatever happens till Hitler is beat orwe cease to be a State Trust you will make sure heleaves with you by aeroplane before too late Shouldour operation prosper and we establish [an] effectivebridgehead we would try if desired to carry someBelgian divisions to France by sea Vitally importantBelgium should continue in war and safety [of] Kingrsquosperson essential

My telegram did not reach Admiral Keyes until after hisreturn to England on the 28th In consequence thisparticular message was not delivered to King Leopold Thefact is not however important because on the afternoon ofthe 27th between five and six orsquoclock Admiral Keyes spoketo me on the telephone The following passage is takenfrom his report

At about 5 PM on the 27th when the King told mehis Army had collapsed and he was asking for acessation of hostilities a cipher telegram was sent toGort and to the War Office by wireless The War Officereceived it at 554 PM I motored at once to La Panne


and telephoned to the Prime Minister The PrimeMinister was not at all surprised in view of the repeatedwarnings but he told me that I must make everyendeavour to persuade the King and Queen to come toEngland with me and dictated a message which hesaid I ought to have received that afternoon

27V40ldquoBelgian Embassy here assumes from Kingrsquos

decision to remain that he regards the war as lost andcontemplates separate peace

ldquoIt is in order to dissociate itself from this that theconstitutional Belgian Government has reassembled onforeign soil Even if present Belgian Army has to laydown its arms there are two hundred thousandBelgians of military age in France and greaterresources than Belgium had in 1914 on which to fightback By present decision the King is dividing the nationand delivering it into Hitlerrsquos protection Please conveythese considerations to the King and impress upon himthe disastrous consequences to the Allies and toBelgium of his present choicerdquo

I gave King Leopold the Prime Ministerrsquos messagebut he said that he had made up his mind that he muststay with his Army and peoplehellip

At home I issued the following general injunction

(Strictly confidential) 28V40In these dark days the Prime Minister would be

grateful if all his colleagues in the Government as wellas important officials would maintain a high morale intheir circles not minimising the gravity of events butshowing confidence in our ability and inflexible resolve


to continue the war till we have broken the will of theenemy to bring all Europe under his domination

No tolerance should be given to the idea that Francewill make a separate peace but whatever may happenon the Continent we cannot doubt our duty and weshall certainly use all our power to defend the Islandthe Empire and our Cause

During the morning of the 28th Lord Gort met GeneralBlanchard again I am indebted to General Pownall LordGortrsquos Chief of Staff for this record made by him at the time

Blanchardrsquos enthusiasm at the Cassel meeting hadevaporated when he visited us today He had noconstructive suggestions or plans We read to him thetelegram ordering us to proceed to the coast with aview to embarkation He was horrified And that wasstrange for what other reason did he think that he andGort had been ordered to form bridgeheads To whatelse could such a preliminary move lead We pointedout that we had both received similar instructionsregarding the bridgeheads What had happened nowwas that we had got from our Government the next andlogical step (which had no doubt been communicatedto the French Government) whereas he had receivedas yet no such corresponding order This pacified himsomewhat but by no means entirely Then we said thatwe too like him wanted to keep the British and theFirst French Army together in this their last phasePresumably therefore the First French Army wouldcontinue the retirement tonight keeping aligned withus Whereat he went completely off the deep end ndash itwas impossible he declared We explained to him asclearly as the human tongue can explain the factors inthe situation The threat from the Germans on ournortheastern flank would probably not develop instrength for the next twenty-four hours (though when itdid come it would be serious indeed) What was ofimmediate importance was the threat to our longsouthwestern flank There as he well knew advanceguards of German infantry divisions supported by


artillery had made attacks yesterday at various pointsThough the main points Wormhould CasselHazebrouck had held there had been some penetra-tion The Germans might be relied upon to press theseadvantages and we could be sure that the main bodiesof the divisions would soon deploy and force them-selves right across our line of withdrawal to the sea (awithdrawal which had been ordered for us if not forhim) There was therefore not a moment to be lost ingetting back from the Lys and we must get backtonight at least to the line Ypres-Poperinghe-Cassel Towait till tomorrow night was to give two days to theGermans to get behind us an act of madness Wethought it unlikely that we could get even thirty per centof our forces away even if we reached the sea manyindeed in forward positions would never reach it Buteven if we could only save a small proportion of highlytrained officers and men it would be something usefulto the continuance of the war Everything possible musttherefore be done and the one thing that was possibleif only in part was to get back some way tonighthellip

Then came a liaison officer from General Priouxnow commanding the First Army The liaison officer toldBlanchard that Prioux had decided that he could notwithdraw any farther tonight and therefore intended toremain in the quadrangle of canals whose northeasterncorner is Armentiegraveres and southwestern cornerBeacutethune This seemed to decide Blanchard againstwithdrawal We begged him for the sake of the FirstArmy and of the Allied cause to order Prioux to bringback at least some of his army in line with us Not all ofthem could be so tired or so far away that it wasimpossible For every man brought back there was atleast some chance of embarkation whereas every manwho remained behind would certainly be eaten up Whynot try then There was nothing to be gained by nottrying for those who did try there was at least somehope But there was no shaking him He declared thatevacuation from the beach was impossible ndash no doubtthe British Admiralty had arranged it for the BEF butthe French Marine would never be able to do it for


French soldiers It was therefore idle to try ndash the chancewasnrsquot worth the effort involved he agreed with Prioux

He then asked in terms whether it was thereforeGortrsquos intention to withdraw tonight to the line Ypres-Poperinghe-Cassel or not knowing that in doing soGort would be going without the French First Army Towhich Gort replied that he was going In the first placehe had been ordered to re-embark and to do sonecessitated immediate withdrawal To wait anothertwenty-four hours would mean that he would not beable to carry out his orders for the troops would be cutoff In the second place and apart from the formalaspect of obeying orders it was madness to leave thetroops forward in their present exposed positionsThere they would certainly be overwhelmed very soonFor these reasons therefore and with great regret itwas necessary for the BEF to withdraw even if theFirst French Army did not do sohellip



In the early hours of the 28th the Belgian Armysurrendered Lord Gort had intimation of this only one hourbefore the event but the collapse had been foreseen threedays earlier and in one fashion or another the gap wasplugged I announced this event to the House in far moremoderate terms than those M Reynaud had thought it rightto use

The House will be aware that the King of theBelgians yesterday sent a plenipotentiary to theGerman Command asking for a suspension of arms onthe Belgian front The British and French Governmentsinstructed their generals immediately to dissociatethemselves from this procedure and to persevere in theoperations in which they are now engaged Howeverthe German Command has agreed to the Belgianproposals and the Belgian Army ceased to resist theenemyrsquos will at four orsquoclock this morning

I have no intention of suggesting to the House thatwe should attempt at this moment to pass judgmentupon the action of the King of the Belgians in hiscapacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian ArmyThis army has fought very bravely and has bothsuffered and inflicted heavy losses The BelgianGovernment has dissociated itself from the action ofthe King and declaring itself to be the only legalGovernment of Belgium has formally announced itsresolve to continue the war at the side of the Allies

Concern was expressed by the French Government that myreference to King Leopoldrsquos action was in sharp contrast tothat of M Reynaud I thought it my duty when speaking inthe House on June 4 after a careful examination of thefuller facts then available and in justice not only to our


French Ally but also to the Belgian Government now inLondon to state the truth in plain terms

At the last moment when Belgium was alreadyinvaded King Leopold called upon us to come to hisaid and even at the last moment we came He and hisbrave efficient Army nearly half a million strongguarded our left flank and thus kept open our only lineof retreat to the sea Suddenly without prior consulta-tion with the least possible notice without the advice ofhis Ministers and upon his own personal act he sent aplenipotentiary to the German Command surrenderedhis Army and exposed our whole flank and means ofretreat

All this day of the 28th the escape of the British Army hungin the balance On the front from Comines to Ypres andthence to the sea facing east and attempting to fill theBelgian gap General Brooke and his Second Corps foughta magnificent battle For two days past the 5th Division hadheld Comines against all attacks but as the Belgianswithdrew northward and then capitulated the gap widenedbeyond repair The protection of the flank of the BEF wasnow their task First the 50th Division came in to prolongthe line then the 4th and 3d Divisions newly withdrawnfrom east of Lille hastened in motor transports to extendthe wall of the vital corridor that led to Dunkirk The Germanthrust between the British and Belgian armies was not to beprevented but its fatal consequence an inward turn acrossthe Yser which would have brought the enemy onto thebeaches behind our fighting troops was foreseen andeverywhere forestalledThe Germans sustained a bloody repulse Orders weregiven to the British artillery both field and medium to fire


off all their ammunition at the enemy and the tremendousfire did much to quell the German assault All the time onlyabout four miles behind Brookersquos struggling front vastmasses of transport and troops poured back into thedeveloping bridgehead of Dunkirk and were fitted withskilful improvisation into its defences Moreover within theperimeter itself the main east-west road was at one timecompletely blocked by vehicles and a one-way track wascleared only by bulldozers hurling them into the ditches oneither sideIn the afternoon of the 28th Gort ordered a generalwithdrawal to the bridgehead which now ran Gravelines-Bergues-Furnes-Nieuport On this front the British divisionsstood from right to left and from Bergues to the sea byNieuport in the following order 46th 42d 1st 50th 3dand 4th By the 29th a large part of the BEF had arrivedwithin the perimeter and by this time the naval measuresfor evacuation were beginning to attain their full effect OnMay 30 General Headquarters reported that all Britishdivisions or the remains of them had come inMore than half the First French Army found their way toDunkirk where the great majority were safely embarkedBut the line of retreat of at least five divisions was cut by theGerman pincer movement west of Lille On the 28th theyattempted to break out westward but in vain the enemyclosed in upon them from all sides All through the nextthree days the French in Lille fought on graduallycontracting fronts against increasing pressure until on theevening of the 31st short of food and with their ammunitionexhausted they were forced to surrender About fiftythousand men thus fell into German hands TheseFrenchmen under the gallant leadership of GeneralMolinieacute had for four critical days contained no less thanseven German divisions which otherwise could have joined


in the assaults on the Dunkirk perimeter This was asplendid contribution to the escape of their more fortunatecomrades and of the British Expeditionary Force

It was a severe experience for me bearing so heavy anover-all responsibility to watch during these days inflickering glimpses this drama in which control wasimpossible and intervention more likely to do harm thangood There is no doubt that by pressing in all loyalty theWeygand plan of retirement to the Somme as long as wedid our dangers already so grave were increased ButGortrsquos decision in which we speedily concurred toabandon the Weygand plan and march to the sea wasexecuted by him and his staff with masterly skill and willever be regarded as a brilliant episode in British militaryannals


5The Deliverance of Dunkirk May 26 to

June 4

ldquoHard and Heavy Tidingsrdquomdash A Demonstration ofMinisters mdashServiceof Intercession and Prayer mdashThe Gathering of the Little Ships mdash SevenHundred Vessels mdash Three Vital Factors mdash TheMosquito Armada mdash Bringing off the French mdashFinal Orders to Lord Gort mdash A Possible Conse-quence mdash Gort Transfers the Dunkirk Commandto Alexander mdash My Third Visit to Paris May 31 mdashGeneral Spears and Marshal Peacutetain mdash TheEvacuation Complete mdash My Statement toParliament June 4 mdashSignificance of the AirVictory mdash Britainrsquos Resolve

THERE WAS A SHORT SERVICE of intercession and prayerin Westminster Abbey The English are loth to expose theirfeelings but in my stall in the choir I could feel the pent-uppassionate emotion and also the fear of the congregationnot of death or wounds or material loss but of defeat andthe final ruin of Britain

It was Tuesday May 28 and I did not attend the Houseuntil that day week There was no advantage to be gainedby a further statement in the interval nor did Membersexpress a wish for one But everyone realised that the fateof our Army and perhaps much else might well be decided


by then ldquoThe Houserdquo I said ldquoshould prepare itself for hardand heavy tidings I have only to add that nothing whichmay happen in this battle can in any way relieve us of ourduty to defend the world cause to which we have vowedourselves nor should it destroy our confidence in our powerto make our way as on former occasions in our historythrough disaster and through grief to the ultimate defeat ofour enemiesrdquo I had not seen many of my colleaguesoutside the War Cabinet except individually since theformation of the Government and I thought it right to havea meeting in my room at the House of Commons of allMinisters of Cabinet rank other than the War CabinetMembers We were perhaps twenty-five round the table Idescribed the course of events and I showed them plainlywhere we were and all that was in the balance Then I saidquite casually and not treating it as a point of specialsignificance ldquoOf course whatever happens at Dunkirk weshall fight onrdquoThere occurred a demonstration which considering thecharacter of the gathering ndash twenty-five experiencedpoliticians and Parliament men who represented all thedifferent points of view whether right or wrong before thewar ndash surprised me Quite a number seemed to jump upfrom the table and come running to my chair shouting andpatting me on the back There is no doubt that had I at thisjuncture faltered at all in the leading of the nation I shouldhave been hurled out of office I was sure that everyMinister was ready to be killed quite soon and have all hisfamily and possessions destroyed rather than give in Inthis they represented the House of Commons and almostall the people It fell to me in these coming days andmonths to express their sentiments on suitable occasionsThis I was able to do because they were mine also There


was a white glow overpowering sublime which ranthrough our island from end to end

Accurate and excellent accounts have been written of theevacuation of the British and French armies from DunkirkEver since the 20th the gathering of shipping and smallcraft had been proceeding under the control of AdmiralRamsay who commanded at Dover On the evening of the26th (657 PM) an Admiralty signal put ldquoOperationDynamordquo into play and the first troops were brought homethat night After the loss of Boulogne and Calais only theremains of the port of Dunkirk and the open beaches nextto the Belgian frontier were in our hands At this time it wasthought that the most we could rescue was about 45000men in two days Early the next morning May 27emergency measures were taken to find additional smallcraft ldquofor a special requirementrdquo This was no less than thefull evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force It wasplain that large numbers of such craft would be required forwork on the beaches in addition to bigger ships whichcould load in Dunkirk Harbour On the suggestion of Mr HC Riggs of the Ministry of Shipping the various boatyardsfrom Teddington to Brightlingsea were searched byAdmiralty officers and yielded upwards of forty serviceablemotor-boats or launches which were assembled atSheerness on the following day At the same time lifeboatsfrom liners in the London docks tugs from the Thamesyachts fishing-craft lighters barges and pleasure-boats ndashanything that could be of use along the beaches ndash werecalled into service By the night of the 27th a great tide ofsmall vessels began to flow towards the sea first to ourChannel ports and thence to the beaches of Dunkirk andthe beloved Army


The Admiralty did not hesitate to give full rein to thespontaneous movement which swept the seafaringpopulation of our south and southeastern shores Everyonewho had a boat of any kind steam or sail put out forDunkirk and the preparations fortunately begun a weekearlier were now aided by the brilliant improvisation ofvolunteers on an amazing scale The numbers arriving onthe 29th were small but they were the forerunners of nearlyfour hundred small craft which from the 31st were destinedto play a vital part by ferrying from the beaches to the off-lying ships almost a hundred thousand men In these days Imissed the head of my Admiralty map room Captain Pimand one or two other familiar faces They had got hold of aDutch schuit which in four days brought off eight hundredsoldiers Altogether there came to the rescue of the Armyunder the ceaseless air bombardment of the enemy abouteight hundred and fifty vessels of which nearly sevenhundred were British and the rest Allied

Here is the official list in which ships not engaged inembarking troops are omitted


BRITISH SHIPS

ALLLIED SHIPS

Meanwhile ashore around Dunkirk the occupation of theperimeter was effected with precision The troops arrivedout of chaos and were formed in order along the defenceswhich even in two days had grown Those men who were inbest shape turned about to form the line Divisions like the2d and 5th which had suffered most were held in reserveon the beaches and were then embarked early In the firstinstance there were to be three corps on the front but bythe 29th with the French taking a greater share in the


defences two sufficed The enemy had closely followed thewithdrawal and hard fighting was incessant especially onthe flanks near Nieuport and Bergues As the evacuationwent on the steady decrease in the number of troops bothBritish and French was accompanied by a correspondingcontraction of the defence On the beaches among thesand dunes for three four or five days scores ofthousands of men dwelt under unrelenting air attackHitlerrsquos belief that the German Air Force would renderescape impossible and that therefore he should keep hisarmoured formations for the final stroke of the campaignwas a mistaken but not unreasonable view



Three factors falsified his expectations First the incessantair-bombing of the masses of troops along the seashore didthem very little harm The bombs plunged into the softsand which muffled their explosions In the early stagesafter a crashing air raid the troops were astonished to findthat hardly anybody had been killed or woundedEverywhere there had been explosions but scarcelyanyone was the worse A rocky shore would have producedfar more deadly results Presently the soldiers regarded theair attacks with contempt They crouched in the sand duneswith composure and growing hope Before them lay thegrey but not unfriendly sea Beyond the rescuing ships andndash HomeThe second factor which Hitler had not foreseen was theslaughter of his airmen British and German air quality wasput directly to the test By intense effort Fighter Commandmaintained successive patrols over the scene and foughtthe enemy at long odds Hour after hour they bit into theGerman fighter and bomber squadrons taking a heavy tollscattering them and driving them away Day after day thiswent on till the glorious victory of the Royal Air Force wasgained Wherever German aircraft were encounteredsometimes in forties and fifties they were instantlyattacked often by single squadrons or less and shot downin scores which presently added up into hundreds Thewhole Metropolitan Air Force our last sacred reserve wasused Sometimes the fighter pilots made four sorties a dayA clear result was obtained The superior enemy werebeaten or killed and for all their bravery mastered or evencowed This was a decisive clash Unhappily the troops onthe beaches saw very little of this epic conflict in the airoften miles away or above the clouds They knew nothingof the loss inflicted on the enemy All they felt was thebombs scourging the beaches cast by the foes who had


got through but did not perhaps return There was even abitter anger in the Army against the Air Force and some ofthe troops landing at Dover or at Thames ports in theirignorance insulted men in Air Force uniform They shouldhave clasped their hands but how could they know InParliament I took pains to spread the truthBut all the aid of the sand and all the prowess in the airwould have been vain without the sea The instructionsgiven ten or twelve days before had under the pressure andemotion of events borne amazing fruit Perfect disciplineprevailed ashore and afloat The sea was calm To and frobetween the shore and the ships plied the little boatsgathering the men from the beaches as they waded out orpicking them from the water with total indifference to the airbombardment which often claimed its victims Theirnumbers alone defied air attack The Mosquito Armada asa whole was unsinkable In the midst of our defeat glorycame to the island people united and unconquerable andthe tale of the Dunkirk beaches will shine in whateverrecords are preserved of our affairsNotwithstanding the valiant work of the small craft it mustnot be forgotten that the heaviest burden fell on the shipsplying from Dunkirk Harbour where two-thirds of the menwere embarked The destroyers played the predominantpart as the casualty lists show Nor must the great partplayed by the personnel ships with their mercantile crewsbe overlooked

The progress of the evacuation was watched with anxiouseyes and growing hope On the evening of the 27th LordGortrsquos position appeared critical to the Naval authoritiesand Captain Tennant RN from the Admiralty who had


assumed the duties of Senior Naval Officer at Dunkirksignalled for all available craft to be sent to the beachesimmediately as ldquoevacuation tomorrow night isproblematicalrdquo The picture presented was grim evendesperate Extreme efforts were made to meet the call anda cruiser eight destroyers and twenty-six other vesselswere sent The 28th was a day of tension which graduallyeased as the position on land was stabilised with thepowerful help of the Royal Air Force The naval plans werecarried through despite severe losses on the 29th whenthree destroyers and twenty-one other vessels were sunkand many others damagedThere was never any question of our leaving the Frenchbehind Here was my order before any request or complaintfrom the French was received

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar CIGS andGeneral Ismay

29V40

(Original to CIGS)It is essential that the French should share in such

evacuations from Dunkirk as may be possible Nor mustthey be dependent only upon their own shippingresources Arrangements must be concerted at oncewith the French Missions in this country or ifnecessary with the French Government so that noreproaches or as few as possible may arise It mightperhaps be well if we evacuated the two Frenchdivisions from Dunkirk and replaced them pro tem withour own troops thus simplifying the command But letme have the best proposals possible and advise mewhether there is any action I should take


Prime Minister toGeneral Spears (Paris)

29V40

Following for Reynaud for communication toWeygand and Georges

We have evacuated nearly 50000 from Dunkirk andbeaches and hope another 30000 tonight Front maybe beaten in at any time or piers beaches andshipping rendered unusable by air attack and also byartillery fire from the southwest No one can tell howlong present good flow will last or how much we cansave for future We wish French troops to share inevacuation to fullest possible extent and Admiraltyhave been instructed to aid French Marine as requiredWe do not know how many will be forced to capitulatebut we must share this loss together as best we canand above all bear it without reproaches arising frominevitable confusion stresses and strains

As soon as we have reorganised our evacuatedtroops and prepared forces necessary to safeguard ourlife against threatened and perhaps imminent invasionwe shall build up a new BEF from St Nazaire I ambringing Regulars from India and Palestine Australiansand Canadians are arriving soon At present we areremoving equipment south of Amiens beyond what isneeded for five divisions But this is only to get intoorder and meet impending shock and we shall shortlysend you new scheme for reinforcement of our troopsin France I send this in all comradeship Do nothesitate to speak frankly to me

On the 30th I held a meeting of the three Service Ministersand the Chiefs of Staff in the Admiralty War Room Weconsidered the events of the day on the Belgian coast Thetotal number of troops brought off had risen to 120000including only 6000 French 850 vessels of all kinds were atwork A message from Admiral Wake Walker at Dunkirk


said that in spite of intense bombardment and air attack4000 men had been embarked in the previous hour Healso thought that Dunkirk itself would probably be untenableby the next day I emphasised the urgent need of getting offmore French troops To fail to do so might do irreparableharm to the relations between ourselves and our ally I alsosaid that when the British strength was reduced to that of acorps we ought to tell Lord Gort to embark and return toEngland leaving a corps commander in charge The BritishArmy would have to stick it out as long as possible so thatthe evacuation of the French could continueKnowing well the character of Lord Gort I wrote out in myown hand the following order to him which was sentofficially by the War Office at 2 PM on the 30th

Continue to defend the present perimeter to theutmost in order to cover maximum evacuation nowproceeding well Report every three hours through LaPanne If we can still communicate we shall send youan order to return to England with such officers as youmay choose at the moment when we deem yourcommand so reduced that it can be handed over to acorps commander You should now nominate thiscommander If communications are broken you are tohand over and return as specified when your effectivefighting force does not exceed the equivalent of threedivisions This is in accordance with correct militaryprocedure and no personal discretion is left you in thematter On political grounds it would be a needlesstriumph to the enemy to capture you when only a smallforce remained under your orders The corpscommander chosen by you should be ordered to carryon the defence in conjunction with the French andevacuation whether from Dunkirk or the beaches butwhen in his judgment no further organised evacuationis possible and no further proportionate damage can beinflicted on the enemy he is authorised in consultation


with the senior French commander to capitulateformally to avoid useless slaughter

It is possible that this last message influenced other greatevents and the fortunes of another valiant commanderWhen I was at the White House at the end of December1941 I learned from the President and Mr Stimson of theapproaching fate of General MacArthur and the Americangarrison at Corregidor I thought it right to show them theway in which we had dealt with the position of aCommander-in-Chief whose force was reduced to a smallfraction of his original command The President and MrStimson both read the telegram with profound attentionand I was struck by the impression it seemed to make uponthem A little later in the day Mr Stimson came back andasked for a copy of it which I immediately gave him It maybe (for I do not know) that this influenced them in the rightdecision which they took in ordering General MacArthur tohand over his command to one of his subordinate generalsand thus saved for all his future glorious services the greatCommander who would otherwise have perished or passedthe war as a Japanese captive I should like to think thiswas true

On the 30th members of Lord Gortrsquos staff in conferencewith Admiral Ramsay at Dover informed him that daylighton June 1 was the latest time up to which the easternperimeter might be expected to hold Evacuation wastherefore pressed on with the utmost urgency to ensure sofar as possible that a British rearguard of no more than


about four thousand men would then remain ashore Laterit was found that this number would be insufficient todefend the final covering positions and it was decided tohold the British sector until midnight June 12 evacuationproceeding meanwhile on the basis of full equality betweenFrench and British forcesSuch was the situation when on the evening of May 31 LordGort in accordance with his orders handed over hiscommand to Major-General Alexander and returned toEngland

To avoid misunderstandings by keeping personal contact itwas necessary for me to fly to Paris on May 31 for ameeting of the Supreme War Council With me in the planecame Mr Attlee and Generals Dill and Ismay I also tookGeneral Spears who had flown over on the 30th with thelatest news from Paris This brilliant officer and Member ofParliament was a friend of mine from the First Great WarHalf French by birth liaison officer between the left of theFrench and the right of the British Armies he had taken meround the Vimy Ridge in 1916 and had made me friendswith General Fayolle who commanded the Thirty-ThirdFrench Corps Speaking French with a perfect accent andbearing five wound stripes on his sleeve he was apersonality at this moment fitted to our anxious relationsWhen Frenchmen and Englishmen are in trouble togetherand arguments break out the Frenchman is often volubleand vehement and the Englishman unresponsive or evenrude But Spears could say things to the high Frenchpersonnel with an ease and force which I have never seenequalled


This time we did not go to the Quai drsquoOrsay but to MReynaudrsquos room at the War Office in the Rue Saint-Dominique Attlee and I found Reynaud and Marshal Peacutetainopposite to us as the only French Ministers This was thefirst appearance of Peacutetain now Vice-President of theCouncil at any of our meetings He wore plain clothes OurAmbassador Dill Ismay and Spears were with us andWeygand and Darlan Captain de Margerie head ofReynaudrsquos private office and a M Baudouin of theSecretariat represented the FrenchThe first question was the position in Norway I said that theBritish Government was of the considered opinion that theNarvik area should be evacuated at once Our troops therethe destroyers involved and a hundred anti-aircraft gunswere badly wanted elsewhere We therefore proposed anevacuation beginning on June 2 The British Navy wouldtransport and repatriate the French forces the King ofNorway and any Norwegian troops who wished to comeReynaud said that the French Government agreed with thispolicy The destroyers would be urgently required in theMediterranean in the event of war with Italy The sixteenthousand men would be very valuable on the line of theAisne and the Somme This matter was therefore settledI then turned to Dunkirk The French seemed to have nomore idea of what was happening to the northern armiesthan we had about the main French front When I told themthat 165000 men of whom 15000 were French had beentaken off they were astonished They naturally drewattention to the marked British preponderance I explainedthat this was due largely to the fact that there had beenmany British administrative units in the back area who hadbeen able to embark before fighting troops could be sparedfrom the front Moreover the French up to the present had


had no orders to evacuate One of the chief reasons why Ihad come to Paris was to make sure that the same orderswere given to the French troops as to the British The threeBritish divisions now holding the centre would cover theevacuation of all the Allied forces That and the sea-transport would be the British contribution to offset theheavy Allied losses which must now be faced His MajestyrsquosGovernment had felt it necessary in the dire circumstancesto order Lord Gort to take off fighting men and leave thewounded behind If present hopes were confirmed 200000able-bodied troops might be got away This would bealmost a miracle Four days ago I would not have wageredon more than 50000 as a maximum I dwelt upon ourterrible losses in equipment Reynaud paid a handsometribute to the work of the British Navy and Air Force forwhich I thanked him We then spoke at some length uponwhat could be done to rebuild the British forces in FranceMeanwhile Admiral Darlan had drafted a telegram toAdmiral Abrial at Dunkirk

(1) A bridgehead shall be held round Dunkirk withthe divisions under your command and those underBritish command

(2) As soon as you arc convinced that no troopsoutside the bridgehead can make their way to thepoints of embarkation the troops holding thebridgehead shall withdraw and embark the Britishforces embarking first

I intervened at once to say that the British would notembark first but that the evacuation should proceed onequal terms between the British and the French ndashldquoBras-dessus bras-dessousrdquo The British would form therearguard This was agreedThe conversation next turned to Italy I expressed theBritish view that if Italy came in we should strike at her at


once in the most effective manner Many Italians wereopposed to war and all should be made to realise itsseverity I proposed that we should strike by air-bombing atthe northwestern industrial triangle enclosed by the threecities of Milan Turin and Genoa Reynaud agreed that theAllies must strike at once and Admiral Darlan said he had aplan ready for the naval and aerial bombardment of Italyrsquosoil supplies largely stored along the coast between thefrontier and Naples The necessary technical discussionswere arrangedI then mentioned my desire that more Ministers of theAdministration I had just formed should become acquaintedwith their French opposite numbers as soon as possibleFor instance I should like Mr Bevin the Minister of Labourand trade-union leader to visit Paris Mr Bevin wasshowing great energy and under his leadership the Britishworking class was now giving up holidays and privileges toa far greater extent than in the last war Reynaud cordiallyassentedAfter some talk about Tangier and the importance ofkeeping Spain out of the war I spoke on the generaloutlook I said

The Allies must maintain an unflinching front againstall their enemieshellip The United States had been rousedby recent events and even if they did not enter the warwould soon be prepared to give us powerful aid Aninvasion of England if it took place would have a stillmore profound effect on the United States England didnot fear invasion and would resist it most fiercely inevery village and hamlet It was only after her essentialneed of troops had been met that the balance of herarmed forces could be put at the disposal of her Frenchallyhellip I was absolutely convinced we had only to carryon the fight to conquer Even if one of us should bestruck down the other must not abandon the struggleThe British Government were prepared to wage war


from the New World if through some disaster Englandherself were laid waste If Germany defeated either allyor both she would give no mercy we should bereduced to the status of vassals and slaves forever Itwould be better far that the civilisation of WesternEurope with all its achievements should come to atragic but splendid end than that the two greatdemocracies should linger on stripped of all that madelife worth living

Mr Attlee then said that he entirely agreed with my viewThe British people now realise the danger with

which they are faced and know that in the event of aGerman victory everything they have built up will bedestroyed The Germans kill not only men but ideasOur people are resolved as never before in their history

Reynaud thanked us for what we had said He was surethat the morale of the German people was not up to thelevel of the momentary triumph of their army If Francecould hold the Somme with the help of Britain and ifAmerican industry came in to make good the disparity inarms then we could be sure of victory He was mostgrateful he said for my renewed assurance that if onecountry went under the other would not abandon thestruggleThe formal meeting then endedAfter we rose from the table some of the principals talkedtogether in the bay window in a somewhat differentatmosphere Chief among these was Marshal PeacutetainSpears was with me helping me out with my French andspeaking himself The young Frenchman Captain deMargerie had already spoken about fighting it out in AfricaBut Marshal Plainrsquos attitude detached and sombre gaveme the feeling that he would face a separate peace Theinfluence of his personality his reputation his serene


acceptance of the march of adverse events apart from anywords he used was almost overpowering to those underhis spell One of the Frenchmen I cannot remember whosaid in their polished way that a continuance of militaryreverses might in certain eventualities enforce amodification of foreign policy upon France Here Spearsrose to the occasion and addressing himself particularly toMarshal Peacutetain said in perfect French ldquoI suppose youunderstand M le Mareacutechal that that would meanblockaderdquo Someone else said ldquoThat would perhaps beinevitablerdquo But then Spears to Peacutetainrsquos face ldquoThat wouldnot only mean blockade but bombardment of all Frenchports in German handsrdquo I was glad to have this said I sangmy usual song we would fight on whatever happened orwhoever fell out

Again we had a night of petty raids and in the morning Ideparted Here was the information that awaited me on myreturn

Prime Minister toGeneral Weygand

1VI40

Crisis in evacuation now reached Five FighterSquadrons acting almost continuously is the most wecan do but six ships several filled with troops sunk bybombing this morning Artillery fire menacing onlypracticable channel Enemy closing in on reducedbridgehead By trying to hold on till tomorrow we maylose all By going tonight much may certainly be savedthough much will be lost Nothing like numbers ofeffective French troops you mention believed inbridgehead now and we doubt whether such largenumbers remain in area Situation cannot be fully


judged by Admiral Abrial in the fortress nor by you norby us here We have therefore ordered GeneralAlexander commanding British sector of bridgehead tojudge in consultation with Admiral Abrial whether to tryto stay over tomorrow or not Trust you will agree

May 31 and June 1 saw the climax though not the end atDunkirk On these two days over 132000 men were safelylanded in England nearly one-third of them having beenbrought from the beaches in small craft under fierce airattack and shell fire On June 1 from early dawn onward theenemy bombers made their greatest efforts often timedwhen our own fighters had withdrawn to refuel Theseattacks took heavy toll of the crowded shipping whichsuffered almost as much as in all the previous week Onthis single day our losses by air attack by mines E-boatsor other misadventure were thirty-one ships sunk andeleven damagedThe final phase was carried through with much skill andprecision For the first time it became possible to planahead instead of being forced to rely on hourlyimprovisations At dawn on June 2 about four thousandBritish with seven antiaircraft guns and twelve anti-tankguns remained with the considerable French forces holdingthe contracting perimeter of Dunkirk Evacuation was nowpossible only in darkness and Admiral Ramsay determinedto make a massed descent on the harbour that night withall his available resources Besides tugs and small craftforty-four ships were sent that evening from Englandincluding eleven destroyers and fourteen minesweepersForty French and Belgian vessels also participated Beforemidnight the British rearguard was embarkedThis was not however the end of the Dunkirk story Wehad been prepared to carry considerably greater numbersof French that night than had offered themselves The


result was that when our ships many of them still emptyhad to withdraw at dawn great numbers of French troopsmany still in contact with the enemy remained ashore Onemore effort had to be made Despite the exhaustion ofshipsrsquo companies after so many days without rest or respitethe call was answered On June 4 26175 Frenchmen werelanded in England over 21000 of them in British ships

BRITISH AND ALLIED TROOPS LANDED IN ENGLAND

Finally at 223 PM that day the Admiralty in agreementwith the French announced that ldquoOperation Dynamordquo wasnow completed

Parliament assembled on June 4 and it was my duty to laythe story fully before them both in public and later in secretsession The narrative requires only a few extracts from myspeech which is extant It was imperative to explain notonly to our own people but to the world that our resolve tofight on was based on serious grounds and was no meredespairing effort It was also right to lay bare my ownreasons for confidence


We must be very careful not to assign to thisdeliverance the attributes of a victory Wars are not wonby evacuations But there was a victory inside thisdeliverance which should be noted It was gained bythe Air Force Many of our soldiers coming back havenot seen the Air Force at work they saw only thebombers which escaped its protective attack Theyunderrate its achievements I have heard much talk ofthis that is why I go out of my way to say this I will tellyou about it

This was a great trial of strength between the Britishand German Air Forces Can you conceive a greaterobjective for the Germans in the air than to makeevacuation from these beaches impossible and to sinkall these ships which were displayed almost to theextent of thousands Could there have been anobjective of greater military importance and significancefor the whole purpose of the war than this They triedhard and they were beaten back they were frustratedin their task We got the Army away and they havepaid fourfold for any losses which they have inflictedhellipAll of our types and all our pilots have been vindicatedas superior to what they have at present to face


When we consider how much greater would be ouradvantage in defending the air above this islandagainst an overseas attack I must say that I find inthese facts a sure basis upon which practical andreassuring thoughts may rest I will pay my tribute tothese young airmen The great French Army was verylargely for the time being cast back and disturbed bythe onrush of a few thousands of armoured vehiclesMay it not also be that the cause of civilisation itself willbe defended by the skill and devotion of a fewthousand airmen

We are told that Herr Hitler has a plan for invadingthe British Isles This has often been thought of beforeWhen Napoleon lay at Boulogne for a year with his flat-bottomed boats and his Grand Army he was told bysomeone ldquoThere are bitter weeds in Englandrdquo Thereare certainly a great many more of them since theBritish Expeditionary Force returned

The whole question of Home Defence againstinvasion is of course powerfully affected by the factthat we have for the time being in this island incompa-rably stronger military forces than we have ever had atany moment in this war or the last But this will notcontinue We shall not be content with a defensive warWe have our duty to our Ally We have to reconstituteand build up the British Expeditionary Force onceagain under its gallant Commander-in-Chief Lord GortAll this is in train but in the interval we must put ourdefences in this island into such a high state oforganisation that the fewest possible numbers will berequired to give effective security and that the largestpossible potential of offensive effort may be realisedOn this we are now engaged

I ended in a passage which was to prove as will beseen a timely and important factor in United Statesdecisions

Even though large tracts of Europe and many old

and famous States have fallen or may fall into the gripof the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazirule we shall not flag or fail We shall go on to the endwe shall fight in France we shall fight in the seas and


oceans we shall fight with growing confidence andgrowing strength in the air we shall defend our islandwhatever the cost may be we shall fight on thebeaches we shall fight on the landing-grounds weshall fight in the fields and in the streets we shall fightin the hills we shall never surrender and even if whichI do not for a moment believe this island or a large partof it were subjugated and starving then our Empirebeyond the seas armed and guarded by the BritishFleet would carry on the struggle until in Godrsquos goodtime the New World with all its power and might stepsforth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old


6The Rush for the Spoils

Traditional British and Italian Friendship mdashAdvantages to Italy and Mussolini of Neutrality mdashMy Message to Mussolini on Becoming PrimeMinister mdash His Hard Response mdash Reynaudrsquos Visitto London of May 26 mdash France and Britain InvitePresident Roosevelt to Intervene mdash My TelegramConveying the Cabinet Decision of May 28 mdashPreparations to Strike at Italy Should She DeclareWar mdash Italy and Yugoslavia mdash The ItalianDeclaration of War mdash The Attack on the AlpineFront Stopped by the French Army mdash CianorsquosLetter to Me of December 23 1943 mdash PresidentRooseveltrsquos Denunciation of Italy mdash My Telegramto Him of June 11 mdash Anglo-Soviet Relations mdashMolotovrsquos Congratulations upon German Victoriesmdash Sir Stafford Cripps Appointed Ambassador toMoscow mdash My Letter to Stalin of June 25 1940 mdashThe Soviet Share of the Spoil

THE FRIENDSHIP between the British and Italian peoplessprang from the days of Garibaldi and Cavour Every stagein the liberation of Northern Italy from Austria and everystep towards Italian unity and independence hadcommanded the sympathies of Victorian Liberalism Thishad bred a warm and enduring response The declarationin the original Treaty of Triple Alliance between ItalyGermany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire stipulated thatin no circumstances should Italy be drawn into war with


Great Britain British influence had powerfully contributed tothe Italian accession to the Allied cause in the First WorldWar The rise of Mussolini and the establishment ofFascism as a counter to Bolshevism had in its early phasesdivided British opinion on party lines but had not affectedthe broad foundations of good will between the peoplesWe have seen that until Mussolinirsquos designs againstAbyssinia had raised grave issues he had ranged himselfwith Great Britain in opposition to Hitlerism and Germanambitions I have told in the previous volume the sad tale ofhow the Baldwin-Chamberlain policy about Abyssiniabrought us the worst of both worlds how we estranged theItalian dictator without breaking his power and how theLeague of Nations was injured without Abyssinia beingsaved We have also seen the earnest but futile effortsmade by Mr Chamberlain Sir Samuel Hoare and LordHalifax to win back during the period of appeasementMussolinirsquos lost favour And finally there was the growth ofMussolinirsquos conviction that Britainrsquos sun had set and thatItalyrsquos future could with German help be founded on theruins of the British Empire This had been followed by thecreation of the Berlin-Rome Axis in accordance with whichItaly might well have been expected to enter the waragainst Britain and France on its very first dayIt was certainly only common prudence for Mussolini to seehow the war would go before committing himself and hiscountry irrevocably The process of waiting was by nomeans unprofitable Italy was courted by both sides andgained much consideration for her interests manyprofitable contracts and time to improve her armamentsThus the twilight months had passed It is an interestingspeculation what the Italian fortunes would have been if thispolicy had been maintained The United States with itslarge Italian vote might well have made it clear to Hitler that


an attempt to rally Italy to his side by force of arms wouldraise the gravest issues Peace prosperity and growingpower would have been the prize of a persistent neutralityOnce Hitler was embroiled with Russia this happy statemight have been almost indefinitely prolonged with ever-growing benefits and Mussolini might have stood forth inthe peace or in the closing year of the war as the wiseststatesman the sunny peninsula and its industrious andprolific people had known This was a more agreeablesituation than that which in fact awaited himAt the time when I was Chancellor of the Exchequer underMr Baldwin in the years after 1924 I did what I could topreserve the traditional friendship between Italy and BritainI made a debt settlement with Count Volpi which contrastedvery favourably with the arrangements made with France Ireceived the warmest expressions of gratitude from theDuce and with difficulty escaped the highest decorationMoreover in the conflict between Fascism and Bolshevismthere was no doubt where my sympathies and convictionslay On the two occasions in 1927 when I met Mussolini ourpersonal relations had been intimate and easy I wouldnever have encouraged Britain to make a breach with himabout Abyssinia or roused the League of Nations againsthim unless we were prepared to go to war in the lastextreme He like Hitler understood and in a way respectedmy campaign for British rearmament though he was veryglad British public opinion did not support my viewIn the crisis we had now reached of the disastrous Battle ofFrance it was clearly my duty as Prime Minister to do myutmost to keep Italy out of the conflict and though I did notindulge in vain hopes I at once used what resources andinfluence I might possess Six days after becoming Head ofthe Government I wrote at the Cabinetrsquos desire the appeal


to Mussolini which together with his answer was publishedtwo years later in very different circumstances

Prime Minister toSignor Mussolini

16V40

Now that I have taken up my office as Prime Ministerand Minister of Defence I look back to our meetings inRome and feel a desire to speak words of good will toyou as Chief of the Italian nation across what seems tobe a swiftly widening gulf Is it too late to stop a river ofblood from flowing between the British and Italianpeoples We can no doubt inflict grievous injuries uponone another and maul each other cruelly and darkenthe Mediterranean with our strife If you so decree itmust be so but I declare that I have never been theenemy of Italian greatness nor ever at heart the foe ofthe Italian lawgiver It is idle to predict the course of thegreat battles now raging in Europe but I am sure thatwhatever may happen on the Continent England willgo on to the end even quite alone as we have donebefore and I believe with some assurance that we shallbe aided in increasing measure by the United Statesand indeed by all the Americas

I beg you to believe that it is in no spirit of weaknessor of fear that I make this solemn appeal which willremain on record Down the ages above all other callscomes the cry that the joint heirs of Latin and Christiancivilisation must not be ranged against one another inmortal strife Hearken to it I beseech you in all honourand respect before the dread signal is given It willnever be given by us

The response was hard It had at least the merit of candour

Signer Mussolini toPrime Minister

18V40


I reply to the message which you have sent me inorder to tell you that you are certainly aware of gravereasons of an historical and contingent character whichhave ranged our two countries in opposite campsWithout going back very far in time I remind you of theinitiative taken in 1935 by your Government to organiseat Geneva sanctions against Italy engaged in securingfor herself a small space in the African sun withoutcausing the slightest injury to your interests andterritories or those of others I remind you also of thereal and actual state of servitude in which Italy findsherself in her own sea If it was to honour yoursignature that your Government declared war onGermany you will understand that the same sense ofhonour and of respect for engagements assumed in theItalian-German Treaty guides Italian policy today andtomorrow in the face of any event whatsoever

From this moment we could have no doubt of Mussolinirsquosintention to enter the war at his most favourable momentHis resolve had in fact been made as soon as the defeat ofthe French armies was obvious On May 13 he had toldCiano that he would declare war on France and Britainwithin a month His official decision to declare war on anydate suitable after June 5 was imparted to the Italian Chiefsof Staff on May 29 At Hitlerrsquos request the date waspostponed to June 10

On May 26 while the fate of the Northern Armies hung inthe balance and no one could be sure that any wouldescape Reynaud flew over to England to have a talk withus about this topic which had not been absent from ourminds The Italian declaration of war must be expected atany moment Thus France would burn upon another frontand a new foe would march hungrily upon her in the SouthCould anything be done to buy off Mussolini That was the


question posed I did not think there was the slightestchance and every fact that the French Premier used as anargument for trying only made me surer there was no hopeHowever Reynaud was under strong pressure at homeand we on our side wished to give full consideration to ourAlly whose one vital weapon her Army was breaking inher hand M Reynaud has published a full account of hisvisit and especially of his conversations1 Lord Halifax MrChamberlain Mr Attlee and Mr Eden were also at ourmeetings Although there was no need to marshal thegrave facts M Reynaud dwelt not obscurely upon thepossible French withdrawal from the war He himself wouldfight on but there was always the possibility that he mightsoon be replaced by others of a different temperWe had already on May 25 at the instance of the FrenchGovernment made a joint request to President Roosevelt tointervene In this message Britain and France authorisedhim to state that we understood Italy had territorialgrievances against them in the Mediterranean that wewere disposed to consider at once any reasonable claimsthat the Allies would admit Italy to the Peace Conferencewith a status equal to that of any belligerent and that wewould invite the President to see that any agreementreached now would be carried out The President actedaccordingly but his addresses were repulsed by the Italiandictator in the most abrupt manner At our meeting withReynaud we had already this answer before us The FrenchPremier now suggested more precise proposals Obviouslyif these were to remedy Italyrsquos ldquostate of servitude in her ownseardquo they must affect the status both of Gibraltar and SuezFrance was prepared to make similar concessions aboutTunis


We were not able to show any favour to these ideas Thiswas not because it was wrong to examine them or becauseit did not seem worth while at this moment to pay a heavyprice to keep Italy out of the war My own feeling was that atthe pitch in which our affairs lay we had nothing to offerwhich Mussolini could not take for himself or be given byHitler if we were defeated One cannot easily make abargain at the last gasp Once we started negotiating forthe friendly mediation of the Duce we should destroy ourpower of fighting on I found my colleagues very stiff andtough All our minds ran much more on bombing Milan andTurin the moment Mussolini declared war and seeing howhe liked that Reynaud who did not at heart disagreeseemed convinced or at least content The most we couldpromise was to bring the matter before the Cabinet andsend a definite answer the next day Reynaud and Ilunched alone together at the Admiralty The followingtelegram the greater part of which is my own wordingembodies the conclusions of the War Cabinet

Prime Minister to MReynaud

28V40

I have with my colleagues examined with the mostcareful and sympathetic attention the proposal for anapproach by way of precise offer of concessions toSignor Mussolini that you have forwarded to me todayfully realising the terrible situation with which we areboth faced at this moment

2 Since we last discussed this matter the new factwhich has occurred namely the capitulation of theBelgian Army has greatly changed our position for theworse for it is evident that the chance of withdrawingthe armies of Generals Blanchard and Gort from theChannel ports has become very problematical The firsteffect of such a disaster must be to make it impossible


at such a moment for Germany to put forward anyterms likely to be acceptable and neither we nor youwould be prepared to give up our independence withoutfighting for it to the end

3 In the formula prepared last Sunday by LordHalifax it was suggested that if Signor Mussolini wouldco-operate with us in securing a settlement of allEuropean questions which would safeguard ourindependence and form the basis of a just and durablepeace for Europe we should be prepared to discuss hisclaims in the Mediterranean You now propose to addcertain specific offers which I cannot suppose wouldhave any chance of moving Signor Mussolini andwhich once made could not be subsequently with-drawn in order to induce him to undertake the rocircle ofmediator which the formula discussed on Sundaycontemplated

4 I and my colleagues believe that Signor Mussolinihas long had it in mind that he might eventually fill thisrocircle no doubt counting upon substantial advantages forItaly in the process But we are convinced that at thismoment when Hitler is flushed with victory andcertainly counts on early and complete collapse ofAllied resistance it would be impossible for SignorMussolini to put forward proposals for a conferencewith any success I may remind you also that thePresident of the USA has received a wholly negativereply to the proposal which we jointly asked him tomake and that no response has been made to theapproach which Lord Halifax made to the ItalianAmbassador here last Saturday

5 Therefore without excluding the possibility of anapproach to Signor Mussolini at some time we cannotfeel that this would be the right moment and I ambound to add that in my opinion the effect on themorale of our people which is now firm and resolutewould be extremely dangerous You yourself can bestjudge what would be the effect in France

6 You will ask then how is the situation to beimproved My reply is that by showing that after theloss of our two [Northern] armies and the support of ourBelgian ally we still have stout hearts and confidence in


ourselves we shall at once strengthen our hands innegotiations and draw the admiration and perhaps thematerial help of the USA Moreover we feel that aslong as we stand together our undefeated Navy andour Air Force which is daily destroying German fightersand bombers at a formidable rate afford us the meansof exercising in our common interest a continuouspressure upon Germanyrsquos internal life

7 We have reason to believe that the Germans tooare working to a time-table and that their losses andthe hardships imposed on them together with the fearof our air raids is undermining their courage It wouldindeed be a tragedy if by too hasty an acceptance ofdefeat we threw away a chance that was almost withinour grasp of securing an honourable issue from thestruggle

8 In my view if we both stand out we may yet saveourselves from the fate of Denmark or Poland Oursuccess must depend first on our unity then on ourcourage and endurance

This did not prevent the French Government from making afew days later a direct offer of their own to Italy of territorialconcessions which Mussolini treated with disdain ldquoHe wasnot interestedrdquo said Ciano to the French Ambassador onJune 3 ldquoin recovering any French territories by peacefulnegotiation He had decided to make war on Francerdquo2 Thiswas only what we had expected

I now gave daily a series of directions to make sure that ifwe were subjected to this odious attack by Mussolini weshould be able to strike back at once



28V40

Pray bring the following before the COS Commit-tee

What measures have been taken in the event ofItalyrsquos going to war to attack Italian forces in Abyssiniasending rifles and money to the Abyssinian insurgentsand generally to disturb that country

I understand General Smuts has sent a Unionbrigade to East Africa Is it there yet When will it beWhat other arrangements are made What is thestrength of the Khartoum garrison including troops inthe Blue Nile Province This is the opportunity for theAbyssinians to liberate themselves with Allied help

2 If France is still our ally after an Italian declarationof war it would appear extremely desirable that thecombined fleets acting from opposite ends of theMediterranean should pursue an active offensiveagainst Italy It is important that at the outset collisionshould take place both with the Italian Navy and AirForce in order that we can see what their quality reallyis and whether it has changed at all since the last warThe purely defensive strategy contemplated byCommander-in-Chiepound Mediterranean ought not to beaccepted Unless it is found that the fighting qualities ofthe Italians are high it will be much better that the Fleetat Alexandria should sally forth and run some risks thanthat it should remain in a posture so markedlydefensive Risks must be run at this juncture in alltheatres

3 I presume that the Admiralty have a plan in theevent of France becoming neutral

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay (andothers)

29V40

We must have eight battalions from Palestine homeat the earliest moment I regard the Mediterranean asclosed to troopships The choice is therefore between


the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf Let this alternativeroute [across the desert to the Gulf] be examined thisafternoon and Admiralty be consulted and report tome on relative times and safety The Australians can beleft in Palestine for the moment but the HighCommissioner like others must conform to thesupreme requirements of the State

Admiralty should say whether it would be possible topick these men up at the Cape in the big liners for extraspeed

Prime Minister to FirstLord of the Admiralty

30V40

What measures have been taken to seize all Italianships at the moment of war How many are there inBritish ports and what can be done about them on theseas or in foreign ports Will you kindly pass this to theproper Department immediately

At the Supreme War Council in Paris on May 31 which hasalready been described it was agreed that the Allies shouldundertake offensive operations against selected objectivesin Italy at the earliest possible moment and that the Frenchand British naval and air staffs should concert their plansWe had also agreed that in the event of Italian aggressionagainst Greece of which there were indications we shouldmake sure that Crete did not fall into enemy hands Ipursued the same theme in my minutes

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forAir and Chief of AirStaff

2VI40

It is of the utmost importance in view of the[possible] raids on Lyons and Marseilles that weshould be able to strike back with our heavy bombers at


Italy the moment she enters the war I considertherefore that these squadrons should be flown to theiraerodromes in Southern France at the earliest momentwhen French permission can be obtained and when theservicing units are ready for their reception

Pray let me know at our meeting tonight what youpropose

Prime Minister to S ofS for Air and CAS

6VI40

It is of the highest importance that we should strikeat Italy the moment war breaks out or an overbearingultimatum is received Please let me know the exactposition of the servicing units which are on their way tothe southern aerodromes in France

An early Italian plan favoured particularly by Ciano hadbeen that Italian action in Europe should be confined to thelaunching of an attack on Yugoslavia thus consolidatingItalyrsquos power in Eastern Europe and strengthening herpotential economic position Mussolini himself was for atime won over to this idea Graziani records that at the endof April the Duce told him ldquoWe must bring Yugoslavia toher knees we have need of raw materials and it is in hermines that we must find them In consequence my strategicdirective is ndash defensive in the west (France) and offensive inthe east (Yugoslavia) Prepare a study of the problemrdquo3Graziani claims that he advised strongly against committingthe Italian armies short as they were of equipmentparticularly of artillery to a repetition of the Isonzocampaign of 1915 There were also political argumentsagainst the Yugoslav plan The Germans were anxious atthis moment to avoid disturbing Eastern Europe Theyfeared it would provoke British action in the Balkans and


might inadvertently tempt Russia to further activity in theEast I was not aware of this aspect of Italian policy

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forForeign Affairs

6VI40

I have hitherto argued against going to war with Italybecause she attacked [ie if she were to attack]Yugoslavia and have wished to see whether it was aserious attack upon Yugoslavian independence ormerely taking some naval bases in the AdriaticHowever this situation has changed Italy is continuallythreatening to go to war with England and France andnot by ldquothe back doorrdquo We are so near a break withItaly on grounds which have nothing to do withYugoslavia that it would seem that our main aim mightwell be now to procure this Balkan mobilisation Willyou think this over

In spite of the extreme efforts made by the United States ofwhich Mr Hull has given an impressive account in hismemoirs4 nothing could turn Mussolini from his courseOur preparations to meet the new assault and complicationwere well advanced when the moment came On June 10at 445 PM the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs informedthe British Ambassador that Italy would consider herself atwar with the United Kingdom from 1 PM the next day Asimilar communication was made to the FrenchGovernment When Ciano delivered his note to the FrenchAmbassador M Franccedilois-Poncet remarked as he reachedthe door ldquoYou too will find the Germans are hard mastersrdquoThe British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine received the


announcement with perfect composure and apparentindifference He asked only one question Was Cianorsquosstatement early news or was it in fact the declaration ofwar Ciano replied it was the latter Loraine then made aformal bow and left the room without another word5 Fromhis balcony in Rome Mussolini announced to well-organisedcrowds that Italy was at war with France and Britain It wasas Ciano is said to have apologetically remarked later onldquoA chance which comes only once in five thousand yearsrdquoSuch chances though rare are not necessarily goodForthwith the Italians attacked the French troops on theAlpine front and Great Britain reciprocally declared war onItaly The five Italian ships detained at Gibraltar were seizedand orders were given to the Navy to intercept and bringinto controlled ports all Italian vessels at sea On the nightof the 12th our bomber squadrons after a long flight fromEngland which meant light loads dropped their first bombsupon Turin and Milan We looked forward however to amuch heavier delivery as soon as we could use the Frenchairfields at MarseillesIt may be convenient at this point to dispose of the briefFranco-Italian campaign The French could only musterthree divisions with fortress troops equivalent to three moreto meet invasion over the Alpine passes and along theRiviera coast by the western group of Italian armies Thesecomprised thirty-two divisions under Prince UmbertoMoreover strong German armour rapidly descending theRhone Valley soon began to traverse the French rearNevertheless the Italians were still confronted and evenpinned down at every point on the new front by the FrenchAlpine units even after Paris had fallen and Lyons was inGerman hands When on June 18 Hitler and Mussolini metat Munich the Duce had little cause to boast A new Italian


offensive was therefore launched on June 21 The FrenchAlpine positions however proved impregnable and themajor Italian effort towards Nice was halted in the suburbsof Mentone But although the French army on thesoutheastern borders saved its honour the German marchto the south behind them made further fighting impossibleand the conclusion of the armistice with Germany waslinked with a French request to Italy for the cessation ofhostilities

My account of this Italian tragedy may fittingly be closedhere by the letter which the unlucky Ciano wrote me shortlybefore his execution at the orders of his father-in-law

Verona December 23 1943Signer ChurchillYou will not be surprised that as I approach the hour

of my death I should turn to you whom I profoundlyadmire as the champion of a crusade though you did atone time make an unjust statement against me

I was never Mussolinirsquos accomplice in that crimeagainst our country and humanity that of fighting sideby side with the Germans Indeed the opposite is thetruth and if last August I vanished from Rome it wasbecause the Germans had convinced me that mychildren were in imminent danger After they hadpledged themselves to take me to Spain they deportedme and my family against my will to Bavaria Now Ihave been nearly three months in the prisons of Veronaabandoned to the barbarous treatment of the SS Myend is near and I have been told that in a few days mydeath will be decided which to me will be no more norless [than] a release from this daily martyrdom And Iprefer death to witnessing the shame and irreparabledamage of an Italy which has been under Hundomination


The crime which I am now about to expiate is that ofhaving witnessed and been disgusted by the coldcruel and cynical preparation for this war by Hitler andthe Germans I was the only foreigner to see at closequarters this loathsome clique of bandits preparing toplunge the world into a bloody war Now in accordancewith gangster rule they are planning to suppress adangerous witness But they have miscalculated foralready a long time ago I put a diary of mine andvarious documents in a safe place which will provemore than I myself could the crimes committed bythose people with whom later that tragic and vilepuppet Mussolini associated himself through his vanityand disregard of moral values

I have made arrangements that as soon as possibleafter my death these documents of the existence ofwhich Sir Percy Loraine was aware at the time of hisMission in Rome should be put at the disposal of theAllied Press

Perhaps what I am offering you today is but little butthat and my life are all I can offer to the cause of libertyand justice in the triumph of which I fanatically believe

This testimony of mine should be brought to light sothat the world may know may hate and may rememberand that those who will have to judge the future shouldnot be ignorant of the fact that the misfortune of Italywas not the fault of her people but due to the shamefulbehaviour of one man

Yours sincerelyG CLANO

A speech from President Roosevelt had been announcedfor the night of the 10th About midnight I listened to it witha group of officers in the Admiralty War Room where I stillworked When he uttered the scathing words about Italy


ldquoOn this tenth day of June 1940 the hand that held thedagger has struck it into the back of its neighborrdquo there wasa deep growl of satisfaction I wondered about the Italianvote in the approaching presidential election but I knewthat Roosevelt was a most experienced American partypolitician although never afraid to run risks for the sake ofhis resolves It was a magnificent speech instinct withpassion and carrying to us a message of hope While theimpression was strong upon me and before going to bed Iexpressed my gratitude


11VI40

We all listened to you last night and were fortified bythe grand scope of your declaration Your statementthat the material aid of the United States will be given tothe Allies in their struggle is a strong encouragement ina dark but not unhopeful hour Everything must bedone to keep France in the fight and to prevent anyidea of the fall of Paris should it occur becoming theoccasion of any kind of parley The hope with whichyou inspire them may give them the strength topersevere They should continue to defend every yardof their soil and use the full fighting force of their ArmyHitler thus baffled of quick results will turn upon usand we are preparing ourselves to resist his fury anddefend our island Having saved the BEF we do notlack troops at home and as soon as divisions can beequipped on the much higher scale needed forContinental service they will be despatched to FranceOur intention is to have a strong army fighting in Francefor the campaign of 1941 I have already cabled youabout aeroplanes including flying-boats which are soneedful to us in the impending struggle for the life ofGreat Britain But even more pressing is the need fordestroyers The Italian outrage makes it necessary forus to cope with a much larger number of submarines


which may come out into the Atlantic and perhaps bebased on Spanish ports To this the only counter isdestroyers Nothing is so important as for us to havethe thirty or forty old destroyers you have already hadreconditioned We can fit them very rapidly with ourAsdics and they will bridge the gap of six monthsbefore our wartime new construction comes into playWe will return them or their equivalents to you withoutfail at six monthsrsquo notice if at any time you need themThe next six months are vital If while we have to guardthe East Coast against invasion a new heavy German-Italian submarine attack is launched against ourcommerce the strain may be beyond our resourcesand the ocean traffic by which we live may bestrangled Not a day should be lost I send you myheartfelt thanks and those of my colleagues for all youare doing and seeking to do for what we may nowindeed call the Common Cause

The rush for the spoils had begun But Mussolini was notthe only hungry animal seeking prey To join the Jackalcame the BearI have recorded in the previous volume the course of Anglo-Soviet relations up till the outbreak of war and the hostilityverging upon an actual breach with Britain and Francewhich arose during the Russian invasion of FinlandGermany and Russia now worked together as closely astheir deep divergences of interest permitted Hitler andStalin had much in common as totalitarians and theirsystems of government were akin M Molotov beamed onthe German Ambassador Count Schulenburg on everyimportant occasion and was forward and fulsome in hisapproval of German policy and praise for Hitlerrsquos militarymeasures When the German assault had been made uponNorway he had said (April 7) that ldquothe Soviet Government


understood the measures which were forced uponGermany The English had certainly gone much too farThey had disregarded completely the rights of neutralnationshellip We wish Germany complete success in herdefensive measuresrdquo6 Hitler had taken pains to informStalin on the morning of May 10 of the onslaught he hadbegun upon France and the neutral Low Countries ldquoI calledon Molotovrdquo wrote Schulenburg ldquoHe appreciated the newsand added that he understood that Germany had to protectherself against Anglo-French attack He had no doubt of oursuccessrdquo7

Although these expressions of their opinion were of courseunknown till after the war we were under no illusions aboutthe Russian attitude We nonetheless pursued a patientpolicy of trying to re-establish relations of a confidentialcharacter with Russia trusting to the march of events andto their fundamental antagonisms to Germany It wasthought wise to use the abilities of Sir Stafford Cripps asAmbassador to Moscow He willingly accepted this bleakand unpromising task We did not at that time realisesufficiently that Soviet Communists hate extreme left-wingpoliticians even more than they do Tories or Liberals Thenearer a man is to Communism in sentiment the moreobnoxious he is to the Soviets unless he joins the partyThe Soviet Government agreed to receive Cripps asAmbassador and explained this step to their Naziconfederates ldquoThe Soviet Unionrdquo wrote Schulenburg toBerlin on May 29 ldquois interested in obtaining rubber and tinfrom England in exchange for lumber There is no reasonfor apprehension concerning Crippsrsquos mission since thereis no reason to doubt the loyal attitude of the Soviet Uniontowards us and since the unchanged direction of Sovietpolicy towards England precludes damage to Germany orvital German interests There are no indications of any kind


here for belief that the latest German successes causealarm or fear of Germany in the Soviet Governmentrdquo8

The collapse of France and the destruction of the Frencharmies and of all counter-poise in the West ought to haveproduced some reaction in Stalinrsquos mind but nothingseemed to warn the Soviet leaders of the gravity of theirown peril On June 18 when the French defeat was totalSchulenburg reported ldquoMolotov summoned me thisevening to his office and expressed the warmestcongratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendidsuccess of the German armed forcesrdquo9 This was almostexactly a year from the date when these same armedforces taking the Soviet Government by complete surprisefell upon Russia in cataracts of fire and steel We now knowthat only four months later in 1940 Hitler definitely decidedupon a war of extermination against the Soviets and beganthe long vast stealthy movement of these much-congratulated German armies to the East No recollectionof their miscalculation and former conduct ever preventedthe Soviet Government and its Communist agents andassociates all over the world from screaming for a SecondFront in which Britain whom they had consigned to ruinand servitude was to play a leading partHowever we comprehended the future more truly thanthese cold-blooded calculators and understood theirdangers and their interest better than they did themselves Inow addressed myself for the first time to Stalin

Prime Minister toMonsieur Stalin

25VI40

At this time when the face of Europe is changinghourly I should like to take the opportunity of your


receiving His Majestyrsquos new Ambassador to ask thelatter to convey to you a message from myself

Geographically our two countries lie at the oppositeextremities of Europe and from the point of view ofsystems of government it may be said that they standfor widely differing systems of political thought But Itrust that these facts need not prevent the relationsbetween our two countries in the international spherefrom being harmonious and mutually beneficial

In the past ndash indeed in the recent past ndash ourrelations have it must be acknowledged beenhampered by mutual suspicions and last August theSoviet Government decided that the interests of theSoviet Union required that they should break offnegotiations with us and enter into a close relation withGermany Thus Germany became your friend almost atthe same moment as she became our enemy

But since then a new factor has arisen which Iventure to think makes it desirable that both ourcountries should re-establish our previous contact sothat if necessary we may be able to consult together asregards those affairs in Europe which must necessarilyinterest us both At the present moment the problembefore all Europe ndash our two countries included ndash is howthe States and peoples of Europe are going to reacttowards the prospect of Germany establishing ahegemony over the Continent

The fact that both our countries lie not in Europe buton her extremities puts them in a special position Weare better enabled than others less fortunately placedto resist Germanyrsquos hegemony and as you know theBritish Government certainly intend to use theirgeographical position and their great resources to thisend

In fact Great Britainrsquos policy is concentrated on twoobjects ndash one to save herself from German dominationwhich the Nazi Government wishes to impose and theother to free the rest of Europe from the dominationwhich Germany is now in process of imposing on it

The Soviet Union is alone in a position to judgewhether Germanyrsquos present bid for the hegemony ofEurope threatens the interests of the Soviet Union and


if so how best these interests can be safeguarded But Ihave felt that the crisis through which Europe andindeed the world is passing is so grave as to warrantmy laying before you frankly the position as it presentsitself to the British Government This I hope willensure that in any discussion that the Soviet Govern-ment may have with Sir S Cripps there should be nomisunderstanding as to the policy of His MajestyrsquosGovernment or of their readiness to discuss fully withthe Soviet Government any of the vast problemscreated by Germanyrsquos present attempt to pursue inEurope a methodical process by successive stages ofconquest and absorption

There was of course no answer I did not expect one SirStafford Cripps reached Moscow safely and even had aninterview of a formal and frigid character with M Stalin

Meanwhile the Soviet Government was busy collecting itsspoils On June 14 the day Paris fell Moscow had sent anultimatum to Lithuania accusing her and the other BalticStates of military conspiracy against the USSR anddemanding radical changes of government and militaryconcessions On June 15 Red Army troops invaded thecountry and the President Smetona fled into East PrussiaLatvia and Estonia were exposed to the same treatmentPro-Soviet Governments must be set up forthwith andSoviet garrisons admitted into these small countriesResistance was out of the question The President of Latviawas deported to Russia and Mr Vyshinsky arrived tonominate a Provisional Government to manage newelections In Estonia the pattern was identical On June 19Zhdanov arrived in Tallinn to instal a similar regime OnAugust 36 the pretense of pro-Soviet friendly and


democratic Governments was swept away and the Kremlinannexed the Baltic States to the Soviet UnionThe Russian ultimatum to Rumania was delivered to theRumanian Minister in Moscow at 10 PM on June 26 Thecession of Bessarabia and the northern part of the provinceof Bukovina was demanded and an immediate replyrequested by the following day Germany though annoyedby this precipitate action of Russia which threatened hereconomic interests in Rumania was bound by the terms ofthe German-Soviet pact of August 1939 which recognisedthe exclusive political interest of Russia in these areas ofSoutheast Europe The German Government thereforecounselled Rumania to yield


7Back to France June 4 to June 12

High Morale of the ArmymdashMy First Thoughts andDirective June 2 1940 mdash The Lost Equipment mdashThe President General Marshall and MrStettiniusmdashAn Act of Faith mdash The DoubleTensions of JunemdashReconstitution of the BritishArmymdashIts Fearful Lack of Modern WeaponsmdashDecision to Send Our Only Two Well-ArmedDivisions to FrancemdashThe Battle of France FinalPhasemdashDestruction of the Fifty-First HighlandDivision June 1112 mdashldquoAuld Scotland Stands forSomething StillrdquomdashMy Fourth Visit to France BriaremdashWeygand and PeacutetainmdashGeneral GeorgesSummonedmdashMussolini Strikes mdash My Discussionwith WeygandmdashThe French Prevent the Royal AirForce from Bombing Milan and TurinmdashTheGermans Enter Paris mdash Renewed ConferenceNext MorningmdashAdmiral Darlanrsquos Promise mdashFarewell to GQG mdash Our Journey HomemdashMyReport to the War Cabinet of the Conference

WHEN IT WAS KNOWN how many men had been rescuedfrom Dunkirk a sense of deliverance spread in the islandand throughout the Empire There was a feeling of intenserelief melting almost into triumph The safe home-comingof a quarter of a million men the flower of our Army was amilestone in our pilgrimage through years of defeat Theachievement of the Southern Railway and the Movements


Branch of the War Office of the staffs at the ports in theThames Estuary and above all at Dover where over twohundred thousand men were handled and rapidlydistributed throughout the country is worthy of the highestpraise The troops returned with nothing but rifles andbayonets and a few hundred machine guns and wereforthwith sent to their homes for seven daysrsquo leave Theirjoy at being once again united with their families did notovercome a stern desire to engage the enemy at theearliest moment Those who had actually fought theGermans in the field had the belief that given a fair chancethey could beat them Their morale was high and theyrejoined their regiments and batteries with alacrityAll the Ministers and departmental officers permanent ornewly chosen acted with confidence and vigour night andday and there are many tales to be told besides this onePersonally I felt uplifted and my mind drew easily and freelyfrom the knowledge I had gathered in my life I wasexhilarated by the salvation of the Army I present for whatthey are worth the directives to the Departments andsubmissions to the War Cabinet which I issued day by dayIsmay carried them to the Chiefs of Staff and Bridges tothe War Cabinet and the Departments Mistakes werecorrected and gaps filled Amendments and improvementswere often made but in the main to the degree perhaps ofninety per cent action was taken and with a speed andeffectiveness which no dictatorship could rivalHere were my first thoughts at the moment when it becamecertain that the Army had escaped


2VI40


Notes for COS etc by the Minister of DefenceThe successful evacuation of the BEF has

revolutionised the Home Defence position As soon asthe BEF units can be reformed on a Home Defencebasis we have a mass of trained troops in the countrywhich would require a raid to be executed on aprohibitively large scale Even 200000 men would notbe beyond our compass The difficulties of a descentand its risks and losses increase with every addition tothe first 10000 We must at once take a new view ofthe situation Certain questions must be consideredchiefly by the War Office but also by the Joint Staffs

1 What is the shortest time in which the BEF canbe given a new fighting value

2 Upon what scheme would they be organised Willit be for service at Home in the first instance and onlysecondarily despatch to France On the whole I preferthis

3 The BEF in France must immediately bereconstituted otherwise the French will not continue inthe war Even if Paris is lost they must be adjured tocontinue a gigantic guerrilla A scheme should beconsidered for a bridgehead and area of disembarka-tion in Brittany where a large army can be developedWe must have plans worked out which will show theFrench that there is a way through if they will only besteadfast

4 As soon as the BEF is reconstituted for HomeDefence three divisions should be sent to join our twodivisions south of the Somme or wherever the Frenchleft may be by then It is for consideration whether theCanadian Division should not go at once Pray let mehave a scheme

5 Had we known a week ago what we now knowabout the Dunkirk evacuation Narvik would havepresented itself in a different light Even now thequestion of maintaining a garrison there for someweeks on a self-contained basis should be reconsid-ered I am deeply impressed with the vice and peril ofchopping and changing The letter of the Minister ofEconomic Warfare as well as the telegram of some


days ago from the C-in-C must however receive onefinal weighing

6 Ask Admiralty to supply a latest return of the stateof the destroyer flotillas showing what reinforcementshave arrived or are expected within the month of Juneand how many will come from repair

7 It should now be possible to allow the eightRegular battalions in Palestine to be relieved by theeight native battalions from India before they arebrought home as brought home they must be toconstitute the cadres of the new BEF

8 As soon as the Australians land the big shipsshould be turned round and should carry eight or tenTerritorial battalions to Bombay They should bring backa second eight Regular battalions from India andafterwards carry to India a second eight or tenTerritorial battalions from England It is for considera-tion how far the same principle should be applied tobatteries in India

9 Our losses in equipment must be expected todelay the fruition of our expansion of the BEF fromthe twenty divisions formerly aimed at by Z l + 12months to no more than fifteen divisions by Z + 18 butwe must have a project to put before the French Theessence of this should be the armoured division the51st the Canadians and two Territorial divisions underLord Gort by mid-July and the augmenting of this forceby six divisions formed from the twenty-four Regularbattalions in conjunction with Territorials a secondCanadian division an Australian division and twoTerritorial divisions by Z + 18 Perhaps we may even beable to improve on this

10 It is of the highest urgency to have at least half adozen Brigade groups formed from the Regulars of theBEF for Home Defence

11 What air co-operation is arranged to cover thefinal evacuation tonight It ought to be possible toreduce the pressure on the rearguard at this criticalmoment

I close with a general observation As I havepersonally felt less afraid of a German attempt at


invasion than of the piercing of the French line on theSomme or Aisne and the fall of Paris I have naturallybelieved the Germans would choose the latter Thisprobability is greatly increased by the fact that they willrealise that the armed forces in Great Britain are nowfar stronger than they have ever been and that theirraiding parties would not have to meet half-trainedformations but the men whose mettle they havealready tested and from whom they have recoiled notdaring seriously to molest their departure The next fewdays before the BEF or any substantial portion of itcan be reorganised must be considered as still critical

There was of course a darker side to Dunkirk We had lostthe whole equipment of the Army to which all the firstfruitsof our factories had hitherto been given

7000 tons of ammunition90000 rifles

2300 Guns120000 vehicles

8000 Bren guns400 anti-tank rifles

Many months must elapse even if the existing programmeswere fulfilled without interruption by the enemy before thisloss could be repairedHowever across the Atlantic in the United States strongemotions were already stirring in the breasts of its leadingmen A precise and excellent account of these events isgiven by Mr Stettinius2 the worthy son of my old Munitionscolleague of the First World War one of our truest friends


It was at once realised that the bulk of the British Army hadgot away only with the loss of all their equipment As earlyas June 1 the President sent out orders to the War andNavy Departments to report what weapons they couldspare for Britain and France At the head of the AmericanArmy as Chief of Staff was General Marshall not only asoldier of proved quality but a man of commanding visionHe instantly directed his Chief of Ordnance and hisAssistant Chief of Staff to survey the entire list of theAmerican reserve ordnance and munitions stocks In forty-eight hours the answers were given and on June 3Marshall approved the lists The first list comprised half amillion 30 calibre rifles out of two million manufactured in1917 and 1918 and stored in grease for more than twentyyears For these there were about 250 cartridges apieceThere were 900 soixante-quinze field guns with a millionrounds 80000 machine guns and various other items Inhis excellent book about American supplies Mr Stettiniussays ldquoSince every hour counted it was decided that theArmy should sell (for 37 million dollars) everything on thelist to one concern which could in turn resell immediately tothe British and Frenchrdquo The Chief of Ordnance Major-General Wesson was told to handle the matter andimmediately on June 3 all the American Army depots andarsenals started packing the material for shipment By theend of the week more than six hundred heavily loadedfreight cars were rolling towards the Army docks at RaritanNew Jersey up the river from Gravesend Bay By June 11a dozen British merchant ships moved into the bay andanchored and loading from lighters beganBy these extraordinary measures the United States leftthemselves with the equipment for only 1800000 men theminimum figure stipulated by the American ArmyMobilisation Plan All this reads easily now but at that time


it was a supreme act of faith and leadership for the UnitedStates to deprive themselves of this very considerablemass of arms for the sake of a country which many deemedalready beaten They never had need to repent of it As willpresently be recounted we ferried these precious weaponssafely across the Atlantic during July and they formed notonly a material gain but an important factor in allcalculations made by friend or foe about invasion

Mr Cordell Hull has a passage in his memoirs 3 which isrelevant at this point

In response to Reynaudrsquos almost pitiful pleas forbacking the President urged Mr Churchill to sendplanes to France but the Prime Minister refused Bullitt[the United States Ambassador in Paris] outraged bythis decision communicated to the President and meon June 5 his fear that the British might be conservingtheir Air Force and Fleet so as to use them asbargaining points in negotiations with Hitler ThePresident and I however thought differently Francewas finished but we were convinced that Britain underChurchillrsquos indomitable leadership intended to fight onThere would be no negotiations between London andBerlin Only the day before Bullittrsquos telegram Churchillhad made his magnificent speech in the House ofCommons The President and I believed Mr Churchillmeant what he said Had we had any doubt of Britainrsquosdetermination to keep on fighting we would not havetaken the steps we did to get material aid to her Therewould have been no logic in sending arms to Britain ifwe had thought that before they arrived thereChurchillrsquos Government would surrender to Germany


The month of June was particularly trying to all of usbecause of the dual and opposite stresses to which in ournaked condition we were subjected by our duty to Franceon the one hand and the need to create an effective armyat home and to fortify the island on the other The doubletension of antagonistic but vital needs was most severeNevertheless we followed a firm and steady policy withoutundue excitement First priority continued to be given tosending whatever trained and equipped troops we had inorder to reconstitute the British Expeditionary Force inFrance After that our efforts were devoted to the defenceof the island first by re-forming and re-equipping theRegular Army secondly by fortifying the likely landing-places thirdly by arming and organising the population sofar as was possible and of course by bringing homewhatever forces could be gathered from the Empire At thistime the most imminent dangers seemed to be the landingof comparatively small but highly mobile German tankforces which would rip us up and disorganise our defenceand also parachute descents In close contact with the newSecretary of State for War Anthony Eden I busied myselfon all thisThe following scheme was devised by the Secretary ofState and the War Office for reconstituting the Army inaccordance with the directives which had been issuedSeven mobile brigade groups were already in existenceThe divisions returned from Dunkirk were reconstituted re-equipped as fast as possible and took up their stations Intime the seven brigade groups were absorbed into the re-formed divisions There were available fourteen Territorialdivisions of high-quality men who had been nine monthsardently training under war conditions and were partlyequipped One of these the 52d was already fit for serviceoverseas There was a second armoured division and four


Army tank brigades in process of formation but withouttanks There was the 1st Canadian Division fully equippedIt was not men that were lacking but arms Over eightythousand rifles were retrieved from the communicationsand bases south of the Seine and by the middle of Juneevery fighting man in the Regular forces had at least apersonal weapon in his hand We had very little fieldartillery even for the Regular Army Nearly all the new 25-pounders had been lost in France There remained aboutfive hundred 18-pounders 45-inch and 6-inch howitzersThere were only 103 cruiser 132 infantry and 252 lighttanks Fifty of the infantry tanks were at home in a battalionof the Royal Tank Regiment and the remainder were intraining-schools Never has a great nation been so nakedbefore her foes

From the beginning I kept in the closest contact with my oldfriends now at the head of the Governments of Canada andSouth Africa

Prime Minister to MrMackenzie King

5VI40

British situation vastly improved by miraculousevacuation of BEF which gives us an army in theisland more than capable when re-equipped of copingwith any invading force likely to be landed Alsoevacuation was a main trial of strength between Britishand German Air Forces Germans have been unable toprevent evacuation though largely superior in numbersand have suffered at least three times our loss Fortechnical reasons British Air Force would have manymore advantages in defending the air above the island


than in operating overseas Principal remaining dangeris of course air[craft] factories but if our air defence isso strong that enemy can only come on dark nightsprecision will not be easy I therefore feel solidconfidence in British ability to continue the war defendthe island and the Empire and maintain the blockade

I do not know whether it will be possible to keepFrance in the war or not I hope they will even at theworst maintain a gigantic guerrilla We are reconstitut-ing the BEF out of other units

We must be careful not to let Americans view toocomplacently prospect of a British collapse out ofwhich they would get the British Fleet and theguardianship of the British Empire minus Great BritainIf United States were in the war and England [were]conquered locally it would be natural that eventsshould follow the above course But if Americacontinued neutral and we were overpowered I cannottell what policy might be adopted by a pro-Germanadministration such as would undoubtedly be set up

Although President is our best friend no practicalhelp has [reached us] from the United States as yetWe have not expected them to send military aid butthey have not even sent any worthy contribution indestroyers or planes or by a visit of a squadron of theirFleet to southern Irish ports Any pressure which youcan apply in this direction would be invaluable

We are most deeply grateful to you for all your helpand for [the four Canadian] destroyers which havealready gone into action against a U-boat Kindestregards

Smuts far off in South Africa and without the latestinformation upon the specialised problems of Insular AirDefence naturally viewed the tragedy of France accordingto orthodox principles ldquoConcentrate everything at thedecisive pointrdquo I had the advantage of knowing the factsand of the detailed advice of Air Marshal Dowding head ofFighter Command If Smuts and I had been together forhalf an hour and I could have put the data before him we


should have agreed as we always did on large militaryissues

Prime Minister toGeneral Smuts

9VI40

We are of course doing all we can both from the airand by sending divisions as fast as they can beequipped to France It would be wrong to send the bulkof our fighters to this battle and when it was lost as isprobable be left with no means of carrying on the war Ithink we have a harder longer and more hopeful dutyto perform Advantages of resisting German air attackin this island where we can concentrate very powerfulfighter strength and hope to knock out four or fivehostiles to one of ours are far superior to fighting inFrance where we are inevitably outnumbered andrarely exceed two to one ratio of destruction and whereour aircraft are often destroyed at exposed aero-dromes This battle does not turn on the score or so offighter squadrons we could transport with their plant inthe next month Even if by using them up we held theenemy Hitler could immediately throw his whole [air]strength against our undefended island and destroy ourmeans of future production by daylight attack Theclassical principles of war which you mention are in thiscase modified by the actual quantitative data Isee onlyone way through now to wit that Hitler should attackthis country and in so doing break his air weapon Ifthis happens he will be left to face the winter withEurope writhing under his heel and probably with theUnited States against him after the presidential electionis over

Am most grateful to you for cable Please alwaysgive me your counsel my old and valiant friend


Apart from our last twenty-five Fighter Squadrons on whichwe were adamant we regarded the duty of sending aid tothe French Army as paramount The movement of the 52dDivision to France under previous orders was due to beginon June 7 These orders were confirmed The 3d Divisionunder General Montgomery was put first in equipment andassigned to France The leading division of the CanadianArmy which had concentrated in England early in the yearand was well armed was directed with the full assent ofthe Dominion Government to Brest to begin arriving thereon June 11 for what might by this time already be deemeda forlorn hope The two French light divisions evacuatedfrom Norway were also sent home together with all theFrench units and individuals we had carried away fromDunkirkThat we should have sent our only two formed divisionsthe 52d Lowland Division and the 1st Canadian Divisionover to our failing French ally in this mortal crisis when thewhole fury of Germany must soon fall upon us must be setto our credit against the very limited forces we had beenable to put in France in the first eight months of warLooking back on it I wonder how when we were resolvedto continue the war to the death and under the threat ofinvasion and France was evidently falling we had thenerve to strip ourselves of the remaining effective militaryformations we possessed This was only possible becausewe understood the difficulties of the Channel crossingwithout the command of the sea or the air or the necessarylanding craft

We had still in France behind the Somme the 51stHighland Division which had been withdrawn from the


Maginot Line and was in good condition and the 52dLowland Division which was arriving in Normandy Therewas also our 1st (and only) Armoured Division less thetank battalion and the support group which had been sentto Calais This however had lost heavily in attempts tocross the Somme as part of Weygandrsquos plan By June 1 itwas reduced to one-third of its strength and was sent backacross the Seine to refit At the same time a compositeforce known as ldquoBeauman Forcerdquo was scraped togetherfrom the bases and lines of communication in France Itconsisted of nine improvised infantry battalions armedmainly with rifles and very few anti-tank weapons It hadneither transport nor signalsThe Tenth French Army with this British contingent tried tohold the line of the Somme The 51st Division alone had afront of sixteen miles and the rest of the army was equallystrained On June 4 with a French division and Frenchtanks they attacked the German bridgehead at Abbevillebut without successOn June 5 the final phase of the Battle of France beganThe French front consisted of the Second Third andFourth Groups of Armies The Second defended the Rhinefront and the Maginot Line the Fourth stood along theAisne and the Third from the Aisne to the mouth of theSomme This Third Army Group comprised the SixthSeventh and Tenth Armies and all the British forces inFrance formed part of the Tenth Army All this immenseline in which there stood at this moment nearly one and ahalf million men or perhaps sixty-five divisions was now tobe assaulted by one hundred and twenty-four Germandivisions also formed in three army groups namelyCoastal Sector Bock Central Sector Rundstedt EasternSector Leeb These attacked on June 5 June 9 and June15 respectively On the night of June 5 we learned that a


German offensive had been launched that morning on aseventy-mile front from Amiens to the Laon-Soissons roadThis was war on the largest scaleWe have seen how the German armour had been hobbledand held back in the Dunkirk battle in order to save it forthe final phase in France All this armour now rolled forwardupon the weak and improvised or quivering French frontbetween Paris and the sea It is here only possible to recordthe battle on the coastal flank in which we played a partOn June 7 the Germans renewed their attack and twoarmoured divisions drove towards Rouen so as to split theTenth French Army The left French Ninth Corps includingthe Highland Division two French infantry divisions andtwo cavalry divisions or what was left of them wereseparated from the rest of the Tenth Army front ldquoBeaumanForcerdquo supported by thirty British tanks now attempted tocover Rouen On June 8 they were driven back to theSeine and that night the Germans entered the city The51st Division with the remnants of the French Ninth Corpswas cut off in the Rouen-Dieppe cul-de-sac


We had been intensely concerned lest this division shouldbe driven back to the Havre peninsula and thus beseparated from the main armies and its commander Major-General Fortune had been told to fall back if necessary inthe direction of Rouen This movement was forbidden bythe already disintegrating French command Repeatedurgent representations were made by us but they were ofno avail A dogged refusal to face facts led to the ruin of theFrench Ninth Corps and our 51st Division On June 9 whenRouen was already in German hands our men had butnewly reached Dieppe thirty-five miles to the north Onlythen were orders received to withdraw to Havre A forcewas sent back to cover the movement but before the mainbodies could move the Germans interposed Striking fromthe east they reached the sea and the greater part of the51st Division with many of the French was cut off It was a


case of gross mismanagement for this very danger wasvisible a full three days beforeOn the 10th after sharp fighting the division fell backtogether with the French Ninth Corps to the perimeter of StValeacutery expecting to be evacuated by sea Meanwhile allour other forces in the Havre peninsula were embarkingspeedily and safely During the night of the 11th and 12thfog prevented the ships from evacuating the troops from StValeacutery By morning on the 12th the Germans had reachedthe sea cliffs to the south and the beach was under directfire White flags appeared in the town The French corpscapitulated at eight orsquoclock and the remains of the HighlandDivision were forced to do so at 1030 AM Only 1350British officers and men and 930 French escaped eightthousand fell into German hands I was vexed that theFrench had not allowed our division to retire on Rouen ingood time but had kept it waiting till it could neither reachHavre nor retreat southward and thus forced it to surrenderwith their own troops The fate of the Highland Division washard but in after years not unavenged by those Scots whofilled their places re-created the division by merging it withthe 9th Scottish and marched across all the battlefieldsfrom Alamein to final victory beyond the RhineSome lines of Dr Charles Murrayrsquos written in the FirstWorld War came into my mind and it is fitting to print themhere

Half-mast the castle banner droopsThe Lairdrsquos lament was played yestreenAnrsquo mony a widowed cottar wifeIs greetinrsquo at her shank aleen


In Freedomrsquos cause for ane that farsquosWersquoll glean the glens anrsquo send them threeTo clip the reivinrsquo eaglersquos clawsAnrsquo drook his feathers irsquo the seaFor gallant loons in brochs anrsquo toonsAre leavinrsquo shop anrsquo yaird anrsquo millArsquo keen to show baith friend anrsquo foeAuld Scotland counts for something still

About eleven orsquoclock the morning of June 11 there was amessage from Reynaud who had also cabled to thePresident The French tragedy had moved and sliddownward For several days past I had pressed for ameeting of the Supreme Council We could no longer meetin Paris We were not told what were the conditions thereCertainly the German spearheads were very close I hadhad some difficulty in obtaining a rendezvous but this wasno time to stand on ceremony We must know what the


French were going to do Reynaud now told me that hecould receive us at Briare near Orleacuteans The seat ofgovernment was moving from Paris to Tours GrandQuartier Geacuteneacuteral was near Briare He specified the airfieldto which I should come Nothing loth I ordered theFlamingo to be ready at Hendon after luncheon and havingobtained the approval of my colleagues at the morningCabinet we started about two orsquoclock Before leaving Icabled to the President


11VI40

The French have sent for me again which meansthat crisis has arrived Am just off Anything you cansay or do to help them now may make the difference

We are also worried about Ireland An AmericanSquadron at Berehaven would do no end of good I amsure

This was my fourth journey to France and since militaryconditions evidently predominated I asked the Secretary ofState for War Mr Eden to come with me as well asGeneral Dill now CIGS and of course Ismay TheGerman aircraft were now reaching far down into theChannel and we had to make a still wider sweep Asbefore the Flamingo had an escort of twelve HurricanesAfter a couple of hours we alighted at a small landing-ground There were a few Frenchmen about and soon acolonel arrived in a motor-car I displayed the smilingcountenance and confident air which are thought suitablewhen things are very bad but the Frenchman was dull andunresponsive I realised immediately how very far things


had fallen even since we were in Paris a week before Afteran interval we were conducted to the chateau where wefound M Reynaud Marshal Peacutetain General Weygand theAir General Vuillemin and some others including therelatively junior General de Gaulle who had just beenappointed Under-Secretary for National Defence Hard byon the railway was the Headquarters train in which some ofour party were accommodated The chacircteau possessed butone telephone in the lavatory It was kept very busy withlong delays and endless shouted repetitionsAt seven orsquoclock we entered into conference GeneralIsmay kept a record I merely reproduce my lastingimpressions which in no way disagree with it There wereno reproaches or recriminations We were all up againstbrute facts We British did not know where exactly the frontline lay and certainly there was anxiety about some dart bythe German armour ndash even upon us In effect thediscussion ran on the following lines I urged the FrenchGovernment to defend Paris I emphasised the enormousabsorbing power of the house-to-house defence of a greatcity upon an invading army I recalled to Marshal Peacutetain thenights we had spent together in his train at Beauvais afterthe British Fifth Army disaster in 1918 and how he as I putit not mentioning Marshal Foch had restored the situationI also reminded him how Clemenceau had said ldquoI will fightin front of Paris in Paris and behind Parisrdquo The Marshalreplied very quietly and with dignity that in those days hehad a mass of manoeuvre of upwards of sixty divisionsnow there was none He mentioned that there were thensixty British divisions in the line Making Paris into a ruinwould not affect the final eventThen General Weygand exposed the military position sofar as he knew it in the fluid battle proceeding fifty or sixtymiles away and he paid a high tribute to the prowess of the


French Army He requested that every reinforcementshould be sent ndash above all that every British fighter airsquadron should immediately be thrown into the battleldquoHererdquo he said ldquois the decisive point Now is the decisivemoment It is therefore wrong to keep any squadrons backin Englandrdquo But in accordance with the Cabinet decisiontaken in the presence of Air Marshal Dowding whom I hadbrought specially to a Cabinet meeting I replied ldquoThis isnot the decisive point and this is not the decisive momentThat moment will come when Hitler hurls his Luftwaffeagainst Great Britain If we can keep command of the airand if we can keep the seas open as we certainly shallkeep them open we will win it all back for yourdquo4 Twenty-five fighter squadrons must be maintained at all costs forthe defence of Britain and the Channel and nothing wouldmake us give up these We intended to continue the warwhatever happened and we believed we could do so for anindefinite time but to give up these squadrons woulddestroy our chance of life At this stage I asked that GeneralGeorges the Commander-in-Chief of the NorthwesternFront who was in the neighbourhood should be sent forand this was accordingly donePresently General Georges arrived After being apprised ofwhat had passed he confirmed the account of the Frenchfront which had been given by Weygand I again urged myguerrilla plan The German Army was not so strong asmight appear at their points of impact If all the Frencharmies every division and brigade fought the troops ontheir front with the utmost vigour a general standstill mightbe achieved I was answered by statements of the frightfulconditions on the roads crowded with refugees harried byunresisted machine-gun fire from the German aeroplanesand of the wholesale flight of vast numbers of inhabitantsand the increasing breakdown of the machinery of


government and of military control At one point GeneralWeygand mentioned that the French might have to ask foran armistice Reynaud at once snapped at him ldquoThat is apolitical affairrdquo According to Ismay I said ldquoIf it is thoughtbest for France in her agony that her Army shouldcapitulate let there be no hesitation on our accountbecause whatever you may do we shall fight on forever andever and everrdquo When I said that the French Army fightingon wherever it might be could hold or wear out a hundredGerman divisions General Weygand replied ldquoEven if thatwere so they would still have another hundred to invadeand conquer you What would you do thenrdquo On this I saidthat I was not a military expert but that my technicaladvisers were of opinion that the best method of dealingwith German invasion of the island of Britain was to drownas many as possible on the way over and knock the otherson the head as they crawled ashore Weygand answeredwith a sad smile ldquoAt any rate I must admit you have a verygood anti-tank obstaclerdquo These were the last striking wordsI remember to have heard from him In all this miserablediscussion it must be borne in mind that I was haunted andundermined by the grief I felt that Britain with her forty-eightmillion population had not been able to make a greatercontribution to the land war against Germany and that sofar nine-tenths of the slaughter and ninety-nine-hundredthsof the suffering had fallen upon France and upon FrancealoneAfter another hour or so we got up and washed our handswhile a meal was brought to the conference table In thisinterval I talked to General Georges privately andsuggested first the continuance of fighting everywhere onthe home front and a prolonged guerrilla in themountainous regions and secondly the move to Africawhich a week before I had regarded as ldquodefeatistrdquo My


respected friend who although charged with much directresponsibility had never had a free hand to lead the Frencharmies did not seem to think there was much hope ineither of theseI have written lightly of the happenings of these days buthere to all of us was real agony of mind and soul

At about ten orsquoclock everyone took his place at the dinner Isat on M Reynaudrsquos right and General de Gaulle was onmy other side There was soup an omelette or somethingcoffee and light wine Even at this point in our awfultribulation under the German scourge we were quitefriendly But presently there was a jarring interlude Thereader will recall the importance I had attached to strikinghard at Italy the moment she entered the war and thearrangement that had been made with full Frenchconcurrence to move a force of British heavy bombers tothe French airfields near Marseilles in order to attack Turinand Milan All was now in readiness to strike Scarcely hadwe sat down when Air Vice-Marshal Barratt commandingthe British Air Force in France rang up Ismay on thetelephone to say that the local authorities objected to theBritish bombers taking off on the grounds that an attack onItaly would only bring reprisals upon the South of Francewhich the British were in no position to resist or preventReynaud Weygand Eden Dill and I left the table andafter some parleying Reynaud agreed that orders shouldbe sent to the French authorities concerned that thebombers were not to be stopped But later that night AirMarshal Barratt reported that the French people near theairfields had dragged all kinds of country carts and lorries


onto them and that it had been impossible for the bombersto start on their missionPresently when we left the dinner table and sat with somecoffee and brandy M Reynaud told me that Marshal Peacutetainhad informed him that it would be necessary for France toseek an armistice and that he had written a paper upon thesubject which he wished him to read ldquoHe has notrdquo saidReynaud ldquohanded it to me yet He is still ashamed to do itrdquoHe ought also to have been ashamed to support eventacitly Weygandrsquos demand for our last twenty-fivesquadrons of fighters when he had made up his mind thatall was lost and that France should give in Thus we allwent unhappily to bed in this disordered chateau or in themilitary train a few miles away The Germans entered Parison the 14th

Early in the morning we resumed our conference AirMarshal Barratt was present Reynaud renewed his appealfor five more squadrons of fighters to be based in Franceand General Weygand said that he was badly in need ofday bombers to make up for his lack of troops I gave theman assurance that the whole question of increased airsupport for France would be examined carefully andsympathetically by the War Cabinet immediately I got backto London but I again emphasised that it would be a vitalmistake to denude the United Kingdom of its essentialHome defencesTowards the end of this short meeting I put the followingspecific questions

(1) Will not the mass of Paris and its suburbspresent an obstacle dividing and delaying the enemy asin 1914 or like Madrid


(2) May this not enable a counter-stroke to beorganised with British and French forces across thelower Seine

(3) If the period of co-ordinated war ends will thatnot mean an almost equal dispersion of the enemyforces Would not a war of columns and [attacks] uponthe enemy communications be possible Are theenemy resources sufficient to hold down all thecountries at present conquered as well as a large partof France while they are fighting the French Army andGreat Britain

(4) Is it not possible thus to prolong the resistanceuntil the United States come in

General weygand while agreeing with the conception of thecounter-stroke on the lower Seine said that he hadinadequate forces to implement it He added that in hisjudgment the Germans had got plenty to spare to holddown all the countries at present conquered as well as alarge part of France Reynaud added that the Germans hadraised fifty-five divisions and had built four thousand to fivethousand heavy tanks since the outbreak of war This wasof course an immense exaggeration of what they had builtIn conclusion I expressed in the most formal manner myhope that if there was any change in the situation theFrench Government would let the British Government knowat once in order that they might come over and see themat any convenient spot before they took any final decisionswhich would govern their action in the second phase of thewarWe then took leave of Peacutetain Weygand and the staff of GQG and this was the last we saw of them Finally I tookAdmiral Darlan apart and spoke to him alone ldquoDarlan youmust never let them get the French Fleetrdquo He promisedsolemnly that he would never do so


The morning was cloudy thus making it impossible for thetwelve Hurricanes to escort us We had to choose betweenwaiting till it cleared up or taking a chance in the FlamingoWe were assured that it would be cloudy all the way It wasurgently necessary to get back home Accordingly westarted alone calling for an escort to meet us if possibleover the Channel As we approached the coast the skiescleared and presently became cloudless Eight thousandfeet below us on our right hand was Havre burning Thesmoke drifted away to the eastward No new escort was tobe seen Presently I noticed some consultations going onwith the captain and immediately after we dived to ahundred feet or so above the calm sea where aeroplanesare often invisible What had happened I learned later thatthey had seen two German aircraft below us firing at fishing-boats We were lucky that their pilots did not look upwardThe new escort met us as we approached the Englishshore and the faithful Flamingo alighted safely at Hendon

At five orsquoclock that evening I reported to the War Cabinetthe results of my missionI described the condition of the French armies as it hadbeen reported to the conference by General Weygand Forsix days they had been fighting night and day and theywere now almost wholly exhausted The enemy attacklaunched by one hundred and twenty divisions withsupporting armour had fallen on forty French divisionswhich had been outmanoeuvred and outmatched at everypoint The enemyrsquos armoured forces had caused greatdisorganisation among the headquarters of the higher


formations which were unwieldy and when on the moveunable to exercise control over the lower formations TheFrench armies were now on the last line on which theycould attempt to offer an organised resistance This linehad already been penetrated in two or three places and ifit collapsed General Weygand would not be responsible forcarrying on the struggleGeneral Weygand evidently saw no prospect of the Frenchgoing on fighting and Marshal Peacutetain had quite made uphis mind that peace must be made He believed thatFrance was being systematically destroyed by theGermans and that it was his duty to save the rest of thecountry from this fate I mentioned his memorandum to thiseffect which he had shown to Reynaud but had not left withhim ldquoThere could be no doubtrdquo I said ldquothat Peacutetain was adangerous man at this juncture he had always been adefeatist even in the last warrdquo On the other hand MReynaud had seemed quite determined to fight on andGeneral de Gaulle who had attended the conference withhim was in favour of carrying on a guerrilla warfare Hewas young and energetic and had made a very favourableimpression on me I thought it probable that if the presentline collapsed Reynaud would turn to him to takecommand Admiral Darlan also had declared that he wouldnever surrender the French Navy to the enemy in the lastresort he had said he would send it over to Canada but inthis he might be overruled by the French politiciansIt was clear that France was near the end of organisedresistance and a chapter in the war was now closing TheFrench might by some means continue the struggle Theremight even be two French Governments one which madepeace and one which organised resistance from theFrench colonies carrying on the war at sea through theFrench Fleet and in France through guerrillas It was too


early yet to tell Though for a period we might still have tosend some support to France we must now concentrateour main efforts on the defence of our island


8Home Defence June

Intense British Effort mdash Imminent Dangers mdash TheQuestion of ldquoCommandosrdquomdash Local DefenceVolunteers Renamed ldquoHome Guardrdquomdash Lack ofMeans of Attacking Enemy Tanks mdash MajorJefferisrsquo Experimental Establishment mdash TheldquoStickyrdquo Bomb mdash Help for de Gaullersquos Free Frenchmdash Arrangements for Repatriation of Other FrenchTroops mdash Care of French Wounded mdash FreeingBritish Troops for Intensive Training mdash The Pressand Air Raids mdash Danger of German Use ofCaptured European Factories mdash QuestionsArising in the Middle East and India mdash Question ofArming the Jewish Colonists in Palestine mdashProgress of Our Plan of Defence mdash The GreatAnti-Tank Obstacle and Other Measures

THE READER OF THESE PAGES in future years shouldrealise how dense and baffling is the veil of the UnknownNow in the full light of the after-time it is easy to see wherewe were ignorant or too much alarmed where we werecareless or clumsy Twice in two months we had beentaken completely by surprise The overrunning of Norwayand the breakthrough at Sedan with all that followed fromthese proved the deadly power of the German initiativeWhat else had they got ready ndash prepared and organised tothe last inch Would they suddenly pounce out of the bluewith new weapons perfect planning and overwhelming


force upon our almost totally unequipped and disarmedisland at any one of a dozen or score of possible landing-places Or would they go to Ireland He would have beena very foolish man who allowed his reasoning howeverclean-cut and seeming sure to blot out any possibilityagainst which provision could be madeldquoDepend upon itrdquo said Doctor Johnson ldquowhen a manknows he is going to be hanged in a month it concentrateshis mind wonderfullyrdquo I was always sure we should win butnevertheless I was highly geared-up by the situation andvery thankful to be able to make my views effective June 6seems to have been for me an active and not barren dayMy minutes dictated as I lay in bed in the morning andpondered on the dark horizon show the variety of topicsupon which it was necessary to give directionsFirst I called upon the Minister of Supply (Mr HerbertMorrison) for an account of the progress of various devicesconnected with our rockets and sensitive fuzes for useagainst aircraft on which some progress had been madeand upon the Minister of Aircraft Production (LordBeaverbrook) for weekly reports on the design andproduction of automatic bomb-sights and low-altitude RDF (Radio Direction Finding) and AI (Air Interception) I didthis to direct the attention of these two new Ministers withtheir vast departments to those topics in which I hadalready long been especially interested I asked theAdmiralty to transfer at least fifty trained and half-trainedpilots temporarily to Fighter Command Fifty-five actuallytook part in the great air battle I called for a plan to beprepared to strike at Italy by air raids on Turin and Milanshould she enter the war against us I asked the War Officefor plans for forming a Dutch Brigade in accordance withthe desires of the exiled Netherlands Government andpressed the Foreign Secretary for the recognition of the


Belgian Government apart from the prisoner King as thesole constitutional Belgian authority and for theencouragement of mobilisation in Yugoslavia as a counterto Italian threats I asked that the aerodromes atBardufosse and Skaarnlands which we had constructed inthe Narvik area and were about to abandon should bemade unusable for as long as possible by means ofdelayed-action bombs buried in them I remembered howeffectively the Germans had by this method delayed ouruse in 1918 of the railways when they finally retreatedAlas we had no bombs of long-delay in any numbers I wasworried about the many ships lying in Malta Harbour undervarious conditions of repair in view of impending Italianhostility I wrote a long minute to the Minister of Supplyabout timber felling and production at home This was oneof the most important methods of reducing the tonnage ofour imports Besides we should get no more timber fromNorway for a long time to come Many of these minutes willbe found in the AppendixI longed for more Regular troops with which to rebuild andexpand the Army Wars are not won by heroic militias

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar

6VI40

1 It is more than a fortnight since I was told thateight battalions could leave India and arrive in thiscountry in forty-two days from the orderrsquos being givenThe order was given Now it is not till June 6 [ietoday] that the first eight battalions leave India on theirvoyage round the Cape arriving only July 25

2 The Australians are coming in the big ships butthey seem to have wasted a week at Capetown andare now only proceeding at eighteen knots instead of


the twenty I was assured were possible It is hopedthey will be here about the 15th Is this so At any ratewhenever they arrive the big ships should beimmediately filled with Territorials ndash the more the betterndash preferably twelve battalions and sent off to India atfull speed As soon as they arrive in India they shouldembark another eight Regular battalions for thiscountry making the voyage again at full speed Theyshould then take another batch of Territorials to IndiaFuture transferences can be discussed laterhellip All I amasking now is that the big ships should go to and fro atfull speed

3 I am very sorry indeed to find the virtual deadlockwhich local objections have imposed upon thebattalions from Palestine It is quite natural that GeneralWavell should look at the situation only from his ownviewpoint Here we have to think of building up a goodarmy in order to make up as far as possible for thelamentable failure to support the French by anadequate BEF during the first year of the war Do yourealise that in the first year of the late war we broughtforty-seven divisions into action and that these weredivisions of twelve battalions plus one Pioneerbattalion not nine as now We are indeed the victimsof a feeble and weary departmentalism

4 Owing to the saving of the BEF I have beenwilling to wait for the relief of the eight battalions fromPalestine by eight native Indian battalions providedthese latter were sent at once but you give me no time-table for this I have not yet received any report onwhether it is possible to send these British battalionsand their Indian relief via Basra and the Persian GulfPerhaps you would very kindly let me have this in thefirst instance

5 I am prepared also to consider as an alternativeor an immediate step the sending home [ie to Britain]of the rest of the Australian Corps Perhaps you will letme have a note on this showing especially dates atwhich the moves can be made

6 You must not think I am ignoring the position inthe Middle East On the contrary it seems to me thatwe should draw upon India much more largely and that


a ceaseless stream of Indian units should be passinginto Palestine and Egypt via Bombay and [by] Karachiacross the desert route India is doing nothing worthspeaking of at the present time In the last war not onlydid we have all the [British] Regular troops out [of India]in the first nine months (many more than are therenow) but also an Indian Corps fought by Christmas inFrance Our weakness slowness lack of grip and driveare very apparent on the background of what was donetwenty-five years ago I really think that you Lloyd andAmery ought to be able to lift our affairs in the East andMiddle East out of the catalepsy by which they aresmitten

This was a time when all Britain worked and strove to theutmost limit and was united as never before Men andwomen toiled at the lathes and machines in the factories tillthey fell exhausted on the floor and had to be draggedaway and ordered home while their places were occupiedby newcomers ahead of time The one desire of all themales and many women was to have a weapon TheCabinet and Government were locked together by bondsthe memory of which is still cherished by all The sense offear seemed entirely lacking in the people and theirrepresentatives in Parliament were not unworthy of theirmood We had not suffered like France under the Germanflail Nothing moves an Englishman so much as the threatof invasion the reality unknown for a thousand years Vastnumbers of people were resolved to conquer or die Therewas no need to rouse their spirit by oratory They were gladto hear me express their sentiments and give them goodreasons for what they meant to do or try to do The onlypossible divergence was from people who wished to do


even more than was possible and had the idea that frenzymight sharpen actionOur decision to send our only two well-armed divisions backto France made it all the more necessary to take everypossible measure to defend the island against directassault Our most imminent dangers at home seemed to beparachute descents or even worse the landing ofcomparatively small but highly mobile German tank forceswhich would rip up and disorganise our defence as theyhad done when they got loose in France In close contactwith the new Secretary of State for War my thoughts anddirections were increasingly concerned with Home DefenceThe fact that we were sending so much to France made itall the more necessary to make the best of what we had leftfor ourselves


18VI40

I should like to be informed upon (1) the coastalwatch and coastal batteries (2) the gorging of theharbours and defended inlets (ie the making of thelandward defences) (3) the troops held in immediatesupport of the foregoing (4) the mobile columns andbrigade groups (5) the General Reserve

Someone should explain to me the state of thesedifferent forces including the guns available in eacharea I gave directions that the 8th Tank Regimentshould be immediately equipped with the supply ofinfantry and cruiser tanks until they have fifty-two newtanks all well armoured and well gunned What hasbeen done with the output of this month and lastmonth Make sure it is not languishing in depots butpasses swiftly to troops General Carr is responsible forthis Let him report

What are the ideas of C-in-C HF about StormTroops We have always set our faces against this


idea but the Germans certainly gained in the last warby adopting it and this time it has been a leading causeof their victory There ought to be at least twentythousand Storm Troops or ldquoLeopardsrdquo [eventually calledldquoCommandosrdquo] drawn from existing units ready tospring at the throat of any small landings or descentsThese officers and men should be armed with the latestequipment tommy guns grenades etc and should begiven great facilities in motor-cycles and armoured cars

Mr Edenrsquos plan of raising Local Defence Volunteers whichhe had proposed to the Cabinet on May 13 met with animmediate response in all parts of the country


22VI40

Could I have a brief statement of the LDV positionshowing the progress achieved in raising and armingthem and whether they are designed for observation orfor serious fighting What is their relationship to thepolice the Military Command and the RegionalCommissioners From whom do they receive theirorders and to whom do they report It would be a greatcomfort if this could be compressed on one or twosheets of paper

I had always hankered for the name ldquoHome Guardrdquo I hadindeed suggested it in October 1939



26VI40

I donrsquot think much of the name ldquoLocal DefenceVolunteersrdquo for your very large new force The wordldquolocalrdquo is uninspiring Mr Herbert Morrison suggested tome today the title ldquoCivic Guardrdquo but I think ldquoHomeGuardrdquo would be better Donrsquot hesitate to change onaccount of already having made armlets etc if it isthought the title of Home Guard would be morecompulsive


27VI40

I hope you like my suggestion of changing the nameldquoLocal Defence Volunteersrdquo which is associated withLocal Government and Local Option to ldquoHome GuardrdquoI found everybody liked this in my tour yesterday

The change was accordingly made and the mightyorganisation which presently approached one and a halfmillion men and gradually acquired good weapons rolledforward

In these days my principal fear was of German tankscoming ashore Since my mind was attracted to landingtanks on their coasts I naturally thought they might havethe same idea We had hardly any anti-tank guns orammunition or even ordinary field artillery The plight towhich we were reduced in dealing with this danger may bemeasured from the following incident I visited our beachesin St Margaretrsquos Bay near Dover The Brigadier informedme that he had only three anti-tank guns in his brigade


covering four or five miles of this highly menaced coastlineHe declared that he had only six rounds of ammunition foreach gun and he asked me with a slight air of challengewhether he was justified in letting his men fire one singleround for practice in order that they might at least knowhow the weapon worked I replied that we could not affordpractice rounds and that fire should be held for the lastmoment at the closest rangeThis was therefore no time to proceed by ordinary channelsin devising expedients In order to secure quick action freefrom departmental processes upon any bright idea orgadget I decided to keep under my own hand as Ministerof Defence the experimental establishment formed by MajorJefferis at Whitchurch While engaged upon the fluvialmines in 1939 I had had useful contacts with this brilliantofficer whose ingenious inventive mind proved as will beseen fruitful during the whole war Lindemann was in closetouch with him and me I used their brains and my powerMajor Jefferis and others connected with him were at workupon a bomb which could be thrown at a tank perhapsfrom a window and would stick upon it The impact of avery high explosive in actual contact with a steel plate isparticularly effective We had the picture in mind thatdevoted soldiers or civilians would run close up to the tankand even thrust the bomb upon it though its explosion costthem their lives There were undoubtedly many who wouldhave done it I thought also that the bomb fixed on a rodmight be fired with a reduced charge from rifles


6VI40

It is of the utmost importance to find some projectilewhich can be fired from a rifle at a tank like a rifle


grenade or from an anti-tank rifle like a trench-mortarbomb The ldquostickyrdquo bomb seems to be useful for the firstof these but perhaps this is not so Anyhow concen-trate attention upon finding something that can be firedfrom anti-tank rifles or from ordinary rifles

I pressed the matter hard


16VI40

Who is responsible for making the ldquostickyrdquo bomb Iam told that a great sloth is being shown in pressingthis forward Ask General Carr to report today upon theposition and to let me have on one sheet of paper theback history of the subject from the moment when thequestion was first raised

The matter is to be pressed forward from day to dayand I wish to receive a report every three days


24VI40

I minuted some days ago about the ldquostickyrdquo bombsAll preparations for manufacture should proceed inanticipation that the further trials will be successful Letme have a time-table showing why it is that delay hascrept into all this process which is so urgent


24VI40

I understand that the trials were not entirelysuccessful and the bomb failed to stick on tanks whichwere covered with dust and mud No doubt some moresticky mixture can be devised and Major Jefferisshould persevere

Any chortling by officials who have been slothful inpushing this bomb over the fact that at present it has


not succeeded will be viewed with great disfacour byme

In the end the ldquostickyrdquo bomb was accepted as one of ourbest emergency weapons We never had to use it at homebut in Syria where equally primitive conditions prevailed itproved its value

We had evidently to do our utmost to form French forceswhich might aid General de Gaulle in keeping the truepersonification of France alive

Prime Minister to FirstLord of the Admiraltyand other ServiceMinisters

27VI40

1 The French naval personnel at Aintree Campnumbering 13600 equally with the 5530 military atTrentham Park the 1900 at Arrow Park and the detailsat Blackpool are to be immediately repatriated toFrench territory ie Morocco in French ships now inour hands

2 They should be told we will take them to FrenchAfrica because all French metropolitan ports are inGerman hands and that the French Government willarrange for their future movements

3 If however any wish to remain here to fightagainst Germany they must immediately make thisclear Care must be taken that no officer or man is sentback into French jurisdiction against his will Theshipping is to be ready tomorrow The troops shouldmove under their own officers and carry their personalarms but as little ammunition as possible Somearrangements should be made for their pay TheFrench material on board ships from Narvik will be


taken over by us with the ammunition from theLombardy and other ships as against expenses towhich we are put

4 Great care is to be taken of the French woundedAll who can be moved without danger should be sentback direct to France if possible The French Govern-ment should be asked where they wish them deliveredand if at French metropolitan ports should arrange withthe Germans for their safe entry otherwise Casablan-ca All dangerous cases must be dealt with here

5 Apart from any volunteers in the above groups ofpersonnel who may wish to stay there must be manyindividuals who have made their way here hoping tocontinue to fight These also should be given the optionof returning to France or serving in the French unitsunder General de Gaulle who should be told of ourdecisions and given reasonable facilities to collect hispeople I have abandoned the hope that he couldaddress the formed bodies as their morale hasdeteriorated too fast

My desire that our own Army should regain its poise andfighting quality was at first hampered because so manytroops were being absorbed in fortifying their own localitiesor sectors of the coast


25VI40

It is shocking that only 57000 men [civilians] arebeing employed on all these [defence] worksMoreover I fear that the troops are being used in largenumbers on fortifications At the present stage theyshould be drilling and training for at least eight hours aday including one smart parade every morning All the


labour necessary should be found from civilian sourcesI found it extremely difficult to see even a singlebattalion on parade in East Anglia during my visit Thefighting troops in the Brigade Groups should neither beused for guarding vulnerable points nor for makingfortifications Naturally a change like this cannot bemade at once but let me have your proposals forbringing it about as soon as possible

Prime Minister toMinister of Information

26VI40

The press and broadcast should be asked to handleair raids in a cool way and on a diminishing tone ofpublic interest The facts should be chronicled withoutundue prominence or headlines The people should beaccustomed to treat air raids as a matter of ordinaryroutine Localities affected should not be mentionedwith any precision Photographs showing shatteredhouses should not be published unless there issomething very peculiar about them or to illustrate howwell the Anderson shelters work It must be clear thatthe vast majority of people are not at all affected by anysingle air raid and would hardly sustain any evilimpression if it were not thrust before them Everyoneshould learn to take air raids and air-raid alarms as ifthey were no more than thunderstorms Pray try toimpress this upon the newspaper authorities andpersuade them to help If there is difficulty in this Iwould myself see the Newspaper ProprietorsrsquoAssociation but I hope this will not be necessary Thepress should be complimented on their work so far inthis matter


27VI40


Enclosed [dates of troop convoys from India] makeme anxious to know how you propose to use theseeight fine Regular battalions Obviously they will be areinforcement for your shock troops One wouldsuppose they might make the infantry of two divisionswith five good Territorial battalions added to eachdivision total eighteen Should they not also yield up acertain number of officers and NCOrsquos to stiffen theTerritorial battalions so attached You would thus havesix brigades of infantry quite soon Alas I fear theartillery must lag behind but not I trust for long

As rumours grew of peace proposals and a message wassent to us from the Vatican through Berne I thought it rightto send the following minute to the Foreign Secretary

28VI40I hope it will be made clear to the Nuncio that we do

not desire to make any inquiries as to terms of peacewith Hitler and that all our agents are strictly forbiddento entertain any such suggestions

But here is the record of a qualm

Prime Minister toProfessor Lindemann

29VI40

While we are hastening our preparations for airmastery the Germans will be organising the wholeindustries of the captured countries for air productionand other war production suitable [for use] against us Itis therefore a race They will not be able to get thecaptured factories working immediately and meanwhilewe shall get round the invasion danger through thegrowth of our defences and Army strength But whatsort of relative outputs must be faced next year unlesswe are able to bomb the newly acquired Germanplants Germany also being relieved from the need ofkeeping a gigantic army in constant contact with the


French Army must have spare capacity for the air andother methods of attacking us Must we not expect thiswill be very great How soon can it come into playHitherto I have been looking at the next three monthsbecause of the emergency but what about 1941 Itseems to me that only immense American supplies canbe of use in turning the corner

As the month of June ground itself out the sense ofpotential invasion at any moment grew upon us all


30VI40

The Admiralty charts of tides and state of the moonHumber Thames Estuary Beachy Head should bestudied with a view to ascertaining on which daysconditions will be most favourable to a sea-bornelanding The Admiralty view is sought

A landing or descent in Ireland was always a deep anxietyto the Chiefs of Staff But our resources seemed to me toolimited for serious troop movements


30VI40

It would be taking an undue risk to remove one ofour only two thoroughly equipped divisions out of GreatBritain at this juncture Moreover it is doubtful whetherthe Irish situation will require the use of divisionalformations complete with their technical vehicles as iffor Continental war The statement that it would taketen days to transport a division from this country toIreland even though every preparation can be made


beforehand is not satisfactory Schemes should beprepared to enable two or three lightly equippedbrigades to move at short notice and in not more thanthree days into Northern Ireland Duplicate transportshould be sent on ahead It would be a mistake to sendany large force of artillery to Ireland It is not at all likelythat a naval descent will be effected there Air-bornedescents cannot carry much artillery Finally nothingthat can happen in Ireland can be immediately decisive

In bringing home the troops from Palestine I had difficultieswith both my old friends the Secretary of State for IndiaMr Amery and the Secretary of State for the ColoniesLord Lloyd who was a convinced anti-Zionist and pro-ArabI wished to arm the Jewish colonists Mr Amery at the IndiaOffice had a different view from mine about the part whichIndia should play I wanted Indian troops at once to comeinto Palestine and the Middle East whereas the Viceroyand the India Office were naturally inclined to a long-termplan of creating a great Indian Army based upon Indianmunition factories

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forIndia (Mr Amery)

22VI40

1 We have already very large masses of troops inIndia of which no use is being made for the generalpurposes of the war The assistance of India this time isincomparably below that of 1914-18hellip It seems to mevery likely that the war will spread to the Middle Eastand the climates of Iraq Palestine and Egypt are wellsuited to Indian troops I recommend their organisationin brigade groups each with a proportion of artillery on


the new British model I should hope that six or eight ofthese groups could be ready this winter They shouldinclude some brigades of Gurkhas

2 The process of liberating the Regular Britishbattalions must continue and I much regret that afortnightrsquos delay has become inevitable in returning youthe Territorial battalions in exchange You shouldreassure the Viceroy that it is going forward

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forthe Colonies (LordLloyd)

28VI40

The failure of the policy which you favour is provedby the very large numbers of sorely needed troops you[we] have to keep in Palestine

6 battalions of infantry9 regiments of yeomanry8 battalions of Australian infantry

ndash the whole probably more than twenty thousand

men This is the price we have to pay for the anti-Jewish policy which has been persisted in for someyears Should the war go heavily into Egypt all thesetroops will have to be withdrawn and the position of theJewish colonists will be one of the greatest dangerIndeed I am sure that we shall be told we cannotwithdraw these troops though they include some of ourbest and are vitally needed elsewhere If the Jewswere properly armed our forces would becomeavailable and there would be no danger of the Jewsattacking the Arabs because they are entirelydependent upon us and upon our command of theseas I think it is little less than a scandal that at a time


when we are fighting for our lives these very largeforces should be immobilised in support of a policywhich commends itself only to a section of theConservative Party

I had hoped you would take a broad view of thePalestine situation and would make it an earnestobjective to set the British garrison free I couldcertainly not associate myself with such an answer asyou have drawn up for me I do not at all admit thatArab feeling in the Near East and India would beprejudiced in the manner you suggest Now that wehave the Turks in such a friendly relationship theposition is much more secure

For the first time in a hundred and twenty-five years apowerful enemy was now established across the narrowwaters of the English Channel Our re-formed RegularArmy and the larger but less well-trained Territorials had tobe organised and deployed to create an elaborate systemof defences and to stand ready if the invader came todestroy him ndash for there could be no escape It was for bothsides ldquoKill or Curerdquo Already the Home Guard could beincluded in the general framework of defence On June 25General Ironside Commander-in-Chief Home Forcesexposed his plans to the Chiefs of Staff They were ofcourse scrutinised with anxious care by the experts and Iexamined them myself with no little attention On the wholethey stood approved There were three main elements inthis early outline of a great future plan first an entrenchedldquocrustrdquo on the probable invasion beaches of the coastwhose defenders should fight where they stood supportedby mobile reserves for immediate counter-attack secondlya line of anti-tank obstacles manned by the Home Guardrunning down the east centre of England and protecting


London and the great industrial centres from inroads byarmoured vehicles thirdly behind that line the mainreserves for major counter-offensive actionCeaseless additions and refinements to this first plan wereeffected as the weeks and months passed but the generalconception remained All troops if attacked should standfirm not in linear only but in all-round defence whilst othersmoved rapidly to destroy the attackers whether they camefrom sea or air Men who had been cut off from immediatehelp would not have merely remained in position Activemeasures were prepared to harass the enemy from behindto interfere with his communications and to destroymaterial as the Russians did with great results when theGerman tide flowed over their country a year later Manypeople must have been bewildered by the innumerableactivities all around them They could understand thenecessity for wiring and mining the beaches the anti-tankobstacles at the defiles the concrete pillboxes at thecrossroads the intrusions into their houses to fill an atticwith sandbags onto their golf-courses or most fertile fieldsand gardens to burrow out some wide anti-tank ditch Allthese inconveniences and much more they accepted ingood part But sometimes they must have wondered ifthere was a general scheme or whether lesser individualswere not running amok in their energetic use of newlygranted powers of interference with the property of thecitizenThere was however a central plan elaborate co-ordinated and all-embracing As it grew it shaped itselfthus the over-all command was maintained at GeneralHeadquarters in London All Great Britain and NorthernIreland were divided into seven commands these againinto areas of corps and divisional commands Commandscorps and divisions were each required to hold a proportion


of their resources in mobile reserve only the minimumbeing detailed to hold their own particular defencesGradually there were built up in rear of the beaches zonesof defence in each divisional area behind these similarcorps zones and command zones the whole systemamounting in depth to a hundred miles or more And behindthese was established the main anti-tank obstacle runningacross Southern England and northward intoNottinghamshire Above all was the final reserve directlyunder the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces This itwas our policy to keep as large and mobile as possibleWithin this general structure were many variations Each ofour ports on the east and south coasts was a special studyDirect frontal attack upon a defended port seemed anunlikely contingency and all were made into strong-pointsequally capable of defence from the landward or theseaward side It astonishes me that when this principle offortifying the gorges was so universally accepted andrigorously enforced by all military authorities at home nosimilar measures were adopted at Singapore by thesuccession of high officers employed there But this is alater story Obstacles were placed on many thousandsquare miles of Britain to impede the landing of air-bornetroops All our aerodromes radar stations and fuel depotsof which even in the summer of 1940 there were threehundred and seventy-five needed defence by specialgarrisons and by their own airmen Many thousands ofldquovulnerable pointsrdquondash bridges power-stations depots vitalfactories and the like ndash had to be guarded day and nightfrom sabotage or sudden onset Schemes were ready forthe immediate demolition of resources helpful to the enemyif captured The destruction of port facilities the cratering ofkey roads the paralysis of motor transport and oftelephones and telegraph stations of rolling stock or


permanent way before they passed out of our control wereplanned to the last detail Yet despite all these wise andnecessary precautions in which the civilian departmentsgave unstinted help to the military there was no question ofa ldquoscorched-earth policyrdquo England was to be defended byits people not destroyed


9The French Agony

Telegram to President RooseveltmdashMy Visit toToursmdashIncreasing DegenerationmdashM BaudouinmdashThe Great MandelmdashConversation with ReynaudmdashMy Refusal to Release France from the Obligationof March 28 1940 mdash Resolute Attitude of MMHerriot and Jeanneney mdashldquoLrsquoHomme du DestinrdquomdashFrench Government Decide to Move to BordeauxmdashPresident Roosevelt to M Reynaud June 13 mdashMy Telegram to the PresidentmdashAnd to ReynaudmdashldquoIndissoluble Union of France and BritainrdquomdashDisappointing Telegram from the PresidentmdashMyTelegram to the President of June 1415 mdash AGrave SuggestionmdashGreat Battle of June 9 Alongthe AisnemdashDefeat of the FrenchmdashForlornResistance on the Maginot LinemdashOur SlenderContributionmdashGeneral Brookersquos New Commandmdash Talk of a Bridgehead in BrittanymdashBrookeDeclares the Military Situation HopelessmdashI AgreemdashOur Troops Withdraw and Re-embark June1617 mdash The Peacutetain Government Asks for anArmisticemdashA Second Dunkirk EvacuationmdashAHundred and Fifty Thousand British and Forty-twoThousand Poles Carried to BritainmdashThe ldquoLancas-triardquo HorrormdashMy Message of June 16 to theDominion Prime MinistersmdashMy Hopes of the AirBattle over Britain


FUTURE GENERATIONS may deem it noteworthy that thesupreme question of whether we should fight on alonenever found a place upon the War Cabinet agenda It wastaken for granted and as a matter of course by these menof all parties in the State and we were much too busy towaste time upon such unreal academic issues We wereunited also in viewing the new phase with good confidenceIt was decided to tell the Dominions the whole facts I wasinvited to send a message in the same sense to PresidentRoosevelt and also to sustain the determination of theFrench Government and assure them of our utmost support


12VI40

I spent last night and this morning at the French GQG where the situation was explained to me in thegravest terms by Generals Weygand and Georges Youhave no doubt received full particulars from Mr BullittThe practical point is what will happen when and if theFrench front breaks Paris is taken and GeneralWeygand reports formally to his Government thatFrance can no longer continue what he calls ldquoco-ordinated warrdquo The aged Marshal Peacutetain who wasnone too good in April and July 1918 is I fear readyto lend his name and prestige to a treaty of peace forFrance Reynaud on the other hand is for fighting onand he has a young General de Gaulle who believesmuch can be done Admiral Darlan declares he willsend the French Fleet to Canada It would bedisastrous if the two big modern ships fell into badhands It seems to me that there must be manyelements in France who will wish to continue thestruggle either in France or in the French colonies or inboth This therefore is the moment for you tostrengthen Reynaud the utmost you can and try to tipthe balance in favour of the best and longest possible


French resistance I venture to put this point beforeyou although I know you must understand it as well asI do

On June 13 I made my last visit to France for four yearsalmost to a day The French Government had nowwithdrawn to Tours and tension had mounted steadily Itook Edward Halifax and General Ismay with me and MaxBeaverbrook volunteered to come too In trouble he isalways buoyant This time the weather was cloudless andwe sailed over in the midst of our Hurricane squadronmaking however a rather wider sweep to the southwardthan before Arrived over Tours we found the airport hadbeen heavily bombed the night before but we and all ourescort landed smoothly in spite of the craters Immediatelyone sensed the increasing degeneration of affairs No onecame to meet us or seemed to expect us We borrowed aservice car from the Station Commander and motored intothe city making for the preacutefecture where it was said theFrench Government had their headquarters No one ofconsequence was there but Reynaud was reported to bemotoring in from the country and Mandel was also to arrivesoonIt being already nearly two orsquoclock I insisted uponluncheon and after some parleyings we drove throughstreets crowded with refugeesrsquo cars most of them with amattress on top and crammed with luggage We found acafeacute which was closed but after explanations we obtaineda meal During luncheon I was visited by M Baudouin anofficial of the French Foreign Office whose influence hadrisen in these latter days He began at once in his soft silkymanner about the hopelessness of the French resistance If


the United States would declare war on Germany it mightbe possible for France to continue What did I think aboutthis I did not discuss the question further than to say that Ihoped America would come in and that we should certainlyfight on He afterwards I was told spread it about that I hadagreed that France should surrender unless the UnitedStates came inWe then returned to the preacutefecture where Mandel Ministerof the Interior awaited us This faithful former secretary ofClemenceau and a bearer forward of his lifersquos messageseemed in the best of spirits He was energy and defiancepersonified His luncheon an attractive chicken wasuneaten on the tray before him He was a ray of sunshineHe had a telephone in each hand through which he wasconstantly giving orders and decisions His ideas weresimple fight on to the end in France in order to cover thelargest possible movement into Africa This was the lasttime I saw this valiant Frenchman The restored FrenchRepublic rightly shot to death the hirelings who murderedhim His memory is honoured by his countrymen and theirAlliesPresently M Reynaud arrived At first he seemeddepressed General Weygand had reported to him that theFrench armies were exhausted The line was pierced inmany places refugees were pouring along all the roadsthrough the country and many of the troops were indisorder The Generalissimo felt it was necessary to ask foran armistice while there were still enough French troops tokeep order until peace could be made Such was themilitary advice He would send that day a further messageto Mr Roosevelt saying that the last hour had come andthat the fate of the Allied cause lay in Americarsquos handHence arose the alternative of armistice and peace


M Reynaud proceeded to say that the Council of Ministershad on the previous day instructed him to inquire whatwould be Britainrsquos attitude should the worst come Hehimself was well aware of the solemn pledge that noseparate peace would be entered into by either allyGeneral Weygand and others pointed out that France hadalready sacrificed everything in the common cause Shehad nothing left but she had succeeded in greatlyweakening the common foe It would in thosecircumstances be a shock if Britain failed to concede thatFrance was physically unable to carry on if France was stillexpected to fight on and thus deliver up her people to thecertainty of corruption and evil transformation at the handsof ruthless specialists in the art of bringing conqueredpeoples to heel That then was the question which he hadto put Would Great Britain realise the hard facts with whichFrance was facedThe official British record reads as follows

Mr Churchill said that Great Britain realised howmuch France had suffered and was suffering Her ownturn would come and she was ready She grieved tofind that her contribution to the land struggle was atpresent so small owing to the reverses which had beenmet with as a result of applying an agreed strategy inthe North The British had not yet felt the German lashbut were aware of its force They nevertheless had butone thought to win the war and destroy HitlerismEverything was subordinate to that aim no difficultiesno regrets could stand in the way He was well assuredof British capacity for enduring and persisting forstriking back till the foe was beaten They wouldtherefore hope that France would carry on fightingsouth of Paris down to the sea and if need be fromNorth Africa At all costs time must be gained Theperiod of waiting was not limitless a pledge from theUnited States would make it quite short The alternative


course meant destruction for France quite as certainlyHitler would abide by no pledges If on the other handFrance remained in the struggle with her fine Navy hergreat Empire her Army still able to carry on guerrillawarfare on a gigantic scale and if Germany failed todestroy England which she must do or go under ifthen Germanyrsquos might in the air was broken then thewhole hateful edifice of Nazidom would topple overGiven immediate help from America perhaps even adeclaration of war victory was not so far off At allevents England would fight on She had not and wouldnot alter her resolve no terms no surrender Thealternatives for her were death or victory That was hisanswer to M Reynaudrsquos question

M Reynaud replied that he had never doubtedEnglandrsquos determination He was however anxious toknow how the British Government would react in acertain contingency The French Government ndash thepresent one or another ndash might say ldquoWe know you willcarry on We would also if we saw any hope of avictory But we see no sufficient hopes of an earlyvictory We cannot count on American help There is nolight at the end of the tunnel We cannot abandon ourpeople to indefinite German domination We mustcome to terms We have no choicehelliprdquo It was alreadytoo late to organise a redoubt in Brittany Nowherewould a genuine French Government have a hope ofescaping capture on French soilhellip The question toBritain would therefore take the form ldquoWill youacknowledge that France has given her best her youthand life-blood that she can do no more and that she isentitled having nothing further to contribute to thecommon cause to enter into a separate peace whilemaintaining the solidarity implicit in the solemnagreement entered into three months previouslyrdquo

Mr Churchill said that in no case would Britainwaste time and energy in reproaches and recrimina-tions That did not mean that she would consent toaction contrary to the recent agreement The first stepought to be M Reynaudrsquos further message putting thepresent position squarely to President Roosevelt Let


them await the answer before considering anythingelse If England won the war France would be restoredin her dignity and in her greatness

All the same I thought the issue raised at this point was soserious that I asked to withdraw with my colleagues beforeanswering it So Lords Halifax and Beaverbrook and therest of our party went out into a dripping but sunlit gardenand talked things over for half an hour On our return Irestated our position We could not agree to a separatepeace however it might come Our war aim remained thetotal defeat of Hitler and we felt that we could still bring thisabout We were therefore not in a position to releaseFrance from her obligation Whatever happened we wouldlevel no reproaches against France but that was a differentmatter from consenting to release her from her pledge Iurged that the French should now send a new appeal toPresident Roosevelt which we would support from LondonM Reynaud agreed to do this and promised that theFrench would hold on until the result of his final appeal wasknownBefore leaving I made one particular request to MReynaud Over four hundred German pilots the bulk ofwhom had been shot down by the RAF were prisoners inFrance Having regard to the situation they should behanded over to our custody M Reynaud willingly gave thispromise but soon he had no power to keep it TheseGerman pilots all became available for the Battle of Britainand we had to shoot them down a second time

At the end of our talk M Reynaud took us into theadjoining room where MM Herriot and Jeanneney thePresidents of the Chamber and Senate respectively were


seated Both these French patriots spoke with passionateemotion about fighting on to the death As we went downthe crowded passage into the courtyard I saw General deGaulle standing stolid and expressionless at the doorwayGreeting him I said in a low tone in French ldquoLrsquohomme dudestinrdquo He remained impassive In the courtyard theremust have been more than a hundred leading Frenchmenin frightful misery Clemenceaursquos son was brought up tome I wrung his hand The Hurricanes were already in theair and I slept sound on our swift and uneventful journeyhome This was wise for there was a long way to go beforebedtime

After our departure from Tours at about half-past five MReynaud met his Cabinet again at Cangeacute They were vexedthat I and my colleagues had not come there to join themWe should have been very willing to do so no matter howlate we had to fly home But we were never invited nor didwe know there was to be a French Cabinet meetingAt Cangeacute the decision was taken to move the FrenchGovernment to Bordeaux and Reynaud sent off histelegram to Roosevelt with its desperate appeal for theentry on the scene at least of the American FleetAt 1015 PM I made my new report to the Cabinet Myaccount was endorsed by my two companions While wewere still sitting Ambassador Kennedy arrived withPresident Rooseveltrsquos reply to Reynaudrsquos appeal of June 10

President Roosevelt toM Reynaud

13VI40


Your message of June 10 has moved me verydeeply As I have already stated to you and to MrChurchill this Government is doing everything in itspower to make available to the Allied Governments thematerial they so urgently require and our efforts to dostill more are being redoubled This is so because ofour faith in and our support of the ideals for which theAllies are fighting

The magnificent resistance of the French and BritishArmies has profoundly impressed the American people

I am personally particularly impressed by yourdeclaration that France will continue to fight on behalfof Democracy even if it means slow withdrawal evento North Africa and the Atlantic It is most important toremember that the French and British Fleets continue[in] mastery of the Atlantic and other oceans also toremember that vital materials from the outside world arenecessary to maintain all armies

I am also greatly heartened by what Prime MinisterChurchill said a few days ago about the continuedresistance of the British Empire and that determinationwould seem to apply equally to the great FrenchEmpire all over the world Naval power in world affairsstill carries the lessons of history as Admiral Darlanwell knows

We all thought the President had gone a very long way Hehad authorised Reynaud to publish his message of June10 with all that that implied and now he had sent thisformidable answer If upon this France decided to endurethe further torture of the war the United States would bedeeply committed to enter it At any rate it contained twopoints which were tantamount to belligerence first apromise of all material aid which implied active assistancesecondly a call to go on fighting even if the Governmentwere driven right out of France I sent our thanks to thePresident immediately and I also sought to commend thePresidentrsquos message to Reynaud in the most favourableterms Perhaps these points were stressed unduly but it


was necessary to make the most of everything we had orcould get


13VI40

Ambassador Kennedy will have told you about theBritish meeting today with the French at Tours of whichI showed him our record I cannot exaggerate its criticalcharacter They were very nearly gone Weygand hadadvocated an armistice while he still has enough troopsto prevent France from lapsing into anarchy Reynaudasked us whether in view of the sacrifices andsufferings of France we would release her from theobligation about not making a separate peaceAlthough the fact that we have unavoidably been out ofthis terrible battle weighed with us I did not hesitate inthe name of the British Government to refuse consentto an armistice or separate peace I urged that thisissue should not be discussed until a further appeal hadbeen made by Reynaud to you and the United Stateswhich I undertook to second Agreement was reachedon this and a much better mood prevailed for themoment in Reynaud and his Ministers

Reynaud felt strongly that it would be beyond hispower to encourage his people to fight on without hopeof ultimate victory and that that hope could only bekindled by American intervention up to the extreme limitopen to you As he put it they wanted to see light at theend of the tunnel

While we were flying back here your magnificentmessage was sent and Ambassador Kennedy broughtit to me on my arrival The British Cabinet wereprofoundly impressed and desire me to express theirgratitude for it but Mr President I must tell you that itseems to me absolutely vital that this message shouldbe published tomorrow June 14 in order that it mayplay the decisive part in turning the course of worldhistory It will I am sure decide the French to denyHitler a patched-up peace with France He needs this


peace in order to destroy us and take a long stepforward to world mastery All the far-reaching plansstrategic economic political and moral which yourmessage expounds may be still-born if the French cutout now Therefore I urge that the message should bepublished now We realise fully that the moment Hitlerfinds he cannot dictate a Nazi peace in Paris he willturn his fury onto us We shall do our best to withstandit and if we succeed wide new doors are open uponthe future and all will come out even at the end of theday

To M Reynaud I sent this message13VI40

On returning here we received a copy of PresidentRooseveltrsquos answer to your appeal of June 10 Cabinetis united in considering this magnificent document asdecisive in favour of the continued resistance of Francein accordance with your own declaration of June 10about fighting before Paris behind Paris in a provinceor if necessary in Africa or across the Atlantic Thepromise of redoubled material aid is coupled withdefinite advice and exhortation to France to continuethe struggle even under the grievous conditions whichyou mentioned If France on this message of PresidentRooseveltrsquos continues in the field and in the war wefeel that the United States is committed beyond recallto take the only remaining step namely becoming abelligerent in form as she already has constitutedherself in fact Constitution of United States makes itimpossible as you foresaw for the President to declarewar himself but if you act on his reply now receivedwe sincerely believe that this must inevitably follow Weare asking the President to allow publication of themessage but even if he does not agree to this for aday or two it is on the record and can afford the basisfor your action I do beg you and your colleagueswhose resolution we so much admired today not tomiss this sovereign opportunity of bringing about theworld-wide oceanic and economic coalition which must


be fatal to Nazi domination We see before us a definiteplan of campaign and the light which you spoke ofshines at the end of the tunnel

Finally in accordance with the Cabinetrsquos wishes I sent aformal message of good cheer to the French Governmentin which the note of an indissoluble union between our twocountries was struck for the first time


13VI40

In this solemn hour for the British and Frenchnations and for the cause of Freedom and Democracyto which they have avowed themselves His MajestyrsquosGovernment desire to pay to the Government of theFrench Republic the tribute which is due to the heroicfortitude and constancy of the French armies in battleagainst enormous odds Their effort is worthy of themost glorious traditions of France and has inflicteddeep and long-lasting injury upon the enemyrsquos strengthGreat Britain will continue to give the utmost aid in herpower We take this opportunity of proclaiming theindissoluble union of our two peoples and of our twoEmpires We cannot measure the various forms oftribulation which will fall upon our peoples in the nearfuture We are sure that the ordeal by fire will only fuzethem together into one unconquerable whole Werenew to the French Republic our pledge and resolve tocontinue the struggle at all costs in France in thisisland upon the oceans and in the air wherever it maylead us using all our resources to the utmost limit andsharing together the burden of repairing the ravages ofwar We shall never turn from the conflict until Francestands safe and erect in all her grandeur until thewronged and enslaved states and peoples have beenliberated and until civilisation is freed from thenightmare of Nazidom That this day will dawn we are


more sure than ever It may dawn sooner than we nowhave the right to expect

All these three messages were drafted by me before I wentto bed after midnight on the 13th They were writtenactually in the small hours of the 14thThe next day arrived a telegram from the Presidentexplaining that he could not agree to the publication of hismessage to Reynaud He himself according to MrKennedy had wished to do so but the State Departmentwhile in full sympathy with him saw the gravest dangersThe President thanked me for my account of the meeting atTours and complimented the British and FrenchGovernments on the courage of their troops He renewedthe assurances about furnishing all possible material andsupplies but he then said he had told AmbassadorKennedy to inform me that his message of the 14th was inno sense intended to commit and did not commit theGovernment of the United States to military participationThere was no authority under the American Constitutionexcept Congress which could make any commitment of thatnature He bore particularly in mind the question of theFrench Fleet Congress at his desire had appropriated fiftymillion dollars for the purpose of supplying food andclothing to civilian refugees in France Finally he assuredme that he appreciated the significance and weight of whatI had set forth in my messageThis was a disappointing telegramAround our table we all fully understood the risks thePresident ran of being charged with exceeding hisconstitutional authority and consequently of being defeatedon this issue at the approaching election on which our fateand much more depended I was convinced that he wouldgive up life itself to say nothing of public office for the


cause of world freedom now in such awful peril But whatwould have been the good of that Across the Atlantic Icould feel his suffering In the White House the torment wasof a different character from that of Bordeaux or LondonBut the degree of personal stress was not unequalIn my reply I tried to arm the President with somearguments which he could use to others about the dangerto the United States if Europe fell and Britain failed Thiswas no matter of sentiment but of life and death

Former NavalPerson toPresidentRoosevelt

14-15VI40

I am grateful to you for your telegram and I havereported its operative passages to Reynaud to whom Ihad imparted a rather more sanguine view He will Iam sure be disappointed at non-publication Iunderstand all your difficulties with American publicopinion and Congress but events are movingdownward at a pace where they will pass beyond thecontrol of American public opinion when at last it isripened Have you considered what offers Hitler maychoose to make to France He may say ldquoSurrender theFleet intact and I will leave you Alsace-Lorrainerdquo oralternatively ldquoIf you do not give me your ships I willdestroy your townsrdquo I am personally convinced thatAmerica will in the end go to all lengths but thismoment is supremely critical for France A declarationthat the United States will if necessary enter the warmight save France Failing that in a few days Frenchresistance may have crumpled and we shall be leftalone

Although the present Government and I personallywould never fail to send the Fleet across the Atlantic ifresistance was beaten down here a point may be


reached in the struggle where the present Ministers nolonger have control of affairs and when very easy termscould be obtained for the British island by theirbecoming a vassal state of the Hitler Empire A pro-German Government would certainly be called intobeing to make peace and might present to a shatteredor a starving nation an almost irresistible case for entiresubmission to the Nazi will The fate of the British Fleetas I have already mentioned to you would be decisiveon the future of the United States because if it werejoined to the fleets of Japan France and Italy and thegreat resources of German industry overwhelming seapower would be in Hitlerrsquos hands He might of courseuse it with a merciful moderation On the other hand hemight not This revolution in sea power might happenvery quickly and certainly long before the United Stateswould be able to prepare against it If we go down youmay have a United States of Europe under the Nazicommand far more numerous far stronger far betterarmed than the New World

I know well Mr President that your eye will alreadyhave searched these depths but I feel I have the rightto place on record the vital manner in which Americaninterests are at stake in our battle and that of France

I am sending you through Ambassador Kennedy apaper on destroyer strength prepared by the NavalStaff for your information If we have to keep as weshall the bulk of our destroyers on the East Coast toguard against invasion how shall we be able to copewith a German-Italian attack on the food and trade bywhich we live The sending of the thirty-five destroyersas I have already described will bridge the gap until ournew construction comes in at the end of the year Hereis a definite practical and possibly decisive step whichcan be taken at once and I urge most earnestly thatyou will weigh my words


Meanwhile the situation on the French front went from badto worse The German operations northwest of Paris inwhich our 51st Division had been lost had brought theenemy by June 9 to the lower reaches of the Seine andthe Oise On the southern banks the dispersed remnants ofthe Tenth and Seventh French Armies were hastilyorganising a defence they had been riven asunder and toclose the gap the garrison of the capital the so-calledArmeacutee de Paris had been marched out and interposedFarther to the east along the Aisne the Sixth Fourth andSecond Armies were in far better shape They had hadthree weeks in which to establish themselves and to absorbsuch reinforcements as had been sent During all the periodof Dunkirk and of the drive to Rouen they had been leftcomparatively undisturbed but their strength was small forthe hundred miles they had to hold and the enemy hadused the time to concentrate against them a great mass ofdivisions to deliver the final blow On June 9 it fell Despitea dogged resistance for the French were now fighting withgreat resolution bridgeheads were established south of theriver from Soissons to Rethel and in the next two daysthese were expanded until the Marne was reachedGerman Panzer divisions which had played so decisive apart in the drive down the coast were brought across to jointhe new battle Eight of these in two great thrusts turnedthe French defeat into a rout The French armiesdecimated and in confusion were quite unable to withstandthis powerful assembly of superior numbers equipmentand technique In four days by June 16 the enemy hadreached Orleacuteans and the Loire while to the east the otherthrust had passed through Dijon and Besanccedilon almost tothe Swiss frontier


West of Paris the remains of the Tenth Army theequivalent of no more than two divisions had been pressedback south-westward from the Seine towards Alenccedilon Thecapital fell on the 14th its defending armies the Seventhand the Armeacutee de Paris were scattered a great gap nowseparated the exiguous French and British forces in thewest from the rest and the remains of the once proud Armyof FranceAnd what of the Maginot Line the shield of France and itsdefenders Until June 14 no direct attack was made andalready some of the active formations leaving behind thegarrison troops had started to join if they could the fast-withdrawing armies of the centre But it was too late Onthat day the Maginot Line was penetrated beforeSaarbruecken and across the Rhine by Colmar theretreating French were caught up in the battle and unableto extricate themselves Two days later the Germanpenetration to Besanccedilon had cut off their retreat More thanfour hundred thousand men were surrounded without hope


of escape Many encircled garrisons held out desperatelythey refused to surrender until after the armistice whenFrench officers were despatched to give them the orderThe last forts obeyed on June 30 the commanderprotesting that his defences were still intact at every pointThus the vast disorganised battle drew to its conclusion allalong the French front It remains only to recount theslender part which the British were able to play

General Brooke had won distinction in the retreat toDunkirk and especially by his battle in the gap opened bythe Belgian surrender We had therefore chosen him tocommand the British troops which remained in France andall reinforcements until they should reach sufficientnumbers to require the presence of Lord Gort as an ArmyCommander Brooke had now arrived in France and on the14th he met Generals Weygand and Georges Weygandstated that the French forces were no longer capable oforganised resistance or concerted action The French Armywas broken into four groups of which its Tenth Army wasthe westernmost Weygand also told him that the AlliedGovernments had agreed that a bridgehead should becreated in the Brittany peninsula to be held jointly by theFrench and British troops on a line running roughly northand south through Rennes He ordered him to deploy hisforces on a defensive line running through this townBrooke pointed out that this line of defence was a hundredand fifty kilometres long and required at least fifteendivisions He was told that the instructions he was receivingmust be regarded as an orderIt is true that on June 11 at Briare Reynaud and I hadagreed to try to draw a kind of ldquoTorres Vedras linerdquo across


the foot of the Brittany peninsula Everything however wasdissolving at the same time and the plan for what it wasworth never reached the domain of action In itself the ideawas sound but there were no facts to clothe it with realityOnce the main French armies were broken or destroyedthis bridgehead precious though it was could not havebeen held for long against concentrated German attack Buteven a few weeksrsquo resistance here would have maintainedcontact with Britain and enabled large French withdrawalsto Africa from other parts of the immense front now torn toshreds If the battle in France was to continue it could beonly in the Brest peninsula and in wooded or mountainousregions like the Vosges The alternative for the French wassurrender Let none therefore mock at the conception of abridgehead in Brittany The Allied armies underEisenhower then an unknown American colonel bought itback for us later at a high priceGeneral Brooke after his talk with the French commandersand having measured from his own headquarters a scenewhich was getting worse every hour reported to the WarOffice and by telephone to Mr Eden that the position washopeless All further reinforcements should be stopped andthe remainder of the British Expeditionary Force nowamounting to a hundred and fifty thousand men should bere-embarked at once On the night of June 14 as I wasthought to be obdurate he rang me up on a telephone linewhich by luck and effort was open and pressed this viewupon me I could hear quite well and after ten minutes Iwas convinced that he was right and we must go Orderswere given accordingly He was released from Frenchcommand The back-loading of great quantities of storesequipment and men began The leading elements of theCanadian Division which had landed got back into theirships and the 52d Division which apart from its 157th


Brigade had not yet been committed to action retreated onBrest No British troops operating under the Tenth FrenchArmy were withdrawn but all else of ours took to the shipsat Brest Cherbourg St Malo and St Nazaire On June 15our troops were released from the orders of the TenthFrench Army and next day when it carried out a furtherwithdrawal to the south they moved towards CherbourgThe 157th Brigade after heavy fighting was extricated thatnight and retiring in their lorries embarked during the nightof June 1718 On June 17 it was announced that thePeacutetain Government had asked for an armistice ordering allFrench forces to cease fighting without evencommunicating this information to our troops GeneralBrooke was consequently told to come away with all menhe could embark and any equipment he could saveWe repeated now on a considerable scale though withlarger vessels the Dunkirk evacuation Over twentythousand Polish troops who refused to capitulate cut theirway to the sea and were carried by our ships to Britain TheGermans pursued our forces at all points In the Cherbourgpeninsula they were in contact with our rearguard ten milessouth of the harbour on the morning of the 18th The lastship left at 4 PM when the enemy were within three milesof the port Very few prisoners were caughtIn all there were evacuated from all French harbours136000 British troops and 310 guns a total with the Polesof 156000 men This reflects great credit on GeneralBrookersquos embarkation staff of whom the chief General deFonblanque a British officer died shortly afterwards as theresult of his exertionsAt Brest and the Western ports the evacuations werenumerous The German air attack on the transports washeavy One frightful incident occurred on the 17th at St


Nazaire The 20000-ton liner Lancastria with five thousandmen on board was bombed and set on fire just as she wasabout to leave A mass of flaming oil spread over the waterround the ship and upwards of three thousand menperished The rest were rescued under continued air attackby the devotion of the small craft When this news came tome in the quiet Cabinet Room during the afternoon Iforbade its publication saying ldquoThe newspapers have gotquite enough disaster for today at leastrdquo I had intended torelease the news a few days later but events crowdedupon us so black and so quickly that I forgot to lift the banand it was some years before the knowledge of this horrorbecame public

To lessen the shock of the impending French surrender itwas necessary at this time to send a message to theDominion Prime Ministers showing them that our resolve tocontinue the struggle although alone was not based uponmere obstinacy or desperation and to convince them bypractical and technical reasons of which they might well beunaware of the real strength of our position I thereforedictated the following statement on the afternoon of June16 a day already filled with much business

Prime Minister to thePrime Ministers ofCanada AustraliaNew Zealand andSouth Africa

16VI40

[After some sentences of introduction particular toeach]


I do not regard the situation as having passedbeyond our strength It is by no means certain that theFrench will not fight on in Africa and at sea butwhatever they do Hitler will have to break us in thisisland or lose the war Our principal danger is hisconcentrated air attack by bombing coupled withparachute and air-borne landings and attempts to runan invading force across the sea This danger hasfaced us ever since the beginning of the war and theFrench could never have saved us from it as he couldalways switch onto us Undoubtedly it is aggravated bythe conquests Hitler has made upon the Europeancoast close to our shores Nevertheless in principle thedanger is the same I do not see why we should not beable to meet it The Navy has never pretended toprevent a raid of five or ten thousand men but we donot see how a force of say eighty to a hundredthousand could be transported across the sea and stillless maintained in the teeth of superior sea power Aslong as our Air Force is in being it provides a powerfulaid to the Fleet in preventing sea-borne landings andwill take a very heavy toll of air-borne landings

Although we have suffered heavy losses byassisting the French and during the Dunkirk evacuationwe have managed to husband our air-fighter strength inspite of poignant appeals from France to throw itimprovidently into the great land battle which it couldnot have turned decisively I am happy to tell you that itis now as strong as it has ever been and that the flowof machines is coming forward far more rapidly thanever before in fact pilots have now become the limitingfactor at the moment Our fighter aircraft have beenwont to inflict a loss of two or two and a half to oneeven when fighting under the adverse conditions inFrance During the evacuation of Dunkirk which was asort of No Manrsquos Land we inflicted a loss of three orfour to one and often saw German formations turnaway from a quarter of their numbers of our planes Butall air authorities agree that the advantage in defendingthis country against an oversea air attack will be stillgreater because first we shall know pretty well by ourvarious devices where they are coming and because


our squadrons lie close enough together to enable usto concentrate against the attackers and provideenough to attack both the bombers and the protectingfighters at the same time All their shot-down machineswill be total losses many of ours and our pilots will fightagain Therefore I do not think it by any meansimpossible that we may so maul them that they will finddaylight attacks too expensive

The major danger will be from night attack on ouraircraft factories but this again is far less accuratethan daylight attack and we have many plans forminimising its effect Of course their numbers are muchgreater than ours but not so much greater as todeprive us of a good and reasonable prospect ofwearing them out after some weeks or even months ofair struggle Meanwhile of course our bomber forcewill be striking continually at their key points especiallyoil refineries and air factories and at their congestedand centralised war industry in the Ruhr We hope ourpeople will stand up to this bombardment as well as theenemy It will on both sides be on an unprecedentedscale All our information goes to show that theGermans have not liked what they have got so far

It must be remembered that now that the BEF ishome and largely rearmed or rearming if not upon aContinental scale at any rate good enough for Homedefence we have far stronger military forces in thisisland than we have ever had in the late war or in thiswar Therefore we hope that such numbers of theenemy as may be landed from the air or by sea-borneraid will be destroyed and be an example to those whotry to follow No doubt we must expect novel forms ofattack and attempts to bring tanks across the sea Weare preparing ourselves to deal with these as far as wecan foresee them No one can predict or guarantee thecourse of a life-and-death struggle of this character butwe shall certainly enter upon it in good heart

I have given you this full explanation to show youthat there are solid reasons behind our resolve not toallow the fate of France whatever it may be to deter usfrom going on to the end I personally believe that thespectacle of the fierce struggle and carnage in our


island will draw the United States into the war andeven if we should be beaten down through the superiornumbers of the enemyrsquos Air Force it will always bepossible as I indicated to the House of Commons in mylast speech to send our fleets across the oceanswhere they will protect the Empire and enable it tocontinue the war and the blockade I trust in conjunc-tion with the United States until the Hitler reacutegimebreaks under the strain We shall let you know at everystage how you can help being assured that you will doall in human power as we for our part are entirelyresolved to do

I composed this in the Cabinet Room and it was typed as Ispoke The door to the garden was wide open and outsidethe sun shone warm and bright Air Chief Marshal Newallthe Chief of the Air Staff sat on the terrace meanwhile andwhen I had finished revising the draft I took it out to him incase there were any improvements or corrections to bemade He was evidently moved and presently said heagreed with every word I was comforted and fortifiedmyself by putting my convictions upon record and when I


read the message over the final time before sending it off Ifelt a glow of sober confidence This was certainly justifiedby what happened All came true


10The Bordeaux Armistice

The FrenchGovernment Moves to BordeauxmdashGeneral Weygandrsquos Attitude mdash Weygand andReynaud mdash M Chautempsrsquo Insidious Proposal mdashThe FrenchDecision to Ask for TermsmdashBritishInsistence on the Safeguarding of the French FleetmdashMy Telegram to Reynaud of June 16 mdash A NewIssue ArisesmdashBritish Offer of Indissoluble Unionwith FrancemdashHigh Hopes of General de Gaullethat This Would Strengthen M ReynaudmdashMReynaudrsquos Satisfaction mdash My Telegram of June16 SuspendedmdashPlan for Me to Visit Bordeaux byCruiser with the Labour and Liberal Party LeadersFrustrated mdash Unfavourable Reception of theBritish Offer mdash Fall of the Reynaud Cabinet mdashReynaudrsquos Resignation mdash A Conversation with MMonnet and General de Gaulle in Downing StreetmdashMarshal Peacutetain Forms a French Government foran Armistice mdash My Message to Marshal Peacutetainand General Weygand June 17 mdash My Broadcastof June 17 mdash General Spears Plans the Escapeof General de Gaulle mdash Further Talk of Resis-tance in Africa mdash Mandelrsquos Intentions mdash AdmiralDarlanrsquos TrapmdashVoyage of the ldquoMassiliardquomdash Mandelat Casablanca mdash Mr Duff Cooperrsquos MissionmdashFateoftheFrench Patriots mdash A HypotheticalSpeculation mdash My Settled Conviction


WE MUST NOW QUIT the field of military disaster for theconvulsions in the French Cabinet and the personages whosurrounded it at BordeauxIt is not easy to establish the exact sequence of events TheBritish War Cabinet sat almost continuously and messageswere sent off from time to time as decisions were taken Asthey took two or three hours to transmit in cipher andprobably another hour to deliver the telephone was freelyused by the officials of the Foreign Office to convey thesubstance to our Ambassador and he also used thetelephone frequently in reply Therefore there are overlapsand short-circuits which are confusing Events were movingat such a speed on both sides of the Channel that it wouldbe misleading to present the tale as if it were an orderlyflow of argument and decisionM Reynaud reached the new seat of government fromTours in the evening of the 14th He received the BritishAmbassador about nine orsquoclock Sir Ronald Campbellinformed him that His Majestyrsquos Government intended toinsist on the terms of the agreement of March 28 bindingboth parties not to make any terms with the enemy He alsooffered to provide all the necessary shipping in the event ofthe French Government resolving to move to North AfricaBoth these statements were in accordance with theAmbassadorrsquos current instructionsOn the morning of the 15th Reynaud again received theAmbassador and told him that he had definitely decided todivide the Government in half and to establish a centre ofauthority beyond the sea Such a policy would obviouslycarry with it the removal of the French Fleet to ports beyondGerman power Later that morning President Rooseveltrsquosreply to Reynaudrsquos appeal of June 13 was receivedAlthough I had made the best of it in my telegram to the


French Premier I knew it was bound to disappoint himMaterial aid if Congress approved was offered but therewas no question of any American entry into the war Francehad no reason to expect such a declaration at this momentand the President had not either the power to give it himselfor to obtain it from Congress There had been no meetingsof the Council of Ministers since that at Cangeacute near Tourson the evening of the 13th The Ministers having now allreached Bordeaux the Council was summoned for theafternoon

General Weygand had been for some days convinced thatall further resistance was vain He therefore wished to forcethe French Government to ask for an armistice while theFrench Army still retained enough discipline and strength tomaintain internal order on the morrow of defeat He had aprofound lifelong dislike of the parliamentary reacutegime of theThird Republic As an ardently religious Catholic he saw inthe ruin which had overwhelmed his country thechastisement of God for its abandonment of the Christianfaith He therefore used the power of his supreme militaryposition far beyond the limits which his professionalresponsibilities great as they were justified or required Heconfronted the Prime Minister with declarations that theFrench armies could fight no more and that it was time tostop a horrible and useless massacre before generalanarchy supervenedPaul Reynaud on the other hand realised that the battle inFrance was over but still hoped to carry on the war fromAfrica and the French Empire and with the French FleetNone of the other states overrun by Hitler had withdrawnfrom the war Physically in their own lands they were


gripped but from overseas their Governments had kept theflag flying and the national cause alive Reynaud wished tofollow their example and with much more solid resourcesHe sought a solution on the lines of the Dutch capitulationThis while it left the Army whose chiefs had refused tofight any longer free to lay down its arms wherever it was incontact with the enemy nevertheless preserved to theState its sovereign right to continue the struggle by all themeans in its powerThis issue was fought out between the Premier and theGeneralissimo at a stormy interview before the Councilmeeting Reynaud offered Weygand written authority fromthe Government to order the ldquoCease Firerdquo Weygandrefused with indignation the suggestion of a militarysurrender ldquoHe would never accept the casting of thisshame upon the banners of the French Armyrdquo The act ofsurrender which he deemed imperative must be that of theGovernment and of the State to which the army hecommanded would dutifully conform In so acting GeneralWeygand though a sincere and unselfish man behavedwrongly He asserted the right of a soldier to dominate theduly constituted Government of the Republic and thus tobring the whole resistance not only of France but of herEmpire to an end contrary to the decision of his politicaland lawful chiefApart from these formalities and talk about the honour ofthe French Army there stood a practical point An armisticeformally entered into by the French Government wouldmean the end of the war for France By negotiation part ofthe country might be left unoccupied and part of the Armyfree whereas if the war were continued from overseas allwho had not escaped from France would be controlleddirectly by the Germans and millions of Frenchmen wouldbe carried off to Germany as prisoners of war without the


protection of any agreement This was a substantialargument but it belonged to the Government of theRepublic and not to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army todecide upon it Weygandrsquos position that because the Armyunder his orders would in his opinion fight no more theFrench Republic must give in and order its armed forces toobey an order which he was certainly willing to carry outfinds no foundation in the law and practice of civilised statesor in the professional honour of a soldier In theory at leastthe Prime Minister had his remedy He could have repliedldquoYou are affronting the Constitution of the Republic You aredismissed from this moment from your command I willobtain the necessary sanction from the PresidentrdquoUnfortunately M Reynaud was not sufficiently sure of hisposition Behind the presumptuous General loomed theillustrious Marshal Peacutetain the centre of the band ofdefeatist Ministers whom Reynaud had so recently and soimprovidently brought into the French Government andCouncil and who were all resolved to stop the war Behindthese again crouched the sinister figure of Laval who hadinstalled himself at Bordeaux City Hall surrounded by aclique of agitated Senators and Deputies Lavalrsquos policy hadthe force and merit of simplicity France must not only makepeace with Germany she must change sides she mustbecome the ally of the conqueror and by her loyalty andservices against the common foe across the Channel saveher interests and her provinces and finish up on thevictorious side Evidently M Reynaud exhausted by theordeals through which he had passed had not the life orstrength for so searching a personal ordeal which wouldindeed have taxed the resources of an Oliver Cromwell orof a Clemenceau of Stalin or of HitlerIn the discussions on the afternoon of the 15th at which thePresident of the Republic was present Reynaud having


explained the situation to his colleagues appealed toMarshal Peacutetain to persuade General Weygand to theCabinet view He could not have chosen a worse envoyThe Marshal left the room There was an interval After awhile he returned with Weygand whose position he nowsupported At this serious juncture M Chautemps animportant Minister slid in an insidious proposal which worethe aspect of a compromise and was attractive to thewaverers He stated in the name of the Leftist elements ofthe Cabinet that Reynaud was right in affirming that anagreement with the enemy was impossible but that it wouldbe prudent to make a gesture which would unite FranceThey should ask the Germans what the conditions ofarmistice would be remaining entirely free to reject them Itwas not of course possible to embark on this slippery slopeand stop The mere announcement that the FrenchGovernment were asking the Germans on what terms anarmistice would be granted was sufficient in itself to destroywhat remained of the morale of the French Army Howcould the soldier be ordered to cast away his life inobdurate resistance after so fatal a signal had been givenHowever combined with the demonstration which they hadwitnessed from Peacutetain and Weygand the Chautempssuggestion had a deadly effect on the majority It wasagreed to ask His Majestyrsquos Government how they wouldview such a step informing them at the same time that inno circumstances would the surrender of the Fleet beallowed Reynaud now rose from the table and declared hisintention to resign But the President of the Republicrestrained him and declared that if Reynaud went he wouldgo too When the confused discussion was resumed noclear distinction was drawn between declining to surrenderthe French Fleet to the Germans and putting it out ofGerman power by sailing it to ports outside France It wasagreed that the British Government should be asked to


consent to the inquiry about the German terms Themessage was immediately despatched

The next morning Reynaud received the BritishAmbassador again and was told that the British wouldaccept the French request on the condition that the FrenchFleet was placed beyond German power ndash in fact that itshould be directed to British ports These instructions hadbeen telephoned to Campbell from London to save time Ateleven orsquoclock the distracted Council of Ministers met againPresident Lebrun being present The President of theSenate M Jeanneney was brought in to endorse both onhis own behalf and on that of his colleague the President ofthe Chamber M Herriot the proposal of the Premier totransfer the Government to North Africa Up rose MarshalPeacutetain and read a letter which it is believed had beenwritten for him by another hand resigning from the CabinetHaving finished his speech he prepared to leave the roomHe was persuaded by the President of the Republic toremain on the condition that an answer would be given tohim during the day The Marshal had also complained ofthe delay in asking for an armistice Reynaud replied that ifone asked an ally to free one from an obligation it wascustomary to await the answer The session then closedAfter luncheon the Ambassador brought to Reynaud thetextual answer of the British Government of which he hadalready given the telephoned purport in his conversation ofthe morning

In these days the War Cabinet were in a state of unusualemotion The fall and the fate of France dominated their


minds Our own plight and what we should have to faceand face alone seemed to take a second place Grief forour ally in her agony and desire to do anything in humanpower to aid her was the prevailing mood There was alsothe overpowering importance of making sure of the FrenchFleet It was in this spirit that a proposal for ldquoan indissolubleunionrdquo between France and Britain was conceivedI was not the prime mover I first heard of a definite plan ata luncheon at the Carlton Club on the 15th at which werepresent Lord Halifax M Corbin Sir Robert Vansittart andone or two others It was evident that there had beenconsiderable discussion beforehand On the 14th Vansittartand Desmond Morton had met M Monnet and M Pleven(members of the French Economic Mission in London) andbeen joined by General de Gaulle who had flown over tomake arrangements for shipping to carry the FrenchGovernment and as many French troops as possible toAfrica These gentlemen had evolved the outline of adeclaration for a Franco-British Union with the object apartfrom its general merits of giving M Reynaud some newfact of a vivid and stimulating nature with which to carry amajority of his Cabinet into the move to Africa and thecontinuance of the war My first reaction was unfavourableI asked a number of questions of a critical character andwas by no means convinced However at the end of ourlong Cabinet that afternoon the subject was raised I wassomewhat surprised to see the staid stolid experiencedpoliticians of all parties engage themselves so passionatelyin an immense design whose implications andconsequences were not in any way thought out I did notresist but yielded easily to these generous surges whichcarried our resolves to a very high level of unselfish andundaunted action


When the War Cabinet met the next morning we firstaddressed ourselves to the answer to be given to MReynaudrsquos request sent the night before for the formalrelease of France from her obligations under the Anglo-French Agreement The Cabinet authorised the followingreply which at their request I went into the next room anddrafted myself It was despatched from London at 1235 PM on the 16th It endorsed and repeated in a formalmanner the telephoned instructions sent to Campbell earlyin the morning

Foreign Office to Sir R CampbellPlease give M Reynaud the following message

which has been approved by the Cabinet

Mr Churchill toM Reynaud

16 June1940 1235PM

Our agreement forbidding separate negotiationswhether for armistice or peace was made with theFrench Republic and not with any particular Frenchadministration or statesman It therefore involves thehonour of France Nevertheless provided but onlyprovided that the French Fleet is sailed forthwith forBritish harbours pending negotiations His MajestyrsquosGovernment give their full consent to an inquiry by theFrench Government to ascertain the terms of anarmistice for France His Majestyrsquos Government beingresolved to continue the war wholly exclude them-selves from all part in the above-mentioned inquiryconcerning an armistice

Early in the afternoon a second message in similar termswas sent by the Foreign Office to Sir Ronald Campbell(June 16 310 PM)Both messages were stiff and embodied the main purposeof the War Cabinet at their morning meeting


Foreign Office to Sir R CampbellYou should inform M Reynaud as followsWe expect to be consulted as soon as any armistice

terms are received This is necessary not merely invirtue of Treaty forbidding separate peace or armisticebut also in view of vital consequences of any armisticeto ourselves having regard especially to the fact thatBritish troops are fighting with French Army You shouldimpress on French Government that in stipulating forremoval of French Fleet to British ports we have in mindFrench interests as well as our own and are convincedthat it will strengthen the hands of the FrenchGovernment in any armistice discussions if they canshow that the French Navy is out of reach of theGerman forces As regards the French Air Force weassume that every effort will be made to fly it to NorthAfrica unless indeed the French Government wouldprefer to send it to this country

We count on the French Government doing all theycan both before and during any armistice discussions toextricate the Polish Belgian and Czech troops atpresent in France and to send them to North AfricaArrangements are being made to receive Polish andBelgian Governments in this country

We reassembled at three orsquoclock that same afternoon Irecalled to the Cabinet that at the conclusion of our meetingthe day before there had been some discussion on aproposal for the issue of some further declaration of closerunion between France and Great Britain I had seenGeneral de Gaulle in the morning and he had impressedon me that some dramatic move was essential to give MReynaud the support which he needed to keep hisGovernment in the war and suggested that a proclamationof the indissoluble union of the French and British peopleswould serve the purpose Both General de Gaulle and M


Corbin had been concerned at the sharpness of thedecision reached by the War Cabinet that morning andembodied in the telegrams already despatched I had heardthat a new declaration had been drafted for considerationand that General de Gaulle had telephoned to M ReynaudAs a result it had seemed advisable to suspend action forthe moment A telegram had therefore been sent to SirRonald Campbell instructing him to suspend deliveryaccordinglyThe Foreign Secretary then said that after our morningmeeting he had seen Sir Robert Vansittart whom he hadpreviously asked to draft some dramatic announcementwhich might strengthen M Reynaudrsquos hand Vansittart hadbeen in consultation with General de Gaulle M Monnet MPleven and Major Morton Between them they had drafteda proclamation General de Gaulle had impressed uponthem the need for publishing the document as quickly aspossible and wished to take the draft back with him toFrance that night De Gaulle had also suggested that Ishould go to meet M Reynaud next dayThe draft statement was passed round and everyone readit with deep attention All the difficulties were immediatelyapparent but in the end a Declaration of Union seemed tocommand general assent I stated that my first instinct hadbeen against the idea but that in this crisis we must not letourselves be accused of lack of imagination Somedramatic announcement was clearly necessary to keep theFrench going The proposal could not be lightly turnedaside and I was encouraged at finding so great a body ofopinion in the War Cabinet favourable to itAt 355 PM we were told that the French Council ofMinisters would meet at five to decide whether furtherresistance was possible Secondly General de Gaulle had


been informed by M Reynaud on the telephone that if afavourable answer on the proposed proclamation of unitywas received by five orsquoclock M Reynaud felt he could holdthe position On this the War Cabinet approved the finaldraft proclamation of an Anglo-French Union andauthorised its despatch to M Reynaud by the hand ofGeneral de Gaulle This was telephoned to M Reynaudforthwith The War Cabinet further invited me Mr Attleeand Sir Archibald Sinclair representing the three Britishparties to meet M Reynaud at the earliest moment todiscuss the draft proclamation and related questionsHere is the final draft

DECLARATION OF UNIONAt this most fateful moment in the history of the

modern world the Governments of the United Kingdomand the French Republic make this declaration ofindissoluble union and unyielding resolution in theircommon defence of justice and freedom againstsubjection to a system which reduces mankind to a lifeof robots and slaves

The two Governments declare that France andGreat Britain shall no longer be two nations but oneFranco-British Union

The constitution of the Union will provide for jointorgans of defence foreign financial and economicpolicies

Every citizen of France will enjoy immediatelycitizenship of Great Britain every British subject willbecome a citizen of France

Both countries will share responsibility for the repairof the devastation of war wherever it occurs in theirterritories and the resources of both shall be equallyand as one applied to that purpose

During the war there shall be a single War Cabinetand all the forces of Britain and France whether onland sea or in the air will be placed under its directionIt will govern from wherever it best can The two


Parliaments will be formally associated The Nations ofthe British Empire are already forming new armiesFrance will keep her available forces in the field on thesea and in the air The Union appeals to the UnitedStates to fortify the economic resources of the Alliesand to bring her powerful material aid to the commoncause

The Union will concentrate its whole energy againstthe power of the enemy no matter where the battlemay be

And thus we shall conquer

Of all this Parliament was informed in due course But theissue by then had ceased to countI did not as has been seen draft the statement myself Itwas composed around the table and I made mycontribution to it I then took it into the next room where deGaulle was waiting with Vansittart Desmond Morton andM Corbin The General read it with an air of unwontedenthusiasm and as soon as contact with Bordeaux couldbe obtained began to telephone it to M Reynaud Hehoped with us that this solemn pledge of union andbrotherhood between the two nations and empires wouldgive the struggling French Premier the means to carry hisGovernment to Africa with all possible forces and order theFrench Navy to sail for harbours outside impending Germancontrol

We must now pass to the other end of the wire The BritishAmbassador delivered the two messages in answer to theFrench request to be released from their obligation ofMarch 28 According to his account M Reynaud who wasin a dejected mood did not take them well He at onceremarked that the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean


Fleet to British ports would invite the immediate seizure ofTunis by Italy and also create difficulties for the BritishFleet He had got no further than this when my messagetelephoned by General de Gaulle came through ldquoIt actedrdquosaid the Ambassador ldquolike a tonicrdquo Reynaud said that for adocument like that he would fight to the last In came at thatmoment M Mandel and M Marin They obviously wereequally relieved M Reynaud then left ldquowith a light steprdquo toread the document to the President of the Republic Hebelieved that armed with this immense guarantee hewould be able to carry his Council with him on the policy ofretiring to Africa and waging war My telegram instructingthe Ambassador to delay the presentation of the two stiffmessages or anyhow to suspend action upon them arrivedimmediately after the Premier had gone A messenger wastherefore sent after him to say that the two earliermessages should be considered asldquocancelledrdquoldquoSuspendedrdquo would have been a better wordThe War Cabinet had not altered its position in any respectWe felt however that it would be better to give theDeclaration of Union its full chance under the mostfavourable conditions If the French Council of Ministerswere rallied by it the greater would carry the less and theremoval of the Fleet from German power would followautomatically If our offer did not find favour our rights andclaims would revive in their full force We could not tell whatwas going on inside the French Government nor know thatthis was the last time we should ever be able to deal withM ReynaudI had spoken to him on the telephone some time this dayproposing that I should come out immediately to see him Inview of the uncertainty about what was happening or aboutto happen at Bordeaux my colleagues in the War Cabinetwished me to go in a cruiser and a rendezvous was duly


arranged for the next day off the Brittany coast I ought tohave flown But even so it would have been too lateThe following was sent from the Foreign Office

To Sir RCampbellBordeaux

June 16645 PM

The PM accompanied by the Lord Privy SealSecretary of State for Air and three Chiefs of Staff andcertain others arrive at Concarneau at 12 noontomorrow the 17th in a cruiser for a meeting with MReynaud General de Gaulle has been informed of theabove and has expressed the view that time andrendezvous would be convenient We suggest themeeting be held on board as arousing less attention HMS Berkeley has been warned to be at the disposal ofM Reynaud and party if desired

And also from the Foreign Secretary by telephone at 8 PMJune 16

Following is reason why you have been asked tosuspend action on my last two telegrams

After consultation with General de Gaulle PM hasdecided to meet M Reynaud tomorrow in Brittany tomake a further attempt to dissuade the FrenchGovernment from asking for an armistice For thispurpose on the advice of General de Gaulle he willoffer to M Reynaud to join in issuing forthwith adeclaration announcing immediate constitution ofclosest Anglo-French Union in all spheres in order tocarry on the war Text of draft declaration as authorisedby HMG is contained in my immediately followingtelegram You should read this text to M Reynaud atonce

An outline of this proposed declaration has alreadybeen telephoned by General de Gaulle to M Reynaudwho has replied that such a declaration by the two


Governments would make all the difference to thedecision of the French Government General isreturning tonight with copy

Our War Cabinet sat until six orsquoclock on the 16th andthereafter I set out on my mission I took with me theleaders of the Labour and Liberal Parties the three Chiefsof Staff and various important officers and officials Aspecial train was waiting at Waterloo We could reachSouthampton in two hours and a night of steaming at thirtyknots in the cruiser would bring us to the rendezvous bynoon on the 17th We had taken our seats in the train Mywife had come to see me off There was an odd delay instarting Evidently some hitch had occurred Presently myprivate secretary arrived from Downing Street breathlesswith the following message from Campbell at Bordeaux

Ministerial crisis has openedhellip Hope to have newsby midnight Meanwhile meeting arranged for tomorrowimpossible

On this I returned to Downing Street with a heavy heart

The final scene in the Reynaud Cabinet was as followsThe hopes which M Reynaud had founded upon theDeclaration of Union were soon dispelled Rarely has sogenerous a proposal encountered such a hostile receptionThe Premier read the document twice to the Council Hedeclared himself strongly for it and added that he wasarranging a meeting with me for the next day to discuss thedetails But the agitated Ministers some famous somenobodies torn by division and under the terrible hammer ofdefeat were staggered Some we are told had heardabout it by a tapping of telephones These were the


defeatists Most were wholly unprepared to receive such far-reaching themes The overwhelming feeling of the Councilwas to reject the whole plan Surprise and mistrustdominated the majority and even the most friendly andresolute were baffled The Council had met expecting toreceive the answer to the French request on which theyhad all agreed that Britain should release France from herobligations of March 28 in order that the French might askthe Germans what their terms of armistice would be It ispossible even probable that if our formal answer had beenlaid before them the majority would have accepted ourprimary condition about sending their Fleet to Britain or atleast would have made some other suitable proposal andthus have freed them to open negotiations with the enemywhile reserving to themselves a final option of retirement toAfrica if the German conditions were too severe But nowthere was a classic example of ldquoOrder counter-orderdisorderrdquoPaul Reynaud was quite unable to overcome theunfavourable impression which the proposal of Anglo-French Union created The defeatist section led by MarshalPeacutetain refused even to examine it Violent charges weremade ldquoIt was a last-minute planrdquoldquoa surpriserdquoldquoa scheme toput France in tutelage or to carry off her colonial empirerdquo Itrelegated France so they said to the position of aDominion Others complained that not even equality ofstatus was offered to the French because Frenchmen wereto receive only the citizenship of the British Empire insteadof that of Great Britain while the British were to be citizensof France This suggestion is contradicted by the textBeyond these came other arguments Weygand hadconvinced Peacutetain without much difficulty that England waslost High French military authorities ndash perhaps Weygandhimself ndash had advised ldquoIn three weeks England will have


her neck wrung like a chickenrdquo To make a union with GreatBritain was according to Peacutetain ldquofusion with a corpserdquoYbarnegaray who had been so stout in the previous warexclaimed ldquoBetter be a Nazi province At least we knowwhat that meansrdquo Senator Reibel a personal friend ofGeneral Weygandrsquos declared that this scheme meantcomplete destruction for France and anyhow definitesubordination to England In vain did Reynaud reply ldquoIprefer to collaborate with my allies rather than with myenemiesrdquo And Mandel ldquoWould you rather be a Germandistrict than a British Dominionrdquo But all was in vainWe are assured that Reynaudrsquos statement of our proposalwas never put to a vote in the Council It collapsed of itselfThis was a personal and fatal reverse for the strugglingPremier which marked the end of his influence andauthority upon the Council All further discussion turnedupon the armistice and asking the Germans what termsthey would give and in this M Chautemps was cool andsteadfast Our two telegrams about the Fleet were neverpresented to the Council The demand that it should besailed to British ports as a prelude to the negotiations withthe Germans was never considered by the ReynaudCabinet which was now in complete decomposition Hereagain there was no vote At about eight orsquoclock Reynaudutterly exhausted by the physical and mental strain to whichhe had for so many days been subjected sent hisresignation to the President and advised him to send forMarshal Peacutetain This action must be judged precipitate Hestill seems to have cherished the hope that he could keephis rendezvous with me the next day and spoke of this toGeneral Spears ldquoTomorrow there will be anotherGovernment and you will no longer speak for anyonerdquo saidSpearsAccording to Campbell (sent by telephone June 16)


M Reynaud who had been so heartened thisafternoon by PMrsquos magnificent message told us laterthat forces in favour of ascertaining terms of armisticehad become too strong for him He had read themessage twice to Council of Ministers and explained itsimport and the hope which it held out for the future Ithad been of no avail

We worked on him for half an hour encouraginghim to try to get rid of the evil influences among hiscolleagues After seeing M Mandel for a moment wethen called for second time today on the President ofSenate M Jeanneney whose views (like those ofPresident of Chamber) are sound in hope of his beingable to influence President of Republic to insist on MReynaud forming new Government

We begged him to make it very clear to Presidentthat offer contained in PMrsquos message would not beextended to a Government which entered intonegotiation with enemy

An hour or so later M Reynaud informed us that hewas beaten and had handed in his resignationCombination of Marshal Peacutetain and General Weygand(who were living in another world and imagined theycould sit round a green table discussing armistice termsin the old manner) had proved too much for weakmembers of Government on whom they worked bywaving the spectre of revolution

On the afternoon of June 16 M Monnet and General deGaulle visited me in the Cabinet Room The General in hiscapacity of Under-Secretary of State for National Defencehad just ordered the French ship Pasteur which wascarrying weapons to Bordeaux from America to proceedinstead to a British port Monnet was very active upon aplan to transfer all French contracts for munitions inAmerica to Britain if France made a separate peace He


evidently expected this and wished to save as much aspossible from what seemed to him to be the wreck of theworld His whole attitude in this respect was most helpfulThen he turned to our sending all our remaining fighter airsquadrons to share in the final battle in France which wasof course already over I told him that there was nopossibility of this being done Even at this stage he used theusual arguments ndashldquothe decisive battlerdquoldquonow or neverrdquoldquoifFrance falls all fallsrdquo and so forth But I could not doanything to oblige him in this field My two French visitorsthen got up and moved towards the door Monnet leadingAs they reached it de Gaulle who had hitherto scarcelyuttered a single word turned back and taking two or threepaces towards me said in English ldquoI think you are quiterightrdquo Under an impassive imperturbable demeanour heseemed to me to have a remarkable capacity for feelingpain I preserved the impression in contact with this verytall phlegmatic man ldquoHere is the Constable of Francerdquo Hereturned that afternoon in a British aeroplane which I hadplaced at his disposal to Bordeaux But not for long

Forthwith Marshal Peacutetain formed a French Governmentwith the main purpose of seeking an immediate armisticefrom Germany Late on the night of June 16 the defeatistgroup of which he was the head was already so shapedand knit together that the process did not take long MChautemps (ldquoto ask for terms is not necessarily to acceptthemrdquo) was Vice-President of the Council GeneralWeygand whose view was that all was over held theMinistry of Defence Admiral Darlan was Minister of Marineand M Baudouin Minister for Foreign Affairs


The only hitch apparently arose over M Laval TheMarshalrsquos first thought had been to offer him the post ofMinister of Justice Laval brushed this aside with disdainHe demanded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from whichposition alone he conceived it possible to carry out his planof reversing the alliances of France finishing up Englandand joining as a minor partner the New Nazi EuropeMarshal Peacutetain surrendered at once to the vehemence ofthis formidable personality M Baudouin who had alreadyundertaken the Foreign Office for which he knew himself tobe utterly inadequate was quite ready to give it up Butwhen he mentioned the fact to M Charles-RouxPermanent Under-Secretary to the Ministry of ForeignAffairs the latter was indignant He enlisted the support ofWeygand When Weygand entered the room andaddressed the illustrious Marshal Laval became so furiousthat both the military chiefs were overwhelmed TheGeneral fled and the Marshal submitted The permanentofficial however stood firm He refused point-blank toserve under Laval Confronted with this the Marshal againsubsided and after a violent scene Laval departed in wrathand dudgeonThis was a critical moment When four months later onOctober 28 Laval eventually became Foreign Ministerthere was a new consciousness of military values Britishresistance to Germany was by then a factor Apparently theisland could not be entirely discounted Anyhow its neckhad not been ldquowrung like a chickenrsquos in three weeksrdquo Thiswas a new fact and a fact at which the whole French nationrejoiced


Our telegram of the 16th had made our assent to inquiriesabout an armistice conditional upon the sailing of theFrench Fleet to British harbours It had already beenpresented formally to Marshal Peacutetain The War Cabinetapproved at my suggestion a further messageemphasising the point But we were talking to the voidOn the 17th also I sent a personal message to MarshalPeacutetain and General Weygand of which copies were to befurnished by our Ambassador to the French President andAdmiral Darlan

I wish to repeat to you my profound conviction thatthe illustrious Marshal Peacutetain and the famous GeneralWeygand our comrades in two great wars against theGermans will not injure their ally by delivering over tothe enemy the fine French Fleet Such an act wouldscarify their names for a thousand years of history Yetthis result may easily come by frittering away these fewprecious hours when the Fleet can be sailed to safety inBritish or American ports carrying with it the hope ofthe future and the honour of France

In order that these appeals might not lack personalreinforcement on the spot we sent the First Sea Lord whobelieved himself to be in intimate personal and professionaltouch with Admiral Darlan the First Lord Mr A VAlexander and Lord Lloyd Secretary of State for theColonies so long known as a friend of France All thesethree laboured to make what contacts they could with thenew Ministers during the 19th They received many solemnassurances that the Fleet would never be allowed to fallinto German hands But no more French warships movedbeyond the reach of the swiftly approaching German power


At the desire of the Cabinet I had broadcast the followingstatement on the evening of June 17

The news from France is very bad and I grieve forthe gallant French people who have fallen into thisterrible misfortune Nothing will alter our feelingstowards them or our faith that the genius of France willrise again What has happened in France makes nodifference to our actions and purpose We havebecome the sole champions now in arms to defend theworld cause We shall do our best to be worthy of thishigh honour We shall defend our island home andwith the British Empire we shall fight on unconquerableuntil the curse of Hitler is lifted from the brows ofmankind We are sure that in the end all will come right

On the morning of the 17th I mentioned to my colleaguesin the Cabinet a telephone conversation which I had hadduring the night with General Spears who said he did notthink he could perform any useful service in the newstructure at Bordeaux He spoke with some anxiety aboutthe safety of General de Gaulle Spears had apparentlybeen warned that as things were shaping it might be wellfor de Gaulle to leave France I readily assented to a goodplan being made for this So that very morning ndash the 17th ndashde Gaulle went to his office in Bordeaux made a number ofengagements for the afternoon as a blind and then droveto the airfield with his friend Spears to see him off Theyshook hands and said good-bye and as the plane began tomove de Gaulle stepped in and slammed the door Themachine soared off into the air while the French police andofficials gaped De Gaulle carried with him in this smallaeroplane the honour of France


That same evening he made his memorable broadcast tothe French people One passage should be quoted here

France is not alone She has a vast Empire behindher She can unite with the British Empire which holdsthe seas and is continuing the struggle She can utiliseto the full as England is doing the vast industrialresources of the United States

Other Frenchmen who wished to fight on were not sofortunate When the Peacutetain Government was formed theplan of going to Africa to set up a centre of power outsideGerman control was still open It was discussed at ameeting of the Peacutetain Cabinet on June 18 The sameevening President Lebrun Peacutetain and the Presidents of theSenate and the Chamber met together There seems tohave been general agreement at least to send arepresentative body to North Africa Even the Marshal wasnot hostile He himself intended to stay but saw no reasonwhy Chautemps Vice-President of the Council should notgo and act in his name When rumours of an impendingexodus ran round agitated Bordeaux Weygand was hostileSuch a move he thought would wreck the ldquohonourablerdquoarmistice negotiations which had already been begun byway of Madrid on French initiative on June 17 Laval wasdeeply alarmed He feared that the setting-up of aneffective resistance administration outside France wouldfrustrate the policy on which he was resolved Weygandand Laval set to work on the clusters of Deputies andSenators crowded into BordeauxDarlan as Minister of Marine took a different view To packoff all the principal critics of his conduct in a ship seemed atthe moment to him a most convenient solution of manydifficulties Once aboard all those who went would be in hispower and there would be plenty of time for the


Government to settle what to do With the approval of thenew Cabinet he offered passages on the armed auxiliarycruiser Massilia to all political figures of influence whowished to go to Africa The ship was to sail from the mouthof the Gironde on the 20th Many however who hadplanned to go to Africa including Jeanneney and Herriotsuspected a trap and preferred to travel overland throughSpain The final party apart from refugees consisted oftwenty-four Deputies and one Senator and includedMandel Campinchi and Daladier who had all been activelypressing for the move to Africa On the afternoon of the21st the Massilia sailed On the 23d the shiprsquos radioannounced that the Peacutetain Government had accepted andsigned the armistice with Germany Campinchi immediatelytried to persuade the captain to set his course for Englandbut this officer no doubt had his instructions and met hisformer political chief of two days before with a bleak refusalThe unlucky band of patriots passed anxious hours till onthe evening of June 24 the Massilia anchored atCasablancaMandel now acted with his usual decision He had withDaladier drafted a proclamation setting up a resistanceadministration in North Africa with himself as Premier Hewent on shore and after calling on the British Consulestablished himself at the Hocirctel Excelsior He thenattempted to send his proclamation out through the HavasAgency When General Noguegraves read its text he wasdisturbed He intercepted the message and it wastelegraphed not to the world but to Darlan and Peacutetain Theyhad now made up their minds to have no alternative andpotentially rival Government outside German powerMandel was arrested at his hotel and brought before thelocal court but the magistrate afterwards dismissed byVichy declared there was no case against him and set him


free He was however by the orders of Governor-GeneralNoguegraves rearrested and put back on the Massilia whichhenceforth was detained in the harbour under strict controlwithout its passengers having any communication with theshoreWithout of course knowing any of the facts here set forth Iwas already concerned about the fate of Frenchmen whowished to fight on


24VI40

It seems most important to establish now before thetrap closes an organisation for enabling French officersand soldiers as well as important technicians whowish to fight to make their way to various ports A sortof ldquounderground railwayrdquo as in the olden days of slaveryshould be established and a Scarlet Pimpernelorganisation set up I have no doubt there will be asteady flow of determined men and we need all we canget for the defence of the French colonies TheAdmiralty and Air Force must co-operate General deGaulle and his Committee would of course be theoperative authority

At our meeting of the War Cabinet late at night on June 25we heard among other things that a ship with a largenumber of prominent French politicians on board hadpassed Rabat We decided to establish contact with themat once Mr Duff Cooper the Minister of Informationaccompanied by Lord Gort started for Rabat at dawn in aSunderland flying-boat They found the town in mourningFlags were flying at half-mast church bells were tolling anda solemn service was taking place in the cathedral tobewail the defeat of France All their attempts to get intouch with Mandel were prevented The Deputy Governor


named Morice declared not only on the telephone but in apersonal interview which Duff Cooper demanded that hehad no choice but to obey the orders of his superiors ldquoIfGeneral Noguegraves tells me to shoot myself I will gladly obeyUnfortunately the orders he has given me are more cruelrdquoThe former French Ministers and Deputies were in fact tobe treated as escaped prisoners Our mission had nochoice but to return the way they came A few days later(July 1) I gave instructions to the Admiralty to try to cut outthe Massilia and rescue those on board No plan couldhowever be made and for nearly three weeks she layunder the batteries of Casablanca after which the wholeparty were brought back to France and disposed of as theVichy Government thought convenient to themselves andagreeable to their German masters Mandel began his longand painful internment which ended in his murder byGerman orders at the end of 1944 Thus perished the hopeof setting up a strong representative French Governmenteither in Africa or in London

Although vain the process of trying to imagine what wouldhave happened if some important event or decision hadbeen different is often tempting and sometimes instructiveThe manner of the fall of France was decided on June 16by a dozen chances each measured by a hairrsquos-breadth IfPaul Reynaud had survived the 16th I should have beenwith him at noon on the 17th accompanied by the mostpowerful delegation that has ever left our shores armedwith plenary powers in the name of the British nationCertainly we should have confronted Peacutetain WeygandChautemps and the rest with our blunt proposition ldquoNorelease from the obligation of March 28 unless the FrenchFleet is sailed to British ports On the other hand we offer


an indissoluble Anglo-French Union Go to Africa and let usfight it out togetherrdquo Surely we should have been aided bythe President of the Republic by the Presidents of the twoFrench Chambers and by all that resolute band whogathered behind Reynaud Mandel and de Gaulle It seemsto me probable that we should have uplifted and convertedthe defeatists round the table or left them in a minority oreven under arrestBut let us pursue this ghostly speculation further TheFrench Government would have retired to North Africa TheAnglo-French Super-State or Working Committee to whichit would probably in practice have reduced itself wouldhave faced Hitler The British and French Fleets from theirharbours would have enjoyed complete mastery of theMediterranean and free passage through it for all troopsand supplies Whatever British air force could be sparedfrom the defence of Britain and what was left of the Frenchair force nourished by American production and based onthe French North African airfields would soon have becomean offensive factor of the first importance Malta instead ofbeing for so long a care and peril would at once have takenits place as our most active naval base Italy could havebeen attacked with heavy bombing from Africa far easierthan from England Her communications with the Italianarmies in Libya and Tripolitania would have been effectivelysevered Using no more fighter aircraft than we actuallyemployed in the defence of Egypt and sending to theMediterranean theatre no more troops than we actuallysent or held ready to send we might well with the remainsof the French Army have transferred the war from the Eastto the Central Mediterranean and during 1941 the entireNorth African shore might have been cleared of Italianforces


France would never have ceased to be one of the principalbelligerent allies and would have been spared the fearfulschism which rent and still rends her people Her homelandno doubt would have lain prostrate under the German rulebut that was only what actually happened after the Anglo-American descent in November 1942Now that the whole story is before us no one can doubtthat the armistice did not spare France a pangIt is still more shadowy to guess what Hitler would havedone Would he have forced his way through Spain with orwithout Spanish agreement and after assaulting andperhaps capturing Gibraltar have invaded Tangier andMorocco This was an area which deeply concerned theUnited States and was ever prominent in PresidentRooseveltrsquos mind How could Hitler have made this majorattack through Spain on Africa and yet fight the Battle ofBritain He would have had to choose If he chose Africawe with the command of the sea and the French basescould have moved both troops and air forces into Moroccoand Algeria quicker than he and in greater strength Weshould certainly have welcomed in the autumn and winterof 1940 a vehement campaign in or from a friendly FrenchNorthwest AfricaSurveying the whole scene in the afterlight it seemsunlikely that Hitlerrsquos main decision and the major events ofthe war namely the Battle of Britain and the German surgeto the East would have been changed by the retirement ofthe French Government to North Africa After the fall ofParis when Hitler danced his jig of joy he naturally dealtwith very large propositions Once France was prostrate hemust if possible conquer or destroy Great Britain His onlyother choice was Russia A major operation through Spaininto Northwest Africa would have prejudiced both these


tremendous adventures or at least have prevented hisattack on the Balkans I have no doubt that it would havebeen better for all the Allies if the French Government hadgone to North Africa And that this would have remainedtrue whether Hitler followed them and us thither or notOne day when I was convalescing at Marrakech in January1944 General Georges came to luncheon In the course ofcasual conversation I aired the fancy that perhaps theFrench Governmentrsquos failure to go to Africa in June 1940had all turned out for the best At the Peacutetain trial in August1945 the General thought it right to state this in evidence Imake no complaint but my hypothetical speculation on thisoccasion does not represent my considered opinion eitherduring the war or now


11Admiral Darlan and the French Fleet

Oran

Would Britain Surrender mdash My Speech of June18 mdash Strong Rally of the DominionsmdashEnduringComradeship with the French PeoplemdashldquoTheirFinest HourrdquomdashWords and Deeds mdash Reply to LordLothian June 22 mdash Telegram to Mr MackenzieKing June 24 mdash Telegram of June 27 to GeneralSmutsmdashTo Lord Lothian June 28 mdash AdmiralDarlanrsquos Opportunity mdash His ObsessionmdashHis FatalChoicemdashSolid Reasons for Confidence of WarCabinet and Chiefs of Staff mdash The French NavymdashArmistice Article 8 mdashA Dire DecisionmdashldquoOperationCatapultrdquo Zero Day July 3 mdash Distribution of theFrench Fleet at the End of JunemdashPortsmouth andPlymouth mdash Distress of the British Admirals atGibraltarmdashThe War Cabinet Inflexible mdash OurTerms to the FrenchmdashThe Tragedy of OranmdashAlexandria Dakar and Martinique mdash My Reportto Parliament July 4 mdash Admonition to All BritishMinisters and Officialsmdash Tumultuous Approval ofthe House of CommonsmdashWorld Impression onElimination of French Navy mdash His MajestyrsquosGovernment Would Stop at NothingmdashThe Geniusof FrancemdashAppendix to Chapter Admiral DarlanrsquosFinal Letter to Me

AFTER THE COLLAPSE of France the question which arosein the minds of all our friends and foes was ldquoWould Britainsurrender toordquo So far as public statements count in the


teeth of events I had in the name of His MajestyrsquosGovernment repeatedly declared our resolve to fight onalone After Dunkirk on June 4 I had used the expressionldquoif necessary foryears if necessary alonerdquo This was not inserted withoutdesign and the French Ambassador in London had beeninstructed the next day to inquire what I actually meant Hewas told ldquoexactly what was saidrdquo I could remind the Houseof my remark when I addressed it on June 18 the morrowof the Bordeaux collapse I then gave ldquosome indication ofthe solid practical grounds on which we based our inflexibleresolve to continue the warrdquo I was able to assureParliament that our professional advisers of the threeServices were confident that there were good andreasonable hopes of ultimate victory I told them that I hadreceived from all the four Dominion Prime Ministersmessages in which they endorsed our decision to fight onand declared themselves ready to share our fortunes ldquoIncasting up this dread balance-sheet and contemplating ourdangers with a disillusioned eye I see great reasons forvigilance and exertion but none whatever for panic or fearrdquoI added

During the first four years of the last war the Alliesexperienced nothing but disaster and disappoint-menthellip We repeatedly asked ourselves the questionldquoHow are we going to winrdquo and no one was ever ableto answer it with much precision until at the end quitesuddenly quite unexpectedly our terrible foe collapsedbefore us and we were so glutted with victory that inour folly we threw it away

However matters may go in France or with theFrench Government or other French Governments wein this island and in the British Empire will never loseour sense of comradeship with the French peoplehellip Iffinal victory rewards our toils they shall share the gainsndash aye and freedom shall be restored to all We abate


nothing of our just demands not one jot or tittle do werecedehellip Czechs Poles Norwegians Dutch Belgianshave joined their causes to our own All these shall berestored

What General Weygand called the Battle of Franceis over I expect that the Battle of Britain is about tobegin Upon this battle depends the survival ofChristian civilisation Upon it depends our own Britishlife and the long continuity of our institutions and ourEmpire The whole fury and might of the enemy mustvery soon be turned on us Hitler knows that he willhave to break us in this island or lose the war If we canstand up to him all Europe may be free and the life ofthe world may move forward into broad sunlit uplandsBut if we fail then the whole world including the UnitedStates including all that we have known and cared forwill sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made moresinister and perhaps more protracted by the lights ofperverted science Let us therefore brace ourselves toour duties and so bear ourselves that if the BritishEmpire and its Commonwealth last for a thousandyears men will say ldquoThis was their finest hourrdquo

All these often-quoted words were made good in the hourof victory But now they were only words Foreigners whodo not understand the temper of the British race all over theglobe when its blood is up might suppose that they wereonly a bold front set up as a good prelude for peacenegotiations Hitlerrsquos need to finish the war in the West wasobvious He was in a position to offer the most temptingterms To those who like myself had studied his moves itdid not seem impossible that he would consent to leaveBritain and her Empire and Fleet intact and make a peacewhich would have secured him that free hand in the East ofwhich Ribbentrop had talked to me in 1937 and which washis heartrsquos main desire So far we had not done him muchharm We had indeed only added our own defeat to histriumph over France Can one wonder that astute


calculators in many countries ignorant as they mostly wereof the problems of overseas invasion and of the quality ofour air force and who dwelt under the overwhelmingimpression of German might and terror were notconvinced Not every Government called into being byDemocracy or by Despotism and not every nation whilequite alone and as it seemed abandoned would havecourted the horrors of invasion and disdained a fair chanceof peace for which many plausible excuses could bepresented Rhetoric was no guarantee Anotheradministration might come into being ldquoThe warmongershave had their chance and failedrdquo America had stood aloofNo one was under any obligation to Soviet Russia Whyshould not Britain join the spectators who in Japan and inthe United States in Sweden and in Spain might watchwith detached interest or even relish a mutually destructivestruggle between the Nazi and Communist EmpiresFuture generations will find it hard to believe that the issuesI have summarised here were never thought worth a placeupon the Cabinet agenda or even mentioned in our mostprivate conclaves Doubts could be swept away only bydeeds The deeds were to come

Meanwhile 1 telegraphed to Lord Lothian who at thedesire of the United States naval authorities had askedanxiously whether ammunition for the British Fleet andmaterial for its repair ought not to be sent from Englandacross the Atlantic

22VI40There is no warrant for such precautions at the

present time


I also sent the following telegrams to my Dominion friends

To Mr MackenzieKing

24VI40

If you will read again my telegram of June 5 you willsee that there is no question of trying to make a bargainwith the United States about their entry into the war andour despatch of the Fleet across the Atlantic should theMother Country be defeated On the contrary I doubtvery much the wisdom of dwelling upon the lastcontingency at the present time I have good confi-dence in our ability to defend this island and I see noreason to make preparation for or give any counte-nance to the transfer of the British Fleet I shall myselfnever enter into any peace negotiations with Hitler butobviously I cannot bind a future Government which ifwe were deserted by the United States and beatendown here might very easily be a kind of Quisling affairready to accept German overlordship and protection Itwould be a help if you would impress this danger uponthe President as I have done in my telegrams to him

All good wishes and we are very glad your grandCanadian Division is with us in our fight for Britain

To Smuts I cabled again27VI40

Obviously we have first to repulse any attack onGreat Britain by invasion and show ourselves able tomaintain our development of air power This can onlybe settled by trial If Hitler fails to beat us here he willprobably recoil eastward Indeed he may do this evenwithout trying invasion to find employment for his Armyand take the edge off the winter strain upon him

I do not expect the winter strain will prove decisivebut to try to hold all Europe down in a starving conditionwith only Gestapo and military occupation and no large


theme appealing to the masses is not an arrangementwhich can last long

Development of our air power particularly in regionsunaffected by bombing should cause him ever-increasing difficulties possibly decisive difficulties inGermany no matter what successes he has in Europeor Asia

Our large Army now being created for HomeDefence is being formed on the principle of attack andopportunity for large-scale offensive amphibiousoperations may come in 1940 and 1941 We are stillworking on the fifty-five-division basis here but as ourmunitions supply expands and Empire resources aremobilised larger numbers may be possible After all weare now at last on interior lines Hitler has vast hungryareas to defend and we have the command of theseas Choice of objectives in Western Europe istherefore wide

I send you these personal notes in order to keep inclosest contact with your thoughts which ever weighwith me

It was with good confidence that we entered upon thesupreme test

Prime Minister to LordLothian (Washington)

28VI40

No doubt I shall make some broadcast presently butI donrsquot think words count for much now Too muchattention should not be paid to eddies of United Statesopinion Only force of events can govern them Up tillApril they were so sure the Allies would win that theydid not think help necessary Now they are so sure weshall lose that they do not think it possible I feel goodconfidence we can repel invasion and keep alive in theair Anyhow we are going to try Never cease toimpress on President and others that if this countrywere successfully invaded and largely occupied afterheavy fighting some Quisling Government would be


formed to make peace on the basis of our becoming aGerman Protectorate In this case the British Fleetwould be the solid contribution with which this PeaceGovernment would buy terms Feeling in Englandagainst United States would be similar to Frenchbitterness against us now We have really not had anyhelp worth speaking of from the United States so far[The rifles and field guns did not arrive till the end ofJuly The destroyers had been refused] We knowPresident is our best friend but it is no use trying todance attendance upon Republican and DemocraticConventions What really matters is whether Hitler ismaster of Britain in three months or not I think not Butthis is a matter which cannot be argued beforehandYour mood should be bland and phlegmatic No one isdownhearted here

In the closing days at Bordeaux Admiral Darlan becamevery important My contacts with him had been few andformal I respected him for the work he had done in re-creating the French Navy which after ten years of hisprofessional control was more efficient than at any timesince the French Revolution When in November 1939 hehad visited England we gave him an official dinner at theAdmiralty In response to the toast he began by remindingus that his great-grandfather had been killed at the Battle ofTrafalgar I therefore thought of him as one of those goodFrenchmen who hate England Our Anglo-French navaldiscussions in January had also shown how very jealousthe Admiral was of his professional position in relation towhoever was the political Minister of Marine This hadbecome a positive obsession and I believe played adefinite part in his action


For the rest Darlan had been present at most of theconferences which I have described and as the end of theFrench resistance approached he had repeatedly assuredme that whatever happened the French Fleet should neverfall into German hands Now at Bordeaux came the fatefulmoment in the career of this ambitious self-seeking andcapable Admiral His authority over the Fleet was for allpractical purposes absolute He had only to order the shipsto British American or French colonial harbours ndash somehad already started ndash to be obeyed In the morning of June17 after the fall of M Reynaudrsquos Cabinet he declared toGeneral Georges that he was resolved to give the orderThe next day Georges met him in the afternoon and askedhim what had happened Darlan replied that he hadchanged his mind When asked why he answered simplyldquoI am now Minister of Marinerdquo This did not mean that hehad changed his mind in order to become Minister ofMarine but that being Minister of Marine he had a differentpoint of viewHow vain are human calculations of self-interest Rarelyhas there been a more convincing example Admiral Darlanhad but to sail in any one of his ships to any port outsideFrance to become the master of all French interests beyondGerman control He would not have come like General deGaulle with only an unconquerable heart and a few kindredspirits He would have carried with him outside the Germanreach the fourth Navy in the world whose officers and menwere personally devoted to him Acting thus Darlan wouldhave become the chief of the French Resistance with amighty weapon in his hand British and American dockyardsand arsenals would have been at his disposal for themaintenance of his fleet The French gold reserve in theUnited States would have assured him once recognised ofample resources The whole French Empire would have


rallied to him Nothing could have prevented him from beingthe Liberator of France The fame and power which he soardently desired were in his grasp Instead he went forwardthrough two years of worrying and ignominious office to aviolent death a dishonoured grave and a name long to beexecrated by the French Navy and the nation he hadhitherto served so well

There is a final note which should be struck at this point Ina letter which Darlan wrote to me on December 4 19421just three weeks before his assassination he vehementlyclaimed that he had kept his word As this letter states hiscase and should be on record I print it at the end of thischapter It cannot be disputed that no French ship was evermanned by the Germans or used against us by them in thewar This was not entirely due to Admiral Darlanrsquosmeasures but he had certainly built up in the minds of theofficers and men of the French Navy that at all costs theirships should be destroyed before being seized by theGermans whom he disliked as much as the English

Those of us who were responsible at the summit in Londonunderstood the physical structure of our island strength andwere sure of the spirit of the nation The confidence withwhich we faced the immediate future was not founded aswas commonly supposed abroad upon audacious bluff orrhetorical appeal but upon a sober consciousness andcalculation of practical facts When I spoke in the House ofCommons I founded myself upon realities which I andothers had carefully studied ndash some for many years I will


presently analyse in detail the invasion problem as I and myexpert advisers saw it in these memorable days But first ofall there was one step to take It was obvious and it wasdireThe addition of the French Navy to the German and ItalianFleets with the menace of Japan measureless upon thehorizon confronted Great Britain with mortal dangers andgravely affected the safety of the United States Article 8 ofthe Armistice prescribed that the French Fleet except thatpart left free for safeguarding French Colonial interestsldquoshall be collected in ports to be specified and theredemobilised and disarmed under German or Italian controlrdquoIt was therefore clear that the French war vessels wouldpass into that control while fully armed It was true that inthe same article the German Government solemnlydeclared that they had no intention of using them for theirown purposes during the war But who in his senses wouldtrust the word of Hitler after his shameful record and thefacts of the hour Furthermore the article excepted fromthis assurance ldquothose units necessary for coast surveillanceand mine-sweepingrdquo The interpretation of this lay with theGermans Finally the Armistice could at any time be voidedon any pretext of non-observance There was in fact nosecurity for us at all At all costs at all risks in one way oranother we must make sure that the Navy of France didnot fall into wrong hands and then perhaps bring us andothers to ruinThe War Cabinet never hesitated Those Ministers who theweek before had given their whole hearts to France andoffered common nationhood resolved that all necessarymeasures should be taken This was a hateful decision themost unnatural and painful in which I have ever beenconcerned It recalled the episode of the destruction of theDanish Fleet in Copenhagen Harbour by Nelson in 1801


but now the French had been only yesterday our dear alliesand our sympathy for the misery of France was sincere Onthe other hand the life of the State and the salvation of ourcause were at stake It was Greek tragedy But no act wasever more necessary for the life of Britain and for all thatdepended upon it I thought of Danton in 1793 ldquoThecoalesced Kings threaten us and we hurl at their feet as agage of battle the head of a Kingrdquo The whole event was inthis order of ideas

The French Navy was disposed in the following mannerTwo battleships four light cruisers (or contre-torpilleurs)some submarines including a very large one the Surcoufeight destroyers and about two hundred smaller butvaluable minesweeping and anti-submarine craft lay for themost part at Portsmouth and Plymouth These were in ourpower At Alexandria there were a French battleship fourFrench cruisers three of them modern eight-inch cruisersand a number of smaller ships These were covered by astrong British battle squadron At Oran at the other end ofthe Mediterranean and at its adjacent military port of Mers-el-Kebir were two of the finest vessels of the French fleetthe Dunkerque and the Strasbourg modern battle cruisersmuch superior to the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and builtfor the express purpose of being superior to them Thesevessels in German hands on our trade routes would havebeen most disagreeable With them were two Frenchbattleships several light cruisers and a number ofdestroyers submarines and other vessels At Algiers wereseven cruisers of which four were eight-inch armed and atMartinique an aircraft-carrier and two light cruisers AtCasablanca lay the Jean Bart newly arrived from Saint


Nazaire but without her guns This was one of the keyships in the computation of world naval strength It wasunfinished and could not be finished at Casablanca It mustnot go elsewhere The Richelieu which was far nearercompletion had reached Dakar She could steam and herfifteen-inch guns could fire There were many other Frenchships of minor importance in various ports Finally atToulon a number of warships were beyond our reachldquoOperation Catapultrdquo comprised the simultaneous seizurecontrol or effective disablement or destruction of all theaccessible French Fleet


1VII40

1 The Admiralty are retaining Nelson and her fourdestroyers in home waters and ldquoOperation Catapultrdquoshould go forward aiming at daybreak the 3d

2 During the night of 2d3d all necessary measuresshould be taken at Portsmouth and Plymouth atAlexandria and if possible at Martinique on the samelines as Catapult The reactions to these measures atDakar and Casablanca must be considered and everyprecaution taken to prevent the escape of valuableunits

On account of the pressure of events I added alsoThe Admiralty should endeavour to raise the flotillas

in the narrow seas to a strength of forty destroyers withadditional cruiser support An effort should be made toreach this strength during the next two or three daysand hold it for the following fortnight when the positioncan be reviewed The losses in the Western approach-es must be accepted meanwhile I should like also adaily return of the numbers of craft on patrol oravailable between Portsmouth and the Tyne


On the night of July 3 all the French vessels at Portsmouthand Plymouth were taken under British control The actionwas sudden and necessarily a surprise Overwhelmingforce was employed and the whole transaction showedhow easily the Germans could have taken possession ofany French warships lying in ports which they controlled InBritain the transfer except in the Surcouf was amicableand the crews came willingly ashore In the Surcouf twoBritish officers were wounded one leading seaman killedand an able seaman wounded One Frenchman was killedin the scuffle but the utmost endeavours were made withsuccess to reassure and comfort the French sailors Manyhundreds volunteered to join us The Surcouf afterrendering distinguished service perished on February 191942 with all her gallant French crew

The deadly stroke was in the Western Mediterranean Hereat Gibraltar Vice-Admiral Somerville with ldquoForce Hrdquoconsisting of the battle cruiser Hood the battleships Valiantand Resolution the aircraft-carrier Ark Royal two cruisersand eleven destroyers received orders sent from theAdmiralty at 225 AM on July 1

Be prepared for ldquoCatapultrdquo July 3

Among Somervillersquos officers was Captain Holland a gallantand distinguished officer lately Naval Attacheacute in Paris andwith keen French sympathies who was influential In theearly afternoon of July 1 the Vice-Admiral telegraphed

After talk with Holland and others Vice-AdmiralldquoForce Hrdquo is impressed with their view that the use of


force should be avoided at all costs Holland considersoffensive action on our part would alienate all Frenchwherever they are

To this the Admiralty replied at 620 PMFirm intention of HMG that if French will not accept

any of your alternatives they are to be destroyed

Shortly after midnight (108 AM July 2) Admiral Somervillewas sent the following carefully conceived text of thecommunication to be made to the French Admiral

It is impossible for us your comrades up to now toallow your fine ships to fall into the power of theGerman or Italian enemy We are determined to fighton to the end and if we win as we think we shall weshall never forget that France was our Ally that ourinterests are the same as hers and that our commonenemy is Germany Should we conquer we solemnlydeclare that we shall restore the greatness and territoryof France For this purpose we must make sure thatthe best ships of the French Navy are not used againstus by the common foe In these circumstances HisMajestyrsquos Government have instructed me to demandthat the French Fleet now at Mers-el-Kebir and Oranshall act in accordance with one of the followingalternatives

(a) Sail with us and continue to fight for victoryagainst the Germans and Italians

(b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to aBritish port The reduced crews will be repatriated atthe earliest moment

If either of these courses is adopted by you we willrestore your ships to France at the conclusion of thewar or pay full compensation if they are damagedmeanwhile

(c) Alternatively if you feel bound to stipulate thatyour ships should not be used against the Germans orItalians unless these break the Armistice then sailthem with us with reduced crews to some French portin the West Indies ndash Martinique for instance ndash where


they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction or perhapsbe entrusted to the United States and remain safe untilthe end of the war the crews being repatriated

If you refuse these fair offers I must with profoundregret require you to sink your ships within six hours

Finally failing the above I have the orders of HisMajestyrsquos Government to use whatever force may benecessary to prevent your ships from falling intoGerman or Italian hands

In the evening of the 2d I requested the Admiralty to sendthe Vice-Admiral the following message (despatched 1055PM)

You are charged with one of the most disagreeableand difficult tasks that a British Admiral has ever beenfaced with but we have complete confidence in youand rely on you to carry it out relentlessly

The Admiral sailed at daylight and was off Oran at about930 He sent Captain Holland himself in a destroyer to waitupon the French Admiral Gensoul After being refused aninterview Holland sent by messengers the documentalready quoted Admiral Gensoul replied in writing that in nocase would the French warships be allowed to fall intactinto German and Italian hands and that force would be metwith forceAll day negotiations continued Captain Holland waiting inhis destroyer off the boom The distress of the BritishAdmiral and his principal officers was evident to us from thesignals which had passed Nothing but the most directorders compelled them to open fire on those who had beenso lately their comrades At the Admiralty also there wasmanifest emotion But there was no weakening in theresolve of the War Cabinet I sat all the afternoon in theCabinet Room in frequent contact with my principal


colleagues and the First Lord and First Sea Lord A finalsignal was despatched at 626 PM

French ships must comply with our terms or sinkthemselves or be sunk by you before dark

But the action had already begun At 554 AdmiralSomerville opened fire upon this powerful French fleetwhich was also protected by its shore batteries At 60 PMhe reported that he was heavily engaged Thebombardment lasted for some ten minutes and wasfollowed by heavy attacks by our naval aircraft launchedfrom the Ark Royal The battleship Bretagne was blown upThe Dunkerque ran aground The battleship Provence wasbeached The Strasbourg escaped and though attackedand damaged by torpedo aircraft reached Toulon as didalso the cruisers from AlgiersAt Alexandria after protracted negotiations with AdmiralCunningham the French Admiral Godfrey agreed todischarge his oil fuel to remove important parts of his gun-mechanisms and to repatriate some of his crews At Dakaron July 8 an attack was made on the battleship Richelieu bythe aircraft-carrier Hermes and most gallantly by a motor-boat The Richelieu was hit by an air torpedo and seriouslydamaged The French aircraft-carrier and two light cruisersat Martinique were immobilised after long-drawn-outdiscussions under an agreement with the United StatesOn July 4 I reported at length to the House of Commonswhat we had done Although the battle-cruiser Strasbourghad escaped from Oran and the effective disablement ofthe Richelieu had not then been reported the measures wehad taken had removed the French Navy from majorGerman calculations I spoke for an hour or more thatafternoon and gave a detailed account of all these sombreevents as they were known to me I have nothing to add to


the account which I then gave to Parliament and to theworld I thought it better for the sake of proportion to endupon a note which placed this mournful episode in truerelation with the plight in which we stood I therefore read tothe House the admonition which I had with Cabinetapproval circulated through the inner circles of thegoverning machine the day before

On what may be the eve of an attempted invasion orbattle for our native land the Prime Minister desires toimpress upon all persons holding responsible positionsin the Government in the Fighting Services or in theCivil Departments their duty to maintain a spirit of alertand confident energy While every precaution must betaken that time and means afford there are no groundsfor supposing that more German troops can be landedin this country either from the air or across the seathan can be destroyed or captured by the strong forcesat present under arms The Royal Air Force is inexcellent order and at the highest strength yet attainedThe German Navy was never so weak nor the BritishArmy at home so strong as now The Prime Ministerexpects all His Majestyrsquos servants in high places to setan example of steadiness and resolution They shouldcheck and rebuke the expression of loose and ill-digested opinions in their circles or by their subordi-nates They should not hesitate to report or ifnecessary remove any persons officers or officialswho are found to be consciously exercising a disturbingor depressing influence and whose talk is calculated tospread alarm and despondency Thus alone will theybe worthy of the fighting men who in the air on thesea and on land have already met the enemy withoutany sense of being outmatched in martial qualities

The House was very silent during the recital but at the endthere occurred a scene unique in my own experienceEverybody seemed to stand up all around cheering forwhat seemed a long time Up till this moment theConservative Party had treated me with some reserve and


it was from the Labour benches that I received the warmestwelcome when I entered the House or rose on seriousoccasions But now all joined in solemn stentorian accordThe elimination of the French Navy as an important factoralmost at a single stroke by violent action produced aprofound impression in every country Here was this Britainwhich so many had counted down and out which strangershad supposed to be quivering on the brink of surrender tothe mighty power arrayed against her striking ruthlessly ather dearest friends of yesterday and securing for a while toherself the undisputed command of the sea It was madeplain that the British War Cabinet feared nothing and wouldstop at nothing This was true

The Peacutetain Government had moved to Vichy on July 1 andproceeded to set itself up as the Government ofUnoccupied France On receiving the news of Oran theyordered retaliation by air upon Gibraltar and a few bombswere dropped upon the harbour from their African stationsOn July 5 they formally broke off relations with GreatBritain On July 11 President Lebrun gave place to MarshalPeacutetain who was installed as Chief of the State by anenormous majority of 569 against 80 with 17 abstentionsand many absenteesThe genius of France enabled her people to comprehendthe whole significance of Oran and in her agony to drawnew hope and strength from this additional bitter pangGeneral de Gaulle whom I did not consult beforehand wasmagnificent in his demeanour and France liberated andrestored has ratified his conduct I am indebted to MTeitgen for a tale which should be told In a village nearToulon dwelt two peasant families each of whom had lost


their sailor son by British fire at Oran A funeral service wasarranged to which all their neighbours sought to go Bothfamilies requested that the Union Jack should lie upon thecoffins side by side with the Tricolour and their wisheswere respectfully observed In this we may see how thecomprehending spirit of simple folk touches the sublime

Immense relief spread through the high Government circlesin the United States The Atlantic Ocean seemed to regainits sheltering power and a long vista of time opened out forthe necessary preparations for the safety of the greatRepublic Henceforth there was no more talk about Britaingiving in The only question was would she be invaded andconquered That was the issue which was now to be put tothe proof

APPENDIX

Admiral Darlan to Mr Churchill2

Algiers December 4 1942Dear Mr Prime Minister

On June 12 1940 at Briare at the Headquarters ofGeneral Weygand you took me aside and said to meldquoDarlan I hope that you will never surrender the FleetrdquoI answered you ldquoThere is no question of doing so itwould be contrary to our naval traditions and honourrdquoThe First Lord of the Admiralty Alexander and the FirstSea Lord Pound received the same reply on June 171940 at Bordeaux as did Lord Lloyd If I did notconsent to authorise the French Fleet to proceed toBritish ports it was because I knew that such adecision would bring about the total occupation ofMetropolitan France as well as North Africa


I admit having been overcome by a great bitternessand a great resentment against England as the result ofthe painful events which touched me as a sailorfurthermore it seemed to me that you did not believemy word One day Lord Halifax sent me word by MDupuy that in England my word was not doubted butthat it was believed that I should not be able to keep itThe voluntary destruction of the Fleet at Toulon has justproved that I was right because even though I nolonger commanded the Fleet executed the orderswhich I had given and maintained contrary to thewishes of the Laval Government On the orders of myChief the Marshal I was obliged from January 1941 toApril 1942 to adopt a policy which would preventFrance and its Empire from being occupied andcrushed by the Axis Powers This policy was by theforce of events opposed to yours What else could Ido At that time you were not able to help us and anygesture towards you would have led to the mostdisastrous consequences for my country If we had notassumed the obligation to defend the Empire by ourown forces (I always refused German aid even inSyria) the Axis would have come to Africa and our ownArmy would have been discarded the First British Armyundoubtedly would not be before Tunis today withFrench troops at its side to combat the Germans andItalians

When the Allied forces landed in Africa on Novem-ber 8 I at first executed the orders I had receivedThen as soon as this became impossible I ordered thecessation of the fighting in order to avoid unnecessarybloodshed and a fight which was contrary to theintimate sentiments of those engaged Disavowed byVichy and not wishing to resume the fight I placedmyself at the disposition of the American militaryauthorities only in that way being able to remain faithfulto my oath On November 11 I learned of the violationof the Armistice Convention by the Germans theoccupation of France and the solemn protest of theMarshal I then considered that I could resume myliberty of action and that remaining faithful to theperson of the Marshal I could follow that road which


was most favourable to the welfare of the FrenchEmpire that of the fight against the Axis Supported bythe high authorities of French Africa and by publicopinion and acting as the eventual substitute of theChief of State I formed the High Commissariat in Africaand ordered the French forces to fight at the side of theAllies Since then French West Africa has recognisedmy authority I should never have been able toaccomplish this result if I had not acted under the aegisof the Marshal and if I were simply represented as adissident I have the conviction that all Frenchmen whonow fight against Germany each in his own manner willfinally achieve a general reconciliation but I believethat for the moment they must continue their separateaction There is a certain resentment notably in FrenchWest Africa which is too active for me to obtain moreas you know I follow my rocircle without attacking anyoneI ask for reciprocity For the moment the only thingwhich counts is to defeat the Axis the French peoplewhen liberated will later choose their political reacutegimeand their leaders

I thank you Mr Prime Minister for having associat-ed yourself with President Roosevelt in declaring thatlike the United States Great Britain wishes the integralre-establishment of French sovereignty as it existed in1939 When my country has recovered its integrity andits liberty my only ambition will be to retire with thesentiment of having served it well

Please accept Mr Prime Minister the assurancesof my highest consideration

FRANCcedilOIS DARLAN Admiral of the Fleet


12The Apparatus of Counter-Attack 1940

My Own Reactions After DunkirkmdashMinute toGeneral Ismay of June 4 mdash Work of June 6 mdash ARetrogression mdash My Old Plans of July 1917 mdashAn Early Idea of Tank-Landing Craft mdash The Germof the ldquoMulberryrdquo Harbours of 1944 mdash Directive toGeneral Ismay on Counter-AttackmdashldquoComman-dosrdquomdash Tank-Landing Craft and ParachutistsmdashMyMinute of July 7 1940 Calling for Beach LandingCraft for Six or Seven Hundred Tanks mdash Minute ofAugust 5 1940 on Programme of ArmouredDivisions mdash Overseas Transportation for TwoDivisions at a Time mdash Creation of the CombinedOperations Command mdash Appointment of SirRoger KeyesmdashThe Joint PlanningCommittee IsPlaced Directly Under the Minister of DefencemdashProgress of the Landing-Craft Construction in1940 and 1941 mdash My Telegram to PresidentRoosevelt of July 25 1941 mdash My ConsistentPurpose to Land Large Armies in Europe

MY FIRST REACTION to the ldquoMiracle of Dunkirkrdquo had beento turn it to proper use by mounting a counter-offensiveWhen so much was uncertain the need to recover theinitiative glared forth June 4 was much occupied for me bythe need to prepare and deliver the long and seriousspeech to the House of Commons of which some accounthas been given but as soon as this was over I made haste


to strike the note which I thought should rule our minds andinspire our actions at this moment


4VI40

We are greatly concerned ndash and it is certainly wiseto be so ndash with the dangers of the German landing inEngland in spite of our possessing the command of theseas and having very strong defence by fighters in theair Every creek every beach every harbour hasbecome to us a source of anxiety Besides this theparachutists may sweep over and take Liverpool orIreland and so forth All this mood is very good if itengenders energy But if it is so easy for the Germansto invade us in spite of sea-power some may feelinclined to ask the question ldquoWhy should it be thoughtimpossible for us to do anything of the same kind tothemrdquo The completely defensive habit of mind whichhas ruined the French must not be allowed to ruin allour initiative It is of the highest consequence to keepthe largest numbers of German forces all along thecoasts of the countries they have conquered and weshould immediately set to work to organise raidingforces on these coasts where the populations arefriendly Such forces might be composed of self-contained thoroughly equipped units of say onethousand up to not more than ten thousand whencombined Surprise would be ensured by the fact thatthe destination would be concealed until the lastmoment What we have seen at Dunkirk shows howquickly troops can be moved off (and I suppose on) toselected points if need be How wonderful it would be ifthe Germans could be made to wonder where theywere going to be struck next instead of forcing us to tryto wall in the island and roof it over An effort must bemade to shake off the mental and moral prostration tothe will and initiative of the enemy from which we suffer


Ismay conveyed this to the Chiefs of Staff and in principle itreceived their cordial approval and was reflected in many ofthe decisions which we took Out of it gradually sprang apolicy My thought was at this time firmly fixed on tankwarfare not merely defensive but offensive This requiredthe construction of large numbers of tank-landing vesselswhich henceforward became one of my constant cares Asall this was destined to become of major importance in thefuture I must now make a retrogression into a subjectwhich had long ago lain in my mind and was now revived

I had always been fascinated by amphibious warfare andthe idea of using tanks to run ashore from speciallyconstructed landing craft on beaches where they were notexpected had long been in my mind Ten days before Irejoined Mr Lloyd Georgersquos Government as Minister ofMunitions on July 17 1917 I had prepared without expertassistance a scheme for the capture of the two Frisianislands Borkum and Sylt The object was to secure anoverseas base for flotillas and cruisers and for such airforces as were available in those days in order to force thenaval fighting in which we had a great numericalsuperiority and by re-establishing close blockade relievethe pressure of the U-boat war then at its height againstour Atlantic supply-line and the movement of the Americanarmies to France Mr Lloyd George was impressed with theplan and had it specially printed for the Admiralty and theWar CabinetIt contained the following paragraph 22c which has neveryet seen the light of day

The landing of the troops upon the island [of Borkumor Sylt] under cover of the guns of the Fleet [should be]


aided by gas and smoke from torpedo-proof transportsby means of bullet-proof lighters Approximately onehundred should be provided for landing a division Inaddition a number ndash say fifty ndashtank-landing lightersshould be provided each carrying a tank or tanks [and]fitted for wire-cutting in its bow By means of adrawbridge or shelving bow [the tanks] would landunder [their] own power and prevent the infantry frombeing held up by wire when attacking the gorges of theforts and batteries This is a new feature and removesone of the very great previous difficulties namely therapid landing of [our] field artillery to cut wire

And further paragraph 27There is always the danger of the enemy getting

wind of our intentions and reinforcing his garrisons withgood troops beforehand at any rate so far as Borkumabout which he must always be very sensitive isconcerned On the other hand the landing could beeffected under the shields of lighters proof againstmachine-gun bullets and too numerous to be seriouslyaffected by heavy gunfire [ie the fire of heavy guns]and tanks employed in even larger numbers than arehere suggested especially the quick-moving tank andlighter varieties would operate in an area where nopreparations could have been made to receive themThese may be thought new and important favourableconsiderations

In this paper also I had an alternative plan for making anartificial island in the shallow waters of Horn Reef (to thenorthward)

Paragraph 30 One of the methods suggested forinvestigation is as follows A number of flat-bottomedbarges or caissons made not of steel but of concreteshould be prepared in the Humber at Harwich and in


the Wash the Medway and the Thames Thesestructures would be adapted to the depths in whichthey were to be sunk according to a general plan Theywould float when empty of water and thus could betowed across to the site of the artificial island Onarrival at the buoys marking the island sea-cockswould be opened and they would settle down on thebottom They could subsequently be gradually filledwith sand as opportunity served by suction dredgersThese structures would range in size from 50rsquo X 40rsquo X20rsquo to 120rsquo X 80rsquo X 40rsquo By this means a torpedo- andweather-proof harbour like an atoll would be created inthe open sea with regular pens for the destroyers andsubmarines and alighting platforms for aeroplanes

This project if feasible is capable of greatelaboration and it might be applied in various placesConcrete vessels can perhaps be made to carry acomplete heavy-gun turret and these on theadmission of water to their outer chambers would siton the sea floor like the Solent forts at the desiredpoints Other sinkable structures could be made tocontain storerooms oil tanks or living chambers It isnot possible without an expert inquiry to do more herethan indicate the possibilities which embrace nothingless than the creation transportation in piecesassemblement and posing of an artificial island anddestroyer base

31 Such a scheme if found mechanically soundavoids the need of employing troops and all the risks ofstorming a fortified island It could be applied as asurprise for although the construction of these concretevessels would probably be known in Germany thenatural conclusion would be that they were intended foran attempt to block up the river mouths which indeed isan idea notto be excluded Thus until the island orsystem of breakwaters actually began to grow theenemy would not penetrate the design

A yearrsquos preparation would however be required

For nearly a quarter of a century this paper had slumberedin the archives of the Committee of Imperial Defence I did


not print it in The World Crisis of which it was to have beena chapter for reasons of space and because it was neverput into effect This was fortunate because the ideasexpressed were in this war more than ever vital and theGermans certainly read my war books with attentionIndeed a staff study of the writings of anyone in my positionwould be a matter of normal routine The underlyingconceptions of this old paper were deeply imprinted in mymind and in the new emergency formed the foundation ofaction which after a long interval found memorableexpression in the vast fleet of tank-landing craft of 1943 andin the ldquoMulberryrdquo harbours of 1944

On this same not unfertile 6th of June 1940 flushed withthe sense of deliverance and the power to plan ahead Ibegan a long series of Minutes in which the design andconstruction of tank-landing craft was ordered and steadilypressed


6VI40

Further to my Minute of yesterday [dated June 4]about offensive action when the Australians arrive it isa question whether they should not be organised indetachments of 250 equipped with grenades trench-mortars tommy-guns armoured vehicles and the likecapable of acting against an attack in this country butalso capable of landing on the friendly coasts now heldby the enemy We have got to get out of our minds theidea that the Channel ports and all the country betweenthem are enemy territory What arrangements are beingmade for good agents in Denmark Holland Belgiumand along the French coast Enterprises must be


prepared with specially trained troops of the hunterclass who can develop a reign of terror down thesecoasts first of all on the ldquobutcher and boltrdquo policy butlater on or perhaps as soon as we are organised wecould surprise Calais or Boulogne kill and capture theHun garrison and hold the place until all the prepara-tions to reduce it by siege or heavy storm have beenmade and then away The passive-resistance war inwhich we have acquitted ourselves so well must cometo an end I look to the Joint Chiefs of the Staff topropose me measures for a vigorous enterprising andceaseless offensive against the whole German-occupied coastline Tanks and AFVs [ArmouredFighting Vehicles] must be made in flat-bottomed boatsout of which they can crawl ashore do a deep raidinland cutting a vital communication and then backleaving a trail of German corpses behind them It isprobable that when the best troops go on to the attackof Paris only the ordinary German troops of the line willbe left The lives of these must be made an intensetorment The following measures should be taken

1 Proposals for organising the striking companies2 Proposals for transporting and landing tanks on

the beach observing that we are supposed to have thecommand of the sea while the enemy have not

3 A proper system of espionage and intelligencealong the whole coasts

4 Deployment of parachute troops on a scale equalto five thousand

5 Half a dozen of our fifteen-inch guns should belined up [ie with inner tubes] immediately to fire fifty orsixty miles and should be mounted either on railwaymountings or on steel and concrete platforms so as tobreak up the fire of the German guns that will certainlyin less than four months be firing across the Channel

Action in many directions followed accordingly TheldquoStriking Companiesrdquo emerged under the name ofldquoCommandosrdquo ten of which were now raised from theRegular Army and the Royal Marines The nucleus of thisorganisation had begun to take shape in the Norwegian


campaign An account will be given in its proper place ofthe cross-Channel heavy guns I regret however that Iallowed the scale I had proposed for British parachutetroops to be reduced from five thousand to five hundred

I recurred at intervals to the building of landing craft onwhich my mind constantly dwelt both as a peril to us and inthe future a project against the enemy Development ofsmall assault craft had been started before the outbreak ofwar and a few had been employed at Narvik Most of thesehad been lost either there or at Dunkirk Now we requirednot only the small craft which could be lifted in the troop-carrying ships but sea-going vessels capable themselvesof transporting tanks and guns to the assault and landingthem onto the beaches

Prime Minister toMinister of Supply

7VII40

What is being done about designing and planningvessels to transport tanks across the sea for a Britishattack on enemy countries This might well be remittedas a study to Mr Hopkins former Chief Constructor ofthe Navy who must have leisure now that CultivatorNo 61 is out of fashion These must be able to movesix or seven hundred vehicles in one voyage and landthem on the beach or alternatively take them off thebeaches as well of course as landing them on quaysndash if it be possible to combine the two


5VIII40

I asked the other day for a forecast of the develop-ment of the armoured divisions which will be required in


1941 ndash namely five by the end of March and oneadditional every month until a total of ten is reached atthe end of August 1941 and also for the compositionof each division in armoured and ancillary vehicles of allkinds

Pray let me know how far the War Office plans haveproceeded and whether the number of tanks orderedcorresponds with a programme of these dimensions

Let me further have a report on the progress of themeans of transportation overseas which should beadequate to the movement at one moment of twoarmoured divisions Who is doing this ndash Admiralty orMinistry of Supply I suggested that Mr Hopkins mighthave some spare time available


9VIII40

Get me a further report about the designs and typesof vessels to transport armoured vehicles by sea andland on[to] beaches

In July I created a separate Combined OperationsCommand under the Chiefs of Staff for the study andexercise of this form of warfare and Admiral of the Fleet SirRoger Keyes became its chief His close personal contactwith me and with the Defence Office served to overcomeany departmental difficulties arising from this unusualappointment

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay and SirEdward Bridges

17VII40

I have appointed Admiral of the Fleet Sir RogerKeyes as Director of Combined Operations He shouldtake over the duties and resources now assigned toGeneral Bourne General Bourne should be informedthat owing to the larger scope now to be given to these


operations it is essential to have an officer of higherrank in charge and that the change in no way reflectsupon him or those associated with him Evidently he willhave to co-operate effectively I formed a high opinionof this officerrsquos work as Adjutant-General RoyalMarines and in any case the Royal Marines must playa leading part in this organisation

Pending any further arrangements Sir Roger Keyeswill form contact with the Service Departments throughGeneral Ismay as representing the Minister of Defence

I have already explained how smoothly the office of Ministerof Defence came into being and grew in authority At theend of August I took the only formal step which I everfound necessary Hitherto the Joint Planning Committeehad worked under the Chiefs of Staff and looked to them astheir immediate and official superiors I felt it necessary tohave this important though up till now not very effectivebody under my personal control Therefore I asked the WarCabinet to give approval to this definite change in our warmachine This was readily accorded me by all mycolleagues and I gave the following instructions

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay andSir Edward Bridges

24VIII40

The Joint Planning Committee will from Monday nextwork directly under the orders of the Minister ofDefence and will become a part of the Minister ofDefencersquos office ndash formerly the CID SecretariatAccommodation will be found for them at RichmondTerrace They will retain their present positions in andcontacts with the three Service Departments They willwork out the details of such plans as are communicated


to them by the Minister of Defence They may initiateplans of their own after reference to General IsmayThey will of course be at the service of the Chiefs ofStaff Committee for the elaboration of any matters sentto them

2 All plans produced by the Joint PlanningCommittee or elaborated by them under instructions asabove will be referred to the Chiefs of Staff Committeefor their observations

3 Thereafter should doubts and differences exist orin important cases all plans will be reviewed by theDefence Committee of the War Cabinet which willconsist of the Prime Minister the Lord Privy Seal andLord Beaverbrook and the three Service Ministers thethree Chiefs of the Staff with General Ismay being inattendance

4 The Prime Minister assumes the responsibility ofkeeping the War Cabinet informed of what is in handbut the relation of the Chiefs of Staff to the War Cabinetis unaltered

The Chiefs of Staff accepted this change without seriousdemur Sir John Dill however wrote a Minute to theSecretary of State for War on which I was able to reassurehim


31VIII40

There is no question of the Joint Planning Commit-tee ldquosubmitting military advicerdquo to me They are merelyto work out plans in accordance with directions which Ishall give The advice as to whether these plans or anyvariants of them should be adopted will rest as atpresent with the Chiefs of Staff It is quite clear that theChiefs of Staff also have their collective responsibilityfor advising the Cabinet as well as the Prime Minister orMinister of Defence It has not been thought necessary


to make any alteration in their constitutional positionMoreover I propose to work with and through them asheretofore

I have found it necessary to have direct access toand control of the Joint Planning Staffs because after ayear of war I cannot recall a single plan initiated by theexisting machinery I feel sure that I can count uponyou and the other two Service Ministers to help me ingiving a vigorous and positive direction to the conductof the war and in overcoming the dead weight or inertiaand delay which has so far led us to being forestalledon every occasion by the enemy

It will of course be necessary from time to time toincrease the number of the Joint Planning Staffs

In practice the new procedure worked in an easy andagreeable manner and I cannot recall any difficulties whicharose

Henceforth intense energy was imparted to thedevelopment of all types of landing craft and a specialdepartment was formed in the Admiralty to deal with thesematters By October 1940 the trials of the first Landing-Craft Tank (LCT) were in progress Only about thirty ofthese were built as they proved too small An improveddesign followed many of which were built in sections formore convenient transport by sea to the Middle East wherethey began to arrive in the summer of 1941 These provedtheir worth and as we gained experience the capabilities oflater editions of these strange craft steadily improved TheAdmiralty were greatly concerned at the inroads which thisnew form of specialised production might make into theresources of the shipbuilding industry Fortunately it provedthat the building of LCT could be delegated toconstructional engineering firms not engaged in


shipbuilding and thus the labour and plant of the largershipyards need not be disturbed This rendered possiblethe large-scale programme which we contemplated butalso placed a limit on the size of the craftThe LCT was suitable for cross-Channel raidingoperations or for more extended work in the Mediterraneanbut not for long voyages in the open sea The need arosefor a larger more seaworthy vessel which besidestransporting tanks and other vehicles on ocean voyagescould also land them over beaches like the LCT I gavedirections for the design of such a vessel which was firstcalled an ldquoAtlantic LCTrdquo but was soon renamed ldquoLandingShip Tankrdquo (LST) The building of these inevitablyimpinged on the resources of our hard-pressed shipyardsThus of the first design nicknamed in the Admiralty theldquoWinetterdquo only three were built others were ordered in theUnited States and Canada but were superseded by a laterdesign Meanwhile we converted three shallow-drafttankers to serve the same purpose and these too rendereduseful service later onBy the end of 1940 we had a sound conception of thephysical expression of amphibious warfare The productionof specialised craft and equipment of many kinds wasgathering momentum and the necessary formations tohandle all this new material were being developed andtrained under the Combined Operations Command Specialtraining centres for this purpose were established both athome and in the Middle East All these ideas and theirpractical manifestation we presented to our Americanfriends as they took shape The results grew steadily acrossthe years of struggle and thus in good time they formed theapparatus which eventually played an indispensable part inour greatest plans and deeds Our work in this field in theseearlier years had such a profound effect on the future of the


war that I must anticipate events by recording some of thematerial progress which we made laterIn the summer of 1941 the Chiefs of Staff pointed out thatthe programme of landing-craft construction was relatedonly to small-scale operations and that our ultimate returnto the Continent would demand a much greater effort thanwe could then afford By this time the Admiralty hadprepared a new design of the landing ship tank (LST)and this was taken to the United States where the detailswere jointly worked out In February 1942 this vessel wasput into production in America on a massive scale Itbecame the LST(2) which figured so prominently in allour later operations making perhaps the greatest singlecontribution to the solution of the stubborn problem oflanding heavy vehicles over beaches Ultimately over athousand of these were builtMeanwhile the production of small craft of many types foruse in a Continental assault was making steady progresson both sides of the Atlantic All these required transport tothe scene of action in the ships carrying the assaultingtroops Thus an immense conversion programme wasinitiated to fit British and American troopships to carry thesecraft as well as great quantities of other specialisedequipment These ships became known as ldquoLanding ShipsInfantryrdquo (LSI) Some were commissioned into the RoyalNavy others preserved their mercantile status and theirmasters and crews served them with distinction in all ouroffensive operations Such ships could ill be spared fromthe convoys carrying the endless stream of reinforcementsto the Middle East and elsewhere yet this sacrifice had tobe made In 1940 and 1941 our efforts in this field werelimited by the demands of the U-boat struggle Not morethan seven thousand men could be spared for landing-craftproduction up to the end of 1940 nor was this number


greatly exceeded in the following year However by 1944no less than seventy thousand men in Britain alone werededicated to this stupendous task besides much largernumbers in the United States

As all our work in this sphere had a powerful bearing on thefuture of the war I print at this point a telegram which I sentto President Roosevelt in 1941

25VII41We have been considering here our war plans not

only for the fighting of 1942 but also for 1943 Afterproviding for the security of essential bases it isnecessary to plan on the largest scale the forcesneeded for victory In broad outline we must aim first atintensifying the blockade and propaganda Then wemust subject Germany and Italy to a ceaseless andever-growing air bombardment These measures maythemselves produce an internal convulsion or collapseBut plans ought also to be made for coming to the aid of the conquered populations by landing armies ofliberation when opportunity is ripe For this purpose itwill be necessary not only to have great numbers oftanks but also of vessels capable of carrying them andlanding them direct onto beaches It ought not to bedifficult for you to make the necessary adaptation insome of the vast numbers of merchant vessels you arebuilding so as to fit them for tank-landing ships

And a little later

Prime Minister to FirstSea Lord

8IX41

My idea was not that the President should buildWinettes as such apart from any already arranged for


but that out of the great number of merchant vesselsbeing constructed in the United States for 1942 hewould fit out a certain number with bows and side-portsto enable tanks to be landed from them on beaches orinto tank-landing craft which would take them to thebeaches

Please help me to explain this point to him showingwhat kind of alteration would be required in theAmerican merchant ships now projected

In view of the many accounts which are extant andmultiplying of my supposed aversion from any kind of large-scale opposed-landing such as took place in Normandy in1944 it may be convenient if I make it clear that from thevery beginning I provided a great deal of the impulse andauthority for creating the immense apparatus and armadafor the landing of armour on beaches without which it isnow universally recognised that all such major operationswould have been impossible I shall unfold this theme stepby step in these volumes by means of documents written byme at the time which show a true and consistent purposeon my part in harmony with the physical facts and a closecorrespondence with what was actually done


13At Bay July 1940

Can Britain Survive mdash Anxiety in the UnitedStatesmdashResolute Demeanour of the British Nationmdash The Relief of Simplicitymdash Hitlerrsquos Peace OfferJuly 19 mdash Our ResponsemdashGerman DiplomaticApproaches RejectedmdashThe King of SwedenrsquosDeacutemarche mdash I Visit the Threatened CoastsmdashGeneral Montgomery and the Third Division atBrightonmdashThe Importance of Buses mdash MyContacts with General BrookemdashBrooke SucceedsIronside in Command of the Home ArmymdashStimulus of Invasion ExcitementmdashSome Direc-tives and Minutes of JulymdashThe Defence of LondonmdashConditions in the Threatened Coastal ZonesmdashStatistics on the Growth and Equipment of theArmymdashLindemannrsquos DiagramsmdashThe CanadianSecond Division Retrieved from Ice-landmdashNeed toPrevent Enemy Concentration of Shipping in theChannelmdashArrival of the American RiflesmdashSpecialPrecautionsmdashThe French Seventy-FivesmdashTheGrowth of the German Channel BatteriesmdashOurCounter-Measures mdash My Visits to AdmiralRamsay at DovermdashProgress ofOur BatteriesCoaxed and UrgedmdashThe Monitor ldquoErebusrdquomdashTheDefence of the Kentish Promontory mdash BritishHeavy-Gun Concentration SeptembermdashOurRising Strength mdash An Ordeal Averted


IN THESE SUMMER DAYS OF 1940 after the fall of Francewe were all alone None of the British Dominions or India orthe Colonies could send decisive aid or send what theyhad in time The victorious enormous German armiesthoroughly equipped and with large reserves of capturedweapons and arsenals behind them were gathering for thefinal stroke Italy with numerous and imposing forces haddeclared war upon us and eagerly sought our destructionin the Mediterranean and in Egypt In the Far East Japanglared inscrutably and pointedly requested the closing ofthe Burma Road against supplies for China Soviet Russiawas bound to Nazi Germany by her pact and lent importantaid to Hitler in raw materials Spain which had alreadyoccupied the International Zone of Tangier might turnagainst us at any moment and demand Gibraltar or invitethe Germans to help her attack it or mount batteries tohamper passage through the Straits The France of Peacutetainand Bordeaux soon moved to Vichy might any day beforced to declare war upon us What was left at Toulon ofthe French Fleet seemed to be in German power Certainlywe had no lack of foesAfter Oran it became clear to all countries that the BritishGovernment and nation were resolved to fight on to thelast But even if there were no moral weakness in Britainhow could the appalling physical facts be overcome Ourarmies at home were known to be almost unarmed exceptfor rifles There were in fact hardly five hundred field gunsof any sort and hardly two hundred medium or heavy tanksin the whole country Months must pass before our factoriescould make good even the munitions lost at Dunkirk Canone wonder that the world at large was convinced that ourhour of doom had struck


Deep alarm spread through the United States and indeedthrough all the surviving free countries Americans gravelyasked themselves whether it was right to cast away any oftheir own severely limited resources to indulge a generousthough hopeless sentiment Ought they not to strain everynerve and nurse every weapon to remedy their ownunpreparedness It needed a very sure judgment to riseabove these cogent matter-of-fact arguments Thegratitude of the British nation is due to the noble Presidentand his great officers and high advisers for never even inthe advent of the third-term presidential election losing theirconfidence in our fortunes or our willThe buoyant and imperturbable temper of Britain which Ihad the honour to express may well have turned the scaleHere was this people who in the years before the war hadgone to the extreme bounds of pacifism and improvidencewho had indulged in the sport of party politics and whothough so weakly armed had advanced lightheartedly intothe centre of European affairs now confronted with thereckoning alike of their virtuous impulses and neglectfularrangements They were not even dismayed They defiedthe conquerors of Europe They seemed willing to havetheir island reduced to a shambles rather than give in Thiswould make a fine page in history But there were othertales of this kind Athens had been conquered by SpartaThe Carthaginians made a forlorn resistance to Rome Notseldom in the annals of the past ndash and how much moreoften in tragedies never recorded or long-forgotten ndash hadbrave proud easygoing states and even entire racesbeen wiped out so that only their name or even no mentionof them remainsFew British and very few foreigners understood the peculiartechnical advantages of our insular position nor was it


generally known how even in the irresolute years before thewar the essentials of sea and latterly air defence had beenmaintained It was nearly a thousand years since Britainhad seen the fires of a foreign camp on English soil At thesummit of British resistance everyone remained calmcontent to set their lives upon the cast That this was ourmood was gradually recognised by friends and foesthroughout the whole world What was there behind themood That could only be settled by brute force

There was also another aspect One of our greatestdangers during June lay in having our last reserves drawnaway from us into a wasting futile French resistance inFrance and the strength of our air forces gradually worndown by their flights or transference to the Continent IfHitler had been gifted with supernatural wisdom he wouldhave slowed down the attack on the French front makingperhaps a pause of three or four weeks after Dunkirk on theline of the Seine and meanwhile developing hispreparations to invade England Thus he would have had adeadly option and could have tortured us with the hooks ofeither deserting France in her agony or squandering the lastresources for our future existence The more we urged theFrench to fight on the greater was our obligation to aidthem and the more difficult it would have become to makeany preparations for defence in England and above all tokeep in reserve the twenty-five squadrons of fighter aircrafton which all depended On this point we should never havegiven way but the refusal would have been bitterlyresented by our struggling ally and would have poisoned allour relations It was even with an actual sense of relief thatsome of our high commanders addressed themselves toour new and grimly simplified problem As the


commissionaire at one of the Service clubs in London saidto a rather downcast member ldquoAnyhow sir wersquore in theFinal and itrsquos to be played on the Home Groundrdquo

The strength of our position was not even at this dateunderrated by the German High Command Ciano tells howwhen he visited Hitler in Berlin on July 7 1940 he had along conversation with General von Keitel Keitel like Hitlerspoke to him about the attack on England He repeated thatup to the present nothing definite had been decided Heregarded the landing as possible but considered it anldquoextremely difficult operation which must be approachedwith the utmost caution in view of the fact that theintelligence available on the military preparedness of theisland and on the coastal defences is meagre and not veryreliablerdquo1 What would appear to be easy and also essentialwas a major air attack upon the airfields factories and theprincipal communication centres in Great Britain It wasnecessary however to bear in mind that the British AirForce was extremely efficient Keitel calculated that theBritish had about fifteen hundred machines ready fordefence and counter-attack He admitted that recently theoffensive action of the British Air Force had been greatlyintensified Bombing missions were carried out withnoteworthy accuracy and the groups of aircraft whichappeared numbered up to eighty machines at a time Therewas however in England a great shortage of pilots andthose who were now attacking the German cities could notbe replaced by the new pilots who were completelyuntrained Keitel also insisted upon the necessity of strikingat Gibraltar in order to disrupt the British imperial systemNeither Keitel nor Hitler made any reference to the duration


of the war Only Himmler said incidentally that the warought to be finished by the beginning of OctoberSuch was Cianorsquos report He also offered Hitler at ldquotheearnest wish of the Ducerdquo an army of ten divisions and anair component of thirty squadrons to take part in theinvasion The army was politely declined Some of the airsquadrons came but as will be presently related fared ill

On July 19 Hitler delivered his triumphant speech in theReichstag in which after predicting that I would shortlytake refuge in Canada he made what has been called hisPeace Offer The operative sentences were

In this hour I feel it to be my duty before my ownconscience to appeal once more to reason andcommon sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhereI consider myself in a position to make this appealsince I am not a vanquished foe begging favours butthe victor speaking in the name of reason I can see noreason why this war need go on I am grieved to thinkof the sacrifices it must claimhellip Possibly Mr Churchillwill brush aside this statement of mine by saying it ismerely born of fear and doubt of final victory In thatcase I shall have relieved my conscience in regard tothe things to come

This gesture was accompanied during the following days bydiplomatic representations through Sweden the UnitedStates and at the Vatican Naturally Hitler would be veryglad after having subjugated Europe to his will to bring thewar to an end by procuring British acceptance of what hehad done It was in fact an offer not of peace but ofreadiness to accept the surrender by Britain of all she hadentered the war to maintain As the German ChargeacutedrsquoAffaires in Washington had attempted some


communication with our Ambassador there I sent thefollowing telegram

20VII40I do not know whether Lord Halifax is in town today

but Lord Lothian should be told on no account to makeany reply to the German Charge drsquoAffairesrsquo message

My first thought however was a solemn formal debate inboth Houses of Parliament I therefore wrote at the sametime to Mr Chamberlain and Mr Attlee

20VII40It might be worth while meeting Hitlerrsquos speech by

resolutions in both Houses These resolutions shouldbe proposed by private Peers and Members On theother hand the occasion will add to our burdens Whatdo you say

My colleagues thought that this would be making too muchof the matter upon which we were all of one mind It wasdecided instead that the Foreign Secretary should dismissHitlerrsquos gesture in a broadcast On the night of the 22d heldquobrushed asiderdquo Hitlerrsquos ldquosummons to capitulate to his willrdquoHe contrasted Hitlerrsquos picture of Europe with the picture ofthe Europe for which we were fighting and declared thatldquowe shall not stop fighting until Freedom is securerdquo In facthowever the rejection of any idea of a parley had alreadybeen given by the British press and by the BBC withoutany prompting from His Majestyrsquos Government as soon asHitlerrsquos speech was heard over the radioCiano in his account of another meeting with Hitler on July20 observes

The reaction of the English Press to yesterdayrsquosspeech has been such as to allow of no prospect of anunderstanding Hitler is therefore preparing to strike themilitary blow at England He stresses that Germanyrsquos


strategic position as well as her sphere of influenceand of economic control are such as to have alreadygreatly weakened the possibilities of resistance byGreat Britain which will collapse under the first blowsThe air attack already began some days ago and iscontinually growing in intensity The reaction of the anti-aircraft defences and of the British fighters is notseriously hindering the German air attack The decisiveoffensive operation is now being studied since thefullest preparations have been made2

Ciano also records in his diaries that ldquoLate in the evening ofthe 19th when the first cold British reaction to the speecharrived a sense of ill-concealed disappointment spreadamong the Germansrdquo Hitler ldquowould like an understandingwith Great Britain He knows that war with the British will behard and bloody and knows also that people everywhereare averse from bloodshedrdquo Mussolini on the other handldquofears that the English may find in Hitlerrsquos much too cunningspeech a pretext to begin negotiationsrdquoldquoThatrdquo remarksCiano ldquowould be sad for Mussolini because now more thanever he wants warrdquo3 He need not have fretted himself Hewas not to be denied all the war he wantedThere was no doubt continuous German diplomatic activitybehind the scenes and when on August 3 the King ofSweden thought fit to address us on the subject Isuggested to the Foreign Secretary the following replywhich formed the basis of the official answer

On October 12 1939 His Majestyrsquos Governmentdefined at length their position towards German peaceoffers in maturely considered statements to ParliamentSince then a number of new hideous crimes have beencommitted by Nazi Germany against the smaller Statesupon her borders Norway has been overrun and isnow occupied by a German invading army Denmarkhas been seized and pillaged Belgium and Hollandafter all their efforts to placate Herr Hitler and in spite


of all the assurances given to them by the GermanGovernment that their neutrality would be respectedhave been conquered and subjugated In Hollandparticularly acts of long-prepared treachery andbrutality culminated in the massacre of Rotterdamwhere many thousands of Dutchmen were slaughteredand an important part of the city destroyed

These horrible events have darkened the pages ofEuropean history with an indelible stain His MajestyrsquosGovernment see in them not the slightest cause torecede in any way from their principles and resolves asset forth in October 1939 On the contrary theirintention to prosecute the war against Germany byevery means in their power until Hitlerism is finallybroken and the world relieved from the curse which awicked man has brought upon it has been strength-ened to such a point that they would rather all perish inthe common ruin than fail or falter in their duty Theyfirmly believe however that with the help of God theywill not lack the means to discharge their task Thistask may be long but it will always be possible forGermany to ask for an armistice as she did in 1918 orto publish her proposals for peace Before howeverany such requests or proposals could even beconsidered it would be necessary that effectiveguarantees by deeds not words should be forthcomingfrom Germany which would ensure the restoration ofthe free and independent life of CzechoslovakiaPoland Norway Denmark Holland Belgium andabove all France as well as the effectual security ofGreat Britain and the British Empire in a general peace

I addedThe ideas set forth in the Foreign Office memo

appear to me to err in trying to be too clever and toenter into refinements of policy unsuited to the tragicsimplicity and grandeur of the times and the issues atstake At this moment when we have had no sort ofsuccess the slightest opening will be misjudgedIndeed a firm reply of the kind I have outlined is the


only chance of extorting from Germany any offerswhich are not fantastic

On the same day I issued the following statement to thepress

3VIII40The Prime Minister wishes it to be known that the

possibility of German attempts at invasion has by nomeans passed away The fact that the Germans arenow putting about rumours that they do not intend aninvasion should be regarded with a double dose of thesuspicion which attaches to all their utterances Oursense of growing strength and preparedness must notlead to the slightest relaxation of vigilance or moralalertness

At the end of June the Chiefs of Staff through GeneralIsmay had suggested to me at the Cabinet that I shouldvisit the threatened sectors of the east and south coastsAccordingly I devoted a day or two every week to thisagreeable task sleeping when necessary in my train whereI had every facility for carrying on my regular work and wasin constant contact with Whitehall I inspected the Tyne andthe Humber and many possible landing places TheCanadian Division soon to be reinforced to a corps by thedivision sent to Iceland did an exercise for me in Kent Iexamined the landward defences of Harwich and DoverOne of my earliest visits was to the 3d Divisioncommanded by General Montgomery an officer whom Ihad not met before My wife came with me The 3d Divisionwas stationed near Brighton It had been given the highestpriority in re-equipment and had been about to sail forFrance when the French resistance ended General


Montgomeryrsquos headquarters were at Lancing College nearwhich he showed me a small exercise of which the centralfeature was a flanking movement of Bren-gun carriers ofwhich he could at that moment muster only seven or eightAfter this we drove together along the coast throughShoreham and Hove till we came to the familiar Brightonfront of which I had so many schoolboy memories Wedined in the Royal Albion Hotel which stands opposite theend of the pier The hotel was entirely empty a great dealof evacuation having taken place but there were still anumber of people airing themselves on the beaches or theparade I was amused to see a platoon of the GrenadierGuards making a sandbag machine-gun post in one of thekiosks of the pier like those where in my childhood I hadoften admired the antics of the performing fleas It waslovely weather I had very good talks with the General andenjoyed my outing thoroughly However

(Action this Day)Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar

3VII40

I was disturbed to find the 3d Division spread alongthirty miles of coast instead of being as I had imaginedheld back concentrated in reserve ready to moveagainst any serious head of invasion But much moreastonishing was the fact that the infantry of this divisionwhich is otherwise fully mobile are not provided withthe buses necessary to move them to the point ofaction4 This provision of buses waiting always readyand close at hand is essential to all mobile units andto none more than the 3d Division while spread aboutthe coast

I heard the same complaint from Portsmouth that thetroops there had not got their transport ready and close


at hand Considering the great masses of transportboth buses and lorries which there are in this countryand the large numbers of drivers brought back from theBEF it should be possible to remedy thesedeficiencies at once I hope at any rate that the GOC 3d Division will be told today to take up as he wouldlike to do the large number of buses which are evennow plying for pleasure traffic up and down the sea-front at Brighton

In mid-July the Secretary of State for War recommendedthat General Brooke should replace General Ironside incommand of our Home Forces On July 19 in the course ofmy continuous inspection of the invasion sectors I visitedthe Southern Command Some sort of tactical exercise waspresented to me in which no fewer than twelve tanks ()were able to participate All the afternoon I drove withGeneral Brooke who commanded this front His recordstood high Not only had he fought the decisive flank-battlenear Ypres during the retirement to Dunkirk but he hadacquitted himself with singular firmness and dexterity incircumstances of unimaginable difficulty and confusionwhen in command of the new forces we had sent to Franceduring the first three weeks of June I also had a personallink with Alan Brooke through his two gallant brothers ndash thefriends of my early military life5

These connections and memories did not decide myopinion on the grave matters of selection but they formed apersonal foundation upon which my unbroken wartimeassociation with Alan Brooke was maintained and ripenedWe were four hours together in the motor-car on this Julyafternoon 1940 and we seemed to be in agreement on themethods of Home Defence After the necessary


consultations with others I approved the Secretary of Statefor Warrsquos proposal to place Brooke in command of theHome Forces in succession to General Ironside Ironsideaccepted his retirement with the soldierly dignity which onall occasions characterised his actionsDuring the invasion menace for a year and a half Brookeorganised and commanded the Home Armies andthereafter when he had become CIGS we continuedtogether for three and a half years until victory was won Ishall presently narrate the benefits which I derived from hisadvice in the decisive changes of command in Egypt andthe Middle East in August 1942 and also the heavydisappointment which I had to inflict upon him about thecommand of the cross-Channel invasion ldquoOperationOverlordrdquo in 1944 His long tenure as chairman of theChiefs of Staff Committee during the greater part of the warand his work as CIGS enabled him to render services ofthe highest order not only to the British Empire but also tothe Allied Cause These volumes will record occasionaldifferences between us but also an overwhelming measureof agreement and will witness to a friendship which Icherish

Meanwhile we all faced in ever-increasing detail andtenacity the possibility of invasion Some of my Minutesillustrate this process

(Action this Day)


Prime Minister toSecretary of State forAir and CAS

3VII40

I hear from every side of the need for throwing yourmain emphasis on bombing the ships and barges in allthe ports under German control


2VII40

See the letter [on the defence of London] from MrWedgwood MP which is interesting and characteris-tic What is the position about London I have a veryclear view that we should fight every inch of it and thatit would devour quite a large invading army

Prime Minister to MrWedgwood

5VII40

Many thanks for your letters I am hoping to get agreat many more rifles very soon and to continue theprocess of arming the Home Guard (LDV) You mayrest assured that we should fight every street of Londonand its suburbs It would devour an invading armyassuming one ever got so far We hope however todrown the bulk of them in the salt sea

It is curious that the German Army Commander chargedwith the invasion plan used this same word ldquodevourrdquo aboutLondon and determined to avoid it


4VII40

What is being done to encourage and assist thepeople living in threatened seaports to make suitableshelters for themselves in which they could remainduring an invasion Active measures must be takenforthwith Officers or representatives of the local


authority should go round explaining to families that ifthey decide not to leave in accordance with our generaladvice they should remain in the cellars andarrangements should be made to prop up the buildingoverhead They should be assisted in this both withadvice and materials Their gas-masks should beinspected All this must be put actively in operation fromtoday The process will stimulate voluntary evacuationand at the same time make reasonable provision forthose who remain


5VII40

Clear instructions should now be issued about thepeople living in the threatened coastal zones (1) Theyshould be encouraged as much as possible to departvoluntarily both by the pressure of a potentialcompulsory order hanging over them and also by local(not national) propaganda through their RegionalCommissioners or local bodies Those who wish tostay or can find nowhere to go on their own should betold that if invasion impact occurs in their town or villageon the coast they will not be able to leave till the battleis over They should therefore be encouraged andhelped to put their cellars in order so that they havefairly safe places to go to They should be supplied withwhatever form of Anderson shelter is now available (Ihear there are new forms not involving steel) Onlythose who are trustworthy should be allowed to stay Alldoubtful elements should be removed

Pray have precise proposals formulated upon theselines for my approval

Prime Minister toProfessor Lindemann(Copy to GeneralIsmay)

7VII40

I want my ldquoSrdquo Branch to make a chart of all the thirtydivisions showing their progress towards completeequipment Each division would be represented by a


square divided into sections officers and men riflesBren guns Bren-gun carriers anti-tank rifles antitankguns field artillery medium ditto (if any) transportsufficient to secure mobility of all three brigadessimultaneously etc As and when a proportion of thesesubsidiary squares is completed a chart can be paintedred I should like to see this chart every week A similardiagram can be prepared for the Home Guard In thiscase it is only necessary to show rifles and uniforms


7VII40

You shared my astonishment yesterday at thestatement made to us by General McNaughton that thewhole of the 2d Canadian Division was destined forIceland It would surely be a very great mistake to allowthese fine troops to be employed in so distant a theatreApparently the first three battalions have already gonethere No one was told anything about this We requiretwo Canadian divisions to work as a corps as soon aspossible

I am well aware of the arguments about trainingetc but they did not convince me We ought to haveanother thorough re-examination of this point Surely itshould be possible to send second-line Territorialtroops to Iceland where they should fortify themselvesat the key points and then to have say one very high-class battalion of the ldquoGubbinsrdquo type in order to strike atany landing I should be most grateful if you would dealwith this

Prime Minister to FirstLord and First SeaLord

7VII40

1 I cannot understand how we can tolerate themovement at sea along the French coast of anyvessels without attacking them It is not sufficient surelyto use the air only Destroyers should be sent under airescort Are we really to resign ourselves to the


Germans building up a large armada under our nosesin the Channel and conducting vessels through theStraits of Dover with impunity This is the beginning ofa new and very dangerous threat which must becountered

2 I should be glad of a report not only on the pointsmentioned above but also on the state of our minefieldthere and how it is to be improved Is it true the mineshave become defective after ten months If so severalnew rows should be laid Why should not an effort bemade to lay a minefield by night in the French passageand lie in wait for any craft sent to sweep a channelthrough it We really must not be put off from assertingour sea power by the fact that the Germans are holdingthe French coast If German guns open upon us aheavy ship should be sent to bombard them underproper air protection


During this month of July American weapons inconsiderable quantities were safely brought across theAtlantic This seemed to me so vital that I issued reiteratedinjunctions for care in their transportation and reception


7VII40

I have asked the Admiralty to make very specialarrangements for bringing in your rifle convoys Theyare sending four destroyers far out to meet them andall should arrive during the 9th You can ascertain thehour from the Admiralty I was so glad to hear that youwere making all preparations for the unloading


reception and distribution of these rifles At least onehundred thousand ought to reach the troops that verynight or in the small hours of the following morningSpecial trains should be used to distribute them and theammunition according to a plan worked out beforehandexactly and directed from the landing-port by somehigh officer thoroughly acquainted with it It would seemlikely that you would emphasise early distribution to thecoastal districts so that all the Home Guard in thedanger areas should be the first served Perhaps youwould be good enough to let me know beforehand whatyou decide


8VII40

Have any steps been taken to load the later portionsof American ammunition rifles and guns upon fasterships than was the case last time What are the shipsin which the latest consignments are being packed andwhat are their speeds Will you kindly ascertain thisfrom the Admiralty

Prime Minister to FirstLord

27VII40

The great consignments of rifles and guns togetherwith their ammunition which are now approaching thiscountry are entirely on a different level from anythingelse we have transported across the ocean except theCanadian Division itself Do not forget that two hundredthousand rifles mean two hundred thousand men asthe men are waiting for the rifles The convoysapproaching on July 31 are unique and a special effortshould be made to ensure their safe arrival The loss ofthese rifles and field guns would be a disaster of thefirst order

When the ships from America approached our shores withtheir priceless arms special trains were waiting in all theports to receive their cargoes The Home Guard in every


county in every town in every village sat up all through thenights to receive them Men and women worked night andday making them fit for use By the end of July we were anarmed nation so far as parachute or air-borne landingswere concerned We had become a ldquohornetrsquos nestrdquoAnyhow if we had to go down fighting (which I did notanticipate) a lot of our men and some women hadweapons in their hands The arrival of the first instalment ofthe half-million 300 rifles for the Home Guard (albeit withonly about fifty cartridges apiece of which we dared onlyissue ten and no factories yet set in motion) enabled us totransfer three hundred thousand 303 British-type rifles tothe rapidly expanding formations of the Regular ArmyAt the seventy-fives with their thousand rounds apiecesome fastidious experts presently turned their noses upThere were no limbers and no immediate means ofprocuring more ammunition Mixed calibres complicateoperations But I would have none of this and during all1940 and 1941 these nine hundred seventy-fives were agreat addition to our military strength for Home DefenceArrangements were devised and men were drilled to runthem up on planks into lorries for movement When you arefighting for existence any cannon is better than no cannonat all and the French seventy-five although outdated bythe British twenty-five-pounder and the German field gun-howitzer was still a splendid weapon

We had watched with attention the growth of the Germanheavy batteries along the Channel coast during August andSeptember By far the strongest concentration of thisartillery was around Calais and Cape Gris-Nez with theapparent purpose not only of forbidding the Straits to our


warships but also of commanding the shortest route acrossthem We now know that by the middle of September thefollowing batteries were already mounted and ready for usein this region alone

(a) Siegfried battery south of Gris-Nez with four 38-cm guns(b) Friedrich-August battery north of Boulogne withthree 305-cm guns(c) Grosser Kurfuerst battery at Gris-Nez with four 28-cm guns(d) Prinz Heinrich battery between Calais and Blanc-Ncz with two 28-cm guns(e) Oldenburg battery east of Calais with two 24-cmguns(f) M1 M2 M3 M4 batteries in the sector of Gris-Nez ndash Calais with a total of 14 17-cm guns

Besides this no fewer than thirty-five heavy and mediumbatteries of the German Army as well as seven batteries ofcaptured guns were sited along the French coast fordefensive purposes by the end of AugustThe orders which I had given in June for arming the Doverpromontory with guns that could fire across the Channelhad borne fruit though not on the same scale I took apersonal interest in the whole of this business I visitedDover several times in these anxious summer months Inthe citadel of the castle large underground galleries andchambers had been cut in the chalk and there was a widebalcony from which on clear days the shores of Francenow in the hands of the enemy could be seen AdmiralRamsay who commanded was a friend of mine He wasthe son of a colonel of the 4th Hussars under whom I had


served in my youth and I had often seen him as a child onthe Barrack Square at Aldershot When three years beforethe war he had resigned his position as Chief of the Staff tothe Home Fleet through a difference with its Commander-in-Chief it was to me that he had come to seek advice I hadlong talks with him and together with the Dover FortressCommander visited our rapidly improving defencesI carefully studied there and at home the Intelligencereports which almost daily showed the progress of theGerman batteries The series of Minutes which I dictatedabout the Dover guns during August show my very greatdesire to break up some of the heaviest battery-sites beforetheir guns could reply I certainly thought this ought to havebeen done in August as we had at least three of the veryheaviest guns capable of firing across the Channel Lateron the Germans became too strong for us to court a duel


3VIII40

1 The fourteen-inch gun I ordered to be mounted atDover should be ready in ample time to deal with thisnew German battery It certainly should not fire until allthe guns are in position The plan for the shoot mayhowever now be made and I should like to know whatarrangements for spotting aircraft protected by Fightersin strength will be prepared for that joyous occasionAlso when the two guns 135rsquos on railway mountingswill be ready and whether they can reach the targetmentioned Several other camouflaged guns should beput up at various points with arrangements to makesuitable flashes smoke and dust Let me know whatarrangements can be devised I presume work on therailway extensions for the 135rsquos is already in handPlease report


2 The movement of the German warshipssouthward to Kiel creates a somewhat differentsituation from that dealt with in C-in-C Home Fleetrsquosappreciation asked for some time ago about aninvasion across the narrow waters supported by heavyships The Admiralty should be asked whether C-in-Crsquos attention should not be drawn to the altereddispositions of the enemy in case he has anythingfurther to say


8VIII40

I am impressed by the speed and efficiency withwhich the emplacement for the fourteen-inch gun atDover has been prepared and the gun itself mountedWill you tell all those who have helped in thisachievement how much I appreciate the sterling effortthey have made

The enemy batteries first opened fire on August 22engaging a convoy without effect and later firing onDover They were replied to by one of our fourteen-inchguns which was now in action Thenceforward therewere artillery duels at irregular intervals Dover wasengaged six times in September the heaviest daybeing September 9 when over a hundred and fiftyshells were fired Very little damage was done toconvoys

Prime Minister toFirst Lord and FirstSea Lord

25VIII40

I shall be much obliged if you will make proposals fora shoot by Erebus6 against the German batteries atGris-Nez I was very glad to hear you thought thispracticable It is most desirable There is no reason whyit should wait for the railway guns though of course ifthey were ready they could follow on with the fourteen-inch at daybreak We ought to smash these batteries Ihope we have not got to wait for the next moon for


Erebus and I shall be glad to know what are the moon-conditions which you deem favourable

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay and COS Committee

27VIII40

It would not seem unreasonable that the enemyshould attempt gradually to master the Doverpromontory and command the Channel at its narrowestpoint This would be a natural preliminary to invasion Itwould give occasion for continued fighting with our AirForce in the hope of exhausting them by numbers Itwould tend to drive our warships from all the Channelbases The concentration of many batteries on theFrench coast must be expected What are we doing indefence of the Dover promontory by heavy artilleryTen weeks ago I asked for heavy guns One has beenmounted Two railway guns are expected Now we aretold these will be very inaccurate on account of super-charging We ought to have a good many more heavyguns lined up inside to smaller calibre with stiffer riflingand a range of at least fifty miles and firing at twenty-five or thirty miles would then become more accurate Ido not understand why I have not yet receivedproposals on this subject We must insist uponmaintaining superior artillery positions on the Doverpromontory no matter what form of attack they areexposed to We have to fight for the command of theStraits by artillery to destroy the enemyrsquos batteries andto multiply and fortify our own

I have sent on other papers a request for a surpriseattack by Erebus which should be able to destroy thebatteries at Gris-Nez She has an armoured deckagainst air-bombing What is being done about thisWhen is she going into action The Air Ministry shouldof course co-operate The operation would take anoffensive turn We should require spotting aircraft byday It may be that the first squadrons of Hurricanesfitted with Merlin 20 would be the best for this If Erebusis attacked from the air she should be stronglydefended and action sought with the enemy air force


Pray let me have your plans

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay for COS Committee

30VIII40

Further to my previous Minute on defence of theKentish promontory we must expect that very powerfulbatteries in great numbers will be rapidly brought intobeing on the French coast It would be a naturalthought for the Germans to try to dominate the Straitsby artillery At present we are ahead of them with ourfourteen-inch and two 135 railway guns The Admiralat Dover should be furnished in addition as soon aspossible with a large number of the most modern six-inch or eight-inch guns I understand the Admiralty isconsidering taking guns from [HMS] Newcastle orGlasgow which are under long repair A recordevolution should be made of getting one or two of theseturrets mounted Report to me about this and datesThere is a 92 Army experimental gun and mountingand surely we have some twelve-inch on railwaymountings If our ships cannot use the Straits theenemy must not be able to Even if guns cannot fireonto the French shore they are none the less veryvaluable

Some of our heavy artillery ndash the eighteen-inchhowitzer and the 92rsquos ndash should be planted in positionswhence they could deny the ports and landings to theenemy and as CIGS mentioned support the counter-attack which would be launched against any attemptedbridgehead Much of this mass of artillery I saved fromthe last war has done nothing and has been underreconditioning for a whole year

Let me have a good programme for using it tosupport counter-strokes and deny landings both northand south of the Thames Farther north I have seenalready some very good heavy batteries

I should like also to be informed of the real [actual]lines of defence drawn up between Dover and Londonand Harwich and London Now that the coast isfinished there is no reason why we should not develop


these lines which in no way detract from the principleof vehement counter-attack

But the most urgent matter is one or two modern six-inch to shoot all German craft up to thirty-five thousandyards

I am also endeavouring to obtain from United Statesat least a pair of their sixteen-inch coast-defenceweapons These fire forty-five thousand yards throwinga ton and a quarter without being super-charged Theyshould therefore be very accurate General StrongUnited States Army mentioned this to me as apromising line He thought without committing hisGovernment that the United States Army might beprepared to take a couple of these guns and theircarriages away from some of their twin batteries

Let me know all details about these guns It ought tobe possible to make the concrete foundation in threemonths and I expect it would take as long to get theseguns over here There are very few ships that can carrythem on their decks

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay andFirst Sea Lord

31VIII40

It becomes particularly urgent to attack the batterieson the French shore Yesterdayrsquos photographs showguns being actually hoisted up into position and it willbe wise to fire on them before they are able to replyThere are quite enough guns in position already I trusttherefore Erebus will not be delayed as every day ourtask will become harder

It seems most necessary to damage and delay thedevelopment of the hostile batteries in view of the factthat we are so far behindhand with our own

At the beginning of September our heavy-gun strengthtowards the sea was


Pre-War Coast Defence92-inch two6-inch sixRecent Additions14-inch (Naval) one92-inch two (railway mountings)6-inch (Naval) two4-inch (Naval) two

These were soon to be further reinforced by two 135-inchguns from the old battleship Iron Duke which were beingerected on railway mountings and a battery of four 55-inchguns from HMS Hood Many of these additional gunswere manned by the Royal Navy and Royal MarinesAlthough still inferior in numbers to the enemy we thus hada powerful fire concentrationIn addition one of the eighteen-inch howitzers I had savedafter the First World War and twelve twelve-inch howitzerswere installed for engaging enemy landings All these weremobile and would have brought a terrible fire on anylanding-area

As the months of July and August passed without anydisaster we settled ourselves down with increasingassurance that we could make a long and hard fight Ourgains of strength were borne in upon us from day to dayThe entire population laboured to the last limit of itsstrength and felt rewarded when they fell asleep after theirtoil or vigil by a growing sense that we should have timeand that we should win All the beaches now bristled with


defences of various kinds The whole country wasorganised in defensive localities The factories poured outtheir weapons By the end of August we had over twohundred and fifty new tanks The fruits of the American ldquoActof Faithrdquo had been gathered The whole trainedprofessional British Army and its Territorial comrades drilledand exercised from morn till night and longed to meet thefoe The Home Guard overtopped the million mark andwhen rifles were lacking grasped lustily the shotgun thesporting rifle the private pistol or when there was nofirearm the pike and the club No Fifth Column existed inBritain though a few spies were carefully rounded up andexamined What few Communists there were lay lowEveryone else gave all they had to giveWhen Ribbentrop visited Rome in September he said toCiano ldquoThe English Territorial defence is non-existent Asingle German division will suffice to bring about acomplete collapserdquo This merely shows his ignorance Ihave often wondered however what would have happenedif two hundred thousand German storm troops had actuallyestablished themselves ashore The massacre would havebeen on both sides grim and great There would have beenneither mercy nor quarter They would have used terrorand we were prepared to go all lengths I intended to usethe slogan ldquoYou can always take one with yourdquo I evencalculated that the horrors of such a scene would in the lastresort turn the scale in the United States But none of theseemotions was put to the proof Far out on the grey waters ofthe North Sea and the Channel coursed and patrolled thefaithful eager flotillas peering through the night High in theair soared the fighter pilots or waited serene at a momentrsquosnotice around their excellent machines This was a timewhen it was equally good to live or die


14The Invasion Problem

Former Studies of Invasion mdash The New Air Powermdash My Statement to Parliament of June 18 mdashTheFirst Rumours June 27 1940 mdashMy Note of June28 mdashMy Note on ldquoInvasionrdquo of July 10 mdashImpor-tance of Mobile ReservesmdashTwo Thousand Milesof British Coastline mdash The First Sea LordrsquosMemorandum mdash Distribution of Potential AttackmdashIDouble His Estimate for SafetymdashMy Minute ofAugust 5 1940 mdashMy Suggested Distribution ofOur Army mdash Coincidence of Chiefs of Staff Viewmdash Our Emphasis on East Coast mdash The GermansChoose the South Coast mdash We Turn Our Front mdashChange in Our Dispositions Between August andSeptember mdash Persisting Dangers from Across theNorth Sea mdash Tension in July and August

AFTER DUNKIRK and still more when three weeks later theFrench Government capitulated the questions whetherHitler would or secondly could invade and conquer ourisland rose as we have seen in all British minds I was nonovice at this problem As First Lord I had for three yearsbefore the First Great War taken part in all the discussionsof the Committee of Imperial Defence upon the point Onbehalf of the Admiralty I had always argued that at least twodivisions out of our Expeditionary Force of six should bekept at home until the Territorial Army and other wartimeforces became militarily effective As Admiral ldquoTugrdquo Wilson


put it ldquoThe Navy cannot play international football without agoal-keeperrdquo However when at the outbreak of that warwe found ourselves with the Navy fully mobilised the GrandFleet safe beyond hostile ken at sea all surprisestreacheries and accidents left behind us we felt ourselvesable at the Admiralty to be better than our word At theextraordinary meeting of Ministers and high militaryauthorities which Mr Asquith summoned to the CabinetRoom on August 5 1914 I declared formally with the fullagreement of the First Sea Lord (Prince Louis ofBattenberg) that the Navy would guarantee the protectionof the island against invasion or serious raid even if all theRegular troops were immediately sent to the great battleimpending in France So far as we were concerned thewhole Army could go In the course of the first six weeks allthe six divisions wentSea-power when properly understood is a wonderful thingThe passage of an army across salt water in the face ofsuperior fleets and flotillas is an almost impossible featSteam had added enormously to the power of the Navy todefend Great Britain In Napoleonrsquos day the same windwhich would carry his flat-bottomed boats across theChannel from Boulogne would drive away our blockadingsquadrons But everything that had happened since thenhad magnified the power of the superior navy to destroy theinvaders in transit Every complication which modernapparatus had added to armies made their voyage morecumbrous and perilous and the difficulties of theirmaintenance when landed probably insuperable At thatformer crisis in our island fortunes we possessed superiorand as it proved ample sea-power The enemy wasunable to gain a major sea battle against us He could notface our cruiser forces In flotillas and light craft weoutnumbered him tenfold Against this must be set the


incalculable chances of weather particularly fog But even ifthis were adverse and a descent were effected at one ormore points the problem of maintaining a hostile line ofcommunication and of nourishing any lodgments remainedunsolved Such was the position in the First Great WarBut now there was the air What effect had this sovereigndevelopment produced upon the invasion problemEvidently if the enemy could dominate the narrow seas onboth sides of the Straits of Dover by superior air power thelosses of our flotillas would be very heavy and mighteventually be fatal No one would wish except on asupreme occasion to bring heavy battleships or largecruisers into waters commanded by the German bombersWe did not in fact station any capital ships south of theForth or east of Plymouth But from Harwich the NoreDover Portsmouth and Portland we maintained a tirelessvigilant patrol of light fighting vessels which steadilyincreased in number By September they exceeded eighthundred which only a hostile air power could destroy andthen only by degreesBut who had the power in the air In the Battle of Francewe had fought the Germans at two and three to one andinflicted losses in similar proportion Over Dunkirk wherewe had to maintain continuous patrol to cover the escape ofthe Army we had fought at four or five to one with successand profit Over our own waters and exposed coasts andcounties Air Chief Marshal Dowding contemplated profitablefighting at seven or eight to one The strength of theGerman Air Force at this time taken as a whole so far aswe knew ndash and we were well informed ndash apart fromparticular concentrations was about three to one Althoughthese were heavy odds at which to fight the brave andefficient German foe I rested upon the conclusion that inour own air over our own country and its waters we could


beat the German Air Force And if this were true our navalpower would continue to rule the seas and oceans andwould destroy all enemies who set their course towards usThere was of course a third potential factor Had theGermans with their renowned thoroughness and foresightsecretly prepared a vast armada of special landing craftwhich needed no harbours or quays but could land tankscannon and motor-vehicles anywhere on the beaches andwhich thereafter could supply the landed troops As hadbeen shown such ideas had risen in my mind long ago in1917 and were now being actually developed as the resultof my directions We had however no reason to believethat anything of this kind existed in Germany though it isalways best when counting the cost not to exclude theworst It took us four years of intense effort and experimentand immense material aid from the United States to providesuch equipment on a scale equal to the Normandy landingMuch less would have sufficed the Germans at thismoment But they had only a few Siebel ferriesThus the invasion of England in the summer and autumn of1940 required from Germany local naval superiority and airsuperiority and immense special fleets and landing craftBut it was we who had the naval superiority it was we whoconquered the mastery in the air and finally we believedas we now know rightly that they had not built or conceivedany special craft These were the foundations of my thoughtabout invasion in 1940 from which I gave from day to daythe instructions and directives which these chapters contain

I laid the broad outlines plainly before Parliament on June18


The Navy has never pretended to be able to preventraids by bodies of five or ten thousand men flungsuddenly across and thrown ashore at several pointson the coast some dark night or foggy morning Theefficacy of sea-power especially under modernconditions depends upon the invading force being oflarge size It has to be of large size in view of ourmilitary strength to be of any use If it is of large sizethen the Navy have something they can find and meetand as it were bite on Now we must remember thateven five divisions however lightly equipped wouldrequire two hundred to two hundred and fifty ships andwith modern air reconnaissance and photography itwould not be easy to collect such an armada marshalit and conduct it across the sea with any powerfulnaval forces to escort it and there would be very greatpossibilities to put it mildly that this armada would beintercepted long before it reached the coast and all themen drowned in the sea or at the worst blown topieces with their equipment while trying to land

As early as the end of June some reports indicated that theenemyrsquos plans might include the Channel and Iimmediately called for inquiry


27VI40

It seems difficult to believe that any large force oftransports could be brought to the Channel portswithout our being aware of it or that any system ofmining would prevent our sweepers from clearing a wayfor attack on such transports on passage However itwould be well if the Chiefs of the Staff gave theirattention to this rumour


Anyhow the possibility of a cross-Channel invasionimprobable though it was at that time had to be mostclosely examined I was not entirely satisfied with themilitary dispositions It was imperative that the Army shouldknow the exact task assigned to it and above all should notfritter away strength in a sedentary dispersion along thethreatened coasts or exhaust the national resources bymanning unduly all the coasts Therefore I wrote


28VI40

Note by the Prime Minister to COS Committee1 See papers by Vice-Chiefs of Staff and further

papers by COS Committee2 It is prudent to block off likely sections of the

beaches with a good defence and to make secure allcreeks and harbours on the east coast The south coastis less immediately dangerous No serious invasion ispossible without a harbour with its quays etc No onecan tell should the Navy fail on what part of the eastcoast the impact will fall Perhaps there will be severallodgments Once these are made all troops employedon other parts of the coastal crust will be as useless asthose in the Maginot Line Although fighting on thebeaches is favourable to the defence this advantagecannot be purchased by trying to guard all the beachesThe process must be selective But if time permitsdefended sectors may be widened and improved

3 Every effort should be made to man coastdefences with sedentary troops well sprinkled withexperienced late-war officers The safety of the countrydepends [however] on having a large number (now onlynine but should soon be fifteen) ldquoLeopardrdquo brigadegroups which can be directed swiftly ie within fourhours to the points of lodgment Difficulties of landingon beaches are serious even when the invader hasreached them but difficulties of nourishing a lodgment


when exposed to heavy attack by land air and sea arefar greater All therefore depends on rapid resoluteengagement of any landed forces which may slipthrough the sea-control This should not be beyond ourmeans provided the field troops are not consumed inbeach defences and are kept in a high condition ofmobility crouched and ready to spring

4 In the unhappy event of the enemy capturing aport larger formations with artillery will be necessaryThere should be four or five good divisions held ingeneral reserve to deal with such an improbablemisfortune The scale of lodgment to be anticipatedshould be not more than ten thousand men landed atthree points simultaneously ndash say thirty thousand in allthe scale of air attack not more than fifteen thousandlanded simultaneously at two or three points in all Theenemy will not have strength to repeat such descentsoften It is very doubtful whether air-borne troops canbe landed in force by night by day they should be aneasy prey [to our Air Force]

5 The tank story is somewhat different and it isright to minimise by local cannon and obstacles thelanding places of tanks The Admiralty should reportupon the size character and speed of potential tank-carrying barges or floats whether they will be self-propelled or towed and by what craft As they canhardly go above seven miles an hour they should bedetected in summertime after they have started andeven in fog or haze the RDF stations should givewarning while they are still several hours from land Thedestroyers issuing from the sally-ports must strike atthese with gusto The arrangement of stops and blocksheld by local sedentary forces should be steadilydeveloped and anti-tank squads formed Our own tankreserve must engage the surviving invader tanks andno doubt it is held in a position which allows swift railing[transport by rail] to the attacked area

6 Parachutists Fifth-Columnists and enemy motor-cyclists who may penetrate or appear in disguise inunexpected places must be left to the Home Guardreinforced by special squads Much thought must begiven to the [enemy] trick of wearing British uniform


7 In general I find myself in agreement with theCommander-in-Chiefrsquos plan but all possible field troopsmust be saved from the beaches and gathered into theldquoLeopardrdquo brigades and other immediate mobilesupports Emphasis should be laid upon the mainreserve The battle will be won or lost not on thebeaches but by the mobile brigades and the mainreserve Until the Air Force is worn down by prolongedair fighting and destruction of aircraft supply the powerof the Navy remains decisive against any seriousinvasion

8 The above observations apply only to theimmediate summer months We must be much betterequipped and stronger before the autumn

In July there was growing talk and anxiety on the subjectboth inside the British Government and at large In spite ofceaseless reconnaissance and all the advantages of airphotography no evidence had yet reached us of largeassemblies of transport in the Baltic or in the Rhine orScheldt harbours and we were sure that no movementeither of shipping or self-propelled barges through theStraits into the Channel had taken place Neverthelesspreparation to resist invasion was the supreme task beforeus all and intense thought was devoted to it throughout ourwar circle and Home Command

INVASION

NOTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister to C-in-C Home ForcesCIGS and GeneralIsmay

10VII40

I find it very difficult to visualise the kind of invasionall along the coast by troops carried in small craft andeven in boats I have not seen any serious evidence oflarge masses of this class of craft being assembled


and except in very narrow waters it would be a mosthazardous and even suicidal operation to commit alarge army to the accidents of the sea in the teeth ofour very numerous armed patrolling forces TheAdmiralty have over a thousand armed patrollingvessels of which two or three hundred are always atsea the whole being well manned by competentseafaring men A surprise crossing should beimpossible and in the broader parts of the North Seathe invaders should be an easy prey as part of theirvoyage would be made by daylight Behind thesepatrolling craft are the flotillas of destroyers of whichforty destroyers are now disposed between the Humberand Portsmouth the bulk being in the narrowestwaters The greater part of these are at sea every nightand rest in the day They would therefore probablyencounter the enemy vessels in transit during the nightbut also could reach any landing point or points on thefront mentioned in two or three hours They couldimmediately break up the landing craft interrupt thelanding and fire upon the landed troops who howeverlightly equipped would have to have some proportionof ammunition and equipment carried onto the beachesfrom their boats The flotillas would however needstrong air support from our fighter aircraft during theirintervention from dawn onward The provision of the air-fighter escort for our destroyers after daybreak isessential to their most powerful intervention on thebeaches

2 You should see the Commander-in-Chiefrsquos (HomeFleet) reply to the question put to him by the desire ofthe Cabinet ie what happens if the enemy cover thepassage of their invading army with their heavywarships The answer is that as far as we know atpresent they have no heavy ships not under long repairexcept those at Trondheim1 which are closely watchedby our very largely superior forces When the Nelsonand Barham are worked up after refit in a few daysrsquotime (the 13th and 16th) it would be easily possible tomake two forces of British heavy ships either of whichwould be sufficiently strong thus the danger of a


northern outbreak could be contained and at the sametime a dart to the south by the Trondheim ships couldbe rapidly countered Moreover the cruisers in theThames and Humber are themselves strong enoughwith the flotillas to attack effectively any light cruiserswith which the enemy could cover an invasion I feeltherefore that it will be very difficult for the enemy toplace large well-equipped bodies of troops on the eastcoast of England whether in formed bodies or flungpiecemeal on the beaches as they get across Evengreater difficulties would attend expeditions in largervessels seeking to break out to the northward It mayfurther be added that at present there are no signs ofany assemblies of ships or small craft sufficient tocause anxiety except perhaps in Baltic ports Frequentreconnaissance by the air and the constant watching byour submarines should give timely warning and ourminefields are an additional obstruction

3 Even more unlikely is it that the south coast wouldbe attacked We know that no great mass of shippingexists in the French ports and that the numbers ofsmall boats there are not great The Dover barrage isbeing replenished and extended to the French shoreThis measure is of the utmost consequence and theAdmiralty are being asked to press it forward constantlyand rapidly They do not think that any importantvessels warships or transports have come through theStraits of Dover Therefore I find it difficult to believethat the south coast is in serious danger at the presenttime Of course a small raid might be made uponIreland from Brest But this also would be dangerous tothe raiders while at sea

4 The main danger is from the Dutch and Germanharbours which bear principally upon the coast fromDover to the Wash As the nights lengthen this dangerzone will extend northward but then again theweather becomes adverse and the ldquofishing-boatinvasionrdquo far more difficult Moreover with cloud theenemy air support may be lacking at the moment of hisimpact

5 I hope therefore relying on the above reasoningwhich should be checked with the Admiralty that you


will be able to bring an ever larger proportion of yourformed divisions back from the coast into support orreserve so that their training may proceed in thehighest forms of offensive warfare and counter-attackand that the coast as it becomes fortified will beincreasingly confided to troops other than those of theformed divisions and also to the Home Guard I amsure you will be in agreement with this view in principleand the only question open would be the speed of thetransformation Here too I hope we shall be agreedthat the utmost speed shall rule

6 Air-borne attack is not dealt with in this note Itdoes not alter its conclusions

It will be noted that my advisers and I deemed the eastcoast more likely to be attacked during July and Augustthan the south coast There was in fact no chance of eitherassault during these two months As will presently bedescribed the German plan was to invade across theChannel with medium ships (four thousand to five thousandtons) and small craft and we now know that they never hadany hope or intention of moving an army from the Baltic andNorth Sea ports in large transports still less did they makeany plans for an invasion from the Biscay ports This doesnot mean that in choosing the south coast as their targetthey were thinking rightly and we wrongly The east-coastinvasion was by far the more formidable if the enemy hadhad the means to attempt it There could of course be nosouth-coast invasion unless or until the necessary shippinghad passed southward through the Straits of Dover and hadbeen assembled in the French Channel ports Of thisduring July there was no signWe had nonetheless to prepare against all variants and yetat the same time avoid the dispersion of our mobile forces


and to gather reserves This nice and difficult problem couldonly be solved in relation to the news and events from weekto week The British coastline indented with innumerableinlets is over two thousand miles in circumference withoutincluding Ireland The only way of defending so vast aperimeter any part or parts of which may be simultaneouslyor successively attacked is by lines of observation andresistance around the coast or frontiers with the object ofdelaying an enemy and meanwhile creating the largestpossible reserves of highly trained mobile troops sodisposed as to be able to reach any point assailed in theshortest time for strong counter-attack When in the lastphases of the war Hitler found himself encircled andconfronted with a similar problem he made as we shallsee the gravest possible mistakes in handling it He hadcreated a spiderrsquos web of communications but he forgot thespider With the example of the unsound Frenchdispositions for which such a fatal penalty had just beenexacted fresh in our memories we did not forget the ldquomassof manoeuvrerdquo and I ceaselessly inculcated this policy tothe utmost extent that our growing resources would allowThe views in my paper of July 10 were in general harmonywith Admiralty thought and two days later Admiral Poundsent me a full and careful statement which he and theNaval Staff had drawn up in pursuance of it Naturally andproperly the dangers we had to meet were forcefully statedBut in summing up Admiral Pound said

It appears probable that a total of some hundredthousand men might reach these shores without beingintercepted by naval forces hellip but the maintenance oftheir line of supply unless the German Air Force hadovercome both our Air Force and our Navy seemspractically impossiblehellip If the enemy undertook thisoperation he would do so in the hope that he could


make a quick rush on London living on the country ashe went and force the Government to capitulate

The First Sea Lord divided the hundred-thousand maximumfigure both as to enemy ports of departure and the possibleimpact on our coasts as in the following table

I was content with this estimate As the enemy could notbring heavy weapons with them and would speedily havethe supply lines of any lodgments cut the invading strengthseemed even in July to be well within the capacity of ourrapidly improving army I remitted the two documents to theStaffs and Home Command

MIINUTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

15VII40The Chiefs of Staff and Home Defence should

consider these papers The First Sea Lordrsquos memoran-dum may be taken as a working basis and although Ipersonally believe that the Admiralty will in fact bebetter than their word and that the invadersrsquo losses intransit would further reduce the scale of attack yet thepreparations of the land forces should be such as tomake assurance doubly sure Indeed for the landforces the scale of attack might well be doublednamely 200000 men distributed as suggested [ie inthe proportion suggested] by the First Sea Lord OurHome Army is already at a strength when it should beable to deal with such an invasion and its strength israpidly increasing

I should be very glad if our plans to meet invasionon shore could be reviewed on this basis so that theCabinet may be informed of any modifications It should


be borne in mind that although the heaviest attackwould seem likely to fall in the north yet the sovereignimportance of London and the narrowness of the seasin this quarter make the south the theatre where thegreatest precautions must be taken

There was general acceptance of this basis and for thenext few weeks we proceeded upon it Upon the action tobe taken by our main Fleet in the narrow waters preciseorders were issued with which I was in full agreement OnJuly 20 after considerable discussion with Admiral Forbesthe Commander-in-Chief the following decisions werepromulgated by the Admiralty

(1) Their Lordships do not expect our heavy ships togo south to break up an expedition landing on our coastin the absence of any reports indicating the presence ofenemy heavy ships

(2) If enemy heavy ships support an expeditionaccepting the risks involved in an approach to our coastin the southern part of the North Sea then it is essentialthat our heavy ships should move south against themalso accepting risks

In order to reach more definite conclusions about thevarying probabilities and scales of attack on our extendedcoastline so as to avoid undue spreading of our forces Isent the Chiefs of the Staff a further Minute early in August

DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION

MINUTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OFDEFENCE

5VIII40Bearing in mind the immense cost in war energy and

the disadvantages of attempting to defend the wholecoast of Great Britain and the dangers of being undulycommitted to systems of passive defence I should beglad if the following notes could be borne in mind


1 Our first line of defence against invasion must beas ever the enemyrsquos ports Air reconnaissancesubmarine watching and other means of obtaininginformation should be followed by resolute attacks withall our forces available and suitable upon anyconcentrations of enemy shipping

2 Our second line of defence is the vigilantpatrolling of the sea to intercept any invadingexpedition and to destroy it in transit

3 Our third line is the counter-attack upon theenemy when he makes any landfall and particularlywhile he is engaged in the act of landing This attackwhich has long been ready from the sea must bereinforced by air action and both sea and air attacksmust be continued so that it becomes impossible for theinvader to nourish his lodgments

4 The land defences and the Home Army aremaintained primarily for the purpose of making theenemy come in such large numbers as to afford aproper target to the sea and air forces abovementioned and to make hostile preparations andmovements noticeable to air and other forms ofreconnaissance

5 However should the enemy succeed in landing atvarious points he should be made to suffer as much aspossible by local resistance on the beaches combinedwith the aforesaid attack from the sea and the air Thisforces him to use up his ammunition and confines himto a limited area The defence of any part of the coastmust be measured not by the forces on the coast butby the number of hours within which strong counter-attacks by mobile troops can be brought to bear uponthe landing places Such attacks should be hurled withthe utmost speed and fury upon the enemy at hisweakest moment which is not as is sometimessuggested when actually getting out of his boats butwhen sprawled upon the shore with his communica-tions cut and his supplies running short It ought to bepossible to concentrate ten thousand men fullyequipped within six hours and twenty thousand menwithin twelve hours upon any point where a seriouslodgment has been effected The withholding of the


reserves until the full gravity of the attack is known is anice problem for the Home Command

6 It must be admitted that the task of the Navy andAir Force in preventing invasion becomes more difficultin the Narrow Seas namely from the Wash to DoverThis sector of the coast front is also nearest to thesupreme enemy objective London The sector fromDover to Landrsquos End is far less menaced because theNavy and Air Force must make sure that no mass ofshipping still less protecting warships can be passedinto the French Channel ports At present the scale ofattack on this wide front is estimated by the Admiralty atno more than five thousand men2 Doubling this forgreater security it should be possible to make goodarrangements for speedy counter-attack in superiornumbers and at the same time to achieve largeeconomies of force on this southern sector in which thebeach troops should be at their minimum and themobile reserves at their maximum These mobilereserves must be available to move to the southeasternsectors at short notice Evidently this situation can bejudged only from week to week

7 When we come to the west coast of Britain a newset of conditions rules The enemy must commit himselfto the broad seas and there will be plenty of time if hisapproach is detected to attack him with cruisers andflotillas The Admiralty dispositions should conform tothis need The enemy has at present no warships toescort him Should we for instance care to sendtwelve thousand men unescorted in merchant ships toland on the Norwegian coast or in the Skagerrak andKattegat in face of superior sea-power and air-powerIt would be thought madness

8 However to make assurance triply sure theAdmiralty should pursue their plan of laying a strongminefield from Cornwall to Ireland covering the BristolChannel and the Irish Sea from southward attack Thisminefield is all the more necessary now that by theadoption of the northabout route for commerce we havetransferred a large part of our patrolling craft from the


[south-]western approaches which have becomepermanently more empty and un-watched

9 The establishment of this minefield will simplifyand mitigate all questions of local defence north of itspoint of contact with Cornwall We must consider thissector from Cornwall to the Mull of Cantyre as the leastvulnerable to sea-borne invasion Here the works ofdefence should be confined to guarding by a few gunsor land torpedo tubes the principal harbours and givinga moderate scale of protection to their gorges3 It is notadmissible to lavish our limited resources upon thissector

10 North of the Mull of Cantyre to Scapa Flow theShetlands and the Faroes all lies in the orbit of themain Fleet The voyage of an expedition from theNorwegian coast would be very hazardous and itsarrival anywhere right round to Cromarty Firth would notraise immediately decisive issues The enemy who isnow crouched would then be sprawled His advancewould lie in difficult and sparsely inhabited country Hecould be contained until sufficient forces were broughtto bear and his communications immediately cut fromthe sea This would make his position all the moredifficult as the distances to any important objective aremuch longer and he would require considerablewheeled transport It would be impossible to fortify alllanding points in this sector and it would be a waste ofenergy to attempt to do so A much longer period maybe allowed for counter-attack than in the southeastopposite London

11 From Cromarty Firth to the Wash is the secondmost important sector ranking next after the Wash toDover Here however all the harbours and inlets aredefended both from the sea and from the rear and itshould be possible to counter-attack in superior forcewithin twenty-four hours The Tyne must be regardedas the second major objective after London for here(and to a lesser extent at the Tees) grievous damagecould be done by an invader or large-scale raider in ashort time On the other hand the sea and air


conditions are more favourable to us than to thesouthward

12 The Combined Staffs should endeavour toassign to all these sectors their relative scales ofvulnerability and defence both in the number of menemployed in the local defence of beaches and ofharbours and also in the number of days or hourswithin which heavy counter-attacks should be possibleAs an indication of these relative scales of attack anddefence I set down for consideration the following

The Chiefs of Staff Committee after another review of allour information replied to this paper by a report fromColonel Hollis who acted as their Secretary


Prime Minister 13VIII40The Chiefs of Staff have examined in consultation

with the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces yourMinute [of August 5] and find themselves in completeagreement with the principles enunciated in paragraphs1 to 5

2 The Commander-in-Chief assures us that theparamount importance of immediate counter-attackupon the enemy should he obtain a temporary footingon these shores has been impressed on all ranks andthat it is his policy to bring back divisions into reserveas soon as they are adequately trained and equippedfor offensive operations

3 The Chiefs of Staff also agree with yourassessment of the relative scales of vulnerability to sea-borne attack of the various sectors of the coast Indeedit is remarkable how closely the present distribution of


Home Defence divisions corresponds with your figuresin paragraph 12 This is worked out as follows

4 Your theoretical scales of defence are

5 A force of ten divisions if distributed in the aboveproportions would give three divisions on Sector Forth-Wash five divisions on Sector Wash-Dover and so onThere are in fact twenty-six active divisions in thisisland and if your figures are multiplied by 26 andcompared with actual distribution of these twenty-sixdivisions the following picture results

6 The similarity between the two sets of figures iseven closer than appears at first sight by reason of thefact that the reserve divisions located immediately northand northwest of London are available for deploymentin either the sector Wash-Dover or the sector Dover-Portsmouth and therefore the number of ldquoavailablerdquodivisions for these two sectors is variable A total offifteen divisions is available on the combined sectorsagainst your suggested requirements of 1675

7 The Chiefs of Staff point out that your figures arebased on scales of sea-borne attack whereas the


actual distribution takes into account the threat from air-borne attack as well Thus although we may seem atpresent to be slightly overinsured along the southcoast the reason for this is that our defences there canbe brought under the enemy fighter ldquoumbrellardquo and canbe subjected to assault across the Channel atcomparatively short range

Even while these documents were being considered andprinted the situation had begun to change in a decisivemanner Our excellent Intelligence confirmed that theldquoOperation Sea Lionrdquo had been definitely ordered by Hitlerand was in active preparation It seemed certain that theman was going to try Moreover the front to be attackedwas altogether different from or additional to the eastcoast on which the Chiefs of the Staff the Admiralty and Iin full agreement still laid the major emphasisBut thereafter came a rapid transformation A large numberof self-propelled barges and motor-boats began to pass bynight through the Straits of Dover creeping along theFrench coast and gradually assembling in all the FrenchChannel ports from Calais to Brest Our daily photographsshowed this movement with precision It had not beenfound possible to relay our minefields close to the Frenchshore We immediately began to attack the vessels intransit with our small craft and Bomber Command wasconcentrated upon the new set of invasion ports nowopening upon us At the same time a great deal ofinformation came to hand about the assembly of a GermanArmy or Armies of Invasion along this stretch of the hostilecoast of movement on the railways and of largeconcentrations in the Pas de Calais and Normandy Lateron two mountain divisions with mules evidently meant to


scale the Folkestone cliffs were reported near BoulogneMeanwhile large numbers of powerful long-range batteriesall along the French Channel coast came into existenceIn response to the new menace we began to shift ourweight from one leg to the other and to improve all ourfacilities for moving our increasingly large mobile reservestowards the southern front About the end of the first weekof August General Brooke now Commander-in-ChiefHome Forces pointed out that the threat of invasion wasdeveloping equally on the south coast All the time ourforces were increasing in numbers efficiency mobility andequipment

The change in our dispositions between August andSeptember was as follows

Thus in the last half of September we were able to bringinto action on the south coast front including Dover sixteendivisions of high quality of which three were armoureddivisions or their equivalent in brigades all of which wereadditional to the local coastal defence and could come intoaction with great speed against any invasion landing Thisprovided us with a punch or series of punches whichGeneral Brooke was well poised to deliver as might berequired and no one more capable


All this while we could not feel any assurance that the inletsand river mouths from Calais to Terschelling andHeligoland with all that swarm of islands off the Dutch andBelgian coasts (the ldquoRiddle of the Sandsrdquo of the previouswar) might not conceal other large hostile forces with smallor moderate-sized ships An attack from Harwich rightround to Portsmouth Portland or even Plymouth centringupon the Kent promontory seemed to impend We hadnothing but negative evidence that a third wave of invasionharmonised with the others might not be launched from theBaltic through the Skagerrak in large ships This wasindeed essential to a German success because in no otherway could heavy weapons reach the landed armies or largedepots of supply be established in and around store-shipsstranded near the east-coast beachesWe now entered upon a period of extreme tension andvigilance We had of course all this time to maintain heavyforces north of the Wash right up to Cromarty andarrangements were perfected to draw from these shouldthe assault declare itself decidedly in the south Theabundant intricate railway system of the island and ourcontinued mastery of our home air would have enabled usto move with certainty another four or five divisions toreinforce the southern defence if it were necessary on thefourth fifth and sixth days after the enemyrsquos full effort hadbeen exposedA very careful study was made of the moon and the tidesWe thought that the enemy would like to cross by night andland at dawn and we now know the German ArmyCommand felt like this too They would also be glad of ahalf-moonlight on the way over so as to keep their orderand make their true landfall Measuring it all with precisionthe Admiralty thought the most favourable conditions for the


enemy would arise between the 15th and 30th ofSeptember Here also we now find that we were inagreement with our foes We had little doubt of our ability todestroy anything that got ashore on the Dover promontoryor on the sector of coast from Dover to Portsmouth or evenPortland As all our thoughts at the summit moved togetherin harmonious and detailed agreement one could not helpliking the picture which presented itself with growingdefinition Here perhaps was the chance of striking a blowat the mighty enemy which would resound throughout theworld One could not help being inwardly excited alike bythe atmosphere and the evidence of Hitlerrsquos intentionswhich streamed in upon us There were indeed somewho on purely technical grounds and for the sake of theeffect the total defeat and destruction of his expeditionwould have on the general war were quite content to seehim tryIn July and August we had asserted air mastery over GreatBritain and were especially powerful and dominant over thehome counties of the southeast The Canadian Army Corpsstood most conveniently posted between London andDover Their bayonets were sharp and their hearts werehigh Proud would they have been to strike the decisiveblow for Britain and Freedom Similar passions burned in allbreasts Vast intricate systems of fortifications defendedlocalities anti-tank obstacles block-houses pillboxes andthe like laced the whole area The coastline bristled withdefences and batteries and at the cost of heavier lossesthrough reduced escorts in the Atlantic and also by newconstruction coming into commission the flotillas grewsubstantially in numbers and quality We had brought thebattleship Revenge and the old target-ship and dummy-battleship Centurion and a cruiser to Plymouth The HomeFleet was at its maximum strength and could operate


without much risk to the Humber and even to the Wash Inall respects therefore we were fully preparedFinally we were already not far from the equinoctial galescustomary in October Evidently September was the monthfor Hitler to strike if he dared and the tides and the moon-phase were favourable in the middle of that month

There was some talk in Parliament after the danger hadpassed away of the ldquoinvasion scarerdquo Certainly those whoknew most were the least scared Apart from mastery of theair and command of the sea we had as large (if not so wellequipped) an army fresh and ardent as that whichGermany assembled in Normandy four years later tooppose our return to the Continent In that case althoughwe landed a million men in the first month with vastapparatus and with every other condition favourable thebattle was long and severe and nearly three months wererequired to enlarge the area originally seized and break outinto the open field But these were values only to be testedand known in the future

It is time to go over to the other camp and set forth theenemyrsquos preparations and plans as we now know them


15Operation Sea Lion

Plan of the German Admiralty mdash Their ConditionsMet by the Conquest of France and the LowCountries mdash Meeting with the Fuehrer of July 21mdash Hitler Comprehends the Difficulties but Givesthe Order mdash Controversy Between the GermanNavy and Army Staffs mdash Raeder and Halder atVariance ndash The Compromise Plan Agreed mdashFurther Misgivings of the German Admiralty mdashBoth German Navy and Army Chiefs Cast theBurden on Goering and the Air mdash GoeringAccepts mdash Hitler Postpones D-Day mdash BritishCounter-Activities mdash The ldquoCromwellrdquo Order ofSeptember 7 mdashA Healthy Tonic mdash GermanIgnorance of Amphibious Warfare mdash ServiceDisunion mdash The Germans Stake All on the AirBattle

SOON AFTER WAR BROKE OUT on September 3 1939 theGerman Admiralty as we have learnt from their capturedarchives began their staff study of the invasion of BritainUnlike us they had no doubt that the only way was acrossthe narrow waters of the English Channel They neverconsidered any other alternative If we had known this itwould have been an important relief An invasion across theChannel came upon our best-defended coast the old sea-front against France where all the ports were fortified andour main flotilla bases and in later times most of our


airfields and air-control stations for the defence of Londonwere established There was no part of the island where wecould come into action quicker or in such great strengthwith all three Services Admiral Raeder was anxious not tobe found wanting should the demand to invade Britain bemade upon the German Navy At the same time he askedfor a lot of conditions The first of these was the entirecontrol of the French Belgian and Dutch coasts harboursand river mouths Therefore the project slumbered duringthe Twilight WarSuddenly all these conditions were surprisingly fulfilled andit must have been with some misgivings but alsosatisfaction that on the morrow of Dunkirk and the Frenchsurrender he could present himself to the Fuehrer with aplan On May 21 and again on June 20 he spoke to Hitleron the subject not with a view to proposing an invasion butin order to make sure that if it were ordered the planning indetail should not be rushed Hitler was sceptical saying thatldquohe fully appreciated the exceptional difficulties of such anundertakingrdquo He also nursed the hope that England wouldsue for peace It was not until the last week in June that theSupreme Headquarters turned to this idea nor till July 2that the first directive was issued for planning the invasionof Britain as a possible event ldquoThe Fuehrer has decidedthat under certain conditions ndash the most important of whichis achieving air superiority ndash a landing in England may takeplacerdquo On July 16 Hitler issued his directive ldquoSinceEngland in spite of her militarily hopeless position showsno sign of coming to terms I have decided to prepare alanding operation against England and if necessary to carryit outhellip The preparations for the entire operation must becompleted by mid-Augustrdquo Active measures in everydirection were already in progress


The German Navy Plan of which it is clear I had receivedan inkling in June was essentially mechanical Under thecover of heavy-gun batteries firing from Gris-Nez towardsDover and a very strong artillery protection along theFrench coast in the Straits they proposed to make a narrowcorridor across the Channel on the shortest convenient lineand to wall this in by minefields on either side with outlyingU-boat protection Through this the Army was to be ferriedover and supplied in a large number of successive wavesThere the Navy stopped and on this the German ArmyChiefs were left to address themselves to the problemConsidering that we could with our overwhelming navalsuperiority tear these minefields to pieces with small craftunder superior air power and also destroy the dozen orscore of U-boats concentrated to protect them this was atthe outset a bleak proposition Nevertheless after the fall ofFrance anyone could see that the only hope of avoiding along war with all that it might entail was to bring Britain toher knees The German Navy itself had been as we haverecorded knocked about in a most serious manner in thefighting off Norway and in their crippled condition theycould not offer more than minor support to the Army Stillthey had their plan and no one could say that they hadbeen caught unawares by good fortuneThe German Army Command had from the first regardedthe invasion of England with considerable qualms Theyhad made no plans or preparations for it and there hadbeen no training As the weeks of prodigious deliriousvictory succeeded one another they were emboldenedThe responsibility for the safe crossing was notdepartmentally theirs and once landed in strength they feltthat the task was within their power Indeed already in


August Admiral Raeder felt it necessary to draw theirattention to the dangers of the passage during whichperhaps the whole of the army forces employed might belost Once the responsibility for putting the Army across wasdefinitely thrust upon the Navy the German Admiraltybecame consistently pessimisticOn July 21 the heads of the three Services met theFuehrer He informed them that the decisive stage of thewar had already been reached but that England had notyet recognised it and still hoped for a turn of fate He spokeof the support of England by the United States and of apossible change in German political relations with SovietRussia The execution of ldquoSea Lionrdquo he said must beregarded as the most effective means of bringing about arapid conclusion of the war After his long talks with AdmiralRaeder Hitler had begun to realise what the crossing of theChannel with its tides and currents and all the mysteries ofthe sea involved He described ldquoSea Lionrdquo as ldquoanexceptionally bold and daring undertakingrdquoldquoEven if the wayis short this is not just a river crossing but the crossing of asea which is dominated by the enemy This is not a case ofa single-crossing operation as in Norway operationalsurprise cannot be expected a defensively prepared andutterly determined enemy faces us and dominates the seaarea which we must use For the Army operation fortydivisions will be required The most difficult part will be thematerial reinforcements and stores We cannot count onsupplies of any kind being available to us in Englandrdquo Theprerequisites were complete mastery of the air theoperational use of powerful artillery in the Dover Straits andprotection by minefields ldquoThe time of yearrdquo he said ldquois animportant factor since the weather in the North Sea and inthe Channel during the second half of September is verybad and the fogs begin in the middle of October The main


operation must therefore be completed by September 15for after that date co-operation between the Luftwaffe andthe heavy weapons becomes too unreliable But as air co-operation is decisive it must be regarded as the principalfactor in fixing the daterdquoA vehement controversy conducted with no little asperityarose in the German staffs about the width of the front andthe number of points to be attacked The Army demanded aseries of landings along the whole English southern coastfrom Dover to Lyme Regis west of Portland They alsodesired an ancillary landing north of Dover at RamsgateThe German Naval Staff now stated that the most suitablearea for the safe crossing of the English Channel wasbetween the North Foreland and the western end of the Isleof Wight On this the Army Staff developed a plan for alanding of 100000 men followed almost immediately by160000 more at various points from Dover westward toLyme Bay Colonel-General Halder Chief of the Army Staffdeclared that it was necessary to land at least four divisionsin the Brighton area He also required landings in the areaDeal-Ramsgate at least thirteen divisions must bedeployed as far as possible simultaneously at points alongthe whole front In addition the Luftwaffe demandedshipping to transport fifty-two AA batteries with the firstwaveThe Chief of the Naval Staff however made it clear thatnothing like so large or rapid a movement was possible Hecould not physically undertake to escort a landing fleetacross the whole width of the area mentioned All he hadmeant was that within these limits the Army should pick thebest place The Navy had not enough strength even withair supremacy to protect more than one passage at a timeand they thought the narrowest parts of the Straits of Doverthe least difficult To carry the whole of the 160000 men of


the second wave and their equipment in a single operationwould require two million tons of shipping Even if thisfantastic requirement could have been met such quantitiesof shipping could not have been accommodated in the areaof embarkation Only the first echelons could be thrownacross for the formation of narrow bridgeheads and at leasttwo days would be needed to land the second eacutechelons ofthese divisions to say nothing of the second six divisionswhich were thought indispensable He further pointed outthat a broad-front landing would mean three to five and ahalf hoursrsquo difference in the times of high water at thevarious points selected Either therefore unfavourable tideconditions must be accepted at some places orsimultaneous landings renounced This objection musthave been very difficult to answerMuch valuable time had been consumed in theseexchanges of memoranda It was not until August 7 that thefirst verbal discussion took place between General Halderand the Chief of the Naval Staff At this meeting Haldersaid ldquoI utterly reject the Navyrsquos proposals From the Armyviewpoint I regard it as complete suicide I might just as wellput the troops that have been landed straight through thesausage-machinerdquo The Naval Chief of Staff rejoined thathe must equally reject the landing on a broad front as thatwould lead only to a sacrifice of the troops on the passageover In the end a compromise decision was given by Hitlerwhich satisfied neither the Army nor the Navy A SupremeCommand Directive issued on August 27 decided that ldquotheArmy operations must allow for the facts regarding availableshipping space and security of the crossing anddisembarkationrdquo All landings in the Deal-Rams-gate areawere abandoned but the front was extended fromFolkestone to Bognor Thus it was nearly the end of Augustbefore even this measure of agreement was reached and


of course everything was subject to victory being gained inthe air battle which had now been raging for six weeksOn the basis of the frontage at last fixed the final plan wasmade The military command was entrusted to Rundstedtbut shortage of shipping reduced his force to thirteendivisions with twelve in reserve The Sixteenth Army fromports between Rotterdam and Boulogne were to land in theneighbourhood of Hythe Rye Hastings and Eastbournethe Ninth Army from ports between Boulogne and Havreattacking between Brighton and Worthing Dover was to becaptured from the landward side then both armies wouldadvance to the covering line of Canterbury-Ashford-Mayfield-Arundel In all eleven divisions were to be landedin the first waves A week after the landing it was hopedoptimistically to advance yet farther to GravesendReigate Petersfield Portsmouth In reserve lay the SixthArmy with divisions ready to reinforce or if circumstancesallowed to extend the frontage of attack to Weymouth Itwould have been easy to increase these three armies oncethe bridgeheads were gained ldquobecauserdquo says GeneralHalder ldquono military forces were facing the Germans on theContinentrdquo There was indeed no lack of fierce and well-armed troops but they required shipping and safeconveyanceOn the Naval Staff fell the heaviest initial task Germanyhad about 1200000 tons of seagoing shipping available tomeet all her needs To embark the invasion force wouldrequire more than half this amount and would involve greateconomic disturbance By the beginning of September theNaval Staff were able to report that the following had beenrequisitioned


168 transports (of 700000 tons)1910 Barges419 tugs and trawlers1600 motor-boats

All this armada had to be manned and brought to theassembly ports by sea and canal Meanwhile since earlyJuly we had made a succession of attacks on the shippingin Wilhelmshaven Kiel Cuxhaven Bremen and Emdenand raids were made on small craft and barges in Frenchports and Belgian canals When on September 1 the greatsouthward flow of invasion shipping began it was watchedreported and violently assailed by the Royal Air Forcealong the whole front from Antwerp to Havre The GermanNaval Staff recorded

The enemyrsquos continuous fighting defence off thecoast his concentration of bombers on the ldquoSea Lionrdquo


embarkation ports and his coastal reconnaissanceactivities indicate that he is now expecting animmediate landing

And againThe English bombers however and the mine-laying

forces of the British Air Force hellip are still at fulloperational strength and it must be confirmed that theactivity of the British forces has undoubtedly beensuccessful even if no decisive hindrance has yet beencaused to German transport movement

Yet despite delays and damage the German Navycompleted the first part of their task The ten per centmargin for accidents and losses they had provided was fullyexpended What survived however did not fall short of theminimum they had planned to have for the first stageBoth Navy and Army now cast their burden on the GermanAir Force All this plan of the corridor with its balustrades ofminefields to be laid and maintained under the German AirForce canopy against the overwhelming superiority of theBritish flotillas and small craft depended upon the defeat ofthe British Air Force and the complete mastery of the air byGermany over the Channel and Southeast England andnot only over the crossing but over the landing points Boththe older Services passed the buck to ReichsmarshalGoeringGoering was by no means unwilling to accept thisresponsibility because he believed that the German AirForce with its large numerical superiority would aftersome weeks of hard fighting beat down the British airdefence destroy their airfields in Kent and Sussex andestablish a complete domination of the Channel But apartfrom this he felt assured that the bombing of England andparticularly of London would reduce the decadent peace-


loving British to a condition in which they would sue forpeace more especially if the threat of invasion grewsteadily upon their horizonThe German Admiralty were by no means convincedindeed their misgivings were profound They consideredldquoSea Lionrdquo should be launched only in the last resort and inJuly they had recommended the postponement of theoperation till the spring of 1941 unless the unrestricted airattack and the unlimited U-boat warfare should ldquocause theenemy to negotiate with the Fuehrer on his own termsrdquo ButFeldmarshal Keitel and General Jodl were glad to find theAir Supreme Commander so confidentThese were great days for Nazi Germany Hitler haddanced his jig of joy before enforcing the humiliation of theFrench Armistice at Compiegravegne The German Armymarched triumphantly through the Arc de Triomphe anddown the Champs Elyseacutees What was there they could notdo Why hesitate to play out a winning hand Thus each ofthe three Services involved in the operation ldquoSea Lionrdquoworked upon the hopeful factors in their own theme and leftthe ugly side to their companionsAs the days passed doubts and delays appeared andmultiplied Hitlerrsquos order of July 16 had laid down that allpreparations were to be completed by the middle of AugustAll three Services saw that this was impossible And at theend of July Hitler accepted September 15 as the earliest D-Day reserving his decision for action until the results of theprojected intensified air battle could be knownOn August 30 the Naval Staff reported that owing to Britishcounteraction against the invasion fleet preparations couldnot be completed by September 15 At their request D-Daywas postponed to September 21 with a proviso of ten daysrsquoprevious warning This meant that the preliminary order had


to be issued on September 11 On September 10 theNaval Staff again reported their various difficulties from theweather which is always tiresome and from British counter-bombing They pointed out that although the necessarynaval preparations could in fact be completed by the 21stthe stipulated operational condition of undisputed airsuperiority over the Channel had not been achieved On the11th therefore Hitler postponed the preliminary order bythree days thus setting back the earliest D-Day to the 24thon the 14th he further put it off

On the 14th Admiral Raeder expressed the view that(1) The present air situation does not provide

conditions for carrying out the operation as the risk isstill too great

(2) If the ldquoSea Lionrdquo operation fails this will mean agreat gain in prestige for the British and the powerfuleffect of our attacks will thus be annulled

(3) Air attacks on England particularly on Londonmust continue without interruption If the weather isfavourable an intensification of the attacks is to beaimed at without regard to ldquoSea Lionrdquo The attacksmust have a decisive outcome

(4) ldquoSea Lionrdquo however must not yet be cancelledas the anxiety of the British must be kept up ifcancellation became known to the outside world thiswould be a great relief to the British

On the 17th the postponement became indefinite and forgood reason in their view as in ours Raeder continues

(1) The preparations for a landing on the Channelcoast are extensively known to the enemy who isincreasingly taking counter-measures Symptoms arefor example operational use of his aircraft for attacksand reconnaissances over the German operational


harbours frequent appearance of destroyers off thesouth coast of England in the Straits of Dover and onthe Franco-Belgian coast stationing of his patrolvessels off the north coast of France Churchillrsquos lastspeech etc

(2) The main units of the Home Fleet are being heldin readiness to repel the landing though the majority ofthe units are still in western bases

(3) Already a large number of destroyers (over thirty)have been located by air reconnaissance in thesouthern and southeastern harbours

(4) All available information indicates that theenemyrsquos naval forces are solely occupied with thistheatre of operations

During August the corpses of about forty German soldierswere washed up at scattered points along the coastbetween the Isle of Wight and Cornwall The Germans hadbeen practising embarkations in the barges along theFrench coast Some of these barges put out to sea in orderto escape British bombing and were sunk either bybombing or bad weather This was the source of awidespread rumour that the Germans had attempted aninvasion and had suffered very heavy losses either bydrowning or by being burnt in patches of sea covered withflaming oil We took no steps to contradict such tales whichspread freely through the occupied countries in a wildlyexaggerated form and gave much encouragement to theoppressed populations In Brussels for instance a shopexhibited menrsquos bathing-suits marked ldquoFor ChannelswimmingrdquoOn September 7 the information before us showed that thewesterly and southerly movement of barges and smallships to posts between Ostend and Havre was in progress


and as these assembly harbours were under heavy Britishair attack it was not likely the ships would be brought tothem until shortly before the actual attempt The strikingstrength of the German Air Force between Amsterdam andBrest had been increased by the transfer of a hundred andsixty bomber aircraft from Norway and short-range dive-bomber units were observed on the forward airfields in thePas de Calais area Four Germans captured a few daysearlier after landing from a rowing-boat on the southeastcoast had confessed to being spies and said that they wereto be ready at any time during the next fortnight to reportthe movement of British reserve formations in the areaIpswich-London-Reading-Oxford Moon and tide conditionsbetween the 8th and 10th of September were favourable forinvasion on the southeast coast On this the Chiefs of Staffconcluded that the possibility of invasion had becomeimminent and that the defence forces should stand by atimmediate noticeThere was however at that time no machinery at GeneralHeadquarters Home Forces by which the existing eighthoursrsquo notice for readiness could be brought to ldquoreadinessfor immediate actionrdquo by intermediate stages The code-word ldquoCromwellrdquo which meant ldquoinvasion imminentrdquo wastherefore issued by Home Forces at 8 PM September 7to the eastern and southern commands implying actionstations for the forward coastal divisions It was also sent toall formations in the London area and to the 4th and 7thCorps in GHQ Reserve It was repeated for information toall other commands in the United Kingdom On this insome parts of the country the Home Guard commandersacting on their own initiative called out the Home Guard byringing the church bells This led to rumours of enemyparachutist landings and also that German E-boats wereapproaching the coast Neither I nor the Chiefs of Staff


were aware that the decisive code-word ldquoCromwellrdquo hadbeen used and the next morning instructions were given todevise intermediate stages by which vigilance could beincreased on future occasions without declaring an invasionimminent Even on receipt of the code-word ldquoCromwellrdquo theHome Guard were not to be called out except for specialtasks and also church bells were to be rung only by orderof a Home Guard who had himself seen as many as twenty-five parachutists landing and not because other bells hadbeen heard or for any other reason As may be imaginedthis incident caused a great deal of talk and stir but nomention of it was made in the newspapers or Parliament Itserved as a useful tonic and rehearsal for all concerned

Having traced the German invasion preparations steadilymounting to a climax we have seen how the early mood oftriumph changed gradually to one of doubt and finally tocomplete loss of confidence in the outcome Confidencewas in fact already destroyed in 1940 and despite therevival of the project in 1941 it never again held theimagination of the German leaders as it had done in thehalcyon days following the fall of France During the fatefulmonths of July and August we see the Naval CommanderRaeder endeavouring to teach his military and aircolleagues about the grave difficulties attending large-scaleamphibious war He realised his own weakness and thelack of time for adequate preparation and sought to imposelimits on the grandiose plans advanced by Halder forlanding immense forces simultaneously over a wide frontMeanwhile Goering with soaring ambition was determinedto achieve spectacular victory with his air force alone andwas disinclined to play the humbler rocircle of working to a


combined plan for the systematic reduction of opposing seaand air forces in the invasion areaIt is apparent from the records that the German HighCommand were very far from being a co-ordinated teamworking together with a common purpose and with a properunderstanding of each otherrsquos capabilities and limitationsEach wished to be the brightest star in the firmamentFriction was apparent from the outset and so long asHalder could thrust responsibility onto Raeder he did littleto bring his own plans into line with practical possibilitiesIntervention by the Fuehrer was necessary but seems tohave done little to improve the relations between theServices In Germany the prestige of the Army wasparamount and the military leaders regarded their navalcolleagues with some condescension It is impossible toresist the conclusion that the German Army was reluctant toplace itself in the hands of its sister Service in a majoroperation When questioned after the war about theseplans General Jodl impatiently remarked ldquoOurarrangements were much the same as those of JuliusCaesarrdquo Here speaks the authentic German soldier inrelation to the sea affair having little conception of theproblems involved in landing and deploying large militaryforces on a defended coast exposed to all the hazards ofthe seaIn Britain whatever our shortcomings we understood thesea affair very thoroughly For centuries it has been in ourblood and its traditions stir not only our sailors but thewhole race It was this above all things which enabled us toregard the menace of invasion with a steady gaze Thesystem of control of operations by the three Chiefs of Staffconcerted under a Minister of Defence produced a standardof team-work mutual understanding and ready co-operation unrivalled in the past When in course of time our


opportunity came to undertake great invasions from thesea it was upon a foundation of solid achievement inpreparation for the task and with a full understanding of thetechnical needs of such vast and hazardous undertakingsHad the Germans possessed in 1940 well-trainedamphibious forces equipped with all the apparatus ofmodern amphibious war their task would still have been aforlorn hope in the face of our sea and air power In factthey had neither the tools nor the training

We have seen how our many anxieties and self-questionings led to a steady increase in the confidence withwhich from the beginning we had viewed the invasionproject On the other hand the more the German HighCommand and the Fuehrer looked at the venture the lessthey liked it We could not of course know each otherrsquosmoods and valuations but with every week from the middleof July to the middle of September the unknown identity of


views upon the problem between the German and BritishAdmiralties between the German Supreme Command andthe British Chiefs of Staff and also between the Fuehrerand the author of this book became more definitelypronounced If we could have agreed equally well aboutother matters there need have been no war It was ofcourse common ground between us that all dependedupon the battle in the air The question was how this wouldend between the combatants and in addition the Germanswondered whether the British people would stand up to theair bombardment the effect of which in these days wasgreatly exaggerated or whether they would crumple andforce His Majestyrsquos Government to capitulate About thisReichsmarshal Goering had high hopes and we had nofears

END OF BOOK ONE


Book TwoAlone


1The Battle of Britain

The Decisive StrugglemdashHitlerrsquos DilemmamdashThreePhases ndash Advantages of Fighting in Onersquos OwnAir mdashldquoSea Lionrdquo and the Air AssaultmdashTheGerman Raid Against Tyneside mdash Massacre ofthe Heinkels mdash Lord Beaverbrookrsquos HourmdashMrErnest Bevin and LabourmdashCabinet Solidarity mdashChecking German LossesmdashFirst Attacks onLondonmdashUneasiness of the German Naval StaffmdashMy Broadcast of September 11 mdash The HardStrain from August 24 to September 6 mdash TheArticulation of Fighter Command EndangeredmdashAQuarter of Our Pilots Killed or Disabled in aFortnight mdash Goeringrsquos Mistake of Turning onLondon Too SoonmdashA Breathing SpacemdashSeptember 15 the Culminating DatemdashWithNumber 11 GroupmdashAir Vice-Marshal ParkmdashTheGroup Operations RoommdashThe Attack Begins mdashAll Reserves EmployedmdashA Cardinal VictorymdashHitler Postpones ldquoSea Lionrdquo September 17 mdashAfterlight on Claims and Losses mdash Honour for All

OUR FATE now depended up on victory in the air TheGerman leaders had recognised that all their plans for theinvasion of Britain depended on winning air supremacyabove the Channel and the chosen landing places on oursouth coast The preparation of the embarkation ports theassembly of the transports the minesweeping of the


passages and the laying of the new minefields wereimpossible without protection from British air attack For theactual crossing and landings complete mastery of the airover the transports and the beaches was the decisivecondition The result therefore turned upon the destructionof the Royal Air Force and the system of airfields betweenLondon and the sea We now know that Hitler said toAdmiral Raeder on July 31 ldquoIf after eight days of intensiveair war the Luftwaffe has not achieved considerabledestruction of the enemyrsquos air force harbours and navalforces the operation will have to be put off till May 1941rdquoThis was the battle that had now to be foughtI did not myself at all shrink mentally from the impendingtrial of strength I had told Parliament on June 4 ldquoThe greatFrench Army was very largely for the time being cast backand disturbed by the onrush of a few thousand armouredvehicles May it not also be that the cause of civilisationitself will be defended by the skill and devotion of a fewthousand airmenrdquo And to Smuts on June 9 ldquoI see onlyone sure way through now ndash to wit that Hitler should attackthis country and in so doing break his air weaponrdquo Theoccasion had now arrivedAdmirable accounts have been written of the strugglebetween the British and German Air Forces whichconstitutes the Battle of Britain In Air Chief MarshalDowdingrsquos despatch and the Air Ministry pamphlet number156 the essential facts are fully recorded as they wereknown to us in 1941 and 1943 We have now also accessto the views of the German High Command and of theirinner reactions in the various phases It appears that theGerman losses in some of the principal combats were agood deal less than we thought at the time and that reportson both sides were materially exaggerated But the mainfeatures and the outline of this famous conflict upon which


the life of Britain and the freedom of the world dependedare not in disputeThe German Air Force had been engaged to the utmostlimit in the Battle of France and like the German Navyafter the Norway Campaign they required a period ofweeks or months for recovery This pause was convenientto us too for all but three of our fighter squadrons had atone time or another been engaged in the Continentaloperations Hitler could not conceive that Britain would notaccept a peace offer after the collapse of France LikeMarshal Peacutetain Weygand and many of the Frenchgenerals and politicians he did not understand theseparate aloof resources of an island state and like theseFrenchmen he misjudged our will-power We had travelleda long way and learned a lot since Munich During themonth of June he had addressed himself to the newsituation as it gradually dawned upon him and meanwhilethe German Air Force recuperated and redeployed for theirnext task There could be no doubt what this would beEither Hitler must invade and conquer England or he mustface an indefinite prolongation of the war with all itsincalculable hazards and complications There was alwaysthe possibility that victory over Britain in the air would bringabout the end of the British resistance and that actualinvasion even if it became practicable would also becomeunnecessary except for the occupying of a defeatedcountryDuring June and early July the German Air Force revivedand regrouped its formations and established itself on allthe French and Belgian airfields from which the assault hadto be launched and by reconnaissance and tentative forayssought to measure the character and scale of theopposition which would be encountered It was not until July10 that the first heavy onslaught began and this date is


usually taken as the opening of the battle Two other datesof supreme consequence stand out August 15 andSeptember 15 There were also three successive butoverlapping phases in the German attack First from July10 to August 18 the harrying of British convoys in theChannel and of our southern ports from Dover to Plymouthwhereby our Air Force should be tested drawn into battleand depleted whereby also damage should be done tothose seaside towns marked as objectives for theforthcoming invasion In the second phase August 24 toSeptember 27 a way to London was to be forced by theelimination of the Royal Air Force and its installationsleading to the violent and continuous bombing of thecapital This would also cut communications with thethreatened shores But in Goeringrsquos view there was goodreason to believe that a greater prize was here in sight noless than throwing the worldrsquos largest city into confusionand paralysis the cowing of the Government and thepeople and their consequent submission to the Germanwill Their Navy and Army Staffs devoutly hoped thatGoering was right As the situation developed they sawthat the RAF was not being eliminated and meanwhiletheir own urgent needs for the ldquoSea Lionrdquo adventure wereneglected for the sake of destruction in LondonAnd then when all were disappointed when invasion wasindefinitely postponed for lack of the vital need airsupremacy there followed the third and last phase Thehope of daylight victory had faded the Royal Air Forceremained vexatiously alive and Goering in Octoberresigned himself to the indiscriminate bombing of Londonand the centres of industrial production


In the quality of the fighter aircraft there was little to chooseThe Germansrsquo were faster with a better rate of climb oursmore manoeuvrable better armed Their airmen wellaware of their greater numbers were also the proud victorsof Poland Norway the Low Countries France ours hadsupreme confidence in themselves as individuals and thatdetermination which the British race displays in fullestmeasure when in supreme adversity One importantstrategical advantage the Germans enjoyed and skilfullyused their forces were deployed on many and widelyspread bases whence they could concentrate upon us ingreat strengths and with feints and deceptions as to thetrue points of attack But the enemy may have under-ratedthe adverse conditions of fighting above and across theChannel compared with those which had prevailed inFrance and Belgium That they regarded them as serious isshown by the efforts they made to organise an efficient SeaRescue Service German transport planes marked with theRed Cross began to appear in some numbers over theChannel in July and August whenever there was an airfight We did not recognise this means of rescuing enemypilots who had been shot down in action in order that theymight come and bomb our civil population again Werescued them ourselves whenever it was possible andmade them prisoners of war But all German airambulances were forced or shot down by our fighters ondefinite orders approved by the War Cabinet The Germancrews and doctors on these machines professedastonishment at being treated in this way and protestedthat it was contrary to the Geneva Convention There wasno mention of such a contingency in the GenevaConvention which had not contemplated this form ofwarfare The Germans were not in a strong position tocomplain in view of all the treaties laws of war and


solemn agreements which they had violated withoutcompunction whenever it suited them They soonabandoned the experiment and the work of sea rescue forboth sides was carried out by our small craft on which ofcourse the Germans fired on every occasion

By August the Luftwaffe had gathered 2669 operationalaircraft comprising 1015 bombers 346 dive-bombers 933fighters and 375 heavy fighters The Fuehrerrsquos DirectiveNumber 17 authorised the intensified air war againstEngland on August 5 Goering never set much store byldquoSea Lionrdquo his heart was in the ldquoabsoluterdquo air war Hisconsequent distortion of the arrangements disturbed theGerman Naval Staff The destruction of the Royal Air Forceand our aircraft industry was to them but a means to anend when this was accomplished the air war should beturned against the enemyrsquos warships and shipping Theyregretted the lower priority assigned by Goering to the navaltargets and they were irked by the delays On August 6they reported to the Supreme Command that thepreparations for German mine-laying in the Channel areacould not proceed because of the constant British threatfrom the air On August 10 the Naval Staffrsquos War Diaryrecords

Preparations for ldquoSea Lionrdquo particularly mine-clearance are being affected by the inactivity of theLuftwaffe which is at present prevented from operatingby the bad weather and for reasons not known to theNaval Staff the Luftwaffe has missed opportunitiesafforded by the recent very favourable weatherhellip

The continuous heavy air fighting of July and early Augusthad been directed upon the Kent promontory and the


Channel coast Goering and his skilled advisers formed theopinion that they must have drawn nearly all our fightersquadrons into this southern struggle They thereforedecided to make a daylight raid on the manufacturing citiesnorth of the Wash The distance was too great for their first-class fighters the ME 109rsquos They would have to risk theirbombers with only escorts from the Me 110rsquos whichthough they had the range had nothing like the qualitywhich was what mattered now This was nevertheless areasonable step for them to take and the risk was well runAccordingly on August 15 about a hundred bombers withan escort of forty ME 110rsquos were launched againstTyneside At the same time a raid of more than eighthundred planes was sent to pin down our forces in theSouth where it was thought they were already all gatheredBut now the dispositions which Dowding had made of theFighter Command were signally vindicated The danger hadbeen foreseen Seven Hurricane or Spitfire squadrons hadbeen withdrawn from the intense struggle in the South torest in and at the same time to guard the North They hadsuffered severely but were nonetheless deeply grieved toleave the battle The pilots respectfully represented thatthey were not at all tired Now came an unexpectedconsolation These squadrons were able to welcome theassailants as they crossed the coast Thirty German planeswere shot down most of them heavy bombers (Heinkel111rsquos with four trained men in each crew) for a British lossof only two pilots injured The foresight of Air MarshalDowding in his direction of Fighter Command deserves highpraise but even more remarkable had been the restraintand the exact measurement of formidable stresses whichhad reserved a fighter force in the North through all theselong weeks of mortal conflict in the South We must regardthe generalship here shown as an example of genius in the


art of war Never again was a daylight raid attemptedoutside the range of the highest-class fighter protectionHenceforth everything north of the Wash was safe by dayAugust 15 was the largest air battle of this period of thewar five major actions were fought on a front of fivehundred miles It was indeed a crucial day In the South allour twenty-two squadrons were engaged many twicesome three times and the German losses added to thosein the North were seventy-six to our thirty-four This was arecognisable disaster to the German Air ForceIt must have been with anxious minds that the German AirChiefs measured the consequences of this defeat whichboded ill for the future The German Air Force howeverhad still as their target the port of London all that immenseline of docks with their masses of shipping and the largestcity in the world which did not require much accuracy to hit

During these weeks of intense struggle and ceaselessanxiety Lord Beaverbrook rendered signal service At allcosts the fighter squadrons must be replenished withtrustworthy machines This was no time for red tape andcircumlocution although these have their place in a well-ordered placid system All his remarkable qualities fittedthe need His personal buoyancy and vigour were a tonic Iwas glad to be able sometimes to lean on him He did notfail This was his hour His personal force and geniuscombined with so much persuasion and contrivance sweptaside many obstacles Everything in the supply pipelinewas drawn forward to the battle New or repaired airplanesstreamed to the delighted squadrons in numbers they hadnever known before All the services of maintenance andrepair were driven to an intense degree I felt so much his


value that on August 2 with the Kingrsquos approval I invitedhim to join the War Cabinet At this time also his eldest sonMax Aitken gained high distinction and eleven victories asa fighter-pilotAnother Minister I consorted with at this time was ErnestBevin Minister of Labour and National Service with thewhole man-power of the nation to manage and animate Allthe workers in the munitions factories were ready to takehis direction In October he too joined the War CabinetThe trade-unionists cast their slowly framed jealouslyguarded rules and privileges upon the altar where wealthrank privilege and property had already been laid I wasmuch in harmony with both Beaverbrook and Bevin in thewhite-hot weeks Afterwards they quarrelled which was apity and caused much friction But at this climax we wereall together I cannot speak too highly of the loyalty of MrChamberlain or of the resolution and efficiency of all myCabinet colleagues Let me give them my salute

I was most anxious to form a true estimate of the Germanlosses With all strictness and sincerity it is impossible forpilots fighting often far above the clouds to be sure howmany enemy machines they have shot down or how manytimes the same machine has been claimed by others


17VIII40

Lord Beaverbrook told me that in Thursdayrsquos actionupwards of eighty German machines had been pickedup on our soil Is this so If not how many


I asked C-in-C Fighter Command if he coulddiscriminate in this action between the fighting over theland and over the sea This would afford a good meansof establishing for our own satisfaction the results whichare claimed

Prime Minister to CAS

17VIII40

While our eyes are concentrated on the results ofthe air fighting over this country we must not overlookthe serious losses occurring in the Bomber CommandSeven heavy bombers last night and also twenty-oneaircraft now destroyed on the ground ndash the bulk atTangmere ndash total twenty-eight These twenty-eightadded to the twenty-two Fighters make our loss fifty onthe day and very much alters the picture presented bythe German loss of seventy-five In fact on the day wehave lost two to three

Let me know the types of machines destroyed onthe ground

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forAir

21VIII40

The important thing is to bring the German aircraftdown and to win the battle and the rate at whichAmerican correspondents and the American public areconvinced that we are winning and that our figures aretrue stands at a much lower level They will find outquite soon enough when the German air attack isplainly shown to be repulsed It would be a pity to teasethe Fighter Command at the present time when thebattle is going on from hour to hour and whencontinuous decisions have to be taken about air-raidwarnings etc I confess I should be more inclined to letthe facts speak for themselves There is somethingrather obnoxious in bringing correspondents down to airsquadrons in order that they may assure the Americanpublic that the fighter pilots are not bragging and lying


about their figures We can I think afford to be a bitcool and calm about all this

I should like you to see on other papers an inquiry Ihave been making of my own in order to check up onthe particular day when MAP [Ministry of AircraftProduction] said they picked up no fewer than eightyGerman machines brought down over the land aloneThis gives us a very good line for our own purposes Imust say I am a little impatient about the Americanscepticism The event is what will decide all

On August 20 I could report to ParliamentThe enemy is of course far more numerous than we

are But our new production already largely exceedshis and the American production is only just beginningto flow in Our bomber and fighter strengths now afterall this fighting are larger than they have ever beenWe believe that we should be able to continue the airstruggle indefinitely and as long as the enemy pleasesand the longer it continues the more rapid will be ourapproach first towards that parity and then into thatsuperiority in the air upon which in large measure thedecision of the war depends

Up till the end of August Goering did not take anunfavourable view of the air conflict He and his circlebelieved that the English ground organisation and aircraftindustry and the fighting strength of the RAF had alreadybeen severely damaged They estimated that since August8 we had lost 1115 aircraft against the German losses of467 But of course each side takes a hopeful view and it isin the interest of their leaders that they should There was aspell of fine weather in September and the Luftwaffe hopedfor decisive results Heavy attacks fell upon our aerodromeinstallations round London and on the night of the 6th sixty-


eight aircraft attacked London followed on the 7th by thefirst large-scale attack of about three hundred On this andsucceeding days during which our anti-aircraft guns weredoubled in numbers very hard and continuous air fightingtook place over the capital and the Luftwaffe were stillconfident through their overestimation of our losses But wenow know that the German Naval Staff in anxious regardfor their own interests and responsibilities wrote in theirdiary on September 10

There is no sign of the defeat of the enemyrsquos airforce over Southern England and in the Channel areaand this is vital to a further judgment of the situationThe preliminary attacks by the Luftwaffe have indeedachieved a noticeable weakening of the enemyrsquos fighterdefence so that considerable German fightersuperiority can be assumed over the English areaHowever hellip we have not yet attained the operationalconditions which the Naval Staff stipulated to theSupreme Command as being essential for theenterprise namely undisputed air supremacy in theChannel area and the elimination of the enemyrsquos airactivity in the assembly area of the German navalforces and ancillary shippinghellip It would be inconformity with the time-table preparations for ldquoSeaLionrdquo if the Luftwaffe now concentrated less on Londonand more on Portsmouth and Dover as well as on thenaval ports in and near the operational areahellip

As by this time Hitler had been persuaded by Goering thatthe major attack on London would be decisive the NavalStaff did not venture to appeal to the Supreme Commandbut their uneasiness continued and on the 12th theyreached this sombre conclusion

The air war is being conducted as an ldquoabsolute airwarrdquo without regard to the present requirements of thenaval war and outside the framework of operation ldquoSeaLionrdquo In its present form the air war cannot assistpreparations for ldquoSea Lionrdquo which are predominantly in


the hands of the Navy In particular one cannot discernany effort on the part of the Luftwaffe to engage theunits of the British Fleet which are now able to operatealmost unmolested in the Channel and this will proveextremely dangerous to the transportation Thus themain safeguard against British naval forces would haveto be the minefields which as repeatedly explained tothe Supreme Command cannot be regarded asreliable protection for shipping

The fact remains that up to now the intensified airwar has not contributed towards the landing operationhence for operational and military reasons theexecution of the landing cannot yet be considered

I stated in a broadcast on September 11Whenever the weather is favourable waves of

German bombers protected by fighters often three orfour hundred at a time surge over this islandespecially the promontory of Kent in the hope ofattacking military and other objectives by daylightHowever they are met by our fighter squadrons andnearly always broken up and their losses averagethree to one in machines and six to one in pilots

This effort of the Germans to secure daylightmastery of the air over England is of course the cruxof the whole war So far it has failed conspicuously Ithas cost them very dear and we have felt strongerand actually are relatively a good deal stronger thanwhen the hard fighting began in July There is no doubtthat Herr Hitler is using up his fighter force at a veryhigh rate and that if he goes on for many more weekshe will wear down and ruin this vital part of his air forceThat will give us a great advantage

On the other hand for him to try to invade thiscountry without having secured mastery in the air wouldbe a very hazardous undertaking Nevertheless all hispreparations for invasion on a great scale are steadilygoing forward Several hundreds of self-propelled


barges are moving down the coasts of Europe fromthe German and Dutch harbours to the ports ofNorthern France from Dunkirk to Brest and beyondBrest to the French harbours in the Bay of Biscay

Besides this convoys of merchant ships in tens anddozens are being moved through the Straits of Doverinto the Channel dodging along from port to port underthe protection of the new batteries which the Germanshave built on the French shore There are nowconsiderable gatherings of shipping in the GermanDutch Belgian and French harbours ndash all the way fromHamburg to Brest Finally there are some preparationsmade of ships to carry an invading force from theNorwegian harbours

Behind these clusters of ships or barges there standlarge numbers of German troops awaiting the order togo on board and set out on their very dangerous anduncertain voyage across the seas We cannot tell whenthey will try to come we cannot be sure that in fact theywill try at all but no one should blind himself to the factthat a heavy full-scale invasion of this island is beingprepared with all the usual German thoroughness andmethod and that it may be launched now ndash uponEngland upon Scotland or upon Ireland or upon allthree

If this invasion is going to be tried at all it does notseem that it can be long delayed The weather maybreak at any time Besides this it is difficult for theenemy to keep these gatherings of ships waiting aboutindefinitely while they are bombed every night by ourbombers and very often shelled by our warships whichare waiting for them outside

Therefore we must regard the next week or so as avery important period in our history It ranks with thedays when the Spanish Armada was approaching theChannel and Drake was finishing his game of bowls orwhen Nelson stood between us and Napoleonrsquos GrandArmy at Boulogne We have read all about this in thehistory books but what is happening now is on a fargreater scale and of far more consequence to the life


and future of the world and its civilisation than thosebrave old days

In the fighting between August 24 and September 6 thescales had tilted against Fighter Command During thesecrucial days the Germans had continuously appliedpowerful forces against the airfields of South and SoutheastEngland Their object was to break down the day fighterdefence of the capital which they were impatient to attackFar more important to us than the protection of Londonfrom terror-bombing was the functioning and articulation ofthese airfields and the squadrons working from them In thelife-and-death struggle of the two air forces this was adecisive phase We never thought of the struggle in termsof the defence of London or any other place but only whowon in the air There was much anxiety at FighterHeadquarters at Stanmore and particularly at theheadquarters of Number Eleven Fighter Group at UxbridgeExtensive damage had been done to five of the grouprsquosforward airfields and also to the six sector stationsManston and Lympne on the Kentish coast were on severaloccasions and for days unfit for operating fighter aircraftBiggin Hill Sector Station to the south of London was soseverely damaged that for a week only one fightersquadron could operate from it If the enemy had persistedin heavy attacks against the adjacent sectors and damagedtheir operations rooms or telephone communications thewhole intricate organisation of Fighter Command mighthave been broken down This would have meant notmerely the maltreatment of London but the loss to us of theperfected control of our own air in the decisive area As willbe seen in the Minutes printed in the Appendix I was led to


visit several of these stations particularly Manston (August28) and Biggin Hill which is quite near my home Theywere getting terribly knocked about and their runways wereruined by craters It was therefore with a sense of relief thatFighter Command felt the German attack turn on to Londonon September 7 and concluded that the enemy hadchanged his plan Goering should certainly havepersevered against the airfields on whose organisation andcombination the whole fighting power of our air force at thismoment depended By departing from the classicalprinciples of war as well as from the hitherto accepteddictates of humanity he made a foolish mistakeThis same period (August 24 to September 6) had seriouslydrained the strength of Fighter Command as a whole TheCommand had lost in this fortnight 103 pilots killed and 128seriously wounded while 466 Spitfires and Hurricanes hadbeen destroyed or seriously damaged Out of a total pilotstrength of about a thousand nearly a quarter had beenlost Their places could only be filled by 260 new ardentbut inexperienced pilots drawn from training units in manycases before their full courses were complete The nightattacks on London for ten days after September 7 struck atthe London docks and railway centres and killed andwounded many civilians but they were in effect for us abreathing space of which we had the utmost needDuring this period I usually managed to take two afternoonsa week in the areas under attack in Kent or Sussex in orderto see for myself what was happening For this purpose Iused my train which was now most conveniently fitted andcarried a bed a bath an office a connectible telephoneand an effective staff I was thus able to work continuouslyapart from sleeping and with almost all the facilitiesavailable at Downing Street


We must take September 15 as the culminating date Onthis day the Luftwaffe after two heavy attacks on the 14thmade its greatest concentrated effort in a resumed daylightattack on LondonIt was one of the decisive battles of the war and like theBattle of Waterloo it was on a Sunday I was at Chequers Ihad already on several occasions visited the headquartersof Number 11 Fighter Group in order to witness the conductof an air battle when not much had happened Howeverthe weather on this day seemed suitable to the enemy andaccordingly I drove over to Uxbridge and arrived at theGroup Headquarters Number 11 Group comprised nofewer than twenty-five squadrons covering the whole ofEssex Kent Sussex and Hampshire and all theapproaches across them to London Air Vice-Marshal Parkhad for six months commanded this group on which ourfate largely depended From the beginning of Dunkirk allthe daylight actions in the South of England had alreadybeen conducted by him and all his arrangements andapparatus had been brought to the highest perfection Mywife and I were taken down to the bomb-proof OperationsRoom fifty feet below ground All the ascendancy of theHurricanes and Spitfires would have been fruitless but forthis system of underground control centres and telephonecables which had been devised and built before the war bythe Air Ministry under Dowdingrsquos advice and impulseLasting credit is due to all concerned In the South ofEngland there were at this time Number 11 Group HQ andsix subordinate fighter station centres All these were ashas been described under heavy stress The SupremeCommand was exercised from the Fighter Headquarters atStanmore but the actual handling of the direction of the


squadrons was wisely left to Number 11 Group whichcontrolled the units through its fighter stations located ineach countyThe Group Operations Room was like a small theatreabout sixty feet across and with two storeys We took ourseats in the dress circle Below us was the large-scale map-table around which perhaps twenty highly trained youngmen and women with their telephone assistants wereassembled Opposite to us covering the entire wall wherethe theatre curtain would be was a gigantic blackboarddivided into six columns with electric bulbs for the sixfighter stations each of their squadrons having a sub-column of its own and also divided by lateral lines Thusthe lowest row of bulbs showed as they were lighted thesquadrons which were ldquoStanding Byrdquo at two minutesrsquo noticethe next row those ldquoAt Readinessrdquo five minutes then ldquoAtAvailablerdquo twenty minutes then those which had taken offthe next row those which had reported having seen theenemy the next ndash with red lights ndash those which were inaction and the top row those which were returning homeOn the left-hand side in a kind of glass stage-box were thefour or five officers whose duty it was to weigh andmeasure the information received from our Observer Corpswhich at this time numbered upwards of fifty thousand menwomen and youths Radar was still in its infancy but itgave warning of raids approaching our coast and theobservers with field-glasses and portable telephones wereour main source of information about raiders flyingoverland Thousands of messages were therefore receivedduring an action Several roomfuls of experienced people inother parts of the underground headquarters sifted themwith great rapidity and transmitted the results from minuteto minute directly to the plotters seated around the table on


the floor and to the officer supervising from the glass stage-boxOn the right hand was another glass stage-box containingArmy officers who reported the action of our anti-aircraftbatteries of which at this time in the Command there weretwo hundred At night it was of vital importance to stopthese batteries firing over certain areas in which our fighterswould be closing with the enemy I was not unacquaintedwith the general outlines of this system having had itexplained to me a year before the war by Dowding when Ivisited him at Stanmore It had been shaped and refined inconstant action and all was now fused together into a mostelaborate instrument of war the like of which existednowhere in the worldldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo said Park as we went down ldquowhetheranything will happen today At present all is quietrdquoHowever after a quarter of an hour the raid-plotters beganto move about An attack of ldquo40 plusrdquo was reported to becoming from the German stations in the Dieppe area Thebulbs along the bottom of the wall display panel began toglow as various squadrons came to ldquoStand Byrdquo Then inquick succession ldquo20 plusrdquoldquo40 plusrdquo signals were receivedand in another ten minutes it was evident that a seriousbattle impended On both sides the air began to fillOne after another signals came in ldquo40 plusrdquoldquo60 plusrdquo therewas even an ldquo80 plusrdquo On the floor table below us themovement of all the waves of attack was marked bypushing discs forward from minute to minute along differentlines of approach while on the blackboard facing us therising lights showed our fighter squadrons getting into theair till there were only four or five left ldquoAt Readinessrdquo Theseair battles on which so much depended lasted little morethan an hour from the first encounter The enemy had


ample strength to send out new waves of attack and oursquadrons having gone all out to gain the upper air wouldhave to refuel after seventy or eighty minutes or land torearm after a five-minute engagement If at this moment ofrefuelling or rearming the enemy were able to arrive withfresh unchallenged squadrons some of our fighters couldbe destroyed on the ground It was therefore one of ourprincipal objects to direct our squadrons so as not to havetoo many on the ground refuelling or rearmingsimultaneously during daylightPresently the red bulbs showed that the majority of oursquadrons were engaged A subdued hum arose from thefloor where the busy plotters pushed their discs to and froin accordance with the swiftly changing situation Air Vice-Marshal Park gave general directions for the disposition ofhis fighter force which were translated into detailed ordersto each fighter station by a youngish officer in the centre ofthe dress circle at whose side I sat Some years after Iasked his name He was Lord Willoughby de Broke (I methim next in 1947 when the Jockey Club of which he was asteward invited me to see the Derby He was surprised thatI remembered the occasion) He now gave the orders forthe individual squadrons to ascend and patrol as the resultof the final information which appeared on the map-tableThe Air Marshal himself walked up and down behindwatching with vigilant eye every move in the gamesupervising his junior executive hand and only occasionallyintervening with some decisive order usually to reinforce athreatened area In a little while all our squadrons werefighting and some had already begun to return for fuel Allwere in the air The lower line of bulbs was out There wasnot one squadron left in reserve At this moment Parkspoke to Dowding at Stanmore asking for three squadronsfrom Number 12 Group to be put at his disposal in case of


another major attack while his squadrons were rearmingand refuelling This was done They were specially neededto cover London and our fighter aerodromes becauseNumber 11 Group had already shot their boltThe young officer to whom this seemed a matter of routinecontinued to give his orders in accordance with the generaldirections of his Group Commander in a calm lowmonotone and the three reinforcing squadrons were soonabsorbed I became conscious of the anxiety of theCommander who now stood still behind his subordinatersquoschair Hitherto I had watched in silence I now asked ldquoWhatother reserves have werdquoldquoThere are nonerdquo said Air Vice-Marshal Park In an account which he wrote about itafterwards he said that at this I ldquolooked graverdquo Well Imight What losses should we not suffer if our refuellingplanes were caught on the ground by further raids of ldquo40plusrdquo or ldquo50 plusrdquo The odds were great our margins smallthe stakes infiniteAnother five minutes passed and most of our squadronshad now descended to refuel In many cases our resourcescould not give them overhead protection Then it appearedthat the enemy were going home The shifting of the discson the table below showed a continuous eastwardmovement of German bombers and fighters No new attackappeared In another ten minutes the action was endedWe climbed again the stairways which led to the surfaceand almost as we emerged the ldquoAll Clearrdquo soundedldquoWe are very glad sir you have seen thisrdquo said Park ldquoOfcourse during the last twenty minutes we were so chokedwith information that we couldnrsquot handle it This shows youthe limitation of our present resources They have beenstrained far beyond their limits todayrdquo I asked whether anyresults had come to hand and remarked that the attack


appeared to have been repelled satisfactorily Park repliedthat he was not satisfied that we had intercepted as manyraiders as he had hoped we should It was evident that theenemy had everywhere pierced our defences Many scoresof German bombers with their fighter escort had beenreported over London About a dozen had been broughtdown while I was below but no picture of the results of thebattle or of the damage or losses could be obtainedIt was 430 PM before I got back to Chequers and Iimmediately went to bed for my afternoon sleep I musthave been tired by the drama of Number 11 Group for I didnot wake till eight When I rang John Martin my principalprivate secretary came in with the evening budget of newsfrom all over the world It was repellent This had gonewrong here that had been delayed there an unsatisfactoryanswer had been received from so-and-so there had beenbad sinkings in the Atlantic ldquoHoweverrdquo said Martin as hefinished this account ldquoall is redeemed by the air We haveshot down a hundred and eighty-three for a loss of underfortyrdquo

Although post-war information has shown that the enemyrsquoslosses on this day were only fifty-six September 15 was thecrux of the Battle of Britain That same night our BomberCommand attacked in strength the shipping in the portsfrom Boulogne to Antwerp At Antwerp particularly heavylosses were inflicted On September 17 as we now knowthe Fuehrer decided to postpone ldquoSea Lionrdquo indefinitely Itwas not till October 12 that the invasion was formally calledoff till the following spring In July 1941 it was postponedagain by Hitler till the spring of 1942 ldquoby which time theRussian campaign will be completedrdquo This was a vain but


an important imagining On February 13 1942 AdmiralRaeder had his final interview on ldquoSea Lionrdquo and got Hitlerto agree to a complete ldquostand-downrdquo Thus perishedldquoOperation Sea Lionrdquo And September 15 may stand as thedate of its demise

The German Naval Staff were in hearty accord with all thepostponements indeed they instigated them The Armyleaders made no complaint On the l7th I said in Parliament

The process of waiting keyed up to concert pitch dayafter day is apt in time to lose its charm of noveltySundayrsquos action was the most brilliant and fruitful of anyfought up to that date by the fighters of the Royal AirForcehellip We may await the decision of this long airbattle with sober but increasing confidence

An impartial observer Brigadier-General Strong AssistantChief of the United States War Plans Division and Head ofthe American Military Mission which had been sent toLondon to observe the results of the Luftwaffe attacksarrived back in New York on the 19th and reported that theLuftwaffe ldquohad made no serious inroad on the strength ofthe RAF that the military damage done by airbombardment had been comparatively small and thatBritish claims of German aircraft losses were lsquoon theconservative sidersquordquoYet the Battle of London was still to be fought out Althoughinvasion had been called off it was not till September 27that Goering gave up hope that his method of winning thewar might succeed In October though London received itsfull share the German effort was spread by day and night infrequent small-scale attacks on many places Concentration


of effort gave way to dispersion the battle of attritionbegan Attrition But whose

In cold blood with the knowledge of the after-time we maystudy the actual losses of the British and German AirForces in what may well be deemed one of the decisivebattles of the world From the table our hopes and fearsmay be contrasted with what happenedNo doubt we were always oversanguine in our estimates ofenemy scalps In the upshot we got two to one of theGerman assailants instead of three to one as we believedand declared But this was enough The Royal Air Force farfrom being destroyed was triumphant A strong flow offresh pilots was provided The aircraft factories upon whichnot only our immediate need but our power to wage a longwar depended were mauled but not paralysed Theworkers skilled and unskilled men and women alike stoodto their lathes and manned the workshops under fire as ifthey were batteries in action ndash which indeed they were Atthe Ministry of Supply Herbert Morrison spurred all in hiswide sphere ldquoGo to itrdquo he adjured and to it they wentSkilful and ever-ready support was given to the air fightingby the Anti-Aircraft Command under General Pile Theirmain contribution came later The Observer Corps devotedand tireless were hourly at their posts The carefullywrought organisation of Fighter Command without whichall might have been vain proved equal to months ofcontinuous strain All played their part



Further tables will be found in Appendix CAt the summit the stamina and valour of our fighter pilotsremained unconquerable and supreme Thus Britain wassaved Well might I say in the House of Commons ldquoNeverin the field of human conflict was so much owed by somany to so fewrdquo


2The Blitz

Successive Phases of the German Attack mdashGoering Assumes Command of the Air BattlemdashHisAttempt to Conquer LondonmdashHitlerrsquos Boast mdashFifty-Seven Nightsrsquo Bombardment (September 7to November 3)mdashGeneral Pilersquos BarragemdashSomePersonal NotesmdashDowning Street and the AnnexemdashMr Chamberlainrsquos Fortitude After His MajorOperation mdash He Consents to Leave LondonmdashADinner at Number 10 mdash My Lucky Inspiration mdashThe Bomb in the Treasury CourtyardmdashBurningPall MallmdashDestruction ofthe Carlton ClubmdashCourage of the PeoplemdashThe Margate Restaurantand the War Damage Insurance SchememdashRulesfor the Public DepartmentsmdashThe ldquoAlertrdquo and theldquoAlarmrdquomdash The ldquoBanshee Howlingsrdquomdash The CabinetAdvances Its Meal TimesmdashOur Expectation thatLondon Would be Reduced to RubblemdashHaughtyMood of Parliament mdash I Persuade Them to Actwith Prudence mdash Their Good Fortune

THE GERMAN AIR ASSAULT on Britain is a tale of dividedcounsels conflicting purposes and never fullyaccomplished plans Three or four times in these monthsthe enemy abandoned a method of attack which wascausing us severe stress and turned to something newBut all these stages overlapped one another and cannot bereadily distinguished by precise dates Each one merged


into the next The early operations sought to engage our airforces in battle over the Channel and the south coast nextthe struggle was continued over our southern countiesprincipally Kent and Sussex the enemy aiming to destroyour air-power organisation then nearer to and over Londonthen London became the supreme target and finally whenLondon triumphed there was a renewed dispersion to theprovincial cities and to the sole life-line by the Mersey andthe ClydeWe have seen how very hard they had run us in the attackon the south-coast airfields in the last week of August andthe first week of September But on September 7 Goeringpublicly assumed command of the air battle and turnedfrom daylight to night attack and from the fighter airfields ofKent and Sussex to the vast built-up areas of LondonMinor raids by daylight were frequent indeed constant andone great daylight attack was still to come but in the mainthe whole character of the German offensive was alteredFor fifty-seven nights the bombing of London wasunceasing This constituted an ordeal for the worldrsquos largestcity the results of which no one could measure beforehandNever before was so wide an expanse of houses subjectedto such bombardment or so many families required to faceits problems and its terrorsThe sporadic raiding of London towards the end of Augustwas promptly answered by us in a retaliatory attack onBerlin Because of the distance we had to travel this couldonly be on a very small scale compared with attacks onLondon from nearby French and Belgian airfields The WarCabinet were much in the mood to hit back to raise thestakes and to defy the enemy I was sure they were rightand believed that nothing impressed or disturbed Hitler somuch as his realisation of British wrath and will-power Inhis heart he was one of our admirers He took of course


full advantage of our reprisal on Berlin and publiclyannounced the previously settled German policy ofreducing London and other British cities to chaos and ruinldquoIf they attack our citiesrdquo he declared on September 4 ldquowewill simply rub out theirsrdquo He tried his bestThe first German aim had been the destruction of our air-power the second was to break the spirit of the Londoneror at least render uninhabitable the worldrsquos largest city Inthese new purposes the enemy did not succeed Thevictory of the Royal Air Force had been gained by the skilland daring of our pilots by the excellence of our machinesand by their wonderful organisation Other virtues not lesssplendid not less indispensable to the life of Britain werenow to be displayed by millions of ordinary humble peoplewho proved to the world the strength of a communitynursed in freedom

From September 7 to November 3 an average of twohundred German bombers attacked London every nightThe various preliminary raids which had been made uponour provincial cities in the previous three weeks had led to aconsiderable dispersion of our anti-aircraft artillery andwhen London first became the main target there were butninety-two guns in position It was thought better to leavethe air free for our night-fighters working under Number 11Group Of these there were six squadrons of Blenheimsand Defiants Night-fighting was in its infancy and very fewcasualties were inflicted on the enemy Our batteriestherefore remained silent for three nights in successionTheir own technique was at this time woefully imperfectNevertheless in view of the weakness of our night-fightersand of their unsolved problems it was decided that the anti-


aircraft gunners should be given a free hand to fire atunseen targets using any methods of control they liked Inforty-eight hours General Pile commanding the Air DefenceArtillery had more than doubled the number of guns in thecapital by withdrawals from the provincial cities Our ownaircraft were kept out of the way and the batteries weregiven their chanceFor three nights Londoners had sat in their houses orinadequate shelters enduring what seemed to be an utterlyunresisted attack Suddenly on September 10 the wholebarrage opened accompanied by a blaze of searchlightsThis roaring cannonade did not do much harm to theenemy but gave enormous satisfaction to the populationEveryone was cheered by the feeling that we were hittingback From that time onward the batteries fired regularlyand of course practice ingenuity and grinding needsteadily improved the shooting A slowly increasing toll wastaken of the German raiders Upon occasions the batterieswere silent and the night-fighters whose methods werealso progressing came on the scene The night raids wereaccompanied by more or less continuous daylight attacksby small groups or even single enemy planes and thesirens often sounded at brief intervals throughout the wholetwenty-four hours To this curious existence the sevenmillion inhabitants of London accustomed themselves

In the hope that it may lighten the hard course of thisnarrative I record a few personal notes about the ldquoBlitzrdquowell knowing how many thousands have far more excitingtales to tellWhen the bombardment first began the idea was to treat itwith disdain In the West End everybody went about his


business and pleasure and dined and slept as he usuallydid The theatres were full and the darkened streets werecrowded with casual traffic All this was perhaps a healthyreaction from the frightful squawk which the defeatistelements in Paris had put up on the occasion when theywere first seriously raided in May I remember dining in asmall company when very lively and continuous raids weregoing on The large windows of Stornoway House openedupon the Green Park which flickered with the flashes of theguns and was occasionally lit by the glare of an explodingbomb I felt that we were taking unnecessary risks Afterdinner we went to the Imperial Chemicals Buildingoverlooking the Embankment From these high stonebalconies there was a splendid view of the river At least adozen fires were burning on the south side and while wewere there several heavy bombs fell one near enough formy friends to pull me back behind a substantial stone pillarThis certainly confirmed my opinion that we should have toaccept many restrictions upon the ordinary amenities of lifeThe group of Government buildings around Whitehall wererepeatedly hit Downing Street consists of houses twohundred and fifty years old shaky and lightly built by theprofiteering contractor whose name they bear At the timeof the Munich alarm shelters had been constructed for theoccupants of Number 10 and Number 11 and the rooms onthe garden level had had their ceilings propped up with awooden under-ceiling and strong timbers It was believedthat this would support the ruins if the building was blown orshaken down but of course neither these rooms nor theshelters were effective against a direct hit During the lastfortnight of September preparations were made to transfermy Ministerial Headquarters to the more modern and solidGovernment offices looking over St Jamesrsquos Park byStoreyrsquos Gate These quarters we called ldquothe Annexerdquo


Below them were the War Room and a certain amount ofbomb-proof sleeping accommodation The bombs at thistime were of course smaller than those of the later phasesStill in the interval before the new apartments were readylife at Downing Street was exciting One might as well havebeen at a battalion headquarters in the line

In these months we held our evening Cabinets in the WarRoom in the Annexe basement To get there from DowningStreet it was necessary to walk through the Foreign Officequadrangle and then clamber through the working partieswho were pouring in the concrete to make the War Roomand basement offices safer I did not realise what a trial thiswas to Mr Chamberlain with all the consequences of hismajor operation upon him Nothing deterred him and hewas never more spick and span or cool and determinedthan at the last Cabinets which he attendedOne evening in late September 1940 I looked out of theDowning Street front door and saw workmen pilingsandbags in front of the low basement windows of theForeign Office opposite I asked what they were doing Iwas told that after his operation Mr Neville Chamberlainhad to have special periodical treatment and that it wasembarrassing to carry this out in the shelter of Number 11where at least twenty people were gathered during theconstant raids so a small private place was being preparedover there for him Every day he kept all his appointmentsreserved efficient faultlessly attired But here was thebackground It was too much I used my authority I walkedthrough the passage between Number 10 and Number 11and found Mrs Chamberlain I said ldquoHe ought not to behere in this condition You must take him away till he is well


again I will send all the telegrams to him each dayrdquo Shewent off to see her husband In an hour she sent me wordldquoHe will do what you wish We are leaving tonightrdquo I neversaw him again In less than two months he was no more Iam sure he wanted to die in harness This was not to be

Another evening (October 14) stands out in my mind Wewere dining in the garden room of Number 10 when theusual night raid began My companions were ArchieSinclair Oliver Lyttelton and Moore-Brabazon The steelshutters had been closed Several loud explosions occurredaround us at no great distance and presently a bomb fellperhaps a hundred yards away on the Horse GuardsParade making a great deal of noise Suddenly I had aprovidential impulse The kitchen at Number 10 DowningStreet is lofty and spacious and looks out onto one of thecourts of the Treasury through a large plate-glass windowabout twenty-five feet high The butler and parlour maidcontinued to serve the dinner with complete detachmentbut I became acutely aware of this big window behindwhich Mrs Landemare the cook and Nellie the kitchenmaid never turning a hair were at work I got up abruptlywent into the kitchen told the butler to put the dinner on thehot plate in the dining-room and ordered the cook andother servants into the shelter such as it was I had beenseated again at table only about three minutes when areally very loud crash close at hand and a violent shockshowed that the house had been struck My detective cameinto the room and said much damage had been done Thekitchen the pantry and the offices on the Treasury sidewere shattered


We went into the kitchen to view the scene Thedevastation was complete The bomb had fallen fifty yardsaway on the Treasury and the blast had smitten the largetidy kitchen with all its bright saucepans and crockery intoa heap of black dust and rubble The big plate-glasswindow had been hurled in fragments and splinters acrossthe room and would of course have cut its occupants ifthere had been any to pieces But my fortunate inspirationwhich I might so easily have neglected had come in thenick of time The underground Treasury shelter across thecourt had been blown to pieces by a direct hit and the threecivil servants who were doing Home Guard night-duty therewere killed All however were buried under tons of brickrubble and we did not know who was missingAs the raid continued and seemed to grow in intensity weput on our tin hats and went out to view the scene from thetop of the Annexe buildings Before doing so however Icould not resist taking Mrs Landemare and the others fromthe shelter to see their kitchen They were upset at the sightof the wreck but principally on account of the generaluntidinessArchie and I went up to the cupola of the Annexe buildingThe night was clear and there was a wide view of LondonIt seemed that the greater part of Pall Mall was in flames Atleast five fierce fires were burning there and others in StJamesrsquos Street and Piccadilly Farther back over the river inthe opposite direction there were many conflagrations ButPall Mall was the vivid flame-picture Gradually the attackdied down and presently the ldquoAll Clearrdquo sounded leavingonly the blazing fires We went downstairs to my newapartments on the first floor of the Annexe and there foundCaptain David Margesson the Chief Whip who wasaccustomed to live at the Carlton Club He told us the club


had been blown to bits and indeed we had thought by thesituation of the fires that it must have been hit He was inthe club with about two hundred and fifty members andstaff It had been struck by a heavy bomb The whole of thefaccedilade and the massive coping on the Pall Mall side hadfallen into the street obliterating his motor-car which wasparked near the front door The smoking-room had beenfull of members and the whole ceiling had come downupon them When I looked at the ruins next day it seemedincredible that most of them should not have been killedHowever by what seemed a miracle they had all crawledout of the dust smoke and rubble and though many wereinjured not a single life was lost When in due course thesefacts came to the notice of the Cabinet our Labourcolleagues facetiously remarked ldquoThe Devil looks after hisownrdquo Mr Quintin Hogg had carried his father a former LordChancellor on his shoulders from the wreck as Aeneashad borne Pater Anchises from the ruins of TroyMargesson had nowhere to sleep and we found himblankets and a bed in the basement of the AnnexeAltogether it was a lurid evening and considering thedamage to buildings it was remarkable that there were notmore than five hundred people killed and about a couple ofthousand injured

One day after luncheon the Chancellor of the ExchequerKingsley Wood came to see me on business at Number10 and we heard a very heavy explosion take place acrossthe river in South London I took him to see what hadhappened The bomb had fallen in Peckham It was a verybig one ndash probably a land-mine It had completely destroyedor gutted twenty or thirty small three-story houses andcleared a considerable open space in this very poor district


Already little pathetic Union Jacks had been stuck up amidthe ruins When my car was recognised the people camerunning from all quarters and a crowd of more than athousand was soon gathered All these folk were in a highstate of enthusiasm They crowded round us cheering andmanifesting every sign of lively affection wanting to touchand stroke my clothes One would have thought I hadbrought them some fine substantial benefit which wouldimprove their lot in life I was completely undermined andwept Ismay who was with me records that he heard anold woman say ldquoYou see he really cares Hersquos cryingrdquoThey were tears not of sorrow but of wonder andadmiration ldquoBut see look hererdquo they said and drew me tothe centre of the ruins There was an enormous craterperhaps forty yards across and twenty feet deep Cockedup at an angle on the very edge was an Anderson shelterand we were greeted at its twisted doorway by a youngishman his wife and three children quite unharmed butobviously shell-jarred They had been there at the momentof the explosion They could give no account of theirexperiences But there they were and proud of it Theirneighbours regarded them as enviable curiosities Whenwe got back into the car a harsher mood swept over thishaggard crowd ldquoGive it rsquoem backrdquo they cried and ldquoLetthem have it toordquo I undertook forthwith to see that theirwishes were carried out and this promise was certainlykept The debt was repaid tenfold twentyfold in the frightfulroutine bombardment of German cities which grew inintensity as our air power developed as the bombs becamefar heavier and the explosives more powerful Certainly theenemy got it all back in good measure pressed down andrunning over Alas for poor humanity


Another time I visited Margate An air raid came upon usand I was conducted into their big tunnel where quite largenumbers of people lived permanently When we came outafter a quarter of an hour we looked at the still-smokingdamage A small restaurant had been hit Nobody had beenhurt but the place had been reduced into a litter ofcrockery utensils and splintered furniture The proprietorhis wife and the cooks and waitresses were in tearsWhere was their home Where was their livelihood Hereis a privilege of power I formed an immediate resolve Onthe way back in my train I dictated a letter to the Chancellorof the Exchequer laying down the principle that all damagefrom the fire of the enemy must be a charge upon the Stateand compensation be paid in full and at once Thus theburden would not fall alone on those whose homes orbusiness premises were hit but would be borne evenly onthe shoulders of the nation Kingsley Wood was naturally alittle worried by the indefinite character of this obligationBut I pressed hard and an insurance scheme was devisedin a fortnight which afterwards played a substantial part inour affairs In explaining this to Parliament on September 5I said

It is very painful to me to see as I have seen in myjourneys about the country a small British house orbusiness smashed by the enemyrsquos fire and to see thatwithout feeling assured that we are doing our best tospread the burden so that we all stand in togetherDamage by enemy action stands on a different footingfrom any other kind of loss or damage because thenation undertakes the task of defending the lives andproperty of its subjects and taxpayers against assaultsfrom outside Unless public opinion and the judgment ofthe House were prepared to separate damage resultingfrom the fire of the enemy from all other forms of warloss and unless the House was prepared to draw thedistinction very sharply between war damage by bomb


and shell and the other forms of loss which areincurred we could not attempt to deal with this matterotherwise we should be opening up a field to whichthere would be no bounds If however we were able toembark upon such a project as would give completeinsurance at any rate up to a certain minimum figurefor everyone against war damage by shell or bomb Ithink it would be a very solid mark of the confidencewhich after some experience we are justified in feelingabout the way in which we are going to come throughthis war

The Treasury went through various emotions about thisinsurance scheme First they thought it was going to betheir ruin but when after May 1941 the air raids ceased forover three years they began to make a great deal ofmoney and considered the plan provident andstatesmanlike However later on in the war when theldquodoodle-bugsrdquo and rockets began the account swung theother way and eight hundred and thirty millions have in factalready been paid out I am very glad it is so

Our outlook at this time was that London except for itsstrong modern buildings would be gradually and soonreduced to a rubble-heap I was deeply anxious about thelife of the people of London the greater part of whomstayed slept and took a chance where they were Thebrick and concrete shelters were multiplying rapidly TheTubes offered accommodation for a good many Therewere several large shelters some of which held as many asseven thousand people who camped there in confidencenight after night little knowing what the effect of a direct hitwould have been upon them I asked that brick traversesshould be built in these as fast as possible About the


Tubes there was an argument which was ultimatelyresolved by a compromise

Prime Minister to SirEdward BridgesHome Secretary andMinister of Transport

21IX40

1 When I asked at the Cabinet the other day whythe Tubes could not be used to some extent even atthe expense of transport facilities as air-raid shelters Iwas assured that this was most undesirable and thatthe whole matter had been reviewed before thatconclusion was reached I now see that the AldwychTube is to be used as a shelter Pray let me have moreinformation about this and what has happened tosupersede the former decisive arguments

2 I still remain in favour of a widespread utilisationof the Tubes by which I mean not only the stations butthe railway lines and I should like a short report on onesheet of paper showing the numbers that could beaccommodated on various sections and the structuralchanges that would be required to fit these sections fortheir new use Is it true for instance that 750000people could be accommodated in the Aldwych sectionalone We may well have to balance the relativedemands of transport and shelter

3 I am awaiting the report of the Home Secretary onthe forward policy of ndash

(1) Making more shelters(2) Strengthening existing basements(3) Making empty basements and premises

available(4) Most important Assigning fixed places by tickets

to a large proportion of the people thus keeping themwhere we want them and avoiding crowding

In this new phase of warfare it became important to extractthe optimum of work not only from the factories but even


more from the departments in London which were underfrequent bombardment during both the day and night Atfirst whenever the sirens gave the alarm all the occupantsof a score of Ministries were promptly collected and leddown to the basements for what these were worth Prideeven was being taken in the efficiency and thoroughnesswith which this evolution was performed In many cases itwas only half a dozen aeroplanes which approached ndashsometimes only one Often they did not arrive A petty raidmight bring to a standstill for over an hour the wholeexecutive and administrative machine in LondonI therefore proposed the stage ldquoAlertrdquo operative on thesiren warning as distinct from the ldquoAlarmrdquo which should beenforced only when the spotters on the roof or ldquoJimCrowsrdquo as they came to be called reported ldquoImminentdangerrdquo which meant that the enemy were actuallyoverhead or very near Schemes were worked outaccordingly In order to enforce rigorous compliance whilewe lived under these repeated daylight attacks I called fora weekly return of the number of hours spent by the staff ofeach department in the shelters

Prime Minister to SirEdward Bridges andGeneral Ismay

17IX40

Please report by tomorrow night the number ofhours on September 16 that the principal offices inLondon were in their dug-outs and out of action throughair alarm

2 General Ismay should find out how the AirMinistry and Fighter Command view the idea that nored warning should be given when only two or threeaircraft are approaching London


Prime Minister to SirHorace Wilson and SirEdward Bridges

19IX40

Let me have a further return [of time lost inGovernment Departments owing to air-raid warnings]for the 17th and 18th and henceforward daily from allMinistries including the Service Departments Thesereturns will be circulated to heads of all Departments atthe same time as they are sent to me Thus it will bepossible to see who are doing best If all returns are notreceived on any day from some Departments thosethat are should nevertheless be circulated

This put everybody on their mettle Eight of these returnswere actually furnished It was amusing to see that thefighting Departments were for some time in the worstposition Offended and spurred by this implied reproachthey very quickly took their proper place The loss of hoursin all Departments was reduced to a fraction Presently ourfighters made daylight attack too costly to the enemy andthis phase passed away In spite of the almost continuousalerts and alarms which were sounded hardly a singleGovernment Department was hit during daylight when itwas full of people nor any loss of life sustained But howmuch time might have been wasted in the functioning of thewar machine if the civil and military staffs had shown anyweakness or been guided up the wrong alleyAs early as September 1 before the heavy night attacksbegan I had addressed the Home Secretary and others

Air-raid Warnings and Precautions1 The present system of air-raid warnings was

designed to cope with occasional large mass raids ondefinite targets not with waves coming over several


times a day and still less with sporadic bombersroaming about at nights We cannot allow large parts ofthe country to be immobilised for hours every day andto be distracted every night The enemy must not bepermitted to prejudice our war effort by stopping work inthe factories which he has been unable to destroy

2 There should be instituted therefore a newsystem of warnings

The AlertThe AlarmThe All ClearThe Alert should not interrupt the normal life of the

area People not engaged on national work could ifthey desired take refuge or put their children in a placeof safety But in general they should learn and they dolearn to adapt themselves to their dangers and takeonly such precautions as are compatible with theirduties and imposed by their temperament

3 The air-raid services should be run on anincreased nucleus staff and not all be called out everytime as on a present red warning The lookout systemshould be developed in all factories where war work isproceeding and should be put into effect when theAlert is given the lookouts would have full authority togive local factory or office alarms The signal for theAlert might be given during the day by the hoisting of adisplay of yellow flags by a sufficient number ofspecially charged air-raid wardens At night flickeringyellow (or perhaps red) lamps could be employed Theuse of electric street lighting should be studied and thepossibility of sounding special signals on the telephone

4 The Alarm is a direct order to ldquoTake coverrdquo and forthe full manning of all ARP positions This will verylikely synchronise with or precede by only a briefinterval the actual attack The routine in each casemust be subject to local conditions

The signal for the Alarm would be the siren It wouldprobably be unnecessary to supplement this by light ortelephone signals

5 The All Clear could be sounded as at present Itwould end the Alarm period If the Alert continued theflags would remain hoisted if the enemy had definitely


turned back the Alert flags and lights would beremoved

The use of the Alert and Alarm signals might vary indifferent parts of the country In areas subject tofrequent attack such as East Kent South andSoutheast London Southeast Anglia BirminghamDerby Liverpool Bristol and some other places theAlert would be a commonplace The Alarm woulddenote actual attack This would also apply to theWhitehall district In other parts of the country asomewhat less sparing use of the Alarm might bejustified in order to keep the air-raid services fromdeteriorating

6 In Government offices in London no one shouldbe forced to take cover until actual firing has begun andthe siren ordering the Alarm under the new conditionshas been sounded No one is to stop work merelybecause London is under Alert conditions

I had to give way about the sirens or ldquoBanshee howlingsrdquoas I described them to Parliament

Prime Minister toHome Secretary andothers concerned

14IX40

I promised the House that new regulations about air-raid warnings sirens whistles Jim Crow etc shouldbe considered within the past week However theintensification of raiding has made it inexpedient toabolish the sirens at this moment I shall be gladhowever to have a short statement prepared of what isthe practice which has in fact developed during the lastweek


One felt keenly for all the poor people most of them in theirlittle homes with nothing over their heads

Prime Minister to HomeSecretary

3IX40

In spite of the shortage of materials a great effortshould be made to help people to drain their Andersonshelters which reflect so much credit on your nameand to make floors for them against the winter rainBricks on edge placed loosely together without mortarcovered with a piece of linoleum would be quite goodbut there must be a drain and a sump I am prepared tohelp you in a comprehensive scheme to tackle thisInstruction can be given on the broadcast and ofcourse the Regional Commissioners and localauthorities should be used Let me have a plan

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay andPrivate Office

11IX40

Please call for reports on whether any seriouseffects are being produced by the air attack on ndash

(1) food supplies and distribution(2) numbers of homeless and provision therefor(3) exhaustion of Fire Brigade personnel(4) sewage in London area(5) gas and electricity(6) water supplies in London area(7) General Ismay to find out what is the practical

effect of the bombing on Woolwich production Seealso my report from the Minister of Supply

Prime Minister to SirEdward Bridges

12IX40


Will you kindly convey to the Cabinet and Ministersthe suggestion which I make that our hours should besomewhat advanced Luncheon should be at oneorsquoclock and Cabinet times moved forward by half anhour In principle it will be convenient if we aim at anearlier dinner-hour say 715 PM Darkness fallsearlier and for the next few weeks severe bombingmay be expected once the protection of the fighteraircraft is withdrawn It would be a good thing if staffsand servants could be under shelter as early aspossible and Ministers are requested to arrange towork in places of reasonable security during the nightraids and especially to find places for sleeping wherethey will not be disturbed by anything but a direct hit

I propose to ask Parliament when it meets at theusual time on Tuesday to meet in these occasionalsittings at 11 AM and separate at 4 or 5 PM This willallow Members to reach their homes and I hope theirshelters by daylight We must adapt ourselves to theseconditions which will probably be accentuated Indeedit is likely we shall have to move our office hoursforward by another half-hour as the days shorten

Parliament also required guidance about the conduct of itswork in these dangerous days Members felt that it wastheir duty to set an example This was right but it mighthave been pushed too far I had to reason with theCommons to make them observe ordinary prudence andconform to the peculiar conditions of the time I convincedthem in secret session of the need to take necessary andwell-considered precautions They agreed that their daysand hours of sitting should not be advertised and tosuspend their debates when the Jim Crow reported to theSpeaker ldquoImminent dangerrdquo Then they all trooped downdutifully to the crowded ineffectual shelters that had beenprovided It will always add to the renown of the British


Parliament that its Members continued to sit and dischargetheir duties through all this period The Commons are verytouchy in such matters and it would have been easy tomisjudge their mood When one Chamber was damagedthey moved to another and I did my utmost to persuadethem to follow wise advice with good grace Theirmigrations will be recorded in due course In shorteveryone behaved with sense and dignity It was also luckythat when the Chamber was blown to pieces a few monthslater it was by night and not by day when empty and notfull With our mastery of the daylight raids there cameconsiderable relief in personal convenience But during thefirst few months I was never free from anxiety about thesafety of the Members After all a free sovereignParliament fairly chosen by universal suffrage able to turnout the Government any day but proud to uphold it in thedarkest days was one of the points which were in disputewith the enemy Parliament wonI doubt whether any of the dictators had as much effectivepower throughout his whole nation as the British WarCabinet When we expressed our desires we weresustained by the peoplersquos representatives and cheerfullyobeyed by all Yet at no time was the right of criticismimpaired Nearly always the critics respected the nationalinterest When on occasions they challenged us theHouses voted them down by overwhelming majorities andthis in contrast with totalitarian methods without theslightest coercion intervention or use of the police orSecret Service It was a proud thought that ParliamentaryDemocracy or whatever our British public life can be calledcan endure surmount and survive all trials Even the threatof annihilation did not daunt our Members but thisfortunately did not come to pass


3ldquoLondon Can Take Itrdquo

Grim and Gay mdash Passion in the United States mdashThe London DrainsmdashDanger o f Epidemics mdashBroken WindowsmdashThe Delayed-Action Bombs mdashMinutes Thereupon mdash The UXB Detachmentsmdash The Peril Mastered mdash Heavy Parachute Minesmdash The Question of Reprisals mdash Later GermanExperiences Compared with Ours mdash Need ofSecurity for the Central Government mdashldquoPaddockrdquoRehearsal mdash Herbert Morrison Succeeds JohnAnderson as Home Secretary mdash The IncendiaryAttacks Begin mdash The National Fire Service mdash CivilDefence a Fourth Arm of the Crown mdash Power ofLondon to Take Punishment mdash PermanentArrangements for Safeguarding the War Machinemdash I Am Placed in Safety in Piccadilly Under-ground mdash Return to the Annexe mdash AnotherChange of the German PlanmdashThe ProvincialCities mdash Coventry mdash Birmingham mdash Attacks onthe Ports mdash Great Burning of the City of LondonDecember 29 1940 mdashThe King at BuckinghamPalace mdash His Majestyrsquos Mastery of Business mdash AThought for the Future

THESE WERE THE TIMES When the English andparticularly the Londoners who had the place of honourwere seen at their best Grim and gay dogged andserviceable with the confidence of an unconquered peoplein their bones they adapted themselves to this strange new


life with all its terrors with all its jolts and jars One eveningwhen I was leaving for an inspection on the east coast onmy way to Kingrsquos Cross the sirens sounded the streetsbegan to empty except for long queues of very tired palepeople waiting for the last bus that would run An autumnmist and drizzle shrouded the scene The air was cold andraw Night and the enemy were approaching I felt with aspasm of mental pain a deep sense of the strain andsuffering that was being borne throughout the worldrsquoslargest capital city How long would it go on How muchmore would they have to bear What were the limits of theirvitality What effects would their exhaustion have upon ourproductive warmaking power1

Away across the Atlantic the prolonged bombardment ofLondon and later of other cities and seaports aroused awave of sympathy in the United States stronger than anyever felt before or since in the English-speaking worldPassion flamed in American hearts and in none more thanin the heart of President Roosevelt The temperature rosesteadily in the United States I could feel the glow of millionsof men and women eager to share the suffering burning tostrike a blow As many Americans as could get passagescame bringing whatever gifts they could and their respectreverence deep love and comradeship were very inspiringHowever this was only September and we had manymonths before us of this curious existenceUnder the pressure of the bombardment the shelters anddefences grew continually I was worried principally onthree counts The first was the drains When you had six orseven million people living in a great built-up area thesmashing of their sewers and water supply seemed to me avery great danger Could we keep the sewage systemworking or would there be a pestilence What would


happen if the drains got into the water supply Actuallyearly in October the main sewage outfall was destroyed andwe had to let all our sewage flow into the Thames whichstank first of sewage and afterwards of the floods ofchemicals we poured into it But all was masteredSecondly I feared that the long nights for millions in thecrowded street-shelters ndash only blast-proof at that ndash wouldproduce epidemics of influenza diphtheria the commoncold and what-not But it appeared that Nature had alreadyprovided against this danger Man is a gregarious animaland apparently the mischievous microbes he exhales fightand neutralise each other They go out and devour eachother and Man walks off unharmed If this is notscientifically correct it ought to be The fact remains thatduring this rough winter the health of the Londoners wasactually above the average Moreover the power ofenduring suffering in the ordinary people of every countrywhen their spirit is roused seems to have no boundsMy third fear was a glass famine Sometimes whole streetshad every window-frame smashed by the blast of a singlebomb In a series of Minutes I inquired anxiously about thisand proposed to stop all export of glass forthwith I washowever reassured by facts and figures and this dangeralso never came to pass

In the middle of September a new and damaging form ofattack was used against us Large numbers of delayed-action bombs were now widely and plentifully cast upon usand became an awkward problem Long stretches ofrailway line important junctions the approaches to vitalfactories airfields main thoroughfares had scores of timesto be blocked off and denied to us in our need These


bombs had to be dug out and exploded or renderedharmless This was a task of the utmost peril especially atthe beginning when the means and methods had all to belearned by a series of decisive experiences I have alreadyrecounted in Volume I the drama of dismantling themagnetic mine but this form of self-devotion now becamecommonplace while remaining sublime I had always takenan interest in the delayed-action fuze which had firstimpressed itself on me in 1918 when the Germans hadused it on a large scale to deny us the use of the railwaysby which we planned to advance into Germany I had urgedits use by us both in Norway and in the Kiel Canal There isno doubt that it is a most effective agent in warfare onaccount of the prolonged uncertainty which it creates Wewere now to taste it ourselves A special organisation todeal with it was set up under General King a highlycapable energetic officer whom I interviewed myself atChequers In a series of Minutes I tried to stimulate thework


13IX40

As I telephoned to you last night it appears to be ofhigh importance to cope with the UXB [unexplodedbombs] in London and especially on the railways Thecongestion in the marshalling yards is becoming acutemainly from this cause It would be well to bring inclearance parties both from the north and the west andalso to expand as rapidly as possible General Kingrsquosorganisation It must be planned on large enough linesto cope with this nuisance which may soon wear agraver aspect



21IX40

The rapid disposal of unexploded bombs is of thehighest importance Any failure to grapple with thisproblem may have serious results on the production ofaircraft and other vital war material The work of thebomb-disposal squads must be facilitated by theprovision of every kind of up-to-date equipment Thepaper which I have received from the Secretary ofState for War shows the experiments on foot and theequipment being planned Priority 1 (a) should beallotted to the production of the equipment requiredand to any further requirements which may come tolight


14IX40

I hear that there is a special type of auger manufac-tured in the United States which is capable of boring inthe space of less than an hour a hole of such a sizeand depth as would take two to three days to digmanually

You should I think consider ordering a number ofthese appliances for the use of the bomb-disposalsquads The essence of this business is to reach thebomb and deal with it with the least possible delay

These augers may perhaps be expensive but theywill pay for themselves many times over by the savingthey will effect in life and property Besides I considerthat we owe it to these brave men to provide them withthe very best technical equipment


28IX40

I am told that there is good evidence to show thatthe system of dealing with time-bombs by trepanning2


is proving very successful In view of the serious andgrowing trouble that is being caused by these bombs Ishould like to be assured that this method is being usedon a large enough scale Will you please let me have areport on the extent to which trepanning is being used

Special companies were formed in every city town anddistrict Volunteers pressed forward for the deadly gameTeams were formed which had good or bad luck Somesurvived this phase of our ordeal Others ran twenty thirtyor even forty courses before they met their fate Theunexploded-bomb (UXB) detachments presentedthemselves wherever I went on my tours Somehow orother their faces seemed different from those of ordinarymen however brave and faithful They were gaunt theywere haggard their faces had a bluish look with brightgleaming eyes and exceptional compression of the lipswithal a perfect demeanour In writing about our hard timeswe are apt to overuse the word ldquogrimrdquo It should have beenreserved for the UXB disposal squads3

One squad I remember which may be taken as symbolic ofmany others It consisted of three people ndash the Earl ofSuffolk his lady private secretary and his rather agedchauffeur They called themselves ldquothe Holy Trinityrdquo Theirprowess and continued existence got around among allwho knew Thirty-four unexploded bombs did they tacklewith urbane and smiling efficiency But the thirty-fifthclaimed its forfeit Up went the Earl of Suffolk in his HolyTrinity But we may be sure that as for Mr Valiant-for-Truth ldquoall the trumpets sounded for them on the other siderdquo


Very quickly but at heavy sacrifice of our noblest thedevotion of the UXB detachments mastered the peril In amonth I could write


9X40

We have not heard much lately about the delayed-action bomb which threatened to give so much troubleat the beginning of September I have a sort of feelingthat things are easier in this respect Let me have areport showing how many have been cast upon uslately and how many have been handled successfullyor remain a nuisance

Is the easement which we feel due to the enemyrsquosnot throwing them or to our improved methods ofhandling4

About the same time the enemy began to drop byparachute numbers of naval mines of a weight andexplosive power never carried by aircraft before Manyformidable explosions took place To this there was nodefence except reprisal The abandonment by the Germansof all pretence of confining the air war to military objectiveshad also raised this question of retaliation I was for it but Iencountered many conscientious scruples

Prime Minister to VCAS

6IX40

I never suggested any departure from our mainpolicy but I believe that moral advantage would begained in Germany at the present time if on two or


three nights in a month a number of minor unexpectedwidespread attacks were made upon the smallerGerman centers You must remember that thesepeople are never told the truth and that wherever theair force has not been they are probably told that theGerman defences are impregnable Many factors haveto be taken into consideration and some of them arethose which are not entirely technical I hope thereforeyou will consider my wish and make me proposals forgiving effect to it as opportunity serves

Among those who demurred was my friend Admiral TomPhillips Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay for COS Committee(Admiral Phillips tosee)

19IX40

1 It was not solely on moral grounds that wedecided against retaliation upon Germany It pays usbetter to concentrate upon limited high-class militaryobjectives Moreover in the indiscriminate warfare theenemyrsquos lack of skill in navigation etc does not tellagainst him so much

2 However the dropping of large mines byparachute proclaims the enemyrsquos entire abandonmentof all pretence of aiming at military objectives At fivethousand feet he cannot have the slightest idea whathe is going to hit This therefore proves the ldquoact-of-terrorrdquo intention against the civil population We mustconsider whether his morale would stand up to this aswell as ours Here is a simple war thought

3 My inclination is to say that we will drop a heavyparachute mine on German cities for everyone hedrops on ours and it might be an intriguing idea tomention a list of cities that would be black-listed for thispurpose I do not think they would like it and there is


no reason why they should not have a period ofsuspense

4 The time and character of the announcement is apolitical decision Meanwhile I wish to know when thetackle could be ready Let care be taken to make aforthcoming response to this Let officers be set topropose the best method on a substantial scale in theshortest time It would be better to act by parachutemines upon a number of German towns not hithertotouched but if we have to use thousand-pound air-bombs which we have because otherwise the delaywould be too long let the case be stated

5 I wish to know by Saturday night what is the worstform of proportionate retaliation ie equal retaliationthat we can inflict upon ordinary German cities for whatthey are now doing to us by means of the parachutemine Today we were informed that thirty-six had beendropped but by tomorrow it may be a hundred Well letit be a hundred and make the best plan possible on thatscale for action within say a week or ten days If wehave to wait longer so be it but make sure there is noobstruction

6 Pending the above information I agree that weshould not make a wail or a whine about what hashappened Let me have practical propositions bySaturday night

A month later I was still pressing for retaliation but oneobjection after another moral and technical obstructed it


16X40

I see it reported that last night a large number ofland mines were dropped here many of which have notyet gone off and that great harm was done

Let me have your proposals forthwith for effectiveretaliation upon Germany


I am informed that it is quite possible to carry similarmines or large bombs to Germany and that thesquadrons wish to use them but that the Air Ministryare refusing permission I trust that due considerationwill be given to my views and wishes It is now aboutthree weeks since I began pressing for similartreatment of German military objectives to that whichthey are meting out to us Who is responsible forparalysing action

It is difficult to compare the ordeal of the Londoners in thewinter of 1940ndash41 with that of the Germans in the last threeyears of the war In this latter phase the bombs were muchmore powerful and the raids far more intense On the otherhand long preparation and German thoroughness hadenabled a complete system of bomb-proof shelters to bebuilt into which all were forced to go by iron routine Wheneventually we got into Germany we found cities completelywrecked but strong buildings standing up above theground and spacious subterranean galleries where theinhabitants slept night after night although their houses andproperty were being destroyed all round In many casesonly the rubble-heaps were stirred But in London althoughthe attack was less overpowering the securityarrangements were far less developed Apart from theTubes there were no really safe places There were veryfew basements or cellars which could withstand a direct hitVirtually the whole mass of the London population lived andslept in their homes or in their Anderson shelters under thefire of the enemy taking their chance with British phlegmafter a hard dayrsquos work Not one in a thousand had anyprotection except against blast and splinters But there wasas little psychological weakening as there was physicalpestilence Of course if the bombs of 1943 had beenapplied to the London of 1940 we should have passed intoconditions which might have pulverised all human


organisation However everything happens in its turn andin its relation and no one has a right to say that Londonwhich was certainly unconquered was not alsounconquerableLittle or nothing had been done before the war or during thepassive period to provide bomb-proof strongholds fromwhich the central government could be carried onElaborate plans had been made to move the seat ofGovernment from London Complete branches of manydepartments had already been moved to Harrogate BathCheltenham and elsewhere Accommodation had beenrequisitioned over a wide area providing for all Ministersand important functionaries in the event of an evacuation ofLondon But now under the bombardment the desire andresolve of the Government and of Parliament to remain inLondon was unmistakable and I shared this feeling to thefull I like others had often pictured the destructionbecoming so overpowering that a general move anddispersal would have to be made But under the impact ofthe event all our reactions were in the contrary sense

Prime Minister to SirEdward BridgesGeneral Ismay orColonel Jacob andPrivate Office

14IX40

1 I have not at any time contemplated wholesalemovement from London of black or yellow CivilServants5 Anything of this nature is so detrimental thatit could only be forced upon us by Central Londonbecoming practically uninhabitable Moreover newresorts of Civil Servants would soon be identified andharassed and there is more shelter in London thananywhere else


2 The movement of the high control from theWhitehall area to ldquoPaddockrdquo or other citadels stands ona different footing We must make sure that the centreof Government functions harmoniously and vigorouslyThis would not be possible under conditions of almostcontinuous air raids A movement to ldquoPaddockrdquo byeacutechelons of the War Cabinet War Cabinet SecretariatChiefs of the Staff Committee and Home Forces GHQ must now be planned and may even begin in someminor respects War Cabinet Ministers should visit theirquarters in ldquoPaddockrdquo and be ready to move there atshort notice They should be encouraged to sleep thereif they want quiet nights Secrecy cannot be expectedbut publicity must be forbidden

We must expect that the Whitehall-Westminster areawill be the subject of intensive air attack any time nowThe German method is to make the disruption of theCentral Government a vital prelude to any major assaultupon the country They have done this everywhereThey will certainly do it here where the landscape canbe so easily recognised and the river and its highbuildings afford a sure guide both by day and nightWe must forestall this disruption of the CentralGovernment

3 It is not necessary to move the Admiralty yetThey are well provided for The Air Ministry shouldbegin to get from one leg to the other The War Officeand Home Forces must have all their preparationsmade

4 Pray concert forthwith all the necessary measuresfor moving not more than two or three hundred principalpersons and their immediate assistants to the newquarters and show how it should be done step by stepLet me have this by Sunday night in order that I mayput a well-thought-out scheme before the Cabinet onMonday On Monday the Cabinet will meet either in theCabinet Room or in the Central War Room inaccordance with the rules already prescribed


On the line of sticking it out in London it was necessary toconstruct all kinds of strongholds under or above groundfrom which the Executive with its thousands of officialscould carry out their duties A citadel for the War Cabinethad already been prepared near Hampstead with officesbedrooms and wire and fortified telephone communicationThis was called ldquoPaddockrdquo On September 29 I prescribeda dress rehearsal so that everybody should know what todo if it got too hot ldquoI think it important that lsquoPaddockrsquo shouldbe broken in Thursday next therefore the Cabinet willmeet there At the same time other Departments should beencouraged to try a preliminary move of a skeleton staff Ifpossible lunch should be provided for the Cabinet andthose attending itrdquo We held a Cabinet meeting atldquoPaddockrdquo far from the light of day and each Minister wasrequested to inspect and satisfy himself about his sleepingand working apartments We celebrated this occasion by avivacious luncheon and then returned to Whitehall Thiswas the only time ldquoPaddockrdquo was ever used by MinistersOver the War Room and offices in the basement of theAnnexe we floated-in six feet of steel and concrete andmade elaborate arrangements for ventilation water supplyand above all telephones As these offices were far belowthe level of the Thames only two hundred yards away carehad to be taken that those in them were not trapped by aninrush of water

October came in raw and rough But it seemed that Londonwas adapting itself to the new peculiar conditions ofexistence or death Even in some directions there was aneasement


Transport into and out of the Whitehall area became anoutstanding problem with the frequently repeated dailyraids the rush hour and the breakdowns on the railways Icast about for some solution

Prime Minister to SirHorace Wilson

12X40

About a fortnight ago I directed that the talk aboutfour days a week for Civil Servants should stopbecause I feared the effect in the factories of such anannouncement I am however now coming round tothe idea of a five-day week sleeping in for four nights(and where possible feeding in) and three nights andtwo days away at home This of course would applyonly to people who work in London and live in thesuburbs I see such queues at the bus stops and nodoubt it is going to become increasingly difficult to getin and out of London quickly Each Department shouldwork out a scheme to suit their own and their staffrsquosconvenience The same amount of work must becrowded into the five days as is now done Effortsshould also be made to stagger the hours of arrival anddeparture so as to get as many away as possiblebefore the rush hour and spread the traffic over the day

Let me have your views on this together withproposals for action in a circular to Departments

Nothing came of this plan which broke down under detailedexamination

The retirement of Mr Chamberlain enforced by graveillness led to important Ministerial changes Mr HerbertMorrison had been an efficient and vigorous Minister ofSupply and Sir John Anderson had faced the Blitz of


London with firm and competent management By the earlydays of October the continuous attack on the largest city inthe world was so severe and raised so many problems of asocial and political character in its vast harassed populationthat I thought it would be a help to have a long-trainedParliamentarian at the Home Office which was now alsothe Ministry of Home Security London was bearing thebrunt Herbert Morrison was a Londoner versed in everyaspect of metropolitan administration He had unrivalledexperience of London government having been leader ofthe County Council and in many ways the principal figure inits affairs At the same time I needed John Andersonwhose work at the Home Office had been excellent as LordPresident of the Council in the wider sphere of the HomeAffairs Committee to which an immense mass of businesswas referred with great relief to the Cabinet This alsolightened my own burden and enabled me to concentrateupon the military conduct of the war in which mycolleagues seemed increasingly disposed to give melatitudeI therefore invited these two high Ministers to change theiroffices It was no bed of roses which I offered HerbertMorrison These pages certainly cannot attempt to describethe problems of London government when often night afternight ten or twenty thousand people were made homelessand when nothing but the ceaseless vigil of the citizens asfire guards on the roofs prevented uncontrollableconflagrations when hospitals filled with mutilated men andwomen were themselves struck by the enemyrsquos bombswhen hundreds of thousands of weary people crowdedtogether in unsafe and insanitary shelters whencommunications by road and rail were ceaselessly brokendown when drains were smashed and light power andgas paralysed and when nevertheless the whole fighting


toiling life of London had to go forward and nearly a millionpeople be moved in and out for their work every night andmorning We did not know how long it would last We hadno reason to suppose that it would not go on getting worseWhen I made the proposal to Mr Morrison he knew toomuch about it to treat it lightly He asked for a few hoursrsquoconsideration but in a short time he returned and said hewould be proud to shoulder the job I highly approved hismanly decisionIn Mr Chamberlainrsquos day a Civil Defence Committee of theCabinet had already been set up This met regularly everymorning to review the whole situation In order to makesure that the new Home Secretary was armed with all thepowers of State I also held a weekly meeting usually onFridays of all authorities concerned The topics discussedwere often far from pleasant

Quite soon after the Ministerial movements a change in theenemyrsquos method affected our general policy Till now thehostile attack had been confined almost exclusively to high-explosive bombs but with the full moon of October 15when the heaviest attack of the month fell upon us about480 German aircraft dropped 386 tons of high-explosiveand in addition 70000 incendiary bombs Hitherto we hadencouraged the Londoners to take cover and every effortwas being made to improve their protection But now ldquoTothe basementsrdquo must be replaced by ldquoTo the roofsrdquo It fell tothe new Minister of Home Security to institute this policy Anorganisation of fire-watchers and fire-services on a giganticscale and covering the whole of London (apart frommeasures taken in provincial cities) was rapidly brought intobeing At first the fire-watchers were volunteers but the


numbers required were so great and the feeling that everyman should take his turn upon the roster so strong that fire-watching soon became compulsory This form of servicehad a bracing and buoyant effect upon all classes Womenpressed forward to take their share Large-scale systems oftraining were developed to teach the fire-watchers how todeal with the various kinds of incendiaries which were usedagainst us Many became adept and thousands of fireswere extinguished before they took hold The experience ofremaining on the roof night after night under fire with noprotection but a tin hat soon became habitual

Mr Morrison presently decided to consolidate the fourteenhundred local fire brigades into a single National FireService and to supplement this with a great fire guard ofcivilians trained and working in their spare time The fireguard like the roof-watchers was at first recruited on avoluntary basis but like them it became by general consentcompulsory The National Fire Service gave us theadvantages of greater mobility a universal standard oftraining and equipment and formally recognised ranks Theother Civil Defence forces produced regional columns readyat a minutersquos notice to go anywhere The name CivilDefence Service was substituted for the pre-war title of Air-Raid Precautions (ARP) Good uniforms were providedfor large numbers and they became conscious of being afourth arm of the Crown In all this work Herbert Morrisonwas ably assisted by a brave woman whose death we havelately mourned Ellen Wilkinson She was out and about inthe shelters at all hours of the day and night and took aprominent part in the organisation of the fire guard The


Womenrsquos Voluntary Services under the inspiring leadershipof Lady Reading also played an invaluable part

I was glad that if any of our cities were to be attacked thebrunt should fall on London London was like some hugeprehistoric animal capable of enduring terrible injuriesmangled and bleeding from many wounds and yetpreserving its life and movement The Anderson shelterswere widespread in the working-class districts of two-storeyhouses and everything was done to make them habitableand to drain them in wet weather Later the Morrison shelterwas developed which was no more than a heavy kitchentable made of steel with strong wire sides capable ofholding up the ruins of a small house and thus giving ameasure of protection Many owed their lives to it For therest ldquoLondon could take itrdquo They took all they got andcould have taken more Indeed at this time we saw no endbut the demolition of the whole metropolis Still as I pointedout to the House of Commons at the time the law ofdiminishing returns operates in the case of the demolition oflarge cities Soon many of the bombs would only fall uponhouses already ruined and only make the rubble jumpOver large areas there would be nothing more to burn ordestroy and yet human beings might make their homeshere and there and carry on their work with infiniteresource and fortitude At this time anyone would havebeen proud to be a Londoner The admiration of the wholecountry was given to London and all the other great citiesin the land braced themselves to take their bit as and whenit came and not to be outdone Indeed many personsseemed envious of Londonrsquos distinction and quite anumber came up from the country in order to spend a night


or two in town share the task and see the fun We had tocheck this tendency for administrative reasons

As we could see no reason why the hostile bombing ofLondon should not go on throughout the war it wasnecessary to make long-term plans for safely housing thecentral Government machine


22X40

We now know the probable limits of the enemy airattack on London and that it will be severe andprotracted It is probable indeed that the bombing ofWhitehall and the centre of Government will becontinuous until all old or insecure buildings have beendemolished It is therefore necessary to provide assoon as possible accommodation in the strongesthouses and buildings that exist or are capable of beingfortified for the large nucleus staffs and personnelconnected with the governing machine and theessential Ministers and Departments concerned in theconduct of the war This becomes inevitable as aconsequence of our decision not to be beaten out ofLondon and to release to the War Office or otherDepartments the accommodation hitherto reserved inthe West of England for the Black Move We must doone thing or the other and having made our decisioncarry it out thoroughly

2 The accommodation at Paddock is quite unsuitedto the conditions which have arisen The War Cabinetcannot live and work there for weeks on end whileleaving the great part of their staffs less well providedfor than they are now in Whitehall Apart from thecitadel of Paddock there is no adequate accommoda-tion or shelter and anyone living in Neville Court would


have to be running to and fro on every Jim Crowwarning Paddock should be treated as a last resortand in the meantime should be used by someDepartment not needed in the very centre of London

3 Nearly all the Government buildings and theshelters beneath them are either wholly unsafe orincapable of resisting a direct hit The older buildingslike the Treasury fall to pieces as we have seen andthe shelters beneath them offer no trustworthyprotection The Foreign Office and Board of Tradeblocks on either side of King Charles Street are stronglybuilt and give a considerable measure of protection intheir basements I have approved the provision of asubstantial measure of overhead cover above the WarRoom and Central War Room offices and HomeForces location in the Board of Trade Building This willtake a month or six weeks with perpetual hammeringWe must press on with this But even when finished itwill not be proof Richmond Terrace is quite inadequate-ly protected and essential work suffers from conditionsprevailing there The Board of Trade have been invitedto move to new premises and certainly the bulk of theirstaff should find accommodation out of LondonHowever this move of the Board of Trade must beconsidered as part of the general plan

4 There are several strong modern buildings inLondon of steel and cement construction built with aneye to air-raid conditions These should immediately beprepared to receive the War Cabinet and its Secretari-at and also to provide safe living accommodation forthe essential Ministers We need not be afraid of havingtoo much proof accommodation as increasing numberswill certainly have to be provided for It is essential thatthe central work of the Government should proceedunder conditions which ensure its efficiency

5 I have already asked for alternative accommoda-tion for Parliament but no satisfactory plan has yetbeen made The danger to both Houses during theirsessions is serious and it is only a question of timebefore these buildings and chambers are struck Wemust hope they will be struck when not occupied bytheir Members The protection provided below the


Houses of Parliament is totally inadequate against adirect hit The Palace of Westminster and the Whitehallarea is an obvious prime target of the enemy and Idare say already more than fifty heavy bombs havefallen in the neighbourhood The Cabinet has alreadyfavoured the idea of a trial trip being made by theHouses of Parliament in some alternative accommoda-tion I propose to ask for an adjournment from Thursdaynext for a fortnight by which time it is hoped some plancan be made in London for their meeting

6 I consider that a War Cabinet Minister whoshould keep in close touch with the Chancellor of theExchequer should be entrusted with the generaldirection and supervision of the important andextensive works which are required and that Lord Reithand his Department should work for this purpose underCabinet supervision If my colleagues agree I will askLord Beaverbrook who has already concerned himselfin the matter to take general charge

Lord Beaverbrook was thus entrusted with the task ofmaking a large number of bomb-proof strongholds capableof housing the whole essential staffs of many Departmentsof State and a dozen of them several connected bytunnels survive in London today None of these werefinished till long after the aeroplane raids were over andfew were used during the pilotless-aircraft and rocketattacks which came in 1944 and 1945 However althoughthese buildings were never used for the purposes for whichthey were prepared it was good to feel we had them underour lee The Admiralty on their own constructed the vastmonstrosity which weighs upon the Horse Guards Paradeand the demolition of whose twenty-foot-thick steel andconcrete walls will be a problem for future generationswhen we reach a safer world


Towards the middle of October Josiah Wedgwood beganto make a fuss in Parliament about my not having anabsolutely bomb-proof shelter for the night raids He was anold friend of mine and had been grievously wounded in theDardanelles He had always been a single-taxer Later hebroadened his views on taxation and joined the LabourParty His brother was the Chairman of the RailwayExecutive Committee Before the war they had had theforesight to construct a considerable underground office inPiccadilly It was seventy feet below the surface andcovered with strong high buildings Although one bombhad penetrated eighty feet in marshy subsoil there was nodoubt this depth with buildings overhead gave safety toanyone in it I began to be pressed from all sides to resortto this shelter for sleeping purposes Eventually I agreedand from the middle of October till the end of the year Iused to go there once the firing had started to transact myevening business and sleep undisturbed One felt a naturalcompunction at having much more safety than most otherpeople but so many pressed me that I let them have theirway After about forty nights in the railway shelter theAnnexe became stronger and I moved back to it Hereduring the rest of the war my wife and I lived comfortablyWe felt confidence in this solid stone building and only onvery rare occasions went down below the armour My wifeeven hung up our few pictures in the sitting-room which Ihad thought it better to keep bare Her view prevailed andwas justified by the event From the roof near the cupola ofthe Annexe there was a splendid view of London on clearnights They made a place for me with overhead cover fromsplinters and one could walk in the moonlight and watchthe fireworks In 1941 I used to take some of my American


visitors up there from time to time after dinner They werealways most interested

On the night of November 3 for the first time in nearly twomonths no alarm sounded in London The silence seemedquite odd to many They wondered what was wrong On thefollowing night the enemyrsquos attacks were widely dispersedthroughout the island and this continued for a while Therehad been another change in the policy of the Germanoffensive Although London was still regarded as theprincipal target a major effort was now to be made tocripple the Industrial centres of Britain Special squadronshad been trained with new navigational devices to attackspecific key-centres For instance one formation wastrained solely for the destruction of the Rolls-Royce aero-engine works at Hillington Glasgow All this was amakeshift and interim plan The invasion of Britain hadbeen temporarily abandoned and the attack upon Russiahad not yet been mounted or expected outside Hitlerrsquosintimate circle The remaining winter months weretherefore to be for the German Air Force a period ofexperiment both in technical devices in night-bombing andin attacks upon British sea-borne trade together with anattempt to break down our production military and civilThey would have done much better to have stuck to onething at a time and pressed it to a conclusion But they werealready baffled and for the time being unsure of themselvesThese new bombing tactics began with the blitz onCoventry on the night of November 14 London seemed toolarge and vague a target for decisive results but Goeringhoped that provincial cities or munition centres might beeffectively obliterated The raid started early in the dark


hours of the 14th and by dawn nearly five hundred Germanaircraft had dropped six hundred tons of high-explosivesand thousands of incendiaries On the whole this was themost devastating raid which we sustained The centre ofCoventry was shattered and its life for a spell completelydisrupted Four hundred people were killed and many moreseriously injured The German radio proclaimed that ourother cities would be similarly ldquoCoventratedrdquo Neverthelessthe all-important aero-engine and machine-tool factorieswere not brought to a standstill nor was the populationhitherto untried in the ordeal of bombing put out of actionIn less than a week an emergency reconstructioncommittee did wonderful work in restoring the life of the cityOn November 15 the enemy switched back to London witha very heavy raid in full moonlight Much damage wasdone especially to churches and other monuments Thenext target was Birmingham and three successive raidsfrom the 19th to the 22d of November inflicted muchdestruction and loss of life Nearly eight hundred peoplewere killed and over two thousand injured but the life andspirit of Birmingham survived this ordeal When I visited thecity a day or two later to inspect its factories and see formyself what had happened an incident to me charmingoccurred It was the dinner-hour and a very pretty younggirl ran up to the car and threw a box of cigars into it Istopped at once and she said ldquoI won the prize this week forthe highest output I only heard you were coming an houragordquo The gift must have cost her two or three pounds Iwas very glad (in my official capacity) to give her a kiss Ithen went on to see the long mass grave in which so manycitizens and their children had been newly buried The spiritof Birmingham shone brightly and its million inhabitantshighly organised conscious and comprehending rode highabove their physical suffering


During the last week of November and the beginning ofDecember the weight of the attack shifted to the portsBristol Southampton and above all Liverpool were heavilybombed Later on Plymouth Sheffield Manchester LeedsGlasgow and other munitions centres passed through thefire undaunted It did not matter where the blow struck thenation was as sound as the sea is saltThe climax raid of these weeks came once more toLondon on Sunday December 29 All the painfullygathered German experience was expressed on thisoccasion It was an incendiary classic The weight of theattack was concentrated upon the City of London itself Itwas timed to meet the dead-low-water hour The water-mains were broken at the outset by very heavy high-explosive parachute mines Nearly fifteen hundred fires hadto be fought The damage to railway stations and dockswas serious Eight Wren churches were destroyed ordamaged The Guildhall was smitten by fire and blast andSt Paulrsquos Cathedral was only saved by heroic exertions Avoid of ruin at the very centre of the British world gapesupon us to this day But when the King and Queen visitedthe scene they were received with enthusiasm farexceeding any Royal festivalDuring this prolonged ordeal of which several months werestill to come the King was constantly at BuckinghamPalace Proper shelters were being constructed in thebasement but all this took time Also it happened severaltimes that His Majesty arrived from Windsor in the middle ofan air raid Once he and the Queen had a very narrowescape I have His Majestyrsquos permission to record theincident in his own words

Friday September 13 1940


We went to London [from Windsor] and found an airraid in progress The day was very cloudy and it wasraining hard The Queen and I went upstairs to a smallsitting-room overlooking the Quadrangle (I could notuse my usual sitting-room owing to the broken windowsby former bomb damage) All of a sudden we heard thezooming noise of a diving aircraft getting louder andlouder and then saw two bombs falling past theopposite side of Buckingham Palace into the Quadran-gle We saw the flashes and heard the detonations asthey burst about eighty yards away The blast blew inthe windows opposite to us and two great craters hadappeared in the Quadrangle From one of these craterswater from a burst main was pouring out and flowinginto the passage through the broken windows Thewhole thing happened in a matter of seconds and wewere very quickly out into the passage There were sixbombs two in the Forecourt two in the Quadrangleone wrecked the Chapel and one in the garden

The King who as a sub-lieutenant had served in the Battleof Jutland was exhilarated by all this and pleased that heshould be sharing the dangers of his subjects in the capitalI must confess that at the time neither I nor any of mycolleagues were aware of the peril of this particular incidentHad the windows been closed instead of open the whole ofthe glass would have splintered into the faces of the Kingand Queen causing terrible injuries So little did they makeof it all that even I who saw them and their entourage sofrequently only realised long afterwards when makinginquiries for writing this book what had actually happenedIn those days we viewed with stern and tranquil gaze theidea of going down fighting amid the ruins of Whitehall HisMajesty had a shooting-range made in the BuckinghamPalace garden at which he and other members of hisfamily and his equerries practised assiduously with pistolsand tommy-guns Presently I brought the King an American


short-range carbine from a number which had been sent tome This was a very good weaponAbout this time the King changed his practice of receivingme in a formal weekly audience at about five orsquoclock whichhad prevailed during my first two months of office It wasnow arranged that I should lunch with him every TuesdayThis was certainly a very agreeable method of transactingState business and sometimes the Queen was present Onseveral occasions we all had to take our plates and glassesin our hands and go down to the shelter which was makingprogress to finish our meal The weekly luncheons becamea regular institution After the first few months His Majestydecided that all servants should be excluded and that weshould help ourselves and help each other During the fourand a half years that this continued I became aware of theextrordinary diligence with which the King read all thetelegrams and public documents submitted to him Underthe British Constitutional system the Sovereign has a rightto be made acquainted with everything for which hisMinisters are responsible and has an unlimited right ofgiving counsel to his Government I was most careful thateverything should be laid before the King and at our weeklymeetings he frequently showed that he had masteredpapers which I had not yet dealt with It was a great help toBritain to have so good a King and Queen in those fatefulyears and as a convinced upholder of constitutionalmonarchy I valued as a signal honour the gracious intimacywith which I as First Minister was treated for which Isuppose there has been no precedent since the days ofQueen Anne and Marlborough during his years of power


This brings us to the end of the year and for the sake ofcontinuity I have gone ahead of the general war Thereader will realise that all this clatter and storm was but anaccompaniment to the cool processes by which our wareffort was maintained and our policy and diplomacyconducted Indeed I must record that at the summit theseinjuries failing to be mortal were a positive stimulant toclarity of view faithful comradeship and judicious action Itwould be unwise how-ever to suppose that if the attackhad been ten or twenty times as severe ndash or even perhapstwo or three times as severe ndash the healthy reactions I havedescribed would have followed


4The Wizard War

A Hidden Conflict mdash Lindemannrsquos Services mdashProgress of RadarmdashThe German Beam mdash MrJonesrsquos Tale mdash Principle of the Split Beam orldquoKnickebeinrdquomdash Twisting the BeammdashGoeringrsquosPurblind Obstinacy mdash The X-Apparatus mdashCoventry November 1415 mdashThe Decoy Fires mdashThe Y-Apparatus Forestalled mdash Frustration of theLuftwaffe mdash Triumph of British Science mdash OurFurther PlansmdashThe Rocket Batteries mdash GeneralPilersquos Command and the Air Defences of GreatBritain mdash The Aerial Mine Curtains mdash TheProximity Fuze mdash The Prospect of Counter-AttackmdashThe Expansion of ldquoAir Defence Great Britainrdquo

DURING THE HUMAN STRUGGLE between the British andGerman Air Forces between pilot and pilot between anti-aircraft batteries and aircraft between ruthless bombingand the fortitude of the British people another conflict wasgoing on step by step month by month This was a secretwar whose battles were lost or won unknown to the publicand only with difficulty comprehended even now to thoseoutside the small high scientific circles concerned No suchwarfare had ever been waged by mortal men The terms inwhich it could be recorded or talked about wereunintelligible to ordinary folk Yet if we had not mastered itsprofound meaning and used its mysteries even while wesaw them only in the glimpse all the efforts all the prowess


of the fighting airmen all the bravery and sacrifices of thepeople would have been in vain Unless British sciencehad proved superior to German and unless its strangesinister resources had been effectively brought to bear onthe struggle for survival we might well have been defeatedand being defeated destroyedA wit wrote ten years ago ldquoThe leaders of thought havereached the horizons of human reason but all the wires aredown and they can only communicate with us byunintelligible signalsrdquo Yet upon the discerning of thesesignals and upon the taking of right and timely action on theimpressions received depended our national fate and muchelse I knew nothing about science but I knew something ofscientists and had had much practice as a Minister inhandling things I did not understand I had at any rate anacute military perception of what would help and whatwould hurt of what would cure and of what would kill Myfour yearsrsquo work upon the Air Defence Research Committeehad made me familiar with the outlines of radar problems Itherefore immersed myself so far as my faculties allowed inthis Wizard War and strove to make sure that all thatcounted came without obstruction or neglect at least to thethreshold of action There were no doubt greater scientiststhan Frederick Lindemann though his credentials andgenius command respect But he had two qualifications ofvital consequence to me First as these pages haveshown he was my trusted friend and confidant of twentyyears Together we had watched the advance and onset ofworld disaster Together we had done our best to sound thealarm And now we were in it and I had the power to guideand arm our effort How could I have the knowledgeHere came the second of his qualities Lindemann coulddecipher the signals from the experts on the far horizonsand explain to me in lucid homely terms what the issues


were There are only twenty-four hours in the day of whichat least seven must be spent in sleep and three in eatingand relaxation Anyone in my position would have beenruined if he had attempted to dive into depths which noteven a lifetime of study could plumb What I had to graspwere the practical results and just as Lindemann gave mehis view for all it was worth in this field so I made sure byturning on my power-relay that some at least of theseterrible and incomprehensible truths emerged in executivedecisions

Progress in every branch of radar was constant andunceasing during 1939 but even so the Battle of Britainfrom July to September 1940 was as I have describedfought mainly by eye and ear I comforted myself at first inthese months with the hope that the fogs and mist andcloud which accompany the British winter and shroud theisland with a mantle would at least give a great measure ofprotection against accurate bombing by day and still morein darknessFor some time the German bombers had navigated largelyby radio beacons Scores of these were planted likelighthouses in various parts of the Continent each with itsown call-sign and the Germans using ordinary directionalwireless could fix their position by the angles from whichany two of these transmissions came To counter this wesoon installed a number of stations which we calledldquoMeaconsrdquo These picked up the German signals amplifiedthem and sent them out again from somewhere inEngland The result was that the Germans trying to homeon their beams were often led astray and a number ofhostile aircraft were lost in this manner Certainly one


German bomber landed voluntarily in Devonshire thinking itwas FranceHowever in June I received a painful shock ProfessorLindemann reported to me that he believed the Germanswere preparing a device by means of which they would beable to bomb by day or night whatever the weather It nowappeared that the Germans had developed a radio beamwhich like an invisible searchlight would guide thebombers with considerable precision to their target Thebeacon beckoned to the pilot the beam pointed to thetarget They might not hit a particular factory but they couldcertainly hit a city or town No longer therefore had we onlyto fear the moonlight nights in which at any rate our fighterscould see as well as the enemy but we must even expectthe heaviest attacks to be delivered in cloud and fogLindemann told me also that there was a way of bendingthe beam if we acted at once but that I must see some ofthe scientists particularly the Deputy Director of IntelligenceResearch at the Air Ministry Dr R V Jones a former pupilof his at Oxford Accordingly with anxious mind I convenedon June 21 a special meeting in the Cabinet Room atwhich about fifteen persons were present including SirHenry Tizard and various Air Force Commanders A fewminutes late a youngish man ndash who as I afterwards learnthad thought his sudden summons to the Cabinet Roommust be a practical joke ndash hurried in and took his seat at thebottom of the table According to plan I invited him to openthe discussionFor some months he told us hints had been coming fromall sorts of sources on the Continent that the Germans hadsome novel mode of night-bombing on which they placedgreat hopes In some way it seemed to be linked with thecode-word ldquoKnickebeinrdquo (curtsey) which our Intelligence had


several times mentioned without being able to explain Atfirst it had been thought that the enemy had got agents toplant beacons in our cities on which their bombers couldhome but this idea had proved untenable Some weeksbefore two or three curious squat towers had beenphotographed in odd positions near the coast They did notseem the right shape for any known form of radio or radarNor were they in places which could be explained on anysuch hypothesis Recently a German bomber had beenshot down with apparatus which seemed more elaboratethan was required for night-landing by the Lorenz beamwhich appeared to be the only known use for which it mightbe intended For this and various other reasons which hewove together into a cumulative argument it looked as ifthe Germans might be planning to navigate and bomb onsome sort of system of beams A few days before undercross-examination on these lines a German pilot hadbroken down and admitted that he had heard thatsomething of the sort was in the wind Such was the gist ofMr Jonesrsquos taleFor twenty minutes or more he spoke in quiet tonesunrolling his chain of circumstantial evidence the like ofwhich for its convincing fascination was never surpassed bytales of Sherlock Holmes or Monsieur Lecoq As I listenedthe Ingoldsby Legends jingled in my mind

But now one Mr JonesComes forth and deponesThat fifteen years since he had heard certaingroans

On his way to Stone Henge (to examine the stonesDescribed in a work of the late Sir John Soanersquos)


That hersquod followed the moansAnd led by their tonesFound a Raven a-picking a Drummer-boyrsquos bones

When Mr Jones had finished there was a general air ofincredulity One high authority asked why the Germansshould use a beam assuming that such a thing waspossible when they had at their disposal all the ordinaryfacilities of navigation Above twenty thousand feet thestars were nearly always visible All our own pilots werelaboriously trained in navigation and it was thought theyfound their way about and to their targets very well Othersround the table appeared concerned

I will now explain in the kind of terms which I personally canunderstand how the German beam worked and how wetwisted it Like the searchlight beam the radio beam cannotbe made very sharp it tends to spread but if what is calledthe ldquosplit-beamrdquo method is used considerable accuracy canbe obtained Let us imagine two searchlight beams parallelone to another both flickering in such a way that the left-hand beam comes on exactly when the right-hand beamgoes out and vice versa If an attacking aircraft was exactlyin the centre between the two beams the pilotrsquos coursewould be continuously illuminated but if it got say a littlebit to the right nearer the centre of the right-hand beamthis would become the stronger and the pilot would observethe flickering light which was no guide By keeping in theposition where he avoided the flickerings he would beflying exactly down the middle where the light from bothbeams is equal And this middle path would guide him to


the target Two split beams from two stations could bearranged to cross over any town in the Midlands orSouthern England The German airman had only to flyalong one beam until he detected the second and then todrop his bombs QEDThis was the principle of the split beam and the celebratedldquoKnickebeinrdquo apparatus upon which Goering founded hishopes and the Luftwaffe were taught to believe that thebombing of English cities could be maintained in spite ofcloud fog and darkness and with all the immunity alikefrom guns and intercepting fighters which these gave to theattacker With their logical minds and deliberate large-scaleplanning the German High Air Command staked theirfortunes in this sphere on a device which like the magneticmine they thought would do us in Therefore they did nottrouble to train the ordinary bomber pilots as ours had beentrained in the difficult art of navigation A far simpler andsurer method lending itself to drill and large numbersproducing results wholesale by irresistible science attractedalike their minds and their nature The German pilotsfollowed the beam as the German people followed theFuehrer They had nothing else to followBut duly forewarned and acting on the instant the simpleBritish had the answer By erecting the proper stations ingood time in our own country we could jam the beam Thiswould of course have been almost immediately realised bythe enemy There was another and superior alternative Wecould put a repeating device in such a position that itstrengthened the signal from one half of the split beam andnot from the other Thus the hostile pilot trying to fly so thatthe signals from both halves of the split beam were equalwould be deflected from the true course The cataract ofbombs which would have shattered or at least tormenteda city would fall fifteen or twenty miles away in an open


field Being master and not having to argue too muchonce I was convinced about the principles of this queer anddeadly game I gave all the necessary orders that very dayin June for the existence of the beam to be assumed andfor all counter-measures to receive absolute priority Theslightest reluctance or deviation in carrying out this policywas to be reported to me With so much going on I did nottrouble the Cabinet or even the Chiefs of the Staff If I hadencountered any serious obstruction I should of coursehave appealed and told a long story to these friendlytribunals This however was not necessary as in thislimited and at that time almost occult circle obedience wasforthcoming with alacrity and on the fringes all obstructionscould be swept awayAbout August 23 the first new Knickebein stations nearDieppe and Cherbourg were trained on Birmingham and alarge-scale night offensive began We had of course ourldquoteething troublesrdquo to get through but within a few days theKnickebein beams were deflected or jammed and for thenext two months the critical months of September andOctober the German bombers wandered around Englandbombing by guesswork or else being actually led astrayOne instance happened to come to my notice An officer inmy Defence Office sent his wife and two young children tothe country during the London raids Ten miles away fromany town they were much astonished to see a series ofenormous explosions occurring three fields away Theycounted over a hundred heavy bombs They wonderedwhat the Germans could be aiming at and thanked Godthey were spared The officer mentioned the incident thenext day but so closely was the secret kept so narrow wasthe circle so highly specialised the information that nosatisfactory explanation could be given to him even in his


intimate position The very few who knew exchangedcelestial grinsThe German air crews soon suspected that their beamswere being mauled There is a story that during these twomonths nobody had the courage to tell Goering that hisbeams were twisted or jammed In his ignorance hepledged himself that this was impossible Special lecturesand warnings were delivered to the German Air Forceassuring them that the beam was infallible and that anyonewho cast doubt on it would be at once thrown out Wesuffered as has been described heavily under the Blitzand almost anyone could hit London anyhow Of coursethere would in any case have been much inaccuracy butthe whole German system of bombing was so muchdisturbed by our counter-measures added to the normalpercentage of error that not more than one-fifth of theirbombs fell within the target areas We must regard this asthe equivalent of a considerable victory because even thefifth part of the German bombing which we got was quiteenough for our comfort and occupation

The Germans after internal conflicts at last revised theirmethods It happened fortunately for them that one of theirformations Kampf Gruppe 100 was using a special beamof its own It called its equipment the ldquoX apparatusrdquo a nameof mystery which when we came across it threw up anintriguing challenge to our Intelligence By the middle ofSeptember we had found out enough about it to designcounter-measures but this particular jamming equipmentcould not be produced for a further two months Inconsequence Kampf Gruppe 100 could still bomb withaccuracy The enemy hastily formed a pathfinder group


from it which they used to raise fires in the target area byincendiary bombs and these became the guide for the restof the de-Knickebeined LuftwaffeCoventry on November 1415 was the first target attackedby the new method Although our new jamming had nowstarted a technical error prevented it from becomingeffective for another few months Even so our knowledgeof the beams was helpful From the settings of the hostilebeams and the times at which they played we couldforecast the target and the time route and height of attackOur night-fighters had alas at this date neither thenumbers nor the equipment to make much use of theinformation It was nevertheless invaluable to our fire-fighting and other Civil Defence services These could oftenbe concentrated in the threatened area and specialwarnings given to the population before the attack startedPresently our counter-measures improved and caught upwith the attack Meanwhile decoy fires code-namedldquoStarfishrdquo on a very large scale were lighted by us with theright timing in suitable open places to lead the main attackastray and these sometimes achieved remarkable resultsBy the beginning of 1941 we had mastered the ldquoXapparatusrdquo but the Germans were also thinking hard andabout this time they brought in a new aid called the ldquoYapparatusrdquo Whereas the two earlier systems had both usedcross-beams over the target the new system used only onebeam together with a special method of range-finding byradio by which the aircraft could be told how far it wasalong the beam When it reached the correct distance itdropped its bombs By good fortune and the genius anddevotion of all concerned we had divined the exact methodof working the ldquoY apparatusrdquo some months before theGermans were able to use it in operations and by the timethey were ready to make it their pathfinder we had the


power to render it useless On the very first night when theGermans committed themselves to the ldquoY apparatusrdquo ournew counter-measures came into action against them Thesuccess of our efforts was manifest from the acrimoniousremarks heard passing between the pathfinding aircraft andtheir controlling ground stations by our listeninginstruments The faith of the enemy air crews in their newdevice was thus shattered at the outset and after manyfailures the method was abandoned The bombing ofDublin on the night of May 3031 1941 may well havebeen an unforeseen and unintended result of ourinterference with ldquoYrdquoGeneral Martini the German chief in this sphere has sincethe war admitted that he had not realised soon enough thatthe ldquohigh-frequency warrdquo had begun and that he underratedthe British Intelligence and counter-measures organisationOur exploitation of the strategic errors which he made in theBattle of the Beams diverted enormous numbers of bombsfrom our cities during a period when all other means ofdefence either had failed or were still in their childhoodThese were however rapidly improving under the pressureof potentially mortal attack Since the beginning of the warwe had brought into active production a form of air-borneradar called ldquoAIrdquo on which the Air Defence ResearchCommittee had fruitfully laboured from 1938 onward andwith which it was hoped to detect and close on enemybombers This apparatus was too large and toocomplicated for a pilot to operate himself It was thereforeinstalled in two-seater Blenheims and later in Beaufightersin which the observer operated the radar and directed hispilot until the enemy aircraft became visible and could befired on ndash usually at night about a hundred yards away Ihad called this device in its early days ldquothe Smellerrdquo andlonged for its arrival in action This was inevitably a slow


process However it began A widespread method ofground-control interception grew up and came into use TheBritish pilots with their terrible eight-gun batteries in whichcannon-guns were soon to play their part began to close ndashno longer by chance but by system ndash upon the almostdefenceless German bombersThe enemyrsquos use of the beams now became a positiveadvantage to us They gave clear warning of the time anddirection of the attacks and enabled the night-fightersquadrons in the areas affected and all their apparatus tocome into action at full force and in good time and all theanti-aircraft batteries concerned to be fully manned anddirected by their own intricate science of which more laterDuring March and April the steadily rising rate of loss ofGerman bombers had become a cause of serious concernto the German war chiefs The ldquoerasingrdquo of British cities hadnot been found so easy as Hitler had imagined It was withrelief that the German Air Force received their orders inMay to break off the night attacks on Great Britain and toprepare for action in another theatreThus the three main attempts to conquer Britain after thefall of France were successively defeated or prevented Thefirst was the decisive defeat of the German Air Force in theBattle of Britain during July August and SeptemberInstead of destroying the British Air Force and the stationsand air factories on which it relied for its life and future theenemy themselves in spite of their preponderance innumbers sustained losses which they could not bear Oursecond victory followed from our first The German failure togain command of the air prevented the cross-Channelinvasion The prowess of our fighter pilots and theexcellence of the organisation which sustained them had infact rendered the same service ndash under conditionsindescribably different ndash as Drake and his brave little ships


and hardy mariners had done three hundred and fifty yearsbefore when after the Spanish Armada was broken anddispersed the Duke of Parmarsquos powerful army waitedhelplessly in the Low Countries for the means of crossingthe Narrow SeasThe third ordeal was the indiscriminate night-bombing ofour cities in mass attacks This was overcome and brokenby the continued devotion and skill of our fighter pilots andby the fortitude and endurance of the mass of the peopleand notably the Londoners who together with the civilorganisations which upheld them bore the brunt But thesenoble efforts in the high air and in the flaming streets wouldhave been in vain if British science and British brains hadnot played the ever-memorable and decisive part which thischapter records

There is a useful German saying ldquoThe trees do not grow upto the skyrdquo Nevertheless we had every reason to expectthat the air attack on Britain would continue in an indefinitecrescendo Until Hitler actually invaded Russia we had noright to suppose it would die away and stop We thereforestrove with might and main to improve the measures anddevices by which we had hitherto survived and to find newones The highest priority was assigned to all forms of radarstudy and application Scientists and technicians wereengaged and organised on a very large scale Labour andmaterial were made available to the fullest extent Othermethods of striking down the hostile bomber were soughttirelessly and for many months to come these efforts werespurred by repeated costly and bloody raids upon ourports and cities I will mention three developmentsconstantly referred to in the Appendices to this Volume in


which at Lindemannrsquos prompting and in the light of whatwe had studied together on the Air Defence ResearchCommittee of pre-war years I took special interest andused my authority These were first the massed dischargeof rockets as a reinforcement of our anti-aircraft batteriessecondly the laying of aerial mine curtains in the path of araiding force by means of bombs with long wiresdescending by parachutes thirdly the search for fuzes sosensitive that they did not need to hit their target but wouldbe set off by merely passing near an aircraft Of these threemethods on which we toiled with large expenditure of ourresources some brief account must now be givenNone of these methods could come to fruition in 1940 Atleast a year stood between us and practical relief By thetime we were ready to go into action with our newapparatus and methods the enemy attack they weredesigned to meet came suddenly to an end and for nearlythree years we enjoyed almost complete immunity from itCritics have therefore been disposed to underrate the valueof these efforts which could only be proved by major trialand in any case in no way obstructed other developmentsin the same sphere

By itself beam-distortion was not enough Once having hitthe correct target it was easy for the German bombersunless they were confused by our ldquoStarfishrdquo decoy fires toreturn again to the glow of the fires they had lit the nightbefore Somehow they must be clawed down For this wedeveloped two new devices rockets and aerial mines Byfitting our antiaircraft batteries with radar it was possible topredict the position of an enemy aircraft accurately enoughprovided it continued to fly in a straight line at the same


speed but this is hardly what experienced pilots do Ofcourse they zigzagged or ldquoweavedrdquo and this meant that inthe twenty or thirty seconds between firing the gun and theexplosion of the shell they might well be half a mile or sofrom the predicted pointA wide yet intense burst of fire round the predicted pointwas an answer Combinations of a hundred guns wouldhave been excellent if the guns could have been producedand the batteries manned and all put in the right place atthe right time This was beyond human power to achieveBut a very simple cheap alternative was available in therocket or as it had been called for secrecy the UnrotatedProjectile (UP) Even before the war Dr Crow in the daysof the Air Defence Research Committee had developedtwo-inch and three-inch rockets which could reach almostas high as our anti-aircraft guns The three-inch rocketcarried a much more powerful warhead than a three-inchshell It was not so accurate On the other hand rocketprojectors had the inestimable advantage that they could bemade very quickly and easily in enormous numbers withoutburdening our hard-driven gun factories Thousands ofthese UP projectors were made and some millions ofrounds of ammunition General Sir Frederick Pile an officerof great distinction who was in command of our anti-aircraftground defences throughout the war and who wassingularly free from the distaste for novel devices so oftenfound in professional soldiers welcomed this accession tohis strength He formed these weapons into huge batteriesof ninety-six projectors each manned largely by the HomeGuard which could produce a concentrated volume of firefar beyond the power of anti-aircraft artilleryI worked in increasing intimacy throughout the war withGeneral Pile and always found him ingenious andserviceable in the highest degree He was at his best not


only in these days of expansion when his command rose toa peak of over three hundred thousand men and womenand twenty-four hundred guns apart from the rockets butalso in the period which followed after the air attack onBritain had been beaten off Here was a time when his taskwas to liberate the largest possible numbers of men fromstatic defence by batteries and without diminishing thepotential fire-power to substitute the largest proportion ofwomen and Home Guard for regulars and technicians Butthis is a story which must be told in its proper placeThe task of General Pilersquos command was not merely helpedby the work of our scientists as the battle developed theiraid was the foundation on which all stood In the daylightattacks of the Battle of Britain the guns had accounted fortwo hundred and ninety-six enemy aircraft and probablydestroyed or damaged seventy-four more But the nightraids gave them new problems which with their existingequipment of only searchlights and sound locators couldnot be surmounted In four months from October 1 onlyabout seventy aircraft were destroyed Radar came to therescue The first of these sets for directing gunfire was usedin October and Mr Bevin and I spent most of the nightwatching them The searchlight beams were not fitted tillDecember However much training and experience wereneeded in their use and many modifications andrefinements in the sets themselves were found necessaryGreat efforts were made in all this wide field and the springof 1941 brought a full rewardDuring the attacks on London in the first two weeks of Mayndash the last of the German offensive ndash over seventy aircraftwere destroyed or more than the four winter months hadyielded Of course in the meanwhile the number of gunshad grown In December there had been 1450 heavy gunsand 650 light in May there were 1687 heavy guns 790


light with about 40 rocket batteries1 But the great increasein the effectiveness of our gun defences was due in itsorigin to the new inventions and technical improvementswhich the scientists put into the soldiersrsquo hands and ofwhich the soldiers made such good use

By the middle of 1941 when at last the rocket batteriesbegan to come into service in substantial numbers airattack had much diminished so that they had few chancesof proving themselves But when they did come into actionthe number of rounds needed to bring down an aircraft waslittle more than that required by the enormously more costlyand scanty anti-aircraft guns of which we were so shortThe rockets were good in themselves and also an additionto our other means of defenceShells or rockets alike are of course only effective if theyreach the right spot and explode at the right momentEfforts were therefore made to produce aerial minessuspended on long wires floating down on parachuteswhich could be laid in the path of the enemy air squadronsIt was impossible to pack these into shells But a rocketwith much thinner walls has more room A certain amountof three-inch rocket ammunition which could lay an aerialminefield on wires seven hundred feet long at heights up totwenty thousand feet was made and held ready for useagainst mass attacks on London The advantage of suchminefields over shell-fire is of course that they remainlethal for anything up to a minute For wherever the winghits the wire it pulls up the mine until it reaches the aircraftand explodes There is thus no need for exact fuze-settingas with ordinary shells


Aerial mines could of course be placed in position byrockets laid by aircraft or simply raised on small balloonsThe last method was ardently supported by the AdmiraltyIn fact however the rockets were never brought into actionon any considerable scale By the time they weremanufactured in large numbers mass attacks by bombershad ceased Nevertheless it was surprising and fortunatethat the Germans did not develop this counter to our mass-bombing raids in the last three years of the war Even a fewminelaying aircraft would have been able to lay andmaintain a minefield over any German city which wouldhave taken a toll of our bombers the more deadly asnumbers grew

There was another important aspect In 1940 the dive-bomber seemed to be a deadly threat to our ships and key-factories One might think that aircraft diving on a shipwould be easy to shoot down as the gunner can aimstraight at them without making allowance for their motionBut an aeroplane end on is a very small target and acontact fuze will work only in the rare event of a direct hitTo set a time fuze so that the shell explodes at the exactmoment when it is passing the aircraft is almost impossibleAn error in timing of one-tenth of a second causes a miss ofmany hundreds of feet It therefore seemed worth while totry to make a fuze which would detonate automaticallywhen the projectile passed near to the target whether itactually hit it or notAs there is little space in the head of a shell the roomierhead of the three-inch rocket was attractive While I wasstill at the Admiralty in 1940 we pressed this idea Photo-electric (PE) cells were used which produced an electrical


impulse whenever there was a change of light such as theshade of the enemy plane By February 1940 we had amodel which I took to the Cabinet and showed mycolleagues after one of our meetings When a matchboxwas thrown past the fuze it winked perceptibly with itsdemonstration lamp The cluster of Ministers who gatheredround including the Prime Minister were powerfullyimpressed But there is a long road between a grimacingmodel and an armed mass-production robot We workedhard at the production of the so-called PE fuzes but hereagain by the time they were ready in any quantity ourdanger and their hour had for the moment passedAttempts were made in 1941 to design a similar proximityfuze using a tiny radar set arranged to explode thewarhead when the projectile passed near the aircraftSuccessful preliminary experiments were made but beforethis fuze was developed in England the Americans towhom we imparted our knowledge actually succeeded notonly in perfecting the instrument but in reducing its size somuch that the whole thing could be put into the head notmerely of a rocket but of a shell These so-called ldquoProximityFuzesrdquo made in the United States were used in greatnumbers in the last year of the war and proved potentagainst the small unmanned aircraft (V-1) with which wewere assailed in 1944 and also in the Pacific againstJapanese aircraft

The final phase of ldquoThe Wizard Warrdquo was of course theradar developments and inventions required for our counter-attack upon Germany These suggested themselves tosome extent from our own experiences and defensiveefforts The part they played will be described in future


volumes In September 1940 we had nearly nine longmonths ahead of us of heavy battering and suffering beforethe tide was to turn It may be claimed that while strugglingnot without success against the perils of the hour we bentour thoughts steadily upon the future when better timesmight come

AIR DEFENCE GREAT BRITAIN


5The United States Destroyers and

West Indian Bases

My Appeal for Fifty American Destroyers mdash LordLothianrsquos Helpfulness mdash My Telegram toPresident Roosevelt of July 31 mdash Our Offer toLease Bases in the West Indies mdash My Objectionsto Bargaining About the Fleet mdash Further Telegramto the President of August 15 mdashThe PresidentrsquosStatement mdash My Speech in Parliament of August20 mdashTelegram to the President of August 22 mdashAnd of August 25 mdashAnd of August 27 mdashOur FinalOffer mdash My Assurance About the Fleet of August31 mdashStatement to Parliament of September 5

ON MAY 15 as already narrated I had in my first telegramto President Roosevelt after becoming Prime Ministerasked for ldquothe loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers tobridge the gap between what we have now and the largenew construction we put in hand at the beginning of thewar This time next year we shall have plenty but if in theinterval Italy comes in against us with another hundredsubmarines we may be strained to breaking-pointrdquo Irecurred to this in my cable of June 11 after Italy hadalready declared war upon us ldquoNothing is so important asfor us to have the thirty or forty old destroyers you havealready had reconditioned We can fit them very rapidly withour Asdicshellip The next six months are vitalrdquo At the end ofJuly when we were alone and already engaged in thefateful air battle with the prospect of imminent invasion


behind it I renewed my request I was well aware of thePresidentrsquos good will and of his difficulties For thatreason I had endeavoured to put before him in the bluntterms of various messages the perilous position which theUnited States would occupy if British resistance collapsedand Hitler became master of Europe with all its dockyardsand navies less what we had been able to destroy ordisable

It was evident as this discussion proceeded that thetelegrams I had sent in June dwelling on the graveconsequences to the United States which might follow fromthe successful invasion and subjugation of the BritishIslands played a considerable part in high American circlesAssurances were requested from Washington that theBritish Fleet would in no circumstances be handed over tothe Germans We were very ready to give theseassurances in the most solemn form As we were ready todie they cost nothing I did not however wish at this timeon what might be the eve of invasion and at the height ofthe air battle to encourage the Germans with the idea thatsuch contingencies had ever entered our minds Moreoverby the end of August our position was vastly improved Thewhole Regular Army was re-formed and to a considerableextent rearmed The Home Guard had come into active lifeWe were inflicting heavy losses on the German Air Forceand were far more than holding our own Every argumentabout invasion that had given me confidence in June andJuly was doubled before September


We had at this time in Washington a singularly gifted andinfluential Ambassador I had known Philip Kerr who hadnow succeeded as Marquess of Lothian from the old daysof Lloyd George in 1919 and before and we had differedmuch and often from Versailles to Munich and later As thetension of events mounted not only did Lothian develop abroad comprehension of the scene but his eye penetrateddeeply He had pondered on the grave implications of themessages I had sent to the President during the collapse ofFrance about the possible fate of the British Fleet if Englandwere invaded and conquered In this he moved with theruling minds in Washington who were deeply perturbednot only by sympathy for Britain and her cause but naturallyeven more by anxiety for the life and safety of the UnitedStatesLothian was worried by the last words of my speech in theHouse of Commons on June 4 when I had said ldquoWe shallnever surrender and even if which I do not for a momentbelieve this island or a large part of it were subjugated andstarving then our Empire beyond the seas armed andguarded by the British Fleet will carry on the struggle untilin Godrsquos good time the New World with all its power andmight steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of theOldrdquo He thought these words had given encouragement ldquotothose who believed that even though Great Britain wentunder the Fleet would somehow cross the Atlantic tothemrdquo The reader is aware of the different language I hadbeen using behind the scenes I had explained my positionat the time to the Foreign Secretary and to the Ambassador

Prime Minister to LordLothian

9VI40


My last words in speech were of course addressedprimarily to Germany and Italy to whom the idea of awar of continents and a long war are at presentobnoxious also to [the] Dominions for whom we aretrustees I have nevertheless always had in mind yourpoint and have raised it in various telegrams toPresident as well as to Mackenzie King If Great Britainbroke under invasion a pro-German Government mightobtain far easier terms from Germany by surrenderingthe Fleet thus making Germany and Japan masters ofthe New World This dastard deed would not be doneby His Majestyrsquos present advisers but if some QuislingGovernment were set up it is exactly what they woulddo and perhaps the only thing they could do and thePresident should bear this very clearly in mind Youshould talk to him in this sense and thus discourageany complacent assumption on United Statesrsquo part thatthey will pick up the debris of the British Empire by theirpresent policy On the contrary they run the terrible riskthat their sea-power will be completely overmatchedMoreover islands and naval bases to hold the UnitedStates in awe would certainly be claimed by the NazisIf we go down Hitler has a very good chance ofconquering the world

I hope the foregoing will be a help to you in yourconversations

Nearly a month passed before any result emerged Thencame an encouraging telegram from the Ambassador Hesaid (July 56) that informed American opinion was at lastbeginning to realise that they were in danger of losing theBritish Fleet altogether if the war went against us and if theyremained neutral It would however be extremely difficultto get American public opinion to consider letting us haveAmerican destroyers unless it could be assured that in theevent of the United States entering the war the British Fleetor such of it as was afloat would cross the Atlantic if GreatBritain were overrun


At the end of July under the increasing pressure from somany angles at once I took the matter up again

Former Naval Personto PresidentRoosevelt

31VII40

It is some time since I ventured to cable personallyto you and many things both good and bad havehappened in between It has now become most urgentfor you to let us have the destroyers motor-boats andflying-boats for which we have asked The Germanshave the whole French coastline from which to launchU-boats and dive-bomber attacks upon our trade andfood and in addition we must be constantly prepared torepel by sea-action threatened invasion in the NarrowWaters and also to deal with break-outs from Norwaytowards Ireland Iceland Shetlands and FaroesBesides this we have to keep control of the exits fromthe Mediterranean and if possible the command of thatinland sea itself and thus to prevent the war spreadingseriously into Africa

We have a large construction of destroyers and anti-U-boat craft coming forward but the next three or fourmonths open the gap of which I have previously toldyou Latterly the air attack on our shipping has becomeinjurious In the last ten days we have had the followingdestroyers sunk Brazen Codrington Delight Wrenand the following damaged Beagle Boreas BrilliantGriffin Montrose Walpole Whitshed total eleven Allthis in the advent of any attempt which may be made atinvasion Destroyers are frightfully vulnerable to air-bombing and yet they must be held in the air-bombingarea to prevent sea-borne invasion We could notsustain the present rate of casualties for long and if wecannot get a substantial reinforcement the whole fate ofthe war may be decided by this minor and easilyremediable factor


This is a frank account of our present situation and Iam confident now that you know exactly how we standthat you will leave nothing undone to ensure that fifty orsixty of your oldest destroyers are sent to me at once Ican fit them very quickly with Asdics and use themagainst U-boats on the western approaches and sokeep the more modern and better-gunned craft for theNarrow Seas against invasion Mr President with greatrespect I must tell you that in the long history of theworld this is a thing to do now Large construction iscoming to me in 1941 but the crisis will be reachedlong before 1941 I know you will do all in your powerbut I feel entitled and bound to put the gravity andurgency of the position before you

If the destroyers were given the motor-boats andflying-boats which would be invaluable could surelycome in behind them

I am beginning to feel very hopeful about this war ifwe can get round the next three or four months The airis holding well We are hitting that man hard both inrepelling attacks and in bombing Germany But the lossof destroyers by air attack may well be so serious as tobreak down our defence of the food and trade routesacross the Atlantic

Tonight the latest convoys of rifles cannon andammunition are coming in Special trains are waiting totake them to the troops and Home Guard who will takea lot of killing before they give them up I am sure thatwith your comprehension of the sea affair you will notlet this crux of the battle go wrong for want of thesedestroyers

Three days later I telegraphed to our Ambassador

3VIII40[The] second alternative ie [granting of] bases [in

British possessions] is agreeable but we prefer that itshould be on lease indefinitely and not sale It isunderstood that this will enable us to secure destroyersand flying-boats at once You should let Colonel Knoxand others know that a request on these lines will be


agreeable to ushellip It is as you say vital to settlequickly Now is the time when we want the destroyersWe can fit them with Asdics in about ten days from thetime they are in our hands all preparations having beenmade We should also be prepared to give a number ofAsdics sets to the United States Navy and assist intheir installation and explain their working Go ahead onthese lines full steam

Profound and anxious consultations had taken place atWashington and in the first week of August the suggestionwas made to us through Lord Lothian that the fifty old butreconditioned American destroyers which lay in the eastcoast Navy yards might be traded off to us in exchange fora series of bases in the West Indian islands and alsoBermuda There was of course no comparison betweenthe intrinsic value of these antiquated and inefficient craftand the immense permanent strategic security afforded tothe United States by the enjoyment of the island bases Butthe threatened invasion the importance of numbers in theNarrow Seas made our need clamant Moreover thestrategic value of these islands counted only against theUnited States They were in the old days the stepping-stone by which America could be attacked from Europe orfrom England Now with air power it was all the moreimportant for American safety that they should be in friendlyhands or in their own But the friendly hands might fail inthe convulsive battle now beginning for the life of BritainBelieving as I have always done that the survival of Britainis bound up with the survival of the United States itseemed to me and to my colleagues that it was an actualadvantage to have these bases in American hands 1therefore did not look upon the question from any narrowBritish point of viewThere was another reason wider and more powerful thaneither our need for the destroyers or the American need for


the bases The transfer to Great Britain of fifty Americanwarships was a decidedly unneutral act by the UnitedStates It would according to all the standards of historyhave justified the German Government in declaring warupon them The President judged that there was no dangerand I felt there was no hope of this simple solution of manydifficulties It was Hitlerrsquos interest and method to strike hisopponents down one by one The last thing he wished wasto be drawn into war with the United States before he hadfinished with Britain Nevertheless the transfer of destroyersto Britain in August 1940 was an event which brought theUnited States definitely nearer to us and to the war and itwas the first of a long succession of increasingly unneutralacts in the Atlantic which were of the utmost service to us Itmarked the passage of the United States from being neutralto being non-belligerent Although Hitler could not afford toresent it all the world as will be seen understood thesignificance of the gestureFor all these reasons the War Cabinet and Parliamentapproved the policy of leasing the bases to obtain thedestroyers provided we could persuade the West Indianisland Governments concerned to make what was to thema serious sacrifice and disturbance of their life for the sakeof the Empire On August 6 Lothian cabled that thePresident was anxious for an immediate reply about thefuture of the Fleet He wished to be assured that if Britainwere overrun the Fleet would continue to fight for theEmpire overseas and would not either be surrendered orsunk This was it was said the argument which wouldhave the most effect on Congress in the question ofdestroyers The prospects of legislative action he thoughtwere steadily improvingI expressed my own feelings to the Foreign Secretary


7VIII40The position is I think quite clear We have no

intention of surrendering the British Fleet or of sinkingit voluntarily Indeed such a fate is more likely toovertake the German Fleet ndash or what is left of it Thenation would not tolerate any discussion of what weshould do if our island were overrun Such a discus-sion perhaps on the eve of an invasion would beinjurious to public morale now so high Moreover wemust never get into a position where the United StatesGovernment might say ldquoWe think the time has come foryou to send your Fleet across the Atlantic in accor-dance with our understanding or agreement when wegave you the destroyersrdquo

We must refuse any declaration such as issuggested and confine the deal solely to the colonialleases

I now cabled to Lothian7VIII40

We need the fifty or sixty destroyers very much andhope we shall obtain them In no other way could theUnited States assist us so effectively in the next threeor four months We were as you know very ready tooffer the United States indefinite lease facilities fornaval and air bases in West Indian islands and to dothis freely on grounds of inevitable common associationof naval and military interests of Great Britain and theUnited States It was therefore most agreeable to usthat Colonel Knox should be inclined to suggest actionon these or similar lines as an accompaniment to theimmediate sending of the said destroyers But all thishas nothing to do with any bargaining or declarationabout the future disposition of the British Fleet It wouldobviously be impossible for us to make or agree to anydeclaration being made on such a subject I haverepeatedly warned you in my secret telegrams andthose to the President of the dangers United Stateswould run if Great Britain were successfully invaded


and a British Quisling Government came into office tomake the best terms possible for the survivinginhabitants I am very glad to find that these dangersare regarded as serious and you should in no wiseminimise them We have no intention of relieving UnitedStates from any well-grounded anxieties on this pointMoreover our position is not such as to bring thecollapse of Britain into the arena of practical discussionI have already several weeks ago told you that there isno warrant for discussing any question of thetransference of the Fleet to American or Canadianshores I should refuse to allow the subject even to bementioned in any Staff conversations still less that anytechnical preparations should be made or evenplanned Above all it is essential you should realisethat no such declaration could ever be assented to byus for the purpose of obtaining destroyers or anythinglike that Pray make it clear at once that we could neveragree to the slightest compromising of our full liberty ofaction nor tolerate any such defeatist announcementthe effect of which would be disastrous

Although in my speech of June 4 I thought it well toopen up to German eyes the prospects of indefiniteoceanic war this was a suggestion in the making ofwhich we could admit no neutral partner Of course ifthe United States entered the war and became an allywe should conduct the war with them in common andmake of our own initiative and in agreement with themwhatever were the best dispositions at any period in thestruggle for the final effectual defeat of the enemy Youforesaw this yourself in your first conversation with thePresident when you said you were quite sure that weshould never send any part of our Fleet across theAtlantic except in the case of an actual war alliance

To the President I telegraphed

15VIII40I need not tell you how cheered I am by your

message or how grateful I feel for your untiring effortsto give us all possible help You will I am sure send useverything you can for you know well that the worth of


every destroyer that you can spare to us is measured inrubies But we also need the motor torpedo-boatswhich you mentioned and as many flying-boats andrifles as you can let us have We have a million menwaiting for rifles

The moral value of this fresh aid from yourGovernment and people at this critical time will be verygreat and widely felt

We can meet both the points you considernecessary to help you with Congress and with othersconcerned but I am sure that you will not misunder-stand me if I say that our willingness to do so must beconditional on our being assured that there will be nodelay in letting us have the ships and flying-boats Asregards an assurance about the British Fleet I am ofcourse ready to reiterate to you what I told Parliamenton June 4 We intend to fight this out here to the endand none of us would ever buy peace by surrenderingor scuttling the Fleet But in any use you may make ofthis repeated assurance you will please bear in mindthe disastrous effect from our point of view andperhaps also from yours of allowing any impression togrow that we regard the conquest of the British Islandsand its naval bases as any other than an impossiblecontingency The spirit of our people is splendid Neverhave they been so determined Their confidence in theissue has been enormously and legitimately strength-ened by the severe air fighting in the past week Asregards naval and air bases I readily agree to yourproposals for ninety-nine-year leases which are fareasier for us than the method of purchase I have nodoubt that once the principle is agreed between us thedetails can be adjusted and we can discuss them atleisure It will be necessary for us to consult theGovernments of Newfoundland and Canada about theNewfoundland base in which Canada has an interestWe are at once proceeding to seek their consent

Once again Mr President let me thank you for yourhelp and encouragement which mean so much to us


Lothian thought this reply admirable and said there was areal chance now that the President would be able to get thefifty destroyers without legislation This was still uncertainbut he thought we should send some British destroyercrews to Halifax and Bermuda without any delay It wouldcreate the worst impression in America if destroyers weremade available and no British crews were ready totransport them across the Atlantic Moreover the fact thatour crews were already waiting on the spot would help toimpress the urgency of the case on CongressAt his press conference on August 16 the President madethe following statement

lsquoThe United States Government is holding conversa-tions with the Government of the British Empire withregard to acquisition of naval and air bases for thedefence of the Western Hemisphere and especially thePanama Canal The United States Government iscarrying on conversations with the Canadian Govern-ment on the defence of the Western hemisphere

According to the newspapers the President stated that theUnited States would give Great Britain something in returnbut that he did not know what this would be Heemphasised more than once that the negotiations for the airbases were in no way connected with the question ofdestroyers Destroyers were he said not involved in theprospective arrangements

The President having always to consider Congress andalso the Navy authorities in the United States was ofcourse increasingly drawn to present the transaction to hisfellow-countrymen as a highly advantageous bargainwhereby immense securities were gained in these


dangerous times by the United States in return for a fewflotillas of obsolete destroyers This was indeed true butnot exactly a convenient statement for me Deep feelingswere aroused in Parliament and the Government at theidea of leasing any part of these historic territories and ifthe issue were presented to the British as a naked trading-away of British possessions for the sake of the fiftydestroyers it would certainly encounter vehementopposition I sought therefore to place the transaction onthe highest level where indeed it had a right to standbecause it expressed and conserved the enduring commoninterests of the English-speaking worldWith the consent of the President I presented the questionto Parliament on August 20 in words which have notperhaps lost their meaning with time

Presently we learned that anxiety was also felt in theUnited States about the air and naval defence of theirAtlantic seaboard and President Roosevelt hasrecently made it clear that he would like to discuss withus and with the Dominion of Canada and withNewfoundland the development of American naval andair facilities in Newfoundland and in the West IndiesThere is of course no question of any transference ofsovereignty ndash that has never been suggested ndash or ofany action being taken without the consent or againstthe wishes of the various Colonies concerned but forour part His Majestyrsquos Government are entirely willing toaccord defence facilities to the United States on aninety-nine yearsrsquo leasehold basis and we feel surethat our interests no less than theirs and the interestsof the Colonies themselves and of Canada andNewfoundland will be served thereby These areimportant steps Undoubtedly this process means thatthese two great organisations of the English-speakingdemocracies the British Empire and the United Stateswill have to be somewhat mixed up together in some oftheir affairs for mutual and general advantage For myown part looking out upon the future I do not view the


process with any misgivings I could not stop it if Iwished no one can stop it Like the Mississippi it justkeeps rolling along Let it roll Let it roll on ndash full Hoodinexorable irresistible benignant to broader lands andbetter days

Former Naval Personto President

22VIII40

I am most grateful for all you are doing on ourbehalf I had not contemplated anything in the nature ofa contract bargain or sale between us It is the factthat we had decided in Cabinet to offer you naval andair facilities off the Atlantic Coast quite independently ofdestroyers or any other aid Our view is that we are twofriends in danger helping each other as far as we canWe should therefore like to give you the facilitiesmentioned without stipulating for any return and even iftomorrow you found it too difficult to transfer thedestroyers etc our offer still remains open becausewe think it is in the general good

2 I see difficulties and even risks in the exchangeof letters now suggested or in admitting in any way thatthe munitions which you send us are a payment for thefacilities Once this idea is accepted people willcontrast on each side what is given and received Themoney value of the armaments would be computed andset against the facilities and some would think onething about it and some another

3 Moreover Mr President as you well know eachisland or location is a case by itself If for instancethere were only one harbour or site how is it to bedivided and its advantages shared In such a case weshould like to make you an offer of what we think isbest for both rather than to embark upon a close-cutargument as to what ought to be delivered in return forvalue received

4 What we want is that you shall feel safe on yourAtlantic seaboard so far as any facilities in possessionsof ours can make you safe and naturally if you put in


money and make large developments you must havethe effective security of a long lease Therefore I wouldrather rest at this moment upon the general declarationmade by me in the House of Commons yesterday bothon this point and as regards the future of the FleetThen if you will set out in greater detail what you wantwe will at once tell you what we can do and thereafterthe necessary arrangements technical and legal canbe worked out by our experts Meanwhile we are quitecontent to trust entirely to your judgment and thesentiments of the people of the United States about anyaid in munitions etc you feel able to give us But thiswould be entirely a separate spontaneous act on thepart of the United States arising out of their view of theworld struggle and how their own interests stand inrelation to it and the causes it involves

5 Although the air attack has slackened in the lastfew days and our strength is growing in many ways Ido not think that bad man has yet struck his full blowWe are having considerable losses in merchant shipson the northwestern approaches now our only channelof regular communication with the oceans and yourfifty destroyers if they came along at once would be aprecious help

Lothian now cabled that Mr Sumner Welles had told himthat the constitutional position made it ldquoutterly impossiblerdquofor the President to send the destroyers as a spontaneousgift they could come only as a quid pro quo Under theexisting legislation neither the Chief of the Staff nor theGeneral Board of the Navy were able to give the certificatethat the ships were not essential to national defencewithout which the transfer could not be legally made exceptin return for a definite consideration which they would certifyadded to the security of the United States The Presidenthad tried to find another way out but there was none



25VIII40

I fully understand the legal and constitutionaldifficulties which make you wish for a formal contractembodied in letters but I venture to put before you thedifficulties and even dangers which I foresee in thisprocedure For the sake of the precise list of instrumen-talities mentioned which in our sore need we greatlydesire we are asked to pay undefined concessions inall the islands and places mentioned from Newfound-land to British Guiana ldquoas may be required in thejudgment of the United Statesrdquo Suppose we could notagree to all your experts asked for should we not beexposed to a charge of breaking our contract for whichwe had already received value Your commitment isdefinite ours unlimited Much though we need thedestroyers we should not wish to have them at the riskof a misunderstanding with the United States orindeed any serious argument If the matter is to berepresented as a contract both sides must be definedwith far more precision on our side than has hithertobeen possible But this might easily take some time

As I have several times pointed out we need thedestroyers chiefly to bridge the gap between now andthe arrival of our new construction which I set on footon the outbreak of war This construction is veryconsiderable For instance we shall receive by the endof February new destroyers and new mediumdestroyers 20 corvettes which are a handy type ofsubmarine-hunter adapted to ocean work 60 motortorpedo-boats 37 motor anti-submarine boats 25Fairmiles a wooden anti-submarine patrol boat 104seventy-two-foot launches 29 An even greater inflowwill arrive in the following six months It is just in thegap from September to February inclusive while thisnew crop is coming in and working up that your fiftydestroyers would be invaluable With them we couldminimise shipping losses in the northwesternapproaches and also take a stronger line againstMussolini in the Mediterranean Therefore time is all-


important We should not however be justified in thecircumstances if we gave a blank cheque on the wholeof our transatlantic possessions merely to bridge thisgap through which anyhow we hope to make ourway though with added risk and suffering This I amsure you will see sets forth our difficulties plainly

2 Would not the following procedure be acceptableI would offer at once certain fairly well-defined facilitieswhich will show you the kind of gift we have in mindand your experts could then discuss these or anyvariants of them with ours ndash we remaining the finaljudge of what we can give All this we will do freelytrusting entirely to the generosity and good will of theAmerican people as to whether they on their part wouldlike to do something for us But anyhow it is the settledpolicy of His Majestyrsquos Government to offer you andmake available to you when desired solid and effectivemeans of protecting your Atlantic seaboard I havealready asked the Admiralty and the Air Ministry to drawup in outline what we are prepared to offer leavingyour experts to suggest alternatives I propose to sendyou this outline in two or three days and to publish it indue course In this way there can be no possibledispute and the American people will feel more warmlytowards us because they will see we are playing thegame by the worldrsquos cause and that their safety andinterests are dear to us

3 If your law or your Admiral requires that any helpyou may choose to give us must be presented as aquid pro quo I do not see why the British Governmenthave to come into that at all Could you not say that youdid not feel able to accept this fine offer which wemake unless the United States matched it in someway and that therefore the Admiral would be able tolink the one with the other

4 I am so grateful to you for all the trouble you havebeen taking and I am sorry to add to your burdensknowing what a good friend you have been to us


27VIII40


Lord Lothian has cabled me the outline of thefacilities you have in mind Our naval and air expertsstudying the question from your point of view hadreached practically the same conclusions except thatin addition they thought Antigua might be useful as abase for flying-boats To this also you would be verywelcome Our settled policy is to make the UnitedStates safe on their Atlantic seaboard ldquobeyond aperadventurerdquo to quote a phrase you may remember1

2 We are quite ready to make you a positive offeron these lines forthwith There would of course haveto be an immediate conference on details but for thereasons which I set out in my last telegram we do notlike the idea of an arbiter should any difference arisebecause we feel that as donors we must remain thefinal judges of what the gift is to consist of within thegeneral framework of the facilities which will have beenpromised and always on the understanding that weshall do our best to meet United States wishes

3 The two letters dratted by Lord Lothian to theSecretary of State are quite agreeable to us The onlyreason why I do not wish the second letter to bepublished is that I think it is much more likely that theGerman Government will be the one to surrender orscuttle its fleet or what is left of it In this as you areaware they have already had some practice You willremember that I said some months ago in one of myprivate cables to you that any such action on our partwould be a dastard act and that is the opinion of everyone of us

4 If you felt able after our offer had been made to letus have the ldquoinstrumentalitiesrdquo2 which have beenmentioned or anything else you think proper this couldbe expressed as an act not in payment or considerationfor but in recognition of what we had done for thesecurity of the United States

5 Mr President this business has becomeespecially urgent in view of the recent menace whichMussolini is showing to Greece If our business is putthrough on big lines and in the highest spirit of goodwill it might even now save that small historic country


from invasion and conquest Even the next forty-eighthours are important


27VIII40

Lord Lothianrsquos account of President Rooseveltrsquosrequest should now be put into the first person in casea public declaration is required in our name Forinstance ldquoHis Majestyrsquos Government make thefollowing offer to the President of the United StateslsquoWe are prepared in friendship and good will to meetyour representatives immediately in order to considerthe provision of effective naval and air bases in thefollowing islandsrsquordquo etc

Let me have a draft on these lines so that I candictate a cable The draft should be in my hands thismorning

Accordingly27VIII40

His Majestyrsquos Government make the following offerto the President of the United States

We are prepared in friendship and good will to meetyour representatives forthwith in order to consider thelease for ninety-nine years of areas for the establish-ment of naval and air bases in the following places

NEWFOUNDLAND ANTIGUABERMUDA ST LUCIABAHAMAS TRINIDADJAMAICA BRITISH

GUIANASubject to later settlements on points of detailhellip

At the same time I suggested the following text of thetelegram for publication which the President might send meto elicit the assurance he desired


The Prime Minister of Great Britain is reported tohave stated on June 4 1940 to Parliament in effectthat if during the course of the present war in whichGreat Britain and British Colonies are engaged thewaters surrounding the British Isles should becomeuntenable for British ships-of-war a British Fleet wouldin no event be surrendered or sunk but would be sentoverseas for the defence of other parts of the Empire

The Government of the United States wouldrespectfully inquire whether the foregoing statementrepresents the settled policy of the British Government

The President adopted this version and I sent him thefollowing agreed reply

You ask Mr President whether my statement inParliament on June 4 1940 about Great Britain neversurrendering or scuttling her Fleet ldquorepresents thesettled policy of His Majestyrsquos Governmentrdquo It certainlydoes I must however observe that these hypotheticalcontingencies seem more likely to concern the GermanFleet or what is left of it than our own

Thus all was happily settled and on September 5 using thelanguage of understatement I duly informed the House ofCommons and obtained their acquiescence and indeedgeneral consentThe memorable transactions between Great Britain and theUnited States which were foreshadowed when I lastaddressed the House have now been completed As far asI can make out they have been completed to the generalsatisfaction of the British and American peoples and to theencouragement of our friends all over the world It would bea mistake to try to read into the official notes which havepassed more than the documents bear on their face Theexchanges which have taken place are simply measures ofmutual assistance rendered to one another by two friendlynations in a spirit of confidence sympathy and good will


These measures are linked together in a formal agreementThey must be accepted exactly as they stand Only veryignorant persons would suggest that the transfer ofAmerican destroyers to the British flag constitutes theslightest violation of international law or affects in thesmallest degree the non-belligerency of the United StatesI have no doubt that Herr Hitler will not like this transferenceof destroyers and I have no doubt that he will pay theUnited States out if he ever gets the chance That is why Iam very glad that the army air and naval frontiers of theUnited States have been advanced along a wide arc intothe Atlantic Ocean and that this will enable them to takedanger by the throat while it is still hundreds of miles awayfrom their homeland The Admiralty tell us also that they arevery glad to have these fifty destroyers and that they willcome in most conveniently to bridge the gap which as Ihave previously explained to the House inevitablyintervenes before our considerable wartime programme ofnew construction comes into serviceI suppose the House realises that we shall be a good dealstronger next year on the sea than we are now althoughthat is quite strong enough for the immediate work in handThere will be no delay in bringing the American destroyersinto active service in fact British crews are already meetingthem at the various ports where they are being deliveredYou might call it the long arm of coincidence I really do notthink that there is any more to be said about the wholebusiness at the present time This is not the appropriateoccasion for rhetoric Perhaps I may however veryrespectfully offer this counsel to the House When youhave got a thing where you want it it is a good thing toleave it where it is


Thus we obtained the fifty American destroyers Wegranted ninety-nine-year leases of the air and naval basesspecified in the West Indies and Newfoundland to theUnited States And thirdly I repeated my declaration aboutnot scuttling or surrendering the British Fleet in the form ofan assurance to the President I regarded all these asparallel transactions and as acts of good will performed ontheir merits and not as bargains The President found itmore acceptable to present them to Congress as aconnected whole We neither of us contradicted each otherand both countries were satisfied The effects in Europewere profound


6Egypt and the Middle East 1940 June mdash

Julymdash August

Mussolini Prepares to Invade EgyptmdashOurCompeting Anxieties mdash The Italian Strength inNorth Africa mdash Concentration Towards theEgyptian FrontiermdashBeads on the StringmdashInitiativeof Our Covering TroopsmdashAmphibious PossibilitiesmdashNeed to Reinforce with Tanks and OtherWeaponsmdashMy Complaints of DispersionmdashTheKenya FrontmdashPalestinemdashNeed to Send Forth anArmoured Brigade and Later the SecondArmoured DivisionmdashThe Mediterranean Short Cutmdash The Tanks Have to Go Round the CapemdashPlans for Cutting the Italian Coastal Road from theSeamdashMinisterial Committee on the Middle East mdashGeneral Wavell Comes Home for ConferencemdashHard and Tense Discussions with HimmdashDirectiveof August 16 mdash Assembly of the Army of the NilemdashIts Tactical EmploymentmdashThe SomalilandEpisodemdashA Vexatious Rebuff mdashMy MinutesThereuponmdashIncrease in Italian Forces in AlbaniamdashMy Report on the General Situation to the PrimeMinisters of Australia and New Zealand

WITH THE DISAPPEARANCE of France as a combatant andwith Britain set on her struggle for life at home Mussolinimight well feel that his dream of dominating theMediterranean and rebuilding the former Roman Empirewould come true Relieved from any need to guard against


the French in Tunis he could still further reinforce thenumerous army he had gathered for the invasion of EgyptThe eyes of the world were fixed upon the fate of the BritishIsland upon the gathering of the invading German armiesand upon the drama of the struggle for air mastery Thesewere of course our main preoccupations In manycountries we were presumed to be at the last gasp Ourconfident and resolute bearing was admired by our friendsbut its foundations were deemed unsure Nevertheless theWar Cabinet were determined to defend Egypt against allcomers with whatever resources could be spared from thedecisive struggle at home All the more was this difficultwhen the Admiralty declared themselves unable to passeven military convoys through the Mediterranean onaccount of the air dangers All must go round the CapeThus we might easily rob the Battle of Britain withouthelping the Battle of Egypt It is odd that while at the timeeveryone concerned was quite calm and cheerful writingabout it afterwards makes one shiver

When Italy declared war on June 10 1940 the BritishIntelligence estimated ndash we now know correctly ndash that apartfrom her garrisons in Abyssinia Eritrea and Somalilandthere were about 215000 Italian troops in the North Africancoastal provinces These were disposed as follows inTripolitania six metropolitan and two militia divisions inCyrenaica two metropolitan and two militia divisionsbesides frontier forces equal to three divisions a total offifteen divisions The British forces in Egypt consisted of the7th Armoured Division two-thirds of the 4th Indian Divisionone-third of the New Zealand Division and fourteen Britishbattalions and two regiments of the Royal Artilleryungrouped in higher formations the whole amounting to


perhaps fifty thousand men From these both the defenceof the western frontier and the internal security of Egypt hadto be provided We therefore had heavy odds against usin the field and the Italians had also many more aircraftDuring July and August the Italians became active at manypoints There was a threat from Kassala on the White Nilewestward towards Khartoum Alarm was spread in Kenyaby the fear of an Italian expedition marching four hundredmiles south from Abyssinia towards the Tana River andNairobi Considerable Italian forces advanced into BritishSomaliland But all these anxieties were petty comparedwith the Italian invasion of Egypt which was obviouslybeing prepared on the greatest scale For some time pastMussolini had been steadily moving his forces eastwardtowards Egypt Even before the war a magnificent road hadbeen made along the coast from the main base at Tripolithrough Tripolitania Cyrenaica and Libya to the Egyptianfrontier Along this road there had been for many months aswelling stream of military traffic Large magazines wereslowly established and filled at Benghazi Derna TobrukBardia and Sollum The length of this road was over athousand miles and all these swarming Italian garrisonsand supply depots were strung along it like beads on astringAt the head of the road and near the Egyptian frontier anItalian army of seventy or eighty thousand men with a gooddeal of modern equipment had been patiently gatheredand organised Before this army glittered the prize of EgyptBehind it stretched the long road back to Tripoli and afterthat the sea If this force built up in driblets week by weekfor years could advance continually eastward conqueringall who sought to bar the path its fortunes would be brightIf it could gain the fertile regions of the Delta all worryabout the long road back would vanish On the other hand


if ill-fortune befell it only a few would ever get home In thefield army and in the series of great supply depots all alongthe coast there were by the autumn at least three hundredthousand Italians who could even if unmolested retreatwestward along the road only gradually or piecemeal Forthis they required many months And if the battle were loston the Egyptian border if the armyrsquos front were broken andif time were not given to them all were doomed to captureor death However in July 1940 it was not known who wasgoing to win the battleOur foremost defended position at that time was therailhead at Mersa Matruh There was a good road westwardto Sidi Barani but thence to the frontier at Sollum there wasno road capable of maintaining any considerable strengthfor long near the frontier A small covering mechanisedforce had been formed of some of our finest Regulartroops consisting of the 7th Hussars (light tanks) the 11thHussars (armoured cars) and two motor battalions of the60th Rifles and Rifle Brigade with two regiments ofmotorised Royal Horse Artillery Orders had been given toattack the Italian frontier posts immediately on the outbreakof war Accordingly within twenty-four hours the 11thHussars crossed the frontier took the Italians who had notheard that war had been declared by surprise andcaptured prisoners The next night June 12 they had asimilar success and on June 14 with the 7th Hussars andone company of the 60th Rifles captured the frontier fortsat Capuzzo and Maddalena taking two hundred and twentyprisoners On the 16th they raided deeper destroyedtwelve tanks intercepted a convoy on the Tobruk-Bardiaroad and captured a generalIn this small but lively warfare our troops felt they had theadvantage and soon conceived themselves to be mastersof the desert Until they came up against large formed


bodies or fortified posts they could go where they likedcollecting trophies from sharp encounters When armiesapproach each other it makes all the difference whichowns only the ground on which it stands or sleeps andwhich one owns all the rest I saw this in the Boer Warwhere we owned nothing beyond the fires of our camps andbivouacs whereas the Boers rode where they pleased allover the countryEver-growing enemy forces were now arriving from thewest and by the middle of July the enemy had re-established his frontier line with two divisions and elementsof two more Early in August our covering force wasrelieved by the support group of the 7th Armoured Divisioncomprising the 3d Cold-stream Guards the first 60th Riflesthe 2d Rifle Brigade the 11th Hussars one squadron of the6th Royal Tank Battalion and two mechanised batteries RHA one of which was antitank This small forcedistributed over a front of sixty miles continued to harassthe enemy with increasing effect The published Italiancasualties for the first three months of war were nearly thirty-five hundred men of whom seven hundred were prisonersOur own losses barely exceeded a hundred and fifty Thusthe first phase in the war which Italy had declared upon theBritish Empire opened favourably for us

It was proposed by the Middle East Command underGeneral Wavell to await the shock of the Italian onslaughtnear the fortified position of Mersa Matruh Until we couldgather an army this seemed the only course open Itherefore proposed the following tasks First to assemblethe largest fighting force possible to face the Italianinvaders For this it was necessary to run risks in many


other quarters I was pained to see the dispersions whichwere tolerated by the military authorities Khartoum and theBlue Nile certainly required strengthening against the Italian-Abyssinian border but what was the sense of keepingtwenty-five thousand men including the Union Brigade ofSouth Africa and two brigades of excellent West Africantroops idle in Kenya I had ridden over some of thiscountry north of the Tana River in 1906 It is a very fine-looking country but without much to eat The idea of anItalian expedition of fifteen or twenty thousand men withartillery and modern gear traversing the four or fivehundred miles before they could reach Nairobi seemedridiculous Behind the Kenya front would lie the broad-gauge Uganda Railway We had the command of the seaand could move troops to and fro by sea and rail with afacility incomparable to anything that could be achieved byenemy land movements On account of our superiorcommunications it was our interest to fight an Italianexpedition as near to Nairobi and the broad-gauge railwayas possible For this large numbers of troops were notrequired They were more needed in the Egyptian Delta Igot something but only after a prolonged hard fight againstthe woolly theme of being safe everywhereI did my utmost to draw upon Singapore and bring theAustralian division which had arrived there first to India fortraining and thence to the Western Desert Palestinepresented a different aspect We had a mass of fine troopssprawled over Palestine an Australian division a NewZealand brigade our own choice Yeomanry division all inarmoured cars or about to be the Household Cavalry stillwith horses but longing for modern weapons with lavishadministrative services I wished to arm the Jews at Tel-Aviv who with proper weapons would have made a goodfight against all comers Here I encountered every kind of


resistance My second preoccupation was to ensure thatfreedom of movement through the Mediterranean wasfought for against the weak Italians and the grave airdanger in order that Malta might be made impregnable Itseemed to me most important to pass military convoysespecially of tanks and guns through the Mediterraneaninstead of all round the Cape This seemed a prize worthmany hazards To send a division from Britain round theCape to Egypt was to make sure it could not fight anywherefor three months but these were precious months and wehad very few divisions Finally there was our island nowunder pretty direct menace of invasion How far could wedenude our home and citadel for the sake of the MiddleEast

In July 1940 I began as the telegrams and Minutes showto concern myself increasingly about the Middle EastAlways this long coastal road bulked in my mind Again andagain I recurred to the idea of cutting it by the landing ofstrong but light forces from the sea We had not of courseat that time proper tank-landing craft Yet it should havebeen possible to improvise the necessary tackle for such anoperation If used in conjunction with a heavy battle it mighthave effected a valuable diversion of enemy troops fromthe front


10VII40

Bring the following before the COS CommitteeHave any plans been made in the event of large

forces approaching the Egyptian border from Libya tocut the coastal motor road upon which they would be


largely dependent for supplies of all kinds It is notsufficient merely to bombard by air or from the sea Butif a couple of brigades of good troops could take sometown or other suitable point on the communicationsthey might with sea-power behind them cause aprolonged interruption require heavy forces to bemoved against them and then withdraw to strike againat some other point Of course such an operationwould not be effective until considerable forces of theenemy had already passed the point of interception Itmay be however that the desert itself affords freemovement to the enemyrsquos supplies I wonder whetherthis is so and if so why the Italians were at pains toconstruct this lengthy road

I still do not see why it should not have been possible tomake a good plan It is however a fact that none of ourcommanders either in the Middle East or in Tunis wereever persuaded to make the attempt But General Patton in1943 made several most successful turning movements ofthis character during the conquest of Sicily and gaineddefinite advantages thereby It was not until Anzio in 1944that I succeeded in having this experiment tried This ofcourse was on a far larger scale nor did it in spite of thesuccess of the landing achieve the decisive results forwhich we all hoped But that is another story

I was anxious that the case of the Middle East should bestrongly presented by a group of Ministers all experiencedin war and deeply concerned in that theatre


10VII40


I think it would be well to set up a small standingMinisterial Committee consisting of the Secretaries ofState for War [Mr Eden] India [Mr Amery] and theColonies [Lord Lloyd] to consult together upon theconduct of the war in the Middle East (in which they areall three concerned) and to advise me as Minister ofDefence upon the recommendations I should make tothe Cabinet Will you kindly put this into the properform The Secretary of State for War has agreed totake the chair

Mr Eden reported to his Committee the shortage of troopsequipment and resources in the Middle East and that theCIGS was equally perturbed The Committee urged thefull equipment of the armoured division already in Egypt butfar below strength and also recommended the provision ofa second armoured division at the earliest moment when itcould be spared from home The Chiefs of Staff endorsedthese conclusions the CIGS observing that the momentmust be chosen in relation to declining risks at home andincreasing risks abroad On July 31 Mr Eden consideredthat we might be able to spare some tanks in a few weeksrsquotime and that if they were to reach the Middle East by theend of September we might have to send them and theother equipment through the Mediterranean In spite of therising tension about invasion at home I was in fullagreement with all this trend of thought and brought theextremely harassing choice before the Cabinet severaltimesThe other aspects of the Middle East pressed upon me


23VII40

Where is the South African Union Brigade of tenthousand men Why is it playing no part in the Middle


East We have agreed today to send further reinforce-ments of Hurricanes and other modern aircraft to theSouth African Air Force What is happening to theconcert of the campaign in the Middle East What hasbeen done by the Committee of Ministers I recently setup Now that large naval operations are contemplatedin the Mediterranean it is all the more essential that theattack on the Italian position in Abyssinia should bepressed and concerted by all means Make sure I havea report about the position which I can consider onThursday morning

I felt an acute need of talking over the serious eventsimpending in the Libyan Desert with General Wavellhimself I had hot met this distinguished officer on whom somuch was resting and I asked the Secretary of State forWar to invite him over for a week for consultation when anopportunity could be found He arrived on August 8 Hetoiled with the Staffs and had several long conversationswith me and Mr Eden The command in the Middle East atthat time comprised an extraordinary amalgam of militarypolitical diplomatic and administrative problems of extremecomplexity It took more than a year of ups and downs forme and my colleagues to learn the need of dividing theresponsibilities of the Middle East between a Commander-in-Chief a Minister of State and an Intendant-General tocope with the supply problem While not in full agreementwith General Wavellrsquos use of the resources at his disposal Ithought it best to leave him in command I admired his finequalities and was impressed with the confidence so manypeople had in himThe discussions both oral and written were severe Asusual I put my case in black and white


Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay forGeneral Wavell

10VIII40

I am very much obliged to you for explaining to meso fully the situation in Egypt and Somaliland We haveyet to discuss the position in Kenya and Abyssinia Imentioned the very large forces which you have inKenya namely the Union Brigade of six thousandwhite South Africans probably as fine material asexists for warfare in spacious countries the EastAfrican settlers who should certainly amount to twothousand men thoroughly used to the country the twoWest African Brigades brought at much inconveniencefrom the West Coast numbering six thousand at leasttwo brigades of Kingrsquos African Rifles (KAR) the wholeat least twenty thousand men ndash there may be moreWhy should these all stand idle in Kenya waiting for anItalian invasion to make its way across the very difficultdistances from Abyssinia to the south or preparingthemselves for a similar difficult inroad into Abyssiniawhich must again entail long delays while all the timethe fate of the Middle East and much else may bedecided at Alexandria or on the Canal

Without of course knowing the exact conditionslocally I should suppose that a reasonable dispositionwould be to hold Kenya with the settlers and the KAR and delay any Italian advance southward it beingso much easier to bring troops round by sea than forthe Italians to make their way overland Thus we canalways reinforce them unexpectedly and swiftly Thiswould allow the Union Brigade and the two WestAfrican Brigades to come round at once into the Deltagiving you a most valuable reinforcement in thedecisive theatre at the decisive moment What is theuse of having the command of the sea if it is not to passtroops to and fro with great rapidity from one theatre toanother I am sure I could persuade General Smuts toallow this movement of the Union Brigade Perhaps youwill let me have your views on this by tomorrow nightas time is so short



12VIII40

1 I am not at all satisfied about the Union Brigadeand the West African Brigade in Kenya These forcesas now disposed would play no part in the criticalattacks now being developed against Egypt Khartoumand Somaliland It is always considered a capitalblemish on military operations that large bodies oftroops should be standing idle while decisions arereached elsewhere Without further information Icannot accept the statement that the South AfricanBrigade is so far untrained that it cannot go into actionThe Natal Carbineers were much further advanced intraining before the war than our British Territorials andthey have presumably been embodied since thedeclaration I cannot see why the Union Brigade as awhole should be considered in any way inferior toBritish Territorial units Anyhow they are certainly goodenough to fight Italians I have asked for full particularsof their embodiment and training in each case

2 I do not consider that proper use is being made ofthe large forces in Palestine The essence of thesituation depends on arming the Jewish colonistssufficiently to enable them to undertake their owndefence so that if necessary for a short time the wholeof Palestine can be left to very small British forces Aproposal should be made to liberate immediately alarge portion of the garrison including the YeomanryCavalry Division I do not understand why theAustralians and New Zealanders who have beentraining in Palestine for at least six months should beable to provide only one brigade for service in EgyptHow many of them are there and what are the facts oftheir training These men were brought at greatexpense from Australia having been selected as thefirst volunteers for service in Europe Many of them hadprevious military training and have done nearly a yearrsquostraining since the war broke out How disgraceful itwould be if owing to our mishandling of this important


force only one brigade took part in the decisiveoperations for the defence of Egypt

3 The two West African brigades could certainly bebrought to Khartoum via Port Soudan It is a very goodpolicy to mix native units from various sources so thatone lot can be used to keep the other in disciplineThese two brigades ought to be moved immediately tothe Soudan so that the Indian Division can be used inEgypt or Somaliland as soon as it arrives I do not knowwhy these brigades were taken away from West Africaif the only use to be made of them was to garrisonKenya

4 Let me have a return of the white settlers ofmilitary age in Kenya Are we to believe they have notformed any local units for the defence of their ownprovince If not the sooner they are made to realisetheir position the better No troops ought to be in Kenyaat the present time other than the settlers and the KAR Considering the risks and trouble we are taking toreinforce Egypt from home it cannot be accepted thatforces on the spot should not be used to the highestcapacity at the critical moment

5 Let me have a full account of the two Britishdivisions in the Delta It is misleading to think indivisions in this area nor can any plea that they are notproperly equipped in every detail be allowed toprejudice the employment of these fine Regular troops

6 Surely the statement that the enemyrsquos armouredforces and vehicles can move just as easily along thedesert as along the coastal road requires furtherexamination This might apply to caterpillar vehiclesbut these would suffer severely if forced to make longjourneys over the rocky and soft deserts Anyhowwheeled transport would be hampered in the desertunless provided with desert-expanded india-rubbertyres of a special type Are the Italian vehicles so fittedand to what extent

7 What arrangements have been made toldquodepotabiliserdquo1 for long periods any wells or watersupplies we do not require for ourselves Has a storeof delayed-action fuzes been provided for mines in


roadways which are to be abandoned Make sure thata supply of the longest delayed-action fuzes ie up toat least a fortnight (but I hope they run longer now) aresent to Egypt by the first ship to go through Examinewhether it is not possible to destroy the asphalt of thetarmac road as it is abandoned by chemical action ofheavy petroleum oil or some other treatment

8 Let me have a statement in full and exact detail ofall units in the Middle East including Polish and Frenchvolunteers and arrivals

I should be glad to discuss all these points tonight

As a result of the Staff discussions on August 10 Dill withEdenrsquos ardent approval wrote me that the War Office werearranging to send immediately to Egypt one cruiser tankbattalion of fifty-two tanks one light tank regiment (fifty-twotanks) and one infantry tank battalion of fifty tankstogether with forty-eight anti-tank guns twenty Bofors lightanti-aircraft forty-eight twenty-five-pounder field guns fivehundred Bren guns and two hundred and fifty anti-tankrifles with the necessary ammunition These would start assoon as they could be loaded The only question open waswhether they should go round the Cape or take a chancethrough the Mediterranean I pressed the Admiralty hard aswill be seen in a later chapter for direct convoy through theMediterranean Much discussion proceeded on this latterpoint Meanwhile the Cabinet approved the embarkationand despatch of the armoured force leaving the finaldecision about which way they should go till the convoyapproached Gibraltar This option remained open to us tillAugust 26 by which time we should know a good dealmore about the imminence of any Italian attack No timewas lost The decision to give this blood-transfusion while


we braced ourselves to meet a mortal danger was at onceawful and right No one faltered

The following directive which we had thrashed outtogether was finally drafted by me and the Cabinetapproved it without amendment in accord with the Chiefs ofStaff


16VIII40

(General directive for Commander-in-Chief MiddleEast)

1 A major invasion of Egypt from Libya must beexpected at any time now It is necessary therefore toassemble and deploy the largest possible army uponand towards the western frontier All political andadministrative considerations must be set in propersubordination to this

2 The evacuation of Somaliland is enforced upon usby the enemy but is none the less strategicallyconvenient All forces in or assigned to Somalilandshould be sent to Aden to the Soudan via PortSoudan or to Egypt as may be thought best

3 The defence of Kenya must rank after thedefence of the Soudan There should be time after thecrisis in Egypt and the Soudan is passed to reinforceKenya by sea and rail before any large Italianexpedition can reach the Tana River We can alwaysreinforce Kenya faster than Italy can pass troops thitherfrom Abyssinia or Italian Somaliland

4 Accordingly either the two West African Brigadesor two brigades of the KAR should be movedforthwith to Khartoum General Smuts is being asked toallow the Union Brigade or a large part of it to move to


the Canal Zone and the Delta for internal securitypurposes Arrangements should be made to continuetheir training The Admiralty are being asked to reporton shipping possibilities in the Indian Ocean and RedSea

5 In view of the increased air attack which may beexpected in the Red Sea following upon the Italianconquest of British Somaliland the air reinforcement ofAden becomes important

6 The two brigades one of Regulars and the otherAustralian which are held ready in Palestine shouldnow move into the Delta in order to clear the Palestinecommunications for the movement of further reservesas soon as they can be equipped for field service ororganised for internal security duties

7 However immediately three or four regiments ofBritish cavalry without their horses should take overthe necessary duties in the Canal Zone liberating thethree Regular battalions there for general reserve of theField Army of the Delta

8 The rest of the Australians in Palestine number-ing six battalions will thus [also] be available at fivedaysrsquo notice to move into the Delta for internal securityor other emergency employment The Polish Brigadeand the French Volunteer Unit should move to the Deltafrom Palestine as may be convenient and join thegeneral reserve

9 The movement of the Indian division nowembarking or in transit should be accelerated to theutmost Unless some of the troops evacuated fromSomaliland and not needed for Aden are foundsufficient to reinforce the Soudan in addition toreinforcements from Kenya this whole division as ismost desirable should proceed to Suez to join theArmy of the Delta [later called the Army of the Nile] Inaddition to the above at least three batteries of Britishartillery although horse-drawn must be embarkedimmediately from India for Suez Admiralty to arrangetransport

10 Most of the above movements should becompleted between September 15 and October 1 andon this basis the Army of the Delta should comprise


(1) The British Armoured Force in Egypt(2) The four British battalions at Mersa Matruh the

two at Alexandria and the two in Cairo ndash total eight(3) The three battalions from the Canal Zone(4) The reserve British Brigade from Palestine ndash

total fourteen British Regular infantry battalions(5) The New Zealand Brigade(6) The Australian Brigade from Palestine(7) The Polish Brigade(8) Part of the Union Brigade from East Africa(9) The Fourth Indian Division now in rear of Mersa

Matruh(10) The new Indian division in transit(11) The eleven thousand men in drafts arriving

almost at once at Suez(12) All the artillery (one hundred and fifty guns) now

in the Middle East or en route from India(13) The Egyptian Army so far as it can be used for

field operations 11 The above should constitute by October 1 at the

latest thirty-nine battalions together with the armouredforces a total of 56000 men and 212 guns This isexclusive of internal security troops

(Part II)12 It is hoped that the armoured brigade from

England of three regiments of tanks will be passedthrough the Mediterranean by the Admiralty If this isimpossible their arrival round the Cape may becounted upon during the first fortnight in October Thearrival of this force in September must be deemed soimportant as to justify a considerable degree of risk inits transportation

(Part III Tactical employment of the above force13 The Mersa Matruh position must be fortified

completely and with the utmost speed The sector heldby the three Egyptian battalions must be taken over bythree British battalions making the force homoge-neous This must be done even if the Egyptian


Government wish to withdraw the artillery now in thehands of these three battalions The possibility ofreinforcing by sea the Mersa Matruh position andcutting enemy communications once they have passedby on their march to the Delta must be studied with theNaval Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean FleetAlternatively a descent upon the communications atSollum or farther west may be preferred

14 All water supplies between Mersa Matruh andthe Alexandria defences must be rendered ldquode-potablerdquo2 A special note on this is attached Noattempt should be made to leave small parties todefend the wells near the coast in this region The 4thIndian Division should withdraw upon Alexandria whennecessary or be taken off by sea The road from Sollumto Mersa Matruh and still more the tarmac road fromMersa Matruh to Alexandria must be renderedimpassable as it is abandoned by delayed-actionmines or by chemical treatment of the asphalt surface

15 A main line of defence to be held by the wholeArmy of the Delta with its reserves suitably disposedmust be prepared (as should long ago have been done)from Alexandria along the edge of the cultivated zoneand irrigation canals of the Delta For this purpose thestrongest concrete and sandbag works and pillboxesshould be built or completed from the sea to thecultivated zone and the main irrigation canal Thepipeline forward of this line should be extended as fastas possible The Delta zone is the most effectiveobstacle to tanks of all kinds and can be lightly held bysandbag works to give protection to Egypt and form avery strong extended flank for the Alexandria front Abroad strip four or five miles wide should be inundatedfrom the flood waters of the Nile controlled at AssouanAmid or behind this belt a series of strong posts armedwith artillery should be constructed

16 In this posture then the Army of the Delta willawait the Italian invasion It must be expected that theenemy will advance in great force limited only butseverely by the supply of water and petrol He willcertainly have strong armoured forces in his right hand


to contain and drive back our weaker forces unlessthese can be reinforced in time by the armouredregiment from Great Britain He will mask if he cannotstorm Mersa Matruh But if the main line of the Delta isdiligently fortified and resolutely held he will be forcedto deploy an army whose supply of water petrol foodand ammunition will be difficult Once the army isdeployed and seriously engaged the action against hiscommunications from Mersa Matruh by bombardmentfrom the sea by descent at Sollum or even muchfarther west would be a deadly blow to him

17 The campaign for the defence of the Deltatherefore resolves itself into strong defence with theleft arm from Alexandria inland and a reaching-out withthe right hand using sea-power upon his communica-tions At the same time it is hoped that the [our]reinforcements [acting] from Malta will hamper thesending of further reinforcements ndash Italian or German ndashfrom Europe into Africa

18 All this might be put effectively in train byOctober 1 provided we are allowed the time If not wemust do what we can All trained or Regular unitswhether fully equipped or not must be used in defenceof the Delta All armed white men and also Indian orforeign units must be used for internal security TheEgyptian Army must be made to play its part in supportof the Delta front thus leaving only riotous crowds to bedealt with in Egypt proper

Pray let the above be implemented and be ready todiscuss it in detail with me at 430 PM August 16

With this General Wavell returned to Cairo in the third weekof August

I now have to record a small but at the time vexatiousmilitary episode The Italians using vastly superior forcesdrove us out of Somaliland This story requires to be told


Until December 1939 our policy in a war with Italy was toevacuate Somaliland but in that month General Ironside CIGS declared for defence of the territory and in the lastresort to hold Berbera Defences were to be prepared todefend the Tug Argen Gap through the hills One Britishbattalion (the Black Watch) two Indian and two EastAfrican battalions with the Somaliland Camel Corps andone African light battery with small detachments of anti-tank and anti-aircraft units were gathered by the beginningof August General Wavell on July 21 telegraphed to theWar Office that withdrawal without fighting would bedisastrous for our influence and that Somaliland might be avaluable base for further offensive action Fighting beganduring his visit to London and he told the Middle EastMinisterial Committee that although the strategicdisadvantages of the loss of Somaliland would be slight itwould be a blow to our prestigeThe Italians entered British Somaliland on August 3 withthree battalions of Italian infantry fourteen of colonialinfantry two groups of pack artillery and detachments ofmedium tanks light tanks and armoured cars These largeforces advanced upon us on August 10 and a new Britishcommander General Godwin Austen arrived on the nightof the 11th In his instructions he had been told ldquoYour taskis to prevent any Italian advance beyond the mainpositionhellip You will take the necessary steps for withdrawalif necessaryrdquo Fighting took place on the 12th and 13th andone of our four key-positions was captured from us afterheavy artillery bombardment On the night of the 15thGeneral Godwin Austen determined to withdraw This hesaid ldquowas the only course to save us from disastrousdefeat and annihilationrdquo The Middle East Headquartersauthorised evacuation and this was successfully achievedunder a strong rearguard of the Black Watch


I was far from satisfied with the tactical conduct of thisaffair which remains on record as our only defeat at Italianhands At this particular moment when formidable eventsimpended in Egypt and when so much depended on ourprestige the rebuff caused injury far beyond its strategicscale There was much jubilation in Italy and Mussoliniexulted in the prospects of his attack on the Nile ValleyGeneral Wavell however defended the local commanderaffirming that the fighting had been severeIn view of the great business we had together I did notpress my view further either with the War Office or withGeneral Wavell

Our information at this time showed a rapid increase in theItalian forces in Albania and a consequent menace toGreece As the German preparations for the invasion ofBritain grew in scale and became more evident it wouldhave been particularly inconvenient to lessen our bombingattack on the German and Dutch river mouths and Frenchports where barges were being collected I had formed nodecision in my own mind about moving bomber squadronsaway from home It is often wise however to have plansworked out in detail Strange as it may seem the Air Forceexcept in the air is the least mobile of all the Services Asquadron can reach its destination in a few hours but itsestablishment depots fuel spare parts and workshopstake many weeks and even months to develop

(Action this day)


Prime Minister to CAS and GeneralIsmay

28VIII40

Pray let me have proposals for moving at least fourheavy bombing squadrons to Egypt in addition toanything now in progress These squadrons willoperate from advanced bases in Greece as far as maybe convenient should Greece be forced into the war byItaly They would refuel there before attacking ItalyMany of the finest targets including the Italian Fleetwill be open to such attacks It is better to operate fromGreece should she come in than from Malta in itspresent undefended state The report should be briefand should simply show the method the difficultiesand the objectives together with a time-table It is notnecessary to argue the question of policy which will bedecided by the Defence Committee of the CabinetMaking the best plan possible will not commit the AirMinistry or anyone else to the adoption of the plan butevery effort is to be made to solve its difficuties

I cannot better end this chapter than by the report I gave ofthe situation in August to the Prime Ministers of Australiaand New ZealandThis followed up my message of June 16

Prime Minister to thePrime Ministers ofAustralia and NewZealand

11VIII40

The combined Staffs are preparing a paper on thePacific situation but I venture to send you in advance abrief foreword We are trying our best to avoid war with


Japan both by conceding on points where theJapanese military clique can perhaps force a ruptureand by standing up where the ground is less danger-ous as in arrests [by the Japanese] of individuals I donot think myself that Japan will declare war unlessGermany can make a successful invasion of BritainOnce Japan sees that Germany has either failed ordares not try I look for easier times in the Pacific Inadopting against the grain a yielding policy towardsJapanese threats we have always in mind yourinterests and safety

Should Japan nevertheless declare war on us herfirst objective outside the Yellow Sea would probably bethe Dutch East Indies Evidently the United Stateswould not like this What they would do we cannot tellThey give no undertaking of support but their mainfleet in the Pacific must be a grave preoccupation to theJapanese Admiralty In this first phase of an Anglo-Japanese war we should of course defend Singaporewhich if attacked ndash which is unlikely ndash ought to stand along siege We should also be able to base on Ceylona battle cruiser and a fast aircraft-carrier which with allthe Australian and New Zealand cruisers anddestroyers which would return to you would act as avery powerful deterrent upon the hostile raiding cruisers

We are about to reinforce with more first-class unitsthe Eastern Mediterranean Fleet This fleet could ofcourse at any time be sent through the Canal into theIndian Ocean or to relieve Singapore We do not wantto do this even if Japan declares war until it is found tobe vital to your safety Such a transference would entailthe complete loss of the Middle East and all prospectof beating Italy in the Mediterranean would be goneWe must expect heavy attacks on Egypt in the nearfuture and the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet is neededto help in repelling them If these attacks succeed theEastern Fleet would have to leave the Mediterraneaneither through the Canal or by Gibraltar In either casea large part of it would be available for your protectionWe hope however to maintain ourselves in Egypt andto keep the Eastern Fleet at Alexandria during the firstphase of an Anglo-Japanese war should that occur No


one can lay down beforehand what is going to happenWe must just weigh events from day to day and useour available resources to the utmost

A final question arises whether Japan havingdeclared war would attempt to invade Australia or NewZealand with a considerable army We think this veryunlikely first because Japan is absorbed in Chinasecondly would be gathering rich prizes in the DutchEast Indies and thirdly would fear very much to sendan important part of her fleet far to the southwardleaving the American Fleet between it and home Ifhowever contrary to prudence and self-interest Japanset about invading Australia or New Zealand on a largescale I have the explicit authority of the Cabinet toassure you that we should then cut our losses in theMediterranean and sacrifice every interest except onlythe defence and feeding of this island on which alldepends and would proceed in good time to your aidwith a fleet able to give battle to any Japanese forcewhich could be placed in Australian waters and able toparry any invading force or certainly cut its communica-tions with Japan

We hope however that events will take a differentturn By gaining time with Japan the present dangeroussituation may be got over We are vastly stronger hereat home than when I cabled to you in May We have alarge army now beginning to be well equipped Wehave fortified our beaches We have a strong reserve ofmobile troops including our Regular Army andAustralian New Zealand and Canadian contingentswith several armoured divisions or brigades ready tostrike in counter-attack at the head of any successfullodgment We have ferried over from the United Statestheir grand aid of nearly a thousand guns and sixhundred thousand rifles with ammunition completeRelieved of the burden of defending France our Armyis becoming daily more powerful and munitions aregathering Besides this we have the Home Guard of1500000 men many of them war veterans and mostwith rifles or other arms

The Royal Air Force continues to show that sameindividual superiority over the enemy on which I


counted so much in my cable to you of June 16Yesterdayrsquos important action in the Channel showedthat we could attack against odds of three to one andinflict losses of three and a half to one Astoundingprogress has been made by Lord Beaverbrook inoutput of the best machines Our fighter and bomberstrength is nearly double what it was when I cabledyou and we have a very large reserve of machines inhand I do not think the German Air Force has thenumbers or quality to overpower our air defences

The Navy increases in strength each month and weare now beginning to receive the immense programmestarted at the declaration of war Between June andDecember 1940 over five hundred vessels large andsmall but many most important will join the Fleet TheGerman Navy is weaker than it has ever beenScharnhorst and Gneisenau are both in dock damagedBismarck has not yet done her trials Tirpitz is threemonths behind Bismarck There are available now inthis critical fortnight after which the time for invasion isgetting very late only one pocket-battleship a couple ofeight-inch Hippers two light cruisers and perhaps ascore of destroyers To try to transport a large army aswould now be needed for success across the seasvirtually without escort in the face of our Navy and airforce only to meet our powerful military force on shorestill more to maintain such an army and nourish itslodgments with munitions and supplies would be a veryunreasonable act On the other hand if Hitler fails toinvade and conquer Britain before the weather breakshe has received his first and probably fatal check

We therefore feel a sober and growing conviction ofour power to defend ourselves successfully and topersevere through the year or two that may benecessary to gain victory



7The Mediterranean Passage

The New SituationmdashFrance Out Italy InmdashAdmiralCunningham at AlexandriamdashSuccessful Action offCalabriamdashIncreasing Naval BurdensmdashMediter-ranean InhibitionsmdashMy Minute of July 12 and theFirst Sea Lordrsquos ReplymdashMy Minute of July 15 mdashAdmiral Cunninghamrsquos Views on SendingReinforcements Through the MediterraneanmdashTheFirst Sea Lordrsquos Minute of July 23 mdash The Plan forldquoOperation HatsrdquomdashMy Efforts to Send the TanksThrough the MediterraneanmdashMy Minute of August13 mdash Failure to Persuade the AdmiraltymdashConductof ldquoOperation HatsrdquomdashSuccessful Daring mdash Needfor Bombarding VesselsmdashMy Telegram to AdmiralCunningham of September 8 mdash Hard Efforts toSuccour Malta Air DefencemdashAdmiral SomervillersquosExcursionsmdashThe Takoradi Route to Egypt OpenedmdashA Vital Trickle mdash Malta Still in the Foreground

UNTIL THE FRENCH COLLAPSE the control of theMediterranean had been shared between the British andFrench Fleets At Gibraltar we had maintained a small forceof cruisers and destroyers watching the Straits In theEastern Basin lay our Mediterranean Fleet based onAlexandria This had been reinforced earlier in the yearwhen the Italian attitude became menacing to a force offour battleships seven cruisers twenty-two destroyers oneaircraft-carrier and twelve submarines The French


Mediterranean Fleet comprised five capital ships oneaircraft-carrier fourteen cruisers and many smaller shipsNow France was out and Italy was in The numericallypowerful Italian Fleet included six battleships including twoof the latest type (Littorios) mounting fifteen-inch guns buttwo of the older ships were being reconstructed and werenot immediately ready for service Besides this their Fleetcomprised nineteen modern cruisers seven of which wereof the eight-inch-gun type one hundred and twentydestroyers and torpedo-boats and over a hundredsubmarinesIn addition a strong Italian Air Force was ranged against usSo formidable did the situation appear at the end of Junethat Admiralty first thoughts contemplated the abandonmentof the Eastern Mediterranean and concentration atGibraltar I resisted this policy which though justified onpaper by the strength of the Italian Fleet did not correspondto my impressions of the fighting values and also seemedto spell the doom of Malta It was resolved to fight it out atboth ends On July 3 the Chiefs of Staffs prepared a paperabout the Mediterranean in which they stressed theimportance of the Middle East as a war theatre butrecognised that for the time being our policy must begenerally defensive The possibility of a German attack onEgypt must be taken seriously but so long as the Fleetcould be retained in the Eastern Mediterranean our existingforces were enough to deal with purely local attackWe have seen how at the end of June Force H wasconstituted at Gibraltar under Admiral Somerville Itcomprised the Hood Resolution and Valiant the carrierArk Royal two cruisers and eleven destroyers With thiswe had done the deed at Oran In the EasternMediterranean we found in Admiral Andrew Cunninghaman officer of the highest qualities and dauntless character


Immediately upon the Italian declaration of war he put tosea in search of the enemy The Royal Air Force attackedTobruk and sank the old Italian cruiser San Giorgio TheFleet bombarded Bardia from the sea Submarines on bothsides were active and we destroyed ten of the enemy forthe loss of three of our own from deep mining before theend of JuneOn July 8 whilst covering the passage of a convoy fromMalta to Alexandria Admiral Cunningham became aware ofthe presence of powerful Italian forces It was evident fromthe intensity of Italian air attacks that the enemy also wasengaged in an important operation and we now know thatthey planned to lead the British Admiral into an area wherehe could be subjected to concentrated attack by the fullweight of the Italian Air Force and submarines AdmiralCunningham at once seized the initiative and despite hisinferiority in numbers boldly turned to interpose his fleetbetween the enemy and their baseOn the following day contact was made and an action atlong range ensued in which one enemy battleship and twocruisers were hit without any damage being suffered by theBritish Fleet The enemy refused to stand and fight andthanks to his superior speed was able to escape pursuedby Admiral Cunningham to a point within twenty-five milesof the Italian mainland Throughout this and the next twodays the intense air attacks continued without success andthe convoy though frequently bombed reached Alexandriasafely This spirited action established the ascendancy ofthe British Fleet in the Mediterranean and Italian prestigesuffered a blow from which it never recovered Ten dayslater the Sydney an Australian cruiser with a Britishdestroyer flotilla sank an Italian cruiser Our first contactswith the new enemy were therefore by no meansdiscouraging


The burdens which lay upon the Admiralty at this time werehowever heavy in the extreme The invasion dangerrequired a high concentration of flotillas and small craft inthe Channel and North Sea The U-boats which had byAugust begun to work from Biscayan ports took severe tollof our Atlantic convoys without suffering many lossesthemselves Until now the Italian fleet had never beentested The possibility of a Japanese declaration of warwith all that it would bring upon our Eastern Empire couldnever be excluded from our thoughts It is therefore notstrange that the Admiralty viewed with the deepest anxietyall risking of warships in the Mediterranean and were sorelytempted to adopt the strictest defensive at Gibraltar andAlexandria I on the other hand did not see why the largenumbers of ships assigned to the Mediterranean should notplay an active part from the outset Malta had to bereinforced both with air squadrons and troops Although allcommercial traffic was rightly suspended and all largetroop convoys to Egypt must go round the Cape I could notbring myself to accept the absolute closure of the inlandsea Indeed I hoped that by running a few special convoyswe might arrange and provoke a trial of strength with theItalian Fleet I hoped that this might happen and Malta beproperly garrisoned and equipped with airplanes and AAguns before the appearance which I already dreaded ofthe Germans in this theatre All through the summer andautumn months I engaged in friendly though tensediscussion with the Admiralty upon this part of our war effort


12VII40


I thought that Illustrious might well go to theMediterranean and exchange with ArkRoyal In thiscase Illustrious could take perhaps a good lot ofHurricanes to Malta As we have a number ofHurricanes surplus at the moment could not the MaltaGladiator pilots fly the Hurricanes themselves Thiswould not diminish our flying strength in this country

The operation against Lulea [in the Baltic] hasbecome less important now that the Germans havecontrol of all the French and Belgian orefields We mustlook to the Mediterranean for action

You were going to let me have your plan forexchanging destroyers of more endurance with theMediterranean flotilla Could I have this with dates

To this Admiral Pound replied through the First Lord thesame day

We have now gained experience of the airconditions in the Western Mediterranean and as soonas the present operation on which the Eastern Fleet isemployed is completed we shall know pretty well whatwe are faced with in the Eastern Mediterranean

There is no doubt that both Force H and the EasternMediterranean Fleet work under a grave disadvantageinasmuch as it is not possible to give them fighterprotection as we do in the North Sea when ships are inthe bombing area

At the moment we are faced with the immediateproblem of getting aircraft and A-A guns to Malta andaircraft to Alexandria I am not at all certain that the riskof passing a ship with all these available stores throughthe Mediterranean is not too great and that it might notbe better to accept the delay of sending her round theCape

There is also the question of Illustrious to beconsidered but this need not be settled immediately asshe must first come home to embark a full complementof Fulmar fighters

Arrangements arc being made to replace some ofthe destroyers at Gibraltar by others with longerendurance but the date on which they leave will


probably be dependent on the escorting of the ship Ihave referred to above to Gibraltar

Prime Minister to theFirst Sea Lord

15VII40

1 It is now three weeks since I vetoed the proposalto evacuate the Eastern Mediterranean and bringAdmiral Cunninghamrsquos fleet to Gibraltar I hope therewill be no return to that project Anyone can see the riskfrom air attack which we run in the Central Mediter-ranean From time to time and for sufficient objects thisrisk will have to be faced Warships are meant to gounder fire Our position would be very different if I hadbeen assisted in my wish in October of last year toreconstruct the Royal Sovereign class with heavy anti-aircraft armour on their decks at a cost to their speedthrough increased bulging The difficulties which werepresented at every stage were such as to destroy thisproposal and we are no further on than we were a yearago If we had the Royal Sovereigns armoured andtheir guns cocked up or some of them we couldassault the Italian coasts by bombardment withcomparative impunity1 The various Boards ofAdmiralty which preceded this war altogetherunderrated the danger of air attack and authorisedsweeping statements to Parliament on the ability ofships of war to cope with it Now there is a tendency toproceed to the other extreme and consider it wrong toendanger His Majestyrsquos ships by bringing them underair bombardment as must from time to time benecessary in pursuance of operationshellip

It may be taken for certain that the scale of theenemyrsquos air attack will increase in the Mediterranean asthe Germans come there

2 It becomes of high and immediate importance tobuild up a very strong anti-aircraft defence at Maltaand to base several squadrons of our best fighteraircraft there This will have to be done under the fire of


the enemy I should be glad to know the full scale ofdefence which was proposed in various papers I haveseen The emplacements should be made forthwith Iunderstand that a small consignment of AA guns andHurricanes is now being procured and that the mainequipment is to follow later It may well be possible atthe end of this month to detach the larger consignmentfrom our home defence The urgent first consignmentshould reach Malta at the earliest moment The storesmay be divided between several ships so as to avoidlosing all if one is hit The immense delay involved inpassing these ships round the Cape cannot beaccepted So far as Malta is concerned it is not seenhow the dangers will be avoided by this deacutetour thevoyage from Alexandria to Malta being if anythingmore dangerous than the voyage from Gibraltar toMalta

3 Illustrious Considering that in the North Sea andAtlantic we are on the defensive and that no one wouldpropose to bring Illustrious into the narrow waters northand south of Dover where we have already good shore-based aircraft our aircraft-carriers in home waters willbe able to operate some distance from the enemyrsquoscoast In the Mediterranean on the other hand wemust take the offensive against Italy and endeavourespecially to make Malta once again a Fleet base forspecial occasions Illustrious with her armoured deckwould seem to be better placed in the Mediterraneanand the Ark Royal in the home theatre The delays inbringing Illustrious into service have been very greatand I should be glad to know when the Fulmar [fastfighter aircraft] will be embarked and she be ready toexchange with Ark Royal

4 I am very glad that arrangements will be made tosend out destroyers of longer radius to Gibraltar and tobring home the short-radius vessels to the Narrow Seas


Meanwhile Admiralty policy had again been most carefullyscrutinised and on July 15 the intention to maintain astrong force in the Eastern Mediterranean was reiterated ina signal to the Commander-in-Chief This message statedthat in the East the chief British task would be to destroy theenemy naval forces although they had a numericalpreponderance In the West Force H would control thewestern exit from the Mediterranean and undertakeoffensive operations against the coast of Italy I was ingeneral agreement with this strong policy The Commander-in-Chief was invited to say what heavy ships he considerednecessary for the two forces and if redistribution werethought desirable to advise whether the exchange shouldtake place through the Mediterranean or round the CapeIn reply he asked that both the Valiant and the Barhamshould join him This would give him four battleships withthe best available gun-range and speed He could thendispense with the Royal Sovereign as with her poor deckprotection and inferior speed she was a constant source ofanxiety Furthermore he required two carriers including theIllustrious and two eight-inch cruisers He agreed with theFirst Sea Lord that in the Western Mediterranean a forcecomprising the Hood and the Ark Royal with either one ortwo ldquoRrdquo class battleships would meet requirements Withthese forces he considered that the Mediterranean could bedominated and the Eastern basin held indefinitely providedthat Malta was adequately protected by fighters and that hisresources at Alexandria were built-up In conclusion hesaid ldquoBy carrying out a concerted movement it should bepossible to pass reinforcements through the Mediterraneanbut it would probably be desirable to do it all in oneoperationrdquo


We thus reached a considerable measure of agreement inour talks at the Admiralty It was common ground betweenus that Admiral Cunninghamrsquos fleet should be reinforced bya battleship an aircraft carrier and two cruisers and at thesame time the opportunity should be taken to run a convoyof store ships to Malta from Alexandria Thereafter on July23 the First Sea Lord in the course of a Minute to the FirstLord and me said

Full consideration has been given as to whether it ispossible to pass through the Mediterranean not onlythe additional fighting ships which are being added tothe Eastern Mediterranean force but also merchantvessels containing spare ammunition for the Fleet high-angle guns for Malta and aircraft for Malta and theMiddle East The Commander-in-Chief is definitely ofthe opinion that under existing conditions it will beunsound to attempt to pass through the CentralMediterranean merchant vessels containing valuablecargoes as if one or more ships were damaged in sucha way as to reduce their speed it would be necessaryto scuttle them I am entirely in agreement with theCommander-in-Chief

Thus it came about that the plan for the important operationwhich followed under the code name ldquoHatsrdquo did not includeprovision for the passage of merchant ships None the lesswith the full support of Admiral Cunningham it challengedthe Italian Fleet and Air Force in the Central MediterraneanI was now well content with the main decisions which theAdmiralty were taking and hoped that they might lead to atrial of strength All preparations therefore went forwardA few weeks later the bold and far-reaching step of the WarCabinet with the full agreement of the Chiefs of Staff tosend nearly half our best available tanks to Egypt in spite ofthe invasion menace raised the question of theMediterranean passage again and in a sharper way I was


of course in full accord with sending the tanks but I fearedthat if they went round the Cape they might arrive too latefor the battle on which the fate of Egypt depended TheFirst Sea Lord was at first inclined to run the risk but onfurther study he thought it would complicate operationldquoHatsrdquo which now held the centre of the Admiralty stage Itinvolved sending at least two fast mechanical transportships (16 knots) from Gibraltar to Malta and this wasregarded as more dangerous than sending them by theroute from Alexandria This led to further discussion


11VIII40

I cannot accept this proposal [ie to use the Caperoute for sending the tanks to Egypt] which deprives usof invaluable resources [fifty Infantry tanks or ldquoIrdquo tanks]during a most critical period without making themavailable for the Middle East at the moment when theyare most needed there I must ask the Admiralty tomake further proposals and overcome the difficulties Ifnecessary could not the personnel be distributedamong the destroyers a larger force of destroyersbeing sent through from Force ldquoHrdquo to the EasternMediterranean and returned thereafter in the sameway as the six destroyers are now being sent westwardby Admiral Cunningham

There is no objection to the 3d Hussars (thepersonnel of a tank regiment) going by the Cape asGeneral Wavell can make temporary arrangements formanning [the tanks] in the meanwhile so long as hegets their light tanks I am prepared to risk the fiftyInfantry tanks in the Mediterranean provided theirpersonnel is distributed among HM ships but therecan be no question of them or their personnel going bythe Cape thus making sure they are out of everythingfor two months The personnel sent through the


Mediterranean must be cut down to essentials thebalance going round

Pray let me have further proposals by tomorrow(Monday)


13VIII40

1 Just before the French went out of the warAdmiral Darlan bombarded Genoa in full daylightwithout any Asdic destroyer protection or any aircraftprotection and returned to Toulon unscathed TheEastern Mediterranean Fleet has three times advancedto the centre of the Mediterranean and returned toAlexandria with only one ship ndashGloucesterndash hit by onebomb A few weeks ago a fast and a slow convoy wereconducted uninjured from Malta to Alexandria ndash twodays of their voyage being beset by Italian aircraft

2 The Admiralty now propose to send six destroyersfrom Alexandria to meet Force ldquoHrdquo These destroyerswhich will certainly be detected from the air will bewithin air-attacking distance of the very numerous fastItalian cruiser forces in their home bases Thismovement should be rightly condemned as hazardousin the extreme but for the just estimation in which Italiannaval enterprise is held by C-in-C Mediterranean andthe Admiralty

3 We are now told that it is too dangerous for thepowerful forces we shall have in motion in the nearfuture to carry through to the Eastern Mediterraneantwo MT [mechanical transport] ships steaming incompany at only fifteen knots Yet at the same time weare asked to spend vast sums fortifying a large part ofthe western coasts of Britain against what the Admiraltydeclare is a possible invasion by twelve thousand menembarked and shipped [from the River] Gironde [orfrom] St Nazaire who are to be sent to their destina-tion without any warship protection of any kind If it isheld to be a feasible operation to move twelvethousand men unescorted onto the Irish or Britishwestern coasts in the face of the full British sea-power


can this be reconciled with the standard of danger-values now adopted in the Mediterranean

4 No one can see where or when the main attackon Egypt will develop It seems however extremelylikely that if the Germans are frustrated in an invasionof Great Britain or do not choose to attempt it they willhave great need to press and aid the Italians to theattack of Egypt The month of September must beregarded as critical in the extreme

5 In these circumstances it is very wrong that weshould attempt to send our armoured brigade round theCape thus making sure that during September it canplay no part either in the defence of England or Egypt

6 I request that the operation of passing at least twoMT ships through with the Eastern reinforcementsmay be re-examined The personnel can be distributedin the warships and it is a lesser risk from the point ofview of the general war to pass the MT ships throughthe Mediterranean than to have the whole armouredbrigade certainly out of action going round the CapeSo long as the personnel are properly distributedamong the warships I am prepared to take the fullresponsibility for the possible loss of the armouredvehicles

I was not able to induce the Admiralty to send the armouredbrigade or at least their vehicles through theMediterranean I was both grieved and vexed at thisThough my friendship for Admiral Pound and confidence inhis judgment were never affected sharp argument wasmaintained The professional responsibility was his and nonaval officer with whom I ever worked would run more risksthan he We had gone through a lot together If he wouldnot do it no one else would If I could not make him no oneelse could I knew the Admiralty too well to press them ormy great friend and comrade Pound or the First Lord forwhom I had high esteem beyond a certain point Myrelations with the Admiralty were too good to be imperilledby a formal appeal to the Cabinet against them


When on August 15 I brought the question before theCabinet finally I said that I had hoped to persuade theAdmiralty to fit the two armoured regiments into ldquoOperationHatsrdquo If the tank-units proceeded through theMediterranean they would arrive in Alexandria aboutSeptember 5 if by the Cape about three weeks laterHowever the Chief of the Imperial General Staff did notconsider that an attack in force by the Italians wasimminent and this was also General Wavellrsquos view Havingdone my utmost in favour of the short cut I thought that theWar Cabinet ought not to take the responsibility ofoverruling the judgment of the commanders and Iacquiesced in the longer voyage round the Cape withregret The Chiefs of Staff however prepared an alternativeplan for the short cut should the position in the Middle Eastsuddenly worsen before ldquoOperation Hatsrdquo was actuallylaunched Two fast MT ships carrying Cruiser and ldquoIrdquo tankswould accompany the naval forces through theMediterranean The decision was to be taken before thereinforcements passed Gibraltar In the event reportsreceived from the Middle East were not considered to justifyputting the alternative plan into force and the whole convoycontinued on its way round the CapeldquoOperation Hatsrdquo was carried out successfully and withoutloss between August 30 and September 5 AdmiralCunningham left Alexandria on August 30 and on theevening of the 31st his aircraft reported the approach of anenemy force of two battleships and seven cruisers Hopesof an engagement were raised but evidently the Italianswere not seeking trouble and nothing happened Thefollowing evening our aircraft again made contact with theenemy who were now retiring to Taranto ThereafterAdmiral Cunninghamrsquos ships moved about with completefreedom to the east and south of Malta and were not


seriously molested from the air The convoy reached Maltasafely only one ship being damaged by air attackMeanwhile the reinforcements consisting of the Valiant butnot her unreconstructed sister-ship the Barham the aircraft-carrier Illustrious and two anti-aircraft cruisersaccompanied by Admiral Somerville with Force ldquoHrdquo wereapproaching from Gibraltar The Valiant and the cruisershad no difficulty in landing much-needed guns andammunition in Malta and then joined Admiral Cunninghamto the eastward on September 3 During the return passageto Alexandria the fleet attacked Rhodes and Scarpanto andeasily repulsed an E-boat attack Admiral Somervillersquos forcereturned to Gibraltar without being molested in any wayAll this convinced me that it would have been a fair riskespecially compared with those we were resolutely runningin seriously depleting our armour at home in the teeth of theenemyrsquos invasion preparations to transport the armouredbrigade through the Malta channel and that it would nowbe in Egypt instead of more than three weeks away Noserious disaster did in fact occur in Egypt during those threeweeks Nevertheless an exaggerated fear of Italian aircrafthad been allowed to hamper naval operations I thoughtand think the event proved my case Towards the end ofNovember Admiral Somerville with Force ldquoHrdquo did in factsuccessfully escort a convoy to Malta from the westwardand on the way fought a partial action near Sardinia withthat part of the Italian Fleet which had escaped damage atTaranto One ship of this convoy passed on to Alexandriatogether with three more store ships from Malta escortedby further Fleet reinforcements for the EasternMediterranean This was the first time that a merchant shipmade the complete passage of the Mediterranean after theItalian entry into the war The reader will see in the nextvolume how a still more hazardous exploit was performed


by the Navy in sending tanks to Egypt in 1941 when theGerman Air Force was fully established in Sicily


7IX40

1 The course of ldquoOperation Hatsrdquo makes me quitesure that it was wrong to recede from the idea ofpassing the armoured vehicles through the Mediter-ranean If you will read my Minute reciting all thereasons why this course should be adopted you will seethat they are reinforced by new facts nowhellip


7IX40

I should be glad if you would let me have a shortresume of the different occasions when I pressed asFirst Lord for the preparation of the Ramillies classships to withstand air bombardment by thick deckarmour and larger bulges If those ships had been putin hand when I repeatedly pressed for them to be weshould now have the means of attacking the Italianshores which might be productive of the highestpolitical and military results Even now there is adisposition to delay taking this most necessary stepand no substitute is offered

I have not yet heard from you in reply to the Minute Isent you renewing this project of reconstruction in thehope that we may not be equally destitute of bombard-ing vessels next year I shall be glad to have a talk withyou on this subject when I have refreshed my mind withthe papers

This issue could never at any moment be decided withoutbalancing other bitter needs in new construction It was on


this rock and not on differences of principle that my wishesfinally foundered


8IX40

Following for Sir Andrew Cunningham C-in-CEastern Mediterranean from Prime Minister andMinister of Defence

I congratulate you on the success of the recentoperation in the Eastern and Central Mediterraneanand upon the accession to your Fleet of two of ourfinest units with other valuable vessels I am sorryhowever that the armoured brigade which is sonecessary to the defence of Egypt and Alexandria isstill separated by more than three weeks from its sceneof action I hope you will find it possible to review thenaval situation in the light of the experience gainedduring ldquoHatsrdquo and the arrival of Illustrious and ValiantNot only the paper strength of the Italian Navy but alsothe degree of resistance which they may be inclined tooffer should be measured It is of high importance tostrike at the Italians this autumn because as timepasses the Germans will be more likely to lay stronghands upon the Italian war machine and then thepicture will be very different We intend to strengthenthe anti-aircraft defences of Malta by every possiblemeans and some novel weapons of which I have highhopes will shortly be sent there for experiment I trustthat Malta may become safe for temporary visits of theFleet at an earlier date than April 1941 If in themeanwhile you have any proposals for offensive actionto make they should be transmitted to the Admiralty Ishall be glad if you will also concert with the Army andAir Force plans for an operation against the Italiancommunications in Libya which at the right time couldbe used to hamper any large-scale offensive againstEgypt The advantages of gaining the initiative areobviously very great I hope the Fulmars [the fast fighterplanes which had at last reached our aircraft-carriers]


have made a good impression The battle here for airmastery continues to be severe but firm confidence isfelt in its eventual outcome

It is surprising that the violent impact of the air upon ourcontrol of the Mediterranean had not been more plainlyforeseen by the British Government before the war and bytheir expert advisers In any case however we had fallenso far behind in the air race with Germany that the defenceof Britain made an overwhelming demand on the alreadyoutnumbered forces we possessed Until the Battle ofBritain had been decisively won every reinforcement ofaircraft to the Mediterranean and Egypt had been an act ofacute responsibility Even in the winter months when wefelt we were masters of our own daylight air at home it wasvery hard under the full fury of the Blitz to send away fighteraircraft either to Malta or to Egypt It was also most painfulto take from bombarded British cities and vital seaports andmunitions factories the anti-aircraft guns and shells sorelyneeded for their protection and to send these either allround the Cape to Egypt or at much peril direct to MaltaThe reinforcement of Maltarsquos hitherto neglected airdefences was pressed forward in spite of losses anddisappointments Among the tasks of Admiral Somervillersquosforce at Gibraltar was the convoying of fighter aircraft in acarrier to within flying distance of Malta The first of theseefforts was made in the beginning of August when twelveHurricanes were flown into the island from the aircraft-carrier Argus Until their arrival the air defence of Maltaconsisted of three Gladiators known locally by theaffectionate names of ldquoFaithrdquoldquoHoperdquo and ldquoCharityrdquo Wemade a second attempt in November but there was atragedy Nine aircraft out of fourteen which had beenlaunched from the Argus four hundred miles to thewestward of the island ran out of fuel on the way through a


change of wind and perished at sea with their devotedpilots Never again were the margins cut so fine andthough many similar operations took place in the futurenever did such a catastrophe recur

It had also become necessary to find a way of sendingaircraft to the Middle East which would avoid both thedangers of the Mediterranean and the fearful delay aroundthe Cape An overland route from West Africa would savemany vital days and some shipping The machines hadeither to be flown ashore from an aircraft-carrier ordismantled and crated for the voyage and thenreassembled at some port for their flight The choice laybetween Lagos and TakoradiAfter careful examination Takoradi was chosen and asearly as August 211940 an operating party arrived Thecourse lay by Kano to Khartoum and eventually to Cairo atotal distance of 3700 miles Considerable workshops andaccommodation had to be built at Takoradi and variousrefuelling and rest stations provided along the route Adozen crated Hurricanes and Blenheims arrived by sea onSeptember 5 followed next day by thirty Hurricanes landedfrom the carrier Argus The first delivery flight left Takoradion September 20 and arrived at Khartoum four days laterBy the end of the year a trickle of a hundred and sevenplanes had reached Egypt in this wayAlthough a quick start had been made many monthsrsquo workwere needed before the route was organised The climateat Takoradi and the local malaria harassed the menerecting the crated aircraft The use of the carriers waslimited by other clamant needs Weather hampered the airconvoys The number of aircraft unserviceable awaiting


spares along the route piled up The heavy wear onengines in their flight over vast barren sandy spacesreduced their fighting life Terrible teething trouble had to beovercome None of this aircraft supply was effective in1940 But if we had not begun in good time the Army of theNile and all its ventures could not have lived through thetragic events of 1941

By the close of 1940 the British Navy had once more firmlyestablished itself in the Mediterranean The defences ofMalta had been considerably strengthened by AdmiralSomervillersquos excursions to carry in AA and otherequipment Admiral Cunninghamrsquos offensive policy in theEastern Basin had also yielded excellent resultsEverywhere despite the Italian air strength we held theinitiative and Malta remained in the foreground of eventsas an advanced base for offensive operations against theItalian communications with their forces in Africa


8September Tensions

Climax of the Air Battle mdash Intense Strain upon theFighter Pilots mdash Evidences of the ImpendingInvasion mdash Disappointing Bombing on Concentra-tions ofBarges mdash Britain Braced mdash MunitionsPolicy mdash My General Directive mdash A Survey of1941 Requirements in Material mdash An EightMonthsrsquo ProgrammemdashMy October Note onPriorities mdash Laggards mdash Climax at Home and inEgypt mdash The Perils of FogmdashNeed for De WildeAmmunition mdash Achievements of the Ministry ofAircraft ProductionmdashPolicy of Creating Comman-dos Enforced mdash Advance of Marshal GrazianirsquosArmy September 13 mdashTheir Halt at Sidi Barranimdash Arrival of the Armoured Brigade in Egypt mdashParlous Conditions at MaltamdashTroubles that NeverHappened

SEPTEMBER like June was a month of extreme opposingstresses for those who bore the responsibility for British wardirection The air battle already described on which alldepended raged with its greatest fury and rose steadily toits climax The victory of the Royal Air Force on September15 is seen now in retrospect to have marked its decisiveturning-point But this was not apparent at the time norcould we tell whether even heavier attacks were not to beexpected or how long they would go on The fine weatherfacilitated daylight fighting on the largest scale Hitherto we


had welcomed this but when I visited Air Vice-Marshal Parkat Number 11 Group in the third week of September Inoticed a slight but definite change in outlook I askedabout the weather and was told it was set fair for somedays to come This however did not seem to be as populara prospect as it had been at the beginning of the month Ihad the distinct feeling that a break in the weather would nolonger be regarded as a misfortuneIt happened while I was there in Parkrsquos room with severalofficers that an officer brought in a notification from the AirMinistry that all supplies of De Wilde ammunition wereexhausted This was the favourite of the fighter pilots Thefactory on which it depended had been bombed I saw thatthis hit Park hard but after a gulp and a pause he repliedmagnificently ldquoWe fought them without it before and wecan fight them without it againrdquoIn my talks with Air Marshal Dowding who usually motoredover from Uxbridge to Chequers during the week-ends thesense of Fighter Command being at its utmost strain wasevident The weekly figures over which I pored showed wehad adequate numbers provided the weight of the hostileattack did not increase But the physical and mentalstresses upon the pilots were not reflected on the papercharts For all their sublime devotion often facing odds offive and six to one for all the sense of superiority whichtheir continued success and the enemyrsquos heavy lossescreated there are limits to human endurance There is sucha thing as sheer exhaustion both of the spirit and theanimal I thought of Wellingtonrsquos mood in the afternoon ofthe Battle of Waterloo ldquoWould God that night or Bluecherwould comerdquo This time we did not want BluecherMeanwhile all the evidences of impending Germaninvasion multiplied Upwards of three thousand self-


propelled barges were counted on our air photographs inthe Dutch Belgian and French ports and river mouths Wecould not tell exactly what reserves of larger vessels mightnot be gathered in the Rhine estuary or in the Baltic fromwhich the Kiel Canal was still open In my examination ofthe invasion problem I have set forth the reasoning onwhich I based my confidence that we should beat them ifthey came and consequently that they would not comeand continued to contemplate the issue with a steady gazeAll the same it was impossible to watch these growingpreparations week after week in the photographs andreports of agents without a sense of awe A thing like thisgets hold of you bit by bit The terrible enemy would notcome unless he had solid assurance of victory and plansmade with German thoroughness Might there not also besurprises Might there be tank-landing craft or some cleverimprovisation of them What else might there not be Allour night-bombing was concentrated on the invasion portswhere every night German rehearsal exercises of marchingon and off the barges and other vessels seemed to betaking place The results of our bombing of the masses ofbarges which crowded the basins or lay along the quaysjudged by the photographs had several times disappointedme


23IX40

What struck me about these photographs was theapparent inability of the bombers to hit these very largemasses of barges I should have thought that sticks ofexplosive bombs thrown along these oblongs wouldhave wrought havoc and it is very disappointing to see


that they all remained intact and in order with just a fewapparently damaged at the entrance

Can nothing be done to improve matters

As already mentioned the Chiefs of Staff were on thewhole of the opinion that invasion was imminent while Iwas sceptical and expressed a contrary view Neverthelessit was impossible to quell that inward excitement whichcomes from the prolonged balancing of terrible thingsCertainly we strained every nerve to be ready Nothing wasneglected that could be achieved by the care and ingenuityof our commanders the vigilance of our now large andformidable armies and the unquenchable and fearlessspirit of our whole people

The whole of our war production and its priorities nowrequired to be reviewed in the light of our exclusion from theContinent In this I worked in consultation with the Ministerof Supply and others concerned At the beginning of thismonth after much labour in my small circle and carefulchecking I prepared for the Cabinet a general directiveupon munitions which was intended to govern our affairs in1941

THE MUNITIONS SITUATION

MEMORANDUM BY THE PRIME MINISTER

September 3 19401 The Navy can lose us the war but only the Air

Force can win it Therefore our supreme effort must beto gain overwhelming mastery in the air The Fightersare our salvation but the Bombers alone provide themeans of victory We must therefore develop thepower to carry an ever-increasing volume of explosivesto Germany so as to pulverise the entire industry and


scientific structure on which the war effort andeconomic life of the enemy depend while holding himat armrsquos length from our island In no other way atpresent visible can we hope to overcome the immensemilitary power of Germany and to nullify the furtherGerman victories which may be apprehended as theweight of their force is brought to bear upon African orOriental theatres The Air Force and its action on thelargest scale must therefore subject to what is saidlater claim the first place over the Navy or the Army

2 The weapon of blockade has become bluntedand rendered as far as Germany is concerned lesseffectual on account of their land conquests and powerto rob captive or intimidated peoples for their ownbenefit There remain no very important specialcommodities the denial of which will hamper their wareffort The Navy is at present somewhat pressed in itstask of keeping open the communications but as thiscondition is removed by new Admiralty measures bythe arrival of the American destroyers and by theincreasing output of anti-U-boat craft from our ownyards we may expect a marked improvement It is ofthe utmost importance that the Admiralty should directtheir attention to aggressive schemes of war and to thebombardment of enemy or enemy-held coastsparticularly in the Mediterranean The production of anti-U-boat craft must proceed at the maximum until furtherorders each slip being filled as it is vacated The NavalProgramme does not impinge markedly upon the Airand should cede some of its armour-plate to tankproduction

3 The decision to raise the Army to a strength offifty-five divisions as rapidly as possible does not seemto require any reconsideration Within this we shouldaim at ten armoured divisions five by the spring sevenby the summer and ten by the end of 1941 Theexecution of these programmes of armament supply willtax our munitions factories to the full I agree inprinciple with the proposals of the Minister of Supply[Mr Herbert Morrison] for handling the ammunitionsupply problem and also that firings on the 191718scale are not to be expected in the present war


4 Intense efforts must be made to complete theequipment of our Army at home and of our Army in theMiddle East The most serious weak points are tanksand small-arms ammunition particularly the specialtypes anti-tank guns and rifles and even more theirammunition trench mortars and still more theirammunition and rifles We hope to obtain an additionaltwo hundred and fifty thousand rifles from the UnitedStates but it is lamentable that we should be told thatno more than half a million additional rifles can bemanufactured here before the end of 1941 Surely aslarge numbers of our Regular Army proceed abroadthe need of the Home Guard and of garrison troops forhome defence on a far larger scale than at present willbe felt A substantial increase in rifle-making capacity isnecessary

5 The danger of invasion will not disappear with thecoming of winter and may confront us with novelpossibilities in the coming year The enemyrsquos need tostrike down this country will naturally increase as thewar progresses and all kinds of appliances for crossingthe seas that do not now exist may be devised Actualinvasion must be regarded as perpetually threatenedbut unlikely to materialise as long as strong forcesstand in this island Apart from this the only majortheatre of war which can be foreseen in 194041 is theMiddle East Here we must endeavour to bring intoaction British Australasian and Indian forces on ascale which should only be limited by sea transport andlocal maintenance We must expect to fight in Egyptand the Soudan in Turkey Syria or Palestine andpossibly in Iraq and Persia Fifteen British divisions sixAustralasian and at least six Indian divisions should beprepared for these theatres these forces not beinghowever additional to the fifty-five divisions which havebeen mentioned One would not imagine that theammunition expenditure would approach the last-warscale Air power and mechanised troops will be thedominant factors

6 There remain the possibilities of amphibiousaggressive warfare against the enemy or enemy-heldterritory in Europe or North Africa But the needs of


such operations will be provided by the arms andsupplies already mentioned in general terms

7 Our task as the Minister of Supply rightly remindsus is indeed formidable when the gigantic scale ofGerman military and aviation equipment is consideredThis war is not however a war of masses of menhurling masses of shells at each other It is by devisingnew weapons and above all by scientific leadershipthat we shall best cope with the enemyrsquos superiorstrength If for instance the series of inventions nowbeing developed to find and hit enemy aircraft bothfrom the air and from the ground irrespective ofvisibility realise what is hoped from them not only thestrategic but the munitions situation would beprofoundly altered And if the UP [unrotatedprojectiles] weapon can be provided with ammunitionpredictors and other aids which realise an accuracy ofhitting three or four times as great as that which nowexists the ground will have taken a long step towardsthe re-conquest of the air The Navy will regain much ofits old freedom of movement and power to takeoffensive action And the Army will be able to land atmany points without the risk of being ldquoNamsossedrdquo1We must therefore regard the whole sphere of RDF[Radar] with its many refinements and measurelesspossibilities as ranking in priority with the Air Force ofwhich it is in fact an essential part The multiplication ofthe high-class scientific personnel as well as thetraining of those who will handle the new weapons andresearch work connected with them should be the veryspearpoint of our thought and effort Very great reliefsmay be expected in anti-aircraft guns and ammunitionalthough it is at present too soon to alter present plans

8 Apart from a large-scale invasion which isunlikely there is no prospect of any large expenditureor wastage of military munitions before the spring of1941 Although heavy and decisive fighting maydevelop at any time in the Middle East the difficulties oftransport both of reinforcements and of supplies willrestrict numbers and expenditure We have thereforebefore us if not interrupted a period of eight months in


which to make an enormous improvement in our outputof warlike equipment and in which steady and rapidaccumulations may be hoped for It is upon thispurpose that all our resources of credit materials andabove all of skilled labour must be bent

This policy was generally accepted by my colleagues andthe action of all Departments conformed to it

I found it necessary in October to add a further note aboutPriorities which were a source of fierce contention betweenthe different Departments each striving to do its utmost

PRIORITIES


October 15 1940The very highest priority in personnel and material

should be assigned to what may be called the Radiosphere This demands scientists wireless experts andmany classes of highly skilled labour and high-gradematerial On the progress made much of the winning ofthe war and our future strategy especially Navaldepends We must impart a far greater accuracy to theAA guns and a far better protection to our warshipsand harbours Not only research and experiments butproduction must be pushed hopefully forward frommany directions and after repeated disappointmentswe shall achieve success

2 The IA priority must remain with aircraft produc-tion for the purpose of executing approved targetprogrammes It must be an obligation upon them tocontrive by every conceivable means not to let thispriority be abused and needlessly hamper other vitaldepartments For this purpose they should specify their


requirements in labour and material beforehand quarterby quarter or if practicable month by month andmake all surplus available for others immediately Thepriority is not to be exercised in the sense that aircraftproduction is completely to monopolise the supplies ofany limited commodity Where the condition prevailsthat the approved MAP demands absorb the totalsupply a special allocation must be made even atprejudice to aircraft production to provide the minimumessential needs of other departments or branches Thisallocation if not agreed will be decided on the Cabinetlevel

3 At present we are aiming at five armoureddivisions and armoured brigades equivalent to threemore This is not enough We cannot hope to competewith the enemy in numbers of men and must thereforerely upon an exceptional proportion of armouredfighting vehicles Ten armoured divisions is the target toaim for to the end of 1941 For this purpose the Armymust searchingly review their demands for mechanisedtransport and large purchases of MT must be made inthe United States The home Army working in thissmall island with highly developed communications ofall kinds cannot enjoy the same scale of transportwhich divisions on foreign service require Improvisationand makeshift must be their guides A staff officerrenders no service to the country who aims at idealstandards and thereafter simply adds and multipliesuntil impossible totals are reached A report should befurnished of mechanical transport first second andthird line of British divisions ndash

(1) For foreign service(2) For home service(3) For troops on the beaches

Any attempt to make heavy weather out of this

problem is a failure to aid us in our need


Wherever possible in England horse transportshould be used to supplement MT We improvidentlysold a great many of our horses to the Germans butthere are still a good many in Ireland

4 Special aid and occasional temporary prioritiesmust be given to the laggard elements Among thesestand out the following

(1) Rifles(2) Small-arms ammunition ndash above all the

special types

Intense efforts must be made to bring the new

factories into production The fact that scarcely anyimprovement is now expected until the end of the yearndash ie sixteen months after the outbreak of war ndash isgrave Twelve months should suffice for a cartridgefactory We have been mercifully spared from the worstconsequences of this failure through the armies notbeing in action as was anticipated

Trench mortar ammunition and A T gun ammuni-tion are also in a shocking plight and must be helped

All these laggards must be the subject of weeklyreports to the Production Council and to me

5 The Navy must exercise its existing priorities inrespect of small craft and anti-U-boat building Thisapplies also to merchant shipbuilding and to craft forlanding operations Delay must be accepted upon alllarger vessels that cannot finish in 1941 Plans must bemade to go forward with all processes and parts whichdo not clash with prior needs The utmost possible steeland armour-plate must be ordered in America

By the middle of September the invasion menace seemedsufficiently glaring to arrest further movement of vital unitsto the East especially as they had to go round the CapeAfter a visit to the Dover sector where the electricatmosphere was compulsive I suspended for a few weeks


the despatch of the New Zealanders and the remaining twotank battalions to the Middle East At the same time I keptour three fast transports ldquothe Glen [Line] shipsrdquo as theywere called in hand for an emergency dash through theMediterranean

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay for theChiefs of StaffCommittee

17IX40

In all the circumstances it would be impossible towithdraw the New Zealand Brigade from their forwardposition on the Dover promontory The two cruiser-tankbattalions cannot go Would it not be better to keep theAustralians back and delay the whole convoy until thethird week in October After all none of these forcesgoing round the Cape can possibly arrive in time toinfluence the impending battle in Egypt But they mayplay a big part here Perhaps by the third week inOctober the Admiralty will be prepared to run greaterrisks Anyhow we cannot afford to make sure that theNew Zealanders and the tank battalions are out ofaction throughout October in either theatre


19IX40

Be careful that the Glen ships are not got out of theway so that it will be impossible to take the armouredreinforcements through the Mediterranean if the need issufficient to justify the risk I donrsquot want to be told thereare no suitable vessels available

Let me know what other ships would be available ifwe should decide to run a convoy from west to eastthrough the Mediterranean about the third week inOctober


Although it was a fine September I was frightened of fog

Prime Minister toColonel Jacob

16IX40

Pray send a copy of this report by First Sea Lord[about invasion in fog] to the Chiefs of the Staff for C-in-C Home Forces adding ldquoI consider that fog is thegravest danger as it throws both air forces out ofaction baffles our artillery prevents organised navalattack and specially favours the infiltration tactics bywhich the enemy will most probably seek to secure hislodgments Should conditions of fog prevail thestrongest possible air barrage must be put down uponthe invasion ports during the night and early morning Ishould be glad to be advised of the proposed navalaction by our flotillas both in darkness and at dawn (a)if the fog lies more on the English than the French sideof the Channel (b) if it is uniform on both sides

ldquoAre we proposing to use radio aids to navigationldquoProlonged conditions of stand-by under frequent air

bombardment will be exhausting to the enemyNonetheless fog is our foerdquo

In spite of all the danger it was important not to wear themen out


18IX40

Inquire from the COS Committee whether in viewof the rough weather Alert Number 1 might not bediscreetly relaxed to the next grade

Report to me


18IX40


Make inquiries whether there is no way in which asheet of flaming oil can be spread over one or more ofthe invasion harbours This is no more than the old fire-ship story with modern improvements that was tried atDunkirk in the days of the Armada The Admiralty cansurely think of something


18IX40

The De Wilde ammunition is of extreme importanceAt Number 11 Group the bombing of its factory wasevidently considered a great blow I can quiteunderstand the output dropping to 38000 rounds in theweek while you are moving from Woolwich and gettingreinstated but I trust it will revive again Pray let meknow your future forecast for the next four weeks Ifthere is revival in prospect we might perhaps draw alittle upon our reserve


25IX40

I must show you the comments made upon thelatest returns of small-arms ammunition by myStatistical Department They cause me the greatestanxiety In particular the De Wilde ammunition which isthe most valuable is the most smitten It seems to methat a most tremendous effort must be made not onlyon the whole field of Marks 7 and 8 but on De Wildeand armour-piercing I am well aware of your difficultiesWill you let me know if there is any way in which I canhelp you to overcome them

The reader must pardon this next Minute


18IX40


Surely you can run to a new Admiralty flag It grievesme to see the present dingy object every morning

I was relieved by the results produced by the new Ministryof Aircraft Production

Prime Minister to LordBeaverbrook

21IX40

The figures you gave me of the improvement inoperational types between May 10 and August 30 aremagnificent If similar figures could be prepared downto September 30 which is not far off I should prefer toread them to the Cabinet rather than circulate them Ifhowever the September figures cannot be got until latein October I will read [what I now have] to the Cabinet

The country is your debtor and of your Ministry


25IX40

These wonderful results achieved under circum-stances of increasing difficulty make it necessary forme to ask you to convey to your Department thewarmest thanks and congratulations from His MajestyrsquosGovernment

Throughout the summer and autumn I wished to help theSecretary of State for War in his conflict with War Officeand Army prejudices about the commandos or stormtroops



25VIII40

I have been thinking over our very informal talk theother night and am moved to write to you because Ihear that the whole position of the commandos is beingquestioned They have been told ldquono more recruitingrdquoand that their future is in the melting-pot I thoughttherefore I might write to let you know how strongly Ifeel that the Germans have been right both in the lastwar and in this in the use they have made of stormtroops In 1918 the infiltrations which were so deadly tous were by storm troops and the final defence ofGermany in the last four months of 1918 rested mainlyupon brilliantly posted and valiantly fought machine-gunnests In this war all these factors are multiplied Thedefeat of France was accomplished by an incrediblysmall number of highly equipped eacutelite while the dullmass of the German Army came on behind made goodthe conquest and occupied it If we are to have anycampaign in 1941 it must be amphibious in itscharacter and there will certainly be many opportuni-ties for minor operations all of which will depend onsurprise landings of lightly equipped nimble forcesaccustomed to work like packs of hounds instead ofbeing moved about in the ponderous manner which isappropriate to the regular formations These havebecome so elaborate so complicated in theirequipment so vast in their transport that it is verydifficult to use them in any operations in which time isvital

For every reason therefore we must develop thestorm troop or commando idea I have asked for fivethousand parachutists and we must also have at leastten thousand of these small ldquobands of brothersrdquo whowill be capable of lightning action In this way alone willthose positions be secured which afterwards will givethe opportunity for highly trained Regular troops tooperate on a larger scale


I hope therefore that you will let me have anopportunity of discussing this with you before anyaction is taken to reverse the policy hitherto adopted orto throw into uncertainty all the volunteers who havebeen gathered together

The resistances of the War Office were obstinate andincreased as the professional ladder was descended Theidea that large bands of favoured ldquoirregularsrdquo with theirunconventional attire and free-and-easy bearing shouldthrow an implied slur on the efficiency and courage of theRegular battalions was odious to men who had given alltheir lives to the organised discipline of permanent unitsThe colonels of many of our finest regiments wereaggrieved ldquoWhat is there they can do that my battalioncannot This plan robs the whole Army of its prestige andof its finest men We never had it in 1918 Why nowrdquo Itwas easy to understand these feelings without sharingthem The War Office responded to their complaints But Ipressed hard


8IX40

You told me that you were in entire agreement withthe views I put forward about the special companiesand ending the uncertainty in which they were placedUnhappily nothing has happened so far of which thetroops are aware They do not know they are not undersentence of disbandment All recruiting has beenstopped although there is a waiting list and they arenot even allowed to call up the men who want to joinand have been vetted and approved Although thesecompanies comprise many of the best and most highlytrained of our personnel they are at present only armed


with rifles which seems a shocking waste should theybe thrown into the invasion melee I hope that you willmake sure that when you give an order it is obeyed withpromptness Perhaps you could explain to me what hashappened to prevent your decision from being madeeffective In my experience of Service Departmentswhich is a long one there is always a danger thatanything contrary to Service prejudices will beobstructed and delayed by officers of the second gradein the machine The way to deal with this is to makesignal examples of one or two When this becomesknown you get a better service afterwards

Perhaps you will tell me about this if you can dinewith me tonight

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar (Mr Eden)

21IX40

I am not happy about the equipment position of thecommandos It is a waste of this fine material to leavethem without sufficient equipment for training purposesmuch less for operations

Pray let me have a statement showing

1

What equipment has already been issued tothe various commandos

2

What is the output scale of equipment whichthese units are to have

3

What can be issued to them immediately fortraining purposes

I should like to have a return each week showing theprecise position as regards the equipment of thevarious Commandos


Prime Minister to C-in-C Home Forces (SirAlan Brooke)

21IX40

We often hear tales of how the Germans will invadeon an enormous front trying to throw say a quarter ofa million men ashore anyhow and trusting afterwardsto exploit lodgments which are promising For an attackof this kind our beach defence system seems admirablydevised The difficulty of defending an island againstoverseas attack has always consisted in the power ofthe invader to concentrate a very superior force at onepoint or another But if he is going to spread himself outvery widely the bulk of his forces if they reach shorewill come up against equal or superior forces spreadalong the coast It will be a case of one thin line againstanother Whereas I can readily imagine a concentratedattack pressed forward with tremendous numberssucceeding against our thin line I find it difficult to seewhat would be the good of his landing large numbers ofsmall parties none of which would be strong enough tobreak our well-organised shore defence If he is goingto lose say a hundred thousand in the passage andanother hundred and fifty thousand are to be broughtup short at the beaches the actual invasion would berather an expensive process and the enemy wouldhave sustained enormous losses before we had evenset our reserves in motion If therefore there isanything in this alleged German plan it seems to me itshould give us considerable satisfaction Far moredangerous would be the massed attack on a fewparticular selected points

Perhaps you will talk to me about this when we nextmeet


Our anxieties about the Italian invasion of Egypt were itnow appears far surpassed by those of Marshal Grazianiwho commanded it Ciano notes in his diary

August 8 1940 Graziani has come to see me Hetalks about the attack on Egypt as a very seriousundertaking and says that our present preparations arefar from perfect He attacks Badoglio who does notcheck the Ducersquos aggressive spirit ndash a fact which ldquofor aman who knows Africa means that he must suffer fromsoftening of the brain or what is worse from bad faithThe water supply is entirely insufficient We movetoward a defeat which in the desert must inevitablydevelop into a rapid and total disasterrdquo

I reported this to the Duce who was very muchupset about it because in his last conversation withGraziani he had received the impression that theoffensive would start in a few days Graziani did not setany date with me He would rather not attack at all orat any rate not for two or three months Mussoliniconcluded that ldquoone should only give jobs to peoplewho are looking for at least one promotion Grazianirsquosonly anxiety is to remain a Marshalrdquo1

A month later the Commander-in-Chief asked for a furthermonthrsquos postponement Mussolini however replied that ifhe did not attack on Monday he would be replaced TheMarshal answered that he would obey ldquoNeverrdquo says Cianoldquohas a military operation been undertaken so much againstthe will of the commandersrdquoOn September 13 the main Italian army began its long-expected advance across the Egyptian frontier Their forcesamounted to six infantry divisions and eight battalions oftanks Our covering troops consisted of three battalions ofinfantry one battalion of tanks three batteries and twosquadrons of armoured cars They were ordered to make afighting withdrawal an operation for which their quality and


desert-worthiness fitted them The Italian attack openedwith a heavy barrage of our positions near the frontier townof Sollum When the dust and smoke cleared the Italianforces were seen ranged in a remarkable order In frontwere motor-cyclists in precise formation from flank to flankand front to rear behind them were light tanks and manyrows of mechanical vehicles In the words of a Britishcolonel the spectacle resembled ldquoa birthday party in theLong Valley at Aldershotrdquo The 3d Cold-stream Guards whoconfronted this imposing array withdrew slowly and ourartillery took its toll of the generous targets presented tothemFarther south two large enemy columns moved across theopen desert south of the long ridge that runs parallel to thesea and could be crossed only at Halfaya ndash the ldquoHellfirePassrdquo which played its part in all our later battles EachItalian column consisted of many hundreds of vehicles withtanks anti-tank guns and artillery in front and with lorriedinfantry in the centre This formation which was severaltimes adopted we called the ldquoHedgehogrdquo Our forces fellback before these great numbers taking every opportunityto harass the enemy whose movements seemed erraticand indecisive Graziani afterwards explained that at thelast moment he decided to change his plan of anenveloping desert movement and ldquoconcentrate all myforces on the left to make a lightning movement along thecoast to Sidi Barranirdquo Accordingly the great Italian massmoved slowly forward along the coast road by two paralleltracks They attacked in waves of infantry carried in lorriessent forward in fifties The Coldstream Guards fell backskilfully at their convenience from Sollum to successivepositions for four days inflicting severe punishment as theywent


On the 17th the Italian Army reached Sidi Barrani Ourcasualties were forty killed and wounded and the enemyrsquosabout five times as many including a hundred and fiftyvehicles destroyed Here with their communicationslengthened by sixty miles the Italians settled down tospend the next three months They were continuallyharassed by our small mobile columns and sufferedserious maintenance difficulties Mussolini at first wasldquoradiant with joy He has taken the entire responsibility ofthe offensive on his shouldersrdquo says Ciano ldquoand is proudthat he was rightrdquo As the weeks lengthened into monthshis satisfaction diminished It seemed however certain tous in London that in two or three months an Italian army farlarger than any we could gather would renew the advanceto capture the Delta And then there were always theGermans who might appear We could not of courseexpect the long halt which followed Grazianirsquos advance Itwas reasonable to suppose that a major battle would befought at Mersa Matruh The weeks that had alreadypassed had enabled our precious armour to come roundthe Cape without the time-lag so far causing disadvantageIt was now approaching


14IX40

I hope the armoured brigade will be in time I haveno doubt it could have been conducted safely throughthe Mediterranean and the present danger that it willbe too late averted It must however be rememberedthat General Wavell himself joined in the declaration ofthe Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy Army and Airthat the situation in Egypt did not warrant the risk It


was this declaration that made it impossible for me tooverride the Admiralty objections as I would otherwisehave done

(Action this day)Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar (General Ismayto see)

19IX40

The armoured reinforcements are now in the Gulf ofAden We have been assured that of course GeneralWavell has made all arrangements to get them intoaction as quickly as possible I hope this is so I amsorry that someone like Lord Beaverbrook is not waitingon the quay to do the job of passing them to the fightingline We must do the best we can Has it beenconsidered whether it would be better to carry thesevehicles through the Canal to Alexandria and debarkthem there close to the front or have special trains andrailway cars cranes and other facilities beenaccumulated at Suez Let the alternatives be examinedhere Without waiting for this let a telegram be draftedinquiring about the alternatives and the arrangementsnow made by General Wavell Every day and evenevery hour counts in this matter

All the time I had a fear for Malta which seemed almostdefenceless


21IX40

This telegram [from Governor and C-in-C Malta]confirms my apprehensions about Malta Beachesdefended on an average battalion front of fifteen milesand no reserves for counter-attack worth speaking ofleave the island at the mercy of a landing force You


must remember that we do not possess the commandof the sea around Malta The danger thereforeappears to be extreme I should have thought fourbattalions were needed but owing to the difficulty ofmoving transports from the west we must be contentwith two for the moment We must find two good onesApparently there is no insuperable difficulty inaccommodation

When I look back on all these worries I remember the storyof the old man who said on his deathbed that he had had alot of trouble in his life most of which had never happenedCertainly this is true of my life in September 1940 TheGermans were beaten in the Air Battle of Britain Theoverseas invasion of Britain was not attempted In fact bythis date Hitler had already turned his glare to the East TheItalians did not press their attack upon Egypt The tankbrigade sent all round the Cape arrived in good time notindeed for a defensive battle of Mersa Matruh inSeptember but for a later operation incomparably moreadvantageous We found means to reinforce Malta beforeany serious attack from the air was made upon it and noone dared to try a landing upon the island fortress at anytime Thus September passed


9Dakar

Importance ofAiding General de GaullemdashPlan forLiberating DakarmdashNeed to Support the FreeFrench ForcesmdashMy Minute of August 8 1940 mdashThe War Cabinet Approves ldquoOperation MenacerdquomdashDangers of Delay and LeakagemdashMessage fromldquoJacquesrdquomdashOur Second StringmdashThe FrenchCruisers Sighted mdash A Failure at WhitehallmdashTooLate mdash I Advise the War Cabinet to Abandon theProjectmdashStrong Desire of the Commanders toAttackmdashGeneral de Gaullersquos Persistence mdash TheWar Cabinet Gives Full Discretion to the Comman-dersmdashMy Telegram to General Smuts andPresident RooseveltmdashThe Attack on Dakar mdashShips Versus FortsmdashStubborn Resistance of theVichy French mdash We Suffer Appreciable NavalLossesmdashCabinet and Commanders Agreed toBreak Off mdash Changes of Rocircle at Home and on theSpotmdashJustification of the CommandersmdashParliament Requires No Explanations

AT THIS TIME His Majestyrsquos Government attached greatimportance to aiding General de Gaulle and the FreeFrench to rally the African possessions and colonies ofFrance especially those upon the Atlantic coast Ourinformation was that a large portion of the French officersofficials and traders in all these territories had notdespaired They were stunned by the sudden collapse of


their motherland but being still free from Hitlerrsquos force andPeacutetainrsquos fraud were in no mood to surrender To themGeneral de Gaulle shone as a star in the pitch-black nightDistance gave them time and time gave them opportunityOnce it was clear that Casablanca was beyond ourstrength my mind naturally turned to Dakar In all this thesmall handling committee I formed to advise me personallyon French affairs was convinced and active On theevening of August 3 1940 I sent my general approval fromChequers to a proposal for landing Free French forces inWest Africa General de Gaulle Major-General Spears andMajor Morton had evolved a plan in outline of which theobject was to raise the Free French flag in West Africa tooccupy Dakar and thus consolidate the French colonies inWest and Equatorial Africa for General de Gaulle and laterto rally the French colonies in North Africa General Catrouxwas to come from Indo-China to England and eventuallytake command of the French North African colonies shouldthese be liberated later onOn August 4 the Chiefs of Staff Committee considered thedetails of this plan as worked out further by the JointPlanning Sub-Committee and drew up their report for theWar Cabinet The proposals of the Chiefs of Staff werebased on the three following assumptions first that theforce must be equipped and loaded so that it could land inany French West African port secondly that the expeditionshould consist entirely of Free French troops and have noBritish elements except the ships in which it moved andtheir naval escort thirdly that the matter should be settledas between Frenchmen so that the expedition would landwithout effective oppositionThe strength of the Free French force would be abouttwenty-five hundred men comprising two battalions a


company of tanks sections of artillery and engineers and abomber and a fighter flight for which we should supply theHurricanes This force could be ready at Aldershot onAugust 10 and it was estimated that transports andstoreships could sail from Liverpool on August 13 andtroopships between the 19th and 23d arriving at Dakar onthe 28th or at the other ports Konakri and Duala a fewdays later The War Cabinet approved these proposals attheir meeting on August 5It soon became clear that General de Gaulle required moreBritish support than the Chiefs of Staff had contemplatedThey represented to me that this would involvecommitments larger and more enduring than those whichhad been foreseen and also that the expedition wasbeginning to lose its Free French character Our resourceswere at this time so severely strained that this extensioncould not be lightly accepted However on August 6 Iconferred with General de Gaulle and at 11 PM on August7 I presided over a meeting of the Chiefs of StaffCommittee on the project It was agreed that the best placeto land the Free French force was Dakar I stated that theexpedition must be sufficiently backed by British troops toensure its success and asked for a larger plan on theselines The Chiefs of Staff dwelt upon the conflict between apolicy of improving our relations with Vichy and our interestsin marshalling the French colonies against Germany Theyset forth the danger that General de Gaullersquos movementmight lead to war with Metropolitan France and also withthe French Colonies If nevertheless reports from the FreeFrench agents on the spot and from our ownrepresentatives in the area were favourable theyrecommended that the expedition should go forward


Accordingly in the early hours of August 8 I issued thefollowing directive


8VIII40

1 The telegram from the Governor of Nigeria showsthe danger of German influence spreading quicklythrough the West African colonies of France with theconnivance or aid of the Vichy Government Unless weact with celerity and vigour we may find effective U-boat bases supported by German aviation all downthis coast and it will become barred to us but availablefor the Germans in the same way as the western coastof Europe

2 It is now six weeks since the Cabinet was stronglydisposed to action at Casablanca and Mr Duff Cooperand Lord Gort were despatched Nothing howevercame of this The local French were hostile The Chiefsof the Staff were not able to make any positiveproposals and the situation has markedly deteriorated

3 It would seem extremely important to Britishinterests that General de Gaulle should take Dakar atthe earliest moment If his emissaries report that it canbe taken peaceably so much the better If their reportis adverse an adequate Polish and British force shouldbe provided and full naval protection given Theoperation once begun must be carried through DeGaulle should impart a French character to it and ofcourse once successful his administration will rule Butwe must provide the needful balance of force

4 The Chiefs of the Staff should make a plan forachieving the capture of Dakar For this purpose theyshould consider available (a) de Gaullersquos force and anyFrench warships which can be collected (b) ampleBritish naval force both to dominate French warships inthe neighbourhood and to cover the landing (c) abrigade of Poles properly equipped (d) the Royal


Marine Brigade which was being held available for theAtlantic islands but might well help to put de Gaulleashore first or alternatively commandos from Sir RKeyesrsquos force (e) proper air support either by carrier orby machines working from a British West African colony

5 Let a plan be prepared forthwith and let the datesbe arranged in relation to the Mediterranean operation

6 It is not intended after Dakar is taken that weshall hold it with British forces General de Gaullersquosadministration would be set up and would have tomaintain itself British assistance being limited tosupplies on a moderate scale and of course preventingany sea-borne expedition from Germanised FranceShould de Gaulle be unable to maintain himselfpermanently against air attack or air-borne troops wewill take him off again after destroying all harbourfacilities We should of course in any case take overRichelieu under the French flag and have her repairedThe Poles and the Belgians would also have their goldwhich was moved before the armistice to Africa by theFrench Government for safety recovered for them

7 In working out the above plan time is vital Wehave lost too much already British ships are to be usedas transports whenever convenient and merely hoistFrench colours No question of Orders in Council orlegislation to transfer British transports to the Frenchflag need be considered

8 The risk of a French declaration of war andwhether it should be courted is reserved for the Cabinet

On August 13 I brought the matter before the War Cabinetexplaining that it went farther than the original plan of apurely French expedition The details of a landing of sixdifferent parties at dawn on the beaches near Dakar andthus dispersing the efforts of the defenders assuming therewas opposition were examined by my colleagues The WarCabinet approved the plan subject to consideration by the


Foreign Secretary upon the chances of Vichy Francedeclaring war Measuring the situation as far as I could Idid not believe this would happen I had now become setupon this venture I approved the appointment of Vice-Admiral John Cunningham and Major-General Irwin as thecommanders of the expedition They visited me atChequers on the night of August 12 and we went throughall the aspects of this doubtful and complex affair I draftedtheir instructions myselfI thus undertook in an exceptional degree the initiation andadvocacy of the Dakar expedition to which the code nameldquoMenacerdquo was assigned Of this although I cannot feel wewere well served on all occasions and certainly had badluck I never at any time repented Dakar was a prizerallying the French colonial empire a greater There was afair chance of gaining these results without bloodshed andI felt in my finger-tips that Vichy France would not declarewar The stubborn resistance of Britain the stern mood ofthe United States had lit new hope in French hearts If wewon Vichy could shrug its shoulders If we lost they couldtrade off their resistance with their German masters as avirtue The most serious danger was prolonged fighting Butthese were days in which far more serious risks were thecommonplaces of our daily life I conceived that ourresources albeit strained to the last inch and ounce couldjust manage it With invasion looming up ever nearer andmore imminent we had not shrunk from sending half ourtanks to Wavell for the defence of Egypt Compared to thatthis was a pup Our national War Cabinet Tory Labourand Liberal were hard resolute men imbued with anincreasing sense of playing a winning hand So all theorders were given and everything went forward underunchallengeable authority


Our two dangers were now delay and leakage and the firstaggravated the second At this time the Free French forcesin England were a band of exiled heroes in arms againstthe reigning Government of their country They were readyto fire on their own fellow-countrymen and accept thesinking of French warships by British guns Their leaderslay under sentence of death Who can wonder at still lessblame them for a tenseness of emotion or even forindiscretion The War Cabinet could give orders to our owntroops without anyone but the commanders and the Chiefsof Staff circle having to be informed of our intentions ButGeneral de Gaulle had to carry his gallant band ofFrenchmen with him Many got to know Dakar becamecommon talk among the French troops At a dinner in aLiverpool restaurant French officers toasted ldquoDakarrdquo Ourassault landing craft had to travel on trolleys acrossEngland from near Portsmouth to Liverpool and theirescort wore tropical kit We were all in our wartime infancyThe sealing of the island was not to be compared with whatwe achieved later in the supreme operations of ldquoTorchrdquo andldquoOverlordrdquoThen there were delays We had hoped to strike onSeptember 8 but now it appeared that the main force mustfirst go to Freetown to refuel and make their final poise Theplan was based upon the French troopships reaching Dakarin sixteen days at twelve knots It was found however thatthe ships carrying the mechanical transport could onlymake eight to nine knots and this discovery was reportedonly at a stage of loading when the time lost in reloadinginto faster ships offered no gain In all ten daysrsquo delay fromthe original date became inevitable five days for themiscalculation of the speed of the ships three days forunforeseen loading troubles two days for the refuelling atFreetown We must now be content with September 18


I presided over a meeting of the Chiefs of the Staff andGeneral de Gaulle on August 20 at 1030 PM and am onrecord as summing up the plan as follows

The Anglo-French Armada would arrive at Dakar atdawn aircraft would drop streamers and leaflets overthe town the British squadron would remain on thehorizon and French ships would come towards theport An emissary in a picket boat flying the Tricolourand a white flag would go into the harbour with a letterto the Governor saying that General de Gaulle and hisFree French troops had arrived General de Gaullewould stress in the letter that he had come to freeDakar from the danger of imminent German aggressionand was bringing food and succour to the garrison andinhabitants If the Governor was amenable all would bewell if not and the coast defences opened fire theBritish squadrons would close in If the oppositioncontinued the British warships would open fire on theFrench gun positions but with the utmost restraint Ifdetermined opposition was met with the British forceswould use all means to break down resistance It wasessential that the operation should be completed andGeneral de Gaulle master of Dakar by nightfall

General de Gaulle expressed his agreement

On the 22d we met again and a letter was read from theForeign Secretary to me disclosing a leakage ofinformation Exactly what this leakage amounted to no onecould tell The advantage of sea-power used offensively isthat when a fleet sails no one can be sure where it is goingto strike The seas are broad and the oceans broaderTropical kit was a clue no more definite than the Continentof Africa The wife of a Frenchman in Liverpool who wassuspected of Vichy contacts was known to be convincedthat the Mediterranean was the destination of thetroopships which were gathering in the Mersey Even theword ldquoDakarrdquo if bruited carelessly might be a blind Such


forms of ldquocoverrdquo were carried to remarkable refinements aswe became more experienced and wily I was worried bythe delays and beat against them As to the leakage nonecould tell At any rate on August 27 the Cabinet gave theirfinal general approval for going ahead Our target date wasthen September 19

At 624 PM on September 9 the British Consul-General atTangier cabled to Admiral North commanding the Atlanticstation ldquoa shore appointment at Gibraltarrdquo and repeated tothe Foreign Office

Following received from ldquoJacquesrdquo Frenchsquadron may try to pass the Straits proceedingwestward for unknown destination This attempt maybe timed to take place within the next seventy-twohours

The Admiral was not in the Dakar circle and took nospecial action The telegram was repeated from Tangiersimultaneously to the Foreign Office and received at 750 AM on the 10th At this time we were under almostcontinuous bombardment in London Owing to the recurrentstoppages of work through the air raids arrears hadaccumulated in the cipher branch The message was notmarked ldquoImportantrdquo and was deciphered only in its turn Itwas not ready for distribution until September 14 when atlast it reached the AdmiraltyBut we had a second string At 6 PM on September 10 theBritish Naval Attacheacute in Madrid was officially informed bythe French Admiralty that three French cruisers typeGeorges Leygues and three destroyers had left Toulonand intended to pass the Straits of Gibraltar on the morningof the 11th This was the normal procedure accepted at this


time by the Vichy Government and was a measure ofprudence taken by them only at the latest moment TheBritish Naval Attacheacute reported at once to the Admiralty andalso to Admiral North at Gibraltar The signal was receivedin the Admiralty at 1150 PM on September 10 It wasdeciphered and sent to the Duty Captain who passed it onto the Director of Operations Division (Foreign) It shouldhave been obvious to this officer who was himself fullyinformed of the Dakar expedition that the message was ofdecisive importance He took no instant action on it but letit go forward in the ordinary way with the First Sea Lordrsquostelegrams For this mistake he received in due course theexpression of their lordshipsrsquo displeasureHowever the destroyer Hotspur on patrol in theMediterranean sighted the French ships at 515 AM onSeptember 11 fifty miles to the east of Gibraltar andreported to Admiral North Admiral Somerville whocommanded Force ldquoHrdquo which was based on Gibraltar hadalso received a copy of the Naval Attacheacutersquos signal at eightminutes past midnight that same morning He brought theRenown to one hourrsquos notice for steam at 7 AM andawaited instructions from the Admiralty In consequence ofthe error in the Director of Operations Division and of thedelay at the Foreign Office upon the other message fromthe Consul-General the First Sea Lord knew nothing aboutthe passage of the French warships till Hotspurrsquos signal wasbrought to him during the Chiefs of Staff meeting before theCabinet He at once telephoned the Admiralty to orderRenown and her destroyers to raise steam This hadalready been done He then came to the War Cabinet Butthrough the coincidence of this failure of two separatecommunications ndash one from the Consul-General in Tangierand the other from the Naval Attacheacute in Madrid ndash andthrough lack of appreciation in various quarters all was too


late If the Consul-General had marked the first messageImportant or if either of the admirals at Gibraltar eventhough not in the secret had so considered it themselvesor if the Foreign Office had been working normally or if theDirector of Operations had given the second message thepriority which would have ensured the First Sea Lordrsquosbeing woken up to read it immediately the Renown couldhave stopped and parleyed with the French squadronpending decisive orders which would certainly have beengiven by the War Cabinet or till they could be summonedby meIn the event all our network of arrangements broke downand three French cruisers and three destroyers passed theStraits at full speed (twenty-five knots) at 835 AM on the11th and turned southward down the African coast TheWar Cabinet on being apprised instantly instructed theFirst Lord to order the Renown to get in touch with theFrench ships ask for their destination and make it clearthat they would not be allowed to proceed to any German-occupied ports If they replied that they were going souththey were to be told they could proceed to Casablanca andin this case they were to be shadowed If they tried to gobeyond Casablanca to Dakar they were to be stopped Butthe cruisers were never caught A haze lay overCasablanca on the 12th and 13th One of the reconnoitringBritish aircraft was shot down reports about the presenceof additional warships in Casablanca Harbour wereconflicting and the Renown and her destroyers waited allday and night south of Casablanca to intercept the Frenchsquadron At 420 on the afternoon of the 13th the Renownreceived an air report that there were no cruisers inCasablanca In fact they were already far to the southwardsteaming for Dakar at full speed


There seemed however to be still another chance Ourexpedition and its powerful escort was by now itself south ofDakar approaching Freetown At 1216 AM on September14 the Admiralty signalled to Admiral John Cunninghamtelling him that the French cruisers had left Casablanca at atime unknown and ordering him to prevent them enteringDakar He was to use every ship available including theCumberland and the Ark Royal should operate her aircraftwithout a destroyer screen if this were unavoidable Thecruisers Devonshire Australia and Cumberland and theArk Royal thereupon turned back at maximum speed toestablish a patrol line to the north of Dakar They did notreach their stations until evening on September 14 TheFrench squadron was already anchored in the port withawnings spreadThis chapter of accidents sealed the fate of the Franco-British expedition to Dakar I had no doubt whatever thatthe enterprise should be abandoned The whole scheme ofa bloodless landing and occupation by General de Gaulleseemed to me ruined by the arrival of the French squadronprobably carrying reinforcements good gunners and bitter-minded Vichy officers to decide the Governor to pervertthe garrison and man the batteries It was possiblehowever to cancel the plan without any loss of prestige soimportant to us at this time and indeed without anyoneknowing anything about it The expedition could be divertedto Duala and cover General de Gaullersquos operations againstthe French Cameroons and thereafter the ships andtransports could be dispersed or return homeAccordingly at the meeting of the War Cabinet at noon onSeptember 16 after outlining the history of the Dakaroperation from its inception the serious results of thepostponement of the date originally fixed for September


13 the leakage of information from various sources andthe misfortune of the French warships having slippedthrough the Straits I declared that the whole situation wasaltered and that the operation was now out of the questionThe Cabinet adopted my advice and the following orderswere despatched to the Dakar force at 2 PM that day

His Majestyrsquos Government have decided thatpresence of French cruisers at Dakar renders theexecution of Dakar operation impracticable Alternativeplans have been examined here Landing at Konakridoes not appear to offer any chance of success in viewof difficulty of communications to Bomako the lack oftransport with the force and the probability that forcesfrom Dakar would forestall Moreover close blockadeof Dakar from seaward is not possible with the navalforces available and therefore presence of de Gaullersquosforce at Bomako would not appreciably influencesituation at Dakar Best plan appears to be for Generalde Gaullersquos force to land at Duala with the object ofconsolidating the Cameroons Equatorial Africa andChad and extending influence of de Gaulle toLibreville The British portion of the force would remainfor the present at Freetown

Unless General de Gaulle has any strong objectionsto the latter course it should be put into operationforthwith

The expedition arrived at Freetown on September 17 Allthe leaders reacted vehemently against the idea ofabandoning the enterprise The Admiral and the Generalargued that until it was known to what extent the arrival ofthe Vichy cruisers had raised local morale their presencedid not materially alter the previous naval situation Atpresent they said the cruisers had awnings spread and


two were so berthed as to be virtually impotent whilepresenting excellent bombing targetsHere was another twist in the situation It was very rare atthis stage in the war for commanders on the spot to pressfor audacious courses Usually the pressure to run riskscame from home In this case the General General Irwinhad carefully put all his misgivings on paper before hestarted I was therefore agreeably surprised at the evidentzeal to put this complicated and semi-political operation tothe test If the men on the spot thought it was a time to doand dare we should certainly give them a free hand Itherefore sent at 1152 PM on September 16 the following

You are fully at liberty to consider the whole situationyourselves and consult de Gaulle and we shallcarefully consider then any advice you may give

There soon arrived a vehement protest from General deGaulle who wished to carry out the plan

At the very least [he said] should the BritishGovernment uphold its new and negative decisionconcerning direct action upon Dakar by sea I requestimmediate co-operation of British naval and air forceshere present to support and cover an operation which Ipersonally shall conduct with my own troops againstDakar from the interior1

Our commanders now reported2

At meeting today de Gaulle insisted upon necessityfor early action at Dakarhellip He is advised thatsubstantial support for him is likely to be found in Dakarif agents are sent to foster it action is not undulydeferred and a too-British complexion of the operationavoided His agents are ready at Bathurst and havetheir instructions De Gaulle now proposes original planto enter harbour unopposed should go forward but thatif this fails Free French troops should attempt landing


at Rufisque supported by naval and air action ifnecessary and thence advance on Dakar Britishtroops only to be landed in support if called upon afterbridgehead has been establishedhellip

After careful consideration of all factors we are ofthe opinion that the presence of these three cruisershas not sufficiently increased the risks which werealways accepted to justify the abandonment of theenterprise We accordingly recommend acceptance ofde Gaullersquos new proposal and that should he faillanding of British troops should be undertaken to installhim as previously contemplated Increased strength in[our] naval forces is however considered essential

The operation should be carried out four days afterdecision of His Majestyrsquos Government is received

And finally from Major-General Irwin to the CIGSAs you know I have already accepted risks in this

operation not fully justified on purely military groundsNew information possibly increases those risks but Iconsider them worth accepting in view of obviousresults of success De Gaulle has also committedhimself to complete co-operation with British troops incase of need and he has not shirked responsibility forfighting between Frenchmen

The War Cabinet met for the second time on the 17th at 9 PM Everyone was agreed to let the commanders go aheadas they wished Final decision was postponed till noon thenext day it being plain that no time was being lost as therewas still nearly a week before the blow could be struck Atthe request of the Cabinet I drafted the following messageto the commanders of the Dakar force

We cannot judge relative advantages of alternativeschemes from here We give you full authority to goahead and do what you think is best in order to giveeffect to the original purpose of the expedition Keep usinformed


This was despatched at 120 PM September 18There was nothing to do now but await results On the 19ththe First Sea Lord reported that the French squadron orparts of it were leaving Dakar for the south This made itpretty clear that it had carried Vichy-minded troopstechnicians and authorities to Dakar The probabilities of avigorous resistance were increased out of all proportion tothe new forces involved There would certainly be sharpfighting My colleagues who were tough and also nimble tochange with circumstances as is right in war shared myinstinct to let things rip and the various reports were heardin silenceOn the 20th Admiral Pound told us that the French cruiserPrimauguet intercepted by the Cornwall and Delhi hadagreed to go to Casablanca and was now being escortedthither The three French warships sighted by the Australiaturned out to be the cruisers Georges Leygues Montcalmand Gloire At noon on the 19th the Australia had beenjoined by the Cumberland and they continued to shadowthe Vichy ships till evening These now turned to thenorthward and increased their speed from fifteen to thirty-one knots A chase ensued We were not able to overtakethem At 90 PM however the Gloire had an enginebreakdown and could steam no more than fifteen knotsHer captain agreed to return to Casablanca escorted bythe Australia This pair were due to pass Dakar aboutmidnight and the captain of the Australia told the Gloirethat if he were attacked by submarines he would at oncesink her She no doubt spoke to Dakar and all passed offpleasantly The Cumberland shadowing the other twoVichy warships lost touch in a heavy rainstorm and boththough sighted got back into Dakar without fire being made


upon them The Poitiers when challenged at sea on the17th had already scuttled herself

I kept General Smuts fully informed


22IX40

You will have seen my message about Dakar I havebeen thinking a great deal about what you said in yourvarious messages about not neglecting the Africansphere The de Gaulle movement to rescue the Frenchcolonies has prospered in Equatoria and theCameroons We could not allow these solid gains to bedestroyed by French warships and personnel fromVichy sent probably at German dictation If Dakar fellunder German control and became a U-boat base theconsequences to the Cape route would be deadly Wehave therefore set out upon the business of putting deGaulle into Dakar peaceably if we can forcibly if wemust and the expedition now about to strike seems tohave the necessary force

Naturally the risk of a bloody collision with theFrench sailors and part of the garrison is not a lightone On the whole I think the odds are heavily againstany serious resistance having regard to the low moraleand unhappy plight of this French colony and the ruinand starvation which faces them through our seacontrol Still no one can be sure till we try Theargument that such a risk ought not to be run at a timewhen French opinion encouraged by British resistanceis veering towards us even at Vichy and that anythinglike a second Oran would be a great set-back hasweighed heavily with us Nevertheless we came to theunited conclusion that this objection might not turn outto be valid and must in any case be surpassed by thedangers of doing nothing and of allowing Vichy to


prevail against de Gaulle If Vichy did not declare warafter Oran or under the pressure of our blockade thereis no reason why they should do so if there is a fight atDakar Besides the strategical importance of Dakar andpolitical effects of its capture by de Gaulle there aresixty or seventy millions of Belgian and Polish goldwrongfully held in the interior and the great battleshipRichelieu by no means permanently disabled wouldindirectly come into our hands Anyhow the die is cast

We do not intend to disturb Morocco at present onaccount of the German pressure on Spain and Spanishinterests there We are very hopeful about Syriawhither General Catroux will go next week Animportant battle is now impending at Mersa Matruh andI hope our armoured reinforcements will arrive in time

I am not particularly impressed with the dangers inKenya especially if we lie back and fight from thebroad-gauge railway leaving the enemy the difficultcommunications I am trying to send a few suitabletanks to this theatre which otherwise I feel isoverstocked with troops needed in the Soudan and inthe Delta

It gives me so much pleasure and confidence to betrekking with you along the path we have followedtogether for so many years

To President Roosevelt I telegraphed


23IX40

I was encouraged by your reception of informationconveyed by Lord Lothian about Dakar It would beagainst our joint interests if strong German submarineand aircraft bases were established there It looks as ifthere might be a stiff fight Perhaps not but anyhoworders have been given to ram it through We should bedelighted if you would send some American warships toMonrovia and Freetown and I hope by that time tohave Dakar ready for your call But what really matters


now is that you should put it across the FrenchGovernment that a war declaration would be very badindeed for them in all that concerns United States IfVichy declares war that is the same thing as Germanyand Vichy possessions in the Western Hemispheremust be considered potentially German possessions

Many thanks also for your hint about invasion Weare all ready for them I am very glad to hear about therifles

It is not necessary here to narrate in detail all thathappened during the three days in which Dakar wasattacked These deserve their place in military chroniclesand are a further good example of bad luck Themeteorologists at the Air Ministry had of course carefullystudied climatic conditions on the West African coast Along survey of records reveals uniform regular brightsunlight and clear weather at this season of the year OnSeptember 23 when the Anglo-French armada approachedthe fortress with de Gaulle and his French ships well in thevan fog reigned supreme We had hoped since the greatmajority of the population French and native was on ourside that the appearance of all these ships with the Britishlying far back on the horizon would have decided the actionof the Governor It soon proved however that the Vichypartisans were masters and there can be no doubt that thearrival of the cruisers with their troops had blotted out anyhope of Dakar joining the Free French movement DeGaullersquos two aeroplanes landed on the local airfield andtheir pilots were immediately arrested One of them had onhis person a list of the leading Free French adherents DeGaullersquos emissaries sent under the Tricolour and the whiteflag were rebuffed and others who entered later in alaunch were fired upon and one of them wounded All


hearts were hardened and the British Fleet approachedthrough the mist to within five thousand yards At 10 AM aharbour battery opened fire on one of our wing destroyersThe fire was returned and the engagement soon becamegeneral The destroyers Inglefield and Foresight wereslightly damaged and the Cumberland was struck in theengine-room and had to quit One French submarine wasbombed by an aircraft at periscope depth and one Frenchdestroyer set on fireThere is an age-long argument about ships versus fortsNelson said that a six-gun battery could fight a hundred-gunship-of-the-line Mr Balfour in the Dardanelles inquiry saidin 1916 ldquoIf the ship has guns which can hit the fort atranges where the fort cannot reply the duel is notnecessarily so unequalrdquo On this occasion the British Fleetwith proper spotting could in theory engage and after acertain number of rounds destroy the Dakar batteries of 94-inch guns at 27000 yards But the Vichy forces had at thistime also the battleship Richelieu which proved capable offiring two-gun salvos from fifteen-inch artillery This had tobe taken into account by the British Admiral Above all therewas the fog The firing therefore died away at about 1130and all British and Free French ships retiredIn the afternoon General de Gaulle tried to land his troopsat Rufisque but the fog and the confusion had now becomeso dense that the attempt was abandoned By 430 PM thecommanders decided to withdraw the troopships andresume the operation next day The signal with thisinformation reached London at 719 PM and I thereuponsent the following personal message to the commandertimed at fourteen minutes past ten orsquoclock on September 23

Having begun we must go on to the end Stop atnothing


An ultimatum was sent that night to the Governor of Dakarto which reply was made that he would defend the fortressto the last The commanders answered that they intendedcontinuing the operation Visibility was better than on theprevious day but still poor The shore batteries opened onour ships as they closed and Barham and Resolutionengaged Richelieu at 13600 yards Shortly afterwardsDevonshire and Australia engaged a cruiser and adestroyer damaging the latter The bombardment ended atabout ten orsquoclock by which time Richelieu had been hit by afifteen-inch shell as also had Fort Manuel and a lightcruiser was on fire Moreover one enemy submarine whichhad tried to interfere with our approach had been forced tothe surface by a depth charge the crew surrendering Noneof our ships was hit In the afternoon the bombardment wasrenewed for a short time On this occasion Barham was hitfour times without serious damage The bombardment wasinconclusive except to indicate that the defences werestrong and the garrison determined to resistOn September 25 the action was resumed The weatherwas clear and our fleet bombarded at 21000 yardsrsquo rangewhen they were replied to not only by the very accuratecoastal batteries but by double salvos from the fifteen-inchguns of the Richelieu A smoke-screen used by the Dakarcommander baffled our aim Soon after 9 AM thebattleship Resolution was hit by a torpedo from a Vichysubmarine After this the Admiral decided to withdraw toseaward ldquoin view of the condition of the Resolution thecontinued danger from submarines and the great accuracyand determination of the shore defencesrdquoMeanwhile the Defence Committee which met at 10 AMwithout me had formed the opinion that no pressure shouldbe brought to bear on the commanders to take any action


against their better judgment The Cabinet met at 1130 AM and news of the results of the morningrsquos operationsreached us during the meeting On these tidings it seemedclear that the matter had been pressed as far as prudenceand our resources would allow Several good ships hadbeen severely damaged It was obvious that Dakar wouldbe defended to the death No one could be sure that thefierce passions of protracted fighting would not provoke aFrench declaration of war from Vichy We therefore after apainful discussion were all agreed to push no moreAccordingly I sent the following telegram (127 PMSeptember 25) to the commanders

On all the information now before us includingdamage to Resolution we have decided that theenterprise against Dakar should be abandoned theobvious evil consequences being faced Unlesssomething has happened which we do not know whichmakes you wish to attempt landing in force you shouldforthwith break off You should inform us ldquoMostImmediaterdquo whether you concur but unless the positionhas entirely changed in our favour you should notactually begin landing till you receive our reply

Assuming enterprise abandoned we shall endeav-our to cover Duala by naval force but we cannotsafeguard de Gaullersquos forces [if they remain] atBathurst Question of reinforcing Freetown with troopsis being considered Instructions regarding disposal ofremainder of forces will be given on receipt of yourreply

The commanders made the following reply

Concur in breaking off



25IX40

I much regret we had to abandon Dakar enterpriseVichy got in before us and animated defence withpartisans and gunnery experts All friendly elementswere gripped and held down Several of our ships werehit and to persist with landing in force would have tiedus to an undue commitment when you think of what wehave on our hands already

In the three daysrsquo bombardment no British ships were sunkbut the battleship Resolution was disabled for severalmonths and two destroyers sustained damage whichrequired considerable repairs in home dockyards TwoVichy submarines were sunk the crew of one being savedtwo destroyers were burnt out and beached and thebattleship Richelieu was hit by a fifteen-inch shell anddamaged by two near misses of two-hundred-fifty-poundbombs There was of course no means at Dakar ofrepairing this formidable vessel which had already beenrendered temporarily immobile in July and it could now bedefinitely dismissed as a hostile factor from our calculationsIt is interesting to note the changes of rocircle of the WarCabinet and of its commanders in the enterprise Thecommanders were at first by no means enthusiastic andGeneral Irwin protected himself by a lengthy reasonedmemorandum to the VCIGS in which all the difficultieswere stressed After the expedition had got south of theCanary Islands the French cruiser squadron with itsreinforcements of Vichy partisans carrying with it inphysical as well as moral form the authority of the FrenchRepublic slipped through the Straits of Gibraltar I had no


doubt from that moment that the situation had beentransformed and the War Cabinet on my advice supportedby the Chiefs of the Staff agreed that we should stop theenterprise while time remained and no loss had beenincurred and no failure would be exposedThen the commanders on the spot came forward with theirstrong desire to take action and the War Cabinet quiterightly in my view felt that the commanders should be thejudges and be given a free hand Accordingly the attemptwas made and it was immediately apparent by the efficientand vehement resistance of Dakar that the War Cabinetwere right and rightly advisedAlthough the fighting at Dakar had been far more seriousthan had been expected we were not wrong in ourjudgment that the Vichy Government would not declare warupon Great Britain They contented themselves with airretaliation upon Gibraltar from North Africa On September24 and 25 successive raids were made upon the harbourand dockyard in the first fifty bombs were dropped and inthe second in which about a hundred aircraft took part fourtimes as many The French aviators did not seem to havetheir hearts in the business and most of the bombs fell inthe sea Damage was negligible and no one was hurt Ouranti-aircraft batteries shot down three aircraft Fighting atDakar having ended in a Vichy success the incident wastacitly treated as ldquoquitsrdquoNo blame attached to the British naval and militarycommanders and both were constantly employed until theend of the war the Admiral attaining the highest distinctionIt was one of my rules that errors towards the enemy mustbe lightly judged They were quite right to try if with theirknowledge on the spot they thought they could carry thematter through and the fact that they underestimated the


effect produced on the Vichy garrison by the arrival of thecruisers and their reinforcements was in no way countedagainst them Of General de Gaulle I said in the House ofCommons that his conduct and bearing on this occasionhad made my confidence in him greater than everThe story of the Dakar episode deserves close studybecause it illustrates in a high degree not only theunforeseeable accidents of war but the interplay of militaryand political forces and the difficulties of combinedoperations especially where allies are involved To theworld at large it seemed a glaring example ofmiscalculation confusion timidity and muddle In theUnited States where special interest was taken on accountof the proximity of Dakar to the American continent therewas a storm of unfavourable criticism The AustralianGovernment was distressed At home there were manycomplaints of faulty war direction I decided however thatno explanations should be offered and Parliamentrespected my wish3

In retrospect a brighter view may perhaps be taken of theseevents Students of naval history may be struck by theresemblance of this affair to one which occurred nearlythree centuries ago In 1655 Cromwell despatched a jointnaval and military expedition to seize San Domingo in theWest Indies The attack did not succeed but thecommanders instead of returning empty-handed turnedfailure into success by going on to capture JamaicaAlthough we failed at Dakar we succeeded in arresting theonward progress of the French cruisers and frustrating theirdetermined efforts to suborn the garrisons in French


Equatorial Africa Within a fortnight General de Gaulle wasenabled to establish himself at Duala in the Cameroonswhich became a rallying-point for the Free French causeFree French activities in these regions played their part notonly in halting the penetration of the Vichy virus but inmaking possible through their control of Central Africa thelater development of our transcontinental air transport routefrom Takoradi to the Middle East


10Mr Edenrsquos Mission October 1940

Retirement of Mr Chamberlain mdash CabinetChanges mdash The Leadership of the ConservativeParty mdash Reasons for My Decision to Accept theVacant Post mdash We Reopen the Burma Road mdashMy Telegram to President Roosevelt mdash Growth ofOur Strength on the Desert Front mdash My Com-plaints About the Middle East Administration mdashMalta Anxieties mdash Mr Eden Flies to the MiddleEast mdash My Appreciation of October 13 1940 mdashMr Edenrsquos Conferences with the Generals atCairo mdash His Report and Requests mdash Our GrowingStrength at Mersa Matruh mdash Proposed Meeting ofMr Eden and General Smuts at Khartoum mdash MyDesire for a Forestalling Offensive Against theItaliansmdashNeed for Better Use of Our Resources inthe Middle East

AT THE BEGINNING of October Mr Chamberlainrsquos healthgot far worse The exploratory operation to which he hadsubjected himself in September and from which he hadreturned so courageously to duty had revealed to thedoctors that he was suffering from cancer and that therewas no surgical remedy He now became aware of the truthand that he would never be able to return to his work Hetherefore placed his resignation in my hands In view of thepressure of events I felt it necessary to make the changesin the Government which have been mentioned in an


earlier chapter Sir John Anderson became Lord Presidentof the Council and presided over the Home AffairsCommittee of the Cabinet Mr Herbert Morrison succeededhim as Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security andSir Andrew Duncan became Minister of Supply Thesechanges were effective on October 3Mr Chamberlain also thought it right to resign theleadership of the Conservative Party and I was invited totake his place I had to ask myself the question ndash aboutwhich there may still be various opinions ndash whether theleadership of one great party was compatible with theposition I held from King and Parliament as Prime Ministerof an Administration composed of and officially supportedby all parties I had no doubt about the answer TheConservative Party possessed a very large majority in theHouse of Commons over all other parties combined Owingto the war conditions no election appeal to the nation wasavailable in case of disagreement or deadlock I shouldhave found it impossible to conduct the war if I had had toprocure the agreement in the compulsive days of crisis andduring long years of adverse and baffling struggle not onlyof the leaders of the two minority parties but of the leaderof the Conservative majority Whoever had been chosenand whatever his self-denying virtues he would have hadthe real political power For me there would have been onlythe executive responsibilityThese arguments do not apply in the same degree in timeof peace but I do not feel I could have borne such a trialsuccessfully in war Moreover in dealing with the Labourand Liberal Parties in the coalition it was always animportant basic fact that as Prime Minister and at this timeleader of the largest party I did not depend upon their votesand I could in the ultimate issue carry on in Parliamentwithout them I therefore accepted the position of leader of


the Conservative Party which was pressed upon me and Iam sure that without it and all the steady loyalties whichattached to it I should not have been able to discharge mytask until victory was won Lord Halifax who was the mostprobable alternative choice of the party if I had declinedhimself proposed the motion which was unanimouslyadopted

The summer had crashed its way along with massiverending shocks but with growing assurance of survivalAutumn and winter plunged us into a maze ofcomplications less mortal but more puzzling The invasionchallenge had definitely weakened The Battle of Britain inthe air was won We had bent the German beam OurHome Army and Home Guard had grown vastly morepowerful The equinoctial gales of October stretched roughcapricious hands across the Channel and the Narrow SeasAll the arguments from which I had formerly drawn comfortwere justified and strengthened In the Far East the dangerof a Japanese declaration of war seemed to have recededThey had waited to see what would happen about theinvasion and nothing had happened The Japanese warlords had looked for a certainty But certainties are rare inwar If they had not thought it worth while to strike in Julywhy should they do so now when the life of the BritishEmpire burned brighter and fiercer and world conditionswere less favourable to them We felt ourselves strongenough to reopen the Burma Road when its three monthsrsquoclosure had elapsed The Japanese were experienced insea war and probably thought about it along the same linesas the British Admiralty Nonetheless it was not withoutanxiety that the decision to open the Burma Road and allowsupplies to flow along it into China was taken In this broad


measurement of the unknowable our judgment was notproved wrongI was glad to telegraph to the President news which I wassure would be agreeable to him and to the United States

Former Naval Person toPresident Roosevelt

4X40

After prolonged consideration of all the issuesinvolved we today decided to let the Burma Road bereopened when the three monthsrsquo period expires onOctober 17 The Foreign Secretary and I will announcethis to Parliament on Tuesday 8th I shall say that ourhopes of a just settlement being reached betweenJapan and China have not borne fruit and that theThree-Power Pact revives the Anti-Comintern Pact of1939 and has a clear pointer against the United StatesI know how difficult it is for you to say anything whichwould commit the United States to any hypotheticalcourse of action in the Pacific But I venture to askwhether at this time a simple action might not speaklouder than words Would it not be possible for you tosend an American squadron the bigger the better topay a friendly visit to Singapore There they would bewelcomed in a perfectly normal and rightful way Ifdesired occasion might be taken of such a visit for atechnical discussion of naval and military problems inthose and Philippine waters and the Dutch might beinvited to join Anything in this direction would have amarked deterrent effect upon a Japanese declaration ofwar upon us over the Burma Road opening I should bevery grateful if you would consider action along theselines as it might play an important part in preventingthe spreading of the war

In spite of the Dakar fiasco the Vichy Government isendeavouring to enter into relations with us whichshows how the tides are flowing in France now thatthey feel the German weight and see we are able tohold our own


Although our position in the air is growing steadilystronger both actually and relatively our need foraircraft is urgent Several important factories have beenseriously injured and the rate of production is hamperedby air alarms On the other hand our losses in pilotshave been less than we expected because in fightingover our own soil a very large proportion get downsafely or only wounded When your officers were overhere we were talking in terms of pilots We are nowbeginning to think that aeroplanes will be the limitingfactor so far as the immediate future is concerned

I cannot feel that the invasion danger is past Thegent has taken off his clothes and put on his bathing-suit but the water is getting colder and there is anautumn nip in the air We are maintaining the utmostvigilance

These welcome events at opposite ends of the worldcleared the way for stronger action in the Middle EastEvery nerve had to be strained to make headway againstItaly whose movements were slower than I had expectedStrong reinforcements had reached General Wavell Thetwo tank regiments had arrived in the desert GeneralMaitland-Wilson who commanded the ldquoArmy of the Nilerdquoas it was now called formed a high opinion of thepossibilities of the ldquoMatildasrdquo as the infantry or ldquoIrdquo tankswere nick-named by the troops Our defence position atMersa Matruh was now far more solid and ndash though this Idid not yet knew ndash new thoughts began to stir in Staff andplanning circles at the Middle East Headquarters Obviouslyour next main task was to strengthen our forces in theMiddle East and especially in the Western Desert bothfrom Britain and from India


I was still in argument with the Admiralty about militaryconvoys attempting the passage of the Mediterranean Isaying ldquoYou can now see that we ought to have tried itrdquoand they ldquoThere was not so much hurry after allrdquo I stillremained extremely dissatisfied with the distribution of ourforces already in the Middle East and with the disparity asI judged it between ration and fighting strength I fearedgreatly for Malta I pressed General Wavell and theSecretary of State both directly and through the Chiefs ofStaff on all these points To Mr Eden I wrote


24IX40

There is no difference between us in principle butthe application of the principle raises issues of detailand this is especially true of the denudation of thisisland in the face of the imminent threat of invasionMeanwhile the General Staff continue to press fordiversions from the Middle East such as the SeventhAustralian Division to be used for garrisoning the Malaypeninsula Now the two Indian brigades are to beemployed in these jungles against a possible war withJapan and a still more unlikely Japanese siege ofSingapore The paper on Indian reinforcements wasconsidered last night by me and the Chiefs of the StaffYou will see in it that a division is to be provided forMalaya another for Basra and a corps for Iraq thusabsorbing all the Indian reinforcements available in1941 This geographical distribution or dispersion of ourforces shows the ideas prevailing which are altogethererroneous in a strategic sense However it wasexplained to me that although these forces wereearmarked for particular theatres they could all go tothe Middle East if required I therefore agreed to wordsbeing inserted making this clear Nonetheless the


impression produced by the paragraph dispersing thesedivisions without regard to war needs made anunfavourable impression upon me

We have next to consider the increasing waste oftroops in Kenya and the continued waste in PalestineSome improvement has been made in Palestine butKenya on the contrary is at this moment to have amountain battery sent there instead of to the Soudan Ifear that when General Smuts goes there he willnaturally be influenced by the local situation However Ihope to keep in touch with him by cable

Lastly there is the shocking waste of British Regulartroops on mere police duty in the Canal Zone in Cairoand at Alexandria and the general slackness of theMiddle East Command in concentrating the maximumfor battle and in narrowing the gap between rationstrength and fighting strength I have not had anyanswer to my request for figures on this point

My idea like yours is to gather the strongest armyin the Middle East possible in the next few months andI have indicated on other papers the number ofdivisions I hope can be assembled there But I think thefirst thing would be for the War Office and the EgyptianCommand to make the best use possible of the verylarge number of troops they have already and forwhich we are paying heavily

Further I am much disquieted about the position atMalta It is now agreed that two battalions shall be sentas reinforcements but after how much haggling andboggling and excuses that they could not beaccommodated in the island Have you read GeneralDobbiersquos appreciation and his statement that he has hisbattalions all spread on fifteen-mile fronts each with noreserves not already allocated to the defence ofaerodromes Do you realise there is no command ofthe sea at Malta and that it might be attacked at anytime by an expeditionary force of twenty or thirtythousand men from Italy supported by the ItalianFleet Yet it was proposed that these two battalionsshould go to Freetown to complete the brigade therealthough no enemy can possibly attack Freetown whilewe have the command of the Atlantic Ocean You will I


am sure excuse my putting some of these points toyou because they illustrate tendencies which appear ill-related to the very scheme of war which you have inmind


6X40

Whenever the Fleet is moving from Alexandria to theCentral Mediterranean reinforcements should becarried in to Malta which I consider to be in grievousdanger at the present time These reinforcementsshould be found by taking battalions from the CanalZone and replacing them by dismounted Yeomanry orAustralian details now in Palestine or by South Africanunits presently to be moved from Kenya Pray let mehave proposals on these lines and make sure that atleast one battalion goes to Malta on the next occasionWe cannot waste Regular battalions on internal securityduties in Egypt If they were needed for the Field Armythey would of course be irremovable but that is notwhat they are being used for

I was in such close agreement with the Secretary of Statefor War and felt so much the need of having our views putforward on the spot instead of through endless telegramsthat I now asked him whether he would not make apersonal inspection of the Middle East He was delightedand started immediately He made a thorough tour of thewhole theatre In his absence I took over the War OfficeI also at this time laid the whole military situation as I saw itbefore the Chiefs of Staff



13X40

1 First in urgency is the reinforcement of Malta ndash

(1) by further Hurricane aircraft flown there ascan best be managed

(2) by the convoy now being prepared whichshould carry the largest anti-aircraft outfit possibleas well as the battalions and the battery ndash Iunderstand another MT ship can be madeavailable

(3) by one or better still two more battalionsreleased from police duty on the Canal or inPalestine and carried to Malta when next theFleet moves thither from Alexandria GeneralDobbiersquos latest appreciation bears out thegrievous need of strengthening the garrisonEvery effort should be made to meet his needsobserving that once Malta becomes a thorn in theItalian side the enemyrsquos force may be turnedupon it The movement of these reinforcementsshould therefore precede any marked activity fromMalta

(4) Even three infantry tanks at Malta would beimportant not only in actual defence but as adeterrent if it were known that they were thereSome mock-up tanks also might be exhibitedwhere they would be detected from the air

2 The movement of the Fleet to Malta must awaitthis strengthening of the air defences It is however amost needful and profoundly advantageous step Iwelcome the possibility of basing even light forces uponMalta as they immediately increase its security Iunderstand it is intended they shall sally forth by dayand only lie in harbour as a rule at night It must beobserved that a strong ship like the Valiant can farbetter withstand a hit from a bomb than light craft and


in addition she carries a battery of twenty very high-class AA guns Apart from the stake being higher it isnot seen why if light forces can be exposed in MaltaHarbour well-armoured and well-armed ships cannotuse it too The multiple aerial mine UP weapon givesconsiderable security against dive-bombing

I should be glad to be more fully informed by theAdmiralty about this

Occasional visits by the whole Battle Fleet would bean immense deterrent on hostile attack and also athreat to the [enemy] Libyan communications while theylast

Let me have the number of AA guns now inposition and the whole maximum content [of them in]the new convoy together with estimated dates for theirbeing mounted

3 Relations with Vichy We cannot accept theposition that we must yield to the wishes of Vichy out offear lest they make air raids upon Gibraltar for therewould be no end to that We must reassert ourblockade of the Straits dealing with vessels whetherescorted or unescorted though without violatingSpanish territorial waters We should assemble asufficient force at Gibraltar for this purpose at theearliest date possible Meanwhile we must maintain asgood a blockade of Dakar as possible and protectDuala etc from a counter-stroke by the Frenchcruisers in Dakar The conversations with Vichy if theytake place may reach a modus vivendi fallingsomewhat short of these desiderata Of course if wecould be assured that Vichy or part of Vichy wasgenuinely moving in our direction we could ease up onthem to a very large extent It seems probable that theywill be increasingly inclined to move as we desire and Ipersonally do not believe that hard pressure from uswill prevent this favourable movement It is becomingmore difficult every day for Vichy to lead France intowar with us We must not be too much afraid ofchecking this process because the tide in our favourwill master and overwhelm the disturbing eddies of theblockade and possible sea incidents I do not believethat any trouble will arise with the French which will


prevent the impending movement of our convoy toMalta The chance is there but it is remote and must befaced

4 The greatest prize open to Bomber Command isthe disabling of Bismarck and Tirpitz If Bismarck couldbe set back for three or four months the King George Vcould go to the Eastern Mediterranean to work up andcould therefore play a decisive part in the occupation ofMalta by the Fleet This would speedily transform thestrategic situation in the Mediterranean

5 Should October pass without invasion we shouldbegin the reinforcement of the Middle East by the Caperoute to the utmost extent our shipping permitssending as arranged the armoured units theAustralians and New Zealanders in November anotherBritish division before Christmas and at least four moreduring January February and March All this would bein addition to the necessary drafts Let me know howfar your present programme of sailings conforms to this

6 The time has also come for a further strongreinforcement of the Middle East by bombers and byfighters I should be glad to know how far the Chiefs ofthe Staff would be prepared to go observing thatthough the risk is very great so also is the need

7 Let me see the programme for reinforcing theMediterranean Fleet during the next six months Itshould be possible by the end of the year to send threeflotillas of destroyers to the Eastern Mediterranean andone additional to Gibraltar If King George V must bekept to watch Bismarck Nelson or Rodney should go toAlexandria and either Barham or Queen ElizabethWhat cruiser reinforcements are contemplated Will itbe possible to send Formidable [an aircraft-carrier]thither also and when

8 Agreeably to the despatch of divisions to theMiddle East the Home Army and the Home Guard willbe developed to fill the gap A minimum of twelvemobile divisions must lie in reserve [at home] apartfrom the troops on the beaches at any time

9 It should be possible also to provide by the end ofJuly a striking force for amphibious warfare of sixdivisions of which two should be armoured The


various alternative plans for the employment of such aforce are being studied

Meanwhile Mr Eden was on his journey He ldquowas deeplyimpressed with the rapid progress in recent work on thedefences of Gibraltarrdquo which he said had ldquobeen drivenforward with energy determination and ingenuityrdquo Themorale of the troops was high and the garrison confidentHe was more anxious about the position at Malta andpressed for at least another battalion and a battery oftwenty-five-pounders together of course with continued airreinforcements The Governor General Dobbie thought itimportant that an offensive policy which would provokeretaliation should be avoided at Malta until April 1941 bywhich time the various programmes of reinforcement inaircraft and anti-aircraft guns would be fulfilledOn the 15th Mr Eden reached Cairo He held searchingdiscussions with Generals Wavell and Maitland-Wilsonwho commanded the Desert Army There was goodconfidence about repelling an Italian offensive GeneralWilson estimated that the maximum strength the Italianscould deploy against Matruh was three divisions thelimiting factors being maintenance particularly water andcommunications Against this he had the 7th ArmouredDivision with its newly arrived tank regiments the 4thIndian Division the Matruh garrison of five rifle battalions amachine-gun battalion and eight or nine batteries The 16thBritish Brigade Group and the New Zealand Brigade Grouphad arrived from Palestine An Australian Brigade Group laywest of Alexandria a second Australian brigade wasmoving thither There was also a Polish brigade Theconcentration of these forces wrote Eden was considered


by General Wilson to be sufficient to meet the threat of theenemy and to enable him to defeat it provided he wasassured of adequate air support Eden added thatinundations for which I had asked had been carried out andanti-tank obstacles created He sent a lengthy list ofrequirements particularly aircraft This last was easierasked for than given at the time when the bombing ofLondon was rising to its peak He urged that a company ofldquoIrdquo tanks should be included in the November convoydestination Port Soudan in order to take the offensiveagainst the Italian threat from Kassala on the Blue NileEden also raised at Cairo a pertinent question What actionwould be taken by our forces supposing the Italian attackdid not take place Upon this the generals first spoke oftheir own offensive hopes Eden cabled

It has emerged from our discussion this morningthat infantry tanks [Matildas] can play a much moreimportant role in the fighting in this theatre than we hadthought General Wavell would much like a secondbattalion of ldquoIrdquo tanks and a Brigade Recovery Sectionespecially important to maintain full serviceability

Although no reference had been made in the Secretary ofState for Warrsquos telegram to our taking the offensive I wasvery glad to learn all the good news and urged him tocontinue his inspection


16X40

I have read all your telegrams with deepest interestand realisation of the value of your visit We areconsidering how to meet your needs Meanwhile


continue to master the local situation Do not hurry yourreturn

Eden further arranged for a Turkish Mission to join ourArmy and proposed to General Smuts a meeting atKhartoum to discuss the whole situation and particularlyour Soudan offensive project and my complaints about theovercrowding in Kenya This meeting was fixed for October28 a date which later acquired significance I need scarcelyadd that requests for all kinds of equipment including tenthousand rifles to aid the rebellion in Abyssinia and aboveall for anti-tank guns anti-tank rifles anti-aircraft batteriesand air reinforcements flowed to us in a broadeningstream We did our utmost to meet these needs at theexpense of home defence at this time There was not halfenough for everybody and whatever was given to one manhad to be denied or taken from another also in danger MrEden proposed to fly back by Lagos immediately after hisconference at Khartoum preferring to make a full verbalreport of all he had seen and done I was so muchencouraged by the picture as to become hungry for a turnto the offensive in the Western Desert I thereforetelegraphed to him

26X40Before leaving you should consider searchingly with

your Generals possibilities of a forestalling offensive Icannot form any opinion about it from here but if anyother course was open it would not be sound strategyto await the concentration and deployment ofoverwhelming forces I thought the existing plans forrepelling an attack by a defensive battle and counter-stroke very good but what happens if the enemy do notventure until the Germans arrive in strength Do notsend any answer to this but examine it thoroughly anddiscuss it on return


Please examine in detail the field state of the MiddleEastern Army in order to secure the largest proportionof fighting men and units for the great numbers on ourration strength Study improvisation from White detailsfor the Canal Zone and internal security All Britishbattalions should be mobile and capable of taking partin battle I fear that the proportion of fighting comparedto ration strength is worse in the Middle East thananywhere else Please do not be content with the stockanswers Even Army Ordnance and Service Corpsdepots and other technical details can all help inkeeping order where they are and should be organisedfor use in an emergency Not only the best but thesecond and third best must be made to play their part

Thus on the main issue our minds at home and on the spotwere moving forward in harmony


11Relations with Vichy and Spain

Unity with FrancemdashAmerican and CanadianContacts with Vichy mdash Difficulties of General deGaullemdashMy Broadcast to the French PeopleOctober 21 mdash Its Lasting Effect mdash Need to Insistupon EssentialsmdashThe Toulon FleetmdashPresidentRooseveltrsquos InterventionmdashAdmiralty AnxietiesmdashCorrespondence with the President NovembermdashA Firm Policy About the French Battleships mdashTelegram to General de Gaulle mdash PeacutetainrsquosAssurances to the PresidentmdashBritain and Spainmdash Sir Samuel Hoare Appointed AmbassadormdashGeneral Francorsquos PolicymdashDangers of SpanishHostility mdash Algeciras Bay and the Neutral Groundmdash Artful Diplomacy of the Spanish GovernmentTowards Hitler mdash Francorsquos Dilatory TacticsmdashSuntildeerrsquos MissionmdashRibbentroprsquos Visit to RomeSeptember 19 mdash Increasing Spanish ClaimsmdashHitler and Mussolini at the Brenner Pass October4 mdashHitler and Franco at HendayeOctober 23 mdashHitler and Peacutetain at Montoire October 24 mdashCollaboration Against BritainmdashMy PersonalViews November 14 mdash Peacutetain Breaks with LavalmdashHitlerrsquos Disappointment with SpainmdashFrancorsquosDuplicity and Ingratitude Both to Hitler andMussolinimdashMy Telegram to Sir Samuel Hoare mdashAnd to the President


IN SPITE OF THE ARMISTICE and Oran and the ending ofour diplomatic relations with Vichy I never ceased to feel aunity with France People who have not been subjected tothe personal stresses which fell upon prominent Frenchmenin the awful ruin of their country should be careful in theirjudgments of individuals It is beyond the scope of this storyto enter the maze of French politics But I felt sure that theFrench nation would do its best for the common causeaccording to the facts presented to it When they were toldthat their only salvation lay in following the advice of theillustrious Marshal Peacutetain and that England which hadgiven them so little help would soon be conquered or givein very little choice was offered to the masses But I wassure they wanted us to win and that nothing would givethem more joy than to see us continue the struggle withvigour It was our first duty to give loyal support to Generalde Gaulle in his valiant constancy On August 7 I signed amilitary agreement with him which dealt with practicalneeds His stirring addresses were made known to Franceand the world by the British broadcasts The sentence ofdeath which the Peacutetain Government passed upon himglorified his name We did everything in our power to aidhim and magnify his movementAt the same time it was necessary to keep in touch not onlywith France but even with Vichy I therefore always tried tomake the best of them I was very glad when at the end ofthe year the United States sent an Ambassador to Vichy ofso much influence and character as Admiral Leahy whowas himself so close to the President I repeatedlyencouraged Mr Mackenzie King to keep his representativethe skilful and accomplished M Dupuy at Vichy Here atleast was a window upon a courtyard to which we had noother access On July 25 I sent a Minute to the ForeignSecretary in which I said


I want to promote a kind of collusive conspiracy inthe Vichy Government whereby certain members ofthat Government perhaps with the consent of thosewho remain will levant to North Africa in order to makea better bargain for France from the North African shoreand from a position of independence For this purpose Iwould use both food and other inducements as well asthe obvious arguments

It was in this spirit that I was to receive in October a certainM Rougier who represented himself as acting on thepersonal instructions of Marshal Peacutetain This was notbecause I or my colleagues had any respect for MarshalPeacutetain but only because no road that led to France shouldbe incontinently barred Our consistent policy was to makethe Vichy Government and its members feel that so far aswe were concerned it was never too late to mendWhatever had happened in the past France was ourcomrade in tribulation and nothing but actual war betweenus should prevent her being our partner in victoryThis mood was hard upon de Gaulle who had risked alland kept the flag flying but whose handful of followersoutside France could never claim to be an effectivealternative French Government Nevertheless we did ourutmost to increase his influence authority and power Hefor his part naturally resented any kind of truck on our partwith Vichy and thought we ought to be exclusively loyal tohim He also felt it to be essential to his position before theFrench people that he should maintain a proud and haughtydemeanour towards ldquoperfidious Albionrdquo although an exiledependent upon our protection and dwelling in our midstHe had to be rude to the British to prove to French eyesthat he was not a British puppet He certainly carried outthis policy with perseverance He even one day explainedthis technique to me and I fully comprehended the


extraordinary difficulties of his problem I always admiredhis massive strength

On October 21 I made an appeal by radio to the Frenchpeople I took great pains to prepare this short address asit had to be given in French I was not satisfied with theliteral translation at first provided which did not give thespirit of what I could say in English and could feel in Frenchbut M Dejean one of the Free French Staff in Londonmade a far better rendering which I rehearsed severaltimes and delivered from the basement of the Annexeamid the crashes of an air raid

FrenchmenFor more than thirty years in peace and war I have

marched with you and I am marching still along thesame road To-night I speak to you at your firesideswherever you may be or whatever your fortunes are Irepeat the prayer around the louis drsquoor ldquoDieu proteacutege laFrancerdquo Here at home in England under the fire of theBoche we do not forget the ties and links that unite usto France and we are persevering steadfastly and ingood heart in the cause of European freedom and fairdealing for the common people of all countries forwhich with you we drew the sword When goodpeople get into trouble because they are attacked andheavily smitten by the vile and wicked they must bevery careful not to get at loggerheads with one anotherThe common enemy is always trying to bring thisabout and of course in bad luck a lot of things happenwhich play into the enemyrsquos hands We must just makethe best of things as they come along

Here in London which Herr Hitler says he willreduce to ashes and which his aeroplanes are nowbombarding our people are bearing up unflinchinglyOur air force has more than held its own We arewaiting for the long-promised invasion So are the


fishes But of course this for us is only the beginningNow in 1940 in spite of occasional losses we have asever command of the seas In 1941 we shall have thecommand of the air Remember what that means HerrHitler with his tanks and other mechanical weaponsand also by Fifth Column intrigue with traitors hasmanaged to subjugate for the time being most of thefinest races in Europe and his little Italian accompliceis trotting along hopefully and hungrily but ratherwearily and very timidly at his side They both wish tocarve up France and her Empire as if it were a fowl toone a leg to another a wing or perhaps part of thebreast Not only the French Empire will be devoured bythese two ugly customers but Alsace-Lorraine will goonce again under the German yoke and Nice Savoyand Corsica ndash Napoleonrsquos Corsica ndash will be torn fromthe fair realm of France But Herr Hitler is not thinkingonly of stealing other peoplersquos territories or flinginggobbets of them to his little confederate I tell you trulywhat you must believe when I say this evil man thismonstrous abortion of hatred and defeat is resolved onnothing less than the complete wiping out of the Frenchnation and the disintegration of its whole life andfuture By all kinds of sly and savage means he isplotting and working to quench for ever the fountain ofcharacteristic French culture and of French inspirationto the world All Europe if he has his way will bereduced to one uniform Bocheland to be exploitedpillaged and bullied by his Nazi gangsters You willexcuse my speaking frankly because this is not a timeto mince words It is not defeat that France will now bemade to suffer at German hands but the doom ofcomplete obliteration Army Navy Air Force religionlaw language culture institutions literature historytradition all are to be effaced by the brute strength of atriumphant army and the scientific low-cunning of aruthless Police Force

Frenchmen ndash re-arm your spirits before it is too lateRemember how Napoleon said before one of hisbattles ldquoThese same Prussians who are so boastful to-day were three to one at Jena and six to one atMontmirailrdquo Never will I believe that the soul of France


is dead Never will I believe that her place amongst thegreatest nations of the world has been lost for ever Allthese schemes and crimes of Herr Hitlerrsquos are bringingupon him and upon all who belong to his system aretribution which many of us will live to see The story isnot yet finished but it will not be so long We are on histrack and so are our friends across the Atlantic Oceanand your friends across the Atlantic Ocean If he cannotdestroy us we will surely destroy him and all his gangand all their works Therefore have hope and faith forall will come right

Now what is it we British ask of you in this presenthard and bitter time What we ask at this moment inour struggle to win the victory which we will share withyou is that if you cannot help us at least you will nothinder us Presently you will be able to weight the armthat strikes for you and you ought to do so But evennow we believe that Frenchmen wherever they may befeel their hearts warm and a proud blood tingle in theirveins when we have some success in the air or on thesea or presently ndash for that will come ndash upon the land

Remember we shall never stop never weary andnever give in and that our whole people and Empirehave vowed themselves to the task of cleansingEurope from the Nazi pestilence and saving the worldfrom the new Dark Ages Do not imagine as theGerman-controlled wireless tells you that we Englishseek to take your ships and colonies We seek to beatthe life and soul out of Hitler and Hitlerism That alonethat all the time that to the end We do not covetanything from any nation except their respect ThoseFrenchmen who are in the French Empire and thosewho are in so-called Unoccupied France may see theirway from time to time to useful action I will not go intodetails Hostile ears are listening As for those to whomEnglish hearts go out in full because they see themunder the sharp discipline oppression and spying ofthe Hun ndash as to those Frenchmen in the occupiedregions to them I say when they think of the future letthem remember the words which Gambetta that greatFrenchman uttered after 1870 about the future of


France and what was to come ldquoThink of it alwaysspeak of it neverrdquo

Good night then Sleep to gather strength for themorning For the morning will come Brightly will it shineon the brave and true kindly upon all who suffer for thecause glorious upon the tombs of heroes Thus willshine the dawn Vive la France Long live also theforward march of the common people in all the landstowards their just and true inheritance and towards thebroader and fuller age

There is no doubt that this appeal went home to the heartsof millions of Frenchmen and to this day I am reminded ofit by men and women of all classes in France who alwaystreat me with the utmost kindness in spite of the hard thingsI had to do ndash sometimes to them ndash for our commonsalvation

Indeed it was necessary to insist upon essentials We couldnot relax the blockade of Europe and particularly of Francewhile they remained under Hitlerrsquos domination Althoughfrom time to time to meet American wishes we allowed afew specified ships with medical stores to pass intoUnoccupied France we did not hesitate to stop and searchall other ships seeking or coming out of French portsWhatever Vichy might do for good or ill we would notabandon de Gaulle or discourage accessions to his growingcolonial domain Above all we would not allow any portionof the French Fleetrsquo now immobilised in French colonialharbours to return to France There were times when theAdmiralty were deeply concerned lest France shoulddeclare war and thus add to their many cares I alwaysbelieved that once we had proved our resolve and ability tofight on indefinitely the spirit of the French people would


never allow the Vichy Government to take so unnatural astep Indeed there was by now a strong enthusiasm andcomradeship for Britain and French hopes grew as themonths passed This was recognised even by M Lavalwhen he presently became Foreign Minister to MarshalPeacutetainAs the autumn drew into winter I was concerned with thedanger of the two great French battleships attempting tomake their way back to Toulon where they could becompleted President Rooseveltrsquos envoy Admiral Leahyhad established intimate relations with Marshal Peacutetain Itwas to Roosevelt therefore that I turned and not in vain


20X40

We hear rumours from various sources that theVichy Government are preparing their ships andcolonial troops to aid the Germans against us I do notmyself believe these reports but if the French Fleet atToulon were turned over to Germany it would be a veryheavy blow It would certainly be a wise precaution MrPresident if you would speak in the strongest terms tothe French Ambassador emphasising the disapproba-tion with which the United States would view such abetrayal of the cause of democracy and freedom Theywill pay great heed in Vichy to such a warning

You will have seen what very heavy losses we havesuffered in the northwestern approaches to our last twoconvoys1 This is due to our shortage of destroyers inthe gap period I mentioned to you Thank God your fiftyare now coming along and some will soon be in actionWe ought to be much better off by the end of the yearas we have a lot of our own anti-U-boat vesselscompleting but naturally we are passing through ananxious and critical period with so many small crafthaving to guard against invasion in the Narrow Waters


and with the very great naval effort we are making inthe Mediterranean and the immense amount of convoywork

The President in consequence sent a very severe personalmessage to the Peacutetain Government about the Toulon FleetldquoThe factrdquo he said ldquothat a Government is a prisoner of warof another Power does not justify such a prisoner in servingits conqueror in operations against its former allyrdquo Hereminded the Marshal of the solemn assurances he hadreceived that the French Fleet would not be surrendered Ifthe French Government attempted to permit the Germansto use the French Fleet in hostile operations against theBritish Fleet such action would constitute a flagrant anddeliberate breach of faith with the United StatesGovernment Any agreement of that character would mostdefinitely wreck the traditional friendship between theFrench and American peoples It would create a wave ofbitter indignation against France in American public opinionand would permanently end all American aid to the Frenchpeople If France pursued such a policy the United Statescould make no effort when the proper time came to securefor France the retention of her oversea possessions


26X40

Your cable with terms of splendid warning you gavethe French crossed mine to you about a suggestedmessage to Peacutetain Most grateful for what you havealready done but everything still in balance ForeignOffice tell me they have cabled you our latestinformation of German terms which Peacutetain is said to beresisting In this connection the surrender of bases onthe African shores for air or U-boats would be just asbad as surrender of ships In particular Atlantic bases in


bad hands would be a menace to you and a grievousembarrassment to us I hope therefore you will make itclear to the French that your argument about shipsapplies also to the betrayal of bases

In spite of the invasion threats and air attacks of thelast five months we have maintained a continuous flowof reinforcements round the Cape to Middle East aswell as sending modern aircraft and major units of theFleet I do not think the invasion danger is yet at anend but we are now augmenting our easterntransferences The strain is very great in both theatresand all contributions will be thankfully received

At this time the Admiralty were so deeply concerned aboutthe dangers of a rupture with Vichy that they were inclinedto underrate the disadvantages of letting the two Frenchbattleships return to Toulon On this I gave directions

Prime Minister to FirstLord and First SeaLord (From the train)

2XI40

After the defection of France it was considered vitalnot to allow the Jean Bart and the Richelieu to fall intoenemy hands or to reach harbours where they couldbe completed For this purpose you attacked theRichelieu and claimed to have disabled her to a verylarge extent The Jean Bart is in an unfinished stateand neither ship can be fitted for action in the Africanharbours on the Atlantic where they now lie It is ourdecided policy not to allow these ships to pass into badhands I was therefore surprised to hear the First SeaLord demur to the idea that the Jean Bart should beprevented from returning to Toulon and argue in thesense that she might safely be allowed to do so Toulonhas always been judged by us to be an enemy-controlled harbour It was for this reason that the mostextreme efforts were made unhappily without successto prevent the Strasbourg reaching Toulon I cannot


reconcile this action with the apparent readiness toallow the Jean Bart to proceed there

The Admiralty is held responsible for preventing thereturn of either of these two ships to French ports onthe Atlantic or to the Mediterranean where they couldbe repaired and completed at Toulon and then at anytime betrayed to the Germans or captured by them

Prime Minister toForeign Secretary(From the train)

2XI40

I do not know how imminent the movement of theJean Bart may be I have informed the Admiralty thatthey are responsible for stopping her from entering theMediterranean It would seem therefore very importantthat you should give a clear warning to Vichy that theship in question will be stopped and if necessary sunkif she attempts to go either to a German-controlled portin the Atlantic or to a Mediterranean port which may atany time fall into German hands My private office inLondon is sending you a copy of the Minute I have sentto the First Lord and the First Sea Lord


10XI40

1 We have been much disturbed by reports ofintention of French Government to bring Jean Bart andRichelieu to Mediterranean for completion It is difficultto exaggerate [the] potential danger if this were tohappen and so open the way for these ships to fallunder German control We should feel bound to do ourbest to prevent it

2 We conveyed a warning to French Governmentthrough Ambassador at Madrid a few days ago on thefollowing lines ldquoSuch a step would greatly increase thetemptation to the Germans and Italians to seize theFrench Fleet We doubt not the good faith of theFrench Government but their physical ability toimplement their assurances that they will not let theFleet fall into enemy hands We particularly wish to


avoid any clash between British and French navalforces and therefore hope that if they had thought ofmoving the ships they will now refrain from doing sordquo

3 As we said to French Government we should notquestion good faith of assurances but even if weaccept assurances we can feel no security that they willin fact be able to maintain them once the ships are inFrench ports in the power or reach of the enemy and Imust confess that the desire of French Government tobring these ships back if this turns out to be well-founded seems to me to give cause for some suspicion

4 It would be most helpful if you felt able to give afurther warning at Vichy on this matter for if things wentwrong it might well prove of extreme danger for us both

I kept in close touch with General de Gaulle

Prime Minister toGeneral de Gaulle(Libreville)

10XI40

I feel most anxious for consultation with youSituation between France and Britain has changedremarkably since you left A very strong feeling hasgrown throughout France in our favour as it is seenthat we cannot be conquered and that war will go onWe know Vichy Government is deeply alarmed by thevery stern pressure administered to them by UnitedStates On the other hand Laval and revengeful Darlanare trying to force French declaration of war against usand rejoice in provoking minor naval incidents Wehave hopes of Weygand in Africa and no one mustunderrate advantage that would follow if he wererallied We are trying to arrive at some modus vivendiwith Vichy which will minimise the risk of incidents andwill enable favourable forces in France to develop Wehave told them plainly that if they bomb Gibraltar or


take other aggressive action we shall bomb Vichy andpursue the Vichy Government wherever it chooses togo So far we have had no response You will see howimportant it is that you should be here I therefore hopeyou will be able to tidy up at Libreville and come homeas soon as possible Let me know your plans

On November 13 the President replied to my message ofthe 10th about the possible transfer of the Jean Bart andRichelieu to the Mediterranean for completion He hadimmediately instructed the American Chargeacute drsquoAffaires atVichy to obtain a confirmation or denial of this report and topoint out that it was of vital interest to the Government ofthe United States that these vessels should remain instations where they would not be exposed to control orseizure by a Power which might employ them to ends inconflict with the interests of the United States in the futureof the French Fleet Any such step on the part of Francewould inevitably seriously prejudice Franco-Americanrelations He also offered to buy the ships from the FrenchGovernment if they would sell themThe President also informed me that Peacutetain had stated tothe American Chargeacute drsquoAffaires that the most solemnassurances had been given by him that the French Fleetincluding the two battleships would never fall into thehands of Germany The Marshal said he had given thoseassurances to the United States Government to the BritishGovernment and even to me personally

Again I reiterate them [he said] These ships will beused to defend the possessions and territories ofFrance Unless we are attacked by the British they willnever be used against England Even if I wanted to Icannot sell those ships It is impossible under the termsof the armistice and even if it were possible it wouldnever be permitted by the Germans France is underGermanyrsquos heel and impotent I would gladly sell them


if I were free on condition that they be returned to usafter the war and save them for France in this way Imust repeat I have neither the right nor the possibility ofselling them under present circumstances

Marshal Peacutetain had made this statement with greatseriousness but with no sign of either surprise orresentment at the suggestion President Roosevelt hadfurther instructed the Chargeacute drsquoAffaires to inform MarshalPeacutetain that the American offer remained open both aboutthese vessels as well as about any others in the FrenchNavyOn November 23 the President sent me furtherreassurances Marshal Peacutetain had stated categorically thathe would keep the vessels now at Dakar and Casablancawhere they were and that if there was any change in thisplan he would give the President previous notice

The attitude of Spain was of even more consequence to usthan that of Vichy with which it was so closely linked Spainhad much to give and even more to take away We hadbeen neutral in the sanguinary Spanish Civil War GeneralFranco owed little or nothing to us but much ndash perhaps lifeitself ndash to the Axis Powers Hitler and Mussolini had come tohis aid He disliked and feared Hitler He liked and did notfear Mussolini At the beginning of the World War Spainhad declared and since then strictly observed neutrality Afertile and needful trade flowed between our two countriesand the iron ore from Biscayan ports was important for ourmunitions But now in May the ldquoTwilight Warrdquo was over Themight of Nazi Germany was proved The French front wasbroken The Allied armies of the North were in peril It wasat this moment that I had gladly offered to a former


colleague displaced by the Ministerial changes a newsphere of responsibility for which his gifts andtemperament were suited On May 17 Sir Samuel Hoarehad been appointed Ambassador to Spain and certainly Ibelieve that no one could have carried out better thiswearing delicate and cardinal five yearsrsquo mission Thus wewere very well represented at Madrid not only by theAmbassador and by the Counsellor of the Embassy MrArthur Yencken2 but also by the Naval Attacheacute CaptainHillgarth who had retired from the Navy and lived inMajorca but now returned to duty equipped with profoundknowledge of Spanish affairsGeneral Francorsquos policy throughout the war was entirelyselfish and cold-blooded He thought only of Spain andSpanish interests Gratitude to Hitler and Mussolini for theirhelp never entered his head Nor on the other hand did hebear any grudge to England for the hostility of our Left-Wingparties This narrow-minded tyrant only thought aboutkeeping his blood-drained people out of another war Theyhad had enough of war A million men had beenslaughtered by their brothersrsquo hands Poverty high pricesand hard times froze the stony peninsula No more war forSpain and no more war for Franco Such were thecommonplace sentiments with which he viewed and metthe awful convulsion which now shook the worldHis Majestyrsquos Government was quite content with thisunheroic outlook All we wanted was the neutrality of SpainWe wanted to trade with Spain We wanted her ports to bedenied to German and Italian submarines We wanted notonly an unmolested Gibraltar but the use of the anchorageof Algeciras for our ships and the use of the ground whichjoins the Rock to the mainland for our ever-expanding airbase On these facilities depended in large measure our


access to the Mediterranean Nothing was easier than forthe Spaniards to mount or allow to be mounted a dozenheavy guns in the hills behind Algeciras They had a right todo so at any time and once mounted they could at anymoment be fired and our naval and air bases wouldbecome unusable The Rock might once again stand a longsiege but it would be only a rock Spain held the key to allBritish enterprises in the Mediterranean and never in thedarkest hours did she turn the lock against us So greatwas the danger that for nearly two years we kept constantlyat a few daysrsquo notice an expedition of over five thousandmen and their ships ready to seize the Canary Islands bywhich we could maintain air and sea control over the U-boats and contact with Australasia round the Cape if everthe harbour of Gibraltar were denied to us by the SpaniardsThere was another very simple manner in which the FrancoGovernment could have struck us this destructive blowThey could have allowed Hitlerrsquos troops to traverse thePeninsula besiege and take Gibraltar for them andmeanwhile themselves occupy Morocco and French NorthAfrica This became a deep anxiety after the FrenchArmistice when on June 27 1940 the Germans reachedthe Spanish frontier in force and proposed fraternalceremonial parades in San Sebastian and in towns beyondthe Pyrenees Some German troops actually entered SpainHowever as the Duke of Wellington wrote in April 1820 3

There is no country in Europe in the affairs of whichforeigners can interfere with so little advantage asSpain There is no country in which foreigners are somuch disliked and even despised and whose mannersand habits are so little congenial with those of othernations in Europe

Now a hundred and twenty years later the Spaniardsreeling and quivering under the self-inflicted mutilations of


the civil war were even less sociable They did not wish tohave foreign armies marching about their country Even ifthey were Nazi and Fascist in their ideology these morosepeople would rather have the foreignersrsquo room than theircompany Franco shared these feelings to the full and in amost crafty manner he managed to give effect to them Wecould admire his astuteness especially as it was helpful tous

Like everyone else the Spanish Government wasstaggered by the sudden downfall of France and theexpected collapse or destruction of Britain Lots of peopleall over the world had reconciled themselves to the idea ofthe ldquoNew Order in Europerdquo the ldquoHerrenvolkrdquo and all thatFranco therefore indicated in June that he was prepared tojoin the victors and share in the distribution of the spoilsPartly from appetite and partly also from prudence hemade it clear that Spain had large claims But at thismoment Hitler did not feel the need of allies He likeFranco expected that in a few weeks or even days generalhostilities would cease and England would be suing forterms He therefore showed little interest in the gestures ofactive solidarity from MadridBy August the scene had changed It was certain thatBritain would fight on and probable that the war would belengthy With the contemptuous British rejection of hisldquoPeace Offerrdquo of July 19 Hitler sought allies and to whomshould he turn but to the dictator he had helped and whohad so lately offered to join him But Franco also had adifferent outlook arising from the same causes On August8 the German Ambassador in Madrid informed Berlin thatthe Caudillo still held the same view but that he had certain


requests to make First the assurance that GibraltarFrench Morocco and part of Algeria including Oran shouldbe given to Spain together with various expansions ofterritory in the Spanish African colonies Adequate militaryand economic assistance would also be necessarybecause Spain had only enough grain for eight monthsFinally Franco felt that the intervention of Spain should nottake place until after the German landing in England ldquoinorder to avoid too premature an entry into the war and thusa duration which would be unbearable to Spain and incertain conditions a fountain of danger for the reacutegimerdquo Atthe same time Franco wrote to Mussolini recapitulatingSpanish claims and asking for his support Mussolini repliedon August 25 by urging the Caudillo ldquonot to cut himself offfrom the history of Europerdquo Hitler was embarrassed by thesize of the Spanish claims some of which would embroilhim anew with Vichy The taking of Oran from France wouldalmost certainly lead to the setting-up of a hostile FrenchGovernment in North Africa He balanced the issueMeanwhile the days were passing During September GreatBritain seemed to be holding her own against the Germanair offensive The transfer of the fifty American destroyersmade a profound impression throughout Europe and toSpain it seemed that the United States was moving nearerto the war Franco and his Spaniards therefore pursuedthe policy of raising and defining their claims and making itclear that these must be agreed in advance Supplies alsomust be provided particularly a number of fifteen-inchhowitzers for the Spanish batteries facing Gibraltar All thewhile they paid the Germans in small coin All the Spanishnewspapers were Anglophobe German agents wereallowed to flaunt themselves all over Madrid As theSpanish Foreign Minister Beigbeder was suspected of lackof enthusiasm for Germany a special envoy Serrano


Suntildeer head of the Falange was sent on a formal visit toBerlin to smooth things over and preserve a sense ofcomradeship Hitler harangued him at length dwelling onthe Spanish prejudices against the United States The warhe suggested might well turn into a war of continents ndashAmerica against Europe The islands off West Africa mustbe made secure Later in the day Ribbentrop asked for amilitary base for Germany in the Canaries Suntildeer the pro-German and Falangist refused even to discuss this butdwelt incessantly upon Spanish needs for modern weaponsand food and petrol and for the satisfaction of her territorialdemands at the expense of France All this was necessarybefore Spain could realise her hopes of entering the warRibbentrop went to Rome on September 19 to report andconfer He said that the Fuehrer thought the British attitudewas ldquodictated by desperation and also a complete failure tounderstand realities as well as the hope of interventions bythe Russians and the Americansrdquo Mussolini observed thatldquothe United States are for all practical purposes at the sideof Englandrdquo The sale of the fifty destroyers proved this Headvised an alliance with Japan to paralyse American actionldquoAlthough the American Navy can be considered large inthe quantitative sense it must be regarded as a dilettanteorganisation like the British Armyhelliprdquo The Duce continued

There remains the problem of Yugoslavia andGreece Italy has half a million men on the Yugoslavfrontier and two hundred thousand on the Greekfrontier The Greeks represent for Italy what theNorwegians represented for Germany before the actionof April It is necessary for us to proceed with theliquidation of Greece all the more so as when our landforces will have advanced into Egypt the English Fleetwill not be able to remain at Alexandria and will seekrefuge in Greek ports


At this point they both agreed that the principal object wasto defeat England The only question was how ldquoEither thewarrdquo said Mussolini ldquowill finish before the spring or beprotracted into next yearrdquo The second alternative nowseemed to him the more probable and the Spanish cardmust be played in the most effective way Ribbentropaffirmed that a declaration of war by Spain following uponthe alliance with Japan would be a new and formidableblow for England But Suntildeer had not fixed any date

While the Spaniards became less ardent and moreacquisitive Hitler felt an increased desire for their help Asearly as August 15 General Jodl had pointed out that therewere other means besides direct invasion by which Englandcould be defeated namely prolonged air warfare thestepping-up of U-boat warfare the capture of Egypt and thecapture of Gibraltar Hitler was strongly in favour of theassault on Gibraltar But the Spanish terms were too highand also by the end of September other ideas stirred hismind On September 27 the Tripartite Pact betweenGermany Italy and Japan was signed in Berlin Thisopened wider fields

The Fuehrer now decided to throw his personal influenceinto the scale On October 4 he met Mussolini at theBrenner Pass He spoke of the high demands and dilatoryprocedure of the Spanish Government He feared that togive Spain what she asked would have two immediateconsequences an English occupation of the Spanish basesin the Canaries and the adhesion of the French Empire in


North Africa to de Gaullersquos movement This he said wouldforce the Axis seriously to extend their own sphere ofoperations On the other hand he did not exclude thepossibility of having the French armed forces on his side ina European campaign against Great Britain Mussolinidilated on his plans for the conquest of Egypt Hitler offeredhim special units for this attack Mussolini did not think heneeded them at least before the final phase On theRussian question Hitler remarked ldquoit is necessary to realisethat my distrust of Stalin is equalled by his distrust of merdquoIn any case Molotov was coming in a short time to Berlinand it would be the Fuehrerrsquos task to direct Russiandynamism towards IndiaOn October 23 Hitler went all the way to the Franco-Spanish frontier at Hendaye to meet the Spanish dictatorHere the Spaniards instead of being flattered by hiscondescension demanded according to Hitlerrsquos account toMussolini ldquoobjectives absolutely out of proportion to theirstrengthrdquo Spain demanded rectifications of the Pyreneesfrontier the cession of French Catalonia (French territoryonce historically linked with Spain but actually north of thePyrenees) of Algeria from Oran to Cape Blanco andvirtually the whole of Morocco The conversationsconducted through interpreters lasted nine hours Theyproduced only a vague protocol and an arrangement formilitary conversations ldquoRather than go through it againrdquoHitler told Mussolini later at Florence ldquoI would prefer tohave three or four of my teeth outrdquo4

On the way back from Hendaye the Fuehrer summonedMarshal Peacutetain to meet him at Montoire near Tours Thisinterview had been prepared by Laval who two days earlierhad met Ribbentrop and to his surprise Hitler at this veryplace Hitler and Laval both hoped to rally France to the


defeat of Britain The Marshal and most of his circle were atfirst shocked at this But Laval portrayed the proposedmeeting in glowing terms When asked whether Hitler hadinitiated the idea or whether it had been suggested to himLaval replied

What do you take him for Do you think that Hitlerneeds a nurse He has his own ideas that man Hewants to see the Marshal Besides he has a greatrespect for him This interview between the heads ofthe two States will be an historic event In any casesomething very different from a luncheon at Chequers5

Peacutetain was converted to the plan He thought that hispersonal prestige might weigh with Hitler and that it wasworth while giving him the impression that France would notbe unwilling to ldquocollaboraterdquo At ease in the West Hitlermight turn his thoughts and armies eastwardThe meeting took place in Hitlerrsquos armoured train near atunnel on the afternoon of October 24 ldquoI am happyrdquo saidthe Fuehrer ldquoto shake hands with a Frenchman who is notresponsible for this warrdquoLittle more than shameful civilities resulted The Marshalregretted that close relations had not been developedbetween France and Germany before the war Perhaps itwas not yet too late Hitler pointed out that France hadprovoked the war and was defeated But his aim now wasto crush England Before the United States could help hereffectively Britain would be occupied or else reduced to aheap of ruins His object was to end the war as quickly aspossible for there was no business less profitable than warAll Europe would have to pay the cost and so all Europehad the same interest To what extent would France helpPeacutetain conceded the principle of collaboration but pleadedthat he could not define its limits A procegraves-verbal was


drawn up by which ldquoin accord with the Duce the Fuehrermanifested his determination to see France occupy in theNew Europe the place to which she is entitledrdquo The AxisPowers and France had an identical interest in seeing thedefeat of England accomplished as soon as possibleConsequently the French Government would supportwithin the limits of its ability the measures which the AxisPowers might take for defence Questions of detail wouldbe settled by the Armistice Commission in concert with theFrench delegation The Axis Powers would undertake thatat the conclusion of peace with England France wouldretain in Africa a colonial domain ldquoessentially equivalent towhat she possessed at the momentrdquoAccording to the German record Hitler was disappointedEven Laval had begged him not to press France to makewar against Britain before French opinion was dulyprepared Hitler afterwards spoke of Laval as ldquoa dirty littledemocratic politicordquo but he carried away a more favourableimpression of Marshal Peacutetain The Marshal however isreported to have said when he got back to Vichy ldquoIt willtake six months to discuss this programme and another sixmonths to forget itrdquo But the infamous transaction is notforgotten yet in FranceIn October I had telegraphed to our Ambassador in Madrid

Prime Minister to SirSamuel Hoare

19X40

We admire the way in which you are dealing withyour baffling task I hope you will manage to convey toVichy through the French Ambassador two root ideasFirst that we will let bygones go and work with anyonewho convinces us of his resolution to defeat thecommon foes Secondly that as we are fighting for our


lives as well as for a victory which will relievesimultaneously all the captive States we shall stop atnothing Try to make Vichy feel what we here all takefor certain namely that we have got Hitler beat andthough he may ravage the Continent and the war maylast a long time his doom is certain It passes mycomprehension why no French leaders secede toAfrica where they would have an empire the commandof the seas and all the frozen French gold in the UnitedStates If this had been done at the beginning we mightwell have knocked out Italy by now But surely theopportunity is the most splendid ever offered to daringmen Naturally one would not expect precise responsesto such suggestions but try to put it into their heads ifyou see any opening

The various reports which we received of Montoire did notalter my general view of what our attitude towards Vichyshould be Now in November I expressed my views to mycolleagues in a memorandum

14XI40Although revenge has no part in politics and we

should always be looking forward rather than lookingback it would be a mistake to suppose that a solutionof our difficulties with Vichy will be reached by a policyof mere conciliation and forgiveness The VichyGovernment is under heavy pressure from Germanyand there is nothing that they would like better than tofeel a nice soft cosy forgiving England on their otherside This would enable them to win minor favours fromGermany at our expense and hang on as long aspossible to see how the war goes We on the contraryshould not hesitate when our interests require it toconfront them with difficult and rough situations andmake them feel that we have teeth as well as Hitler

It must be remembered that these men havecommitted acts of baseness on a scale which haveearned them the lasting contempt of the world and thatthey have done this without the slightest authority fromthe French people Laval is certainly filled by the


bitterest hatred of England and is reported to have saidthat he would like to see us ldquocrabouilleacutesrdquo which meanssquashed so as to leave only a grease-spot Undoubted-ly if he had had the power he would have marketedthe unexpected British resistance with his Germanmasters to secure a better price for French help infinishing us off Darlan is mortally envenomed by theinjury we have done to his Fleet Peacutetain has alwaysbeen an anti-British defeatist and is now a dotard Theidea that we can build on such men is vain They mayhowever be forced by rising opinion in France and byGerman severities to change their line in our favourCertainly we should have contacts with them But inorder to promote such favourable tendencies we mustmake sure the Vichy folk are kept well ground betweenthe upper and nether millstones of Germany andBritain In this way they are most likely to be broughtinto a more serviceable mood during the short runwhich remains to them

Marshal Peacutetain became increasingly resentful of Lavalrsquosprodding him along the road which would lead to war withBritain and German occupation of the North AfricanColonies On December 13 Laval arrived at Vichy with theproposal that Peacutetain should come to Paris to be present atthe ceremonial transfer of the ashes of Napoleonrsquos son theDuke of Reichstadt (ldquoLrsquoAiglonrdquo) to the Invalides This wasHitlerrsquos flowery idea of a solemn consecration of the ententereached at MontoirePeacutetain was not however attracted by a parade where thevictor of Verdun would be exhibited on French soil withGerman guards of honour before the tomb of the EmperorNapoleon He was moreover both wearied and fearful ofLavalrsquos methods and aims Members of Peacutetainrsquos stafftherefore arranged the arrest of Laval Energetic German


intervention procured his release but Peacutetain refused toaccept him back as Minister Laval retired in wrath toGerman-occupied Paris I was glad that M Flandin took hisplace as Foreign Minister These events marked a changeat Vichy It seemed that the limits of collaboration had atlast been reached There were at this moment hopes ofbetter French relations with Britain and of more sympatheticunderstanding for Vichy from the United States

It is convenient to carry the Spanish story forward at thispoint Franco now convinced of a long war and of theSpanish abhorrence of any more war and by no meanssure of a German victory used every device ofexasperating delay and exorbitant demands He was by thistime so sure of Suntildeer that on October 18 he made himForeign Minister representing the removal of Beigbeder asa proof of his devotion to the Axis In November Suntildeer wassummoned to Berchtes-gaden and Hitler expressed hisimpatience with Spainrsquos delay in coming into the war Bynow the Battle of Britain had been lost by the German AirForce Italy was already involved in Greece and in NorthAfrica Serrano Suntildeer did not respond as was wished Hedwelt lengthily instead upon the economic difficulties of thePeninsula Three weeks later Admiral Canaris Chief of theGerman Secret Service was sent to Madrid to arrange thedetails of Spainrsquos entry into the war He suggested that theGerman troops should pass the Spanish frontier on January10 in preparation for an attack on Gibraltar on January 30The Admiral was surprised when Franco told him that it wasimpossible for Spain to enter the war on the datementioned It seemed that the Caudillo feared the loss ofAtlantic islands and Spanish colonies to the British NavyHe also emphasised the lack of food and the inability of


Spain to stand a protracted war As the German landing inEngland seemed indefinitely postponed Franco introduceda new condition He would not move at any rate until Suezwas in Axis hands since not till then would he feel sure thatSpain would not be involved in long-drawn-out hostilitiesOn February 6 1941 Hitler wrote a letter to Francoappealing in strong and urgent terms that he should playthe man without further delay Franco replied expressinghis undying loyalty He urged that preparations for theattack on Gibraltar should be continued with renewedvigour As another new point he declared that only Spanishtroops with German equipment must be used for thisenterprise Even if all this was arranged Spain could notenter the war for economic reasons Ribbentrop thereuponreported to the Fuehrer that Franco had no intention ofmaking war Hitler was scandalised but being now setupon the invasion of Russia he did not perhaps like theidea of trying Napoleonrsquos other unsuccessful enterprise theinvasion of Spain at the same time Considerable Spanishforces were now gathered along the Pyrenees and he felt itwas wiser to stick to his method with nations ldquoOne by OnerdquoThus by subtlety and trickery and blandishments of all kindsFranco succeeded in tiding things over and keeping Spainout of the war to the inestimable advantage of Britain whenshe was all aloneWe could not count upon this at the time and I urged thePresident to do all in his power to help forward the policy ofconciliation


23XI40


Our accounts show that situation in Spain isdeteriorating and that the Peninsula is not far fromstarvation point An offer by you of food month bymonth so long as they keep out of the war might bedecisive Small things do not count now and this is atime for very plain talk to them The occupation byGermany of both sides of the Straits would be agrievous addition to our naval strain already severeThe Germans would soon have batteries working byradar [ie they could aim in the darkness] which wouldclose the Straits both by night and day With a majorcampaign developing in the Eastern Mediterranean andthe need to reinforce and supply our armies there allround the Cape we could not contemplate any militaryaction on the mainland at or near the Straits The Rockof Gibraltar will stand a long siege but what is the goodof that if we cannot use the harbour or pass the StraitsOnce in Morocco the Germans will work southwardand U-boats and aircraft will soon be operating freelyfrom Casablanca and Dakar I need not Mr Presidentenlarge upon the trouble this will cause to us or theapproach of trouble to the Western Hemisphere Wemust gain as much time as possible

This great danger had in fact passed away and though wedid not know it it passed forever It is fashionable at thepresent time to dwell on the vices of General Franco and Iam therefore glad to place on record this testimony to theduplicity and ingratitude of his dealings with Hitler andMussolini I shall presently record even greater serviceswhich these evil qualities in General Franco rendered to theAllied cause


12Mussolini Attacks Greece Octoberndash

November 1940

Mussolinirsquos Decision to Attack GreecemdashHis Letterto Hitler of October 19 mdashThe Florence ConferencemdashThe Italian Invasion of Greece October 281940 mdash Reinforcement of Admiral CunninghamrsquosFleetmdashThe Arrival of the ldquoIllustriousrdquomdashOurObligationsmdashImportance of CretemdashTelegrams toMr EdenmdashAir Support for GreecemdashMinute toChief of the Air Staff November 2 1940 mdashWavell-Wilson Plans for an Offensive in LibyamdashSecrecyCauses MisunderstandingmdashFurther Telegrams toMr EdenmdashGreek Need for the Cretan DivisionmdashMr Edenrsquos Latest TelegramsmdashHis ReturnmdashHeUnfolds ldquoOperation CompassrdquomdashGeneral Agree-mentmdashWar Cabinet ApprovesmdashThe Fleet Air ArmAttack the Italian FleetmdashGallant Exploit at TarantomdashHalf the Italian Fleet Disabled for Six MonthsmdashNaval DispositionsmdashMy Desire for an AmphibiousFeature in ldquoCompassrdquomdashMy Telegram to Wavell ofNovember 26 mdashPolicy Towards TurkeymdashAnImproved SituationmdashShortcomings at Suda BaymdashDeath of Mr ChamberlainmdashA Tribute to HisMemory

A FRESH though not entirely unexpected outrage byMussolini with baffling problems and far-reachingconsequences to all our harassed affairs now broke uponthe Mediterranean scene


The Duce took the final decision to attack Greece onOctober 15 1940 That morning a meeting of the Italianwar leaders was held in the Palazzo Venezia He openedthe proceedings in the following words

The object of this meeting is to define the course ofaction ndash in general terms ndash which I have decided toinitiate against Greece In the first instance this actionwill have aims of both a maritime and territorialcharacter The territorial aims will be based on thepossession of the whole coast of Southern Albania hellipand the Ionian islands ndash Zante Cephalonia and Corfundash and the occupation of Salonika When we haveattained these objectives we shall have improved ourposition vis-agrave-vis England in the Mediterranean In thesecond instance hellip the complete occupation of Greecein order to put her out of action and to assure that in allcircumstances she will remain in our politico-economicsphere

Having thus defined the question I have laid downthe date ndash which in my opinion must not be postponedeven for an hour ndash and that is for the 26th of thismonth This is an action which I have matured at lengthfor months before our entry into the war and before thebeginning of the conflicthellip I would add that I foreseeno complications in the north Yugoslavia has everyinterest to keep quiethellip I also exclude complicationsfrom the side of Turkey particularly since Germany hasestablished herself in Rumania and since Bulgaria hasincreased her strength The latter can play a part in ourgame and I shall take the necessary steps so as not tomiss the present unique opportunity for achieving heraspirations in Macedonia and for an outlet to theseahellip1

On October 19 Mussolini wrote to Hitler telling him of thedecision to which he had come Hitler was then on hisjourney to Hendaye and Montoire The letter (the text ofwhich has not come to light) seems to have followed him


round When it finally reached him he at once proposed toMussolini a meeting to discuss the general political situationin Europe This meeting took place in Florence on October28 That morning the Italian attack on Greece had begunIt seems however that Hitler did not choose to make anissue of the Greek adventure He said politely that Germanywas in accord with the Italian action in Greece and thenproceeded to tell the tale of his meetings with Franco andPeacutetain There can be no doubt that he did not like what hadbeen done by his associate A few weeks later after theItalian attack was checked he wrote to Mussolini in hisletter of November 20 ldquoWhen I asked you to receive me atFlorence I began the journey with the hope of being able toexpound my views before the threatened action againstGreece had been taken about which I had heard only ingeneral termsrdquo In the main however he accepted thedecision of his ally

Before dawn on October 28 the Italian Minister in Athenspresented an ultimatum to General Metaxas the Premier ofGreece Mussolini demanded that the whole of Greeceshould be opened to Italian troops At the same time theItalian army in Albania invaded Greece at various pointsThe Greek Government whose forces were by no meansunready on the frontier rejected the ultimatum They alsoinvoked the guarantee given by Mr Chamberlain on April13 1939 This we were bound to honour By the advice ofthe War Cabinet and from his own heart His Majestyreplied to the King of the Hellenes ldquoYour cause is ourcause we shall be fighting against a common foerdquo Iresponded to the appeal of General Metaxas ldquoWe will giveyou all the help in our power We will fight a common foe


and we will share a united victoryrdquo This undertaking wasduring a long story made good

Although we were still heavily outnumbered on paper by theItalian Fleet marked improvements had been made in ourMediterranean strength During September the Valiant thearmoured-deck aircraft-carrier Illustrious and two AAcruisers had come safely through the Mediterranean to joinAdmiral Cunningham at Alexandria Hitherto his ships hadalways been observed and usually bombed by the greatlysuperior Italian Air Force The Illustrious with her modernfighters and latest radar equipment by striking down patrolsand assailants gave a new secrecy to the movements ofour Fleet This advantage was timely Apart from a few airsquadrons a British mission and perhaps some tokentroops we had nothing to give and even these trifles werea painful subtraction from ardent projects already lighting inthe Libyan theatre One salient strategic fact leaped outupon us ndash CRETE The Italians must not have it We mustget it first ndash and at once It was fortunate that at thismoment Mr Eden was in the Middle East and that I thushad a Ministerial colleague on the spot with whom to dealHe was about to return home after his conference withGeneral Smuts at Khartoum I telegraphed to him

29X40I recognise importance of your conference with

Smuts but hope first Wavell and thereafter you willreturn at earliest to Cairo

We here are all convinced an effort should be madeto establish ourselves in Crete and that risks should berun for this valuable prize You will have seen theService telegrams on this subject


Prime Minister to MrEden [at Khartoum]

29X40

It seems of prime importance to hold the best airfieldpossible and a naval fuelling base at Suda BaySuccessful defence of Crete is invaluable aid todefence of Egypt Loss of Crete to [the] Italians [wouldbe a] grievous aggravation [of] all Mediterraneandifficulties So great a prize is worth the risk and almostequal to [a] successful offensive in Libya Pray after anexamination of whole problem with Wavell and Smutsdo not hesitate to make proposals for action on largescale at expense of other sectors and ask for anyfurther aid you require from here including aircraft andanti-aircraft [batteries] We are studying how to meetyour need Consider your return to Cairo indispensable

At the invitation of the Greek Government Suda Bay thebest harbour in Crete was occupied by our forces two dayslater


30X40

What steps are we taking to get news from theGreek front Have we observers there What is ourattacheacute there doing

Why do you not send one of your generals fromEgypt at the head of a military mission to be at theheadquarters of the Greek field army Let them go andsee the fighting and give us some close-up informationabout the relative merits of the two armies I expect tohave a good wire every day or so telling us exactlywhat is happening as far as the Greeks will allow it


30X40


There is no objection to two battalions going toFreetown pending their relief by the West AfricanBrigade after which they can go on to Egypt They arenot to leave England until it is agreed that the WestAfrican Brigade is to go to West Africa

Both Crete and Malta come before Freetown in AAguns and I cannot approve of this diversion at thepresent time Neither can I agree to the diversion of afighter squadron [for Freetown] at this stage The Navyis responsible for preventing any sea-borne expeditionattacking our West African colonies As to the airattack if the French bomb Freetown or Bathurst we willbomb Vichy I do not think this will happen

Prime Minister to AirVice-MarshalLongmore2

1XI40

[In dispatching a Blenheim squadron to Greece] youhave taken a very bold and wise decision I hope toreinforce you as soon as possible

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay for CAS and for COSCommittee

1XI40

I should propose to make immediate arrangementsto send four additional heavy bomber squadrons(including the one already sent to Malta) to the MiddleEast at once and also four Hurricane fightersquadrons Let me see plans for this movement Ishould like to have a report on this today


1XI40

Mr Eden has asked for ten thousand rifles for theMiddle East Can we not supply these out of the


American packet or is there any small parcel of riflesanywhere in the world to be picked up

Prime Minister to CAS 2XI401 I had in mind that the four bomber squadrons

would fly to Crete or Greece via Malta The personneland ground stores would have to be carried through bycruiser It is essential to have these squadronsoperating at the earliest from bases in Greek territoryupon the Italian Fleet at Taranto and generally againstSouthern For so vital an operation of war the Navywould have to make special exertions and you shouldnot assume that a ship will not be forthcoming at anyrate for such ground personnel stores etc as arenecessary to come into action at this very critical time Isee more difficulty in the vehicles but perhaps somecould come from Egypt and the rest be improvised

2 The fighters are of course more difficult but Ishould hope that they could fly from a carrier to Maltaas was done last time If necessary the Furious wouldhave to help the Ark Royal Could they fly from Malta toan aerodrome in Greece If not could they fly on to acarrier to refuel and thence to Greece In the case ofthe fighters the same arrangements would have to bemade about stores ground personnel etc as with thebombers

Prime Minister to MrEden [at GHQ MiddleEast]

2XI40

Greek situation must be held to dominate othersnow We are well aware of our slender resources Aidto Greece must be attentively studied lest wholeTurkish position is lost through proof that Englandnever tries to keep her guarantees I invite you to stayin Cairo for at least another week while these questionsare being studied and we make sure we have done ourbest from both ends Meanwhile another thirty


thousand men are reaching you by November 15which must affect local situation in Egypt

During Mr Edenrsquos earlier conferences and talks withGeneral Wavell and also with General Wilson he posed thequestion What action was intended if the Italian offensivedid not develop He was told in extreme secrecy that a planwas being made to attack the Italians in the Western Desertinstead of waiting for them to open their offensive againstMersa Matruh Neither he nor Wavell imparted these ideasto me or to the Chiefs of Staff General Wavell begged theSecretary of State for War not to send any telegram on thissubject but to tell us verbally about it when he got homeThus for some weeks we remained without knowledge ofthe way their minds were moving It is clear from mymessage of October 26 that any forestalling operation on alarge scale in the Western Desert would command my keensupport We were all however until Mr Edenrsquos return leftunder the impression that Wavell and Wilson were stillwedded to the defensive battle at Mersa Matruh and wouldwait there until they were attacked The only action theyseemed to contemplate in this extremely serious crisis wasto send a battalion or so to Crete a few air squadrons toGreece and make some minor diversions against theDodecanese and a small though desirable offensive in theSoudan This seemed by no means good enoughemployment for the very large forces with which at greatrisk exertion and cost we had furnished themOur correspondence during this period was thus on bothsides based upon misunderstanding Wavell and theSecretary of State thought that for the sake of givingineffectual aid to Greece we were pressing them todissipate the forces they were gathering for an offensive inthe Western Desert We on the other hand not creditingthem with offensive intentions objected to their standing


idle or trifling at such a crucial moment In fact as willpresently be seen we were all agreed On November 1indeed Mr Eden telegraphed cryptically

We cannot from Middle East forces send sufficientair or land reinforcements to have any decisiveinfluence upon course of fighting in Greece To sendsuch forces from here or to divert reinforcements nowon their way or approved would imperil our wholeposition in the Middle East and jeopardise plans for anoffensive operation now being laid in more than onetheatre3 After much painful effort and at the cost ofgrave risks we have so far as our land forces areconcerned now built up a reasonably adequatedefensive3 force here We should presently be in aposition to undertake certain offensive operations whichif successful may have far-reaching effects on thecourse of the war as a whole It would surely be badstrategy to allow ourselves to be diverted from this taskand unwise to employ our forces in fragments in atheatre of war where they cannot be decisivehellip Thebest way in which we can help Greece is by striking atItaly and we can do that most effectively from areaswhere our strength has been developed and where ourplans are laid I am anxious to put before you in detailat the earliest date the dispositions and plans whichhave been worked out here and propose hellip to returnhome by the shortest route leaving on the 3d

This telegram crossed one from me to him at Khartoumwhich afterwards had to be repeated back to Cairo whitherhe had repaired


3XI40


Gravity and consequence of Greek situationcompels your presence in Cairo However unjust it maybe collapse of Greece without any effort by us will havedeadly effect on Turkey and on future of war Greeksprobably as good as Italians and Germans not yet onthe spot Establishment of fuelling base and airfield inCrete to be steadily developed into permanent warfortresses [is] indispensable This is being done Butsurely effort must be made to aid Greece directly evenif only with token forces Quite understand howeveryone with you is fixed on idea of set-piece battle atMersa Matruh For that very reason it is unlikely tooccur Enemy will await completion pipeline anddevelopment of larger forces than are now concentrat-ed Your difficulties in attacking across the desertobvious but if you have no major offensive of your ownin Libya possible during next two months then youshould run risks to stimulate Greek resistance Overseventy thousand men sent to Middle East Commandsince June and thirty thousand reaching you beforeNovember 15 fifty-three thousand by end of the yearArmoured regiments have started in big convoyyesterday Cannot therefore believe that various minoroffensives of which you speak plus major defence atMersa Matruh will outvalue need of effective action inGreece

No one will thank us for sitting tight in Egypt withever-growing forces while Greek situation and all thathangs on it is cast away Loss of Athens far greaterinjury than Kenya and Khartoum but no necessity forsuch a price to be paid Read carefully Palairetrsquos (ourminister in Athens) telegrams New emergencies mustbe met in war as they come and local views must notsubjugate main issue No one expected Italy so late inthe year would attack Greece Greece resistingvigorously with reasonable aid from Egypt and Englandmight check invaders I am trying to send substantialbomber and fighter reinforcements to Crete andGreece flying from England with stores by cruiser Ifthis proves feasible details will be cabled tomorrow orMonday Trust you will grasp situation firmly abandon-ing negative and passive policies and seizing


opportunity which has come into our hands ldquoSafetyfirstrdquo is the road to ruin in war even if you had thesafety which you have not Send me your proposalsearliest or say you have none to make

And again4XI40

We are sending you air reinforcements arriving asfully explained in accompanying message from Chiefsof Staff Send at once to Greece one Gladiatorsquadron and two more Blenheim squadrons three inall If necessary send a second battalion to CreteAgreeably with arrival of our air reinforcementsaforesaid and at earliest send one more Gladiatorsquadron Anti-aircraft guns for airfields in Greeceshould precede arrival of squadrons

It was proposed at this time to ask the Greeks to keep theirCretan division in the island I therefore minuted


6XI40

It will be difficult to deny the Greeks the use of thisCretan division If that be so we shall certainly have toput more troops on the island It is important that thereshould be a certain number of troops and that it shouldbe thought by the enemy that we are landingconsiderable numbers The area to be watched is veryextensive and the consequences of a counter-attackwould be most disastrous

Pray let me know your views


7XI40

We shall render poor service to Greece if inconsequence of our using Crete for our own purposeswe deny them the use of two-thirds of their Fifth


Division The defence of Crete depends on the Navybut nevertheless there must be a certain deterrent forceof troops on shore I doubt if the two battalions ofBritish and the three remaining Greek battalions will besufficient I am much obliged to you for telegraphing asI asked to General Wavell He must provide in meal orin malt

(1) Three or four thousand additional British troopsand a dozen guns These need not be fully equipped ormobile

(2) He must do this from forces which he will not beusing in the possibly impending battle

(3) We must tell the Greeks we release [for servicewith their main army] the six battalions and the artilleryof the Fifth Greek Division

Every effort should be made to rush arms orequipment to enable a reserve division of Greeks to beformed in Crete Rifles and machine guns are quitesufficient in this case To keep a Greek division out ofthe battle on the Epirus front would be very bad and tolose Crete because we had not sufficient bulk of forcesthere would be a crime

It was time Mr Eden should come home to report to us ashe earnestly desired The following telegrams are self-explanatory

Mr Eden to PrimeMinister

3XI40

All strongly of the opinion I should return home asrapidly as possible in order to put whole position asseen from here before you Earnestly hope you willagree to this Propose to leave tomorrow morningPerfectly prepared to fly back here if required after Ihave seen you but am convinced that this meetingbetween us is most urgent It is impossible to explainposition and plans fully by telegram

Please reply urgently


Assent was given and the Secretary of State began hisjourney The following points were made in hissimultaneous telegrams to me

Conference [in Cairo] discussed situation in CreteAdmiral Cunningham emphasised the value ofpossession of Crete to us as a means of securingEastern Mediterranean and of interfering with Italiantransit traffic to North Africa It would not however bepossible to base fleet on Suda Bay for more than a fewhours at a time at present owing to lack of anti-submarine protection

He does not consider Italian attempt to take Crete isto be anticipated in the near future nor unless and untilGreece is overrun He and Wavell have concertedarrangements for sending at once to Crete a part of thereinforcements referred to in my telegram of November1 Admiral Cunningham does not consider it isnecessary to keep any large British military garrison inCrete and is convinced that once the Cretans areorganised one battalion together with anti-aircraftdefences would suffice We then discussed thegeneral question of help to Greece As we said onSeptember 22 ldquoany assistance we may be able to giveto Greece cannot be given until German-Italian threatto Egypt is finally liquidated the security of Egypt beingvital to our strategy and incidentally to the future ofGreecerdquohellip

Chief cry for help is for air reinforcements Number30 Blenheim Squadron left today for Athens Longmoreagain emphasised his extreme reluctance to add anymore squadrons to the Greek commitment in presentconditions He feels that to do so would lead to a largewastage of his aircraft from Italian attack whilst theaircraft are on Greek or Cretan aerodromes unpreparedwith protecting pens adequate ground anti-aircraftdefence and other precautions of such nature whichare difficult to improvise at short noticehellipIn general allCommanders-in-Chief were strongly of the opinion thatthe defence of Egypt is of paramount importance to ourwhole position in the Middle East They consider that


from the strategical point of view the security of Egypt isthe most urgent commitment and must take prece-dence of attempts to prevent Greece being overrun Itis also essential if we are to retain the support ofTurkeyhellip

He added in my private cipher the following5XI40

Although reinforcements ordered in Chiefs of Staffsrsquotelegrams involve additional risks in Western Desertand probably increased casualties these risks must befaced in view of political commitments to aid GreeceWithdrawal though it will hamper arrangements madein Western Desert will not entirely dislocate them Butany increase in commitment or attempt to hasten rateof despatch to Greece beyond that now laid down willmean serious risk to our position in Egypt Uncertainfactor still remains date by which air reinforcementsparticularly fighters arrive in Egypt to replace thosesent to Greece Experience hitherto shows thatprevious forecasts have not been fulfilled and time-table is sadly behind Now feel that there is nothingfurther I can do here and propose leave tomorrowmorning by air

The Secretary of State for War got back home onNovember 8 and came that evening after the usual raidhad begun to see me in my temporary underground abodein Piccadilly He brought with him the carefully guardedsecret which I wished I had known earlier Nevertheless noharm had been done Mr Eden unfolded in considerabledetail to a select circle including the CIGS and GeneralIsmay the offensive plan which General Wavell andGeneral Wilson had conceived and prepared No longerwere we to await in our fortified lines at Mersa Matruh an


Italian assault for which defensive battle such long andartful preparations had been made On the contrary withina month or so we were ourselves to attack The operationwas to be called ldquoCompassrdquoAs will be seen from the map Marshal Grazianirsquos Italianarmy then above eighty thousand strong which hadcrossed the Egyptian frontier was spread over a fifty-milefront in a series of fortified camps which were separated bywide distances and not mutually supporting and with nodepth in the system Between the enemyrsquos right flank atSofafi and his next camp at Nibeiwa there was a gap ofover twenty miles The plan was to make an offensivespring through this gap and turning towards the seaattack Nibeiwa camp and the Tummar group of camps insuccession from the west ndash that is to say from the rearMeanwhile both the Sofafi camps and the camp at Meiktilaon the coast were to be contained by light forces For thispurpose there were to be employed the 7th ArmouredDivision the 4th Indian Division now complete and the16th British Infantry Brigade together with a compositeforce from the garrison of Mersa Matruh This plan involveda serious risk but also offered a glittering prize The risk layin the launching of all our best troops into the heart of theenemyrsquos position by a move of seventy miles on twosuccessive nights over the open desert and with the perilof being observed and attacked from the air during theintervening day Besides this the food and petrol had to benicely calculated and if the time-scale went wrong theconsequences must be graveThe prize was worthy of the hazard The arrival of ourvanguard on the sea at Buq Buq or thereabouts would cutthe communications of three-quarters of Marshal Grazianirsquosarmy Attacked by surprise from the rear they might well beforced as a result of vigorous fighting into mass surrenders


In this case the Italian front would be irretrievably brokenWith all their best troops captured or destroyed no forcewould be left capable of withstanding a further onslaughtnor could any organised retreat be made to Tripoli along thehundreds of miles of coastal roadHere then was the deadly secret which the Generals hadtalked over with their Secretary of State for War This waswhat they had not wished to telegraph We were alldelighted I purred like six cats Here was something worthdoing It was decided there and then subject to theagreement of the Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet togive immediate sanction and all possible support to thissplendid enterprise and that it should take first place in allour thoughts and have amid so many other competingneeds first claim upon our strained resourcesIn due course these proposals were brought before the WarCabinet I was ready to state the case or have it stated Butwhen my colleagues learned that the Generals on the spotand the Chiefs of Staff were in full agreement with me andMr Eden they declared that they did not wish to know thedetails of the plan that the fewer who knew them thebetter and that they whole-heartedly approved the generalpolicy of the offensive This was the attitude which the WarCabinet adopted on several important occasions and Irecord it here that it may be a model should similardangers and difficulties arise in future times

The Italian Fleet had not reacted in any way against ouroccupation of Crete but Admiral Cunningham had for sometime been anxious to strike a blow at them with his nowaugmented naval air forces as they lay in their main base atTaranto The attack was delivered on November 11 as the


climax of a well-concerted series of operations duringwhich Malta received troops and further navalreinforcements including the battleship Barham twocruisers and three destroyers reached Alexandria Tarantolies in the heel of Italy three hundred and twenty miles fromMalta Its magnificent harbour was heavily defendedagainst all modern forms of attack The arrival at Malta ofsome fast reconnaissance machines enabled us to discernour prey The British plan was to fly two waves of aircraftfrom the Illustrious the first of twelve and the second ofnine of which eleven were to carry torpedoes and the resteither bombs or flares The Illustrious released her aircraftshortly after dark from a point about a hundred and seventymiles from Taranto For an hour the battle raged amid fireand destruction among the Italian ships Despite the heavyflak only two of our aircraft were shot down The rest flewsafely back to the IllustriousBy this single stroke the balance of naval power in theMediterranean was decisively altered The air photographsshowed that three battleships one of them the new Littoriohad been torpedoed and in addition one cruiser wasreported hit and much damage inflicted on the dockyardHalf the Italian battle fleet was disabled for at least sixmonths and the Fleet Air Arm could rejoice at havingseized by their gallant exploit one of the rare opportunitiespresented to themAn ironic touch is imparted to this event by the fact that onthis very day the Italian Air Force at the express wish ofMussolini had taken part in the air attack on Great BritainAn Italian bomber force escorted by about sixty fightersattempted to bomb Allied convoys in the Medway Theywere intercepted by our fighters eight bombers and fivefighters being shot down This was their first and last


intervention in our domestic affairs They might have foundbetter employment defending their fleet at Taranto

I kept the President well informed


16X140

I am sure you will have been pleased about TarantoThe three uninjured Italian battleships have quittedTaranto today which perhaps means they arewithdrawing to Trieste

And again


21XI40

You may be interested to receive the following navalnotes on the action at Taranto which I have asked theAdmiralty to prepare

1 This attack had been in Commander-in-ChiefMediterraneanrsquos mind for some time he had intendedto carry it out on October 21 (Trafalgar Day) when themoon was suitable but a slight mishap to Illustrious ledto a postponement During his cruise in the CentralMediterranean on October 31 and November 1 it wasagain considered but the moon did not serve and itwas thought an attack with parachute flares would beless effective Success in such an attack was believedto depend on state of moon weather an undetectedapproach by the Fleet and good reconnaissance Thelatter was provided by flying-boats and a Glenn Martinsquadron working from Malta On the night of


November 1112 all the above conditions were metUnfavourable weather in the Gulf of Taranto preventeda repetition on 12th13th

2 Duplex pistols were used and probably contribut-ed to the success of the torpedo attack

3 The Greek Ambassador at Angora reported onNovember 11 that Italian Fleet was concentrating atTaranto in preparation for an attack on CorfuReconnaissance on November 13 shows thatundamaged battleships and eight-inch-gun cruisershave left Taranto ndash presumably owing to the attack on11th12th

I now addressed General Wavell

Prime Minister toGeneral Wavell

14XI40

Chiefs of Staff Service Ministers and I haveexamined general situation in the light of recent eventsItalian check on Greek front British naval successagainst battle fleet at Taranto poor showing Italianairmen have made over here encouraging reportsreceived of low morale in Italy Gallabat your ownexperiences by contacts in Western Desert above allthe general political situation make it very desirable toundertake operation of which you spoke to Secretary ofState for War

It is unlikely that Germany will leave her flagging allyunsupported indefinitely Consequently it seems thatnow is the time to take risks and strike the Italians byland sea and air You should act accordingly inconcert with other Commanders-in-Chief


26XI40


News from every quarter must have impressed onyou the importance of Compass in relation to wholeMiddle East position including Balkans and Turkey toFrench attitude in North Africa to Spanish attitude nowtrembling on the brink to Italy in grievous straits andgenerally to the whole war Without being over-sanguine I cannot repress strong feelings of confi-dence and hope and feel convinced risks inseparablefrom great deeds are fully justified

2 Have asked Admiralty to inquire about partassigned to Fleet If success is achieved presume youhave plans for exploiting it to the full I am having aStaff study made of possibilities open to us if all goeswell for moving fighting troops and also reserveforward by sea in long hops along the coast andsetting-up new supply bases to which pursuingarmoured vehicles and units might resort Withoutwishing to be informed on details I should like to beassured that all this has been weighed explored andas far as possible prepared

It seems difficult to believe that Hitler will not beforced to come to the rescue of his partner andobviously German plans may be far advanced for adrive through Bulgaria at Salonika From severalquarters we have reports in that Germans do notapprove of Mussolinirsquos adventure and that they areinclined to let him pay the price himself This makes meall the more suspicious that something bad is bankingup ready to be let off soon Every dayrsquos delay is in ourfavour It might be that Compass would in itselfdetermine action of Yugoslavia and Turkey andanyhow in event of success we should be able to giveTurkey far greater assurances of early support than ithas been in our power to do so far One may indeedsee possibility of centre of gravity in Middle East shiftingsuddenly from Egypt to the Balkans and from Cairo toConstantinople You are no doubt preparing your mindfor this and a Staff study is being made here

As we told you the other day we shall stand by youand Wilson in any well-conceived action irrespective ofresult because no one can guarantee success in warbut only deserve it


Tell Longmore that I much admire his calling-in ofthe southern squadrons and accepting the risk ofpunishment there If all is well Furious and her outfitshould reach Takoradi tomorrow This should makeamends for all the feathers we have had to pull out ofhim for Greece where the part played by RAF inGreek victories has been of immense military andpolitical consequence All good wishes to you both andto the Admiral who is doing so splendidly I rejoice thathe should feel Suda Bay ldquoan inestimable benefitrdquo

Prime Minister toForeign Secretary

26XI40

I suggest the following to our Ambassador in TurkeyWe have placed before you the various arguments

for and against Turkish intervention which haveoccurred to the Staff officers who have reported uponthe matter but we do not wish to leave you in anydoubt of what our own opinion and your instructionsare We want Turkey to come into the war as soon aspossible We are not pressing her to take any specialsteps to help the Greeks except to make it clear toBulgaria that any move by Germany through Bulgaria toattack Greece or any hostile movement by Bulgariaagainst Greece will be followed by immediate Turkishdeclaration of war We should like Turkey andYugoslavia now to consult together so as if possible tohave a joint warning ready to offer Bulgaria andGermany at the first sign of a German movementtowards Bulgaria In the event of German troopstraversing Bulgaria with or without Bulgarian assis-tance it is vital that Turkey should fight there and thenIf she does not she will find herself left absolutelyalone the Balkans will have been eaten up one by oneand it will be beyond our power to help her You maymention that by the summer of 1941 we hope to haveat least fifteen divisions operating in the Middle Eastand by the end of the year nearly twenty-five We donot doubt our ability to defeat Italy in Africa


6 PM The Chiefs of Staffs are in general agree-ment with the above

PrimeMinister to FirstLord First Sea Lordand General Ismayfor COS CommitteeCAS to see

30XI40

Furiousshould return home at once and carryanother load of aircraft and pilots as reinforcement forthe Middle East Every effort should be made to put offher refit till after she has carried this force CASshould say what composition of force is best


1XII40

Exactly what have we got and done at Suda Bay[Crete] ndash ie troops AA guns coast defence gunslights wireless RDF nets mines preparation ofaerodromes etc

I hope to be assured that many hundreds of Cretansare working at strengthening the defences andlengthening and improving the aerodromes

General Ismay for COS Committee

1XII40

The continued retreat of the Italians in Albania andthe reports which we have received today of difficultiesof feeding and watering their forces in the LibyanDesert together with other reports of aircraft beingmoved back to Tripoli to be safer from our attackscombined with safe arrival at Takoradi of thirty-threeHurricanes with first-class pilots all constitute new factsentitling us to take a more confident view of thesituation which should be communicated to GeneralWavell

The enormous advantage of being able once anenemy is on the run to pull supplies and fighting troopsforward eighty miles in a night by sea and bring fresh


troops up to the advance guard is very rarely offered inwar General Wavellrsquos reply to my telegram does notseem to take any account of this and considering howmuch we have ourselves at stake I do not think weshould be doing our duty if we did not furnish him withthe results of our Staff study It is a crime to haveamphibious power and leave it unused Therefore Iwish the study if favourable to be telegraphed It musthowever be ready by the 3d at latest

I add the following general observation The fact thatwe now have established ourselves at Suda Bayentitles us to feel much easier about Malta While theFleet is or may be at Suda it will be most unlikely thatany large landing will be attempted at Malta which wehave already reinforced by tanks and guns from MiddleEasthellip The possession of Suda Bay has made anenormous change in the Eastern Mediterranean

The story of Suda Bay is sad The tragedy was not reacheduntil 1941 I believe I had as much direct control over theconduct of the war as any public man had in any country atthis time The knowledge I possessed the fidelity andactive aid of the War Cabinet the loyalty of all mycolleagues the ever-growing efficiency of our war machineall enabled an intense focusing of constitutional authority tobe achieved Yet how far short was the action taken by theMiddle East Command of what was ordered and what weall desired In order to appreciate the limitations of humanaction it must be remembered how much was going on inevery direction at the same time Nevertheless it remainsastonishing to me that we should have failed to make SudaBay the amphibious citadel of which all Crete was thefortress Everything was understood and agreed and muchwas done but all was half-scale effort We were presentlyto pay heavily for our shortcomings


The Italian invasion of Greece from Albania was anotherheavy rebuff to Mussolini The first assault was repulsedwith heavy loss and the Greeks immediately counter-attacked In the northern (Macedonian) sector the Greeksadvanced into Albania capturing Koritza on November 22In the central sector of the northern Pindus an Italian Alpinidivision was annihilated In the coastal zone where theItalians had at first succeeded in making deep penetrationsthey hastily retreated from the Kalamas River The Greekarmy under General Papagos showed superior skill inmountain warfare out-manoeuvring and outflanking theirenemy By the end of the year their prowess had forced theItalians thirty miles behind the Albanian frontier along thewhole front For several months twenty-seven Italiandivisions were pinned in Albania by sixteen Greek divisionsThe remarkable Greek resistance did much to hearten theother Balkan countries and Mussolinirsquos prestige sank low

On November 9 Mr Neville Chamberlain died at hiscountry home in Hampshire I had obtained the Kingrsquospermission to have him supplied with the Cabinet papersand until a few days before the end he followed our affairswith keenness interest and tenacity He met the approachof death with a steady eye I think he died with the comfortof knowing that his country had at least turned the cornerAs soon as the House met on November 12 I paid a tributeto his character and career

At the lychgate we may all pass our own conductand our own judgments under a searching review It isnot given to human beings happily for them forotherwise life would be intolerable to foresee or topredict to any large extent the unfolding course of


events In one phase men seem to have been right inanother they seem to have been wrong Then again afew years later when the perspective of time haslengthened all stands in a different setting There is anew proportion There is another scale of valuesHistory with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trailof the past trying to reconstruct its scenes to revive itsechoes and kindle with pale gleams the passion offormer days What is the worth of all this The onlyguide to a man is his conscience the only shield to hismemory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions It isvery imprudent to walk through life without this shieldbecause we are so often mocked by the failure of ourhopes and the upsetting of our calculations but withthis shield however the Fates may play we marchalways in the ranks of honour

Whatever else history may or may not say aboutthese terrible tremendous years we can be sure thatNeville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerityaccording to his lights and strove to the utmost of hiscapacity and authority which were powerful to savethe world from the awful devastating struggle in whichwe are now engagedhellip Herr Hitler protests with franticwords and gestures that he has only desired peaceWhat do these ravings and outpourings count beforethe silence of Neville Chamberlainrsquos tomb Long hardand hazardous years lie before us but at least we enterupon them united and with clean heartshellip

He was like his father and his brother Austen beforehim a famous Member of the House of Commons andwe here assembled this morning members of allparties without a single exception feel that we doourselves and our country honour in saluting thememory of one whom Disraeli would have called ldquoanEnglish worthyrdquo


13Lend-Lease

Roosevelt Re-elected President mdash BritishMunitions Contracts in the United StatesmdashLordLothian Visits Me at Ditchley mdashldquoCash and CarryrdquoNovember 1939 mdash British Losses of Dollars inthe Twilight WarmdashA New Era May 1940 mdash IDraft My Letter of December 8 1940 to thePresidentmdashThe Common Interests of Britain andthe United StatesmdashNeed of Forward PlanningmdashBritish Recovery Since JunemdashImpending Peril onthe Atlantic in 1941 mdash Our Shipping LossesmdashBritish and German Battleship Strength mdash TheMenace of Japan mdash The Atlantic LifelinemdashAmerican Influence on EiremdashMy Request for TwoThousand Additional Aircraft a Month mdash ArmyEquipment mdash How to Pay the Bill mdash Appeal tothe United States mdash The Presidentrsquos DiscoveryldquoLend-Leaserdquomdash His Press Conference ofDecember 17 mdashldquoEliminate the Dollar SignrdquomdashLend-Lease Bill Presented to CongressmdashSuddenDeath of Philip Lothian mdash I Choose Lord Halifaxas His SuccessormdashMy Tribute to Lord HalifaxmdashMr Eden Returns Home to the Foreign OfficemdashCaptain Margesson Secretary of State for WarmdashWaiting for Lend-LeasemdashNew Year Greetings tothe President

ABOVE THE ROAR AND CLASH OF ARMS there now loomedupon us a world-fateful event of a different order The


presidential election took place on November 6 In spite ofthe tenacity and vigour with which these four-yearlycontests are conducted and the bitter differences ondomestic issues which at this time divided the two mainparties the Supreme Cause was respected by theresponsible leaders Republicans and Democrats alike AtCleveland on November 2 Mr Roosevelt said ldquoOur policyis to give all possible material aid to the nations which stillresist aggression across the Atlantic and Pacific OceansrdquoHis opponent Mr Wendell Willkie declared next day atMadison Square Garden ldquoAll of us ndash RepublicansDemocrats and Independents ndash believe in giving aid to theheroic British people We must make available to them theproducts of our industryrdquoThis larger patriotism guarded both the safety of theAmerican Union and our life Still it was with profoundanxiety that I awaited the result No newcomer into powercould possess or soon acquire the knowledge andexperience of Franklin Roosevelt None could equal hiscommanding gifts My own relations with him had beenmost carefully fostered by me and seemed already to havereached a degree of confidence and friendship which was avital factor in all my thought To close the slowly built-upcomradeship to break the continuity of all our discussionsto begin again with a new mind and personality seemed tome a repellent prospect Since Dunkirk I had not beenconscious of the same sense of strain It was withindescribable relief that I received the news that PresidentRoosevelt had been re-elected


6XI40


I did not think it right for me as a foreigner to expressany opinion upon American politics while the electionwas on but now I feel you will not mind my saying that Iprayed for your success and that I am truly thankful forit This does not mean that I seek or wish for anythingmore than the full fair and free play of your mind uponthe world issues now at stake in which our two nationshave to discharge their respective duties We areentering upon a sombre phase of what must evidentlybe a protracted and broadening war and I look forwardto being able to interchange my thoughts with you in allthat confidence and good will which has grown upbetween us since I went to the Admiralty at theoutbreak Things are afoot which will be rememberedas long as the English language is spoken in anyquarter of the globe and in expressing the comfort Ifeel that the people of the United States have onceagain cast these great burdens upon you I must avowmy sure faith that the lights by which we steer will bringus all safely to anchor

Curiously enough I never received any answer to thistelegram It may well have been engulfed in the vast massof congratulatory messages which were swept aside byurgent workUp till this time we had placed our orders for munitions inthe United States separately from though in consultationwith the American Army Navy and Air Services The ever-increasing volume of our several needs had led tooverlapping at numerous points with possibilities of frictionarising at lower levels in spite of general good will ldquoOnly asingle unified Government procurement policy for alldefence purposesrdquo writes Mr Stettinius1ldquocould do thetremendous job that was now aheadrdquo This meant that theUnited States Government should place all the orders forweapons in America Three days after his re-election thePresident publicly announced a ldquorule of thumbrdquo for the


division of American arms output As weapons came off theproduction line they were to be divided roughly fifty-fiftybetween the United States forces and the British andCanadian forces That same day the Priorities Boardapproved a British request to order twelve thousand moreaeroplanes in the United States in addition to the eleventhousand we had already booked But how was ail this tobe paid for

In mid-November Lord Lothian flew home from Washingtonand spent two days with me at Ditchley I had been advisednot to make a habit of staying at Chequers every week-endespecially when the moon was full in case the enemyshould pay me special attention Mr Ronald Tree and hiswife made me and my staff very welcome many times attheir large and charming house near Oxford Ditchley is onlyfour or five miles away from Blenheim In these agreeablesurroundings I received the Ambassador Lothian seemedto me a changed man In all the years I had known him hehad given me the impression of high intellectual andaristocratic detachment from vulgar affairs Airy viewyaloof dignified censorious yet in a light and gay mannerhe had always been good company Now under the samehammer that beat upon us all I found an earnest deeplystirred man He was primed with every aspect and detail ofthe American attitude He had won nothing but good willand confidence in Washington by his handling of thedestroyer-cum-bases negotiations He was fresh fromintimate contact with the President with whom he hadestablished a warm personal friendship His mind was nowset upon the dollar problem this was grim indeed


Before the war the United States was governed by the pre-war Neutrality Act which obliged the President onSeptember 3 1939 to place an embargo on all shipmentsof arms to any of the belligerent nations Ten days later hehad called Congress to a special session to consider theremoval of this ban which under the appearance ofimpartiality virtually deprived Great Britain and France of allthe advantages of the command of the seas in the transportof munitions and supplies It was not until the end ofNovember 1939 after many weeks of discussion andagitation that the Neutrality Act was repealed and the newprinciple of ldquoCash and Carryrdquo substituted This stillpreserved the appearance of strict neutrality on the part ofthe United States for Americans were as free to sellweapons to Germany as to the Allies In fact however oursea-power prevented any German traffic while Britain andFrance could ldquocarryrdquo freely as long as they had ldquocashrdquoThree days after the passage of the new law ourPurchasing Commission headed by Mr Arthur Purvis aman of outstanding ability began its work

Britain entered the war with about 4500000000 in dollarsor in gold and in United States investments that could beturned into dollars The only way in which these resourcescould be increased was by new gold-production in theBritish Empire mainly of course in South Africa and byvigorous efforts to export goods principally luxury goodssuch as whisky fine woollens and pottery to the UnitedStates By these means an additional two thousand milliondollars were procured during the first sixteen months of thewar During the period of the ldquoTwilight Warrdquo we were tornbetween a vehement desire to order munitions in America


and gnawing fear as our dollar resources dwindled Alwaysin Mr Chamberlainrsquos day the Chancellor of the ExchequerSir John Simon would tell us of the lamentable state of ourdollar resources and emphasise the need for conservingthem It was more or less accepted that we should have toreckon with a rigorous limitation of purchases from theUnited States We acted as Mr Purvis once said toStettinius ldquoas if we were on a desert island on short rationswhich we must stretch as far as we couldrdquo2

This had meant elaborate arrangements for eking out ourmoney In peace we imported freely and made paymentsas we liked When war came we had to create a machinewhich mobilised gold and dollars and other private assetswhich stopped the ill-disposed from remitting their funds tocountries where they felt things were safer and which cutout wasteful imports and other expenditures On top ofmaking sure that we did not waste our money we had tosee that others went on taking it The countries of thesterling area were with us they adopted the same kind ofexchange-control policy as we did and were willing takersand holders of sterling With others we made specialarrangements by which we paid them in sterling whichcould be used anywhere in the sterling area and theyundertook to hold any sterling for which they had noimmediate use and to keep dealings at the official rates ofexchange Such arrangements were originally made withthe Argentine and Sweden but were extended to a numberof other countries on the Continent and in South AmericaThese arrangements were completed after the spring of1940 and it was a matter of satisfaction ndash and a tribute tosterling ndash that we were able to achieve and maintain themin circumstances of such difficulty In this way we were ableto go on dealing with most parts of the world in sterling and


to conserve most of our precious gold and dollars for ourvital purchases in the United StatesWhen the war exploded into hideous reality in May 1940we were conscious that a new era had dawned in Anglo-American relations From the time I formed the newGovernment and Sir Kingsley Wood became Chancellor ofthe Exchequer we followed a simpler plan namely to ordereverything we possibly could and leave future financialproblems on the lap of the Eternal Gods Fighting for lifeand presently alone under ceaseless bombardment withinvasion glaring upon us it would have been false economyand misdirected prudence to worry too much about whatwould happen when our dollars ran out We were consciousof the tremendous changes taking place in Americanopinion and of the growing belief not only in Washingtonbut throughout the Union that their fate was bound up withours Moreover at this time an intense wave of sympathyand admiration for Britain surged across the Americannation Very friendly signals were made to us fromWashington direct and also through Canada encouragingour boldness and indicating that somehow or other a waywould be found In Mr Morgenthau Secretary of theTreasury the cause of the Allies had a tireless championThe taking-over of the French contracts in June had almostdoubled our rate of spending across the Exchange Besidesthis we placed new orders for aeroplanes tanks andmerchant ships in every direction and promoted thebuilding of great new factories both in the United States andCanada

Up till November 1940 we had paid for everything we hadreceived We had already sold $335000000 worth of


American shares requisitioned for sterling from privateowners in Britain We had paid out over $4500000000 incash We had only two thousand millions left the greaterpart in investments many of which were not readilymarketable It was plain that we could not go on any longerin this way Even if we divested ourselves of all our goldand foreign assets we could not pay for half we hadordered and the extension of the war made it necessary forus to have ten times as much We must keep something inhand to carry on our daily affairsLothian was confident that the President and his adviserswere earnestly seeking the best way to help us Now thatthe election was over the moment to act had comeCeaseless discussions on behalf of the Treasury wereproceeding in Washington between their representative SirFrederick Phillips and Mr Morgenthau The Ambassadorurged me to write a full statement of our position to thePresident Accordingly that Sunday at Ditchley I drew up inconsultation with him a personal letter On November 16 Itelegraphed to Roosevelt ldquoI am writing you a very longletter on the outlook for 1941 which Lord Lothian will giveyou in a few daysrdquo As the document had to be checkedand rechecked by the Chiefs of Staff and the Treasury andapproved by the War Cabinet it was not completed beforeLothianrsquos return to Washington On November 26 I senthim a message ldquoI am still struggling with my letter to thePresident but hope to cable it to you in a few daysrdquo In itsfinal form the letter was dated December 8 and wasimmediately sent to the President This letter was one ofthe most important I ever wrote As it gives a view of thewhole situation agreed to by all concerned in London andas it played a recognisable part in our fortunes it deservesstudy


10 DOWNING STREET WHITEHALLDecember 8 1940

MY DEAR MR PRESIDENT

1 As we reach the end of this year I feel you willexpect me to lay before you the prospects for 1941 Ido so with candour and confidence because it seemsto me that the vast majority of American citizens haverecorded their conviction that the safety of the UnitedStates as well as the future of our two Democraciesand the kind of civilisation for which they stand isbound up with the survival and independence of theBritish Commonwealth of Nations Only thus can thosebastions of sea-power upon which the control of theAtlantic and Indian Oceans depend be preserved infaithful and friendly hands The control of the Pacific bythe United States Navy and of the Atlantic by the BritishNavy is indispensable to the security and trade routesof both our countries and the surest means ofpreventing war from reaching the shores of the UnitedStates

2 There is another aspect It takes between threeand four years to convert the industries of a modernstate to war purposes Saturation-point is reachedwhen the maximum industrial effort that can be sparedfrom civil needs has been applied to war productionGermany certainly reached this point by the end of1939 We in the British Empire are now only abouthalfway through the second year The United States Ishould suppose is by no means so far advanced aswe Moreover I understand that immense programmesof naval military and air defence are now on foot in theUnited States to complete which certainly two yearsare needed It is our British duty in the commoninterest as also for our own survival to hold the frontand grapple with the Nazi power until the preparationsof the United States are complete Victory may comebefore two years are out but we have no right to countupon it to the extent of relaxing any effort that ishumanly possible Therefore I submit with very great


respect for your good and friendly consideration thatthere is a solid identity of interest between the BritishEmpire and the United States while these conditionslast It is upon this footing that I venture to address you

3 The form which this war has taken and seemslikely to hold does not enable us to match the immensearmies of Germany in any theatre where their mainpower can be brought to bear We can however by theuse of sea-power and air-power meet the Germanarmies in regions where only comparatively smallforces can be brought into action We must do our bestto prevent the German domination of Europe spreadinginto Africa and into Southern Asia We have also tomaintain in constant readiness in this island armiesstrong enough to make the problem of an overseainvasion insoluble For these purposes we are formingas fast as possible as you are already aware betweenfifty and sixty divisions Even if the United States wereour ally instead of our friend and indispensable partnerwe should not ask for a large American expeditionaryarmy Shipping not men is the limiting factor and thepower to transport munitions and supplies claimspriority over the movement by sea of large numbers ofsoldiers

4 The first half of 1940 was a period of disaster forthe Allies and for Europe The last five months havewitnessed a strong and perhaps unexpected recoveryby Great Britain fighting alone but with the invaluableaid in munitions and in destroyers placed at ourdisposal by the great Republic of which you are for thethird time the chosen Chief

5 The danger of Great Britain being destroyed by aswift overwhelming blow has for the time being verygreatly receded In its place there is a long graduallymaturing danger less sudden and less spectacular butequally deadly This mortal danger is the steady andincreasing diminution of sea tonnage We can endurethe shattering of our dwellings and the slaughter of ourcivil population by indiscriminate air attacks and wehope to parry these increasingly as our sciencedevelops and to repay them upon military objectives inGermany as our Air Force more nearly approaches the


strength of the enemy The decision for 1941 lies uponthe seas Unless we can establish our ability to feedthis island to import the munitions of all kinds which weneed unless we can move our armies to the varioustheatres where Hitler and his confederate Mussolinimust be met and maintain them there and do all thiswith the assurance of being able to carry it on till thespirit of the Continental Dictators is broken we may fallby the way and the time needed by the United Statesto complete her defensive preparations may not beforthcoming It is therefore in shipping and in thepower to transport across the oceans particularly theAtlantic Ocean that in 1941 the crunch of the wholewar will be found If on the other hand we are able tomove the necessary tonnage to and fro across saltwater indefinitely it may well be that the application ofsuperior air-power to the German homeland and therising anger of the German and other Nazi-grippedpopulations will bring the agony of civilisation to amerciful and glorious end

But do not let us underrate the task6 Our shipping losses the figures for which in

recent months are appended have been on a scalealmost comparable to that of the worst year of the lastwar In the five weeks ending November 3 lossesreached a total of 420300 tons Our estimate of annualtonnage which ought to be imported in order tomaintain our effort at full strength is forty-three milliontons the tonnage entering in September was only atthe rate of thirty-seven million tons and in October ofthirty-eight million tons Were this diminution to continueat this rate it would be fatal unless indeed immenselygreater replenishment than anything at present in sightcould be achieved in time Although we are doing all wecan to meet this situation by new methods the difficultyof limiting losses is obviously much greater than in thelast war We lack the assistance of the French Navythe Italian Navy and the Japanese Navy and above allof the United States Navy which was of such vital helpto us during the culminating years The enemycommands the ports all around the northern andwestern coasts of France He is increasingly basing his


submarines flying-boats and combat planes on theseports and on the islands off the French coast We aredenied the use of the ports or territory of Eire in whichto organise our coastal patrols by air and sea In factwe have now only one effective route of entry to theBritish Isles namely the northern approaches againstwhich the enemy is increasingly concentratingreaching ever farther out by U-boat action and long-distance aircraft bombing In addition there have forsome months been merchant-ship raiders both in theAtlantic and Indian Oceans And now we have thepowerful warship raider to contend with as well Weneed ships both to hunt down and to escort Large asare our resources and preparations we do not possessenough

7 The next six or seven months [will] bring relativebattleship strength in home waters to a smaller marginthan is satisfactory Bismarck and Tirpitz will certainlybe in service in January We have already King GeorgeV and hope to have Prince of Wales in the line at thesame time These modern ships are of course farbetter armoured especially against air attack thanvessels like Rodney and Nelson designed twenty yearsago We have recently had to use Rodney ontransatlantic escort and at any time when numbers areso small a mine or a torpedo may alter decisively thestrength of the line of battle We get relief in Junewhen Duke of York will be ready and shall be stillbetter off at the end of 1941 when Anson also will havejoined But these two first-class modern 35000-ton3fifteen-inch-gun German battleships force us tomaintain a concentration never previously necessary inthis war

8 We hope that the two Italian Littorios will be out ofaction for a while and anyway they are not sodangerous as if they were manned by GermansPerhaps they might be We are indebted to you for yourhelp about the Richelieu and Jean Bart and I daresaythat will be all right But Mr President as no one willsee more clearly than you we have during thesemonths to consider for the first time in this war a fleet


action in which the enemy will have two ships at leastas good as our two best and only two modern ones Itwill be impossible to reduce our strength in theMediterranean because the attitude of Turkey andindeed the whole position in the Eastern Basindepends upon our having a strong fleet there Theolder unmodernised battleships will have to go forconvoy Thus even in the battleship class we are in fullextension

9 There is a second field of danger The VichyGovernment may either by joining Hitlerrsquos New Order inEurope or through some manoeuvre such as forcing usto attack an expedition despatched by sea against theFree French Colonies find an excuse for ranging withthe Axis Powers the very considerable undamagednaval forces still under its control If the French Navywere to join the Axis the control of West Africa wouldpass immediately into their hands with the gravestconsequences to our communications between theNorthern and Southern Atlantic and also affectingDakar and of course thereafter South America

10 A third sphere of danger is in the Far East Hereit seems clear that Japan is thrusting southwardthrough Indo-China to Saigon and other naval and airbases thus bringing them within a comparatively shortdistance of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies It isreported that the Japanese are preparing five gooddivisions for possible use as an overseas expeditionaryforce We have today no forces in the Far East capableof dealing with this situation should it develop

11 In the face of these dangers we must try to usethe year 1941 to build up such a supply of weaponsparticularly of aircraft both by increased output at homein spite of bombardment and through ocean-bornesupplies as will lay the foundations of victory In view ofthe difficulty and magnitude of this task as outlined byall the facts I have set forth to which many others couldbe added I feel entitled nay bound to lay before youthe various ways in which the United States could givesupreme and decisive help to what is in certainaspects the common cause


12 The prime need is to check or limit the loss oftonnage on the Atlantic approaches to our island Thismay be achieved both by increasing the naval forceswhich cope with the attacks and by adding to thenumber of merchant ships on which we depend For thefirst purpose there would seem to be the followingalternatives

(1) The reassertion by the United States of thedoctrine of the freedom of the seas from illegal andbarbarous methods of warfare in accordance with thedecisions reached after the late Great War and asfreely accepted and defined by Germany in 1935 Fromthis United States ships should be free to trade withcountries against which there is not an effective legalblockade

(2) It would I suggest follow that protection shouldbe given to this lawful trading by United States forces ie escorting battleships cruisers destroyers and airflotillas The protection would be immensely moreeffective if you were able to obtain bases in Eire for theduration of the war I think it is improbable that suchprotection would provoke a declaration of war byGermany upon the United States though probably seaincidents of a dangerous character would from time totime occur Herr Hitler has shown himself inclined toavoid the Kaiserrsquos mistake He does not wish to bedrawn into war with the United States until he hasgravely undermined the power of Great Britain Hismaxim is ldquoOne at a timerdquo

The policy I have ventured to outline or somethinglike it would constitute a decisive act of constructivenon-belligerency by the United States and more thanany other measure would make it certain that Britishresistance could be effectively prolonged for thedesired period and victory gained

(3) Failing the above the gift loan or supply of alarge number of American vessels of war above alldestroyers already in the Atlantic is indispensable tothe maintenance of the Atlantic route Further could notthe United States Naval Forces extend their sea-controlof the American side of the Atlantic so as to prevent themolestation by enemy vessels of the approaches to the


new line of naval and air bases which the United Statesis establishing in British islands in the WesternHemisphere The strength of the United States NavalForces is such that the assistance in the Atlantic thatthey could afford us as described above would notjeopardise the control of the Pacific

(4) We should also then need the good offices of theUnited States and the whole influence of its Govern-ment continually exerted to procure for Great Britainthe necessary facilities upon the southern and westernshores of Eire for our flotillas and still more importantfor our aircraft working to the westward into theAtlantic If it were proclaimed an American interest thatthe resistance of Great Britain should be prolonged andthe Atlantic route kept open for the importantarmaments now being prepared for Great Britain inNorth America the Irish in the United States might bewilling to point out to the Government of Eire thedangers which its present policy is creating for theUnited States itself

His Majestyrsquos Government would of course take themost effective measures beforehand to protect Irelandif Irish action exposed it to German attack It is notpossible for us to compel the people of Northern Irelandagainst their will to leave the United Kingdom and joinSouthern Ireland But I do not doubt that if theGovernment of Eire would show its solidarity with thedemocracies of the English-speaking world at thiscrisis a Council for Defence of all Ireland could be setup out of which the unity of the island would probably insome form or other emerge after the war

13 The object of the foregoing measures is toreduce to manageable proportions the presentdestructive losses at sea In addition it is indispensablethat the merchant tonnage available for supplying GreatBritain and for the waging of the war by Great Britainwith all vigour should be substantially increasedbeyond the 1250000 tons per annum which is theutmost we can now build The convoy system thedetours the zigzags the great distances from which wenow have to bring our imports and the congestion ofour western harbours have reduced by about one-third


the fruitfulness of our existing tonnage To ensure finalvictory not less than three million tons of additionalmerchant shipbuilding capacity will be required Onlythe United States can supply this need Looking to thefuture it would seem that production on a scalecomparable to that of the Hog Island scheme of the lastwar ought to be faced for 1942 In the meanwhile weask that in 1941 the United States should makeavailable to us every ton of merchant shipping surplusto its own requirements which it possesses or controlsand to find some means of putting into our service alarge proportion of merchant shipping now underconstruction for the National Maritime Board

14 Moreover we look to the industrial energy of theRepublic for a reinforcement of our domestic capacity tomanufacture combat aircraft Without that reinforce-ment reaching us in substantial measure we shall notachieve the massive preponderance in the air on whichwe must rely to loosen and disintegrate the Germangrip on Europe We are at present engaged on aprogramme designed to increase our strength to seventhousand first-line aircraft by the spring of 1942 But it isabundantly clear that this programme will not suffice togive us the weight of superiority which will force openthe doors of victory In order to achieve such superiori-ty it is plain that we shall need the greatest productionof aircraft which the United States of America iscapable of sending us It is our anxious hope that in theteeth of continuous bombardment we shall realise thegreater part of the production which we have planned inthis country But not even with the addition to oursquadrons of all the aircraft which under presentarrangements we may derive from planned output inthe United States can we hope to achieve thenecessary ascendancy May I invite you then MrPresident to give earnest consideration to animmediate order on joint account for a further twothousand combat aircraft a month Of these aircraft Iwould submit the highest possible proportion should beheavy bombers the weapon on which above allothers we depend to shatter the foundations ofGerman military power I am aware of the formidable


task that this would impose upon the industrialorganisation of the United States Yet in our heavyneed we call with confidence to the most resourcefuland ingenious technicians in the world We ask for anunexampled effort believing that it can be made

15 You have also received information about theneeds of our armies In the munitions sphere in spite ofenemy bombing we are making steady progress hereWithout your continued assistance in the supply ofmachine tools and in further releases from stock ofcertain articles we could not hope to equip as many asfifty divisions in 1941 I am grateful for the arrange-ments already practically completed for your aid in theequipment of the army which we have already plannedand for the provision of the American type of weaponsfor an additional ten divisions in time for the campaignof 1942 But when the tide of dictatorship begins torecede many countries trying to regain their freedommay be asking for arms and there is no source towhich they can look except the factories of the UnitedStates I must therefore also urge the importance ofexpanding to the utmost American productive capacityfor small arms artillery and tanks

16 I am arranging to present you with a completeprogramme of the munitions of all kinds which we seekto obtain from you the greater part of which is ofcourse already agreed An important economy of timeand effort will be produced if the types selected for theUnited States Services should whenever possibleconform to those which have proved their merit underthe actual conditions of war In this way reserves ofguns and ammunition and of airplanes becomeinterchangeable and are by that very fact augmentedThis is however a sphere so highly technical that I donot enlarge upon it

17 Last of all I come to the question of FinanceThe more rapid and abundant the flow of munitions andships which you are able to send us the sooner will ourdollar credits be exhausted They are already as youknow very heavily drawn upon by the payments wehave made to date Indeed as you know the ordersalready placed or under negotiation including the


expenditure settled or pending for creating munitionsfactories in the United States many times exceed thetotal exchange resources remaining at the disposal ofGreat Britain The moment approaches when we shallno longer be able to pay cash for shipping and othersupplies While we will do our utmost and shrink fromno proper sacrifice to make payments across theExchange I believe you will agree that it would bewrong in principle and mutually disadvantageous ineffect if at the height of this struggle Great Britain wereto be divested of all saleable assets so that after thevictory was won with our blood civilisation saved andthe time gained for the United States to be fully armedagainst all eventualities we should stand stripped tothe bone Such a course would not be in the moral oreconomic interests of either of our countries We hereshould be unable after the war to purchase the largebalance of imports from the United States over andabove the volume of our exports which is agreeable toyour tariffs and industrial economy Not only should wein Great Britain suffer cruel privations but widespreadunemployment in the United States would follow thecurtailment of American exporting power

18 Moreover I do not believe that the Governmentand people of the United States would find it inaccordance with the principles which guide them toconfine the help which they have so generouslypromised only to such munitions of war and commodi-ties as could be immediately paid for You may becertain that we shall prove ourselves ready to sufferand sacrifice to the utmost for the Cause and that weglory in being its champions The rest we leave withconfidence to you and to your people being sure thatways and means will be found which future generationson both sides of the Atlantic will approve and admire

19 If as I believe you are convinced Mr Presidentthat the defeat of the Nazi and Fascist tyranny is amatter of high consequence to the people of the UnitedStates and to the Western Hemisphere you will regardthis letter not as an appeal for aid but as a statement


of the minimum action necessary to achieve ourcommon purpose

A table was added showing the losses by enemy action ofBritish Allied and neutral merchant tonnage for the periodsgiven4

The letter reached our great friend when he was cruisingon board an American warship the Tuscaloosa in thesunlight of the Caribbean Sea He had only his ownintimates around him Harry Hopkins then unknown to metold me later that Mr Roosevelt read and re-read this letteras he sat alone in his deck-chair and that for two days hedid not seem to have reached any clear conclusion He wasplunged in intense thought and brooded silentlyFrom all this there sprang a wonderful decision It wasnever a question of the President not knowing what hewanted to do His problem was how to carry his countrywith him and to persuade Congress to follow his guidanceAccording to Stettinius the President as early as the latesummer had suggested at a meeting of the DefenceAdvisory Commission on Shipping Resources that ldquoItshould not he necessary for the British to take their ownfunds and have ships built in the United States or for us tolend them money for this purpose There is no reason whywe should not take a finished vessel and lease it to them forthe duration of the emergencyrdquo It seems that this idea hadoriginated in the Treasury Department whose lawyersespecially Oscar S Cox of Maine had been stirred bySecretary Morgenthau It appeared that by a statute of 1892the Secretary for War ldquowhen in his discretion it will be forthe public goodrdquo could lease Army property if not requiredfor public use for a period of not longer than five years


Precedents for the use of this statute by the lease ofvarious Army items from time to time were on recordThus the word ldquoleaserdquo and the idea of applying the leaseprinciple to meeting British needs had been in PresidentRooseveltrsquos mind for some time as an alternative to a policyof indefinite loans which would soon far outstrip allpossibilities of repayment Now suddenly all this sprang intodecisive action and the glorious conception of Lend-Leasewas proclaimedThe President returned from the Caribbean on December16 and broached his plan at his press conference next dayHe used a simple illustration

Suppose my neighbourrsquos house catches fire and Ihave a length of garden hose four or five hundred feetaway If he can take my garden hose and connect it upwith his hydrant I may help him to put out the fire Nowwhat do I do I donrsquot say to him before that operationldquoNeighbour my garden hose cost me fifteen dollarsyou have to pay me fifteen dollars for itrdquo No What isthe transaction that goes on I donrsquot want fifteen dollarsndash I want my garden hose back after the fire is over

And againThere is absolutely no doubt in the mind of a very

overwhelming number of Americans that the bestimmediate defence of the United States is the successof Great Britain defending itself and that thereforequite aside from our historic and current interest in thesurvival of Democracy in the world as a whole it isequally important from a selfish point of view and ofAmerican defence that we should do everythingpossible to help the British Empire to defend itself

FinallyWhat I am trying to do is to eliminate the dollar sign


On this foundation the ever-famous Lend-Lease Bill was atonce prepared for submission to Congress I described thisto Parliament later as ldquothe most unsordid act in the historyof any nationrdquo Once it was accepted by Congress ittransformed immediately the whole position It made us freeto shape by agreement long-term plans of vast extent for allour needs There was no provision for repayment Therewas not even to be a formal account kept in dollars orsterling What we had was lent or leased to us because ourcontinued resistance to the Hitler tyranny was deemed tobe of vital interest to the great Republic According toPresident Roosevelt the defence of the United States andnot dollars was henceforth to determine where Americanweapons were to go

It was at this moment the most important in his publiccareer that Philip Lothian was taken from us Shortly afterhis return to Washington he fell suddenly and gravely illHe worked unremittingly to the end On December 12 inthe full tide of success he died This was a loss to thenation and to the Cause He was mourned by wide circlesof friends on both sides of the ocean To me who had beenin such intimate contact with him a fortnight before it was apersonal shock I paid my tribute to him in a House ofCommons united in deep respect for his work and memory

I had now to turn immediately to the choice of hissuccessor It seemed that our relations with the UnitedStates at this time required as Ambassador an outstandingnational figure and a statesman versed in every aspect of


world politics Having ascertained from the President thatmy suggestion would be acceptable I invited Mr LloydGeorge to take the post He had not felt able to join the WarCabinet in July and was not happily circumstanced inBritish politics His outlook on the war and the eventsleading up to it was from a different angle from mine Therecould be no doubt however that he was our foremostcitizen and that his incomparable gifts and experiencewould be devoted to the success of his mission I had along talk with him in the Cabinet Room and also atluncheon on a second day He showed genuine pleasure athaving been invited ldquoI tell my friendsrdquo he said ldquoI have hadhonourable offers made to me by the Prime Ministerrdquo Hewas sure that at the age of eighty-two he ought not toundertake so exacting a task As a result of my longconversations with him I was conscious that he had agedeven in the months which had passed since I had askedhim to join the War Cabinet and with regret but also withconviction I abandoned my planI next turned to Lord Halifax whose prestige in theConservative Party stood high and was enhanced by hisbeing at the Foreign Office For a Foreign Secretary tobecome an Ambassador marks in a unique manner theimportance of the mission His high character waseverywhere respected yet at the same time his record inthe years before the war and the way in which events hadmoved left him exposed to much disapprobation and evenhostility from the Labour side of our National Coalition Iknew that he was conscious of this himselfWhen I made him this proposal which was certainly not apersonal advancement he contented himself with saying ina simple and dignified manner that he would servewherever he was thought to be most useful In order toemphasise still further the importance of his duties I


arranged that he should resume his function as a memberof the War Cabinet whenever he came home on leave Thisarrangement worked without the slightest inconvenienceowing to the qualities and experience of the personalitiesinvolved and for six years thereafter both under theNational Coalition and the Labour-Socialist GovernmentHalifax discharged the work of Ambassador to the UnitedStates with conspicuous and ever-growing influence andsuccessPresident Roosevelt Mr Hull and other high personalities inWashington were extremely pleased with the selection ofLord Halifax Indeed it was at once apparent to me that thePresident greatly preferred it to my first proposal Theappointment of the new Ambassador was received withmarked approval both in America and at home and wasjudged in every way adequate and appropriate to the scaleof events

I had no doubt who should fill the vacancy at the ForeignOffice On all the great issues of the past four years I hadas these pages have shown dwelt in close agreement withAnthony Eden I have described my anxieties and emotionswhen he parted company with Mr Chamberlain in thespring of 1938 Together we had abstained from the voteon Munich Together we had resisted the party pressuresbrought to bear upon us in our constituencies during thewinter of that melancholy year We had been united inthought and sentiment at the outbreak of the war and ascolleagues during its progress The greater part of Edenrsquospublic life had been devoted to the study of foreign affairsHe had held the splendid office of Foreign Secretary withdistinction and had resigned it when only forty years of age


for reasons which are in retrospect and at this time viewedwith the approval of all parties in the State He had played afine part as Secretary of State for War during this terrificyear and his conduct of Armv affairs had brought us veryclose together We thought alike even without consultationon a very great number of practical issues as they arosefrom day to day I looked forward to an agreeable andharmonious comradeship between the Prime Minister andthe Foreign Secretary and this hope was certainly fulfilledduring the four and a half years of war and policy which laybefore us Eden was sorry to leave the War Office in all thestresses and excitements of which he was absorbed but hereturned to the Foreign Office like a man going home

I filled Mr Edenrsquos place as Secretary of State for War bysubmitting to the King the name of Captain Margesson atthat time the Chief Whip to the National Government Thischoice excited some adverse comment David Margessonhad been for nearly ten years at the head of theGovernment Whiprsquos Office in the House of Commons andit had fallen to him to marshal and to stimulate the patientand solid Conservative majorities which had so longsustained the Baldwin and Chamberlain Administrations Ihad as a leading figure among the Conservativedissentients from the India Bill had many sharp passageswith him In the course of those eleven years of myexclusion from office my contacts with him had been notinfrequent and generally hostile I had formed the opinionthat he was a man of high ability serving his chief whoeverhe was with unfaltering loyalty and treating his opponentswith strict good faith This opinion was also held by theWhips of the Labour and Liberal Parties and such areputation is of course essential to the discharge of this


particular office When I became Prime Minister it wasgenerally expected that I should find someone else for thetask but I was quite sure that I should receive fromMargesson the same skilful and faithful service that he hadgiven to my predecessors and in this I had been in no waydisappointed He had served in the First World War andthrough much of the worst of it as a regimental officergaining the Military Cross He thus had a strong soldierlybackground as well as a complete knowledge of the Houseof CommonsIn Margessonrsquos place I appointed Captain James Stuartwith whom also I had had many differences but for whosecharacter I had high respect

The interval between November 1940 and the passage ofLend-Lease in March 1941 was marked by an acutestringency in dollars Every kind of expedient was devisedby our friends The American Government bought from ussome of the war plants which they had built to our order inthe United States They assigned them to the Americandefence programme but bade us go on using them to thefull The War Department placed orders for munitions that itdid not need immediately so that when finished they couldbe released to us On the other hand certain things weredone which seemed harsh and painful to us The Presidentsent a warship to Capetown to carry away all the gold wehad gathered there The great British business ofCourtaulds in America was sold by us at the request of theUnited States Government at a comparatively low figureand then resold through the markets at a much higher pricefrom which we did not benefit I had a feeling that thesesteps were taken to emphasise the hardship of our position


and raise feeling against the opponents of Lend-LeaseAnyhow in one way or another we came throughOn December 30 the President gave a ldquofireside chatrdquo onthe radio urging his policy upon his countrymen

There is danger ahead ndash danger against which wemust prepare But we well know that we cannot escapedanger by crawling into bed and pulling the covers overour headshellip If Britain should go down all of us in allthe Americas would be living at the point of a gun agun loaded with explosive bullets economic as well asmilitary We must produce arms and ships with everyenergy and resource we can commandhellip We must bethe great arsenal of Democracy


31XII40

We are deeply grateful to you for all you saidyesterday We welcome especially the outline of yourplans for giving us the aid without which Hitlerismcannot be extirpated from Europe and Asia We canreadily guess why you have not been able to give aprecise account of how your proposals will be workedout Meanwhile some things make me anxious

First sending the warship to Capetown to take upthe gold lying there may produce embarrassing effectsIt is almost certain to become known This will disturbpublic opinion here and throughout the Dominions andencourage the enemy who will proclaim that you aresending for our last reserves If you feel this is the onlyway directions will be given for the available Captowngold to be loaded on the ship But we should avoid it ifwe can Could we for instance by a technicaloperation exchange gold in South Africa for gold heldfor others at Ottawa and make the latter available formovement to New York We must know soon becausethe ship is on its way


My second anxiety is because we do not know howlong Congress will debate your proposals and how weshould be enabled to place orders for armaments andpay our way if this time became protracted RememberMr President we do not know what you have in mindexactly what the United States is going to do and weare fighting for our lives What would be the effect uponthe world situation if we had to default in payments toyour contractors who have their workmen to payWould not this be exploited by the enemy as acomplete breakdown in Anglo-American co-operationYet a few weeksrsquo delay might well bring this upon us

Thirdly apart from the interim period there arises agroup of problems about the scope of your plan afterbeing approved by Congress What is to be done aboutthe immense heavy payments still due to be madeunder existing orders before delivery is completedSubstantial advance payments on these same ordershave already denuded our resources We havecontinued need for various American commodities notdefinitely weapons ndash for instance raw materials andoils Canada and other Dominions Greece and refugeeallies have clamant dollar needs to keep their wareffort alive I do not seek to know immediately how youwill solve these latter questions We shall be entirelyready for our part to lay bare to you all our resourcesand our liabilities around the world and we shall seekno more help than the common cause demands Wenaturally wish to feel sure that the powers with whichyou propose to arm yourself will be sufficiently wide todeal with these larger matters subject to all properexamination

Sir Frederick Phillips is discussing these matterswith Mr Secretary Morgenthau and he will explain thewar commitments we have in many parts of the worldfor which we could not ask your direct help but forwhich gold and dollars are necessary This applies alsoto the Dutch and Belgian gold which we may becomeunder obligation to return in specie in due course

They burned a large part of the City of London last

night and the scenes of widespread destruction here


and in our provincial centres are shocking but when Ivisited the still-burning ruins today the spirit of theLondoners was as high as in the first days of theindiscriminate bombing in September four months ago

I thank you for testifying before all the world that thefuture safety and greatness of the American Union areintimately concerned with the upholding and theeffective arming of that indomitable spirit

All my heartiest good wishes to you in the New Yearof storm that is opening upon us


14Germany and Russia

Hitler Turns EastwardmdashStalinrsquos Attempts toPlacate GermanymdashCommunist Machinations inthe British FactoriesmdashProjects of Dividing theBritish EmpiremdashSoviet MiscalculationsmdashMolotovrsquosVisit to BerlinmdashHis Meeting with Ribbentrop andwith the FuehrermdashSoviet-Nazi NegotiationsmdashABritish Air Raid IntervenesmdashFurther Argumentwith the FuehrermdashSecond British Air RaidmdashTalksin a DugoutmdashStalinrsquos Account Given to Me inAugust 1942 mdashHitlerrsquos Final Resolve to InvadeRussiamdashMilitary PreparationsmdashThe DraftAgreementmdashThe Soviets Ask for MoremdashAmbas-sador Schulenburgrsquos Efforts to Reach anAgreementmdashHitler VeiledmdashldquoOperation Bar-barossardquo December 1940

HITLER had failed to quell or conquer Britain It was plainthat the Island would persevere to the end Without thecommand of the sea or the air it had been deemedimpossible to move German armies across the ChannelWinter with its storms had closed upon the scene TheGerman attempt to cow the British nation or shatter theirwarmaking capacity and will-power by bombing had beenfoiled and the Blitz was costly There must be manymonthsrsquo delay before ldquoSea Lionrdquo could be revived and withevery week that passed the growth ripening andequipment of the British home armies required a larger


ldquoSea Lionrdquo with aggravated difficulties of transportationEven three-quarters of a million men with all theirfurnishings would not be enough in April or May 1941What chance was there of finding by then the shipping thebarges the special landing-craft necessary for so vast anoversea stroke How could they be assembled under ever-increasing British air-power Meanwhile this air-power fedby busy factories in Britain and the United States and byimmense training schemes for pilots in the Dominionscentred in Canada would perhaps in a year or so make theBritish Air Force superior in numbers as it was already inquality to that of Germany Can we wonder then thatHitler once convinced that Goeringrsquos hopes and boasts hadbeen broken should turn his eyes to the East LikeNapoleon in 1804 he recoiled from the assault of the islanduntil at least the Eastern danger was no more He must henow felt at all costs settle with Russia before stakingeverything on the invasion of Britain Obeying the sameforces and following the same thoughts as Napoleon whenhe marched the Grand Army from Boulogne to UlmAusterlitz and Fried-land Hitler abandoned for the momenthis desire and need to destroy Great Britain That must nowbecome the final act of the dramaThere is no doubt that he had made up his own mind by theend of September 1940 From that time forth the airattacks on Britain though often on a larger scale throughthe general multiplication of aircraft took the second placein the Fuehrerrsquos thoughts and German plans They might bemaintained as effective cover for other designs but Hitlerno longer counted on them for decisive victory Eastwardho Personally on purely military grounds I should not havebeen averse from a German attempt at the invasion ofBritain in the spring or summer of 1941 I believed that theenemy would suffer the most terrific defeat and slaughter


that any country had ever sustained in a specific militaryenterprise But for that very reason I was not so simple asto expect it to happen In war what you donrsquot dislike is notusually what the enemy does Still in the conduct of a longstruggle when time seemed for a year or two on our sideand mighty allies might be gained I thanked God that thesupreme ordeal was to be spared our people As will beseen from my papers written at the time I never seriouslycontemplated a German descent upon England in 1941 Bythe end of 1941 the boot was on the other leg we were nolonger alone three-quarters of the world were with us Buttremendous events measureless before they happenedwere to mark that memorable yearWhile to uninformed continentals and the outer world ourfate seemed forlorn or at best in the balance the relationsbetween Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia assumed thefirst position in world affairs The fundamental antagonismsbetween the two despotic Powers resumed their sway onceit was certain that Britain could not be stunned andoverpowered like France and the Low Countries To do himjustice Stalin tried his very best to work loyally and faithfullywith Hitler while at the same time gathering all the strengthhe could in the enormous mass of Soviet Russia He andMolotov sent their dutiful congratulations on every Germanvictory They poured a heavy flow of food and essential rawmaterials into the Reich Their Fifth Column Communistsdid what they could to disturb our factories Their radiodiffused its abuse and slanders against us They were atany time ready to reach a permanent settlement with NaziGermany upon the numerous important questions openbetween them and to accept with complacency the finaldestruction of the British power But all the while theyrecognised that this policy might fail They were resolved togain time by every means and had no intention as far as


they could measure the problem of basing Russianinterests or ambitions solely upon a German victory Thetwo great totalitarian empires equally devoid of moralrestraints confronted each other polite but inexorableThere had of course been disagreements about Finlandand Rumania The Soviet leaders had been shocked at thefall of France and the end of the Second Front for whichthey were so soon to clamour They had not expected sosudden a collapse and had counted confidently on a phaseof mutual exhaustion on the Western Front Now there wasno Western Front Still it would be foolish to make anyserious change in their collaboration with Germany till itcould be seen whether Britain would give in or be crushedin 1940 As it gradually became apparent to the Kremlinthat Britain was capable of maintaining a prolonged andindefinite war during which anything might happen aboutthe United States and also in Japan Stalin became moreconscious of his danger and more earnest to gain timeNevertheless it is remarkable as we shall see whatadvantages he sacrificed and what risks he ran to keep onfriendly terms with Nazi Germany Even more surprisingwere the miscalculations and the ignorance which hedisplayed about what was coming to him He was indeedfrom September 1940 to the moment of Hitlerrsquos assault inJune 1941 at once a callous a crafty and an ill-informedgiant

With these preliminaries we may come to the episode ofMolotovrsquos visit to Berlin on November 12 1940 Everycompliment was paid and all ceremony shown to theBolshevik envoy when he readied the heart of NaziGermany During the next two days long and tense


discussions took place between Molotov and Ribbentropand also with Hitler All the essential facts of theseformidable interchanges and confrontations have been laidbare in the selection of captured documents published earlyin 1948 by the State Department in Washington under thetitle ldquoNazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941rdquo On this it isnecessary to draw if the story is to be told or understood

Molotovrsquos first meeting was with Ribbentrop1

November 12 1940

The Reich Foreign Minister said that in the letter toStalin he had already expressed the firm conviction ofGermany that no power on earth could alter the factthat the beginning of the end had now arrived for theBritish Empire England was beaten and it was only aquestion of time when she would finally admit herdefeat It was possible that this would happen soonbecause in England the situation was deterioratingdaily Germany would of course welcome an earlyconclusion of the conflict since she did not wish underany circumstances to sacrifice human lives unnecessari-ly If however the British did not make up their mindsin the immediate future to admit their defeat they woulddefinitely ask for peace during the coming yearGermany was continuing her bombing attacks onEngland day and night Her submarines wouldgradually be employed to the full extent and wouldinflict terrible losses on England Germany was of theopinion that England could perhaps be forced by theseattacks to give up the struggle A certain uneasinesswas already apparent in Great Britain which seemed toindicate such a solution If however England were notforced to her knees by the present mode of attackGermany would as soon as weather conditionspermitted resolutely proceed to a large-scale attackand thereby definitely crush England This large-scaleattack had thus far been prevented only by abVspparaweather conditions


Any attempt at a landing or at military operations on

the European Continent by England or by Englandbacked by America was doomed to complete failure atthe start This was no military problem at all This theEnglish had not yet understood because apparentlythere was some degree of confusion in Great Britainand because the country was led by a political andmilitary dilettante by the name of Churchill whothroughout his previous career had completely failed atall decisive moments and who would fail again this time

Furthermore the Axis completely dominated its partof Europe militarily and politically Even France whichhad lost the war and had to pay for it (of which theFrench incidentally were quite aware) had acceptedthe principle that France in the future would never againsupport England and de Gaulle the quixotic conquerorof Africa Because of the extraordinary strength of theirposition the Axis Powers were not thereforeconsidering how they might win the war but rather howrapidly they could end the war which was already won

After luncheon the Soviet Envoy was received by theFuehrer who dilated further upon the total defeat of Britain

The war [he said] had led to complications whichwere not intended by Germany but which hadcompelled her from time to time to react militarily tocertain events

The Fuehrer then outlined to Molotov the course ofmilitary operations up to the present which had led tothe fact that England no longer had an ally on theContinenthellip The English retaliatory measures wereridiculous and the Russian gentlemen could convincethemselves at first hand of the fiction of allegeddestruction in Berlin As soon as atmosphericconditions improved Germany would be poised for the


great and final blow against England At the momentthen it was her aim to try not only to make militarypreparations for this final struggle but also to clarify thepolitical issues which would be of importance duringand after this showdown He had therefore re-examined the relations with Russia and not in anegative spirit but with the intention of organising thempositively ndash if possible for a long period of time In sodoing he had reached several conclusions

1 Germany was not seeking to obtain military aidfrom Russia

2 Because of the tremendous extension of the warGermany had been forced in order to oppose Englandto penetrate into territories remote from her and inwhich she was not basically interested politically oreconomically

3 There were nevertheless certain requirementsthe full importance of which had become apparent onlyduring the war but which were absolutely vital toGermany Among them were certain sources of rawmaterials which were considered by Germany as mostvital and absolutely indispensable

To all this Molotov gave a non-committal assent

Molotov asked about the Tripartite Pact2 What wasthe meaning of the New Order in Europe and in Asiaand what rocircle would the USSR be given in it Theseissues must be discussed during the Berlin conversa-tions and during the contemplated visit of the ReichForeign Minister to Moscow on which the Russianswere definitely counting Moreover there were issuesto be clarified regarding Russiarsquos Balkan and Black Seainterests about Bulgaria Rumania and Turkey Itwould be easier for the Russian Government to givespecific replies to the questions raised by the Fuehrer ifit could obtain the explanations just requested TheSoviet would be interested in the New Order in Europe


and particularly in the tempo and the form of this NewOrder It would also like to have an idea of theboundaries of the so-called Greater East Asian Sphere

The Fuehrer replied that the Tripartite Pact wasintended to regulate conditions in Europe as to thenatural interests of the European countries andconsequently Germany was now approaching theSoviet Union in order that she might express herselfregarding the areas of interest to her In no case was asettlement to be made without Soviet-Russian co-operation This applied not only to Europe but also toAsia where Russia herself was to co-operate in thedefinition of the Greater East Asian Sphere and whereshe was to designate her claims there Germanyrsquos taskin this case was that of a mediator Russia by nomeans was to be confronted with a fait accompli

When the Fuehrer undertook to try to establish theabove-mentioned coalition of Powers it was not theGerman-Russian relationship which appeared to him tobe the most difficult point but the question of whether acollaboration between Germany France and Italy waspossible Only now hellip had he thought it possible tocontact Soviet Russia for the purpose of settling thequestions of the Black Sea the Balkans and Turkey

In conclusion the Fuehrer summed up by statingthat the discussion to a certain extent represented thefirst concrete step toward a comprehensive collabora-tion with due consideration for the problems ofWestern Europe which were to be settled betweenGermany Italy and France as well as for the issues ofthe East which were essentially the concern of Russiaand Japan but in which Germany offered her goodoffices as mediator It was a matter of opposing anyattempt on the part of America to ldquomake money onEuroperdquo The United States had no business in Europein Africa or in Asia

Molotov expressed his agreement with thestatements of the Fuehrer upon the rocircle of America andEngland The participation of Russia in the TripartitePact appeared to him entirely acceptable in principleprovided that Russia was to co-operate as a partner


and not be merely an object In that case he saw nodifficulties in the matter of participation of the SovietUnion in the common effort But the aim and thesignificance of the Pact must first be more closelydefined particularly with regard to the delimitation ofthe Greater East Asian Sphere

When the conferences were resumed on November 15Molotov mentioned the question of the strip of

Lithuanian territory and emphasised that the SovietGovernment had not received any clear answer yetfrom Germany on this question However it awaited adecision Regarding the Bukovina he admitted that thisinvolved an additional territory one not mentioned inthe secret protocol Russia had at first confined herdemands to Northern Bukovina Under the presentcircumstances however Germany must understandthe Russian interest in Southern Bukovina But Russiahad not received an answer to her question regardingthis subject either Instead Germany had guaranteedthe entire territory of Rumania and completelydisregarded Russiarsquos wishes with regard to SouthernBukovina

The Fuehrer replied that it would mean a consider-able concession on the part of Germany if even part ofBukovina were to be occupied by Russiahellip

Molotov however persisted in the opinionpreviously stated that the revisions desired by Russiawere insignificant

The Fuehrer replied that if German-Russiancollaboration was to show positive results in the futurethe Soviet Government would have to understand thatGermany was engaged in a life-and-death strugglewhich at all events she wanted to conclude successful-lyhellip Both sides agreed in principle that Finlandbelonged to the Russian sphere of influence Insteadtherefore of continuing a purely theoretical discussionthey should rather turn to more important problems


After the conquest of England the British Empirewould be apportioned as a gigantic world-wide estate inbankruptcy of forty million square kilometres In thisbankrupt estate there would be for Russia access tothe ice-free and really open ocean Thus far a minorityof forty-five million Englishmen had ruled six hundredmillion inhabitants of the British Empire He was aboutto crush this minority Even the United States wasactually doing nothing but picking out of this bankruptestate a few items particularly suitable to the UnitedStates Germany of course would like to avoid anyconflict which would divert her from her struggle againstthe heart of the Empire the British Isles For thatreason he (the Fuehrer) did not like Italyrsquos war againstGreece as it diverted forces to the periphery instead ofconcentrating them against England at one point Thesame would occur during a Baltic war The conflict withEngland would be fought to the last ditch and he hadno doubt that the defeat of the British Isles would leadto the dissolution of the Empire It was a chimera tobelieve that the Empire could possibly be ruled andheld together from Canada Under those circumstancesthere arose world-wide perspectives During the nextfew weeks they would have to be settled in jointdiplomatic negotiations with Russia and Russiarsquosparticipation in the solution of these problems wouldhave to be arranged All the countries which couldpossibly be interested in the bankrupt estate wouldhave to stop all controversies among themselves andconcern themselves exclusively with the partition of theBritish Empire This applied to Germany France ItalyRussia and Japan

Molotov replied that he had followed the argumentsof the Fuehrer with interest and that he was inagreement with everything that he had understood

Hitler then retired for the night After supper at the SovietEmbassy there was a British air raid on Berlin We had


heard of the conference beforehand and though not invitedto join in the discussion did not wish to be entirely left out ofthe proceedings On the ldquoAlertrdquo all moved to the shelterand the conversation was continued till midnight by the twoForeign Secretaries in safer surroundings The Germanofficial account says

Because of the air raid the two Ministers went intothe Reich Foreign Ministerrsquos air-raid shelter at 940 PMin order to conduct the final conversation

The time was not yet ripe said Ribbentrop for

discussing the new order of things in Poland TheBalkan issue had already been discussed extensivelyIn the Balkans we had solely an economic interest andwe did not want England to disturb us there Thegranting of the German guarantee to Rumania hadapparently been misconstrued by Moscowhellip In all itsdecisions the German Government was guided solelyby the endeavour to preserve peace in the Balkans andto prevent England from gaining a foothold there andfrom interfering with supplies to Germany Thus our[German] action in the Balkans was motivatedexclusively by the circumstances of our war againstEngland As soon as England conceded her defeat andasked for peace German interests in the Balkanswould be confined exclusively to the economic fieldand German troops would be withdrawn from RumaniaGermany had as the Fuehrer had repeatedly declaredno territorial interests in the Balkans He could onlyrepeat again and again that the decisive question waswhether the Soviet Union was prepared and in aposition to co-operate with us in the great liquidation ofthe British Empire On all other questions we wouldeasily reach an understanding if we could succeed inextending our relations and in defining the spheres ofinfluence Where the spheres of influence lay had beenstated repeatedly It was therefore ndash as the Fuehrer hadso clearly put it ndash a matter of the interests of the Soviet


Union and Germany requiring that the partners standnot breast to breast but back to back in order tosupport each other in the achievement of theiraspirations

In his reply Molotov stated that the Germans wereassuming that the war against England had alreadyactually been won If therefore as had been said inanother connection Germany was waging a life-and-death struggle against England he could only construethis as meaning that Germany was fighting ldquofor liferdquo andEngland ldquofor deathrdquo As to the question of collaborationhe quite approved of it but he added that they had [to]come to a thorough understanding This idea had alsobeen expressed in Stalinrsquos letter A delimitation of thespheres of influence must also be sought On this pointhowever he (Molotov) could not take a definitive standat this time since he did not know the opinion of Stalinand of his other friends in Moscow in the matterHowever he had to state that all these great issues oftomorrow could not be separated from the issues oftoday and the fulfilment of existing agreementshellip

Thereupon Herr Molotov cordially bade farewell tothe Reich Foreign Minister stressing that he did notregret the air-raid alarm because he owed to it such anexhaustive conversation with the Reich ForeignMinister

When in August 1942 I first visited Moscow I receivedfrom Stalinrsquos lips a shorter account of this conversationwhich in no essential differs from the German record butmay be thought more pithy

ldquoA little while agordquo said Stalin ldquothe great complaintagainst Molotov was that he was too pro-German Noweveryone says he is too pro-British But neither of usever trusted the Germans For us it was always life anddeathrdquo I interjected that we had been through thisourselves and so knew how they felt ldquoWhen Molotovrdquo


said the Marshal ldquowent to see Ribbentrop in Berlin inNovember of 1940 you got wind of it and sent an airraidrdquo I nodded ldquoWhen the alarm sounded Ribbentropled the way down many flights of stairs to a deepshelter sumptuously furnished When he got inside theraid had begun He shut the door and said to MolotovlsquoNow here we are alone together Why should we notdividersquo Molotov said lsquoWhat will England sayrsquolsquoEng-landrsquo said Ribbentrop lsquois finished She is no more useas a PowerrsquolsquoIf that is sorsquo said Molotov lsquowhy are we inthis shelter and whose are these bombs which fallrsquordquo

The Berlin conversations made no difference to Hitlerrsquosdeep resolve During October Keitel Jodl and the GermanGeneral Staff had under his orders been forming andshaping the plans for the eastward movement of theGerman armies and for the invasion of Russia in the earlysummer of 1941 It was not necessary at this stage todecide on the exact date which might also be affected bythe weather Having regard to the distances to be traversedafter the frontiers were crossed and the need of takingMoscow before the winter began it was obvious that thebeginning of May offered the best prospects Moreover theassembly and deployment of the German Army along thetwo-thousand-mile front from the Baltic to the Black Seaand the provision of all the magazines camps and railwaysidings was in itself one of the largest military tasks everundertaken and no delay either in planning or in actioncould be tolerated Over all hung the vital need forconcealment and deceptionFor this purpose two separate forms of cover were used byHitler each of which had advantages of its own The firstwas an elaborate negotiation about a common policy basedon the partition and distribution of the British Empire in the


East The second was the domination of RumaniaBulgaria and Greece with Hungary on the way by asteady influx of troops This offered important military gainsand at the same time masked or presented an explanationfor the building-up of the German armies on the southernflank of the front to be developed against RussiaThe negotiations took the form of draft proposals byGermany for the accession of Soviet Russia to the Three-Power Pact at the expence of British interests in the OrientIf Stalin had accepted this scheme events might for a timehave taken a different course It was possible at anymoment for Hitler to suspend his plans for invading RussiaWe cannot attempt to describe what might have happenedas the result of an armed alliance between the two greatempires of the Continent with their millions of soldiers toshare the spoil in the Balkans Turkey Persia and theMiddle East with India always in the background and withJapan as an eager partner in the ldquoGreater East AsiaSchemerdquo But Hitlerrsquos heart was set on destroying theBolsheviks for whom his hatred was mortal He believedthat he had the force to gain his main life-aim Thereafter allthe rest would be added unto him He must have knownfrom the conversations at Berlin and other contacts that theproposals which he made Ribbentrop send to Moscow fellfar short of Russian ambitionsA draft bearing no date of a Four-Power Pact was found inthe captured correspondence of the German Foreign Officewith the German Embassy in Moscow This apparentlyformed the basis for Schulenburgrsquos conversation withMolotov reported on November 26 1940 By this GermanyItaly and Japan were to agree to respect each otherrsquosnatural spheres of influence In so far as these spheres ofinterest came into contact with each other they would


constantly consult each other in an amicable way withregard to the problems arising therefromGermany Italy and Japan declared on their part that theyrecognised the present extent of the possessions of theSoviet Union and would respect themThe Four Powers undertook to join no combination ofPowers and to support no combination of Powers whichwas directed against one of the Four Powers They wouldassist each other in economic matters in every way andwould supplement and extend the agreements existingamong themselves The agreement would continue for aperiod of ten yearsTo this there was to be a secret protocol by which Germanydeclared that apart from the territorial revisions in Europeto be carried out at the conclusion of peace her territorialaspirations centred in the territories of Central Africa Italydeclared that apart from territorial revisions in Europe herterritorial aspirations centred in the territories of Northernand Northeastern Africa Japan declared that her territorialaspirations centred in the area of Eastern Asia to the southof the Island Empire of Japan and the Soviet Uniondeclared that its territorial aspirations centred south of thenational territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of theIndian OceanThe Four Powers declared that reserving the settlement ofspecific questions they would mutually respect theseterritorial aspirations and would not oppose theirachievement3

As was expected the Soviet Government did not acceptthe German project They were alone with Germany in


Europe and at the other side of the world Japan lay heavyupon them Nevertheless they had confidence in theirgrowing strength and in their vast expanse of territoryamounting to one-sixth of the land-surface of the globeThey therefore bargained toughly On November 26 1940Schulenburg sent to Berlin the draft of the Russian counter-proposals These stipulated that the German troops shouldbe immediately withdrawn from Finland which under theCompact of 1939 belonged to the Soviet Unionrsquos sphere ofinfluence that within the next few months the security of theSoviet Union in the Straits should be assured by theconclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the SovietUnion and Bulgaria which geographically is situated insidethe security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the SovietUnion and by the establishment of a base for land andnaval forces of the USSR within range of the Bosphorusand the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease thatthe area south of Batum and Baku in the general directionof the Persian Gulf should be recognised as the centre ofthe aspirations of the Soviet Union that Japan shouldrenounce her rights to concessions for coal and oil inNorthern SakhalinNo effective answer was returned to this document Noattempt was made by Hitler to split the difference Issues sograve as these might well justify a prolonged and carefulstudy in a friendly spirit by both sides The Soviets certainlyexpected and awaited an answer Meanwhile on both sidesof the frontier the forces already heavy began to grow andHitlerrsquos right hand reached out towards the Balkans

The plans prepared on his instructions by Keitel and Jodlhad by now reached sufficient maturity to enable the


Fuehrer to issue from his headquarters on December 181940 his historic Directive Number 21

OPERATION BARBAROSSAThe German Armed Forces must be prepared to

crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign4 even beforethe conclusion of the war against England

For this purpose the Army will have to employ allavailable units with the reservation that the occupiedterritories must be secured against surprise attacks

For the Air Force it will be a matter of releasing suchstrong forces for the eastern campaign in support of theArmy that a quick completion of the ground operationsmay be expected and that damage to Eastern Germanterritory by enemy air attacks will be as slight aspossible This concentration of the main effort in theEast is limited by the requirement that the entirecombat and armament area dominated by us mustremain adequately protected against enemy air attacksand that the offensive operations against Englandparticularly her supply lines must not be permitted tobreak down

The main effort of the Navy will remain unequivocal-ly directed against England even during an easterncampaign

I shall order the concentration against Soviet Russiapossibly eight weeks before the intended beginning ofoperations

Preparations requiring more time to begin are to bestarted now ndash if this has not yet been done ndash and are tobe completed by May 15 1941

It is to be considered of decisive importancehowever that the intention to attack is not discovered

The preparations of the High Commands are to bemade on the following basis

IGeneral PurposeThe mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is

to be destroyed in daring operations by driving forwarddeep armoured wedges and the retreat of units


capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territoryis to be prevented

In quick pursuit a line is then to be reached fromwhich the Russian Air Force will no longer be able toattack German Reich territory The ultimate objective ofthe operation is to establish a defence line againstAsiatic Russia from a line running approximately fromthe Volga River to Archangel Then in case ofnecessity the last industrial area left to Russia in theUrals can be eliminated by the Luftwaffe

In the course of these operations the Russian BalticSea Fleet will quickly lose its bases and thus will nolonger be able to fight

Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force is tobe prevented by powerful blows at the very beginningof the operation

IIProbable Allies and their Tasks1 On the flanks of our operation we can count on

the active participation of Rumania and Finland in thewar against Soviet Russia

The High Command will in due time concert anddetermine in what form the armed forces of the twocountries will be placed under German command at thetime of their intervention

2 It will be the task of Rumania together with theforce concentrating there to pin down the enemy facingher and in addition to render auxiliary services in therear area

3 Finland will cover the concentration of theredeployed German North Group (parts of the XXIGroup) coming from Norway and will operate jointly withit Besides Finland will be assigned the task ofeliminating Hango

4 It may be expected that Swedish railroads andhighways will be available for the concentration of theGerman North Group from the start of operations at thelatest

IIIDirection of OperationsA Army (hereby approving the plans presented to

me)


In the zone of operations divided by the PripetMarshes into a southern and northern sector the maineffort will be made north of this area Two Army Groupswill be provided here

The southern group of these two Army Groups ndash thecentre of the entire front ndash will be given the task ofannihilating the forces of the enemy in White Russia byadvancing from the region around and north of Warsawwith especially strong armoured and motorised unitshellipOnly a surprisingly fast collapse of Russian resistancecould justify aiming at both objectives simultaneouslyhellip

The Army Group employed south of the PripetMarshesis to make its main effort in the area fromLublin in the general direction of Kiev in order topenetrate quickly with strong armoured units into thedeep flank and rear of the Russian forces and then toroll them up along the Dnieper River

The German-Rumanian groups on the right flank areassigned the task of

(a)protecting Rumanian territory and thereby thesouthern flank of the entire operation

(b)pinning down the opposing enemy forces whileArmy Group South is attacking on its northern flankand according to the progressive development of thesituation and in conjunction with the Air Forcepreventing their orderly retreat across the Dniesterduring the pursuit

[and] in the north of reaching Moscow quicklyThe capture of this city means a decisive success

politically and economically and beyond that theelimination of the most important railway centre

B Air ForceIts task will be to paralyse and to eliminate as far as

possible the intervention of the Russian Air Force aswell as to support the Army at its main points of effectparticularly those of Army Group Centre and on theflank those of Army Group South The Russianrailroads in the order of their importance for theoperations will be cut or the most important near-byobjectives (river crossings) seized by the boldemployment of parachute and airborne troops


In order to concentrate all forces against the enemyAir Force and to give immediate support to the Armythe armament industry will not be attacked during themain operations Only after the completion of themobile operations may such attacks be considered ndashprimarily against the Ural regionhellip

IV All orders to be issued by the Commanders-in-Chief on the basis of this directive must clearly indicatethat they are precautionary measures for the possibilitythat Russia should change her present attitude towardsus The number of officers to be assigned to thepreparatory work at an early date is to be kept as smallas possible additional personnel should be briefed aslate as possible and only to the extent required for theactivity of each individual Otherwise through thediscovery of our preparations ndash the date of theirexecution has not even been fixed ndash there is dangerthat most serious political and military disadvantagesmay arise

V I expect reports from the Commanders-in-chiefconcerning their further plans based on this directive

The contemplated preparations of all branches ofthe Armed Forces including their progress are to bereported to me through the High Command [OKW]

ADOLF HITLER5

From this moment the moulds had been shaped for thesupreme events of 1941 We of course had no knowledgeof the bargainings between Germany and Russia fordividing the spoils of our Empire and for our destruction norcould we measure the as yet unformed intentions of JapanThe main troop movements of the German armieseastward had not yet become apparent to our activeIntelligence Service Only the infiltration and gradualmassing in Bulgaria and Rumania could be discerned Had


we known what is set forth in this chapter we should havebeen greatly relieved The combination against us ofGermany Russia and Japan was the worst of our fearsBut who could tell Meanwhile ldquoFight onrdquo


15Ocean Peril

Disguised Surface Raiders mdash Excursion of theldquoScheerrdquomdash The ldquoJervis Bayrdquo Saves the Convoy mdashFurther Depredations of the ldquoScheerrdquomdash A Surprisefor the ldquoHipperrdquomdash Disproportionate Strains mdash TheU-Boat Peril Dominates mdash Increasing Strangle-hold upon the Northwestern Approaches mdashGrievous Losses mdash A Cruel Stroke of Fortune mdashThe Diverrsquos Anxieties mdash Need to Shift the Controlfrom Plymouth to Liverpool mdash Sharp Contractionof Imports mdash Losses off the Bloody Foreland mdashWithdrawal of the Irish Subsidies mdash My Telegramto the President of December 13 mdash A SombreAdmiralty Proposal mdash The Dynamite Carpet mdashReinforcement and Stimulation of the Air ForceCoastal Command mdash Eventual Success of TheirCounter-Offensive

THE destruction of the Graf Spee in the action off the Platein December 1939 had brought to an abrupt end the firstGerman campaign against our shipping in the wide oceansThe fighting in Norway had as we have seen paralysed forthe time being the German Navy in home waters What wasleft of it was necessarily reserved for the invasion projectAdmiral Raeder whose ideas on the conduct of theGerman war at sea were technically sound had somedifficulty in carrying his views in the Fuehrerrsquos councils Hehad even at one time to resist a proposal made by the Armyto disarm all his heavy ships and use their guns for long-


range batteries on shore During the summer however hehad fitted out a number of merchant ships as disguisedraiders They were more powerfully armed were generallyfaster than our armed merchant cruisers and wereprovided with reconnaissance aircraft Five ships of thistype evaded our patrols and entered the Atlantic betweenApril and June 1940 whilst a sixth undertook thehazardous northeast passage to the Pacific along the northcoasts of Russia and Siberia Assisted by a Russian ice-breaker she succeeded in making the passage in twomonths and emerged into the Pacific through the BeringSea in September The object which Admiral Raeder laiddown for the conduct of these ships was threefold first todestroy or capture enemy ships secondly to dislocateshipping movements and thirdly to force the dispersion ofBritish warships for escort and patrol to counter themenace These well-conceived tactics caused us bothinjury and embarrassment By the first weeks ofSeptember these five disguised raiders were loose uponour trade routes Two of them were working in the Atlantictwo others in the Indian Ocean and the fifth after layingmines off Auckland New Zealand was in the Pacific Onlytwo contacts were made with them during the whole yearOn July 29 Raider E was engaged in the South Atlantic bythe armed merchant-cruiser Alcantara but escaped after aninconclusive action In December another armed merchantcruiser the Carnarvon Castle attacked her again off thePlate River but she escaped after some damage Up till theend of September 1940 these five raiders sank orcaptured thirty-six ships amounting to 235000 tonsAt the end of October 1940 the pocket battleship Scheerwas at last ready for service When the invasion of Englandhad been shelved she left Germany on October 27 andbroke out into the Atlantic through the Denmark Strait north


of Iceland She was followed a month later by the eight-inchgun cruiser Hipper The Scheer had orders to attack theNorth Atlantic convoys from which the battleship escortshad been withdrawn to reinforce the MediterraneanCaptain Krancke believed that a homeward-bound convoyhad left Halifax on October 27 and he hoped to intercept itabout November 3 On the 5th his aircraft reported eightships in the southeast and he set off in pursuit At 227 PMhe sighted a single ship the Mopan which he sank bygunfire after taking on board the crew of sixty-eight Bythreats he had been able to prevent any wireless reportsbeing made by the Mopan At 450 PM whilst thusoccupied the masts of the convoy HX 84 consisting ofthirty-seven ships appeared over the horizon In the centreof the convoy was the ocean escort the armed merchantcruiser Jervis Bay Her commanding officer Captain FegenRN realised at once that he was faced with hopelessodds His one thought after reporting the presence of theenemy by wireless was to engage the pocket battleship foras long as possible and thus gain time for the convoy todisperse Darkness approached and there would then be achance of many escaping While the convoy scattered theJervis Bay closed his overwhelming antagonist at fullspeed The Scheer opened fire at eighteen thousand yardsThe shots of the old six-inch guns of the Jervis Bay fellshort The one-sided fight lasted till 6 PM when the JervisBay heavily on fire and completely out of control wasabandoned She finally sank about eight orsquoclock with theloss of over two hundred officers and men With themperished Captain Fegen who went down with the ship Hewas awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously for his heroicconduct which takes an honoured place in the records ofthe Royal Navy


Not until the end of the fight did the Scheer pursue theconvoy but the wintry night had now closed in The shipshad scattered and she was able to overtake and sink onlyfive before darkness fell She could not afford now that herposition was known to remain in the area on which sheexpected that powerful British forces would soon convergeThe great majority of this valuable convoy was thereforesaved by the devotion of the Jervis Bay The spirit of themerchant seamen was not unequal to that of their escortOne ship the tanker San Demetrio carrying seventhousand tons of petrol was set on fire and abandoned Butthe next morning part of the crew reboarded the ship putout the fire and then after gallant efforts withoutcompasses or navigational aids brought the ship into aBritish port with her precious cargo In all however 47000tons of shipping and 206 merchant seamen were lostScheer determined to place as many miles as possiblebetween herself and her pursuers steamed south whereten days later she met a German supply ship andreplenished her fuel and stores On November 24 sheappeared in the West Indies where she sank the PortHobart outward-bound to Curaccedilao and then doubled backto the Cape Verde Islands Her later activities were spreadover the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans and not till April1941 did she return to Kiel after again successfullytraversing the Denmark Strait Her five monthsrsquo cruise hadyielded a harvest of sixteen ships of 99000 tons sunk orcaptured

From June onward the troop convoys (called by the codename ldquoWSrdquo)1 sailed monthly under heavy escort round the


Cape to the Middle East and India At the same time thenumerous troop convoys between ports in the Indian Oceanand the continuous stream of Canadian troops reaching thiscountry from across the Atlantic threw the utmost strain onour naval resources Thus we could not reinstitute thehunting groups which had scoured the seas for the GrafSpee in 1939 Our cruisers were disposed in the focal areasnear the main shipping routes and ships sailingindependently had to rely on evasive routing and thevastness of the oceanOn Christmas Day 1940 convoy WS 5A consisting oftwenty troopships and supply ships for the Middle East wasapproaching the Azores when it was attacked by the cruiserHipper which had followed the Scheer out a month laterVisibility was poor and the Hipper was unpleasantlysurprised to find that the escort comprised the cruisersBerwick Bona-venture and Dunedin There was a briefsharp action between the Hipper and the Berwick in whichboth ships were damaged The Hipper made off and in themist succeeded in escaping to Brest in spite of strenuousefforts by the Home Fleet and by Force ldquoHrdquo from Gibraltar tocatch her but only one ship of the convoy which carriedover thirty thousand men the Empire Trooper had to putinto Gibraltar for repairsWe could not regard the state of the outer oceans withoutuneasiness We knew that disguised merchant ships inunknown numbers were preying in all the southern watersThe pocket battleship Scheer was loose and hidden TheHipper might break out at any moment from Brest and thetwo German battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenaumust also soon be expected to play their partThe enormous disproportion between the numbers of theraiders and the forces the Admiralty had to employ to


counter them and guard the immense traffic has beenexplained in Volume I The Admiralty had to be ready atmany points and give protection to thousands of merchantvessels and could give no guarantee except for troopconvoys against occasional lamentable disasters

A far graver danger was added to these problems The onlything that ever really frightened me during the war was theU-boat peril Invasion I thought even before the air battlewould fail After the air victory it was a good battle for usWe could drown and kill this horrible foe in circumstancesfavourable to us and as he evidently realised bad for himIt was the kind of battle which in the cruel conditions ofwar one ought to be content to fight But now our life-lineeven across the broad oceans and especially in theentrances to the island was endangered I was even moreanxious about this battle than I had been about the gloriousair fight called the Battle of BritainThe Admiralty with whom I lived in the closest amity andcontact shared these fears all the more because it wastheir prime responsibility to guard our shores from invasionand to keep the life-lines open to the outer world This hadalways been accepted by the Navy as their ultimatesacred inescapable duty So we poised and ponderedtogether on this problem It did not take the form of flaringbattles and glittering achieve ments It manifested itselfthrough statistics diagrams and curves unknown to thenation incomprehensible to the publicHow much would the U-boat warfare reduce our importsand shipping Would it ever reach the point where our lifewould be destroyed Here was no field for gestures orsensations only the slow cold drawing of lines on charts


which showed potential strangulation Compared with thisthere was no value in brave armies ready to leap upon theinvader or in a good plan for desert warfare The high andfaithful spirit of the people counted for nought in this bleakdomain Either the food supplies and arms from the NewWorld and from the British Empire arrived across theoceans or they failed With the whole French seaboardfrom Dunkirk to Bordeaux in their hands the Germans lostno time in making bases for their U-boats and co-operatingaircraft in the captured territory From July onward we werecompelled to divert our shipping from the approaches southof Ireland where of course we were not allowed to stationfighter aircraft All had to come in around Northern IrelandHere by the grace of God Ulster stood a faithful sentinelThe Mersey the Clyde were the lungs through which webreathed On the east coast and in the English Channelsmall vessels continued to ply under an ever-increasingattack by air by E-boat2 and by mines As it wasimpossible to vary the east coast route the passage ofeach convoy between the Forth and London becamealmost every day an action in itself Few large ships wererisked on the east coast and none at all in the ChannelThe losses inflicted on our merchant shipping became mostgrave during the twelve months from July lsquo40 to July lsquo41when we could claim that the British Battle of the Atlanticwas won Far heavier losses occurred when the UnitedStates entered the war before any convoy system was setup along their eastern coast But then we were no longeralone The last six months of 1940 showed extremely heavylosses modified only by the winter gales and no greatslaughter of U-boats We gained some advantage by largerpatterning of depth-charges and by evasive routing but theinvasion threat required strong concentrations in the NarrowSeas and our great volume of anti-U-boat new construction


only arrived gradually This shadow hung over the Admiraltyand those who shared their knowledge The week endingSeptember 22 showed the highest rate of loss since thebeginning of the war and was in fact greater than any wehad suffered in a similar period in 1917 Twenty-sevenships of nearly 160000 tons were sunk many of them in aHalifax convoy In October while the Scheer was alsoactive another Atlantic convoy was massacred by U-boatstwenty ships being sunk out of thirty-fourAs November and December drew on the entrances andestuaries of the Mersey and the Clyde far surpassed inmortal significance all other factors in the war We could ofcourse at this time have descended upon de ValerarsquosIreland and regained the southern ports by force of modernarms I had always declared that nothing but self-preservation would lead me to this But perhaps the case ofself-preservation might come Then so be it Even this hardmeasure would only have given a mitigation The only sureremedy was to secure free exit and entrance in the Merseyand the ClydeEvery day when they met those few who knew looked atone another One understands the diver deep below thesurface of the sea dependent from minute to minute uponhis air-pipe What would he feel if he could see a growingshoal of sharks biting at it All the more when there was nopossibility of his being hauled to the surface For us therewas no surface The diver was forty-six millions of people inan overcrowded island carrying on a vast business of warall over the world anchored by nature and gravity to thebottom of the sea What could the sharks do to his air-pipeHow could he ward them off or destroy themAs early as the beginning of August I had been convincedthat it would be impossible to control the western


approaches through the Mersey and Clyde from theCommand at Plymouth


4VIII40

The repeated severe losses in the northwesternapproaches are most grievous and I wish to feelassured that they are being grappled with with thesame intense energy that marked the Admiraltytreatment of the magnetic mine There seems to havebeen a great falling-off in the control of theseapproaches No doubt this is largely due to theshortage of destroyers through invasion precautionsLet me know at once the whole outfit of destroyerscorvettes and Asdic trawlers together with aircraftavailable and employed in this area Who is in chargeof their operations Are they being controlled fromPlymouth and Admiral Nasmithrsquos staff Now that youhave shifted the entry from the south to the north thequestion arises Is Plymouth the right place for theCommand Ought not a new Command of the firstorder to be created in the Clyde or should AdmiralNasmith [C-in-C at Plymouth] move thither Anyhowwe cannot go on like this How is the southern minefieldbarrage getting on Would it not be possible after awhile to ring the changes upon it for a short time andbring some convoys in through the gap which has beenleft This is only a passing suggestion

There were always increased dangers to beapprehended from using only one set of approachesThese dangers cannot be surmounted unless theprotective concentration is carried out with vigoursuperior to that which must be expected from theenemy He will soon learn to put everything there It israther like the early days in the Moray Firth after theeast coast minefield was laid I am confident the


Admiralty will rise to the occasion but evidently a greatnew impulse is needed Pray let me hear from you

I encountered resistances The Admiralty accepted my viewin September of moving from Plymouth to the North rightlysubstituting the Mersey for the Clyde But several monthselapsed before the necessary headquarters organisationwith its operation rooms and elaborate network ofcommunications could be brought into being and in themeantime much improvisation was necessary The newCommand was entrusted to Admiral Sir Percy Noble whowith a large and ever-growing staff was installed atLiverpool in February 1941 Hence-forward this becamealmost our most important station The need andadvantage of the change was by then recognised by allTowards the end of 1940 I became increasingly concernedabout the ominous fall in imports This was another aspectof the U-boat attack Not only did we lose ships but theprecautions we took to avoid losing them impaired thewhole flow of merchant traffic The few harbours on whichwe could now rely became congested The turn-round of allvessels as well as their voyages was lengthened Importswere the final test In the week ending June 8 during theheight of the battle in France we had brought into thecountry 1201535 tons of cargo exclusive of oil From thispeak figure imports had declined at the end of July to lessthan 750000 tons a week Although substantialimprovement was made in August the weekly averageagain fell and for the last three months of the year was littlemore than 800000 tons



3XII40

The new disaster which has overtaken the Halifaxconvoy requires precise examination We heard abouta week ago that as many as thirteen U-boats were lyingin wait on these approaches Would it not have beenwell to divert the convoy to the Minches Would this nothave been even more desirable when owing to badweather the outward-bound convoys were delayed andconsequently the escort for the inward-bound could notreach the dangerous area in time

Prime Minister toChancellor of theExchequer

5XII40

Pray convene a meeting to discuss the measures tobe taken to reduce the burden on our shipping andfinances in consequence of the heavy sinkings off theIrish coast and our inability to use the Irish ports Thefollowing Ministers should be summoned TradeShipping Agriculture Food Dominions Assumingthere is agreement on principle a general plan shouldbe made for acting as soon as possible together with atime-table and programme of procedure It is notnecessary to consider either the Foreign Affairs or theDefence aspect at this stage These will have to bedealt with later The first step essential is to have agood workable scheme with as much in it as possiblethat does not hit us worse than it does the others

Prime Minister toMinister of Transport

13XII40

I am obliged to you for your note of December 3 onsteel and I hope that you are pushing forward with thenecessary measures to give effect to your proposals

In present circumstances it seems to me intolerablethat firms should hold wagons up by delaying to unload


them and action should certainly be taken to preventthis

A sample shows that the average time taken by non-tanker cargo ships to turn round at Liverpool rose fromtwelve and a half days in February to fifteen days inJuly and nineteen and a half in October At Bristol theincrease was from nine and a half to fourteen and ahalf days but at Glasgow the time remained steady attwelve days To improve this seems one of the mostimportant aspects of the whole situation


13XII40

I see that oil imports during September and Octoberwere only half what they were in May and June andcovered only two-thirds of our consumption Iunderstand that there is no shortage of tankers that thefall is the result of the partial closing of the south andeast coast to tankers and that a large number had tobe temporarily laid up in the Clyde and others held atHalifax Nova Scotia More recently some tankers havebeen sent to the south and east coasts and oil importsincreased during November

From the reply your predecessor3 made to myMinute of August 26 I gathered that he was satisfiedwith the preparations in hand for the importation of oilthrough the west coast ports His expectations do notappear to have been fulfilled

There are two policies which can be followed tomeet this situation We can either expose oil tankers toadditional risk by bringing them to south and east coastports and thus increase our current imports or we cancontinue to draw upon our stocks relying upon beingable to replenish them from the west coast ports whenarrangements have been completed for the handling ofthe cargoes and accepting the resulting inconvenienceI should be glad if you would consider in consultationwith the First Lord to what extent each of these twopolicies should be followed

I am sending a copy of this letter to the First Lord



14XII40

Let me have a full account of the condition of theAmerican destroyers showing their many defects andthe little use we have been able to make of them so farI should like to have the paper by me for considerationin the near future


27XII40

What have you done about catapulting expendableaircraft from ships in outgoing convoys I have heard ofa plan to catapult them from tankers of which there arenearly always some in each convoy They then attackthe Focke-Wulf and land in the sea where the pilot ispicked up and machines salved or not as convenient

How is this plan viewed

As we shall see in the next volume this project was fruitfulShips equipped for catapulting fighter aircraft to attack theFocke-Wulf were developed early in 1941


27XII40

It is said that two-fifths of the decline in the fertility ofour shipping is due to the loss of time in turning roundships in British ports Now that we are confined solargely to the Mersey and the Clyde and must expectincreasingly severe attacks upon them it would seemthat this problem constitutes the most dangerous part ofthe whole of our front

Would you kindly give me a note on

1

The facts


2

What you are doing and what you propose todo

3

How you can be helped


29XII40

These [U-boat decoy ships]4 have been a greatdisappointment so far this war The question of theiralternative uses ought to be considered by theAdmiralty I expect they have a large number of skilledratings on board Could I have a list of these ships theirtonnage speeds etc Could they not carry troops orstores while plying on their routes

My indignation at the denial of the Southern Irish portsmounted under these pressures

Prime Minister to theChancellor of theExchequer

1XII40

The straits to which we are being reduced by Irishaction compel a reconsideration of these subsidies [toIreland] It can hardly be argued that we can go onpaying them till our last gasp Surely we ought to usethis money to build more ships or buy more from theUnited States in view of the heavy sinkings off theBloody Foreland

Pray let me know how these subsidies could beterminated and what retaliatory measures could betaken in the financial sphere by the Irish observing thatwe are not afraid of their cutting off our food as it would


save us the enormous mass of fertilisers and feeding-stuffs we have to carry into Ireland through the DeValera-aided German blockade Do not assemble allthe pros and cons for the moment but show what wecould do financially and what would happen I shouldbe glad to know about this tomorrow


3XII40

I gave you and each of the COS a copy of the Irishpaper The Chancellor of the Exchequerrsquos commentsare also favourable and there is no doubt subsidiescan be withdrawn at very short notice

We must now consider the military reactionSuppose they invited the Germans into their ports theywould divide their people and we should endeavour tostop the Germans They would seek to be neutral andwould bring the war upon themselves If they withdrewthe various cable and watching facilities they havewhat would this amount to observing that we couldsuspend all connections between England andSouthern Ireland Suppose they let German U-boatscome in to refresh in west coast ports of Ireland wouldthis be serious observing that U-boats have a radius ofnearly thirty days and that the limiting factor is desire ofcrews to get home and need of refit rather than needof refuelling and provisioning Pray let me have yourobservations on these and other points which mayoccur to you

I thought it well to try to bring the President along in thispolicy


13 XII40


North Atlantic transport remains the prime anxietyUndoubtedly Hitler will augment his U-boat and airattack on shipping and operate ever farther into theocean Now that we are denied the use of Irish portsand airfields our difficulties strain our flotillas to theutmost limit We have so far only been able to bring avery few of your fifty destroyers into action on accountof the many defects which they naturally develop whenexposed to Atlantic weather after having been laid upso long I am arranging to have a very full technicalaccount prepared of renovations and improvementsthat have to be made in the older classes of destroyersto fit them for the present task and this may be of useto you in regard to your own older flotillas

In the meanwhile we are so hard pressed at sea thatwe cannot undertake to carry any longer the 400000tons of feeding-stuffs and fertilisers which we havehitherto convoyed to Eire through all the attacks of theenemy We need this tonnage for our own supply andwe do not need the food which Eire has been sendingus We must now concentrate on essentials and theCabinet proposes to let De Valera know that we cannotgo on supplying him under present conditions He willof course have plenty of food for his people but theywill not have the prosperous trading they are makingnow I am sorry about this but we must think of ourown self-preservation and use for vital purposes ourown tonnage brought in through so many perilsPerhaps this may loosen things up and make him moreready to consider common interests I should like toknow quite privately what your reactions would be ifand when we are forced to concentrate our owntonnage upon the supply of Great Britain We also donot feel able in present circumstances to continue theheavy subsidies we have hitherto been paying to theIrish agricultural producers You will realise also thatour merchant seamen as well as public opiniongenerally take it much amiss that we should have tocarry Irish supplies through air and U-boat attacks and


subsidise them handsomely when De Valera is quitecontent to sit happy and see us strangle

One evening in December I held a meeting in thedownstairs War Room with only the Admiralty and thesailors present All the perils and difficulties about whichthe company was well informed had taken a sharper turnMy mind reverted to February and March 1917 when thecurve of U-boat sinkings had mounted so steadily againstus that one wondered how many monthsrsquo more fighting theAllies had in them in spite of all the Royal Navy could doOne cannot give a more convincing proof of the dangerthan the project which the Admirals put forward We mustat all costs and with overriding priorities break out to theocean For this purpose it was proposed to lay anunderwater carpet of dynamite from the seaward end of theNorth Channel which gives access to the Mersey and theClyde to the hundred-fathom line northwest of Ireland Asubmerged mine-field must be laid three miles broad andsixty miles long from these coastal waters to the openocean Even if all the available explosives weremonopolised for this task without much regard to fieldoperations or the proper rearmament of our troops itseemed vital to make this carpet ndash assuming there was noother wayLet me explain the process Many thousands of contactmines would have to be anchored to the bottom of the seareaching up to within thirty-five feet of its surface Over thispathway all the ships which fed Britain or carried on ourwarfare abroad could pass and repass without their keelsstriking the mines A U-boat however venturing into thisminefield would soon be blown up and after a while they


would find it not good enough to come Here was thedefensive in excelsis Anyhow it was better than nothing Itwas the last resort Provisional approval and directions fordetailed proposals to be presented were given on this nightSuch a policy meant that the diver would in future bethinking about nothing but his air-pipe But he had otherwork to doAt the same time however we gave orders to the RAFCoastal Command to dominate the outlets from the Merseyand Clyde and around Northern Ireland Nothing must bespared from this task It had supreme priority The bombingof Germany took second place All suitable machinespilots and material must be concentrated upon our counter-offensive by fighters against the enemy bombers andsurface craft assisted by bombers against the U-boats inthese narrow vital waters Many other important projectswere brushed aside delayed or mauled At all costs onemust breatheWe shall see the extent to which this counter-offensive bythe Navy and by Coastal Command succeeded during thenext few months how we became the masters of theoutlets how the Heinkel 111rsquos were shot down by ourfighters and the U-boats choked in the very seas in whichthey sought to choke us Suffice it here to say that thesuccess of Coastal Command overtook the preparations forthe dynamite carpet Before this ever made any appreciableinroad upon our war economy the morbid defensivethoughts and projects faded away and once again withshining weapons we swept the approaches to the isle


16Desert Victory

Suspense and Preparation mdash The Forward LeapDecember 78 mdash Complete Success mdash Pleasurein Parliament mdash My Messages to Mr Menzies andGeneral Wavell mdashldquoFrappez la Masserdquomdash TheGospel of St Matthew mdash Bardia January 3 mdashTobruk January 21 mdash One Hundred and ThirteenThousand Prisoners and Over Seven HundredGuns Taken mdash Cianorsquos Diaries mdash MussolinirsquosReactions mdash My Warnings to the House About theFuture mdash The U-Boat Menace mdash My Broadcast tothe Italian People mdashldquoOne Man and One ManOnly Guiltyrdquomdash The Revolt in Abyssinia mdash Returnof the Emperor mdash Attempts to Redeem Vichy mdashMy Message to Marshal Peacutetain and to GeneralWeygand mdash Plans for Liberating JiboutildquoOperation Marierdquomdash Airfields in Greece andTurkey mdash A Wealth of Alternatives mdash The End ofthe Year mdash I Receive a Letter from the King mdash MyReply January 5 mdash Glory of the British Nationand Empire mdash The Flag of Freedom Flies mdashMortal Peril Impends

BEFORE a great enterprise is launched the days passslowly The remedy is other urgent business of which therewas at this time certainly no lack I was myself so pleasedthat our generals would take the offensive that I did notworry unduly about the result I grudged the troops wastedin Kenya and Palestine and on internal security in Egypt


but I trusted in the quality and ascendancy of the famousregiments and long-trained professional officers andsoldiers to whom this important matter was confided Edenalso was confident especially in General Wilson who wasto command the battle but then they were bothldquoGreenjacketsrdquo1 and had fought as such in the previouswar Meanwhile outside the small group who knew whatwas going to be attempted there was plenty to talk aboutand doFor a month or more all the troops to be used in theoffensive practised the special parts they had to play in theextremely complicated attack The details of the plan wereworked out by Lieutenant-General Wilson and Major-General OrsquoConnor and General Wavell paid frequent visitsof inspection Only a small circle of officers knew the fullscope of the plan and practically nothing was put on paperTo secure surprise attempts were made to give the enemythe impression that our forces had been seriouslyweakened by the sending of reinforcements to Greece andthat further withdrawals were contemplated On December6 our lean bronzed desert-hardened and completelymechanised army of about twenty-five thousand menleaped forward more than forty miles and all next day laymotionless on the desert sand unseen by the Italian AirForce They swept forward again on December 8 and thatevening for the first time the troops were told that this wasno desert exercise but the ldquoreal thingrdquo At dawn on the 9ththe battle of Sidi Barrani beganIt is not my purpose to describe the complicated anddispersed fighting which occupied the next four days over aregion as large as Yorkshire Everything went smoothlyNibeiwa was attacked by one brigade at 7 AM and in littlemore than an hour was completely in our hands At 130 P


M the attack on the Tummar camps opened and bynightfall practically the whole area and most of its defenderswere captured Meanwhile the 7th Armoured Division hadisolated Sidi Barrani by cutting the coast road to the westSimultaneously the garrison of Mersa Matruh whichincluded the Coldstream Guards had also prepared theirblow At first light on the 10th they assaulted the Italianpositions on their front supported by heavy fire from thesea Fighting continued all day and by ten orsquoclock theColdstream Battalion Headquarters signalled that it wasimpossible to count the prisoners on account of theirnumbers but that ldquothere were about five acres of officersand two hundred acres of other ranksrdquoAt home in Downing Street they brought me hour-to-hoursignals from the battlefield It was difficult to understandexactly what was happening but the general impressionwas favourable and I remember being struck by amessage from a young officer in a tank of the 7th ArmouredDivision ldquoHave arrived at the second B in Buq Buqrdquo I wasable to inform the House of Commons on the 10th thatactive fighting was in progress in the desert that fivehundred prisoners had been taken and an Italian generalkilled and also that our troops had reached the coast ldquoIt istoo soon to attempt to forecast either the scope or the resultof the considerable operations which are in progress Butwe can at any rate say that the preliminary phase has beensuccessfulrdquo That afternoon Sidi Barrani was capturedFrom December 11 onward the action consisted of apursuit of the Italian fugitives by the 7th Armoured Divisionfollowed by the 16th British Infantry Brigade (motorized) andthe 6th Australian Division which had relieved the 4thIndian Division On December 12 I could tell the House ofCommons that the whole coastal region around Buq Buqand Sidi Barrani was in the hands of British and Imperial


troops and that seven thousand prisoners had alreadyreached Mersa Matruh

We do not yet know how many Italians were caughtin the encirclement but it would not be surprising if atleast the best part of three Italian divisions includingnumerous Blackshirt formations have been eitherdestroyed or captured The pursuit to the westwardcontinues with the greatest vigour The Air Force arenow bombing the Navy are shelling the principal roadopen to the retreating enemy and considerableadditional captures have already been reported

While it is still too soon to measure the scale ofthese operations it is clear that they constitute a victorywhich in this African theatre of war is of the first orderand reflects the highest credit upon Sir ArchibaldWavell Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson the Staff officerswho planned this exceedingly complicated operationand the troops who performed the remarkable feats ofendurance and daring which accomplished it Thewhole episode must be judged upon the background ofthe fact that it is only three or four months ago that ouranxieties for the defence of Egypt were acute Thoseanxieties are now removed and the British guaranteeand pledge that Egypt would be effectually defendedagainst all comers has been in every way made good

The moment the victory of Sidi Barrani was assured ndashindeed on December 12 ndash General Wavell took on his owndirect initiative a wise and daring decision Instead ofholding back in general reserve on the battlefield the 4thBritish Indian Division which had just been relieved hemoved it at once to Eritrea to join the 5th British IndianDivision for the Abyssinian campaign under General PlattThe division went partly by sea to Port Sudan and partly byrail and boat up the Nile Some of them moved practicallystraight from the front at Sidi Barrani to their ships andwere in action again in a theatre seven hundred miles awayvery soon after their arrival The earliest units arrived at


Port Sudan at the end of December and the movementwas completed by January 21 The division joined in thepursuit of the Italians from Kassala which they hadevacuated on January 19 to Keren where the main Italianresistance was encountered General Platt had as we shallsee a hard task at Keren even with his two British IndianDivisions the 4th and 5th Without this farseeing decision ofGeneral Wavellrsquos the victory at Keren could not have beenachieved and the liberation of Abyssinia would have beensubject to indefinite delays The immediate course ofevents both on the North African shore and in Abyssiniaproved how very justly the Commander-in-Chief hadmeasured the values and circumstances of the situationsI hastened to offer my congratulations to all concerned andto urge pursuit to the utmost limit of strength


13XII40

I am sure you will be pleased about our victory inLibya This coupled with the Albanian reverses maygo hard with Mussolini if we make good use of oursuccess The full results of the battle are not yet tohand but if Italy can be broken our affairs will be morehopeful than they were four or five months ago

Mr Churchill to MrMenzies PrimeMinister of Australia

13XII40

I am sure you will be heartened by the fine victorythe Imperial armies have gained in Libya This coupledwith his Albanian disasters may go hard with MussoliniRemember that I could not guarantee a few monthsago even a successful defence of the Delta and Canal


We ran sharp risks here at home in sending troopstanks and cannon all round the Cape while under thethreat of imminent invasion and now there is a rewardWe are planning to gather a very large army represent-ing the whole Empire and ample sea-power in theMiddle East which will face a German lurch that wayand at the same time give us a move eastward in yourdirection if need be Success always demands agreater effort All good wishes


13XII40

I send you my heartfelt congratulations on yoursplendid victory which fulfils our highest hopes TheHouse of Commons was stirred when I explained theskilful staff work required and daring execution by theArmy of its arduous task The King will send you amessage as soon as full results are apparentMeanwhile pray convey my thanks and compliments toWilson and accept the same yourself

The poet Walt Whitman says that from every fruitionof success however full comes forth something tomake a greater struggle necessary Naturally pursuitwill hold the first place in your thoughts It is at themoment when the victor is most exhausted that thegreatest forfeit can be exacted from the vanquishedNothing would shake Mussolini more than a disaster inLibya itself No doubt you have considered taking someharbour in Italian territory to which the Fleet can bringall your stuff and which will give you a new jumping-offpoint to hunt them along the coast until you come upagainst real resistance It looks as if these people werecorn ripe for the sickle I shall be glad to hear from youyour thoughts and plans at earliesthellip

As soon as you come to a full stop along the Africancoast we can take a new view of our prospects andseveral attractive choices will be open

By December 15 all enemy troops had been driven fromEgypt The greater part of the Italian forces remaining in


Cyrenaica had withdrawn within the defences of Bardiawhich was now isolated This ended the first phase of thebattle of Sidi Barrani which resulted in the destruction ofthe greater part of five enemy divisions Over 38000prisoners were taken Our own casualties were 133 killed387 wounded and 8 missing


16XII40

The Army of the Nile has rendered glorious serviceto the Empire and to our cause and we are alreadyreaping rewards in every quarter We are deeplyindebted to you Wilson and other commanders whosefine professional skill and audacious leading havegained us the memorable victory of the Libyan DesertYour first objective now must be to maul the Italianarmy and rip them off the African shore to the utmostpossible extent We were very glad to learn yourintentions against Bardia and Tobruk and now to hearof the latest captures of Sollum and Capuzzo I feelconvinced that it is only after you have made sure thatyou can get no farther that you will relinquish the mainhope in favour of secondary action in the Soudan orDodecanese The Soudan is of prime importance andeminently desirable and it may be that the two Indianbrigades [ie the 4th British Indian Division] can bespared without prejudice to the Libyan pursuit battleThe Dodecanese will not get harder for a little waitingBut neither of them ought to detract from the supremetask of inflicting further defeats upon the main Italianarmy I cannot of course pretend to judge specialconditions from here but Napoleonrsquos maxim ldquoFrappezla masse et tout le reste vient par surcroitrdquo seems toring in onersquos ears I must recur to the suggestion madein my previous telegram about amphibious operationsand landings behind the enemyrsquos front to cut off hostiledetachments and to carry forward supplies and troopsby sea


Pray convey my compliments and congratulations toLongmore on his magnificent handling of the RAFand fine co-operation with the Army I hope most of thenew Hurricanes have reached him safely Tell him weare filling up Furious again with another even largerpacket of flyables from Takoradi He will also get thosethat are being carried through in [Operation] ldquoExcessrdquoBoth these should arrive early in January


18XII40

St Matthew Chapter VII verse 72

General Wavell to Prime MinisterSt James Chapter I verse 173

Bardia was our next objective Within its perimeterseventeen miles in extent was the greater part of four moreItalian divisions The defences comprised a continuous anti-tank ditch and wire obstacles with concrete block-houses atintervals and behind this was a second line of fortificationsThe storming of this considerable stronghold requiredpreparation The 7th Armoured Division prevented allenemy escape to the north and northwest For the assaultthere were available the 6th Australian Division the 16thBritish Infantry Brigade the 7th Battalion Royal TankRegiment (twenty-six tanks) one machine-gun battalionone field and one medium regiment of corps artilleryTo complete this episode of desert victory I shall intrudeupon the New Year The attack opened early on January 3One Australian battalion covered by a strong artilleryconcentration seized and held a lodgment in the westernperimeter Behind them engineers filled in the anti-tank


ditch Two Australian brigades carried on the attack andswept east and southeastward They sang at that time asong they had brought with them from Australia which soonspread to Britain

Have you heard of the wonderful wizardThe wonderful Wizard of OzAnd he is a wonderful wizardIf ever a wizard there was

This tune always reminds me of these buoyant days By theafternoon of the 4th British tanks ndashldquoMatildasrdquo as they werenamed ndash supported by infantry entered Bardia and by the5th all the defenders had surrendered Forty-five thousandprisoners and 462 guns were takenBy next day January 6 Tobruk in its turn had been isolatedby the 7th Armoured Division and on the 7th the leadingAustralian brigade stood before its eastern defences Herethe perimeter was twenty-seven miles long and similar tothat of Bardia except that the anti-tank ditch at many pointswas not deep enough to be effective The garrisonconsisted of one complete infantry division a corpsheadquarters and a mass of remnants from the forwardareas It was not possible to launch the assault till January21 when under a strong barrage another Australianbrigade pierced the perimeter on its southern face The twoother brigades of the division entered the bridgehead thusformed swinging off to left and right By nightfall one-thirdof the defended area was in our hands and early nextmorning all resistance ceased The prisoners amounted tonearly 30000 with 236 guns The Desert Army had in fiveweeks advanced over two hundred miles of waterless andfoodless space had taken by assault two strongly fortified


seaports with permanent air and marine defences andcaptured 113000 prisoners and over 700 guns The greatItalian army which had invaded and hoped to conquerEgypt scarcely existed as a military force and only theimperious difficulties of distance and supplies delayed anindefinite British advance to the westThroughout these operations vigorous support wasprovided by the Fleet Bardia and Tobruk were in turnheavily bombarded from the sea and the Fleet Air Armplayed its part in the battle on land Above all the Navysustained the Army in its advance by handling about threethousand tons of supplies a day for the forward troopsbesides maintaining an invaluable ferry service forpersonnel through the captured ports Our victorious armywas also greatly indebted for their success to the masterywhich the Royal Air Force gained over the RegiaAeronautica Although in inferior numbers theaggressiveness of our pilots soon established a completemoral ascendancy that gave them the freedom of the airOur attacks on enemy airfields reaped a rich reward andhundreds of their aircraft were later found wrecked andabandoned


It is always interesting to see the reactions of the other sideThe reader is already acquainted with Count Ciano andshould not be too hard on weak people who follow easilyinto wrong courses the temptations of affluence and officeThose who have successfully resisted all such temptationsshould form the tribunal When Ciano faced the firing-squadhe paid his debts to the full Villains are made of a differenttexture We must not however imagine that it is better to bea rare villain than a Ciano or one of the multitudinouspotential Cianos

We have the Ciano diaries jotted down each day4 Thediary

December 8 Nothing newDecember 9 Intrigues against BadoglioDecember 10 News of the attack on Sidi Barrani

comes like a thunderbolt At first it doesnrsquot seem


serious but subsequent telegrams from Grazianiconfirm that we have had a licking

Ciano saw his father-in-law twice on this day and found himvery calm ldquoHe comments on the event with impersonalobjectivity hellip being more preoccupied with Grazianirsquosprestigerdquo On the 11th it was known in the inner circle atRome that four Italian divisions must be considereddestroyed and even worse Graziani dwelt upon the daringand design of the enemy rather than upon any counter-measures of his own Mussolini maintained his composureldquoHe maintains that the many painful days through which weare living must be inevitable in the changing fortunes ofevery warrdquo If the British stopped at the frontier nothingserious would have happened If on the contrary theyreached Tobruk ldquohe thinks the situation would verge on thetragicrdquo In the evening the Duce learned that five divisionshad been ldquopulverisedrdquo in two days Evidently there wassomething wrong with this armyOn December 13 a ldquocatastrophic telegramrdquo came fromGraziani He contemplated retiring as far as Tripoli ldquoin orderto keep the flag flying on that fortress at leastrdquo He wasindignant that he should have been forced into sohazardous an advance upon Egypt by Rommelrsquos undueinfluence on Mussolini He complained that he had beenforced into a struggle between ldquoa flea and an elephantrdquoApparently the flea had devoured a large portion of theelephant On the 15th Ciano was himself by no meanssure that the English would be content to stop at thefrontier and records his opinion in that sense Graziani indefault of military deeds served up to his master bitterrecriminations Mussolini remarked perhaps with somejustice ldquoHere is another man with whom I cannot get angry


because I despise himrdquo He still hoped that the Britishadvance would be stopped at least at Derna

I had kept the House daily informed of our progress in thedesert and on December 19 I made a long statement onthe general war position I described the improvement ofour home defence and urged increasing vigilance We mustexpect a continuance of the air attacks and theorganisation of shelters the improvement of sanitation andthe endeavour to mitigate the extremely bad conditionsunder which people had to get their nightrsquos rest was the firsttask of the Government at home ldquoThe Air-RaidPrecautions the Home Office and the Ministry of Healthare just as much in the front line as are the armouredcolumns which are chasing the Italians about the LibyanDesertrdquoI also thought it necessary to utter a warning about thesinkings in the Atlantic

They still continue at a very disquieting level not sobad as in the critical period of 1917 but still we mustrecognise the recrudescence of the danger which ayear ago we seemed to have mastered We shallsteadily increase from now on our resources in flotillasand other methods of defence but we must regard thekeeping-open of this channel to the world againstsubmarines and the long-distance aircraft which arenow attacking as the first of all of our military tasks

I thought it the moment to address the Italian people by thebroadcast and on the night of December 23 I reminded


them of the long friendship between Britain and Italy Nowwe were at war

hellip Our armies are tearing and will tear the Africanarmy to shreds and tattershellip What is all this aboutWhat is all this for

Italians I will tell you the truth It is all because ofone man One man and one man alone has ranged theItalian people in deadly struggle against the BritishEmpire and has deprived Italy of the sympathy andintimacy of the United States of America That he is agreat man I do not deny but that after eighteen yearsof unbridled power he has led your country to the horridverge of ruin can be denied by none It is one man whoagainst the Crown and Royal Family of Italy againstthe Pope and all the authority of the Vatican and of theRoman Catholic Church against the wishes of theItalian people who had no lust for this war has arrayedthe trustees and inheritors of ancient Rome upon theside of the ferocious pagan barbarians

I read out the message I had sent to Mussolini on becomingPrime Minister and his reply of May 18 1940 and Icontinued

Where is it that the Duce has led his trusting peopleafter eighteen years of dictatorial power What hardchoice is open to them now It is to stand up to thebattery of the whole British Empire on sea in the airand in Africa and the vigorous counter-attack of theGreek nation or on the other hand to call in Attila overthe Brenner Pass with his hordes of ravenous soldieryand his gangs of Gestapo policemen to occupy holddown and protect the Italian people for whom he andhis Nazi followers cherish the most bitter andoutspoken contempt that is on record between races

There is where one man and one man only has ledyou and there I leave this unfolding story until the daycomes ndash as come it will ndash when the Italian nation willonce more take a hand in shaping its own fortunes


It is curious that on this same day Mussolini speaking ofthe morale of the Italian Army remarked to Ciano5ldquoI mustnevertheless recognise that the Italians of 1914 were betterthan these It is not flattering for the regime but thatrsquos howit isrdquo And the next day looking out of the window ldquoThissnow and cold are very good In this way our good-for-nothing Italians this mediocre race will be improvedrdquo Suchwere the bitter and ungrateful reflections which the failure ofthe Italian Army in Libya and Albania had wrung from theheart of this dark figure after six months of aggressive waron what he had thought was the decadent British Empire

This was a time when events were so fluid that everypossible stroke had to be studied beforehand and thus thewidest choice of action lay open to us Our victory in Libyahad already stimulated the revolt against Italy in Abyssinia Iwas most anxious that the Emperor Haile Selassie shouldre-enter his country as he desired to do The Foreign Officethought this step premature I deferred to the judgment ofthe new Secretary of State but the delay was short and theEmperor eager to run all risks was soon back on his nativesoil

(Action this day)Prime Minister toForeign Secretaryand General Ismayfor COS Committee

30XII40

It would seem that every effort should be made tomeet the Emperor of Ethiopiarsquos wishes We havealready I understand stopped our officers from


entering the Galla country It seems a pity to employbattalions of Ethiopian deserters who might inflame therevolt on mere road-making We have sixty-fourthousand troops in Kenya where complete passivityreigns so they surely could spare these road-makersOn the first point I am strongly in favour of HaileSelassie entering Abyssinia Whatever differencesthere may be between the various Abyssinian tribesthere can be no doubt that the return of the Emperorwill be taken as a proof that the revolt has greatlyincreased and will be linked up with the rumours of ourvictory in Libya

I should be glad if a favourable answer could bedrafted for me to send to the Emperor


31XII40

One would think the Emperor would be the bestjudge of when to risk his life for his throne In yourMinute you speak of our being ldquostampeded intopremature and possibly catastrophic actionrdquo I do notwish at all to be ldquostampededrdquo but I should like to knowsome of the reasons why nothing is to be done forsome months yet by the Emperor I should have hopedthe telegram to him could have been more forthcomingand the one to Sir Miles Lampson rather more positiveThese are however only matters of emphasis and ifwith your knowledge you are apprehensive of givingmore clear guidance I do not press for alteration of thetelegrams

The question of what pledges we give to HaileSelassie about his restoration and what are our ideasabout the Italian position in East Africa assuming thatour operations prosper as they may is one which I wasglad to hear from you this morning is receiving ForeignOffice attention


Finally I was most anxious to give Vichy its chance to profitby the favourable turn of events There is no room in warfor pique spite or rancour The main objective mustdominate all secondary causes of vexation For someweeks past the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the GeneralStaff of the War Office had been preparing anExpeditionary Force of six divisions and making plans ifthe French attitude should become favourable to land inMorocco We had the advantage of M Dupuy theCanadian representative at Vichy as a channel ofcommunication with Marshal Peacutetain It was necessary tokeep the United States informed for I already sensed thePresidentrsquos interest in Tangier Casablanca and indeed inthe whole Atlantic seaboard of Africa the Germanoccupation of which by U-boat bases was held by theAmerican military authorities to endanger the security of theUnited States Accordingly with the full approval of theChiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet the following messagewas sent by the hand of M Dupuy to Vichy and notified bythe Foreign Office to our Chargeacute drsquoAffaires in Washington

Prime Minister toMarshal Peacutetain

31XII40

If at any time in the near future the FrenchGovernment decide to cross to North Africa or resumethe war there against Italy and Germany we should bewilling to send a strong and well-equipped Expedi-tionary Force of up to six divisions to aid the defence ofMorocco Algiers and Tunis These divisions could sailas fast as shipping and landing facilities were availableWe now have a large well-equipped army in Englandand have considerable spare forces already welltrained and rapidly improving apart from what areneeded to repel invasion The situation in the MiddleEast is also becoming good


2 The British Air Force has now begun its expan-sion and would also be able to give importantassistance

3 The command of the Mediterranean would beassured by the reunion of the British and French Fleetsand by our joint use of Moroccan and North Africanbases

4 We are willing to enter into Staff talks of the mostsecret character with any military representativesnominated by you

5 On the other hand delay is dangerous At anytime the Germans may by force or favour come downthrough Spain render unusable the anchorage atGibraltar take effective charge of the batteries on bothsides of the Straits and also establish their air forces inthe aerodromes It is their habit to strike swiftly and ifthey establish themselves on the Moroccan coast thedoor would be shut on all projects The situation maydeteriorate any day and prospects be ruined unless weare prepared to plan together and act boldly It is mostimportant that the French Government should realisethat we are able and willing to give powerful andgrowing aid But this may presently pass beyond ourpower

A similar message was sent by another hand to GeneralWeygand now Commander-in-Chief at Algiers No answerof any kind was returned from either quarter

At this stage we may review the numerous tasks andprojects for which plans and in most cases preparationshad been made and approval in principle obtained The firstwas of course the defence of the island against invasionWe had now armed and equipped though not in all casesat the highest standard of modern equipment nearly thirtyhigh-class mobile divisions a large proportion of whomwere Regulars and all of whose men had been under


intense training for fifteen months Of these we consideredthat apart from the coastal troops fifteen would besufficient to deal with oversea invasion The Home Guardnow more than a million men had rifles and somecartridges in their hands apart from our reserve Wetherefore had twelve or fifteen divisions available foroffensive action overseas as need and opportunity aroseThe reinforcement of the Middle East and especially of theArmy of the Nile from Australia and New Zealand and fromIndia had already been provided for by shipping and byother arrangements As the Mediterranean was still closedvery long voyages and many weeks were required for allthese convoys and their escortsSecondly in case Vichy or the French in North Africashould rally to the common cause we had prepared anExpeditionary Force of six divisions with an air componentfor an unopposed and assisted landing in Moroccan Atlanticports principally Casablanca Whether we could move thisgood army to Morocco or to Ceuta opposite Gibraltar morerapidly than the Germans could come in equal numbersand equipment through Spain depended upon the degreeof Spanish resistance We could however if invited and ifwe liked it land at Cadiz to support the SpaniardsThirdly in case the Spanish Government yielded to Germanpressure and became Hitlerrsquos ally or co-belligerent thusmaking the harbour at Gibraltar unusable we held ready astrong brigade with four suitable fast transports to seize oroccupy some of the Atlantic islands Alternatively if thePortuguese Government agreed that we might for thispurpose invoke the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1373ldquoFriends to friends and foes to foesrdquo we might set up withall speed a base in the Cape Verde Islands This operationcalled ldquoShrapnelrdquo would secure us the necessary air and


refueling bases to maintain naval control of the criticalstretch of the route round the CapeFourthly a French de Gaullist brigade from England withWest African reinforcements was to be sent round theCape to Egypt in order to effect the capture of Jibouti incase conditions there became favourable (ldquoOperationMarierdquo)6

Preparations were also being made to reinforce Maltaparticularly in air power (ldquoOperation Winchrdquo) with the objectof regaining control of the passage between Sicily andTunis As an important element in this policy plans hadbeen made for the capture by a brigade of commandos ofwhich Sir Roger Keyes wished to take personal commandof the rocky islet of Pantellaria (ldquoOperation Workshoprdquo)Every effort was ordered to be made to develop a strongnaval and air base in Crete at Suda Bay pending themovement thither of any reinforcements for its garrisonwhich a change in the Greek situation might require Wewere developing airfields in Greece both to aid the GreekArmy and to strike at Italy or if necessary at the Rumanianoilfields Similarly the active development of airfields inTurkey and technical assistance to the Turks was inprogressFinally the revolt in Abyssinia was being fanned by everymeans and respectable forces were based on Khartoum tostrike in the neighbourhood of Kassala on the White Nileagainst the menace of the large Italian army in Abyssinia Amovement was planned for a joint military and navaladvance from Kenya up the East African coast towards theRed Sea to capture the Italian fortified seaports of Assaband Massawa with a view to the conquest of the Italiancolony of Eritrea


Thus I was able to lay before the War Cabinet a widechoice of carefully considered and detailed enterpriseswhich could at very short notice be launched against theenemy and certainly from among them we could find themeans for an active and unceasing overseas offensivewarfare albeit on a secondary scale with which to relieveand adorn our conduct of the war during the early part of1941 throughout which the building up of our main warstrength in men and munitions in aircraft tanks andartillery would be continuously and immensely expanded

As the end of the year approached both its lights and itsshadows stood out harshly on the picture We were aliveWe had beaten the German Air Force There had been noinvasion of the island The Army at home was now verypowerful London had stood triumphant through all herordeals Everything connected with our air mastery over ourown island was improving fast The smear of Communistswho obeyed their Moscow orders gibbered about acapitalist-imperialist war But the factories hummed and thewhole British nation toiled night and day uplifted by a surgeof relief and pride Victory sparkled in the Libyan Desertand across the Atlantic the Great Republic drew evernearer to her duty and our aidAt this time I received a very kind letter from the King

SANDRINGHAMJanuary

2

1941

My dear Prime Minister

I must send you my best wishes for a happier NewYear and may we see the end of this conflict in sightduring the coming year I am already feeling better formy sojourn here it is doing me good and the change of


scene and outdoor exercise is acting as a good tonicBut I feel that it is wrong for me to be away from myplace of duty when everybody else is carrying onHowever I must look upon it as medicine and hope tocome back refreshed in mind and body for renewedefforts against the enemy

I do hope and trust you were able to have a littlerelaxation at Christmas with all your arduous work Ihave so much admired all you have done during thelast seven months as my Prime Minister and I have soenjoyed our talks together during our weekly lun-cheons I hope they will continue on my return as I dolook forward to them so much

I hope to pay a visit to Sheffield7 next Monday I cando it from here in the dayhellip

With renewed good wishes

I remain Yours very sincerely

GEORGE R I

I expressed my gratitude which was heartfelt

January 5 1941

Sir

I am honoured by Your Majestyrsquos most graciousletter The kindness with which Your Majesty and theQueen have treated me since I became First Lord andstill more since I became Prime Minister has been acontinuous source of strength and encouragementduring the vicissitudes of this fierce struggle for life Ihave already served Your Majestyrsquos father andgrandfather for a good many years as a Minister of theCrown and my father and grandfather served QueenVictoria but Your Majestyrsquos treatment of me has beenintimate and generous to a degree that I had neverdeemed possible

Indeed Sir we have passed through days andweeks as trying and as momentous as any in the


history of the English Monarchy and even now therestretches before us a long forbidding road I have beengreatly cheered by our weekly luncheons in poor oldbomb-battered Buckingham Palace and to feel that inYour Majesty and the Queen there flames the spirit thatwill never be daunted by peril nor wearied byunrelenting toil This war has drawn the Throne and thepeople more closely together than was ever beforerecorded and Your Majesties are more beloved by allclasses and conditions than any of the princes of thepast I am indeed proud that it should have fallen to mylot and duty to stand at Your Majestyrsquos side as FirstMinister in such a climax of the British story and it isnot without good and sure hope and confidence in thefuture that I sign myself ldquoon Bardia Dayrdquo when thegallant Australians are gathering another twentythousand Italians prisoners

Your Majestyrsquos faithful and devoted servant andsubject

WINSTON S CHURCHILL

We may I am sure rate this tremendous year as the mostsplendid as it was the most deadly year in our long Englishand British story It was a great quaintly organised Englandthat had destroyed the Spanish Armada A strong flame ofconviction and resolve carried us through the twenty-fiveyearsrsquo conflict which William II and Marlborough wagedagainst Louis XIV There was a famous period withChatham There was the long struggle against Napoleon inwhich our survival was secured through the domination ofthe seas by the British Navy under the classic leadership ofNelson and his associates A million Britons died in the FirstWorld War But nothing surpasses 1940 By the end of that


year this small and ancient island with its devotedCommonwealth Dominions and attachments under everysky had proved itself capable of bearing the whole impactand weight of world destiny We had not flinched orwavered We had not failed The soul of the British peopleand race had proved invincible The citadel of theCommonwealth and Empire could not be stormed Alonebut upborne by every generous heartbeat of mankind wehad defied the tyrant in the height of his triumphAll our latent strength was now alive The air terror hadbeen measured The island was intangible inviolateHenceforward we too would have weapons with which tofight Henceforward we too would be a highly organised warmachine We had shown the world that we could hold ourown There were two sides to the question of Hitlerrsquos worlddomination Britain whom so many had counted out wasstill in the ring far stronger than she had ever been andgathering strength with every day Time had once againcome over to our side And not only to our national sideThe United States was arming fast and drawing ever nearerto the conflict Soviet Russia who with callousmiscalculation had adjudged us worthless at the outbreakof the war and had bought from Germany fleeting immunityand a share of the booty had also become much strongerand had secured advanced positions for her own defenceJapan seemed for the moment to be overawed by theevident prospect of a prolonged world war and anxiouslywatching Russia and the United States meditatedprofoundly what it would be wise and profitable to doAnd now this Britain and its far-spread association of statesand dependencies which had seemed on the verge of ruinwhose very heart was about to be pierced had been forfifteen months concentrated upon the war problem trainingits men and devoting all its infinitely varied vitalities to the


struggle With a gasp of astonishment and relief the smallerneutrals and the subjugated states saw that the stars stillshone in the sky Hope and within it passion burned anewin the hearts of hundreds of millions of men The goodcause would triumph Right would not be trampled downThe flag of Freedom which in this fateful hour was theUnion Jack would still fly in all the winds that blewBut I and my faithful colleagues who brooded with accurateinformation at the summit of the scene had no lack ofcares The shadow of the U-boat blockade already cast itschill upon us All our plans depended upon the defeat ofthis menace The Battle of France was lost The Battle ofBritain was won The Battle of the Atlantic had now to befought

END OF BOOK TWO


Publisherrsquos NoteThe following changes in the text were received too late forinclusion in the first edition but will appear in their properplaces in future editionsPage 45 line 1

forNeufchacircteau-sur-AisnereadNeufchacirctel-sur-Aisne

01 line 4 from bottomforeight hundred and fifty vesselsreadeight hundred and sixty vessels

Page 102 correction of official listBRITISH SHIPS


Page 115 footnote added with reference to tableThese figures are taken from a final analysis of the

Admiralty records The War Office figure for the totalnumber of men landed in England is 336427

Page 129 line 17for1 PM the next dayread1 AM the next day

Page 229 line 17for Novemberread December

Page 232 line 9 from bottomformodern eight-inch cruisersreadread modern eight-inch-gun cruisers

Page 233 2 lines from bottomforOn the night of July 3readread In the early morning of July 3

Page 237 line 1forat Martiniquereadread in the French West Indies


Appendices


Contents


APPENDICES

A Prime Ministerrsquos Personal Minutes and Telegrams MaymdashDecember 1940B Weekly Losses at Sea by Enemy Action of British Alliedand Neutral Merchant TonnageC Aircraft Strength Battle of Britain 1940D Correspondence Relating to Dakar between MrChurchill and Mr MenziesE List of Operational Code Names for 1940mdash1941F List of Abbreviations

Appendix A

PRIME MINISTERrsquoS PERSONAL MINUTES AND TELEGRAMS

MAYndash DECEMBER 1940

MAY

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for those concerned

18V40

The proximity fuze and the necessary rocketprojectors have hitherto been treated as importantprotection for ships but even larger numbers will beneeded even some perhaps more urgently for theprotection of aircraft factories and other exceptionallyimportant points What is being done about this Letproposals be made tomorrow for setting up thenecessary manufacture Are any modifications in thedesign of the projectors necessary The Director ofNaval Ordnance (DNO) can go on with the ship sideof the business but be careful no hold-up takes placein the supply for the vulnerable points ashore Reporttomorrow night what organisation or measures arerequired to procure this production

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for the Colonies

23V40

I am in full agreement with the answer you proposeto Wedgwoodrsquos1 Questions and 1 do not want Jewishforces raised to serve outside Palestine The main andalmost the sole aim in Palestine at the present time is


to liberate the eleven battalions of excellent Regulartroops who are now tethered there For this purposethe Jews should be armed in their own defence andproperly organised as speedily as possible We canalways prevent them from attacking the Arabs by oursea-power which thus them off from the outer worldand by other friendly influences On the other hand wecannot leave them unarmed when our troops leave asleave they must at a very early date

Prime Minister to Minister ofAircraft Production

24V40

I should be much obliged if you would have a talkwith Lindemann so as to get at some agreed figuresupon aircraft outputs both recent and prospective Ihave for a long time been convinced that the AirMinistry do not make enough of the deliveries withwhich they are supplied and Lindemann is obtaining forme returns of all aircraft in their hands so that one cansee what use is made of them

It is of the highest importance that all aircraft instorage and reserve should not only be made availablefor service but that these should be organised insquadrons with their pilots Now that the war is comingso close the object must be to prepare the largestnumber of aircraft even as you said training and civilaircraft to carry bombs to enemy aerodromes on theDutch Belgian and French coasts I must get a fullview of the figures both of delivery and employmentand this can be kept up to date weekly

Prime Minister to ProfessorLindemann

24V40

Let me have on one sheet of paper a statementabout the tanks How many have we got with theArmy How many of each kind are being made eachmonth How many are there with the manufacturersWhat are the forecasts What are the plans for heaviertanks

NOTEndash The present form of warfare and the proofthat tanks can overrun fortifications will affect the plans


for the ldquoCultivatorrdquo and it seems very likely that only areduced number will be required

Prime Minister to Sir EdwardBridges

24V40

I am sure there are far too many committees of onekind and another which Ministers have to attend andwhich do not yield a sufficient result These should bereduced by suppression or amalgamation Secondly aneffort should be made to reduce the returns with whichthe Cabinet is oppressed to a smaller compass andsmaller number Pray let proposals be made by theCabinet Office Staff for effecting these simplifications

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for Air

27V40

In your communiqueacute today you distinguish in severalcases between enemy aircraft ldquoput out of actionrdquo orldquodestroyedrdquo Is there any real difference between thetwo or is it simply to avoid tautology If so this is not inaccordance with the best authorities on English Senseshould not be sacrificed to sound

2 Will you also report today whether you would likethe weather to be clear or cloudy for the operations onthe Belgian coast

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay and CIGS

29V40

The change which has come over the war affectsdecisively the usefulness of ldquoCultivator Number 6rdquo Itmay play its part in various operations defensive andoffensive but it can no longer be considered the onlymethod of breaking a fortified line I suggest that theMinister of Supply should today be instructed to reducethe scheme by one-half Probably in a few days it willbe to one-quarter The spare available capacity couldbe turned over to tanks If the Germans can make tanksin nine months surely we can do so Let me have yourgeneral proposals for the priority construction of an


additional thousand tanks capable of engaging theimproved enemy pattern likely to be working in 1941

There should also be formed if it does not alreadyexist an anti-tank committee to study and devise allmethods of attacking the latest German tanks Pray letme have suggested list of names

JUNE


3VI40

Has anything been done about shipping twentythousand internees to Newfoundland or St Helena Isthis one of the matters that the Lord President has inhand If so would you please ask him about it I shouldlike to get them on the high seas as soon as possiblebut I suppose considerable arrangements have to bemade at the other end Is it all going forward


3VI40

The Cabinet were distressed to hear from you thatyou were now running short of pilots for fighters andthat they had now become the limiting factor

This is the first time that this particular admission offailure has been made by the Air Ministry We knowthat immense masses of aircraft are devoted to themaking of pilots far beyond the proportion adopted bythe Germans We heard some months ago of manythousands of pilots for whom the Air Ministry declaredthey had no machines and who consequently had tobe ldquore-musteredrdquo as many as seven thousand werementioned all of whom had done many more hours offlying than those done by German pilots now frequentlycaptured How then therefore is this new shortage tobe explained

Lord Beaverbrook has made a surprising improve-ment in the supply and repair of airplanes and inclearing up the muddle and scandal of the aircraftproduction branch I greatly hope that you will be able


to do as much on the personnel side for it will indeedbe lamentable if we have machines standing idle forwant of pilots to fly them


3VI40

You are not presenting me as I should like every fewdays or every week with a short clear statement ofthe falling-of or improvement in munitions production Iam not able to form a clear view unless you do this


3VI40

See attached paper [Production ProgrammesMemorandum by Chiefs of Staff] which seems tocontain a lot of loose thinking Evidently we must ldquopullforwardrdquo everything that can be made effective in thenext five months and accept the consequentretardation of later production but there is no reasonwhatever to alter so far as I can see the existingapproved schemes for a three yearsrsquo war Indeed theywill be more necessary than ever if France drops out

Pray let me have your views

Prime Minister to ProfessorLindemann (Secret)

7VI40

I am much grieved to hear of the further delay in theproximity fuze (PF)

Considering the enormous importance of this andthe directions I have given that all possible pressureshould be put behind it it would surely have been rightto have two or three firms simultaneously making theexperimental pattern so that if one failed the othercould go on

Please report to me what has been doneYou have not given me yet either a full statement of

the production which is already ordered in rockets forthe proximity fuze and in rockets for the ordinary fuzebefore we get the PF

It is of the utmost importance that you should goforward with the stabilising bomb-sight as we must


knock out their aircraft factories at the same rate thatthey affect ours If you will gather together (a) all thepeople interested in the PF and (b) all those interestedin the stabilised bomb-sight I will next week receivetheir reports and urge them on


11VI40

It was decided on December 22 at a conference onbomb-sight design that urgent action should be taken toconvert two thousand six hundred ABs Mark II intostabilised high altitude bomb-sights over ninety percentof the drawings then being completed Please let meknow exactly what followed How is it that only onebomb-sight was converted I should be very glad if youwould look at the files and ascertain who wasresponsible for stifling action

Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for Air and CAS

11VI40

This report2is most interesting and I shall be glad ifyou will arrange to use the squadron you mentionedyesterday for the purpose of infecting the reachesmentioned where the traffic is reported to be so heavyWe do not need to ask the French permission for thisbut only for the continuous streaming of the navalfluvials This I am doing Meanwhile you should act assoon as you can on the lower reaches Kindly reportwhat you will do

Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for the Colonies

16VI40

Have you considered the advisability of raising aWest Indies Regiment It might have three battalionsstrongly officered by British officers and be representa-tive of most of the islands to be available for ImperialService to give an outlet for the loyalty of the nativesand bring money into these poor islands

At present we are short of weapons but these willcome along


Prime Minister to First Lordof the Admiralty

17VI40

I am content with your proposed disposition of theheavy ships in the West namely Repulse and Renownto maintain the blockade at Scapa Rodney Nelsonand Valiant at Rosyth to cover the island Hood and ArkRoyal to join Resolution at Gibraltar to watch over thefate of the French Fleet

It is of the utmost importance that the fleet atAlexandria should remain to cover Egypt from an Italianinvasion which would otherwise destroy prematurely allour position in the East This fleet is well placed tosustain our interests in Turkey to guard Egypt and theCanal and can if the situation changes either fight itsway westward or go through the Canal to guard theEmpire or come round the Cape onto our trade routes

The position of the Eastern fleet must be constantlywatched and can be reviewed when we know whathappens to the French Fleet and whether Spaindeclares war or not

Even if Spain declares war it does not follow that weshould quit the Eastern Mediterranean If we have toquit Gibraltar we must immediately take the Canarieswhich will serve as a very good base to control thewestern entrance to the Mediterranean

Prime Minister to Minister ofHome Security

20VI40

I understand that it was settled last Saturday thatyour department was to take on the executive control ofsmoke as a means of hiding factories and similarindustrial targets I should be glad to know whom youhave put in charge of this work which I regard as of thehighest importance and what progress he has made

Prime Minister to Admiralty 23VI40I do not think it would be a good thing to keep Hood

and Ark Royal lolling about in Gibraltar Harbour wherethey might be bombed at any time from the shore


Surely when they have fuelled they should go tosea and come back only unexpectedly and for shortvisits

What is being done

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay

24VI40

Has any news been received of the Germanprisoner pilots in France whose return to this countrywas solemnly promised by M Reynaud

Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for Foreign Affairs

24VI40

It does not seem to be necessary to address thePresident again upon the subject of destroyers today ortomorrow Evidently he will be influenced by whathappens to the French Fleet about which I am hopefulI am doubtful about opening Staff talks at the presenttime I think they would turn almost entirely from theAmerican side upon the transfer of the British Fleet totransatlantic bases Any discussion of this is bound toweaken confidence here at the moment when all mustbrace themselves for the supreme struggle I will sendthe President another personal telegram about thedestroyers and flying-boats a little later on


25VI40

The cruel penalties imposed by your predecessorupon the Jews in Palestine for arming have made itnecessary to tie up needless forces for their protectionPray let me know exactly what weapons and organisa-tion the Jews have for self-defence

Prime Minister to Minister ofSupply

25VI40

Thank you for your letter of June 22 about increas-ing the import of steel from the United States Iunderstand that owing to the transfer of the French


contracts to us our volume of purchases for the comingmonth has more than doubled and that we are nowbuying at the rate of about 600000 tons a month Thisis satisfactory and we should certainly get as muchfrom the United States as we can while we can


26VI40

I am sure we shall gain nothing by offering toldquodiscussrdquo Gibraltar at the end of the war Spaniards willknow that if we win discussions would not be fruitfuland if we lose they would not be necessary I do notbelieve mere verbiage of this kind will affect theSpanish decision


28VI40

Although our policy about the French Navy is clear Ishould like to have an appreciation by the Admiralty ofthe consequences which are likely to follow namely ahostile attitude by France and the seizure by Germanyand Italy of any part of the French Navy which wecannot secure I should like to have this on Sundaynext

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay (Secret)

28VI40

This is a very unsatisfactory figure [of civilianlabour]3 When I mentioned fifty-seven thousand theother day in the Cabinet I was assured that theyrepresented a very small part of what were actuallyemployed and that one hundred thousand was nearerthe mark and that many more were coming in beforethe end of the week Now instead we have a figure ofonly forty thousand Pray let me have a full explanationof this

It is very wrong that fighting troops should be keptfrom their training because of the neglect to employcivilian labour


The question must be brought up at the Cabinet onMonday


28VI40

Let me see a list of prominent persons you havearrested


29VI40

If we could have large supplies of multiple projectorsand rockets directed by Radar irrespective of cloud ordarkness and also could have the proximity fuzeworking effectively by day and to a lesser extent inmoonlight or starlight the defence against air attackwould become decisive This combination is thereforethe supreme immediate aim We are not far from it inevery respect yet it seems to baffle us Assemble yourideas and facts so that I may give extreme priority andimpulse to this business


29VI40

It seems to me that the blockade is largely ruined inwhich case the sole decisive weapon in our handswould be overwhelming air attack upon Germany

We should gain great relief in the immediate futurefrom not having to maintain an army in France orsending supplies of beef coal etc to France Let meknow about this

How has the question of beef supplies beenaffected We are freed from the obligation to supply theFrench Army with beef There is really no reason whyour Army at home should have rations far exceedingthe heavy munitions workersrsquo The complications aboutfrozen meat and fresh meat ought also to be affectedby what has happened although I am not sure whichway


JULY


2VII40

If it be true that a few hundred German troops havebeen landed on Jersey or Guernsey by troop-carriersplans should be studied to land secretly by night on theislands and kill or capture the invaders This is exactlyone of the exploits for which the Commandos would besuited There ought to be no difficulty in getting all thenecessary information from the inhabitants and fromthose evacuated The only possible rein forcementswhich could reach the enemy during the fighting wouldbe by aircraft-carriers and here would be a goodopportunity for the Air Force fighting machines Pray letme have a plan

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for Foreign Affairs

3VII40

I could not reconcile myself to leaving a largenumber of influential Frenchmen who are the adherentsof the Peacutetain Government free to run an active andeffective propaganda in our Service circles and inFrench circles in this country against the whole policyof aiding General de Gaulle to which we are publiclyand earnestly committed The attempt to set up aFrench Government in Morocco and to obtain control ofthe Jean Bart and other vessels and to open up acampaign in Morocco with a base on the Atlantic is inmy opinion vital It was most cordially adopted by theCabinet in principle and apart from technical details Ishould find very great difficulty in becoming a party toits abandonment and to our consequent relegation tothe negative defensive which has so long provedruinous to our interests

(Action this day)


Prime Minister to VCNSand ACNS

5VII40

Could you let me know on one sheet of paper whatarrangements you are making about the Channelconvoys now that the Germans are all along the Frenchcoast The attacks on the convoy yesterday both fromthe air and by E-boats were very serious and I shouldlike to be assured this morning that the situation is inhand and that the Air is contributing effectively

Prime Minister to First Lord ofthe Admiralty Secretary ofState for War and Secretaryof State for Air

5VII40

(Sir E Bridges to implement)It has been represented to me that our colleagues

not in the War Cabinet but above the ldquolinerdquo aredepressed at not knowing more of what is goingforward in the military sphere It would be advanta-geous if each of the Service Ministers could in rotationhave a talk with them answer questions and explainthe general position If a weekly meeting wereinstituted this would mean that each Service Ministerwould meet them every three weeks I trust this wouldnot be too heavy a burden upon you Nothing mustever be said to anybody about future operations thesemust always be kept in the most narrow circles butexplanations of the past and expositions of the presentoffer a wide field On the assumption that the above isagreeable to you I am giving directions through SirEdward Bridges

Prime Minister to ColonelJacobs

6VJI40

Obtain a most careful report today from the JointIntelligence Staff of any further indication of enemypreparations for raid or invasion Let me have thistonight



8VII40

In the fierce light of the present emergency thefighter is the need and the output of fighters must bethe prime consideration till we have broken the enemyrsquosattack But when I look round to see how we can winthe war I see that there is only one sure path We haveno Continental army which can defeat the Germanmilitary power The blockade is broken and Hitler hasAsia and probably Africa to draw from Should he berepulsed here or not try invasion he will recoileastward and we have nothing to stop him But there isone thing that will bring him back and bring him downand that is an absolutely devastating exterminatingattack by very heavy bombers from this country uponthe Nazi homeland We must be able to overwhelmthem by this means without which I do not see a waythrough We cannot accept any lower aim than airmastery When can it be obtained

Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for Air

11VII40

Generally speaking the losses in the Bomber forceseem unduly heavy and the Bremen raid from whichonly one out of six returned is most grievous At thepresent time a very heavy price may be paid (a) for information by reconnaissance of the conditions in theGerman ports and German-controlled ports and rivermouths (b) for the bombing of barges or assemblies ofships thus detected Apart from this the long-rangebombing of Germany should be conducted with adesire to save the machines and personnel as much aspossible while keeping up a steady attack It is mostimportant to build up the numbers of the Bomber forcewhich are very low at the present time


11VII40

You should I think prepare a Bill vacating the seatof any Member of Parliament who continues during the


present war outside the jurisdiction for more than sixmonths without the leave of the Secretary of State


12VII40

What is being done to reproduce and install thesmall circular pillboxes which can be sunk in the centreof aerodromes and rise by means of a compressed-airbottle to two or three feet elevation like a small turretcommanding the aerodrome I saw these for the firsttime when I visited Langley Aerodrome last week Thisappears to afford an admirable means of anti-parachutedefence and it should surely be widely adopted Letme have a plan

Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for War

12VII40

Now is the time to popularise your administrationwith the troops by giving to all regiments and units thelittle badges and distinctions they like so much I sawthe London Irish with their green and peacock-bluehackles We can easily afford the expense of bronzebadges the weight of which is insignificant in metal Allregimental distinctions should be encouraged TheFrench Army made a great specialty of additional unofficial regimental badges which they presented topeople I liked this-idea and I am sure it would amusethe troops who will have to face a long vigil I amdelighted at the action you have taken about bands butwhen are we going to hear them playing about thestreets Even quite small parade marches are highlybeneficial especially in towns like Liver pool andGlasgow in fact wherever there are troops and leisurefor it there should be an attempt at military display

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for COSCommittee

12VII40

1 The contacts we have had with the Italiansencourage the development of a more aggressivecampaign against the Italian homeland by bombard-


ment both from air and sea It also seems mostdesirable that the Fleet should be able to use Maltamore freely A plan should be prepared to reinforce theair defences of Malta in the strongest manner with AAguns of various types and with airplanes Malta wasalso the place where it was thought the aerial minebarrage from the ldquoEgglayerrdquo would be useful Finallythere are the PE fuzes4 which will be coming along atthe end of August which should give very gooddaylight results If we could get a stronger Air Forcethere we might obtain considerable immunity fromannoyance by retaliation

2 Let a plan for the speediest anti-aircraft reinforce-ment of Malta be prepared forthwith and let me have itin three days with estimates in time It should bepossible to inform Malta to prepare emplacements forthe guns before they are sent out


12VII40

Will you bring the following to the notice of theChiefs of Staff

It is the settled policy of His Majestyrsquos Governmentto make good strong French contingents for land seaand air service to encourage these men to volunteer tofight on with us to look after them well to indulge theirsentiments about the French flag etc and to havethem as representatives of a France which is continuingthe war It is the duty of the Chiefs of Staff to carry thispolicy out effectively

The same principle also applies to Poles DutchCzech and Belgian contingents in this country as wellas to the Foreign Legion of anti-Nazi Germany Merequestions of administrative inconvenience must not beallowed to stand in the way of this policy of the State Itis most necessary to give to the war which Great Britainis waging single-handed the broad internationalcharacter which will add greatly to our strength andprestige

I hope I may receive assurances that this policy isbeing whole-heartedly pursued I found the conditions


at Olympia very bad and there is no doubt that theFrench soldiers were discouraged by some officersfrom volunteering An opportunity of assisting theFrench would be to make a great success of theirfunction of July 14 when they are going to lay a wreathon the Foch statue


13VII40

Draw Admiralty attention to the importance of allthese ships especially Western Prince What is herspeed It would be a disaster if we lost these fiftythousand rifles Draw attention also to the immenseconsequence of the convoy which is leaving New Yorkbetween July 8 and 12 When will these variousconvoys be in the danger zone When will they arriveLet me have a report on the measures to be taken


13VII40

I am receiving from various sources suggestions thatthere should be another day of prayer and humiliation

Will you find out privately what is thought about thisby the Archbishop


14VII40

It seems to me very important that everybody shouldbe made to look to their gas-masks now I expect agreat many of them require overhauling and it may wellbe Hitler has some gas designs upon us Will youconsider how the necessary overhauls can be set onfoot Action should be taken at once

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for VCAS

15VII40

I am in full agreement with your proposal forbombing during the present moon-phase I do notunderstand however why we have not been able toobtain results in the Kiel Canal Nothing could be more


important than this as it prevents any movement ofprepared shipping and barges from the Baltic forinvasion purposes I heard that you had dropped anumber of bombs into this area but that they did nogood Let me know what you have done about it in thepast How many raids how many bombs what kind ofbombs and what is the explanation that the canal stillworks Can you make any plans for bettering results inthe 1 inure This is surely a matter of the very highestimportance and now is the time when it counts most


15VII40

Make sure that overhead cover against bombingattack is provided for the fourteen-inch gun A structureof steel girders should be put up to carry sandbag coversimilar to that over the six-inch guns which are mountedalong the coast All should be camouflaged You will betold that it will be necessary to change the guns afterone hundred and twenty rounds In that case thestructure will have to be taken to pieces and put upagain after the gun is changed There should be nodifficulty in this


17VI140

Press the War Office continually to develop theForeign Legion either by pioneer battalions orotherwise Let me have weekly reports


18VII40

I certainly do not propose to send a message by thesenior child to Mr Mackenzie King or by the junior childeither If I sent any message by anyone it would bethat I entirely deprecate any stampede from this countryat the present time5

(Action this day)



19VII40

I have noticed lately very many sentences imposedfor indiscretion by magistratesrsquo and other courtsthroughout the country in their execution of recentlegislation and regulation All these cases should bereviewed by the Home Office and His Majesty movedto remit the sentence where there was no malice orserious injury to the State By selecting some of thosecases which have recently figured in the public eyeand announcing remission publicly you would give thenecessary guidance without which it is difficult for localcourts to assess the lead and purpose of Parliament

Prime Minister to First Lordand First Sea Lord

20VII40

I have drawn attention to this danger before I do notthink Hood should be left lying in Gibraltar Harbour atthe mercy of a surprise bombardment by heavyhowitzers Both she and Ark Royal should go to sea fora cruise with or without Valiant and Resolution as maybe thought fit They could return to fuel or to carry outany operations provided the Spanish situation has notfurther deteriorated Pray let me have your proposals

Prime Minister to ForeignSecretary

20VII40

Donrsquot you think we might go very slow on all thisgeneral and equitable fair and honourable peacebusiness between China and Japan Chiang does notwant it none of the pro-Chinese want it and so far fromhelping us round the Burma Road difficulty it will onlymake it worse I am sure that it is not in our interest thatthe Japanese should be relieved of their preoccupationWould it not be a good thing to give it a miss for amonth or so and see what happens


20VII40


You may care to see this [letter from ColonelWedgwood on ldquoLondon Defencerdquo] The only scale ofattack which it seems to me need be contemplated forthe centre of Government is say five hundredparachutists or Fifth Columnists What is the presentplan and what is the scale against which it is beingprovided

You might do something for Jos He is a grand-hearted man

Prime Minister to Ministerwithout Portfolio

20VII40

I am rather doubtful from information which hasreached me whether our home timber resources arebeing adequately developed

This of course is primarily a matter for the Ministerof Supply who I know has made certain departmentaladjustments recently with this particular end in view


21VII40

Let me have a statement showing the scheme ofdefence for the Central Government Whitehall etcWhat was the scale of attack prescribed and who wasresponsible for taking the measures What was thereason for attempting to put an anti-tank obstacleacross St Jamesrsquos Park Who-ordered this Whenwas it counter-ordered


23VII40

I am told that the refuelling of fighter aeroplanescould be much more rapidly achieved if there weremore tankers on the aerodromes and considering thatan attack by air would make every minute gained inreturning the fighters to the air most precious I shouldbe glad if measures were taken at once to double it orgreatly increase the fuelling facilities



23VII40

I do not seem to have had any answer from you tomy query about whether the 2d Canadian Division andall it stands for is being frittered away in Iceland


23VII40

1 It is of course urgent and indispensable thatevery effort should be made to obtain secretly the bestpossible information about the German forces in thevarious countries overrun and to establish intimatecontacts with local people and to plant agents This Ihope is being done on the largest scale as opportunityserves by the new organisation under MEW None ofthis partakes of the nature of military operations

2 It would be most unwise to disturb the coasts ofany of these countries by the kind of silly fiascos whichwere perpetrated at Boulogne and Guernsey The ideaof working all these coasts up against us by pin-prickraids and fulsome communiques is one to be strictlyavoided

3 Sir Roger Keyes is now studying the wholesubject of medium raids ndash ie not less than five normore than ten thousand men Two or three of thesemight be brought off on the French coast during thewinter As soon as the invasion danger recedes or isresolved and Sir R Krsquos paper-work is done we willconsult together and set the Staffs to work upondetailed preparations After these medium raids havehad their chance there will be no objection to stirringup the French coast by minor forays

4 During the spring and summer of 1941 largearmoured irruptions must be contemplated Thematerial for these is however so far ahead of us thatonly very general study of their possibilities is nownecessary and no directions need be given to the Staffupon them until the end of August


Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for Chiefs of Staff

24VII40

Apart from the anti-Nazi Germans who can begin bybeing pioneers rifles and ammunition should be issuedto all foreign corps Whether this should be from BritishService rifles now in the possession of the HomeGuard but in process of being replaced by Americanrifles or whether the foreign corps6 should be armedwith American rifles direct has no doubt beenconsidered On the whole I am inclined to the formersolution It is most urgent to rearm the Poles and theFrench as we may need them for foreign service in thenear future The armament of these foreign corps ranksafter the armament of British troops so far as rifles areconcerned but they have priority over the Home GuardThey ought to have a small proportion of Bren gunsetc even at the expense of our own men What isbeing done to furnish them with artillery Surely someof the 75rsquos can be made to serve the purpose ThePolish unit should be ripened as much as possiblePray let me have a weekly report of numbers andweapons

(Action this day)Prime Minister to First LordFirst Sea Lord and VCNS

25VII40

I cannot help feeling that there is more in the plan oflaying mines behind an invaderrsquos landing than theNaval Staff felt when I mentioned the matter threeweeks ago In the interval I sent a reminder asking thatit should be further considered

If an invader lands during the night or morning theflotillas will attack him in rear during the day and theseflotillas will be heavily bombarded from the air as partof the air battles which will be going on If howeverwhen night falls a curtain or fender of mines can be laidclose inshore so as to cut off the landing-place fromreinforcements of any kind these mines once laid willnot have to be guarded from air attack and consequent-ly will relieve the flotilla from the need of coming back


on the second day thus avoiding losses from the airand air protection At any rate I think it improvident notto provide for the option whether to seal off the hostilelanding by attack of flotillas or mines There may beseveral landings and you may want to leave onesealed off with mines in order to attack another Ofcourse all the above would apply still more if thelanding had got hold of a port instead of merely abeach

Pray let this matter have further attention and alsosay what craft are available for the purpose or howsoon they can be provided or adapted

Prime Minister to VCNS 25VII40Let me have a report of how far the German Dutch

and Belgian harbours have been sealed up by mines orobstructions


26VII40

I saw Mr Quo yesterday at his request andexplained to him frankly the position about the BurmaRoad I told him verbally of the message I sent throughthe Foreign Office to Chiang Kai-shek He was naturallyanxious to extort some promise from me about whatwould happen when the three months had expired Isaid it all depended upon what the situation was thenand that I could make no forecast I assured him weshould put no pressure on General Chiang to consentto terms or negotiations against his will and policy MrQuo seemed fairly satisfied though rueful

Prime Minister to Chancellorof the Exchequer

28VII40

Now that the Rumanian Government are helpingthemselves to the property of British subjects ought wenot to show the Rumanians that we shall use theirfrozen fund to compensate our people I understandthat about six weeks ago you blocked Rumanian assets


in London We have been treated odiously by thesepeople

AUGUST

(Action this day)Prime Minister to First Lordand First Sea Lord

1VIII40

In view of the threatening attitude of Japan it isvitally important to know about Bismarck and TirpitzPray let me have your latest information It seems to methat a great effort will have to be made by the Air Forceto disable these ships as their apparition in the nextfew months would be most dangerous

2 Assuming Japan goes to war with us or forces usinto war I suppose you would send Hood three eight-inch-gun cruisers two Ramillies and twelve long-radiusdestroyers to Singapore

Let me have the legends [ie construction details]of the completed Japanese battle-cruisers


2VIII40

I pray that we may never have to make thiswidespread distribution but I am in full accord with theprinciples on which the Admiralty would propose tomeet the strain I should have thought that Hood wouldbe a greater deterrent than Renown Please let mehave a report of the possibility of air attack on Bismarckand Tirpitz This seems to me to be one of the mostvital steps to take Apart from this there is no need tomake any new dispositions at the present time onaccount of Japanese war-risk

I was much concerned to hear of the sinking of thethree tankers off Tory Island I should like to see youmove some destroyers from the East Coast thither Wehad better wait however until the August moon-phase


is over During this time also the American guns andrifles will be distributed to the troops

(Action this day)Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay

2VIII40

Next week one of my principal tasks must be goingthrough this scheme of the Air Ministry for increasingthe pilots and for the training of pilots Lord Beaver-brook should be asked for his views beforehand

2 Let me have a report on the plans for lectures ontactical subjects for the troops in the autumn

3 What has been done about the collection of scrapof all kinds Let mersquohave a short report on one pagecovering the progress made this year

4 When at the Admiralty f took a special interest inthe work of the Salvage Department and held ameeting there four months ago A naval officer CaptainDewar was then in charge Let me have a report onwhat has happened to salvage since that day

5 I am also expecting this week to reach asettlement about the functions of the ARP and policein the case of invasion The Lord Privy Seal wasdealing with this in the first instance At the same timewe must consider allowing transfers from ARP to theHome Guard and their being made available forfighting purposes To what extent has the payment ofthe ARP personnel been discontinued or restricted Itought to be continually restricted

6 Let me have a report on the progress and futureconstruction of the tank divisions There should be fivearmoured divisions by March 31 [1941] and two moreby the end of May Let me know how far the presentprospects of men and material allow of this Let meknow also what are the latest ideas for the structureand organisation of an armoured division This shouldbe prepared on one sheet of paper showing all theprincipal elements and accessories


2VIII40


It is very important to get on with the uniforms for theHome Guard Let me have a forecast of deliveries

(Action this day)Prime Minister to First Lord 2VIII40

My objection was to anything in the nature of sinkingat sight or sinking without due provision for the safety ofthe crews Provided this is excluded there can be noreason against sinking a captured ship if owing to airattack or other military reasons it is impossible to bringher into port as a prize The disadvantages of sinking aship and losing valuable tonnage are obvious and I donot see why in nineteen cases out of twenty theAdmiralty cannot put a prize crew on board and sendthe ship in in the ordinary way I see no objection tothe action taken in the Hermione case7 which fallsentirely within the general principles set forth above


2VIII40

The whole question of holidays and reduced hoursshould be considered by the Cabinet at an early date Itis far too soon to assume that the danger has passedIt is a great mistake to tell the workpeople that they aretired On the other hand certain easements areindispensable Please communicate with Mr BevinLord Beaverbrook and the Minister of Supply so thattheir views may be in readiness for Cabinet conversa-tion I should also like to know what is being doneabout holidays for the Civil Service and for Ministersand persons in high Service positions Something willhave to be done about this but we must be very carefulnot to be caught while in an August mood

Prime Minister to Lord PrivySeal and Home Secretary

3VIII40

The attached memorandum by Lord Mottistone onduties of police in the event of invasion raises a verydifficult question and one that must be speedily settledWe cannot surely make ourselves responsible for a


system where the police will prevent the people fromresisting the enemy and will lay down their arms andbecome the enemyrsquos servant in any invaded area Iconfess I do not see my way quite clearly to theamendments required in the regulations In principlehowever it would seem that the police should withdrawfrom any invaded area with the last of His Majestyrsquostroops This would also apply to the ARP and the firebrigades etc Their services will be used in otherdistricts Perhaps on invasion being declared thepolice ARP fire brigades etc should automaticallybecome a part of the military forces


3VIII40

All secret service reports about affairs in France orother captive countries are to be shown to MajorMorton who is responsible for keeping me informedMake sure this instruction is obeyed


3VIII40

It seems quite possible that a portion of General deGaullersquos forces will be used in the near future Ittherefore becomes of the utmost consequence andurgency to complete the equipment of his threebattalions company of tanks headquarters etcEvidently action is being taken already but I shall bemuch obliged if you will accelerate this action by everymeans in your power and also if you will let me know inwhat way the situation has improved since MajorMorionrsquos Minute of yesterday

Prime Minister to Sir EdwardBridges and othersconcerned

3VIII40

I think the circular about work in the factories andholidays for whole establishments should whatever theagreement of the Production Council be brought beforethe Cabinet on Tuesday by the Minister of Labour Wemust give holidays without creating a holiday


atmosphere It would therefore seem desirable toannounce only that ldquosuch local arrangements as arepossible are being made for staggered holidaysrdquo orsomething like that

2 I approve Sir Horace Wilsonrsquos letter to Depart-ments It arose out of my instructions to him

3 I shall be very glad if you will adjust the holidaysof Ministers and make sure that the Services arrangefor similar relief in case of high military officers at thecentre of Government

Prime Minister to Sir EBridges

4VIII40

I circulate to my colleagues the enclosed report onthe first use of the UP weapon with the wire curtain atDover This appears to be of high importance and maywell inaugurate a decisive change in the relations ofground and air particularly in respect of ships and portsexposed to dive-bombing attack


4VIII40

What are you doing to focus the discussions onfood shipping and agricultural policy for the secondtwelve months of the war I thought it looked like18000000 tons of shipping [for food] plough up1500000 more acres and instruct the Food Depart-ment to submit a plan both for increasing rations andbuilding up further food reserves This should bepossible on the above basis


4VIII40

The danger of Japanese hostility makes it all themore important that the German capital ships should beput out of action I understand that the Air Force intendto make heavy attacks on these ships as soon as thereis sufficient moon Scharnhorst and the Gneisenauboth in floating docks at Kiel the Bismarck at Hamburgand the Tirpitz at Wilhelm-shaven are all targets ofsupreme consequence Even a few monthsrsquo delay in


Bismarck will affect the whole balance of sea-power toa serious degree 1 shall be glad to hear from you


5VIII40

I am not satisfied with the volume or quality ofinformation received from the unoccupied area ofFrance We seem to be as much cut off from theseterritories as from Germany I do not wish such reportsas are received to be sifted and digested by the variousIntelligence authorities For the present Major Mortonwill inspect them for me and submit what he considersof major interest He is to see everything andsubmitauthentic documents for me in their original form

Further I await proposals for improving andextending our information about France and for keepinga continued flow of agents moving to and fro For thispurpose naval facilities can if necessary be invokedSo far as the Vichy Government is concerned it is notcreditable that we have so little information To whatextent are Americans Swiss and Spanish agentsbeing used


5VIII40

What orders are extant for the future production of UP multiple projectors in groups of twenties tens fivesand also single projectors

What amount of ammunition (a) of the ordinaryrocket (b) of the aerial mine (c) of the PE fuze (d) ofthe radio fuze is on order What are the forecasts ofdeliveries in the next six months in all cases

Presently the PE fuze will probably supersede theaerial mine for use in multiple projectors mounted on HM ships This will entail an alteration of the projectortubes The Admiralty should be asked to study thisbetimes so that the new tubes can be fitted on theexisting mountings of HM ships with the least possibledelay from the moment that this change appearsdesirable


The Admiralty should also be asked to reportwhether any progress has been made on firing shortaerial mines from shipsrsquo guns

I wish to refresh my memory with what happenedabout this before 1 left the Admiralty

Prime Minister to Minister ofMines

6VIII40

I saw it stated that you were piling up large reservesof coal during the summer for use during the winter Ishould be glad to know how far this very wiseprecaution has advanced We were very short andanxious in January last and I hope you are takingprecautions


7VIII40

Please let me know what is being done to train menin the use of the sticky bomb which is now beginning tocome through in quantity


9VIII40

Ask for a statement of the Ministry of Supplyimportation programme under various heads ProfessorLindemann should be consulted about these heads Letme see them

The programme for the second year of the war hasnot yet been presented to me in a coherent form

Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for War and CIGS

9VIII40

I was much concerned to find that the 1st Divisionwhich has an exceptionally high proportion ofequipment and includes a Brigade of Guards shouldbe dispersed along the beaches instead of being heldin reserve for counter-attack What is the number ofdivisions which are now free and out of the line andwhat is the argument for keeping divisions with a highequipment of guns etc on the beaches



9VIII40

If it came to a choice between hampering airproduction or tank production I would sacrifice thetank but 1 do not think this is the case as the points ofoverlap are not numerous and ought to be adjustable Igathered from you that you thought you could arrangewith the Minister of Supply

Prime Minister to Minister ofInformation

9VIII40

It is important to keep General de Gaulle active inFrench on the broadcast and to relay by every possiblemeans our French propaganda to Africa I am told theBelgians will help from the Congo

Have we any means of repeating to the WestAfrican stations the agreement made between us andde Gaulle


10VIII40

Let me have a weekly return of the deliveries totroops of the American 75rsquos and the 300 rifles to HomeGuard with consequent liberation by them of Lee-Metfords Begin at once


10VIII40

The Prime Minister would be glad to have a reportfrom the COS Committee after conference with theC-in-C Home Forces upon the small-arms ammunitionposition on the beaches and with the reserves


11VIII40

I felt sure you would take advantage of thebreakdown of the export market to increase our stocksall over the country I hope you will press on with this


especially as regards our essential gas water andelectricity works I note that the gas and electricitysupplies are about twenty per cent up we cannot gowrong in piling up such well-distributed stocks whichare sure to be used sooner or later

I am sending a note to the Minister of Transport tocall his attention to the position of the railways

The tremendous upset in your plans due to thecollapse of France and the loss of three-quarters of ourexport markets must have put a great strain on yourDepartment It must be very difficult after all your effortsto increase production to explain the sudden slump butI have no doubt the men will understand Indeed whatyou tell me about the fortitude of the Kent miners is anencouraging sign of the spirit which I believe informs allthe workingmen in the country


11VIII40

In view of certain activities we are planning forGeneral de Gaulle it is of the highest importance thatthe broadcasting of French news in North and WestAfrica should be carried to the highest point Pleasemake sure that the BBC conform to this requirementand let me have a report on Monday to the effect thatall is satisfactorily arranged

I cannot emphasise too strongly that you have fullauthority to make the BBC obey

(Action this day)Prime Minister to Minister ofTransport

11VIII40

I should be grateful for a full report on the stepstaken by your Department to deal with the difficultieswhich may arise from the bombing and closing of ports

One-quarter of our imports it seems normallycomes in through the port of London and one-fifththrough the Mersey with a tenth each throughSouthampton the Bristol Channel and the HumberWe must envisage these entrances being wholly orpartially closed either one at a time or even several at


a time but I have no doubt you have worked out plansto take account of the various contingencies

In view of our large accretions of shipping it maywell be that port facilities and roadway facilities may bea more stringent bottleneck than shortage of tonnageso that the preparations you make to meet the variouspossible eventualities may well be of the greatestimportance


12VIII40

How does the position now stand about a TimberController under the Ministry of Supply

Ask for a short summary from the Ministry of Supplyof the present timber position and policy

Prime Minister to Lord PrivySeal and CaptainMargesson

12VIII40

It would probably be convenient for me to make ageneral statement on the war covering the first yearand also the first quarter of the new Governmentbefore the House rises This would be expected and Isuppose Tuesday the 20th would be the best dayThis should of course be in public session Perhapsyou will let me know what you wish An announcementcould be made in good time this week

It would save me a lot of trouble if a record could betaken at the time so that the speech could be repeatedover the wireless in the evening or such parts of it asarc of general interest Can this be arranged without aresolution If not could a resolution be passed thisweek I do not think the House would object


12VIII40

The drafts [about instructions to police in case ofinvasion] submitted do not correspond with my view ofthe recent Cabinet decision We do not contemplate orencourage fighting by persons not in the armed forcesbut we do not forbid it The police and as soon as


possible the ARP Services are to be divided intocombatant and non-combatant armed and unarmedThe armed will co-operate actively in fighting with theHome Guard and Regulars in their neighbourhood andwill withdraw with them if necessary the unarmed willactively assist in the ldquostay putrdquo policy for civiliansShould they fall into an area effectively occupied by theenemy they may surrender and submit with the rest ofthe inhabitants but must not in those circumstancesgive any aid to the enemy in maintaining order or inany other way They may assist the civil population asfar as possible

Prime Minister to Minister ofTransport

13VIII40

I should be glad to know what stocks of coal arenow held by the railways and how they compare withthose normally held With the stoppage of our exporttrade to Europe there should be a great surplus justnow and no doubt you are taking advantage of this tofill up every available dump so that we shall have a well-distributed stock for the railways in case of anyinterruptions or even in case of another very hardwinter Negotiations about price should not be allowedto hold up the process of restocking If necessarysome form of arbitration will have to be employed tomake sure that the prices paid are fair


13VIII40

If owing to lack of equipment and other facilities itis necessary to limit the numbers of the active HomeGuard would it not be possible to recruit a HomeGuard Reserve members of which would for the timebeing be provided with no weapons and no uniformother than arm bands Their only duties would be toattend such courses of instruction as could beorganised locally in the use of simple weapons like theldquoMolotov cocktailrdquo and to report for orders in the eventof invasion


Unless some such step is taken those who arerefused enlistment will be bewildered and disappointedand one of the primary objects of the Home Guardwhich was to provide for the people as a whole anopportunity of helping to defend their homes will belost I am anxious to avoid the disappointment andfrustration which the stoppage of recruiting for theHome Guard is likely to cause to many people

Please let me know what you think of this proposal


19VIII40

Is it true that Admiral [John] Cunningham says thatthe only suitable day for ldquoMenacerdquo [Dakar] is September12 and that if this day is missed owing to storm noother days will be open till the 27th or 28th when tideand moon will again be satisfactory All this raises mostgrave questions The Admiral cannot take up a positionthat only in ideal conditions of tide and moon can theoperation be begun It has got to be begun as soon aspossible as long as conditions are practicable eventhough they be not the best People have to fight in waron all sorts of days and under all sorts of conditions Itwill be a great misfortune if there is any delay beyondthe 8th Pray report to me on this today


21VIII40

I am not convinced by these arguments about flame-throwers The question is one to be settled relatively toother forms of war effort The prospects of invasion arerapidly receding The likelihood in an invasion of acolumn of troops marching up the very defile in whichthese installations have been laid on appears remoteThe idea of setting up a Petroleum Warfare Executiveis a needless multiplication of our apparatus I have nodoubt whatever that the method would be very effectiveit ever the occasion arose but will it arise and in thiscase would it be at the point expected Troops do notmarch along roads without having first cleared their way


by small parties and guarded their flanks on each sideof defiles

Prime Minister to First Lord 22VIII40I await your proposals about the resumption of the

capital ship programme which was approved by thelate Cabinet on my initiative This cannot be settledapart from the general demand upon steel and labourbut in principle I favour its resumption

I hope opportunity will now be taken to repair thedisastrous neglect to convert the Royal Sovereign classinto properly armoured and bulged bombarding vesselswith heavy deck armour These will be needed nextyear for the attack on Italy It is lamentable that wehave not got them now They should certainly takeprecedence over the resumption of battleshipconstruction


24VIII40

Report to me on the position of Major Jefferis Bywhom is he employed Who is he under I regard thisofficer as a singularly capable and forceful man whoshould be brought forward to a higher position He-ought certainly to be promoted Lieutenant-Colonel as itwill give him more authority

Prime Minister to CASand VCAS

24VIII40

It is of high importance to increase both the numberof squadrons and the number of aircraft and crewsimmediately available After a year of war we have onlyoperationally fit about 1750 of which again only three-quarters are immediately available You cannot restsatisfied with this which is less than the number wewere supposed to have available before the war


25VIII40


I have read with interest your memorandum on portclearance

I note that the Minister of Shipping doubts whetherthe country could be supplied through the west coastports on the scale you envisage I should be glad tohave your views on this

Does not the widespread dislocation caused by thecold spell last winter raise some doubts as to the readyadaptability of the railway system in case of suddenemergency

No doubt arrangements have been made for theimportation of oil which is not included in the food orsupply programme It appears that over two-fifths of ouroil imports come through London and Southampton inpeace-time Our stocks are high but if road transporthad to be used more fully to relieve the railways ourconsumption would of course increase

I presume that you have discussed their importprogrammes with the Ministers of Food and of Supplyso that alternative schemes will be ready in case ofgreat diversions


25VIII40

I have been following with much interest the growthand development of the new guerrilla formations of theHome Guard known as ldquoAuxiliary Unitsrdquo

From what I hear these units are being organisedwith thoroughness and imagination and should in theevent of invasion prove a useful addition to the Regularforces

Perhaps you will keep me informed of progress


25VIII40

The enclosed returns show losses of over fortythousand tons reported in a single day I regard thismatter as so serious as to require special considerationby the War Cabinet Will you therefore have prepareda statement showing the recent losses their cause themeasures which have been taken by the Admiralty to


cope with the danger any further measures which youfeel it necessary to propose and whether there is anyway in which the War Cabinet can assist the Admiralty

I should be glad if you would make this report to theWar Cabinet on Thursday next


25VIII40

Address the War Office forthwith upon the situationdisclosed at Slough Point out the danger of this largeconcentration of vehicles the desirability of dispersingand concealing the vehicles Ask that a plan should beexamined for decentralising this depot as far aspossible We should also make sure that no sedimentor surplus accumulates in the depot It would be a greatpity if a thousand valuable vehicles were ruined by anair attack


25VIII40

I visted Kenley [Air Station] on Thursday saw thegunner in question and had a rocket fired off Moreoverit was the Admiralty Committee over which I presidedearly in the year which produced the idea of usingthese distress rockets I am therefore well acquaintedwith the subject The Air Ministry not for the first timespread itself into very large demands and using itspriority barged in heavily into other forms of not lessimportant production I agree that PAC8 rockets maybe a good interim defence against low-flying attack butthey have to take their place in the general scheme Ithought myself about five thousand a month would besufficient but I am willing to agree to fifteen hundred aweek or six thousand a month This figure could besomewhat extended if the wire-recovery projects youmention were further developed and proved aneffective economy

(Action this day)



25VIII40

War Office have accepted from the War Cabinet theresponsibility of dealing with delayed-action bombsThis may become a feature of the enemy attack Anumber were thrown last night into the City causingobstruction They may even try them on Whitehall Itseems to me that energetic effort should be made toprovide sufficient squads to deal with this form of attackin the large centres The squads must be highly mobileso as not to waste men and material They must movein motor lorries quickly from one point to another Ipresume a careful system of reporting all unexplodedbombs and the time at which they fell is in operationand that this information will be sent immediately to thedelayed-action section of Home Defence which has nodoubt already been established and also the variouslocal branches The service which is highly dangerousmust be considered particularly honourable andrewards should follow its successful discharge

I should be very glad to see your plans for the newsection together with numbers and it will also beinteresting to have a short account of the work done upto date and the methods employed I presume you arein touch with all the scientific authorities you need

On the other hand I am asking the Air Ministry forinformation as to their reciprocating this process on theenemy

(General Ismay to see)

(Action this day)Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for War

25VIII40

I cannot feel you are justified in maintaining thepresent scale of communication squadrons when weare fighting so heavily The sole end should surely be toincrease the reserve and operational strength of ourfighting squadrons and to meet the problem of traineraircraft Surely your dominant idea should be ldquoStrengthfor battlerdquo Everything should be keyed onto this andadministrative convenience or local vested interests


must be made to give way In your place I should comband recomb I have been shocked to see the enormousnumbers at Mention and I would far rather give upflying on inspections altogether for members of theGovernment than that this should be made a reason forkeeping these forces out of the fight

I should have thought that Hendon could provide atleast two good squadrons of fighter or bomber aircraftof the reserve category and that they should have themachines issued to them and practise on them asoccasion serves Then they could be thrown in when anemergency came

Ought you not every day to call in question in yourown mind every non-military aspect of the Air ForceThe tendency of every Station Commander is naturallyto keep as much in his hands as possible The Admiralsdo exactly the same Even when you have had athorough search if you look around a few weeks lateryou will see more fat lias been gathered

I hope you will feel able to give some considerationto these views of your old friend


27V1II40

Will you kindly send the following to AdmiralCunningham Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean

Following from Prime Minister Minister of DefencersquoMain object of directive was to safeguard Alexan-

dria Only a limited number of troops can be maintainedMersa Matruh as GOC Middle East will inform youEvery effort is to be made to defend this position Ifhowever it and intermediate positions are forced orturned it will be necessary to hold the line fromAlexandria southward along the cultivated area [of theDelta] Air attack on the Fleet at Alexandria is notnecessarily less effective from one hundred and twentymiles distance than from twenty miles since aeroplanesoften fly at three hundred miles per hour and haveample endurance In practice it is usually thought betterto hold aerodromes a little back of the actual fightingline They do not move forward concurrently with the


fronts of armies Everyone here understands thegrievous consequence of the fall of Alexandria and thatit would probably entail the Fleet leaving the Mediter-ranean If however you have any helpful suggestion tomake for the more effective defence of Mersa Matruh orof any positions in advance of it I should be obliged ifyou would tell me

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for Joint PlanningStaff

28VIII40

Now that the long nights are approaching thequestion of the blackout must be reviewed I am infavour of a policy not of black-out but of blnckable-outFor this purpose a considerable system of auxiliaryelectric street-lighting must be worked out The wholeof the centre of London now lighted by incandescentgas must be given priority The best methods in thecentres of other great cities must also be studied andlocal schemes must be examined Thus the lights canbe switched down and up and finally out on an air-raidwarning being given The lights themselves should notbe of a too brilliant character The subdued lighting ofshop windows must also be studied with a view toextending the facilities given last Christmas on apermanent basis Where factories are allowed tocontinue working at night in spite of the black-out therecan be no objection to extending blackable-out lightingto the surrounding districts thus tending to make thetarget less defined Consideration should also be givento decoy lighting and battle lighting in open spaces atsuitable distances from vulnerable points

Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for Air CAS andGeneral Ismay

29VIII40

I was much concerned on visiting MansionAerodrome yesterday to find that although more thanfour clear days have passed since it was last raidedthe greater part of the craters on the landing groundremained unfilled and the aerodrome was barely


serviceable When you remember what the Germansdid at the Stavanger aerodrome and the enormousrapidity with which craters were filled I must protestemphatically against this feeble method of repairingdamage Altogether there were a hundred and fiftypeople available to work including those that could beprovided from the Air Force personnel These weredoing their best No effective appliances were availableand the whole process appeared disproportionate tothe value of maintaining this fighting vantage-ground

All craters should be filled in within twenty-four hoursat most and every case where a crater is unfilled for alonger period should be reported to higher authoritiesIn order to secure this better service it will benecessary to form some crater-filling companies Youmight begin with say two of two hundred and fifty eachfor the South of England which is under this intensiveattack These companies should be equipped with allhelpful appliances and be highly mobile so that in afew hours they can be at work on any site which hasbeen cratered Meanwhile at every aerodrome in theattack area and later elsewhere there must beaccumulated by local contractors stocks of gravelrubble and other appropriate materials sufficient to fillwithout replenishment at least a hundred craters Thusthe mobile air-field repair companies would arrive tofind all the material all ready on the spot

I saw some time ago that the Germans filled in theshell holes by some process of having the gravel inwooden frameworks The VCNS drew my attention toit during the Norwegian operation and he couldperhaps put you on to the telegram referred to

In what Department of the Air Ministry does thisprocess now fall

After the craters had been refilled camouflage effortmight be made to pretend they had not been but this isa refinement


30VIII40


For all Departments concerned including ServiceDepartment Home Security MAP and Supply)

We must expect that many windows will be brokenin the bombing raids and during the winter glass maybecome scarce with serious resultant damage tobuildings if not replaced

The utmost economy is to be practised in the use ofglass Where windows are broken they should ifpossible be boarded up except for one or two panesWe cannot afford the full-sized windows in glass Allglass not needed for hothouses should be stored if thehothouses are empty I saw at Mansion a largehothouse with a great quantity of glass enough wasbroken to make it useless and I directed that the restshould be carefully stored

What is the condition of glass supply It would seemnecessary to press the manufacturers

Government buildings should all be fitted withemergency windows containing only one or two glasspanes which when the existing framework is blown incan be substituted Let me have a full report on theposition


30VIII40

If French India wish for trade they should be madeto signify association with General de GaulleOtherwise no trade This is not a matter upon which tobe easy-going Secretary of State for India to beinformed

The accession of any French possessions now is ofimportance


31VIII40

I have not approved of any further cruiser tanksbeing despatched to the Middle East beyond thosewhich have already gone Although in principle it isdesirable to complete the despatch of a full armoureddivision further movements from this country can onlybe decided in relation to situation of home forces No


decision of this importance must be taken withoutreference to me and in this case I should have toconsult the Cabinet


31VIII40

I am very glad to know that the [chemical warfare]stocks are piling up in this country Let me know whatthe total now amounts to The necessary containersshould be brought level with supply Do these stockskeep Press on

SEPTEMBER

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for COS Committee

1IX40

Of course if the glider scheme is better than --parachutes we should pursue it but is it beingseriously taken up Are we not in danger of beingfobbed off with one doubtful and experimental policyand losing the other which has already been provedLet me have a full report of what has been done aboutthe gliders


1IX40

I am deeply concerned at your news that you cannotattack these batteries of German long-range guns untilthe 16th You are allowing an artillery concentration tobe developed day after day which presently will forbidthe entry of all British ships into the Straits of Doverand will prepare the way for an attack on Dover itselfPray let me know what you propose to do about this

Surely while the big guns are actually being hoistedinto position and cannot fire back is the time for actionThe general weakness of the defences of Dover itself inheavy guns is also a matter of great seriousness Wemust not simply look at dangers piling up without anyattempt to forestall them Erebus will have to face


double the fire on the 16th that she or any other shipwould have to face in the next week

I remember well that it was customary to bombardthe Knocke and other German batteries on the Belgiancoast very frequently during the late war It waspossible to fire most accurately by night after a buoyhad been fixed and sound-ranging used I ask forproposals for action this week Look at the photographsattached


1IX40

I presume you will be thinking about what is tohappen should ldquoMenacerdquo succeed with little or nobloodshed It would seem that as soon as de Gaullehas established himself there and in the place a little tothe north he should try to get a footing in Morocco andour ships and troops could be used to repeat theprocess of ldquoMenacerdquo if it has been found to workimmediately and in a more important theatre Thisoperation may be called ldquoThreatrdquo

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for War

1IX40

I should be glad to have a full report of thearrangements being made to provide educational andrecreational facilities for the troops during the comingwinter Who will be responsible for this importantbranch of work

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for India

1IX40

1 I am sorry to say that I cannot see my way todiverting aeroplanes or AA guns from the battle nowraging here for the defence of India which is in no waypressing neither is it possible to divert Americansupplies for the building of an aircraft industry in IndiaWe are already running risks which many mightquestion in the reinforcement and re-equipment of theMiddle East and when the battle at home dies down


this theatre will absorb all our surplus for a long time tocome

2 It is very important that India should be a help andnot on the balance a burden at the present time Thedebit balance is heavy when you consider the numberof British troops and batteries locked up there and thevery exiguous Indian forces which after a year of warhave reached the field I am glad you are makingincreased efforts to form Indian divisions for the verylarge important operations which seem likely to developin the Middle East in 1941

Prime Minister to First LordFirst Sea Lord and Controller

5IX40

I continue to be extremely anxious for King GeorgeV to get away to the north It would be disastrous ifBismarck were finished and something happened toKing George V Surely the electricians etc can gonorth in her and finish up at Scapa It would be mostpainful if you lost this ship now after all these longvexatious delays just at the moment when she isfinished and most needed The Tyne is very ill-defended compared to Scapa

(Action this day)Prime Minister to ForeignSecretary

5IX40

Would it not be well to send a telegram to LordLothian expressing War Cabinet approval of themanner in which he handled the whole destroyerquestion and paying him a compliment

At the same time what is being done about gettingour twenty motor torpedo-boats the five PBY [Flying-boats] the hundred and fifty to two hundred aircraftand the two hundred and fifty thousand rifles alsoanything else that is going I consider we werepromised all the above and more too Not an hourshould be lost in raising these questions ldquoBeg while theiron is hotrdquo


(Action this day)Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for War and CIGS

8IX40

I am very pleased with this telegram [about theCavalry Division in Palestine] It has been heartbreak-ing to me to watch these splendid units fooled away fora whole year The sooner they form machine-gunbattalions which can subsequently be converted intomotor battalions and finally into armoured units thebetter Please let nothing stand in the way It is aninsult to the Scots Greys and Household Cavalry totether them to horses at the present time There mightbe something to be said for a few battalions of infantryor cavalrymen mounted on ponies for the rocky hills ofPalestine but these historic Regular regiments have aright to play a manrsquos part in the war I hope I may seeyour telegram approving this course before it goes

Prime Minister to First Lord 9IX40I have read your papers on the new programme I

understand you are going to redraft your Memorandumafter reading the one 1 presented to the Cabinet inMarch I am not content at all with the refusal toreconstruct the Royal Sovereign class9 I think theseshould have precedence over all battleships exceptthose which can finish by the end of 1942 This wouldmean that you could get on with the Howe the positionof the other five capital ships being considered nextyear when the time for presenting the navy estimatescomes I see no reason why work should not proceedon the aircraft-carrier Indefatigable and on the eightsuspended cruisers I am quite ready to approve therefilling of all slips vacated by anti-submarine craftprovided that a maximum limit of fifteen months isassigned to the completion of all new craft All verylarge-size destroyers taking over this period to buildmust be excluded from the emergency wartimeprogramme


After your final proposals are ready we can have aconference


9IX40

1 The prime defence of Singapore is the Fleet Theprotective effect of the Fleet is exercised to a largeextent whether it is on the spot or not For instance thepresent Middle Eastern Fleet which we have justpower fully reinforced could in a very short time ifordered reach Singapore It could if necessary fightan action before reaching Singapore because it wouldfind in that fortress fuel ammunition and repairfacilities The fact that the Japanese had made landingsin Malaya and had even begun the siege of the fortresswould not deprive a superior relieving fleet of its powerOn the contrary the plight of the besiegers cut off fromhome while installing themselves in the swamps andjungle would be all the more forlorn

2 The defence of Singapore must therefore bebased upon a strong local garrison and the generalpotentialities of sea-power The idea of trying to defendthe Malay peninsula and of holding the whole ofMalaya a large country four hundred by two hundredmiles at its widest part cannot be entertained A singledivision however well supplied with signals etc couldmake no impression upon such a task What could asingle division do for the defence of a country nearly aslarge as England

3 The danger of a rupture with Japan is no worsethan it was The probabilities of the Japaneseundertaking an attack upon Singapore which wouldinvolve so large a proportion of their Fleet far outsidethe Yellow Sea are remote in fact nothing could bemore foolish from their point of view Far more attractiveto them are the Dutch East Indies The presence of theUnited States Fleet in the Pacific must always be amain preoccupation to Japan They are not at all likelyto gamble They are usually most cautious and nowhave real need to be since they are involved in Chinaso deeply


4 I should have preferred the Australian Brigade togo to India rather than Malaya but only because theirtraining in India will fit them more readily for the MiddleEast I am delighted to know they can be trained in theMiddle East

5 I do not therefore consider that the politicalsituation is such as to require the withholding of the 7thAustralian Division from its best station strategically andadministratively A telegram should be drafted to theCommonwealth Government in this sense

Prime Minister to the Mayorof Tel Aviv Palestine

15IX40

Please accept my deep sympathy in lossessustained by Tel Aviv in recent air attack This act ofsenseless brutality will only strengthen our unitedresolve

Prime Minister to First Lord 15IX40l Your new programme I am very doubtful whether

the Japanese figures are correct The Naval Intelli-gence Branch are very much inclined to exaggerateJapanese strength and efficiency I am not howeveropposed to the resumption of the battleship pro-gramme provided it can be fitted in with moreimmediate wartime needs Much of the battleship plantand labour would not be useful for other purposes Praylet me have a paper showing the demands these shipswould make in each year they are under constructionin money steel and labour Every effort must beconcentrated uponHowe

2 I should be content if two R [Royal Sovereign]class vessels were taken in hand as soon as theinvasion situation has cleared and we get King GeorgeV in commission Meanwhile material can be collectedand preparations made This should enable them to beready in eighteen months from now ndash ie the summerof 1942

3 You should press on with Indefatigable but weneed not consider an additional aircraft-carrier until


early next year The drawings can however becompleted

4 I suppose you realise that the Belfast type takeover three years to build Considering a largeprogramme of cruisers is already under construction Ihope you will not press for these four to be added tothe programme of this year

5 I am all for building destroyers and I do not mindhow large they are or how great their enduranceprovided that they can be constructed in fifteen monthsThis should be taken as the absolute limit to whicheverything else must be made to conform We weremaking destroyers which took three years to buildeveryone thinking himself very clever in adding oneimprovement after another I should like to discuss thedestroyer designs with the Controller and the Directorof Naval Construction They must be built only for thiswar and have good protection from aircraft Extremespeed is not so important What you say about the U-boats working continually farther west is no doubt truebut the corvettes formerly called whalers have veryfine endurance and range

6 The submarine programme is already very largeand makes inroads on other forms of war requirementsI think you would be wise to re-examine the demand forthe fourteen additional to the twenty-four to which theTreasury have agreed

7 Great efforts should be made to produce thelanding-craft as soon as possible Are the JointPlanning Committee satisfied that these numbers aresufficient

8 I am surprised you ask for only fifty anti-E-boatsUnless this is the utmost limit of your capacity onehundred would be more appropriate

9 Speaking generally the speed of construction andearly dates of completion must at this time beconsidered the greatest virtues in new building It is nouse crowding up the order books of firms and filling theyards with shipping orders which everyone knowscannot be completed You have I presume consultedSir James Lithgow about this programme and haveheard his views upon the consequences it will have


upon merchant-shipping building and our alreadyreduced steel output It is very wrong to trench toodeeply upon the needs of other services in time of war

10 What has happened to the armoured torpedoram which I asked the DNC to design

Prime Minister to ColonelJacob

15IX40

More than a year ago it was considered possiblethat we should soon be able to develop Radar inlandSince then however we have relied entirely on theObserver Corps These have done splendid work butin cloudy weather like yesterday and today they havethe greatest difficulty in functioning accurately If wecould have even half a dozen stations which could workinland I am assured that very great advantages wouldbe reaped in interception This is especially importantover the Sheerness-Isle of Wight promontory which islikely to be the main line of air attack on London I amtold that there are duplicate installations already atsome of the stations on this sector of the coast as aninsurance against bombing These might be turnedround and put in action In other cases new stationscould be made I regard this matter as of the highesturgency

2 Tomorrow Monday Air Marshal Joubert de laFerteacute will assemble all necessary scientific authoritiesand make a report that day to me on (a) the desirabilityof the above (b) its practicability and the time it will laketo get even a few stations into action He should makeproposals for putting into service at the earliest momentsix or twelve stations and for rebuilding their reserves

3 Should a feasible scheme emerge I will myselfbring it before the Minister of Aircraft Production

Prime Minister to GeneralSikorski

17IX40

I deeply appreciated your telegram of September 14conveying the relief felt by the Polish Government thePolish armed forces and the Polish people at thefortunate escape of the King and Queen from the


recent German bombing of Buckingham Palace AsTheir Majesties stated these dastardly attacks haveonly strengthened the resolution of all of us to fightthrough to final victory


18IX40

The enemy will try by magnetic mines and otherdevices to smash as much glass as possible and thewinter is coining on We must immediately revert tomore primitive conditions in regard to daylight indwellings All glass in the country should be held andevery effort made to increase the supply Everyoneshould be encouraged or pressed to reduce window-glass to at least one-quarter of its present compasskeeping the rest as spare Windows should be filled asmay be most convenient with plywood or other fabricand the spare panes kept to replace breakages to bepreserved The quicker this can be done in the targetcentres the better Will you convene a meeting of thedepartments concerned and reach decisions for actionof a violent character and on the broadest lines invitingme to assist you in suppressing obstruction


19IX40

I sent you a Minute on this subject last night andyou were going to look into it for me

How many square feet of glass have beendestroyed up to date Can any estimate be formed Itof course our monthly production is ahead of thedamage there is no need to worry

Let me have the best estimate possible

Prime Minister to Postmaster-General

19IX40

There are considerable complaints about the PostOffice service during air raids Perhaps you will give mea report on what you are doing


Prime Minister to CIGS 21IX40I understood that all brigades from India consisted of

one British and three Indian battalions which would bethe normal and desirable formation But this telegramseems to suggest that Indian brigades have only Indiantroops H so the change made by C-in-C Middle Eastis most desirable

Prime Minister to First SeaLord and Controller

21IX40

How is the expenditure of naval ammunitionproceeding in the Middle East as well as in the NorthSea and Channel Let me know of any weak points inthe supplies which are emerging Have you got over thedifficulty of the 47 ammunition Let me have a shortnote


21IX40

Pray have a look at the Air Ministry communiqueissued in this morningrsquos papers It includes thefollowing ldquoThe enemy formations were engaged by ourfighters but cloud conditions made interception difficultReports so far received show that four enemy aircraftwere shot down Seven of our fighters have been lostthe pilots of three being saferdquo It is very unwise to let theGermans know that their new tactics have beensuccessful and that they resulted in our losing sevenfighters as against tour

We do not of course want to conceal our losses atthe present time when we are prospering but surelythere is no need to relate them to any particular action


22IX40

Make sure through every channel that all arrange-ments are made to bring these rifles [from USA] overat full speed They must be distributed in at least fourfast ships Could not some of them come by passengerliner Let me know what Admiralty can do Make sure


there is no delay at Purcorsquos [Purchasing Commission]end through repacking as described by General StrongUSA


22IX40

I asked Lord Lothian to speak to you about ourremaining desiderata The 250000 rifles are mosturgently needed as I have 250000 trained anduniformed men into whose hands they can be put Ishould be most grateful if you could arrange thenecessary release Every arrangement will be made totransport them with the utmost speed They will enableus to take 250000 303 rifles from the Home Guardand transfer them to the Regular Army leaving theHome Guard armed with about 800000 Americanrifles Even if no ammunition is available these rifleswill be none the less useful as they can draw upon thestock which has already reached us

Prime Minister to General deGaulle

22IX40

From every quarter the presence of General Catrouxwas demanded in Syria I therefore took the responsibili-ty in your name of inviting the General to go there It isof course perfectly understood that he holds hisposition only from you and I shall make this clear tohim again Sometimes one has to take decisions on thespot because of their urgency and difficulty ofexplaining to others at a distance There is time to stophim still if you desire it but I should consider this was avery unreasonable act

All good fortune in your enterprise tomorrow morning


23IX40

I regard the production of GL sets10 as of primeimportance and every step should be taken toaccelerate output I understand that the chief difficultyat the moment is that of obtaining the skilled labour


required and I wish everything possible to be done tomeet this requirement Speed is vital

Action this day) PrimeMinister to Secretary of Statefor War and CIGS

23IX40

There is not much in the report referred to and whatthere is applies equally to the Soudan We are piling uptroops and artillery in Kenya which are urgently neededin the Soudan

With regard to what you say about the vaststrategical front of the Kenya operation if we lie backon the broad-gauge railway from Mombasa to the lakewe have a lateral line of communication incomparablysuperior to any line by which we can be approachedand it should be possible to move our forces so as tohave sudden superior strength at the point where theenemy advance develops Although no one can say forcertain where the enemyrsquos blow will fall I am convincedthat the true disposition would economise [troops] tothe utmost in Kenya in order to reinforce the SoudanThe one concession which is needed for Kenya isabout ten cruiser tanks If these were put on suitablevehicles on the railway they could strike with deadlyeffect and with surprise at any Italian movement Butthe mere piling-up of guns and brigades is a mostpainful process to watch

In order to raise these points I must ask that themove of the mountain battery from Aden to Kenya shallbe held up and that instead the question of moving it oranother battery to the Soudan shall be consideredPlease let me have a statement showing ration riflemachine-gun and artillery strength of all troops inKenya

Prime Minister to Captain HM Destroyer ldquoChurchillrdquo

25IX40

Am delighted that your ship should be named afterthe great Duke of Marlborough and I am sending you


one of his handwritten letters for your Ward Room forluck Thank you so much for your kind message


25IX40

Lord Lothianrsquos proposal to return for a flying visitappeals to me Pray authorise it and arrange it as youthink most serviceable and convenient


26IX40

If these facts [about the use of the blind beam forbombing] are accurate they constitute a deadly dangerand one of the first magnitude I expect the Chiefs ofthe Staff to use all the resources at their disposal and togive me a report by tomorrow night (a) upon the realityof the danger (b) upon the measures to counter it Inmaking any recommendation for action the Chiefs ofthe Staff may be sure that the highest priorities and allother resources will be at their disposal


26IX40

The composition hat for air raids which Mr Bevin ispromoting seems to me of the utmost importance andif it gives a measure of protection against fallingsplinters etc it should certainly be mass-produced ona great scale and eventually made a full issue

Pray let me have a report today on the experimentalaspect and in conjunction with the Minister of Supplylet me have estimates for production

Prime Minister to Minister ofLabour

26IX40

I was delighted with your hat and something onthese lines should certainly be mass-produced as soonas possible for issue pending steel hats I think it is amistake to call it a ldquorag hatrdquo as I see is done in some ofthe papers today I hope you will think of some bettername


I am calling for a full report today from the HomeSecretary


26IX40

Considering that everything depends upon LordBeaverbrookrsquos success in obtaining the supply ofaircraft and the heavy blows he is receiving at BristolSouthampton and elsewhere I earnestly trust you willsee that his wishes are met fully and immediately in thematter of these spares

Prime Minister to Minister ofAgriculture

26IX40

I am far from satisfied at the proposal to reduce pigsto one-third of their present number by the middle of theautumn This is certainly not what was understood bythe Cabinet Why do you not ask for a greaterproportion of feeding-stuffs in the imports We couldthen see what if anything had to give way to itMeanwhile what arrangements are you making forcuring the surplus bacon that will come upon themarket through the massacre of pigs What increaseshave you been able to establish in the pig population byencouraging people to feed individual pigs fromhousehold refuse


28IX40

Recent air raids have shown that the production ofcertain vital munitions and particularly De Wildeammunition has been concentrated in one factory withthe result that output has been seriously curtailed byone successful raid Pray let me have a report on thedistribution of the production of every important keymunition It will then be possible to assess the dangerof serious reductions in output and to consider whatcan be done to distribute the risk more widely



28IX40

1 These two papers [about the supply of materialfor chemical warfare] cause me great anxiety I hadunderstood that Randle [factory] had been working atfull capacity as a result of the orders given by the WarCabinet on October 13 1939 ndash ie almost exactly ayear -ago What is the explanation of the neglect to fulfilthese orders and who is responsible for it

2 Secondly it appears that practically no stepshave been taken to make projectiles or containerseither for air or artillery to discharge these various formsof gas The programme now set out would clearly takemany months before any results are realised Let mehave an immediate report on this The highest prioritymust be given I regard the danger as very great

3 Thirdly the possibility of our having to retaliate onthe German civil population must be studied and onthe largest scale possible We should never begin butwe must be able to reply Speed is vital here

4 Fourthly instant measures should be taken toraise Randle to full production and above all todisperse the existing stock

5 What are the actual amounts in stock


29IX40

These figures [about AA fire first year of war] areencouraging You should ask General Pile however tosend in the account for September

I should like to see a return of the ammunition firedevery twenty-four hours during September as soon aspossible

(Action this day)Prime Minister to Minister ofSupply and President of theBoard of Trade

30IX40

I am sure we ought to increase our steel purchasesfrom the United States so as to save tonnage on ore 1


should like to buy another couple of million tons invarious stages of manufacture Then we should be ableto resume the plan of the Anderson shelters andvarious other steel requirements which press upon us1 would if necessary telegraph to the President

OCTOBER


4X40

This shows the very serious misconception whichhas grown up in this Ambassadorrsquos mind about theconsequences of the United States entering the warHe should surely be told forthwith that the entry of theUnited States into war either with Germany and Italy orwith Japan is fully conformable with British interests

2 That nothing in the munitions sphere cancompare with the importance of the British Empire andthe United States being co-belligerents That if Japanattacked the United States without declaring war on uswe should at once range ourselves at the side of theUnited States and declare war upon Japan

It is astonishing how this misleading Kennedy11stud that we should do better with a neutral UnitedStates than with her warring at our side should havetravelled so far A clear directive is required to all ourAmbassadors in countries concerned


9X40

hellip Anyone can see that aircraft are needed in theMiddle East What is not so easy is whether they canbe spared here Remember that we are still vastlyinferior in numbers both of fighters and bombers to theGerman air forces and that heavy losses have beensustained by our air production The Chief of the AirStaff and Secretary of State must be asked for aprecise recommendation



10X40

I have received your telegram with great pleasureand I send my best wishes to you and to all otherFrenchmen who are resolved to fight on with us Weshall stand resolutely together until all obstacles havebeen overcome and we share in the triumph of ourcause


12X40

This development of Radar with German long-rangecoastal batteries is serious We have for a long timebeen on the track of this device and I drew attention toit some weeks ago I was then told that it had to have alow priority because of other even more urgent needsPerhaps it may now be possible to bring it forwardEvidently it will turn night into day so far as defenceagainst sea bombardment is concerned

Pray see if some proposals can be made withoutinjury to other radio projects

Prime Minister to CIGS 13X40There are great disadvantages in stationing many

British troops on the West African coast In view of thealtered situation pray consider bringing one of theWest African brigades back from Kenya by one of theconvoys returning empty This should not add in anyway to shipping burdens

Prime Minister to Sir JamesGrigg

13X40

A hot discussion is raging in the ATS aboutwhether members who marry should if they wish beallowed to quit Nearly everyone is in favour of this Itseems futile to forbid them and if they desert there isno means of punishing them Only the most honourableare therefore impeded Pray let me have on one sheetof paper a note on this showing the pros and cons



14X40

Let a report be prepared on two sheets only showingwhat are the possibilities of Germany developing themunitions industries especially aircraft of the countriesshe has overrun and when these evil effects are likelyto become manifest

Prime Minister to First Lord 15X40

If you wish to circulate the Naval Staff paper12 ofOctober 13 which I have now read I do not demur Itis of course a most pessimistic and nervous paperwhich it is very depressing to receive from theAdmiralty Instances of the overdrawn character of thepaper are found in paragraph 3 which claims that wemust maintain ldquogeneral control in every seardquo whereaseffective power of passage is all we require in manycases And in paragraph 5 ldquoGerman strength in whichfrom now onward [October 15] must be counted theTirpitz and the Bismarckrdquo This is not true as even theBismarck has I suppose to work up like the KingGeorge V which should be ready as soon or earlierThe Tirpitz is three months behind the Bismarckaccording to every statement I have received and it ishoped by that time we shall have the Prince of Walesand Queen Elizabeth If such statements are made tothe Cabinet I should be forced to challenge them

2 The whole argument is meant to lead up to theidea that we must submit to the wishes of Vichybecause they have the power to drive us out ofGibraltar by bombing I fully share the desire of theNaval Staff not to be molested in Gibraltar but I do notthink that the enforcement of the blockade will lead theFrench to do this still less to declare war upon us I donot believe the Vichy Government has the power towage war against us as the whole French nation iscoming more and more onto our side I have dealt withthis in a Minute on general policy which is beingcirculated and of which I enclose you the relevantextract


3 The redeeming point in this paper is thesuggestion that we should tell the Vichy Governmentthat if they bomb Gibraltar we shall retaliate not againstsay Casablanca but Vichy to which I would add orany other place occupied by the Vichy GovernmentThis is the proper note to strike and it is also importantto bear in mind that while humbleness to Vichy will notnecessarily prevent them being ordered to make warupon us by their German masters a firm attitude willnot necessarily deter them from coming over to our side

These questions are not urgent because of thefailure to intercept Primaguet13

Prime Minister to CAS 18X40What arrangements have we got for blind landings

for aircraft How many aircraft are so fitted It ought tobe possible to guide them down quite safely ascommercial craft were done before the war in spite offog Let me have full particulars The accidents lastnight are very serious

Prime Minister to CIGS 19X40I was very much pleased last week when you told

me you proposed to give an armoured division to Major-General Hobart14 I think very highly of this officer andI am not at all impressed by the prejudices against himin certain quarters Such prejudices attach frequently topersons of strong personality and original view In thiscase General Hobartrsquos original views have been onlytoo tragically borne out The neglect by the GeneralStaff even to devise proper patterns of tanks before thewar has robbed us of all the fruits of this inventionThese fruits have been reaped by the enemy withterrible consequences We should thereforeremember that this was an officer who had the root ofthe matter in him and also vision

In my Minute last week to you I said I hoped youwould propose to me the appointment that day ieTuesday but at the latest this week Will you very


kindly make sure that the appointment is made at theearliest moment

Since making this Minute I have carefully read yournote to me and the summary of the case for andagainst General Hobart We are now at war fighting forour lives and we cannot afford to confine Armyappointments to persons who have excited no hostilecomment in their career The catalogue of GeneralHobartrsquos qualities and defects might almost exactlyhave been attributed to most of the great commandersof British history Marlborough was very much theconventional soldier carrying with him the good will ofthe Service Cromwell Wolfe Clive Gordon and in adifferent sphere Lawrence all had very closeresemblance to the characteristics set down as defectsThey had other qualities as well and so I am led tobelieve has General Hobart This is a time to try men offorce and vision and not to be exclusively confined tothose who are judged thoroughly safe by conventionalstandards

I hope therefore you will not recoil from yourproposal to me of a week ago for I think your instinct inthis matter was sound and true

Prime Minister to CIGS 19X40Are there no younger men available for this

strenuous administrative appointment [Director-General Home Guard] The bringing back of retiredofficers for posts like these causes much criticism bothin and out of Service circles Why not try to find a manstill in the forties and give him temporary rank


19X40

In view of the forecasts of small-arms ammunitionand the very great improvement in our position whichwill be effected from the factories coming into bearing inOctober and the expanding output expected beforeMarch 31 1941 and having regard to the fact thatunless there is an invasion no operations are possibleexcept in the Middle East and then only on a


comparatively moderate scale I am of opinion that avery much larger issue may be made now to theCommander-in-Chief Home Forces for practice Iunderstand he has only two million rounds a week forthis purpose and that training is grievously hamperedin consequence Although it seems a risk to deplete oursmall War Office reserve I think it should be consideredwhether from November 1 onward the amount issuedfor practice should not be doubled ndash ie four million aweek I shall be glad if you will consult the Chiefs ofStaff immediately15


20X40

1 When was the last meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief Naval Air and Military Was it not found veryuseful Who attended it

I should be willing to preside over such a meeting inthe course of the next week or so

2 Let me have a plan for the imparting of moreinformation about our war policy to these very highofficers

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for Air and CAS

20X40

I am deeply concerned with the non-expansion andindeed contraction of our bomber force which must beexpected between now and April or May nextaccording to present policy Surely an effort should bemade to increase our bomb-dropping capacity duringthis period In moon light periods the presentarrangements for bombing are the best possible andthe only difficulty is our small numbers compared to themany attractive military targets On no account shouldthe limited bomber force be diverted from accuratebombing of military objectives reaching far intoGermany But is it not possible to organise a secondline bomber force which especially in the dark of themoon would discharge bombs from a considerable andsafe height upon the nearest large built-up areas ofGermany which contain military targets in abundance


The Ruhr of course is obviously indicated The objectwould be to find easy targets short runs and safeconditions

How is such a second line or auxiliary bomber forceto be improvised during the winter months Could notcrews from the training schools do occasional runsAre none of the Lysander and reconnaissance pilotscapable of doing some of this simpler bombingobserving that the Army is not likely to be in actionunless invasion occurs I ask that a whole-heartedeffort shall be made to cart a large number of bombsinto Germany by a second line organisation such as Ihave suggested and under conditions in whichadmittedly no special accuracy would be obtained Praylet me have the best suggestions possible and we canthen see whether they are practical or not

How is it that so few of our bombers are fitted withblind landing appliances MAP tells me that a numberof Lorenz equipments are available The grievouslosses which occurred one day last week ought not tobe repeated Not only do the bombers need the blindlanding facilities (which have been used in commercialaviation for years) but also if fighter aircraft are tooperate by night as they must increasingly suchaircraft must also be furnished with the means ofmaking safe landings Pray let me have your observa-tions


20X40

In connection with the plans now being developedfor night fighting not only by individual AircraftInterception fitted machines but by eight-inch fightersquadrons it is worth considering whether in any areawhere our fighters are operating and the guns have toremain out of action these guns should not fire blankcharges This would (a) confuse the enemy by theflashing on the ground and tend to make him lessaware of the impending fighter attacks ndash it would thushave a strictly military reason (b) it would make a noiseto drown the approach of our attacking fighters and


also to avoid discouraging silence for the population Itwould not be legitimate to fire blank merely for thesecond purpose but if there is a military reason theobjection disappears

Prime Minister to CIGS 20X40I am concerned by the very low state of equipment

of the Polish troops whose military qualities have beenproved so high I hope to inspect them on Wednesdaythis week

Pray let me have during Monday the best proposalspossible for equipping them I am most anxious theyshould not become disheartened

(Action this day)Prime Minister to SecretaryWar Office

20X40

It is impossible to take away steel helmets from ldquotheHome Guard in Government officesrdquo Four were killedoutside Downing Street on Thursday night Whitehall isas heavily bombed as any part of the country It will bedifficult to take helmets away from anyone to whomthey have been issued I am astonished to see that theArmy is aiming at three million helmets I was not awarethat we had three million men Let me have a full returnof all steel helmets in possession of the Regular Armyshowing the different branches ie whether field armyor training or holding battalions etc or in storehellip

Prime Minister to CIGS SirJames Grigg

21X40

This very lengthy report by General Irwin16 on howhe was carried out to Freetown and back emphasisesall the difficulties of the operation in which he wasconcerned He foresaw all the difficulties beforehandand the many shortcomings in the preparations Hecertainly felt throughout that he was plunged into themidst of a grave and hazardous undertaking on politicalrather than military grounds All this makes it the moresurprising that he should have wished to persist in this


operation with all its defects and dangers of which hewas so acutely conscious after these had been soformidably aggravated by the arrival through a navalfailure of the French cruisers and reinforcements inDakar and in the teeth of the considered opinion of theWar Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff that conditions hadnow so changed as to make the original planimpossible However any error towards the enemy andany evidence of a sincere desire to engage mustalways be generously judged This officer wascommanding a division very ably before he wasselected for the expedition and I see no reason why heshould not resume these duties now that he hasreturned He would make a mistake however if heassumed either (a) that no enterprise should belaunched in war for which lengthy preparation had notbeen made observing that even in this connectiontwenty-five Frenchmen took Duala and with it theCameroons or (b) that ships can in no circumstanceengage forts with success This might well be true inthe fog conditions which so unexpectedly andunnaturally descended upon Dakar but it would notnecessarily be true of the case where the shipsrsquo gunscould engage the forts at ranges to which the fortscould not reply or where the gunners in the forts werefrightened inefficient or friendly to the attacking force

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for the Colonies[LordLloyd]

21X40

I am afraid I have been some time in studying yournotes on the African continent and its strategic andpolitical dangers in the present war I should deprecatesetting up a special committee We are overrun bythem like the Australians were by the rabbits I see noreason to assume that we shall be at war with VichyFrance or Spain or that the South African position willdevelop dangerously I should have thought that youwould be able with your own military experience andpolitical knowledge to gather such officials of theColonial Office as you may need around you and


prepare yourself any reports you may think it right topresent to the Defence Committee or the War CabinetIf however you feel the need of being associated witha committee I suggest that the Middle East MinisterialCommittee take on the agenda you have outlined as anaddition to their present sphere

PS ndash I am trying to move one of the West Africanbrigades back from Kenya to the West Coast

(Action this day)Prime Minister to Minister ofInformation and SirAlexanderCadogan

24X40

Sir Walter Citrine leaves this country shortly for theUnited States on a mission from the Trade UnionCongress to American labour He is a man ofexceptional qualities and consequence and is a PrivyCouncillor He should certainly have a diplomatic statusconferred upon him which will facilitate his movementsThe TUC are paying all his expenses in connectionwith the purely Labour side of the business but I thinkthat any expenses he may incur in work useful in thenational interest should be defrayed by the Ministry ofInformation Perhaps the Minister would look into thisand see what can be done In any case Sir Waltershould be treated with the greatest consideration as Iam sure we can count on his entire loyalty anddiscretion

NOVEMBER

Prime Minister to CAS 1XI40How is it that when we have five hundred and

twenty crews available for bombing operations andonly five hundred and seven aircraft similarly availablewe do not draw on the aircraft storage units where alarge number are awaiting use



1XI40

Let me have on not more than two sheets of paperan analysis of the German aviators taken prisoner ofwar since July 1 showing numbers ages amount oftraining etc distinguishing between bomber andfighter prisoners Any other information about themwould be welcome

Prime Minister to First SeaLord

6XI40

Although 1 feel sceptical about the pocket battleshipgoing to Lorient the Air Force should be thinking ofattacking him there at the earliest moment and shouldbe warned now If he goes to Lorient he runs a chanceof being caught by you on the way in bombed while heis there and caught again on the way out There is onlyone way in and out of Lorient Very different is hisposition at Kiel where he can come out via theHeligoland Bight or through the Skagerrak or sneak upthe Norwegian Corridor to Trondhjem f would muchrather see him go to Lorient than break south or stayout on the Atlantic route or go back one side or theother of Iceland

If he continues preying on the trade you ought to beable to bring him to action

On further reflection I agree it is better our twoheavy ships should stay in the north

These notes are only for your consideration

Prime Minister to CIGS 6XI40You impressed upon me how important it was to

have a first-rate man in charge of the Home Guard andwhat a compliment to them it would be if the formerChief of the Staff in France was chosen so GeneralPownall was appointed But a few weeks later I wasastonished to learn he was to go to America on themission now discharged by General Pakenham-WalshWith some difficulty I stopped this change However alittle later Pownall was sent to Ireland Whereas I


suppose he would have done very well for the HomeGuard just as he got to know his job and men werebeginning to look to him he was whisked off tosomething else and General Eastwood took his placeThis is I think only a month ago However I dutifullyset myself to work to make General Eastwoodrsquosacquaintance and I suppose so did the principalofficers of the Home Guard f formed a favourableopinion of him particularly on account of his age whichis under fifty I suppose he has been working very hardfor the month trying to learn his immense new taskand he certainly had begun to speak about it withknowledge Now you propose to me to send him awayand to appoint a third new figure all in four months

All these rapid changes are contrary to the interestsof the Service and open to the most severe criticism Iam not prepared to agree to dismiss General Eastwoodfrom the Home Guard command If you wish to set upthis Directorate-General he must have it so far as I amconcerned However the Secretary of State will beback in two days if all goes well and I am sending acopy of this Minute to him I shall still expect to beconsulted

Prime Minister to CAS 6XI40Last night at least seven of our planes crashed on

landing or were lost The slow expansion of the bomberforce is as you know a great anxiety to me If bombingin this bad weather is imposing altogether undue risksand losses on the pilots the numbers might be slackeddown in order to accumulate our strength while at thesame time keeping various objectives alive


8XI40

Many of the executive departments naturally haveset up and developed their own statistical branches butthere appears to be a separate statistical branchattached to the Ministerial Committee on Productionand naturally the Ministry of Supplyrsquos statistical branch


covers a very wide field I have my own statisticalbranch under Professor Lindemann

It is essential to consolidate and make sure thatagreed figures only are used The utmost confusion iscaused when people argue on different statistical dataI wish all statistics to be concentrated in my own branchas Prime Minister and Minister of Defence from whichalone the final authoritative working statistics will issueThe various departmental statistical branches will ofcourse continue as at present but agreement must bereached between them and the Central StatisticalOffice

Pray look into this and advise me how my wish canbe most speedily and effectively achieved


8XI40

Let me know what progress has been made inbreaking up the queues and in bringing vehicles intoservice With the earlier black-out it must be very hardon many


9XI40

Please let me have a report on the improvements ofthe Asdic and hydrophone technique which have beenmade in the last year


9XI40

Preliminary inspection seems to indicate that thetime of turn round in ports has increased in recentmonths rather than the reverse This is probably due tothe concentration of traffic on a few west coast portsAre the delays caused by inadequate port facilities orby difficulties in clearing the goods from the docksHave you a scheme to exploit to the full our largeresources of road transport if the railways proveinadequate to deal with these special problems


Prime Minister to CAS 10XI40Altogether broadly speaking one thousand aircraft

and seventeen thousand air personnel in the MiddleEast provide thirty and one-half squadrons with a totalinitial equipment of three hundred and ninety-fiveoperational types of which it is presumed threehundred are ready for action on any date Unhappilyout of sixty-five Hurricanes only two squadrons (apartfrom Malta) are available These are the only modernaircraft unless you count the Blenheim IVrsquos All the restof this enormous force is armed with obsolete or feeblemachines The process of replacement shouldtherefore be pressed to the utmost and surely itshould be possible to utilise all this skilled personnel ofpilots and ground staff to handle the new machinesTherefore ldquoremountingrdquo the Eastern Air Force ought notin principle to require more personnel except wherenew types are more complicated However as part ofthe reinforcements now being sent ndash ie fourWellington and four Hurricane squadrons ndash we aresending over three thousand additional personnel

In the disparity between the great mass of men andnumbers of aircraft on charge and the fighting productconstantly available which is painfully marked bothhere and at home lies the waste of RAF resourcesWhat is the use of the six hundred machines which arenot even included in the initial equipment of the thirtysquadrons No doubt some can be explained astraining communication and transport But how is itthat out of seven hundred and thirty-two operationaltypes only three hundred and ninety-five play any partin the fighting

I hope that a most earnest effort will be made to getfull value for men material and money out of this verylarge force first by remounting second by makingmore squadrons out of the large surplus of machinesnot formed in squadrons third by developing local OTUrsquos or other training establishments


Prime Minister to Minister ofHealth

10XI40

I see your total of homeless is down by onethousand five hundred this week to about ten thousandPlease let me know how many new you had in andhow many former went out With such a small numberas ten thousand you ought to be able to clean this up ifyou have another light week

What is the average time that a homeless personremains at a rest centre

Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for Air17

10XI40

There is a shelter at Chequers which gives goodprotection from lateral damage There is the householdto consider Perhaps you will have the accommodationinspected

The carriage drive is being turfedI cannot bear to divert Bofors from the fighting

positions What about trying a few rockets which are atpresent only in an experimental stage

I am trying to vary my movements a little during themoonlight intervals It is very good of you and yourMinistry to concern yourselves with my safety


10XI40

I hope you will look into this yourself We had thegreatest difficulty in carrying these sticky bombsthrough and there was every evidence they would nothave received fair play had I not gone down myself tosee the experiment Now is the chance to let theGreeks try this method out and it would seem that itmight be very helpful to them

What is this tale that they are dangerous to packand handle They are of course despatched withouttheir detonators and therefore cannot explode


Prime Minister to Air C-in-CMiddle East

12XI40

I am trying every day to speed up the arrivals in yourcommand of Hurricanes etc This is especiallyimportant in the next three weeks Pray report dailywhat you actually receive and how many you are ableto put into action

I was astonished to find that you have nearly onethousand aircraft and one thousand pilots and sixteenthousand air personnel in the Middle East excludingKenya I am most anxious to re-equip you with modernmachines at the earliest moment but surely out of allthis establishment you ought to be able if the machinesare forthcoming to produce a substantially largernumber of modern aircraft operationally fit Pray reportthrough the Air Ministry any steps you may be able totake to obtain more fighting value from the immensemass of material and men under your command

I am grieved that the imperative demands of theGreek situation and its vital importance to the MiddleEast should have disturbed your arrangements at thisexceptionally critical time All good wishes

Prime Minister to Sir EdwardBridges and General Ismay

12XI40

The Prime Minister has noticed that the habit ofprivate secretaries and others addressing each other bytheir Christian names about matters of an officialcharacter is increasing and ought to be stopped Theuse of Christian names in inter-departmental correspon-dence should be confined only to brief explanatorycovering notes or to purely personal and privateexplanations

It is hard enough to follow people by their surnames


12XI40

How are you getting on with the comfort of theshelters in the winter ndash flooring drainage and the likeWhat is being done to bring them inside the houses I


attach the greatest importance to gramophones andwireless in the shelters How is that going forwardWould not this per haps be a very good subject for theLord Mayorrsquos Fund I should not be surprised if theimproved lighting comes up again before many weeksare out and I hope that the preparations for it will goforward


12XI40

We shall certainly have to obtain control of Syria byone means or another in the next few months The bestway would be by a Weygand or a de Gaullistmovement but this cannot be counted on and until wehave dealt with the Italians in Libya we have no troopsto spare for a northern venture On no acount mustItalian or Caitiff-Vichy influences become or remainparamount in Syria


12XI40

I do not think this could be said without the approvalof the Air Ministry and indeed of the COS CommitteeMy own feeling would be against giving these actualfigures18 They tell the enemy too much It is likegetting one of the tail bones of the ichthyosaurus fromwhich a naturalist can reconstruct the entire animalThe more I think about it the more I am against it


15XI40

This amounts to a loss of eleven of our bombers inone night I said the other day by Minute that theoperations were not to be pressed unduly during thesevery adverse weather conditions We cannot afford tohave losses of this kind in view of your very slowreplacements If you go on like this you will break thebomber force down to below a minimum for graveemergencies No results have been achieved whichwould in any way justify or compensate for these


losses I consider the loss of eleven aircraft out of onehundred and thirty-nine ndash ie about eight per cent ndash avery grievous disaster at this stage of our bomberdevelopment

Let me have the losses during the first half ofNovember

Prime Minister to CAS 17XI40I watch these figures every day with much concern

My diagrams show that we are now not even keepinglevel and there is a marked downward turn this weekespecially in the Bomber Command Painful as it is notto be able to strike heavy blows after an event likeCoventry yet I feel we should for the present nurse theBomber Command a little more This can be done (1)by not sending so many to each of the necessaryobjectives (2) by not coming down too low in the faceof heavy prepared batteries and being content withsomewhat less accuracy and (3) by picking out softspots where there is not too much organised protectionso as to keep up our deliveries of bomb content Theremust be unexpecting towns in Germany where verylittle has been done in air raid precautions and yetwhere there are military objectives of a minor orderSome of these could be struck at in the meanwhile

2 I should feel differently about this if our bomberforce were above five hundred and if it were expand-ing But having regard to the uncertainties of war wemust be very careful not to let routine bombing and ourown high standards proceed without constant attentionto our resources These remarks do not apply ofcourse to Italy against which the full-scale risk shouldbe run The wounded Littorio is a fine target


18XI40

I was assured that sixty-four destroyers would beavailable for the northwestern approaches byNovember 15 This return of Asdic-fitted ships whichgoes to November 16 shows sixty But what is


disconcerting is that out of one hundred and fifty-onedestroyers only eighty-four are available for serviceand out of sixty for the northwestern approaches onlythirty-three are available for service When we held ourconference more than a month ago the Admiral wasfound with only twenty-four destroyers available and allthat has happened in the month that has passed is thatanother nine have been added to his available strengthBut meanwhile you have had the American destroyersstreaming into service and I was assured that therewas a steady output from our own yards I cannotunderstand why there has been this serious frustrationof decisions so unitedly arrived at nor why such animmense proportion of destroyers are laid up for onecause or another Are the repairs falling behind Whathas happened to the American destroyers Are wefailing in repairs and new construction

I should be glad to have a special conference at 10AMon Tuesday at the Admiralty War Room


18XI40

I am informed that on the night of November 67 oneof the German KG 100 Squadron19 came down in thesea near Bridport This squadron is the one known tobe fitted with the special apparatus with which theGermans hope to do accurate night-bombing usingtheir very fine beams Vital time was lost during whichthis aircraft or its equipment might have been salvagedbecause the Army claimed that it came under theirjurisdiction made no attempt to secure it and refusedto permit the naval authorities to do so

Pray make proposals to ensure that in futureimmediate steps are taken to secure all possibleinformation and equipment from German aircraft whichcome down in this country or near our coasts and thatthese rare opportunities are not squandered throughdepartmental differences

Prime Minister to PrimeMinister of New Zealand

18XI40


Your telegram is being dealt with departmentallyWe dwell under a drizzle of carping criticism from a fewMembers and from writers in certain organs of thepress This has an irritating effect and would not betolerated in any other country exposed to our presentstresses On the other hand it is a good thing that anyGovernment should be kept keen and made aware ofany shortcomings in time to remedy them You must notsuppose everything is perfect but we are all trying ourbest and the war effort is enormous and moraleadmirable All good wishes

Prime Minister to PrimeMinister of Canada

20XI40

1 I am most grateful to you for your message andfor your very generous offer to afford facilities for afurther expansion of the Joint Air Training Plan 1 amconfident that we shall be able to make excellent use ofit

2 A review of the air training requirements in thelight of the latest developments is at present inprogress and it is of the utmost value to the WarCabinet in this connection to know that in such furthermeasures as prove to be necessary they can rely onthe continuance of the whole-hearted assistance of theCanadian Government which has already made such anotable contribution to our common effort

3 As soon as our review is completed I will let youknow for your consideration what we think would bethe best direction for our further joint efforts

4 As you mention in your message any measuresfor the extension of the Joint Training Plan must formthe subject of discussion and agreement between allthe Governments concerned Would you agree to myrepeating to the Prime Ministers of the Governments ofAustralia and New Zealand the text of your messageand of this reply or would you prefer to take this actionyourself

5 Subject to your agreement we should like to offera cordial invitation to Air Vice-Marshal Breadner to paya short visit to this country Such a visit would be most


valuable for the purpose of consultation on manytraining questions and would give Air Vice-MarshalBreadner the fullest and most up-to-date information onour plans for the future development of the Air Force

Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for the Dominions

22XI40

I think it would be better to let de Valera stew in hisown juice for a while Nothing could be more harmlessor more just than the remarks in the Economist Theclaim now put forward on behalf of de Valera is that weare not only to be strangled by them but to suffer ourfate without making any complaint

Sir John Maffey should be made aware of the risinganger in England and Scotland and especially amongthe merchant seamen and he should not be encour-aged to think that his only task is to mollify de Valeraand make everything including our ruin pass offpleasantly Apart from this the less we say to de Valeraat this juncture the better and certainly nothing must besaid to reassure him

Let me see the Parliamentary Questions as theycome in


22XI40

As the action has been announced it must proceedbut the conditions in Mauritius must not involve thesepeople being caged up for the duration of the war TheCabinet will require to be satisfied about this Praymake me your proposals

[Reference Proposal to ship to Mauritius Jewishrefugees who had illegally emigrated to Palestine]

Prime Minister to First Lordand First Sea Lord (GeneralIsmay to see)

22XI40

In my view Admiral Stark is right and Plan D20 isstrategically sound and also most highly adapted to ourinterests We should therefore so far as opportunity


serves in every way contribute to strengthen the policyof Admiral Stark and should not use argumentsinconsistent with it

2 Should Japan enter the war on one side and theUnited States on ours ample naval forces will beavailable to contain Japan by long-range controls in thePacific The Japanese Navy is not likely to venture farfrom its home bases so long as a superior battle-fleet ismaintained at Singapore or at Honolulu The Japanesewould never attempt a siege of Singapore with ahostile superior American Fleet in the Pacific Thebalance of the American Fleet after providing thenecessary force for the Pacific would be sufficient withour Navy to exercise in a very high degree thecommand of all the seas and oceans except thosewithin the immediate Japanese regions A strictdefensive in the Far East and the acceptance of itsconsequences is also our policy Once the Germansare beaten the Japanese would be at the mercy of thecombined fleets

3 I am much encouraged by the American navalview


23XI40

There seems to be great disparity in thesesentences [on AFS men for looting] and I wonderwhether any attempt is being made to standardise thepunishments inflicted for this very odious crime Fiveyearsrsquo penal servitude for stealing whisky for immediateconsumption seems out of proportion when comparedwith sentences of three or six months for stealingvaluables Exemplary discipline is no doubt necessaryas people must be made to feel that looting is stealingStill I should be glad to know that such cases are beingreviewed and levelled out

Prime Minister to CIGS 24XI40I sent you today two Foreign Office telegrams from

Bucharest and Sofia respectively which concur in anestimate of thirty thousand Germans or one full


division as the maximum in Rumania at the presenttime In view of this your Intelligence Branch shouldcarefully review the advice they gave to the effect thatthere were five divisions in Rumania and that thesecould be assembled on the Bulgarian-Greek frontier inthree or four days I thought myself that this estimatewas altogether too pessimistic and credited the enemywith a rapidity of movement and a degree of prepared-ness which were perhaps more serious than the factsWill you have the whole problem examined mostcarefully again I had thought myself that it would be afortnight before anything serious could happen on theGreek frontier and that perhaps it might be a monthThe great thing is to get the true picture whatever it is

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay and others concerned

24XI40

This paper shows that we have completely tailed tomake cruiser tanks and that there is no prospect of thepresent deficiency being made up in the next year Wemust therefore equip our armoured divisions in the bestpossible way open to us in these melancholycircumstances At this stage in tank productionnumbers count above everything else It is better tohave any serviceable tank than none at all Theformation and training of the divisions can proceed andthe quality and character of the vehicles be improvedlater on The ldquoIrdquo tank should not be disdained becauseof its slow speed and in default of cruisers must belooked upon as our staple for fighting We must adaptour tactics for the time being to this weapon as we haveno other Meanwhile the production of cruiser tanks andof A 22 [a new model] must be driven forward to theutmost limit


24XI40

The full order for the thirty-five thousand vehiclesshould be placed in the United States without further


delay Meanwhile the inquiry into the scale required bythe War Office is to proceed


27XI40

I was the author of this plan of pow-wow but theGreek complication seems to be serious It will be ofenormous advantage to us if Germany delays orshrinks from an attack on Bulgaria through Greece Ishould not like those people in Greece to feel that forthe sake of what is after all only a parade we hadpressed them into action which could be cited byGermany as a justification for marching The only thingto do is to put the meeting off until we can see a littlemore clearly on this very confused chessboard ofEastern Europe

I think the Dominions should be told that we arewaiting for the Greek situation to define itself moreclearly and that this ought not to take more than afortnight I do not think it is necessary to give anyreasons to the Allied Governments except to assurethem that the delay will be short

[Reference Draft telegram to General Metaxas]


28XI40

It is of no use giving me these reports five days lateThe Admiralty know every day exactly the state of theflotillas I do not know why this matter should gothrough the War Cabinet or Defence Ministry Pray tellthe Admiralty to send direct to me every week thestate opound their flotillas

I am much concerned that the patrols on thewestern approaches should only have gone up to thirtyeffective Let me see the chart showing previous weekstomorrow


28XI40

I shall be obliged if you will let me know the presentunemployment figures divided into as many categories


as is convenient and compared with (a) how they stoodat the outbreak of war and (b) when the newGovernment was formed


30XI40

It is to me incomprehensible that with the 50American destroyers coming into service we should nothave been able to raise the total serviceable to above77 by November 23 when they stood at 106 onOctober 16 What happened between October 16 andOctober 26 to beat down serviceable destroyers by 28vessels and why did they go down from 84 to 77between November 16 and November 23 ndash just at thevery time when another dozen Americans were cominginto service

Prime Minister to C-in-CHome Forces

30XI40

I have authorised the ringing of church bells onChristmas Day as the imminence of invasion hasgreatly receded Perhaps however you will let meknow what alternative methods of giving the alarm youwould propose to use on that day and secondly whatsteps would be taken to ensure that the ringing of thebells for church services and without any invasion doesnot in fact lead to an alarm There must certainly be norelaxation of vigilance

DECEMBER

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for Dominions (GeneralIsmay to see for COSCommittee)

1XII40

All this talk about Atlantic operations and Atlanticislands is most dangerous and is contrary to thedecision to describe such operations as ldquoShrapnelrdquo Isee no need for these long and pointless telegrams


and it is becoming quite impossible to conduct militaryoperations when everything has to be spread about theDepartments and around the world like this

Kindly give me the assurance that there will be nofurther discussion of these matters by telegram withoutmy seeing the messages before they are multiplied

Let me also know exactly the lists of officials anddepartments to whom these telegrams have beendistributed

(Action this day)Prime Minister to C-in-CMediterranean (Personal andmost secret)

3XII40

Your 270 We considered whole matter this morningwith the Director of Combined Operations Sir RogerKeyes who will execute it with full control of all forcesemployed and final plans are now being prepared byhim His appointment will not be naval but limited tothese combined operations If necessary he will waivehis naval rank Cannot feel that air counter-attack willbe serious having regard to size island brokencharacter many houses and detached forts in whichcomparatively small attacking force will be inter-mingledwith defenders Enemy aircraft will not know who holdswhat till all is over and even then Italian flags may bedisplayed on soft spots

2 Capture of ldquoWorkshoprdquo21 no doubt a hazard butZeebrugge would never have got past scrutinybestowed on this Commandos very highly trainedcarefully picked volunteers for this kind of workWeather and fixed date of convoy may of courseprevent attempt in which case whole outfit will go toMalta or Suda for other enterprises If conditionsfavorable nothing will be stinted

3 Apprehensions you have that AA guns etc willbe diverted from Eastern Mediterranean and newcommitment created may be mitigated by capture ofenemy AA which are numerous Enemy unlikelyattempt recapture even though garrison left will besmall Commandos will come away after handing over


to Regular troops and be available for furtheroperations

4 Comparing ldquoWorkshoprdquo with other operation youmention in future called ldquoMandiblesrdquo22(repeatldquoMandiblesrdquo) kindly weigh following considera-tions

ldquoMandiblesrdquo requires ten or twelve thousand menand is far larger affair if the two big ones are to betaken Little ones you mention would stir up all this areawithout any important reward unless process continuedSecondly captures in ldquoMandiblesrdquo area would excitekeen rivalry of Greeks and Turks which above all wedonrsquot want now Thirdly our reports show ldquoMandiblesrdquoslowly starving and perhaps we shall get them cheaperlater Apart from the above trying ldquoWorkshoprdquo does notrule out ldquoMandiblesrdquo afterwards unless ships andlanding-craft are lost which they may be Also perhapsoperations on enemyrsquos land communications alongNorth African shore may present opportunities

5 On strategic grounds ldquoWorkshoprdquo gives good aircommand of most used line of enemy communicationswith Libyan army and also increased measure airprotection for our convoys and transports passing so-called Narrows Joint Staffs here consider very highvalue attaches to removal of this obstruction to our Eastand West communications Besides all this we need toshow ourselves capable of vehement offensiveamphibious action I call upon you therefore to useyour utmost endeavours to procure success shouldconditions be favourable at zero hour


3XII40

The King asked me today whether there was anyshortage of instruments for aircraft


4XII40

Two searchlights [at Suda Bay] seem veryinsufficient What is going to be done to increase them


2 In view of the torpedoing of the Glasgow by aseaplane while at anchor ought not ships at anchor tobe protected by nets at short range I gather this wasthe Italian method at Taranto but at the moment of theattack they had taken them off Pray let me have a noteon this

ARMY ORGANISATION


9XII40

I understand that you are asking for another big call-up shortly The papers talk about a million men Thisforces me to examine the distribution of the men youhave According to your paper twenty-seven Britishdivisions are credited to Expeditionary Force andMiddle East These divisions are accounted for at35000 men each to cover corps army and line ofcommunication troops etc plus 70000 security troopsin ME

2 The approved establishment of a British divisionat the present time is 15500 men It comprises onlynine battalions with an establishment of 850 ie about7500 The establishment of all battalions comprises aconsiderable proportion of servicing elements and Idoubt whether the rifle and machine-gun strength ndash iefighting strength ndash amounts to more than 750 Thus thetotal number of men who actually fight in the infantry ofa British division is 6750 This makes the fightinginfantry of twenty-seven divisions in what used to becalled bayonet or rifle strength 182250 It used to besaid that the infantry was ldquothe staple of the Armyrdquo towhich all other branches were ancillary This hascertainly undergone some modification under newconditions but none the less it remains broadly trueThe structure of a division is built round its infantry ofnine battalions with a battery to each battalion thenecessary proportion of signallers and sappers thebattalion brigade and divisional transport and some


additional elements the whole being constituted as anintegral and self-contained unit of 15500 men

3 When we look at the division as a unit we findthat twenty-seven divisions at 15500 official establish-ment require no less than 1015000 men This gives anactual burden of 35000 men for every divisional unit of15500 men the units themselves being already fullyself-contained Nearly 20000 men have therefore to beaccounted for for each division of the EF or ME overand above the full approved establishment of 15500

This great mass amounting to 540000 has now tobe explained We are assured that the corps army Lof C troops etc plus the 70000 security troops in theME justify this enormous demand upon the manhoodof the nation

4 One would have thought if this were concededthat the process was at an end On the contrary it isonly just beginning There still remain nearly two millionmen to be accounted for as are set out on the attachedtable and graph No one can complain of sevendivisions for the Home Field Force though it issurprising that they should require 24000 men fordivisional establishments of 15500 This accounts for170000 men

5 ADGB 500000 must be submitted to for thepresent pending improved methods of dealing with thenight-bomber and increased British ascendancy in theair

6 Two hundred thousand men for the permanentstaffs and ldquounavailablerdquo at training and holding units is adistressing figure having regard to the great marginsalready provided Staffs static and miscellaneous unitsldquoYrdquo list etc require 150000 after all the twenty-sevendivisions and the seven home divisions have been fullysupplied with corps and army troops Apart fromeverything necessary to handle an army of twenty-seven divisions and seven home divisions there is thismass of 350000 staffs and statics living well of thenation as heroes in khaki

7 Compared with the above overseas garrisonsother than ME of 75000 seems moderate India andBurma at 35000 is slender


8 One hundred and fifty thousand men for thecorps army and L of C troops for divisions other thanBritish requires to be explained in detail I understandthe Australian and New Zealand fortes had supplied agreat many of their rearward services At any rate Ishould like to see the exact distribution of this 150000in every category behind the divisions which they areexpected to serve

9 The net wastage ndash 330000 ndash is of course a purelyspeculative figure But it might well be supplied from the350000 permanent staffs static and other non-availables already referred to

10 Deducting for the moment the 330000 men forwastage which deals with the future up till March1942 and 110000 required for overseas garrisonsother than ME India and Burma we face a total of2505000 required for the aforesaid twenty-sevendivisions plus seven home divisions equal to about74000 per division If the 500000 for ADGB isomitted we still have over 2000000 men ie nearly60000 men mobilised for each of thirty-four divisions

Before I can ask the Cabinet to assent to any furthercall-up from the public it is necessary that this wholesubject shall be thrashed out and that at least a millionare combed out of the fluff and flummery behind thefighting troops and made to serve effective militarypurposes We are not doing our duty in letting thesegreat numbers be taken from our civil life and kept atthe public expense to make such inconceivably smallresults in the fighting line


9XII40

Let me have a report on the development of theSalvage Section of the Admiralty showing the work thathas been done and what expansions if any arecontemplated to meet the evergrowing need of repairsrapidly


(Action this day PrimeMinister to Minister of Worksand Buildings (Lord Reith)

9XII40

I am in general agreement with your proposals to setup machinery for the large-scale rebuilding which willbe necessary after the war Perhaps you will discusswith Sir Edward Bridges the best methods of obtaininga decision upon this ie whether by the Home PolicyCommittee or by the Cabinet

2 Your most urgent task however is to repairexisting buildings which are not seriously but onlyslightly damaged Sometimes I see a whole row ofhouses whose windows are blown out but which arenot otherwise damaged standing for weeks desertedand neglected Active measures should be taken toreplace the tiles and to close up the windows withfabric with one small pane for light and to make suchrepairs as render the houses fit for habitation Indealing with house casualties the least serious shouldclaim priority You ought to have a regular corps ofworkmen who would get this job done so that thepeople may get back into their homes which areunlikely to be hit a second time Branches of this corpsshould exist in all the great cities Not a day should belost How the expense is met or divided can be settledwith the Treasury But this question must be noimpediment on action

Pray let me have your plans for dealing with thisforthwith

(Action this day)Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for Air

14XII40

There is one thing about the warfare between the AirMinistry and MAP which is helpful to the publicinterest namely that I get a fine view of what is goingon and hear both sides of the case argued with spiritWill you very kindly address yourself to the variousstatements made in this letter attached [from LordBeaverbrook] and especially to the one that on


September 1 you had over a thousand unserviceabletrainer aircraft I have long suspected that theinefficiency which formerly ruled in the ASUs and leftus with only forty-five airplanes when the newGovernment was formed as against about onethousand two hundred now was reproduced in all thetrainer establishments and communication flights andthat a great mass of airplanes were kept in anunserviceable state and I remember particularly thestatement of one of your high officers that the TrainingCommand worked on a basis of fifty per centunserviceable Who is responsible for repair andtraining establishments If I were you I should throwthe whole business of repair on to MAP and then youwould be able to criticise them for any shortcomings

See also the figures of how repaired aircraft andengines have increased since the change was made

I recur to the point I made to you yesterday whenyou sent me your letter to MAP The Air Ministryrsquosview is that the Germans have nearly 6000 airplanes infront-line action and we have about 2000 Air Ministryalso believe that the German output is 1800 a monthout of which they provide only 400 for trainingestablishments while we out of 1400 output providealso 400 How do you then explain that the Germansare able to keep three times our establishment in front-line action with only an equal monthly subscription oftrainer aircraft Apparently on your figures which Imay say I do not accept (except for controversialpurposes) the Germans can keep three times as largea force in action as you can for the same number oftrainer planes I know that you will rightly say you arepreparing for the expansion of the future but they haveto keep going on a threefold scale and expand as well

I await with keen interest further developments ofyour controversy

Prime Minister to LordBeaverbrook (Private)

15XII40

It is a magnificent achievement23 in the teeth of thebombing Quite apart from new production the repaired


aircraft has been your own creation We now have1200 in the ASUrsquos which is a great comfortDispersion has greatly hampered you but wasabsolutely necessary as an insurance to spread the risk

In addition you have not confined yourself to merenumbers but on the contrary have pushed hard intoquality

The reason why there is this crabbing as at A24 isof course the warfare which proceeds between AMand MAP They regard you as a merciless critic andeven enemy They resent having had the MAPfunctions carved out of their show and I have no doubtthey pour out their detraction by every channel open Iam definitely of opinion that it is more in the publicinterest that there should be sharp criticism and counter-criticism between the two departments than that theyshould be handing each other out ceremoniousbouquets One must therefore accept the stimulatingbut disagreeable conditions of war


15XII40

You will see from my telegram to Mr Menzies that Ido not view the situation in the Far East as immediatelydangerous The victory in Libya has reinforced nayredoubled the argument there set forth I do not wish tocommit myself to any serious dispersion of our forces inthe Malay peninsula and at Singapore On the contraryI wish to build up as large as possible Fleet Army andAir Force in the Middle East and keep this in a fluidcondition either to prosecute war in Greece andpresently in Thrace or reinforce Singapore should theJapanese attitude change I could not commit myself tothe dispatch of many of the air craft mentionedcertainly not the PBYs [Flying-boats] at this juncturewhen we have a major peril to face on the northwesternapproaches I could not therefore agree to yourtelegram and I should have thought my own (asamended in red) was quite sufficient at the present time

Prime Minister to CAS 15XII40


How are you getting on with the development on alarge scale of aerodromes in Greece to take modernbombers and fighters and with the movement ofskeleton personnel spare parts etc there

It is quite clear to me this is going to be mostimportant in the near future and we must try not to betaken by surprise by events

I should be glad to have a fortnightly report

Prime Minister to CIGS 20XII40Please let me know the earliest date when the 2d

Armoured Division (a) will land at Suez and (b) can beavailable for action in the Western Desert

Prime Minister to CAS 20XII40I hope you will try to take a few daysrsquo rest and seize

every opportunity of going to bed early The fight isgoing to be a long one and so much depends uponyou Do not hesitate to send your deputy to anymeetings I may call

Pray forgive my giving you these hints but severalpeople have mentioned to me that you are working toohard

The possible use and counter-use of poison gasshould invasion come in the New Year rested heavilyupon me Our progress in this sphere was howeverconsiderable


21XII40

You will remember that the War Cabinet ordered aninquiry into the fact that bulk storage for two thousandtons of mustard gas which had been ordered by theCabinet in October 1938 was still not ready inOctober 1940


The latest information which I have received fromyour Ministry shows that the bulk stock of mustard gason December 9 was 1485 tons I was also informedthrough your Ministry that 650 tons of additional newstorage was to have become available last week andthat production was being increased accordingly Wasthis promise fulfilled

Meanwhile I note that the filling of the new twenty-five pounder base-ejection shell has at last begun inearnest and that 7812 of this type of shell had beenfilled by December 9 I should be glad to know how thisfigure compares with the total reserve of this type ofshell required by the Army and when this reserve islikely to be attained

None of the new six-inch base-ejection shells hasyet been filled What reserve does the Army require ofthis type of shell and when is this reserve expected tobe ready

I am sending a copy of this Minute to the Secretaryof State for War


22XII40

I learn that the Central Priority Department has beenconducting a special investigation into the requirementsof materials likely to be short

I am told that much the most serious case is that ofdrop-forgings on which the production of airplanestanks guns and transport all depend Requirements for1941 are estimated at 441000 tons Home productionis now at the rate of 208000 I am informed that thereare orders in the United States for 7000 tons and thatthese are likely to rise to an annual rate of 25000 bythe end of 1941 Even if the requirements areconsiderably overstated the deficiency is very serious

Some moderate rate of expansion at home isexpected but we need to double the output There are14000 workers in the industry but it is reported thatonly 300 recruits have been received since August thatthe industry alleges that it cannot absorb more than a


thousand new workers in each quarter and that it isdifficult to get recruits All this needs looking into

Meanwhile the only possible immediate actionseems to be to increase purchases of drop-forgings inAmerica if necessary sending a special expert there forthis purpose

Prime Minister to Minister ofWorks and Buildings

22XII40

I understand that there is a serious shortage ofaccommodation for welfare services of all kinds to meetthe needs of the homeless as well as of the evacuationschemes and that you in conjunction with the Ministerof Health have undertaken to seek for premises

I hope that you will use your utmost endeavours topress on with this work

I should be glad if you would let me have a return ofcommandeered premises which have not yet beenused for war purposes and which might be suitable foruse in this way

Prime Minister to LordChatfield

22XII40

I am grieved to find how very few George Medalshave been issued I had hoped there would be tentimes as many The idea was that you would go aboutand get into touch with local authorities where therehas been heavy bombing and make sure thatrecommendations were sent forward which could besifted and that you would stir the departments on thesubject Can you not do something more in thisdirection You ought by now to have a number oftypical cases which could be circulated to theauthorities and departments concerned who wouldthereafter be asked to match them from theirexperience

Let me know if I can be of any assistance


22XII40


Very soon the Baltic will be frozen Let me know itsstate and future prospects

What has been happening to the Swedish oreduring this summer The Naval Staff should make thenecessary inquiries

What traffic has been moving down the LeadsHow has the position of German ore supplies been

affected by the events of the last eight months Is thereany reason why we should not sow magnetic mines inthe Leads even if we do not lay a regular minefieldWe seem to have forgotten all about this story

I should be glad to have a note upon this andwhether anything can be done


22XII40

The work of the Joint Planners divides itself naturallyinto two parts (a) all the current work they do for the COS Committee and (b) the long-term future projectswhich are indicated to them and on which they arealready at work It is to these latter that I now turn Ithink it would be well to appoint a Director of FutureSchemes or some other suitable title who would guideand concert the preparation of the special schemespreside over any meetings of the Joint Plannersengaged upon them and have direct access to me asMinister of Defence I think Major Oliver Stanley (theformer Secretary of State for War) with his experienceof foreign politics and Cabinet government would beable to impart to all this work a liveliness which I cannotsupply except at rare intervals He would have to begiven a temporary Army rank to make him senior

Pray make me proposals for giving effect to this idea


22XII40

I am disturbed to see from reports sent to me by theMinister of Sup ply that deliveries to the Royal Air Forceof bombs and containers charged with gas havedropped very noticeably during the past month the total


during the four weeks from November 11 to December9 being

I understand that the reason for this decline is thatfactories have been bombed and that difficulties havebeen encountered in the supply of certain componentparts

Nevertheless it is of vital importance that we shouldhave the largest possible supply of aircraft gas-containers for immediate retaliation if need be and Ishould be glad to know what steps are being taken toimprove the delivery of these containers and what is theforecast of these deliveries over the next three months

I was concerned at the grave affronts to the rightsand liberties of the individual which the safety of theState had required Having been brought up on the Billof Rights habeas corpus and trial by jury conceptionsI grieved to become responsible even with the constantassent of Parliament for their breach In June JulyAugust and September our plight had seemed sogrievous that no limits could be put upon the action ofthe State Now that we had for the time being got ourheads again above water a further refinement in thetreatment of internes seemed obligatory We hadalready set up an elaborate sifting process and manypersons who had been arrested in the crisis werereleased by the Home Secretary who presided overthis field


22XII40

It must be remembered that these political deacutetenusare not persons against whom any offence is allegedor who are awaiting trial or on remand They arepersons who cannot be proved to have committed any


offence known to the law but who because of thepublic danger and the conditions of war have to be heldin custody Naturally I feel distressed at having to beresponsible for action so utterly at variance with all thefundamental principles of British liberty habeas corpusand the like The public danger justifies the actiontaken but that danger is now receding

In the case of Mosley and his wife there is muchprejudice from the Left and in the case of the PanditNehru from the Right I particularly asked that therigorous character of the latterrsquos imprisonment shouldbe removed In foreign countries such people areconfined in fortresses ndash at least they used to be whenthe world was still civilised

These reflections led me to look into the details ofMosleyrsquos present confinement as well as others of thatcategory Does a bath every week mean a hot bathand would it be very wrong to allow a bath every dayWhat facilities are there for regular outdoor exerciseand games and recreation under Rule 8 If thecorrespondence is censored as it must be I do not seeany reason why it should be limited to two letters aweek What literature is allowed Is it limited to theprison libraries Are newspapers allowed What arethe regulations about paper and ink for writing books orstudying particular questions Are they allowed to havea wireless set What arrangements are permitted tohusbands and wives to see each other and whatarrangements have been made for Mosleyrsquos wife to seeher baby from whom she was taken before it wasweaned

I should be grateful if you would let me know yourown view upon these matters

Prime Minister to PrimeMinister of Australia

23XII40

1 I am most grateful for your promised help atSingapore in respect both of troops and of equipmentand ammunition and hope that you will make theseavailable as proposed If so we will arrange to relieve


your troops in May by the equivalent of a division fromIndia

2 The danger of Japan going to war with the BritishEmpire is in my opinion definitely less than it was inJune after the collapse of France Since then we havebeaten off the attacks of the German Air Forcedeterred the invader by our ever-growing land strengthand gained a decisive victory in Libya Since then theItalians have shown their weakness by sea land andair and we no longer doubt our ability to defend theDelta and the Canal until or unless Germany makes herway through Turkey Syria and Palestine This wouldbe a long-term affair Our position in the EasternMediterranean is enormously improved by thepossession of Crete where we are making at Suda Baya second Scapa and also by our victories and those ofthe Greeks and the facilities we now have for buildingup strong air bases in Greece from which Italy can beattacked

3 The naval and military successes in the Mediter-ranean and our growing advantage there by land seaand air will not be lost upon Japan It is quite impossiblefor our Fleet to leave the Mediterranean at the presentjuncture without throwing away irretrievably all that hasbeen gained there and all the prospects of the futureOn the other hand with every weakening of the Italiannaval power the mobility of our Mediterranean Fleetbecomes potentially greater and should the ItalianFleet be knocked out as a factor and Italy herselfbroken as a combatant as she may be we could sendstrong naval forces to Singapore without suffering anyserious disadvantage We must try to bear our Easternanxieties patiently and doggedly until this result isachieved it always being understood that if Australia isseriously threatened by invasion we should nothesitate to compromise or sacrifice the Mediterraneanposition for the sake of our kith and kin

4 Apart from the Mediterranean the naval strainhas considerably increased When Bismarck and Tirpitzjoin the German Fleet which they may have donealready the Germans will once again be able to form aline of battle The King George V is ready but we do


not get Prince of Wales for several months nor Duke ofYork till midsummer nor Anson till the end of the year1941 For the next six months we must keep moreconcentrated at Scapa Flow than has been necessaryso far The appearance of a raiding pocket battleship inthe Atlantic has forced us to provide battleship escortagain for our convoys and we are forming hunting-groups for the raiders in the South Atlantic and ifnecessary in the Indian Ocean We have always toconsider the possibility of the undamaged portion of theFrench Fleet being betrayed by Darlan to Germany

5 For all these reasons we are at the fullest navalstrain I have seen either in this or the former war Theonly way in which a naval squadron could be found forSingapore would be by ruining the Mediterraneansituation This I am sure you would not wish us to dounless or until the Japanese danger becomes far moremenacing than at present I am also persuaded that ifJapan should enter the war the United States will comein on our side which will put the naval boot very muchon the other leg and be a deliverance from many perils

6 As regards air reinforcements for Malaya theConference at Singapore recommended the urgentdespatch of considerable numbers of aircraft With theever-changing situation it is difficult to commit ourselvesto the precise number of aircraft which we can makeavailable for Singapore and we certainly could notspare the flying-boats to lie about idle there on theremote chance of a Japanese attack when they oughtto be playing their part in the deadly struggle on thenorthwestern approaches Broadly speaking our policyis to build up as large as possible a fleet army and airforce in the Middle East and keep this in a fluidcondition either to prosecute war in Libya Greece andpresently Thrace or reinforce Singapore should theJapanese attitude change for the worse In this waydispersion of forces will be avoided and victory will giveits own far-reaching protections in many directions

7 I must tell you finally that we are sendingenormous convoys of troops and munitions to theMiddle East and we shall have nearly 300000 menthere by February This again entails heavy escort


duties But great objects are at stake and risks must berun in every quarter of the globe if we are to emergefrom all our dangers as I am sure we shall

8 I am arranging for details as regards shipping andequipment etc to be taken up direct between the WarOffice and Army Headquarters Melbourne

With all good wishes


23XII40

Please see that I have a good supply of pho-tographs of war places For instance Sollum Barcliaetc

One of your staff might be told off to give someattention to this

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for COSCommittee Note for MDupuy travelling to NorthAfrica

23XII40

Should you see Generals Weygand or Nogues youshould explain that we now have a large well-equippedarmy in England and have considerable spare forcesalready well trained and rapidly improving apart fromwhat are needed to repel invasion

The situation in the Middle East is also becominggood If at any time in the near future the FrenchGovernment decide to resume the war in Africa againstItaly and Germany we would send a strong and well-equipped Expeditionary Force to aid the defence ofMorocco Algiers and Tunis These divisions could sailas fast as shipping and landing facilities were availableThe British Air Force has now begun its expansion andwould also be able to give important assistance Thecommand of the Mediterranean would be assured bythe reunion of the British and French Fleets and by ourjoint use of Moroccan and North African bases We arewilling to enter into staff talks of the most secretcharacter with General Weygand or any officersnominated by him


On the other hand delay is dangerous At any timethe Germans may by force or favour come downthrough Spain render unusable the anchorage atGibraltar take effective charge of the batteries on bothsides of the Straits and also establish their air forces inthe aerodromes It is their habit to strike swiftly and ifthey establish themselves at Casablanca the doorwould be shut on all projects We are quite ready towait for a certain time provided that there is a goodhope of bold action and that plans are being made Butthe situation may deteriorate any day and prospects beruined It is most important that the Government ofMarshal Peacutetain should realise that we are able andwilling to give powerful and growing aid But this maypresently pass beyond our power

Prime Minister to Minister ofShipping

24XII40

I see you made a speech about the Americanstaking foreign ships Could you let me have the text ofit together with any reactions you may have noticed inthe American Press I have the impression that theAmericans were not quite pleased with the requestaddressed to them as they do not consider thatsufficient use is being made of British tonnage at thepresent time In this connection you will remember myrepeated inquiries as to the amount of British tonnagenow plying exclusively between ports not in the UnitedKingdom

According to the latest monthly report of the Ministryof Shipping two and one-third million tons of Britishnon-tanker shipping of over sixteen hundred tons istrading between overseas countries Pray let me have afull explanation of this About two million tons ofNorwegian Belgian Polish shipping excluding tankersis also trading abroad


25XII40

With the new year a fresh effort must be made torestrict the circulation of secret matters in Service and


other Departments All the markings of papers in theService Departments Foreign Office Colonial andDominions Offices etc should be reviewed with a viewto striking off as many recipients as possible

The officials concerned in roneo-ing the variouscirculations should be consulted and a return made forme showing how many copies are made of differentsecret documents

Pray report to me how this object can be achieved


25XII40

No departure in principle is contemplated from thepractice of keeping the Dominions informed fully of theprogress of the war Specially full information mustnecessarily be given in respect of theatres whereDominion troops are serving but it is not necessary tocirculate this to the other Dominions not affectedAnyhow on the whole an effort should be made not toscatter so much deadly and secret information over thisvery large circlehellip There is a danger that theDominions Office Staff get into the habit of running akind of newspaper full of deadly secrets bullwhich arecircularised to the four principal Governments withwhom they deal The idea is that the more theycirculate the better they are serving the State Manyother departments fall into the same groove loving tocollect as much secret information as possible andfeeling proud to circulate it conscientiously through allofficial circles I am trying steadily to restrict andcounteract these tendencies which if uncheckedldquowould make the conduct of war impossible

While therefore there is no change in principle thereshould be considerable soft-peddling in practice

I wish to be consulted before anything of a verysecret nature especially anything referring tooperations or current movements is sent out


Prime Minister to Minister ofHealth andMinister of HomeSecurity

25XII40

I enclose Minutes of our meeting yesterday on whichaction is being taken

I am convinced there should be only one authorityinside the shelters who should be responsible foreverything pertaining to the health and comfort of theinmates This authority should be charged withsanitation and storing of the bedding etc I cannot feelthat the Home Security and Home Office with all itsburdens and duties under the enemy attack ought tobe concerned with questions affecting vermin andsanitation These ought to be in the province of theMinistry of Health who should be made responsible forthe whole interior life of the shelters big or small

Prime Minister to Sir EdwardBridges and ProfessorLindemann

26XII40

I must examine the Import Programme for 1941 nextweek 5 PMin the Lower War Room MondayTuesday and Wednesday Agenda to be drawn up byyou and Professor Lindemann Let me see by Saturdaynight here the immediate lay-out of the shippingprogramme in relation to food and supply and thedemand for the Services in the face of present lossesProfessor Lindemann will present me by Saturday nightwith the salient facts and graphs To be summoned tothe meeting the following Lord President Lord PrivySeal Minister without Portfolio Minister of AircraftProduction Minister of Supply Ministers of FoodTransport and Shipping (Ministers only)

Prime Minister to Ministry ofSupply

26XII40


The discrepancy between weapons and ammunitionis terrible in the case of the anti-tank rifles two-inch andthree-inch mortars the climax being reached with thethree-inch mortars We have enough AT rifles to equiptwenty-three and a half divisions but only enoughammunitionat 32000 rounds per month to equip fiveand a half We have enough two-inch mortars at 108per division to equip thirty-three divisions butammunition at 32400 rounds per month suffices onlyfor four and a half divisions The worst of all is the three-inch mortar where oddly enough we have at eighteenper division enough to equip nearly 40 divisions but at14000 rounds per month only enough ammunition forone and a half divisions

Prime Minister to First Lord 26XII40Provided that it can be arranged that four of the

fifteen-inch can be cocked up within six months fromnow and all other repairs be completed I agree toabandon my long-cherished hope in which I have beenso continuously frustrated of making Resolution into aneffective fighting ship for inshore action

The story of these four ships since the war beganranks with the story of the two-gun turret of the KGVclass in the most melancholy pages of the Admiraltyannals

I hope I may have your positive assurance that thesix months condition will be fulfilled barring enemyaction of course25


26XII40

I consider a greater effort should be made tointerrupt the ore traffic through the Leads duringJanuary and onwards This should certainly comebefore the Iceland-Faroes channel which is a vastoperation under taken chiefly to use mines made forquite a different purpose in conditions which havepassed away Now that we have not to give notice andcan lay secretly anywhere conditions are much morefavourable for mining the Norwegian coast than they


were last year but the need to act seems to be almostas great

Pray let me have a further report

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for COSCommittee and othersconcerned

26XII40

Tactical requirements must be paramount duringinvasion I am deeply anxious that gas warfare shouldnot be adopted at the present time For this very reasonI fear the enemy may have it in mind and perhaps itmay be imminent Every precaution must be kept inorder and every effort made to increase retaliatorypower

Sometimes I have wondered whether it would beany deterrent on the enemy if I were to say that weshould never use gas ourselves unless it had first beenused against us but that we had actually in store manythousands of tons of various types of deadly gas withtheir necessary containers and that we shouldimmediately retaliate upon Germany On the whole Ithink it is perhaps better to say nothing unless or untilwe have evidence that the attack is imminent After allthey can make the calculations to which ProfessorLindemann refers for themselves They would certainlysay we had threatened them with gas warfare andwould soon invent a pretext Thirdly there would be toomuch bluff in any such statement If anyone is of adifferent opinion I shall be glad to know The subjectcauses me much anxiety


26XII40

I read in the papers of many people being sen-tenced for various offences against war regulations andfor doing things which would not arise in peace-time Iam curious to know how the prison populationcompares with pre-war both for imprisonment andpenal servitude cases


I should be much obliged if you could give me a fewvery simple figures Are there a great many more nowin gaol26


27XII40

Let me have on one sheet of paper the main headsof your programme as at present settled of imports (a)in the next four months (b) for the year 1941 f shouldbe glad to have this during tomorrow (Saturday)

(Action this day)Prime Minuter to GeneralIsmay for COSCommittee

27XII40

1 I do not recognise at all the account of my viewsgiven about ldquoMarierdquo27 I was under the impression thatI had given a written Minute Pray let this be sought forIt is very unusual for me to give any directions otherthan in writing To avoid further misunderstanding thefollowing is set forth

2 The ldquoOperation Marierdquo has been regarded by theChiefs of the Staff and is considered by me to bevaluable and important For this purpose not only theForeign Legion Battalion but two other Frenchbattalions should be sailed in the January 4 convoyand deposited at Port Soudan where they can eitherintervene in Marie or in Egypt There is no use sendingonly the Foreign Legion without any other troops of theFrench forces Therefore I have asked for proposals tosail transports capable of taking the other two battalionsempty from here to Freetown so that the whole Frenchforce can go round together

Pray let me have today the proposals for givingeffect to this

There will be plenty of time to consider the politicalaspects when these troops have arrived at Port Soudan

Prime Minister to Lord PrivySeal

27XII40


You very kindly sent me a report about cold storageof meat dated November 14 and I wonder whetheryou would care to bring it up to date in the light of laterhappenings I am very much concerned about the meatposition


27XII40

1 Hitherto the production of anti-tank rifles has beena bright spot and we have nearly 30000 alreadymade On the other hand the ammunition for thisweapon is deplorably in arrear being in fact less thanone-fifth of the proper proportion The failure to ldquomarryrdquothe ammunition and the AT rifle is one of the worstblots on our present munition programme It is little lessthan a fraud on the troops to issue these largequantities of AT rifles which would quickly becomeuseless and worth no more than old iron throughammunition shortage In many cases it has not beenpossible to allow any rounds for practice at all thesehaving to be saved for actual use against the enemy

2 In these circumstances one would expect that theWar Office would have concentrated their desires onammunition instead of increasing the already giganticdisproportion of AT rifles to ammunition On thecontrary however for reasons which I have neverheard mentioned the Army requirement of AT rifles issuddenly raised from 31000 to 71000 for the samenumber of divisions When was this decision taken bywhom and what were the arguments Was anyattempt made at the time to make sure that theammunition already lagging so far behind could catchup this enormous increase in rifles Let me have a fullreport on this transaction

3 However the Germans have now twice bombedthe Small Heath factory and checked the output of ATrifles in a most decisive manner There can be nopossibility of fulfilling the increased War Office demandof 71000 at the date desired On the other hand it is tobe hoped that the ammunition supply will now have achance of overtaking the weapons It would therefore


appear that a valuable and necessary readjustment ofour programme has resulted from enemy action

4 Arising out of the above I wish to be informedwhen any large changes are made in the existingprogrammes for the Army particularly when thesenecessitate setting up new plants which can only be setup at the expense of other urgent work All importantmodifications of the equipment tables set out in mydiagrams are to be reported to me before action istaken

Prime Minister to CAS andAir Ministry

29XII40

It seems odd that only one machine should havebeen despatched from Takoradi during the weekending December 27 when no fewer than forty-four arepiled up there waiting Is there a breakdown in thehandling work at Takoradi Could we have a specialreport on conditions there Quite soon they will havethe second instalment from the Furious upon them

Action this day) PrimeMinister to Secretary of Statefor Air CAS and Ministerof Aircraft Production(Secret)

30XII40

1 I am deeply concerned at the stagnant conditionof our bomber force The fighters are going ahead wellbut the bomber force particularly crews is not makingthe progress hoped for I consider the rapid expansionof the bomber force one of the greatest militaryobjectives now before us We are of course drawingupon the bomber force for the coastal command and forthe Middle East If the bottle-neck is as I am toldcrews we must either have the pilots and personnel weare sending out to the Middle East returned to us afterthey have delivered their machines or what would beless injurious to formed squadrons have other pilots


and personnel sent back from the Middle East in theirplace The policy is to remount the Middle East andthis must be achieved before reinforcements of apermanent character can be indulged in Even beforethe recent reinforcements there were one thousandpilots in the Middle East Air Marshal Longmore mustbe told to send back an equal number of good men ofthe various classes and not add to his already grosslydistended personnel

2 In order to increase the number of crewsavailable the training must be speeded up and acertain measure of dilution accepted

3 The figures placed before me each day aredeplorable Moreover I have been told on highauthority that a substantial increase in numbersavailable for operations against Germany must not beexpected for many months I cannot agree to thiswithout far greater assurance than I have now thateverything in human wit and power has been done toavert such a complete failure in our air expansionprogramme

4 So far as aircraft are concerned the questionarises from constant study of the returns whethersufficient emphasis is put upon bomber production Thefighters are streaking ahead and it is a great comfortthat we have so good a position in them We musthowever increase our bomb deliveries on Germanyand it appears some of the types and patterns mostadapted to this are not coming forward as we hadhoped

I am well aware of the damage done by enemyaction but I ask whether it cannot be remedied andwhat further steps are possible

5 I wish to receive a programme of expansion weekby week and also a plan set forth showing whatmeasures can be taken to improve the position whichat present is most distressing and black


Appendix BAUTHORrsquoS NOTE

The first table contains the figures which were given to thePresident in my letter of December 8 19401

The second table gives the final assessment in the light ofpost-war knowledge


TABLE I

WEEKLY LOSSES AT SEA


TABLE I mdash WEEKLY LOSSES AT SEA (Continued)

TABLE II

MONTHLY TOTALS OF SHIPPING LOSSES BRITISH ALLIED ANDNEUTRAL

May 1940 to December 1940


Appendix C

AIRCRAFT STRENGTH DURING THE BATTLE OF BRITAN 1940 1

1 AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION IN 1940

2 OPERATIONAL STRENGTHS DURING THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

SUMMARISED ORDER OF BATTLE (BOMBER COMMAND) ANDBOMBER AIRCRAFT IN AIRCRAFT STORAGE UNITS

BOMBER COMMAND


AIR SUPPLY UNITS

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED TO CURRENTOPERATIONAL STANDARDS READY FOR DISPATCH


3 OPERATIONAL STRENGTHS OF FIGHTER COMMAND WEEK BYWEEK

4 COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND GERMAN FIGHTER STRENGTHDURING THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

The preceding table gives the overall strength of FighterCommand including Blenheims and Defiants But thesecannot be reckoned for the purposes of comparisons aspart of the day fighting force which consisted of Hurricanesand SpitfiresAfter taking representative dates in the period July 10ndashOctober 31 the approximate daily average of Squadronsavailable for operations of these two latter types combinedis


On the German side figures of serviceability are not atpresent available comparison can therefore be made onlyin terms of Initial Equipment The German IE was

The comparable Initial Equipment figures for BritishHurricanes and Spitfires averaged over the 12 weeks was827


Appendix D

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO DAKAR

BETWEEN MR CHURCHILL AND MR MENZIES1

Mr Menzies to the PrimeMinister

29IX40

We are very disturbed in regard to Dakar incidentwhich has had unfortunate effect in Australia First asto matter of substance

It is difficult understand why attempt was madeunless overwhelming chances of success To makewhat appears at this distance to be a halfhearted attackis to incur a damaging loss of prestige

Second as to matter of procedureIt is absolutely wrong that Australian Government

should know practically nothing of details of engage-ment and nothing at all of decision to abandon it untilafter newspaper publication I have refrained from anypublic criticism but privately can tell you that absenceof real official information from Great Britain hasfrequently proved humiliating Finally I must say franklythat Australian Government profoundly hopesdifficulties have not been underestimated in the MiddleEast where clear-cut victory is essential

Prime Minister to Mr Menzies 2X40I am very sorry to receive your message of

September 29 because I feel that the great exertionswe have made deserve a broad and generous measure


of indulgence should any particular minor operationmiscarryhellip The situation at Dakar was revolutionisedby arrival of French ships from Toulon with Vichypersonnel and the manning of the batteries by thehostile French Navy Although every effort was madethe British Navy was not able to stop these ships ontheir way After strongly testing the defences andsustaining the losses I have already reported to youthe naval and military commanders did not considerthey had the strength to effect and support a landingand I think they were quite right not to get us committedto a shore operation which could not like the navalattack be broken off at any moment and might havebecome a serious entanglement

With regard to your criticisms if it is to be laid downthat no attempt is to be made which has not ldquoover-whelming chances of successrdquo you will find that acomplete defensive would be imposed upon us Indealing with unknown factors like the degree of Frenchresistance it is impossible to avoid uncertainty andhazard For instance Duala and with it the Cameroonswere taken by twenty-five Frenchmen after theirSenegalese troops had refused to march Ought we tohave moved in this case without having overwhelmingforce at hand Secondly I cannot accept the reproachof making ldquoa half-hearted attackrdquo I hoped that you hadnot sustained the impression from these last fivemonths of struggle which has excited the admiration ofthe whole world that we were ldquoa halfhearted Govern-mentrdquo or that I am half-hearted in the endeavours it ismy duty to make I thought indeed that from the waymy name was used in the election that quite a goodopinion was entertained in Australia of these efforts

Every care will always be taken to keep youinformed before news is published but we could notprevent the German and Vichy wireless from proclaim-ing the course of events as they occurred at Dakarbefore we had received any information from ourcommanders

With regard to what you say about the Middle East Ido not think the difficulties have been underestimatedbut of course our forces are much smaller than those


which the Italians have in Libya and Abyssinia and theGermans may always help them The defection ofFrance has thrown the whole Middle East into jeopardyand severed our communications through theMediterranean We have had to face the threat ofinvasion here and the full strength of Germanyrsquos air-bombing attack on our cities factories and harboursNevertheless we have steadfastly reinforced theMiddle East and in spite of all our perils at home andscanty resources have sent over thirty thousand mennearly half our best tanks many anti-aircraft gunsneeded to protect our vital aircraft factories two of thefinest units in the Fleet the Illustrious and Valiant anda considerable number of Hurricane fighters andWellington bombers We have done this in the face ofan accumulation across the Channel and the North Seaof barges and shipping sufficient to carry half a millionmen to these shores at a single voyage and in a singlenight Therefore if the Middle East difficulties anddangers have not been fully met it is not because theMother Country has shirked her share of perils andsacrifice At present the situation in Egypt and theSoudan looks better than we feared some time agoStill my dear Prime Minister and friend as you haveallowed me to deem you I cannot guarantee ldquoclear-cutvictoryrdquo in the Middle East or that Cairo Khartoum theSuez Canal and Palestine may not fall into Italian orGerman hands We do not think they will and we aretrying our utmost to resist the attacks which aremassing against us But I can make no promises at allof victory nor can I make any promises that regrettableand lamentable incidents will not occur or that therewill not be disappointments and blunders On thecontrary I think the only certainty is that we have verybad times indeed to go through before we emerge fromthe mortal perils by which we are surrounded

I felt it due to your great position and the extremelysevere tone of your message to reply with equalfrankness

Mr Menzies to Mr Churchill 4X40


I have received your message of October 2 and amvery disturbed by some of its contents

We were and are concerned about the failure atDakar My telegram concerning it was somewhatcrudely expressed as I can see on perusing it againBut I still do not understand how it can be construed ascontaining even the faintest suggestion that you or theBritish Government are half-hearted in policy spirit orachievement

As the recent election here has left my own positionextremely precarious and I may therefore soon go outof office I would like to take the opportunity of saying toyou that I have been very proud on behalf of Australiato be associated even though at a distance with theefforts of Winston Churchill and the British peopleSuch machinery as I possess in my own country has atall times been exercised so as to encourage theAustralian people to realise that Great Britain is fightingour battles and that her heroism and superhumancheerfulness and philosophy must be for us not only ashield but an inspiration

As for yourself ndash praise from me would be animpertinence ndash but what I cabled you on September 3the anniversary of the war represented my whole heartand mind I am indeed grieved to think that you shouldhave felt my recent telegram to be either carping ordiscouraging

I say no more about Dakar because it no doubt haslessons which it is not necessary for me to underlineReal point I make is that we at this distance will learnthe lessons of events the more rapidly if informationabout those events can come to us as promptly and asfully as possible

As to the Middle East I have not sought or intendedto seek guarantees All that we ask ndash and I am sure it isgranted before the asking ndash is that the Middle Eastshould be as fully reinforced and equipped as ishumanly possible Your telegram has given me greatsatisfaction on this point

You point out that if the Middle East difficulties anddangers have not been fully met it is not because theMother Country has shirked her share of the perils or


sacrifice this is of course splendidly true But I hopethat you do not entertain any idea that Australia isshirking her share We have many thousands of men inthe Middle East as many as shipping has been able totake We have in camp in Australia further Expedi-tionary Force approximating 85000 men many ofwhom will shortly be moving to the Middle East

In spite of much public doubt caused by a real fearof what Japan may do my Government has raisednaval air and military forces and pledged ourresources to munitions production on a scale previouslyunknown and regarded only a year ago as impossible

We have done this notwithstanding the parochialinterests and issues which in the recent electionssucceeded in defeating us in the all-important State ofNew South Wales We have set no limit to ourcontribution because we know that there is no limit tothe total British risk

I mention these matters because I desire to make itclear that our anxiety about our main overseas theatreof actual participation in the war is not only intelligiblebut acute

Please my dear Prime Minister do not interpretanxieties arising from these facts as either fearfulselfish or unduly wrong-headed And above all pleaseunderstand that whatever interrogative or even criticaltelegrams I may send to you in secret Australia knowscourage when it sees it and will follow you to a finishas to the best of my abilities I certainly shall

Prime Minister to Mr Menzies 6X40I am deeply grateful for your generous message

Forgive me if I responded too controversially to what Ithought was somewhat severe criticism I am having anaccount prepared of the Dakar incident in all its stageswhich I will send for the confidential information ofyourself and your colleagues I do not propose todefend myself at any length in Parliament as such aspectacle would only gratify the enemy I am deeplygrateful for all that Australia has done under yourleadership for the common cause It has been a great


comfort having some of the Australians here duringthese anxious months I greatly admired their bearingand spirit when I inspected them They had justreceived twenty-four good field guns They are soongoing to join the rest of the Australian Army in theMiddle East where they will probably be in the forefrontof the fighting next year We shall do everything in ourpower to equip them as they deserve For the momentit seems that the situation in the Middle East is steadyShould the armies engage near Mersa Matruh theforces available during the next month or six weekswould not appear to be ill-matched in numbers Thisshould give a good chance to General Wilson who isreputed a fine tactician and the excellent troops hehas The Londoners are standing up magnificently tothe bombing but you can imagine the numerousproblems which a ruthless attack like this upon acommunity of eight million people creates for theAdministration We are getting the better of ourdifficulties and I feel confident that the act of massterror which Hitler has attempted will fail like hismagnetic mines and other deadly schemes All goodwishes personally for yourself


Appendix E

LISTOF OPERATIONAL CODE NAMES FOR 1940ndash1941

CATAPULT Seizure control or effective disablement ordestruction of all the accessible French FleetCOMPASS Offensive operations in the Western DesertCROMWELL Alarm word to be used if invasion of BritainimminentDYNAMO Naval evacuation of the BEF May 1940EXCESS Aircraft reinforcements to the Middle EastJanuary 1941HATS Passing of Fleet reinforcements throughMediterranean and running of supply convoy to MaltaMANDIBLES Operations against the DodecaneseMARIE Occupation of JibutiMENACE Occupation of DakarMULBERRY Artificial harboursOVERLORD Liberation of FranceSEA LION German plan for the invasion of BritainSHRAPNEL Occupation of Cape Verde IslandsTORCH Anglo-American invasion of North Africa


WINCH Fighter reinforcement to MaltaWORKSHOP Capture of Pantellaria


Appendix F

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA guns Anti-aircraft guns or ack-ack gunsADGB Air defence of Great BritainAFS Auxiliary Fire ServiceAFVrsquos Armoured fighting vehiclesAGRM Adjutant General Royal MarinesARP Air raid precautionsASU Air Supply UnitsAT rifles Anti-tank riflesATS (Womenrsquos) Auxiliary Territorial ServiceBEF British Expeditionary ForceCAS Chief of the Air StaffCIGS Chief of the Imperial General StaffC-in-C Commander-in-ChiefController Third Sea Lord and Chief of MaterialCNS Chief of the Naval Staff (First Sea Lord) or ISLCOS Chiefs of StaffDNC Director of Naval ConstructionEF Expeditionary ForceFO Foreign OfficeGHQ General HeadquartersGOC General Officer Commanding


GQG Grand Quartier GeneralHF Home ForcesHMG His Majestyrsquos GovernmentL of C Line of CommunicationsLDV Local Defence Volunteers [renamed Home Guard]MAP Ministry of Aircraft ProductionME Middle EastMEW Ministry of Economic WarfareM of I Ministry of InformationM of L Ministry of LabourM of S Ministry of SupplyOKH Oberkommando das Heeres Supreme Command of the

German ArmyOTU Operational Training UnitPM Prime MinisterUP Unrelated projectiles ie code name for rocketsVCAS Vice Chief of the Air StaffVCIGS Vice Chief of the Imperial General StaffVCNS Vice Chief of the Naval StaffWAAF Womenrsquos Auxiliary Air ForceWRNS Womenrsquos Royal Naval Service ldquoWrensrdquo


Notes

Book One

Chapter 1

Eisenhower ldquoCrusade in Europerdquo

1 The house in Downing Street usually occupied by theChancellor of the Exchequer

2 The Defence Committee met 40 times in 1940 76 in1941 20 in 1942 14 in 1943 and 10 in 1944

Chapter 2

1 Volume 1 page 378

2 The French ldquomobilisationrdquo of five millions included manynot under arms ndash eg in factories on the land etc

3 ldquoOperation Royal Marinerdquo was first planned in November1939 The mines were designed to float down the Rhineand destroy enemy bridges and shipping They were fedinto the river from French territory upstream See Volume IBook II pages 508ndash10


4 As other accounts of what passed have appeared I askedLord Ismay who was at my side throughout to give hisrecollection He writes

ldquoWe did not sit round a table and much may have beensaid as we walked about in groups I am positive that youdid not express any lsquoconsidered military opinionrsquo on whatshould be done When we left London we considered thebreak-through at Sedan serious but not mortal There hadbeen many lsquobreakthroughsrsquo in 1914ndash18 but they had allbeen stopped generally by counterattacks from one or bothsides of the salient

ldquoWhen you realised that the French High Command felt thatall was lost you asked Gamelin a number of questionswith I believe the dual object first of informing yourself asto what had happened and what he proposed to do andsecondly of stopping the panic One of these questionswas lsquoWhen and where are you going to counter-attack theflanks of the Bulge From the north or from the southrsquo Iam sure that you did not press any particular strategical ortactical thought upon the conference The burden of yoursong was lsquoThings may be bad but are certainly notincurablersquoldquo

5 His two volumes entitled Servir throw little light eitherupon his personal conduct of events or generally upon thecourse of the war

Chapter 4

1 Semi-armour-piercing shell


Chapter 6

1 Reynaud La France a sauveacute IrsquoEurope volume II page200 ff

2 See Reynaud op cit volume II page 209

3 Graziani Ho Difeso la Patria page 189

4The Memoirs of Cordell Hull volume I chapter 56

5 Ciano Diaries pages 263ndash64

6Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939ndash1941 page 138

7Ibid page 142

8Ibid pages 142ndash43

9Ibid page 154

Chapter 7

1 ldquoZrdquo means the beginning of the war September 3 1939

2 In Lease-Lend ndash Weapon for Victory 1944


4 I am obliged to General Ismay for his recollection of thesewords

Chapter 11


1 See Appendix to this chapter

2 Translated

Chapter 12

1 A trench-cutting machine for attacking fortified lines

Chapter 13

1 Ciano Diplomatic Papers page 378



4 This was an old device which I had used for the MarineBrigade of the Royal Naval Division when we landed on theFrench coast in September 1914 We took fifty of themfrom the London streets and the Admiralty carried themacross in a night

5 His brother Victor was a subaltern in the 9th Lancerswhen I joined the 4th Hussars and I formed a warmfriendship with him in 1895 and 1896 His horse reared upand fell over backwards breaking his pelvis and he wassorely stricken for the rest of his life However he continuedto be able to serve and ride and perished gloriously fromsheer exhaustion whilst acting as liaison officer with theFrench Cavalry Corps in the retreat from Mons in 1914

General Brooke had another brother Ronnie He was olderthan Victor and several years older than I In the years


1895-1898 he was thought to be a rising star in the BritishArmy Not only did he serve with distinction in all thecampaigns which occurred but he shone at the StaffCollege among his contemporaries In the Boer War hewas Adjutant of the South African Light Horse and I forsome months during the relief of Ladysmith was AssistantAdjutant the regiment having six squadrons Together wewent through the fighting at Spion Kop Vaal Krantz andthe Tugela I learned much about tactics from himTogether we galloped into Ladysmith on the night of itsliberation Later on in 1903 although I was only a youthfulMember of Parliament I was able to help him to theSomaliland campaign in which he added to his highreputation He was stricken down by arthritis at an earlyage and could only command a reserve brigade at homeduring the First World War Our friendship continued till hispremature death in 1925

6 HMS Erebus was a monitor of the First World Warmounting two fifteen-inch guns After being refitted shewent to Scapa for target practice in August Delay arose inher working up practices through defects and bad weatherand she did not reach Dover until late in September It wastherefore not until the night of September 2930 that shecarried out a bombardment of Calais

Chapter 14

1 Actually the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau which had beenat Trondheim had both been torpedoed and were out ofaction

2 Here I omitted to mention the twenty thousand whichmight come from the distant Biscay ports but as will be


seen my proposed disposition of our forces guardedagainst this potential but as we now know non-existentdanger

3 That is their approaches from the rear

4 These are of course proportions not divisionalformations

Book Two

Chapter 3

1 I was coming in one night to the Annexe when there wasa lot of noise and something cracked off not far away andsaw in the obscurity seven or eight men of the Home Guardgathered about the doorway on some patrol or duty Weexchanged greetings and a big man said from amongthem ldquoItrsquos a grand life if we donrsquot weakenrdquo

2 Trepanning consisted of making a hole in the bombcasing in order to deal with the explosive contents

3 It seems incongruous to record a joke in such sombrescenes But in war the soldierrsquos harsh laugh is often ameasure of inward compressed emotions The party weredigging out a bomb and their prize man had gone down thepit to perform the delicate act of disconnection Suddenly heshouted to be drawn up Forward went his mates andpulled him out They seized him by the shoulders anddragging him along all rushed off together for the fifty orsixty yards which were supposed to give a chance Theyflung themselves on the ground But nothing happenedThe prize man was seriously upset He was blanched and


breathless They looked at him inquiringly ldquoMy Godrdquo hesaid ldquothere was a bloody great ratrdquo

4 The reply was reassuring

5 These were the official categories ldquoYellowrdquo civil servantswere those performing less essential tasks and who couldtherefore be evacuated earlier than ldquoblackrdquo ones The latterwould remain in London as long as conditions made itpossible to carry on

Chapter 4

1 See the table at the end of chapter

Chapter 5

1 Used by President Wilson in 1917

2 Also a Wilsonian word

Chapter 6

1 To render undrinkable

2 This was the wretched word used at this time forldquoundrinkablerdquo I am sorry

Chapter 7

1 The subject is discussed in Volume I Book II Chapter IV

Chapter 8


1 Defenceless from air attack as at Namsos

2 Ciano Diaries page 281

Chapter 9

1 September 17 1940 received at 1155 AM

2 Received by the Admiralty at 756 AM on September 181940

3 See Appendix D for my correspondence with Mr Menzies

Chapter 11

1 From October 17 to 19 (inclusive) thirty-three shipstwenty-two of them British were sunk by U-boats in thenorthwestern approaches These figures include twentyships out of one convoy

2 Mr Yencken was killed in an air accident in 1944

3 Quoted by Lord Templewood in his memoirs Ambassadoron Special Mission

4 Ciano LrsquoEuropa verso la Catastrofe page 604

5 Du Moulin de la Barthegravete Le Temps des Illusions pages43-44

Chapter 12

1 Hitler and Mussolini Letters and Documents page 61


2 Commander-in-Chief Air Forces Middle East

3 Authorrsquos italics

Chapter 13

1 Stettinius Lend-Lease

2Ibid page 60

3 Actually they were nearer 45000 tons

4 See Appendix B

Chapter 14

1 See Nazi-Soviet Relations p 218 ff

2 Signed between Germany Italy and Japan on September27 1940

3 It is worth noting that though in Berlin the main emphasisof Hitler and Ribbentrop was on snaring British territory inthe draft agreement the British Empire is not mentioned byname while the colonial possessions of France Hollandand Belgium are obviously included in the areas to beshared under the secret protocol Both at Berlin and in thenegotiations in Moscow the British Empire though offeringthe most conspicuous and valuable booty was not the onlyintended victim of Hitler He was seeking an even widerredistribution of the colonial possessions in Africa and Asiaof all the countries with which he was or had been at war


4 Authorrsquos italics throughout the text of this document

5Nazi-Soviet Relations p 260 ff

Chapter 15

1 I have only heard since the war that these initials which Iused so often were an Admiralty term signifying ldquoWinstonrsquosspecialsrdquo

2 E-boat the German equivalent of British ldquolight coastalcraftrdquo

3 Sir John Reith He became Lord Reith and Minister ofWorks and Buildings on October 3 1940

4 The modern equivalent of ldquoQrdquo ships which had beeneffectively used in the 1914ndash18 war to lure the U-boats totheir destruction They were less successful in the changedconditions of this war

Chapter 16

1 Rifle Brigade and Kingrsquos Royal Rifles

2 ldquoAsk and it shall be given you seek and ye shall findknock and it shall he opened unto yourdquo

3 ldquoEvery good gift and every perfect gift is from above andcometh down from the Father of Light with whom there isno variableness neither shadow of turningrdquo


4Cianorsquos Diary 1989--18 edited by Malcolm Muggeridgepp 315-17

5Cianorsquos Diary p 321

6Prime Minister to General Ismay for COS Committee 1XII40

General de Gaulle told me that he had in mind an attemptto recover Jibouti ndash hereinafter to be called ldquoMarierdquo in allpapers and telegrams connected with the operation Hewould send three French battalions from Equatorial Africato Egypt where General Le Gentilhomme would meetthem These battalions would be for the defence of Egyptor possibly ostensibly as a symbolic contribution to thedefence of Greece There would be no secret about thisOn the contrary prominence would be given to their arrivalHowever when the moment was opportune thesebattalions would go to Jibouti being carried and escortedthither by the British Navy No further assistance would beasked from the British General de Gaulle believes andcertainly the attached paper favours the idea that LeGentilhomme could make himself master of the place bringover the garrison and rally it and immediately engage theItalians This would be a very agreeable development andis much the best thing de Gaulle could do at the presenttime It should be studied attentively and in conjunctionwith him The importance of secrecy and of nevermentioning the name of the place should be inculcated onall remembering Dakar I suppose it would take at least twomonths for the French battalions to arrive in Egypt

Kindly let me have a full report


7 Sheffield had been very heavily bombed

Appendix A

1 Mr Josiah Wedgwood MP

2 On the Royal Marine Operation see Volume I

3 Labour for defence works My former Minute dated 25VI40 is recorded in Book I Chapter VIII page 170

4 This was the photo-electric fuze and although not verysuccessful was the forerunner of the later proximity fuze

5 This refers to the Government sponsored scheme for theevacuation of children to Canada and the USA Thescheme was abandoned after the sinking of the ldquoCity ofBenaresrdquo by a U-boat on September 17 1940

7 The Hermione was a small Greek steamer which wasintercepted by our cruisers in the Aegean on July 28 1940while carrying a military cargo for Italy Our ships wereattacked by aircraft when making the interception TheHermione was therefore sunk and her crew left in boatsnear the land


8 The letters stand for ldquoParachute and Cablerdquo The PACrocket was one form of the UP weapon A description isgiven in a Minute dated January 13 1940 See Volume IBook II Appendix Part II

9 See note under my Minute of 7IX40 Book II ChapterVII and also my Minutes of 15IX40 and 26XII40 below

10 A radar set for anti-aircraft-gun control

11 United States Ambassador to Britain

12 On the naval aspect of our policy towards the VichyGovernment

13 A French merchant ship

14 General Hobart at this time a corporal in the HomeGuard was accordingly appointed to command anarmoured division and in that capacity rendereddistinguished service to the very end of the war I had apleasant talk with him on the day we first crossed the Rhinein 1945 His work was then highly esteemed by GeneralMontgomery

15 It was decided to provide the increased amount

16 See Book II Chapter IX

17 The Air Ministry began making proposals for greaterprotecton of Chequers by sending Bofors guns

18 Figures of aircraft strength proposed to he used by LordBeaverbrook in a broadcast


19 See Book II Chapter IV page 388

20Plan D Provision of all possible naval and military aid inthe European field to the exclusion of any other interestThis would involve the adoption of a strictly defensive planin the Pacific and abandonment of any attempt seriously toreinforce the Far East with accepted consequences Onthe other hand by full-scale concentration in the Europeanarea the defeat of Germany was ensured with certaintyand if subsequently it was in the American interest to dealwith Japan requisite steps would be possible

21 Capture of Pantellaria

22 Operations against Dodecanese

23 Table from Lord Beaverbrook giving comparison ofactual output of aircraft with programme

24 Paragraph in Lord Beaverbrookrsquos Minute of 141240 tothe effect that it is sometimes said that the output of theMinistry of Aircraft Production would have been equalled bythe Air Ministry if there had not been any change in May1940

25 See also my Minute of I5IX40

26 The figures were reassuring

27 Occupation of Jibuti

Appendix B

1 See Book II Chapter XIII pages 560ndash640


Appendix C

1 See Book II Chapter I

Appendix D

1 Book II Chapter IX


About the AuthorOne of the most significant leaders of the twentieth centuryWinston Churchill was born in 1874 He served as a warcorrespondent during the Boer War and after his captureand release became a national hero in England Heparlayed his celebrity into a political career getting electedto the Conservative Party just ten months after his returnChurchill joined the Liberal Party in 1904 After serving asHome Secretary under David Lloyd George he becameLord of the Admiralty but a military setback suffered inWorld War I forced him to resign Churchillrsquos political careersuffered many ups and downs during the 1920rsquos and 30rsquosowing in part to his support of King Edward VIII during hisabdication But when Hitler invaded Poland in 1939Churchill was reappointed Lord of the AdmiraltyIn 1940 Churchill succeeded Chamberlain as PrimeMinister and remained in office until 1945 During that timehe successfully guided the nation through World War IIinspiring and mobilizing the British people and forgingcrucial ties with American President Franklin DelanoRoosevelt Despite his success in the war Churchillrsquosgovernment was voted out in 1945 owing in part to thenationrsquos lack of confidence in his domestic policies Heremained in Parliament and was reelected in 1951ultimately resigning in 1955 at the age of 80After retirement from public life Churchill spent his timewriting publishing The History of the English SpeakingPeople That work along with his six-volume history of


World War II and The World Crisis his history of World WarI earned Churchill the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1953 In1963 Churchill was made an honorary US citizen WinstonChurchill died in 1965 at the age of 90


About this TitleRosettaBooks is the leading publisher dedicated exclusivelyto electronic editions of great works of fiction and non-fictionthat reflect our world RosettaBooks strives to improve thequality of its electronic books We welcome your commentsand suggestions Please write to EditorRosettaBookscomWe hope you enjoyed Their Finest Hour If you areinterested in learning more about the book and WinstonChurchill we suggest you visit the RosettaBooksConnection at



THEIR FINEST HOUR

WINSTON CHURCHILL

Copyright

Their Finest Hour

Copyright copy 1949 by Winston Churchill

Cover art and eForeword to the electronic edition copyrightcopy 2002 by RosettaBooks LLC

All rights reserved No part of this book may be used orreproduced in any manner whatsoever without writtenpermission except in the case of brief quotations embodiedin critical articles and reviews

For information address EditorRosettaBookscom

First electronic edition published 2002 by RosettaBooksLLC New York

ISBN 0-7953-0642-3

Their Finest Hour 2

ContentseForewordPrefaceAcknowledgementBook OneThe Fall of France1 The National Coalition2 The Battle of France The First Week Gamelin3 The Battle of France The Second Week Weygand4 The March to the Sea5 The Deliverance of Dunkirk6 The Rush for the Spoils7 Back to France8 Home Defence June9 The French Agony10 The Bordeaux Armistice11 Admiral Darlan and the French Fleet Oran12 The Apparatus of Counter-Attack 194013 At Bay14 The Invasion Problem

Their Finest Hour 3

15 Operation Sea LionBook TwoAlone1 The Battle of Britain2 The Blitz3 ldquoLondon Can Take Itrdquo4 The Wizard War5 United States Destroyers and West Indian Bases6 Egypt and the Middle East 19407 The Mediterranean Passage8 September Tensions9 Dakar10 Mr Edenrsquos Mission11 Relations with Vichy and Spain12 Mussolini Attacks Greece13 Lend-Lease14 Germany and Russia15 Ocean Peril16 Desert VictoryPublisherrsquos NoteAppendicesNotesAbout the AuthorAbout this Title

Their Finest Hour 4

Changes in text received too late for inclusion in the firstedition are listed under the heading Publisherrsquos Note

Their Finest Hour 5

Maps and Diagrams

Battle of BritainDisposition of Main Fleets in Mediterranean June 14 1940Desert Victory December 1940 to January 1941

Their Finest Hour 7

eForewordOne of the most fascinating works of history ever writtenWinston Churchillrsquos monumental The Second World War isa six-volume account of the struggle of the Allied powers inEurope against Germany and the Axis Told through theeyes of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill TheSecond World War is also the story of one nationrsquos singularheroic role in the fight against tyranny Pride and patriotismare evident everywhere in Churchillrsquos dramatic account andfor good reason Having learned a lesson at Munich thatthey would never forget the British refused to make peacewith Hitler defying him even after France had fallen andafter it seemed as though the Nazis were unstoppableChurchill remained unbowed throughout as did the peopleof Britain in whose determination and courage he placedhis confidencePatriotic as Churchill was he managed to maintain abalanced impartiality in his description of the war What isperhaps most interesting and what lends the work itstension and emotion is Churchillrsquos inclusion of a significantamount of primary material We hear his retrospectiveanalysis of the war to be sure but we are also presentedwith memos letters orders speeches and telegrams thatgive a day-by-day account of the reactions-both mistakenand justified-to the unfolding drama Strategies andcounterstrategies develop to respond to Hitlerrsquos ruthlessconquest of Europe his planned invasion of England and

Their Finest Hour 8

his treacherous assault on Russia It is a mesmerizingaccount of the crucial decisions that have to be made withimperfect knowledge and an awareness that the fate of theworld hangs in the balanceIn Their Finest Hour the second volume of this workChurchill describes the German invasion of France and thegrowing sense of dismay on the part of the British andFrench leadership as it becomes clear that the German warmachine is simply too overpowering As the Frenchdefenses begin to crumble Churchill faces some bleakoptions should the British meet Francersquos desperate pleasfor reinforcements of troops ships and aircraft in the hopesof turning the tide or should they husband their resourcesin preparation for the inevitable German assault if FrancefallsIn the bookrsquos second half entitled ldquoAlonerdquo Churchilldiscusses Great Britainrsquos position as the last stronghold ofresistance against the German conquest The expectedevents are all included in fascinating detail the battle forcontrol of the skies over Britain the bombing of London thediplomatic efforts to draw the United States into the warand the spread of the conflict into Africa and the MiddleEast But we also hear of the contingency plans thespeculations about what will happen should Britain fall toHitler and how the far-flung reaches of its Empire couldturn to rescue the mother country The behind-the-scenesdeliberations the fears expressed and the possibilitiesconsidered continually remind us of exactly what was atstake and how grim the situation often seemedChurchill won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1953 due inno small part to this awe-inspiring workRosettaBooks is the leading publisher dedicated exclusivelyto electronic editions of great works of fiction and non-fiction

Their Finest Hour 9

that reflect our world RosettaBooks is a committed e-publisher maximizing the resources of the Web in openinga fresh dimension in the reading experience In thiselectronic reading environment each RosettaBook willenhance the experience through The RosettaBooksConnection This gateway instantly delivers to the readerthe opportunity to learn more about the title the author thecontent and the context of each work using the fullresources of the WebTo experience The RosettaBooks Connection for TheirFinest Hour



PrefaceDURING THE PERIOD covered by this volume I bore aheavy burden of responsibility I was Prime Minister FirstLord of the Treasury Minister of Defence and Leader ofthe House of Commons After the first forty days we werealone with victorious Germany and Italy engaged in mortalattack upon us with Soviet Russia a hostile neutral activelyaiding Hitler and Japan an unknowable menace Howeverthe British War Cabinet conducting His Majestyrsquos affairswith vigilance and fidelity supported by Parliament andsustained by the Governments and peoples of the BritishCommonwealth and Empire enabled all tasks to beaccomplished and overcame all our foes

WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL

CHARTWELLWESTERHAMKENTJanuary 1 1949


AcknowledgmentsI MUST AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGE the assistance of those whohelped me with the previous volume namely Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall Commodore G R G AllenColonel F W Deakin and Sir Edward Marsh I must alsothank the very large number of others who have kindly readthese pages and commented upon themLord Ismay has continued to give me his aid as have myother friendsI again record my obligations to His Majestyrsquos Governmentfor permission to reproduce the text of certain officialdocuments of which the Crown copyright is legally vested inthe Controller of His Majestyrsquos Stationery Office At therequest of His Majestyrsquos Government on security grounds Ihave paraphrased some of the telegrams published in thisvolume These changes have not altered in any way thesense or substance of the telegrams


Moral of the Work

In War ResolutionIn Defeat Defiance

In Victory MagnanimityIn Peace Good Will


Theme of the Volume

How the British people held the fortALONE

till those whohitherto had been half blind

were half ready


Book OneThe Fall of France


1The National Coalition

The Beginning and the EndmdashThe Magnitude ofBritainrsquos Work for the Common CausemdashDivisionsin Contact with the Enemy Throughout the WarmdashThe Roll of Honour mdash The Share of the RoyalNavy mdash British and American Discharge of AirBombsmdashAmerican Aid in Munitions Magnifies OurWar EffortmdashFormation ofthe New CabinetmdashConservative Loyalty to Mr Chamberlain mdash TheLeadership of the House of CommonsmdashHeresy-hunting Quelled in Due CoursemdashMy Letter to MrChamberlain of May 11 mdash A Peculiar ExperiencemdashForming a Government in the Heat of Battle mdashNew Colleagues Clement Attlee Arthur Green-wood Archibald Sinclair Ernest Bevin MaxBeaverbrookmdashA Small War CabinetmdashStages inthe Formation of the Government May 10 to May16 mdash A Digression on PowermdashRealities andAppearances in the New War Direction mdashAlterations in the Responsibilities of the ServiceMinisters mdash War Direction Concentrated in VeryFew HandsmdashMy Personal Methodsmdash The WrittenWordmdashSir Edward BridgesmdashMy Relations withthe Chiefs of the Staff Committee mdash GeneralIsmay mdash Kindness and Confidence Shown by theWar CabinetmdashThe Office of Minister of Defence mdashIts Staff Ismay Hollis JacobmdashNo Change forFive Years mdash Stability of Chiefs of Staff CommitteemdashNo Changes from 1941 till 1945 Except One by


DeathmdashIntimate Personal Association ofPoliticians and Soldiers at the SummitmdashThePersonal CorrespondencemdashMy Relations withPresident RooseveltmdashMy Message to thePresident of May 15 mdashldquoBlood Toil Tears andSweatrdquo

NOW AT LAST the slowly gathered long-pent-up fury of thestorm broke upon us Four or five millions of men met eachother in the first shock of the most merciless of all the warsof which record has been kept Within a week the front inFrance behind which we had been accustomed to dwellthrough the long years of the former war and the openingphase of this was to be irretrievably broken Within threeweeks the long-famed French Army was to collapse in routand ruin and the British Army to be hurled into the sea withall its equipment lost Within six weeks we were to findourselves alone almost disarmed with triumphantGermany and Italy at our throats with the whole of Europein Hitlerrsquos power and Japan glowering on the other side ofthe globe It was amid these facts and looming prospectsthat I entered upon my duties as Prime Minister andMinister of Defence and addressed myself to the first taskof forming a Government of all parties to conduct HisMajestyrsquos business at home and abroad by whatevermeans might be deemed best suited to the national interestFive years later almost to a day it was possible to take amore favourable view of our circumstances Italy wasconquered and Mussolini slain The mighty German Armysurrendered unconditionally Hitler had committed suicideIn addition to the immense captures by GeneralEisenhower nearly three million German soldiers weretaken prisoners in twenty-four hours by Field MarshalAlexander in Italy and Field Marshal Montgomery in


Germany France was liberated rallied and revived Handin hand with our allies the two mightiest empires in theworld we advanced to the swift annihilation of Japaneseresistance The contrast was certainly remarkable Theroad across these five years was long hard and perilousThose who perished upon it did not give their lives in vainThose who marched forward to the end will always beproud to have trodden it with honour

LAND FORCES IN FIGHTING CONTACT WITH THEENEMYldquoEQUIVALENT DIVISIONSrdquo

In giving an account of my stewardship and in telling thetale of the famous National Coalition Government it is myfirst duty to make plain the scale and force of the


contribution which Great Britain and her Empire whomdanger only united more tensely made to what eventuallybecame the common cause of so many states and nationsI do this with no desire to make invidious comparisons orrouse purposeless rivalries with our greatest ally the UnitedStates to whom we owe immeasurable and enduringgratitude But it is to the combined interest of the English-speaking world that the magnitude of the British war-making effort should be known and realised I havetherefore had a table made which I print on this page whichcovers the whole period of the war This shows that up tillJuly 1944 Britain and her Empire had a substantially largernumber of divisions in contact with the enemy than theUnited States This general figure includes not only theEuropean and African spheres but also all the war in Asiaagainst Japan Up till the arrival in Normandy in the autumnof 1944 of the great mass of the American Army we hadalways the right to speak at least as an equal and usuallyas the predominant partner in every theatre of war exceptthe Pacific and Australasian and this remains also true upto the time mentioned of the aggregation of all divisions inall theatres for any given month From July 1944 thefighting front of the United States as represented bydivisions in contact with the enemy became increasinglypredominant and so continued mounting and triumphanttill the final victory ten months laterAnother comparison which I have made shows that theBritish and Empire sacrifice in loss of life was even greaterthan that of our valiant ally The British total dead andmissing presumed dead of the armed forces amounted to303240 to which should be added over 109000 from theDominions India and the colonies a total of over 412240This figure does not include 60500 civilians killed in the airraids on the United Kingdom nor the losses of our


merchant navy and fishermen which amounted to about30000 Against this figure the United States mourn thedeaths in the Army and Air Force the Navy Marines andCoastguard of 322188 I cite these sombre rolls of honourin the confident faith that the equal comradeship sanctifiedby so much precious blood will continue to command thereverence and inspire the conduct of the English-speakingworldOn the seas the United States naturally bore almost theentire weight of the war in the Pacific and the decisivebattles which they fought near Midway Island atGuadalcanal and in the Coral Sea in 1942 gained for themthe whole initiative in that vast ocean domain and openedto them the assault of all the Japanese conquests andeventually of Japan herself The American Navy could notat the same time carry the main burden in the Atlantic andthe Mediterranean Here again it is a duty to set down thefacts Out of 781 German and 85 Italian U-boats destroyedin the European theatre the Atlantic and Indian Oceans594 were accounted for by British sea and air forces whoalso disposed of all the German battleships cruisers anddestroyers besides destroying or capturing the wholeItalian Fleet


U-BOAT LOSSES

The table of U-boat losses is shown in the table on thispageIn the air superb efforts were made by the United States tocome into action mdash especially with their daylight Fortressbombers mdash on the greatest scale from the earliest momentafter Pearl Harbour and their power was used both againstJapan and from the British Isles against GermanyHowever when we reached Casablanca in January 1943it was a fact that no single American bomber plane had casta daylight bomb on Germany Very soon the fruition of thegreat exertions they were making was to come but up tillthe end of 1943 the British discharge of bombs uponGermany had in the aggregate exceeded by eight tons toone those cast from American machines by day or nightand it was only in the spring of 1944 that thepreponderance of discharge was achieved by the UnitedStates Here as in the armies and on the sea we ran thefull course from the beginning and it was not until 1944 thatwe were overtaken and surpassed by the tremendous wareffort of the United States


It must be remembered that our munitions effort from thebeginning of Lend-Lease in January 1941 was increasedby over one-fifth through the generosity of the UnitedStates Through the materials and weapons which theygave us we were actually able to wage war as if we were anation of fifty-eight millions instead of forty-eight In shippingalso the marvellous production of Liberty Ships enabled theflow of supplies to be maintained across the Atlantic Onthe other hand the analysis of shipping losses by enemyaction suffered by all nations throughout the war should beborne in mind Here are the figures

Of these losses eighty per cent were suffered in the AtlanticOcean including British coastal waters and the North SeaOnly five per cent were lost in the PacificThis is all set down not to claim undue credit but toestablish on a footing capable of commanding fair-mindedrespect the intense output in every form of war activity ofthe people of this small island upon whom in the crisis ofthe worldrsquos history the brunt fell

It is probably easier to form a cabinet especially a coalitioncabinet in the heat of battle than in quiet times The senseof duty dominates all else and personal claims recedeOnce the main arrangements had been settled with theleaders of the other parties with the formal authority of theirorganisations the attitude of all those I sent for was like


that of soldiers in action who go to the places assigned tothem at once without question The party basis beingofficially established it seemed to me that no sense of Selfentered into the minds of any of the very large number ofgentlemen I had to see If some few hesitated it was onlybecause of public considerations Even more did this highstandard of behaviour apply to the large number ofConservative and National Liberal Ministers who had toleave their offices and break their careers and at thismoment of surpassing interest and excitement to step outof official life in many cases foreverThe Conservatives had a majority of more than onehundred and twenty over all other parties in the Housecombined Mr Chamberlain was their chosen leader Icould not but realise that his supersession by me must bevery unpleasant to many of them after all my long years ofcriticism and often fierce reproach Besides this it must beevident to the majority of them how my life had beenpassed in friction or actual strife with the ConservativeParty that I had left them on Free Trade and had laterreturned to them as Chancellor of the Exchequer After thatI had been for many years their leading opponent on Indiaon foreign policy and on the lack of preparations for warTo accept me as Prime Minister was to them very difficult Itcaused pain to many honourable men Moreover loyalty tothe chosen leader of the party is the prime characteristic ofthe Conservatives If they had on some questions fallenshort of their duty to the nation in the years before the warit was because of this sense of loyalty to their appointedchief None of these considerations caused me the slightestanxiety I knew they were all drowned by the cannonadeIn the first instance I had offered to Mr Chamberlain andhe had accepted the leadership of the House of Commonsas well as the Lord Presidency Nothing had been


published Mr Attlee informed me that the Labour Partywould not work easily under this arrangement In a coalitionthe leadership of the House must be generally acceptable Iput this point to Mr Chamberlain and with his readyagreement I took the leadership myself and held it tillFebruary 1942 During this time Mr Attlee acted as mydeputy and did the daily work His long experience inOpposition was of great value I came down only on themost serious occasions These were however recurrentMany Conservatives felt that their party leader had beenslighted Everyone admired his personal conduct On hisfirst entry into the House in his new capacity (May 13) thewhole of his party mdash the large majority of the House mdash roseand received him in a vehement demonstration ofsympathy and regard In the early weeks it was from theLabour benches that I was mainly greeted But MrChamberlainrsquos loyalty and support was steadfast and I wassure of myselfThere was considerable pressure by elements of theLabour Party and by some of those many able and ardentfigures who had not been included in the new Governmentfor a purge of the ldquoguilty menrdquo and of Ministers who hadbeen responsible for Munich or could be criticised for themany shortcomings in our war preparation Among theseLord Halifax Lord Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare were theprincipal targets But this was no time for proscriptions ofable patriotic men of long experience in high office If thecensorious people could have had their way at least a thirdof the Conservative Ministers would have been forced toresign Considering that Mr Chamberlain was the leader ofthe Conservative Party it was plain that this movementwould be destructive of the national unity Moreover I hadno need to ask myself whether all the blame lay on oneside Official responsibility rested upon the Government of


the time But moral responsibilities were more widelyspread A long formidable list of quotations from speechesand votes recorded by Labour and not less by LiberalMinisters all of which had been stultified by events was inmy mind and available in detail No one had more right thanI to pass a sponge across the past I therefore resistedthese disruptive tendencies ldquoIf the presentrdquo I said a fewweeks later ldquotries to sit in judgment on the past it will losethe futurerdquo This argument and the awful weight of the hourquelled the would-be heresy-hunters

Early on the morning of May 11 I sent a message to MrChamberlain ldquoNo one changes houses for a monthrdquo Thisavoided petty inconveniences during the crisis of the battleI continued to live at Admiralty House and made its maproom and the fine rooms downstairs my temporaryheadquarters I reported to him my talk with Mr Attlee andthe progress made in forming the new Administration ldquoIhope to have the War Cabinet and the Fighting Servicescomplete tonight for the King The haste is necessitated bythe battlehellip As we [two] must work so closely together Ihope you will not find it inconvenient to occupy once againyour old quarters which we both know so well in Number11rdquo1 I added

I do not think there is any necessity for a Cabinettoday as the Armies and other Services are fighting inaccordance with prearranged plans I should be veryglad however if you and Edward [Halifax] would cometo the Admiralty War Room at 1230 PM so that wecould look at the maps and talk things over

British and French advanced forces are already onthe Antwerp-Namur line and there seem to be verygood hopes that this line will be strongly occupied bythe Allied armies before it can be assailed This should


be achieved in about forty-eight hours and might bethought to be very important Meanwhile the Germanshave not yet forced the Albert Canal and the Belgiansare reported to be fighting well The Dutch also aremaking a stubborn resistance

My experiences in those first days were peculiar One livedwith the battle upon which all thoughts were centred andabout which nothing could be done All the time there wasthe Government to form and the gentlemen to see and theparty balances to be adjusted I cannot remember nor domy records show how all the hours were spent A BritishMinistry at that time contained between sixty and seventyMinisters of the Crown and all these had to be fitted in likea jigsaw puzzle in this case having regard to the claims ofthree Parties It was necessary for me to see not only all theprincipal figures but for a few minutes at least the crowdof able men who were to be chosen for important tasks Informing a Coalition Government the Prime Minister has toattach due weight to the wishes of the party leaders aboutwhom among their followers shall have the offices allottedto the Party By this principle I was mainly governed If anywho deserved better were left out on the advice of theirparty authorities or even in spite of that advice I can onlyexpress regret On the whole however the difficulties werefewIn Clement Attlee I had a colleague of war experience longversed in the House of Commons Our only differences inoutlook were about Socialism but these were swamped bya war soon to involve the almost complete subordination ofthe individual to the State We worked together with perfectease and confidence during the whole period of the


Government Mr Arthur Greenwood was a wise counsellorof high courage and a good and helpful friendSir Archibald Sinclair as official leader of the Liberal Partyfound it embarrassing to accept the office of Air Ministerbecause his followers felt he should instead have a seat inthe War Cabinet But this ran contrary to the principle of asmall War Cabinet I therefore proposed that he should jointhe War Cabinet when any matter affecting fundamentalpolitical issues or party union was involved He was myfriend and had been my second-in-command when in 1916I commanded the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers at Ploegsteerte(ldquoPlug Streetrdquo) and personally longed to enter upon thegreat sphere of action I had reserved for him After no littleintercourse this had been amicably settled Mr Bevin withwhom I had made acquaintance at the beginning of thewar in trying to mitigate the severe Admiralty demands fortrawlers had to consult the Transport and GeneralWorkersrsquo Union of which he was secretary before he couldjoin the team in the most important office of Minister ofLabour This took two or three days but it was worth it TheUnion the largest of all in Britain said unanimously that hewas to do it and stuck solid for five years till we wonThe greatest difficulty was with Lord Beaverbrook Ibelieved he had services to render of a very high quality Ihad resolved as the result of my experiences in theprevious war to remove the Supply and Design of Aircraftfrom the Air Ministry and I wished him to become theMinister of Aircraft Production He seemed at first reluctantto undertake the task and of course the Air Ministry did notlike having their Supply Branch separated from them Therewere other resistances to his appointment I felt surehowever that our life depended upon the flow of new


aircraft I needed his vital and vibrant energy and Ipersisted in my view

In deference to prevailing opinions expressed in Parliamentand the press it was necessary that the War Cabinet shouldbe small I therefore began by having only five members ofwhom one only the Foreign Secretary had a DepartmentThese were naturally the leading party politicians of the dayFor the convenient conduct of business it was necessarythat the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the leader of theLiberal Party should usually be present and as time passedthe number of ldquoconstant attendersrdquo grew But all theresponsibility was laid upon the five War Cabinet MinistersThey were the only ones who had the right to have theirheads cut off on Tower Hill if we did not win The rest couldsuffer for departmental shortcomings but not on account ofthe policy of the State Apart from the War Cabinet no onecould say ldquoI cannot take the responsibility for this or thatrdquoThe burden of policy was borne at a higher level Thissaved many people a lot of worry in the days which wereimmediately to fall upon usHere are the stages by which the National CoalitionGovernment was built up day by day in the course of thegreat battle


THE WAR CABINET


In my long political experience I had held most of the greatoffices of State but I readily admit that the post which hadnow fallen to me was the one I liked the best Power forthe sake of lording it over fellow-creatures or adding topersonal pomp is rightly judged base But power in anational crisis when a man believes he knows what ordersshould be given is a blessing In any sphere of action therecan be no comparison between the positions of numberone and number two three or four The duties and theproblems of all persons other than number one are quitedifferent and in many ways more difficult It is always amisfortune when number two or three has to initiate adominant plan or policy He has to consider not only themerits of the policy but the mind of his chief not only whatto advise but what it is proper for him in his station toadvise not only what to do but how to get it agreed andhow to get it done Moreover number two or three will haveto reckon with numbers four five and six or maybe somebright outsider number twenty Ambition not so much forvulgar ends but for fame glints in every mind There arealways several points of view which may be right and manywhich are plausible I was ruined for the time being in 1915over the Dardanelles and a supreme enterprise was castaway through my trying to carry out a major and cardinaloperation of war from a subordinate position Men are ill-advised to try such ventures This lesson had sunk into mynatureAt the top there are great simplifications An acceptedleader has only to be sure of what it is best to do or at leastto have made up his mind about it The loyalties whichcentre upon number one are enormous If he trips he mustbe sustained If he makes mistakes they must be coveredIf he sleeps he must not be wantonly disturbed If he is nogood he must be pole-axed But this last extreme process


cannot be carried out every day and certainly not in thedays just after he has been chosen

The fundamental changes in the machinery of war directionwere more real than apparent ldquoA Constitutionrdquo saidNapoleon ldquoshould be short and obscurerdquo The existingorganisms remained intact No official personalities werechanged The War Cabinet and the Chiefs of the StaffCommittee at first continued to meet every day as they haddone before In calling myself with the Kingrsquos approvalMinister of Defence I had made no legal or constitutionalchange I had been careful not to define my rights andduties I asked for no special powers either from the Crownor Parliament It was however understood and acceptedthat I should assume the general direction of the warsubject to the support of the War Cabinet and of the Houseof Commons The key-change which occurred on my takingover was of course the supervision and direction of theChiefs of the Staff Committee by a Minister of Defence withundefined powers As this Minister was also the PrimeMinister he had all the rights inherent in that officeincluding very wide powers of selection and removal of allprofessional and political personages Thus for the first timethe Chiefs of Staff Committee assumed its due and properplace in direct daily contact with the executive Head of theGovernment and in accord with him had full control overthe conduct of the war and the armed forcesThe position of the First Lord of the Admiralty and of theSecretaries of State for War and Air was decisively affectedin fact though not in form They were not members of theWar Cabinet nor did they attend the meetings of the Chiefsof Staff Committee They remained entirely responsible for


their Departments but rapidly and almost imperceptiblyceased to be responsible for the formulation of strategicplans and the day-to-day conduct of operations Thesewere settled by the Chiefs of Staff Committee acting directlyunder the Minister of Defence and Prime Minister and thuswith the authority of the War Cabinet The three ServiceMinisters very able and trusted friends of mine whom I hadpicked for these duties stood on no ceremony Theyorganised and administered the ever-growing forces andhelped all they could in the easy practical English fashionThey had the fullest information by virtue of theirmembership of the Defence Committee and constantaccess to me Their professional subordinates the Chiefsof Staff discussed everything with them and treated themwith the utmost respect But there was an integral directionof the war to which they loyally submitted There never wasan occasion when powers were abrogated or challengedand anyone in this circle could always speak his mind butthe actual war direction soon settled into a very few handsand what had seemed so difficult before became muchmore simple mdash apart of course from Hitler In spite of theturbulence of events and the many disasters we had toendure the machinery worked almost automatically andone lived in a stream of coherent thought capable of beingtranslated with great rapidity into executive action

Although the awful battle was now going on across theChannel and the reader is no doubt impatient to get thereit may be well at this point to describe the system andmachinery for conducting military and other affairs which Iset on foot and practised from my earliest days of power Iam a strong believer in transacting official business by The


Written Word No doubt surveyed in the after-time muchthat is set down from hour to hour under the impact ofevents may be lacking in proportion or may not come true Iam willing to take my chance of that It is always betterexcept in the hierarchy of military discipline to expressopinions and wishes rather than to give orders Still writtendirectives coming personally from the lawfully constitutedHead of the Government and Minister specially chargedwith Defence counted to such an extent that though notexpressed as orders they very often found their fruition inactionTo make sure that my name was not used loosely I issuedduring the crisis of July the following minute

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay CIGS and Sir EdwardBridges

19VII40

Let it be very clearly understood that all directionsemanating from me are made in writing or should beimmediately afterwards confirmed in writing and that Ido not accept any responsibility for matters relating tonational defence on which I am alleged to have givendecisions unless they are recorded in writing

When I woke about 8 AM I read all the telegrams andfrom my bed dictated a continuous flow of minutes anddirectives to the Departments and to the Chiefs of StaffCommittee These were typed in relays as they were doneand handed at once to General Ismay Deputy Secretary(Military) to the War Cabinet and my representative on theChiefs of Staff Committee who came to see me early eachmorning Thus he usually had a good deal in writing to bringbefore the Chiefs of Staff Committee when they met at


1030 They gave all consideration to my views at the sametime as they discussed the general situation Thus betweenthree and five orsquoclock in the afternoon unless there weresome difficulties between us requiring further consultationthere was ready a whole series of orders and telegramssent by me or by the Chiefs of Staff and agreed betweenus usually giving all the decisions immediately requiredIn total war it is quite impossible to draw any precise linebetween military and non-military problems That no suchfriction occurred between the Military Staff and the WarCabinet Staff was due primarily to the personality of SirEdward Bridges Secretary to the War Cabinet Not onlywas this son of a former Poet Laureate an extremelycompetent and tireless worker but he was also a man ofexceptional force ability and personal charm without atrace of jealousy in his nature All that mattered to him wasthat the War Cabinet Secretariat as a whole should servethe Prime Minister and War Cabinet to the very best of theirability No thought of his own personal position ever enteredhis mind and never a cross word passed between the civiland military officers of the SecretariatIn larger questions or if there were any differences of viewI called a meeting of the War Cabinet Defence Committeewhich at the outset comprised Mr Chamberlain Mr Attleeand the three Service Ministers with the Chiefs of the Staffin attendance These formal meetings got fewer after19412 As the machine began to work more smoothly Icame to the conclusion that the daily meetings of the WarCabinet with the Chiefs of Staff present were no longernecessary I therefore eventually instituted what came to beknown among ourselves as the ldquoMonday Cabinet ParaderdquoEvery Monday there was a considerable gathering mdash all theWar Cabinet the Service Ministers and the Minister of


Home Security the Chancellor of the Exchequer theSecretaries of State for the Dominions and for India theMinister of Information the Chiefs of Staff and the officialhead of the Foreign Office At these meetings each Chief ofStaff in turn unfolded his account of all that had happenedduring the previous seven days and the Foreign Secretaryfollowed them with his story of any important developmentsin foreign affairs On other days of the week the WarCabinet sat alone and all important matters requiringdecision were brought before them Other Ministersprimarily concerned with the subjects to be discussedattended for their own particular problems The members ofthe War Cabinet had the fullest circulation of all papersaffecting the war and saw all important telegrams sent byme As confidence grew the War Cabinet intervened lessactively in operational matters though they watched themwith close attention and full knowledge They took almostthe whole weight of Home and Party affairs off myshoulders thus setting me free to concentrate upon themain theme With regard to all future operations ofimportance I always consulted them in good time but whilethey gave careful consideration to the issues involved theyfrequently asked not to be informed of dates and detailsand indeed on several occasions stopped me when I wasabout to unfold these to themI had never intended to embody the office of Minister ofDefence in a Department This would have requiredlegislation and all the delicate adjustments I havedescribed most of which settled themselves by personalgood will would have had to be thrashed out in a processof ill-timed constitution-making There was however inexistence and activity under the personal direction of thePrime Minister the Military Wing of the War CabinetSecretariat which had in pre-war days been the Secretariat


of the Committee of Imperial Defence At the head of thisstood General Ismay with Colonel Hollis and Colonel Jacobas his two principals and a group of specially selectedyounger officers drawn from all three Services ThisSecretariat became the staff of the Office of the Minister ofDefence My debt to its members is immeasurable GeneralIsmay Colonel Hollis and Colonel Jacob rose steadily inrank and repute as the war proceeded and none of themwas changed Displacements in a sphere so intimate andso concerned with secret matters are detrimental tocontinuous and efficient despatch of businessAfter some early changes almost equal stability waspreserved in the Chiefs of Staff Committee On the expiry ofhis term as Chief of the Air Staff in September 1940 AirMarshal Newall became Governor-General of NewZealand and was succeeded by Air Marshal Portal whowas the accepted star of the Air Force Portal remained withme throughout the war Sir John Dill who had succeededGeneral Ironside in May 1940 remained CIGS until heaccompanied me to Washington in December 1941 I thenmade him my personal Military Representative with thePresident and head of our Joint Staff Mission His relationswith General Marshall Chief of Staff of the United StatesArmy became a priceless link in all our business and whenhe died in harness some two years later he was accordedthe unique honour of a resting-place in Arlington Cemeterythe Valhalla hitherto reserved exclusively for Americanwarriors He was succeeded as CIGS by Sir Alan Brookewho stayed with me till the endFrom 1941 for nearly four years the early part of whichwas passed in much misfortune and disappointment theonly change made in this small band either among theChiefs or in the Defence Staff was due to the death inharness of Admiral Pound This may well be a record in


British military history A similar degree of continuity wasachieved by President Roosevelt in his own circle TheUnited States Chiefs of Staff mdash General Marshall AdmiralKing and General Arnold subsequently joined by AdmiralLeahy mdash started together on the American entry into thewar and were never changed As both the British andAmericans presently formed the Combined Chiefs of StaffCommittee this was an inestimable advantage for allNothing like it between allies has ever been known beforeI cannot say that we never differed among ourselves evenat home but a kind of understanding grew up between meand the British Chiefs of Staff that we should convince andpersuade rather than try to overrule each other This wasof course helped by the fact that we spoke the sametechnical language and possessed a large common bodyof military doctrine and war experience In this ever-changing scene we moved as one and the War Cabinetclothed us with ever more discretion and sustained us withunwearied and unflinching constancy There was nodivision as in the previous war between politicians andsoldiers between the ldquoFrocksrdquo and the ldquoBrass Hatsrdquomdashodious terms which darkened counsel We came very closetogether indeed and friendships were formed which Ibelieve were deeply valuedThe efficiency of a war administration depends mainly uponwhether decisions emanating from the highest approvedauthority are in fact strictly faithfully and punctuallyobeyed This we achieved in Britain in this time of crisisowing to the intense fidelity comprehension and whole-hearted resolve of the War Cabinet upon the essentialpurpose to which we had devoted ourselves According tothe directions given ships troops and aeroplanes movedand the wheels of factories spun By all these processesand by the confidence indulgence and loyalty by which I


was upborne I was soon able to give an integral directionto almost every aspect of the war This was reallynecessary because times were so very bad The methodwas accepted because everyone realised how near weredeath and ruin Not only individual death which is theuniversal experience stood near but incomparably morecommanding the life of Britain her message and her glory

Any account of the methods of government whichdeveloped under the National Coalition would beincomplete without an explanation of the series of personalmessages which I sent to the President of the United Statesand the heads of other foreign countries and the DominionGovernments This correspondence must be describedHaving obtained from the Cabinet any specific decisionsrequired on policy I composed and dictated thesedocuments myself for the most part on the basis that theywere intimate and informal correspondence with friends andfellow-workers One can usually put onersquos thought better inonersquos own words It was only occasionally that I read thetext to the Cabinet beforehand Knowing their views I usedthe ease and freedom needed for the doing of my work Iwas of course hand-in-glove with the Foreign Secretary andhis Department and any differences of view were settledtogether I circulated these telegrams in some cases afterthey had been sent to the principal members of the WarCabinet and where he was concerned to the DominionsSecretary Before despatching them I of course had mypoints and facts checked departmentally and nearly allmilitary messages passed through Ismayrsquos hands to theChiefs of Staff This correspondence in no way ran counterto the official communications or the work of theAmbassadors It became however in fact the channel of


much vital business and played a part in my conduct of thewar not less and sometimes even more important than myduties as Minister of DefenceThe very select circle who were entirely free to expresstheir opinion were almost invariably content with the draftsand gave me an increasing measure of confidenceDifferences with American authorities for instanceinsuperable at the second level were settled often in a fewhours by direct contact at the top Indeed as time went onthe efficacy of this top-level transaction of business was soapparent that I had to be careful not to let it become avehicle for ordinary departmental affairs I had repeatedly torefuse the requests of my colleagues to address PresidentRoosevelt personally on important matters of detail Hadthese intruded unduly upon the personal correspondencethey would soon have destroyed its privacy andconsequently its valueMy relations with the President gradually became so closethat the chief business between our two countries wasvirtually conducted by these personal interchanges betweenhim and me In this way our perfect understanding wasgained As Head of the State as well as Head of theGovernment Roosevelt spoke and acted with authority inevery sphere and carrying the War Cabinet with me Irepresented Great Britain with almost equal latitude Thus avery high degree of concert was obtained and the saving intime and the reduction in the number of people informedwere both invaluable I sent my cables to the AmericanEmbassy in London which was in direct touch with thePresident at the White House through special codingmachines The speed with which answers were receivedand things settled was aided by clock-time Any messagewhich I prepared in the evening night or even up to twoorsquoclock in the morning would reach the President before he


went to bed and very often his answer would come back tome when I woke the next morning In all I sent him ninehundred and fifty messages and received about eighthundred in reply I felt I was in contact with a very greatman who was also a warmhearted friend and the foremostchampion of the high causes which we served

The Cabinet being favourable to my trying to obtaindestroyers from the American Government I drafted duringthe afternoon of May 15 my first message to PresidentRoosevelt since I became Prime Minister To preserve thecontinuity of our correspondence I signed myself ldquoFormerNaval Personrdquo and to this fancy I adhered almost withoutexception throughout the war

Although I have changed my office I am sure youwould not wish me to discontinue our intimate privatecorrespondence As you are no doubt aware the scenehas darkened swiftly The enemy have a markedpreponderance in the air and their new technique ismaking a deep impression upon the French I thinkmyself the battle on land has only just begun and Ishould like to see the masses engage Up to thepresent Hitler is working with specialised units in tanksand air The small countries are simply smashed upone by one like matchwood We must expect though itis not yet certain that Mussolini will hurry in to sharethe loot of civilisation We expect to be attacked hereourselves both from the air and by parachute and air-borne troops in the near future and are getting readyfor them If necessary we shall continue the war aloneand we are not afraid of that

But I trust you realise Mr President that the voiceand force of the United States may count for nothing ifthey are withheld too long You may have a completelysubjugated Nazified Europe established withastonishing swiftness and the weight may be more


than we can bear All I ask now is that you shouldproclaim nonbelligerency which would mean that youwould help us with everything short of actuallyengaging armed forces Immediate needs are First ofall the loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers tobridge the gap between what we have now and thelarge new construction we put in hand at the beginningof the war This time next year we shall have plentyBut if in the interval Italy comes in against us withanother one hundred submarines we may be strainedto breaking-point Secondly we want several hundredof the latest types of aircraft of which you are nowgetting delivery These can be repaid by those nowbeing constructed in the United States for us Thirdlyanti-aircraft equipment and ammunition of which againthere will be plenty next year if we are alive to see itFourthly the fact that our ore supply is being compro-mised from Sweden from North Africa and perhapsfrom Northern Spain makes it necessary to purchasesteel in the United States This also applies to othermaterials We shall go on paying dollars for as long aswe can but I should like to feel reasonably sure thatwhen we can pay no more you will give us the stuff allthe same Fifthly we have many reports of possibleGerman parachute or air-borne descents in IrelandThe visit of a United States Squadron to Irish portswhich might well be prolonged would be invaluableSixthly I am looking to you to keep the Japanese quietin the Pacific using Singapore in any way convenientThe details of the material which we have in hand willbe communicated to you separately

With all good wishes and respect

On May 18 a reply was received from the Presidentwelcoming the continuance of our private correspondenceand dealing with my specific requests The loan or gift ofthe forty or fifty older destroyers it was stated wouldrequire the authorisation of Congress and the moment wasnot opportune He would facilitate to the utmost the AlliedGovernments obtaining the latest types of United States


aircraft anti-aircraft equipment ammunition and steel Inall this the representations of our agent the highlycompetent and devoted Mr Purvis (presently to give his lifein an air accident) would receive most favourableconsideration The President would consider carefully mysuggestion that a United States Squadron might visit Irishports About the Japanese he merely pointed to theconcentration of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbour

On Monday May 13 I asked the House of Commonswhich had been specially summoned for a vote ofconfidence in the new Administration After reporting theprogress which had been made in filling the various officesI said ldquoI have nothing to offer but blood toil tears andsweatrdquo In all our long history no Prime Minister had everbeen able to present to Parliament and the nation aprogramme at once so short and so popular I endedIn response to You ask what is our policy I will say It is towage war by sea land and air with all our might and withall the strength that God can give us to wage war against amonstrous tyranny never surpassed in the darklamentable catalogue of human crime That is our policyYou ask What is our aim I can answer in one wordVictory mdash victory at all costs victory in spite of all terrorvictory however long and hard the road may be for withoutvictory there is no survival Let that be realised no survivalfor the British Empire no survival for all that the BritishEmpire has stood for no survival for the urge and impulseof the ages that mankind will move forward towards itsgoal But I take up my task with buoyancy and hope I feelsure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among menAt this time I feel entitled to claim the aid of all and I say


ldquoCome then let us go forward together with our unitedstrengthrdquoUpon these simple issues the House voted unanimouslyand adjourned till May 21

Thus then we all started on our common task Never did aBritish Prime Minister receive from Cabinet colleagues theloyal and true aid which I enjoyed during the next five yearsfrom these men of all Parties in the State Parliament whilemaintaining free and active criticism gave continuousoverwhelming support to all measures proposed by theGovernment and the nation was united and ardent asnever before It was well indeed that this should be sobecause events were to come upon us of an order moreterrible than anyone had foreseen


2The Battle of France Gamelin The

First Week May 10 to May 16

Plan DmdashThe German Order of BattlemdashGermanand French ArmourmdashFrench and British AdvanceThrough BelgiummdashHolland Overrun mdash TheBelgian ProblemmdashAccepted Primacy of France inthe Military ArtmdashThe Gap in the ArdennesmdashBritishDifficulties During the Twilight War Phase mdashProgress of Plan DmdashBad News of May 13 and 14mdashKleistrsquos Group of Armies Break the French FrontmdashHeavy British Air LossesmdashOur Final Limit forHome DefencemdashReynaud Telephones MeMorning of May 15 mdash Destruction of the FrenchNinth Army Opposite the Ardennes GapmdashldquoCeaseFirerdquo in Holland mdash The Italian MenacemdashI Fly toParismdashMeeting at the Quai DrsquoOrsaymdashGeneralGamelinrsquos StatementmdashNo Strategic ReserveldquoAucunerdquomdashProposed Attacks on the GermanldquoBulgerdquomdashFrench Demands for More British FighterSquadronsmdashMy Telegram to the Cabinet on theNight of May 16 mdash Cabinet Agrees to Send TenMore Fighter Squadrons

AT THE MOMENT in the evening of May 10 when I becameresponsible no fresh decision about meeting the Germaninvasion of the Low Countries was required from me orfrom my colleagues in the new and still unformedAdministration We had long been assured that the Frenchand British staffs were fully agreed upon General Gamelinrsquos


Plan D and it had already been in action since dawn Infact by the morning of the 11th the whole vast operationhad made great progress On the seaward flank GeneralGiraudrsquos Seventh French Army had already begun itsadventurous dash into Holland In the centre the Britisharmoured-car patrols of the 12th Lancers were upon theriver Dyle and to the south of our front all the rest ofGeneral Billottersquos First Group of Armies were hasteningforward to the Meuse The opinion of the Allied militarychiefs was that Plan D if successful would save anythingfrom twelve to fifteen divisions by shortening the frontagainst Germany and then of course there was theBelgian Army of twenty-two divisions besides the DutchArmy of ten divisions without which our total forces in theWest were numerically inferior I did not therefore in theslightest degree wish to interfere with the military plans andawaited with hope the impending shockNevertheless if in the after-light we look back upon thescene the important paper written by the British Chiefs ofStaff on September 181 1939 becomes prominent In thisit had been affirmed that unless the Belgians wereeffectively holding their front on the Meuse and the AlbertCanal it would be wrong for the British and French to rushto their aid but that they should rather stand firm on theFrench frontier or at the most swing their left hand slightlyforward to the line of the Scheldt Since those days ofSeptember 1939 agreement had been reached to carryout General Gamelinrsquos Plan D Nothing had howeverhappened in the interval to weaken the original view of theBritish Chiefs of Staff On the contrary much had happenedto strengthen it The German Army had grown in strengthand maturity with every month that had passed and theynow had a vastly more powerful armour The French Armygnawed by Soviet-inspired Communism and chilled by the


long cheerless winter on the front had actuallydeteriorated The Belgian Government staking theircountryrsquos life upon Hitlerrsquos respect for international law andBelgian neutrality had not achieved any effective jointplanning between their army chiefs and those of the AlliesThe anti-tank obstacles and defensive line which were tohave been prepared on the front Namur-Louvain wereinadequate and unfinished The Belgian Army whichcontained many brave and resolute men could hardlybrace itself for a conflict for fear of offending neutrality TheBelgian front had been in fact overrun at many points bythe first wave of German assault even before GeneralGamelin gave the signal to execute his long-prepared planThe most that could now be hoped for was success in thatvery ldquoencounter battlerdquo which the French High Commandhad declared itself resolved to avoidOn the outbreak of the war eight months before the mainpower of the German Army and Air Force had beenconcentrated on the invasion and conquest of PolandAlong the whole of the Western Front from Aix-la-Chapelleto the Swiss frontier there had stood 42 German divisionswithout armour After the French mobilisation France coulddeploy the equivalent of 70 divisions opposite to them Forreasons which have been explained it was not deemedpossible to attack the Germans then Very different was thesituation on May 10 1940 The enemy profiting by theeight monthsrsquo delay and by the destruction of Poland hadarmed equipped and trained about 155 divisions of whichten were armoured (ldquoPanzerrdquo) Hitlerrsquos agreement withStalin had enabled him to reduce the German forces in theEast to the smallest proportions Opposite Russiaaccording to General Halder the German Chief of Staffthere was ldquono more than a light covering force scarcely fitfor collecting customs dutiesrdquo Without premonition of their


own future the Soviet Government watched the destructionof that ldquoSecond Frontrdquo in the West for which they were soonto call so vehemently and to wait in agony so long Hitlerwas therefore in a position to deliver his onslaught onFrance with 126 divisions and the whole of the immensearmour weapon of ten Panzer divisions comprising nearlythree thousand armoured vehicles of which a thousand atleast were heavy tanksThese mighty forces were deployed from the North Sea toSwitzerland in the following order

Army Group B comprising 28 divisions underGeneral von Bock marshalled along the front from theNorth Sea to Aixla-Chapelle was to overrun Hollandand Belgium and thereafter advance into France asthe German right wing

Army Group A of 44 divisions under General vonRundstedt constituting the main thrust was rangedalong the front from Aix-la-Chapelle to the Moselle

Army Group C of 17 divisions under General vonLeeb held the Rhine from the Moselle to the Swissfrontier

The OKH (Supreme Army Command) Reserve consistedof about 47 divisions of which 20 were in immediatereserve bexhind the various Army Groups and 27 ingeneral reserveOpposite this array the exact strength and disposition ofwhich was of course unknown to us the First Group ofArmies under General Billotte consisting of 51 divisions ofwhich 9 were held in GQG (Grand Quartier GeacuteneacuteralReserve) including 9 British divisions stretched from theend of the Maginot Line near Longwy to the Belgian frontierand behind the frontiers to the sea in front of Dunkirk TheSecond and Third Groups of Armies under GeneralsPreacutetelat and Besson consisting with the reserves of 43


divisions guarded the French frontier from Longwy toSwitzerland In addition the French had the equivalent of 9divisions occupying the Maginot Line ndash a total of 103divisions If the armies of Belgium and Holland becameinvolved this number would be increased by 22 Belgianand 10 Dutch divisions As both these countries wereimmediately attacked the grand total of Allied divisions ofall qualities nominally available on May 10 was therefore135 or practically the same number as we now know theenemy possessed Properly organised and equipped welltrained and led this force should according to thestandards of the previous war have had a good chance ofbringing the invasion to a stopHowever the Germans had full freedom to choose themoment the direction and the strength of their attackMore than half of the French Army stood on the southernand eastern sectors of France and the fifty-one French andBritish divisions of General Billottersquos Army Group No 1 withwhatever Belgian and Dutch aid was forthcoming had toface the onslaught of upwards of seventy hostile divisionsunder Bock and Rundstedt between Longwy and the seaThe combination of the almost cannon-proof tank and dive-bomber aircraft which had proved so successful in Polandon a smaller scale was again to form the spearhead of themain attack and a group of five Panzer and threemotorised divisions under Kleist included in Germany ArmyGroup A was directed through the Ardennes on Sedan andMonthermeacuteTo meet such modern forms of war the French deployedabout 2300 tanks mostly light Their armoured formationsincluded some powerful modern types but more than halftheir total armoured strength was held in dispersedbattalions of light tanks for co-operation with the infantryTheir six armoured divisions with which alone they could


have countered the massed Panzer assault were widelydistributed over the front and could not be collectedtogether to operate in coherent action Britain thebirthplace of the tank had only just completed the formationand training of her first armoured division (328 tanks) whichwas still in EnglandThe German fighter aircraft now concentrated in the Westwere far superior to the French in numbers and quality TheBritish Air Force in France comprised the ten fightersquadrons (Hurricanes) which could be spared from vitalHome Defence eight squadrons of Battles six ofBlenheims and five of Lysanders Neither the French northe British air authorities had equipped themselves withdive-bombers which at this time as in Poland becameprominent and were to play an important part in thedemoralisation of the French infantry and particularly oftheir coloured troopsDuring the night of 910 May heralded by widespread airattacks against airfields communications headquartersand magazines all the German forces in the Bock andRundstedt Army Groups sprang forward towards Franceacross the frontiers of Belgium Holland and LuxembourgComplete tactical surprise was achieved in nearly everycase Out of the darkness came suddenly innumerableparties of well-armed ardent storm troops often with lightartillery and long before daybreak a hundred and fifty milesof front were aflame Holland and Belgium assaultedwithout the slightest pretext of warning cried aloud for helpThe Dutch had trusted to their water-line all the sluices notseized or betrayed were opened and the Dutch frontierguards fired upon the invaders The Belgians succeeded indestroying the bridges of the Meuse but the Germanscaptured intact two across the Albert Canal


By Plan D the First Allied Army Group under GeneralBillotte with its small but very fine British army was fromthe moment when the Germans violated the frontier toadvance east into Belgium It was intended to forestall theenemy and stand on the line Meuse-Louvain-Antwerp Infront of that line along the Meuse and the Albert Canal laythe main Belgian forces Should these stem the firstGerman onrush the Army Group would support them Itseemed more probable that the Belgians would be at oncethrown back onto the Allied line And this in facthappened It was assumed that in this case the Belgianresistance would give a short breathing-space during whichthe French and British could organise their new positionExcept on the critical front of the French Ninth Army thiswas accomplished On the extreme left or seaward flankthe Seventh French Army was to seize the islandscommanding the mouth of the Scheldt and if possible toassist the Dutch by an advance toward Breda It wasthought that on our southern flank the Ardennes wereimpassable for large modern armies and south of thatagain began the regular fortified Maginot Line stretchingout to the Rhine and along the Rhine to Switzerland Alltherefore seemed to depend upon the forward left-handedcounterstroke of the Allied Northern Armies This againhung upon the speed with which Belgium could beoccupied Everything had been worked out in this way withthe utmost detail and only a signal was necessary to hurlforward the Allied force of well over a million men At 530 AM on May 10 Lord Gort received a message from GeneralGeorges ordering ldquoAlertes 1 2 and 3rdquo namely instantreadiness to move into Belgium At 645 AM GeneralGamelin ordered the execution of Plan D and the long-prepared scheme of the French High Command to which


the British had subordinated themselves came at once intoaction



Mr Colijn when as Dutch Prime Minister he visited me in1937 had explained to me the marvellous efficiency of theDutch inundations He could he explained by a telephonemessage from the luncheon table at Chartwell press abutton which would confront an invader with impassablewater obstacles But all this was nonsense The power of agreat State against a small one under modern conditions isoverwhelming The Germans broke through at every pointbridging the canals or seizing the locks and water-controlsIn a single day all the outer line of the Dutch defences wasmastered At the same time the German Air Force began touse its might upon a defenceless country The Dutch hopethat they would be bypassed by the German right-handedswing as in the former war was vainThe case of Belgium requires more searching statementSeveral hundreds of thousands of British and Frenchgraves in Belgium mark the struggle of the previous warThe policy of Belgium in the years between the wars hadnot taken sufficient account of the past The Belgianleaders saw with worried eyes the internal weakness ofFrance and the vacillating pacifism of Britain They clung toa strict neutrality In the years before they were againinvaded their attitude towards the two mighty arrays whichconfronted each other was officially at any rate quiteimpartial Great allowance must be made for the fearfulproblems of a small State in such a plight but the FrenchHigh Command had for years spoken bitterly of the linetaken by the Belgian Government Their only chance ofdefending their frontier against a German attack lay in aclose alliance with France and Britain The line of the AlbertCanal and other water fronts was highly defensible andhad the British and French armies aided by the Belgian


armies after the declaration of war been drawn up on theBelgian frontiers in good time a very strong offensive mighthave been prepared and launched from these positionsagainst Germany But the Belgian Government deemedthat their safety lay in the most rigid neutrality and theironly hope was founded on German good faith and respectfor treatiesEven after Britain and France had entered into war it wasimpossible to persuade them to rejoin the old alliance Theydeclared they would defend their neutrality to the deathand placed nine-tenths of their forces on their Germanfrontier while at the same time they strictly forbade theAnglo-French Army to enter their country and makeeffective preparations for their defence or for forestallingcounter-strokes The construction of new lines and the anti-tank ditch during the winter of 1939 by the British armieswith the French First Army on their right along the Franco-Belgian frontier had been the only measure open to us It isa haunting question whether the whole policy of Plan Dshould not have been reviewed upon this basis andwhether we would not have been wiser to stand and fighton the French frontier and amid these strong defencesinvite the Belgian Army to fall back upon them rather thanmake the hazardous and hurried forward leap to the Dyle orthe Albert Canal

No one can understand the decisions of that period withoutrealising the immense authority wielded by the Frenchmilitary leaders and the belief of every French officer thatFrance had the primacy in the military art France hadconducted and carried the main weight of the terrible landfighting from 1914 to 1918 She had lost fourteen hundred


thousand men killed Foch had held the supremecommand and the great British and Imperial armies of sixtyor seventy divisions had been placed like the Americansunreservedly under his orders Now the BritishExpeditionary Army numbered but three or four hundredthousand men spread from the bases at Havre and alongthe coast forward to the line compared with nearly ahundred French divisions or over two million Frenchmenactually holding the long front from Belgium to SwitzerlandIt was natural therefore that we should place ourselvesunder their command and that their judgment should beaccepted It had been expected that General Georgeswould take full command of the French and British armiesin the field from the moment when war was declared andGeneral Gamelin was expected to retire to an advisoryposition on the French Military Council However GeneralGamelin was averse from yielding his control asGeneralissimo He retained the supreme direction Avexatious conflict of authority took place between him andGeneral Georges during the eight monthsrsquo lull GeneralGeorges in my opinion never had the chance to make thestrategic plan in its integrity and on his own responsibilityThe British General Staff and our headquarters in the fieldhad long been anxious about the gap between the northernend of the Maginot Line and the beginning of the Britishfortified front along the Franco-Belgian frontier Mr Hore-Belisha the Secretary of State for War raised the point inthe War Cabinet on several occasions Representationswere made through military channels Consideringhowever our relatively small contribution the Cabinet andour military leaders were naturally shy of criticising thosewhose armies were ten times as strong as our own TheFrench thought that the Ardennes were impassable forlarge modern armies Marshal Peacutetain had told the Senate


Army Commission ldquoThis sector is not dangerousrdquo A greatdeal of field work was done along the Meuse but nothinglike a strong line of pillboxes and anti-tank obstacles suchas the British had made along the Belgian sector wasattempted Moreover General Coraprsquos Ninth French Armywas mainly composed of troops who were definitely belowthe French standards Out of its nine divisions two were ofcavalry partly mechanised one was a fortress division two(61st and 53d) belonged to a secondary category two (22dand 18th) were not much inferior to active divisions onlytwo were divisions of the permanent regular army Herethen from Sedan to Hirson on the Oise along a front of fiftymiles there were no permanent fortifications and only twodivisions of professional troopsOne cannot be strong everywhere It is often right andnecessary to hold long sectors of a frontier with lightcovering forces but this of course should be only with theobject of gathering larger reserves for counter-attacks whenthe enemyrsquos striking-points are revealed The spreading offorty-three divisions or half the mobile French army fromLongwy to the Swiss frontier the whole of which was eitherdefended by the Maginot Line forts or by the broad swift-flowing Rhine with its own fortress system behind it wasan improvident disposition The risks that have to be run bythe defender are more trying than those which an assailantwho is presumably the stronger at the point of attack mustdare Where very long fronts are concerned they can onlybe met by strong mobile reserves which can rapidlyintervene in a decisive battle A weight of opinion supportsthe criticism that the French reserves were inadequateand such as they were badly distributed After all the gapbehind the Ardennes opened the shortest road fromGermany to Paris and had for centuries been a famousbattleground If the enemy penetrated here the whole


forward movement of the Northern Armies would bedeprived of its pivot and all their communications would beendangered equally with the capitalLooking back we can see that Mr Chamberlainrsquos WarCabinet in which I served and for whose acts or neglects Itake my full share of responsibility ought not to have beendeterred from thrashing the matter out with the French inthe autumn and winter of 1939 It would have been anunpleasant and difficult argument for the French at everystage could say ldquoWhy do you not send more troops of yourown Will you not take over a wider sector of the front Ifreserves are lacking pray supply them We have fivemillion men mobilised2 We follow your ideas about the warat sea we conform to the plans of the British AdmiraltyPray show a proper confidence in the French Army and inour historic mastery of the art of war on landrdquoNevertheless we ought to have done itHitler and his generals were in little doubt as to the militaryviews and general arrangements of their opponents Duringthis same autumn and winter the German factories hadpoured out tanks the plants for making which must havebeen well advanced at the Munich crisis in 1938 and boreabundant fruit in the eight months that had passed sincewar began They were not at all deterred by the physicaldifficulties of traversing the Ardennes On the contrary theybelieved that modern mechanical transport and vastorganised road-making capacity would make this regionhitherto deemed impassable the shortest surest andeasiest method of penetrating France and of rupturing thewhole French scheme of counter-attack Accordingly theGerman Supreme Army Command (OKH) planned theirenormous onrush through the Ardennes to sever the curlingleft arm of the Allied Northern Armies at the shoulder-joint


The movement though on a far larger scale and withdifferent speeds and weapons was not unlike Napoleonrsquosthrust at the Plateau of Pratzen in the battle of Austerlitzwhereby the entire Austro-Russian turning move was cut offand ruined and their centre broken

At the signal the Northern Armies sprang to the rescue ofBelgium and poured forward along all the roads amid thecheers of the inhabitants The first phase of Plan D wascompleted by May 12 The French held the left bank of theMeuse to Huy and their light forces beyond the river werefalling back before increasing enemy pressure Thearmoured divisions of the French First Army reached theline Huy-Hannut-Tirle-mont The Belgians having lost theAlbert Canal were falling back to the line of the river Getteand taking up their prescribed position from Antwerp toLouvain They still held Lieacutege and Namur The FrenchSeventh Army had occupied the islands of Walcheren andSouth Beveland and were engaged with mechanised unitsof the German Eighteenth Army on the line Herenthals ndashBergen-op-Zoom So rapid had been the advance of theFrench Seventh Army that it had already outrun itsammunition supplies The superiority in quality though notin numbers of the British Air Force was already apparentThus up till the night of the 12th there was no reason tosuppose that the operations were not going well



However during the 13th Lord Gortrsquos Headquartersbecame aware of the weight of the German thrust on thefront of the French Ninth Army By nightfall the enemy hadestablished themselves on the west bank of the Meuse oneither side of Dinant and Sedan The French GQG (GrandQuartier General) were not yet certain whether the mainGerman effort was directed through Luxembourg againstthe left of the Maginot Line or through Maastricht towardsBrussels Along the whole front Louvain-Namur-Dinant toSedan an intense heavy battle had developed but underconditions which General Gamelin had not contemplatedfor at Dinant the French Ninth Army had no time to installthemselves before the enemy was upon them

During the 14th the bad news began to come in At first allwas vague At 7 PM I read to the Cabinet a messagereceived from M Reynaud stating that the Germans hadbroken through at Sedan that the French were unable toresist the combination of tanks and dive-bombing andasking for ten more squadrons of fighters to re-establish theline Other messages received by the Chiefs of Staff gavesimilar information and added that both Generals Gamelinand Georges took a serious view of the situation and thatGeneral Gamelin was surprised at the rapidity of theenemyrsquos advance In fact Kleistrsquos Group with its immensemass of armour heavy and light had completely scatteredor destroyed the French troops on their immediate frontand could now move forward at a pace never before knownin war At almost all points where the armies had come incontact the weight and fury of the German attack wasoverpowering They crossed the Meuse in the Dinant sectorwith two more armoured divisions To the north the fighting


on the front of the French First Army had been mostsevere The First and Second British Corps were still inposition from Wavre to Louvain where our Third Divisionunder General Montgomery had had sharp fighting Farthernorth the Belgians were retiring to the Antwerp defencesThe French Seventh Army on the seaward flank wasrecoiling even quicker than it had advancedFrom the moment of the invasion we began ldquoOperationRoyal Marinerdquo the launching of the fluvial mines into theRhine and in the first week of the battle nearly 1700 wereldquostreamedrdquo3 They produced immediate results Practicallyall river traffic between Karlsruhe and Mainz wassuspended and extensive damage was done to theKarlsruhe barrage and a number of pontoon bridges Thesuccess of this device was however lost in the deluge ofdisasterAll the British air squadrons fought continuously theirprincipal effort being against the pontoon bridges in theSedan area Several of these were destroyed and othersdamaged in desperate and devoted attacks The losses inthe low-level attacks on the bridges from the German anti-aircraft artillery were cruel In one case of six aircraft onlyone returned from the successful task On this day alonewe lost a total of sixty-seven machines and being engagedprincipally with the enemyrsquos anti-aircraft forces accountedfor only fifty-three German aircraft That night thereremained in France of the Royal Air Force only 206serviceable aircraft out of 474This detailed information came only gradually to hand But itwas already clear that the continuance of fighting on thisscale would soon completely consume the British Air Forcein spite of its individual ascendancy The hard question ofhow much we could send from Britain without leaving


ourselves defenceless and thus losing the power tocontinue the war pressed itself henceforward upon us Ourown natural promptings and many weighty militaryarguments lent force to the incessant vehement Frenchappeals On the other hand there was a limit and that limitif transgressed would cost us our lifeAt this time all these issues were discussed by the wholeWar Cabinet which met several times a day Air ChiefMarshal Dowding at the head of our metropolitan fightercommand had declared to me that with twenty-fivesquadrons of fighters he could defend the island against thewhole might of the German Air Force but that with less hewould be overpowered This would have entailed not onlythe destruction of all our airfields and our air power but ofthe aircraft factories on which our whole future hung Mycolleagues and I were resolved to run all risks for the sakeof the battle up to that limit ndash and those risks were verygreat ndash but not to go beyond it no matter what theconsequences might beAbout half-past seven on the morning of the 15th I waswoken up with the news that M Reynaud was on thetelephone at my bedside He spoke in English andevidently under stress ldquoWe have been defeatedrdquo As I didnot immediately respond he said again ldquoWe are beaten wehave lost the battlerdquo I said ldquoSurely it canrsquot have happenedso soonrdquo But he replied ldquoThe front is broken near Sedanthey are pouring through in great numbers with tanks andarmoured carsrdquondash or words to that effect I then said ldquoAllexperience shows that the offensive will come to an endafter a while I remember the 21st of March 1918 After fiveor six days they have to halt for supplies and theopportunity for counterattack is presented I learned all thisat the time from the lips of Marshal Foch himselfrdquo Certainlythis was what we had always seen in the past and what we


ought to have seen now However the French Premiercame back to the sentence with which he had begun whichproved indeed only too true ldquoWe are defeated we havelost the battlerdquo I said I was willing to come over and have atalkOn this day the French Ninth Army Coraprsquos was in a stateof complete dissolution and its remnants were divided upbetween General Giraud of the Seventh French Army whotook over from Corap in the north and the headquarters ofthe Sixth French Army which was forming in the south Agap of some fifty miles had in fact been punched in theFrench line through which the vast mass of enemy armourwas pouring By the evening of the 15th German armouredcars were reported to be in Liart and Montcornet the lattersixty miles behind the original front The French First Armywas also pierced on a five-thousand yards front south ofLimal Farther north all attacks on the British were repulsedThe German attack and the retirement of the Frenchdivision on their right compelled the making of a Britishdefensive flank facing south The French Seventh Armyhad retreated into the Antwerp defences west of theScheldt and was being driven out of the islands ofWalcheren and South BevelandOn this day also the struggle in Holland came to an endOwing to the ldquoCease Firerdquo order given by the Dutch HighCommand at 11 AM only a very few Dutch troops couldbe evacuatedOf course this picture presented a general impression ofdefeat I had seen a good deal of this sort of thing in theprevious war and the idea of the line being broken evenon a broad front did not convey to my mind the appallingconsequences that now flowed from it Not having hadaccess to official information for so many years I did not


comprehend the violence of the revolution effected sincethe last war by the incursion of a mass of fast-movingheavy armour I knew about it but it had not altered myinward convictions as it should have done There wasnothing I could have done if it had I rang up GeneralGeorges who seemed quite cool and reported that thebreach at Sedan was being plugged A telegram fromGeneral Gamelin also stated that although the positionbetween Namur and Sedan was serious he viewed thesituation with calm I reported Reynaudrsquos message andother news to the Cabinet at 11 AM the Chiefs of Staffbeing presentOn the 16th the German spearheads stood along the lineLa Capelle-Vervins-Marle-Laon and the vanguards of theGerman Fourteenth Corps were in support at Montcornetand Neufchacircteatl-sur-Aisne The fall of Laon confirmed thepenetration of over sixty miles inward upon us from thefrontier near Sedan Under this threat and the ever-increasing pressure on their own front the First FrenchArmy and the British Expeditionary Force were ordered towithdraw in three stages to the Scheldt Although none ofthese details were available even to the War Office and noclear view could be formed of what was happening thegravity of the crisis was obvious I felt it imperative to go toParis that afternoon My colleagues accepted the fact that Imust go and said they would look after everything at home


We had to expect that the disastrous events on the frontwould bring new foes upon us Although there were noindications of a change in Italian policy the Minister ofShipping was given instructions to thin out the shipping inthe Mediterranean No more British ships were to comehomewards from Aden We had already diverted round theCape the first convoy carrying the Australian troops toEngland The Defence Committee were instructed toconsider action in the event of war with Italy particularlywith regard to Crete Schemes for evacuating civilians fromAden and Gibraltar were put into operation

At about 3 PM I flew to Paris in a Flamingo a Governmentpassenger plane of which there were three General Dill


Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff came with me andIsmayIt was a good machine very comfortable and makingabout a hundred and sixty miles an hour As it wasunarmed an escort was provided but we soared off into arain-cloud and reached Le Bourget in little more than anhour From the moment we got out of the Flamingo it wasobvious that the situation was incomparably worse than wehad imagined The officers who met us told General Ismaythat the Germans were expected in Paris in a few days atmost After hearing at the Embassy about the position Idrove to the Quai drsquoOrsay arriving at 530 orsquoclock I wasconducted into one of its fine rooms Reynaud was thereDaladier Minister of National Defence and War andGeneral Gamelin Everybody was standing At no time didwe sit down around a table Utter dejection was written onevery face In front of Gamelin on a studentrsquos easel was amap about two yards square with a black ink linepurporting to show the Allied front In this line there wasdrawn a small but sinister bulge at SedanThe Commander-in-Chief briefly explained what hadhappened North and south of Sedan on a front of fifty orsixty miles the Germans had broken through The Frencharmy in front of them was destroyed or scattered A heavyonrush of armoured vehicles was advancing with unheard-of speed toward Amiens and Arras with the intentionapparently of reaching the coast at Abbeville orthereabouts Alternatively they might make for ParisBehind the armour he said eight or ten German divisionsall motorised were driving onwards making flanks forthemselves as they advanced against the two disconnectedFrench armies on either side The General talked perhapsfive minutes without anyone saying a word When hestopped there was a considerable silence I then asked


ldquoWhere is the strategic reserverdquo and breaking into Frenchwhich I used indifferently (in every sense) ldquoOugrave est la massede manoeuvrerdquo General Gamelin turned to me and with ashake of the head and a shrug said ldquoAucunerdquoThere was another long pause Outside in the garden of theQuai drsquoOrsay clouds of smoke arose from large bonfiresand I saw from the window venerable officials pushingwheelbarrows of archives onto them Already therefore theevacuation of Paris was being preparedPast experience carries with its advantages the drawbackthat things never happen the same way again Otherwise Isuppose life would be too easy After all we had often hadour fronts broken before always we had been able to pullthings together and wear down the momentum of theassault But here were two new factors that I had neverexpected to have to face First the overrunning of thewhole of the communications and countryside by anirresistible incursion of the armoured vehicles and secondlyno strategic reserveldquoAucunerdquo I was dumbfounded Whatwere we to think of the great French Army and its highestchiefs It had never occurred to me that any commandershaving to defend five hundred miles of engaged front wouldhave left themselves unprovided with a mass ofmanoeuvre No one can defend with certainty so wide afront but when the enemy has committed himself to amajor thrust which breaks the line one can always haveone must always have a mass of divisions which marchesup in vehement counter-attack at the moment when the firstfury of the offensive has spent its forceWhat was the Maginot Line for It should have economisedtroops upon a large sector of the frontier not only offeringmany sally-ports for local counter-strokes but also enablinglarge forces to be held in reserve and this is the only way


these things can be done But now there was no reserve Iadmit this was one of the greatest surprises I have had inmy life Why had I not known more about it even though Ihad been so busy at the Admiralty Why had the BritishGovernment and the War Office above all not known moreabout it It was no excuse that the French High Commandwould not impart their dispositions to us or to Lord Gortexcept in vague outline We had a right to know We oughtto have insisted Both armies were fighting in the linetogether I went back again to the window and the curlingwreaths of smoke from the bonfires of the State documentsof the French Republic Still the old gentlemen werebringing up their wheelbarrows and industriously castingtheir contents into the flamesThere was a considerable conversation in changing groupsaround the principals of which M Reynaud has published adetailed record I am represented as urging that thereshould be no withdrawal of the Northern Armies that on thecontrary they should counter-attack Certainly this was mymood But here was no considered military opinion4 Itmust be remembered that this was the first realisation wehad of the magnitude of the disaster or of the apparentFrench despair We were not conducting the operationsand our army which was only a tenth of the troops on thefront was serving under the French command I and theBritish officers with me were staggered at the evidentconviction of the French Commander-in-Chief and leadingMinisters that all was lost and in anything that I said I wasreacting violently against this There is however no doubtthat they were quite right and that the most rapid retreat tothe south was imperative This soon became obvious to allPresently General Gamelin was speaking again He wasdiscussing whether forces should now be gathered to strike


at the flanks of the penetration or ldquoBulgerdquo as we calledsuch things later on Eight or nine divisions were beingwithdrawn from quiet parts of the front the Maginot Linethere were two or three armoured divisions which had notbeen engaged eight or nine more divisions were beingbrought from Africa and would arrive in the battle zoneduring the next fortnight or three weeks General Giraudhad been placed in command of the French army north ofthe gap The Germans would advance henceforwardthrough a corridor between two fronts on which warfare inthe fashion of 1917 and 1918 could be waged Perhaps theGermans could not maintain the corridor with its ever-increasing double flank guards to be built up and at thesame time nourish their armoured incursion Something inthis sense Gamelin seemed to say and all this was quitesound I was conscious however that it carried noconviction in this small but hitherto influential andresponsible company Presently I asked General Gamelinwhen and where he proposed to attack the flanks of theBulge His reply was ldquoInferiority of numbers inferiority ofequipment inferiority of methodrdquondashand then a hopelessshrug of the shoulders There was no argument there wasno need of argument And where were we British anywayhaving regard to our tiny contribution ndash ten divisions aftereight months of war and not even one modern tankdivision in actionThis was the last I saw of General Gamelin He was apatriotic well-meaning man and skilled in his professionand no doubt he has his tale to tell5

The burden of General Gamelinrsquos and indeed of all theFrench High Commandrsquos subsequent remarks was


insistence on their inferiority in the air and earnestentreaties for more squadrons of the Royal Air Forcebomber as well as fighter but chiefly the latter This prayerfor fighter support was destined to be repeated at everysubsequent conference until France fell In the course of hisappeal General Gamelin said that fighters were needed notonly to give cover to the French Army but also to stop theGerman tanks At this I said ldquoNo It is the business of theartillery to stop the tanks The business of the fighters is tocleanse the skies (nettoyer le ciel) over the battlerdquo It wasvital that our metropolitan fighter air force should not bedrawn out of Britain on any account Our existence turnedon this Nevertheless it was necessary to cut to the boneIn the morning before I started the Cabinet had given meauthority to move four more squadrons of fighters toFrance On our return to the Embassy and after talking itover with Dill I decided to ask sanction for the despatch ofsix more This would leave us with only the twenty-fivefighter squadrons at home and that was the final limit Itwas a rending decision either way I told General Ismay totelephone to London that the Cabinet should assemble atonce to consider an urgent telegram which would be sentover in the course of the next hour or so Ismay did this inHindustani having previously arranged for an Indian Armyofficer to be standing by in his office This was my telegram

9 PM 16th May 1940I shall be glad if the Cabinet could meet immediately

to consider following Situation grave in the last degreeFurious German thrust through Sedan finds Frencharmies ill-grouped many in north others in Alsace Atleast four days required to bring twenty divisions tocover Paris and strike at the flanks of the Bulge whichis now fifty kilometres wide

Three [German] armoured divisions with two or threeinfantry divisions have advanced through gap and large


masses hurrying forward behind them Two greatdangers therefore threaten First that BEF will belargely left in the air to make a difficult disengagementand retreat to the old line Secondly that the Germanthrust will wear down the French resistance before itcan be fully gathered

Orders given to defend Paris at all costs butarchives of the Quai drsquoOrsay already burning in thegarden I consider the next two three or four daysdecisive for Paris and probably for the French ArmyTherefore the question we must face is whether we cangive further aid in fighters above four squadrons forwhich the French are very grateful and whether alarger part of our long-range heavy bombers should beemployed tomorrow and the following nights upon theGerman masses crossing the Meuse and flowing intothe Bulge Even so results cannot be guaranteed butthe French resistance may be broken up as rapidly asthat of Poland unless this battle of the Bulge is won Ipersonally feel that we should send squadrons offighters demanded (ie six more) tomorrow andconcentrating all available French and British aviationdominate the air above the Bulge for the next two orthree days not for any local purpose but to give thelast chance to the French Army to rally its bravery andstrength It would not be good historically if theirrequests were denied and their ruin resulted Also nightbombardment by a strong force of heavy bombers canno doubt be arranged It looks as if the enemy was bynow fully extended both in the air and tanks We mustnot underrate the increasing difficulties of his advance ifstrongly counter-attacked I imagine that if all fails herewe could still shift what is left of our own air strikingforce to assist the BEF should it be forced towithdraw I again emphasise the mortal gravity of thehour and express my opinion as above Kindly informme what you will do Dill agrees I must have answer bymidnight in order to encourage the French Telephoneto Ismay at Embassy in Hindustani


The reply came at about 1130 The Cabinet said ldquoYesrdquo Iimmediately took Ismay off with me in a car to MReynaudrsquos flat We found it more or less in darkness Afteran interval M Reynaud emerged from his bedroom in hisdressing-gown and I told him the favourable news Tenfighter squadrons I then persuaded him to send for MDaladier who was duly summoned and brought to the flatto hear the decision of the British Cabinet In this way Ihoped to revive the spirits of our French friends as muchas our limited means allowed Daladier never spoke a wordHe rose slowly from his chair and wrung my hand I gotback to the Embassy about 2 AM and slept well thoughthe cannon fire in petty aeroplane raids made one roll overfrom time to time In the morning I flew home and in spiteof other preoccupations pressed on with construction of thesecond level of the new Government



3The Battle of France The Second

Week Weygand May 17 to May 24

The Battle Crisis Grows mdash The Local DefenceVolunteers mdash Reinforcements from the East mdashMy Telegrams to President Roosevelt of May 18and May 20 mdashGeneral Gamelinrsquos Final Order No12 May 19 mdashGeneral Weygand Appointed mdashFrench Cabinet Changes mdash First Orders to theLittle Ships May 20 mdashldquoOperation DynamordquomdashWeygand Tours the Front mdash Billotte Killed in aMotor Accident mdash French Failure to Grapple withGerman Armour mdash Ironsidersquos Report May 21 mdashParliament Votes Extraordinary Powers to theGovernment mdash My Second Visit to Paris mdashWeygandrsquos Plan mdash Peril of the Northern Armiesmdash Fighting Round Arras mdash Correspondence withM Reynaud mdash Sir John Dill Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff

THE WAR CABINET met at 10 AM on the 17th and I gavethem an account of my visit to Paris and of the situation sofar as I could measure itI said I had told the French that unless they made asupreme effort we should not be justified in accepting thegrave risk to the safety of our country that we were incurringby the despatch of the additional fighter squadrons toFrance I felt that the question of air reinforcements wasone of the gravest that a British Cabinet had ever had toface It was claimed that the German air losses had been


four or five times our own but I had been told that theFrench had only one-quarter of their fighter aircraft left Onthis day Gamelin thought the situation ldquolostrdquo and is reportedto have said ldquoI will guarantee the safety of Paris only fortoday tomorrow [the 18th] and the night followingrdquo InNorway it appeared that Narvik was likely to be captured byus at any moment but Lord Cork was informed that in thelight of the news from France no more reinforcements couldbe sent to himThe battle crisis grew hourly in intensity At the request ofGeneral Georges the British Army prolonged its defensiveflank by occupying points on the whole line from Douai toPeacuteronne thus attempting to cover Arras which was a roadcentre vital to any southward retreat That afternoon theGermans entered Brussels The next day they reachedCambrai passed St Quentin and brushed our smallparties out of Peacuteronne The French Seventh the Belgianthe British and the French First Army all continued theirwithdrawal to the Scheldt the British standing along theDendre for the day and forming the detachmentldquoPetreforcerdquo (a temporary grouping of various units underMajor General Petre) for the defence of ArrasAt midnight (May 18ndash19) Lord Gort was visited at hisheadquarters by General Billotte Neither the personality ofthis French general nor his proposals such as they wereinspired confidence in his allies From this moment thepossibility of a withdrawal to the coast began to presentitself to the British Commander-in-Chief In his despatchpublished in March 1941 he wrote ldquoThe picture was now[night of the 19th] no longer that of a line bent ortemporarily broken but of a besieged fortressrdquo


As the result of my visit to Paris and the Cabinetdiscussions I already found it necessary to pose a generalquestion to my colleagues

Prime Minister to LordPresident

17V40

I am very much obliged to you for undertaking toexamine tonight the consequences of the withdrawal ofthe French Government from Paris or the fall of thatcity as well as the problems which would arise if it werenecessary to withdraw the BEF from France eitheralong its communications or by the Belgian andChannel ports It is quite understood that in the firstinstance this report could be no more than anenumeration of the main considerations which ariseand which could thereafter be remitted to the Staffs Iam myself seeing the military authorities at 630

The swift fate of Holland was in all our minds Mr Eden hadalready proposed to the War Cabinet the formation of LocalDefence Volunteers and this plan was energeticallypressed All over the country in every town and villagebands of determined men came together armed withshotguns sporting rifles clubs and spears From this a vastorganisation was soon to spring But the need of Regularswas also vital

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay for COS

18V40


I cannot feel that we have enough trustworthy troopsin England in view of the very large numbers that maybe landed from air-carriers preceded by parachutists Ido not consider this danger is imminent at the presenttime as the great battle in France has yet to be decided

I wish the following moves to be considered with aview to immediate action

(1) The transports which brought the Aus-tralians to Suez should bring home eightbattalions of Regular infantry from Palestineproperly convoyed even at some risk bywhatever route is thought best I hope it will bepossible to use the Mediterranean

(2) The Australian fast convoy arrives early inJune with 14000 men

(3) These ships should be immediately filledwith eight battalions of Territorials and sent toIndia where they should pick up eight [more]Regular battalions The speed of this fast convoyshould be accelerated

2 Everything must be done to carry out therecommendations for the control of aliens put forwardby the Committee and minuted by me on anotherpaper Action should also be taken against Communistsand Fascists and very considerable numbers shouldbe put in protective or preventive internment includingthe leaders These measures must of course bebrought before the Cabinet before action

3 The Chiefs of Staff must consider whether itwould not be well to send only half of the so-calledArmoured Division to France One must always beprepared for the fact that the French may be offeredvery advantageous terms of peace and the wholeweight be thrown on us


I also thought it necessary with the approval of mycolleagues to send the following grave telegrams toPresident Roosevelt in order to show how seriously theinterests of the United States would be affected by theconquest and subjugation not only of France but of GreatBritain The Cabinet pondered over these drafts for a whilebut made no amendment


18V40

I do not need to tell you about the gravity of whathas happened We are determined to persevere to thevery end whatever the result of the great battle ragingin France may be We must expect in any case to beattacked here on the Dutch model before very long andwe hope to give a good account of ourselves But ifAmerican assistance is to play any part it must beavailable soon


20V40

Lothian has reported his conversation with you Iunderstand your difficulties but I am very sorry aboutthe destroyers If they were here in six weeks theywould play an invaluable part The battle in France isfull of danger to both sides Though we have takenheavy toll of the enemy in the air and are clawing downtwo or three to one of their planes they have still aformidable numerical superiority Our most vital need istherefore the delivery at the earliest possible date ofthe largest possible number of Curtiss P-40 fightersnow in course of delivery to your Army

With regard to the closing part of your talk withLothian our intention is whatever happens to fight onto the end in this island and provided we can get thehelp for which we ask we hope to run them very close


in the air battles in view of individual superiorityMembers of the present Administration would [be] likely[to] go down during this process should it resultadversely but in no conceivable circumstances will weconsent to surrender If members of the presentAdministration were finished and others came in toparley amid the ruins you must not be blind to the factthat the sole remaining bargaining counter withGermany would be the Fleet and if this country wasleft by the United States to its fate no one would havethe right to blame those then responsible if they madethe best terms they could for the surviving inhabitantsExcuse me Mr President putting this nightmarebluntly Evidently I could not answer for my successorswho in utter despair and helplessness might well haveto accommodate themselves to the German willHowever there is happily no need at present to dwellupon such ideas Once more thanking you for yourgood will hellip

Far-reaching changes were now made by M Reynaud inthe French Cabinet and High Command On the 18thMarshal Peacutetain was appointed Vice-President of theCouncil Reynaud himself transferring Daladier to ForeignAffairs took over the Ministry of National Defence and WarAt 7 PM on the 19th he appointed Weygand who had justarrived from the Levant to replace General Gamelin I hadknown Weygand when he was the right-hand man ofMarshal Foch and had admired his masterly intervention inthe Battle of Warsaw against the Bolshevik invasion ofPoland in August 1920 ndash an event decisive for Europe atthat time He was now seventy-three but was reported tobe efficient and vigorous in a very high degree GeneralGamelinrsquos final Order (No 12) dated 945 AM on May 19prescribed that the Northern Armies instead of letting


themselves be encircled must at all costs force their waysouthward to the Somme attacking the Panzer divisionswhich had cut their communications At the same time theSecond Army and the newly forming Sixth were to attacknorthward towards Meacuteziegraveres These decisions were soundIndeed an order for the general retreat of the NorthernArmies southward was already at least four days overdueOnce the gravity of the breach in the French centre atSedan was apparent the only hope for the Northern Armieslay in an immediate march to the Somme Instead underGeneral Billotte they had only made gradual and partialwithdrawals to the Scheldt and formed the defensive flankto the right Even now there might have been time for thesouthward marchThe confusion of the northern command the apparentparalysis of the First French Army and the uncertaintyabout what was happening had caused the War Cabinetextreme anxiety All our proceedings were quiet andcomposed but we had a united and decided opinionbehind which there was silent passion On the 19th wewere informed (430 PM) that Lord Gort was ldquoexamining apossible withdrawal towards Dunkirk if that were forcedupon himrdquo The CIGS (Ironside) could not accept thisproposal as like most of us he favoured the southwardmarch We therefore sent him to Lord Gort with instructionsto move the British Army in a southwesterly direction and toforce his way through all opposition in order to join up withthe French in the south and that the Belgians should beurged to conform to this movement or alternatively thatwe would evacuate as many of their troops as possiblefrom the Channel ports He was to be told that we wouldourselves inform the French Government of what had beenresolved At the same Cabinet we sent Dill to GeneralGeorgesrsquo Headquarters with which we had a direct


telephone He was to stay there for four days and tell us allhe could find out Contacts even with Lord Gort wereintermittent and difficult but it was reported that only fourdaysrsquo supplies and ammunition for one battle were available

At the morning War Cabinet of May 20 we again discussedthe situation of our Army Even on the assumption of asuccessful fighting retreat to the Somme I thought it likelythat considerable numbers might be cut off or driven backon the sea It is recorded in the minutes of the meetingldquoThe Prime Minister thought that as a precautionarymeasure the Admiralty should assemble a large number ofsmall vessels in readiness to proceed to ports and inlets onthe French coastrdquo On this the Admiralty acted immediatelyand with ever-increasing vigour as the days passed anddarkened Operational control had been delegated on the19th to Admiral Ramsay commanding at Dover whoseresources at that time comprised thirty-six personnelvessels of various sorts based on Southampton and DoverOn the afternoon of the 20th in consequence of the ordersfrom London the first conference of all concerned includingrepresentatives of the Shipping Ministry was held at Doverto consider ldquothe emergency evacuation across the Channelof very large forcesrdquo It was planned if necessary toevacuate from Calais Boulogne and Dunkirk at a rate often thousand men from each port every twenty-four hoursThirty craft of passenger-ferry type twelve naval driftersand six small coasters were provided as a first instalmentOn May 22 the Admiralty ordered forty Dutch skoots whichhad taken refuge with us to be requisitioned and mannedwith naval crews These were commissioned between May25 and May 27 From Harwich round to Weymouth sea-


transport officers were directed to list all suitable ships up toa thousand tons and a complete survey was made of allshipping in British harbours These plans for what wascalled ldquoOperation Dynamordquo proved the salvation of theArmy ten days later

The direction of the German thrust had now become moreobvious Armoured vehicles and mechanised divisionscontinued to pour through the gap towards Amiens andArras curling westward along the Somme towards the seaOn the night of the 20th they entered Abbeacuteville havingtraversed and cut the whole communications of theNorthern Armies These hideous fatal scythes encounteredlittle or no resistance once the front had been broken TheGerman tanks ndash the dreaded ldquochars allemandsrdquondash rangedfreely through the open country and aided and supplied bymechanised transport advanced thirty or forty miles a dayThey had passed through scores of towns and hundreds ofvillages without the slightest opposition their officerslooking out of the open cupolas and waving jauntily to theinhabitants Eye-witnesses spoke of crowds of Frenchprisoners marching along with them many still carryingtheir rifles which were from time to time collected andbroken under the tanks I was shocked by the utter failureto grapple with the German armour which with a fewthousand vehicles was compassing the entire destructionof mighty armies and by the swift collapse of all Frenchresistance once the fighting front had been pierced Thewhole German movement was proceeding along the mainroads at no point on which did they seem to be blockedAlready on the 17th I had asked the Chief of the Air StaffldquoIs there no possibility of finding out where a column of


enemy armoured vehicles harbours during the dark hoursand then bombing We are being ripped to pieces behindthe front by these wandering columnsrdquoI now telegraphed to Reynaud

21V40

Many congratulations upon appointing Weygand inwhom we have entire confidence here

It is not possible to stop columns of tanks frompiercing thin lines and penetrating deeply All ideas ofstopping holes and hemming in these intruders arevicious Principle should be on the contrary to punchholes Undue importance should not be attached to thearrival of a few tanks at any particular point What canthey do if they enter a town Towns should be held withriflemen and tank personnel should be fired uponshould they attempt to leave vehicles If they cannot getfood or drink or petrol they can only make a mess anddepart Where possible buildings should be blowndown upon them Every town with valuable cross-roadsshould be held in this fashion Secondly the tankcolumns in the open must be hunted down andattacked in the open country by numbers of smallmobile columns with a few cannon Their tracks mustbe wearing out and their energy must abate This is theone way to deal with the armoured intruders As for themain body which does not seem to be coming on veryquickly the only method is to drive in upon the flanksThe confusion of this battle can only be cleared bybeing aggravated so that it becomes a melee Theystrike at our communications we should strike at theirsI feel more confident than I did at the beginning of thebattle but all the armies must fight at the same timeand I hope the British will have a chance soon Aboveis only my personal view and I trust it will give nooffence if I state it to you

Every good wish


Weygandrsquos first act was to cancel Gamelinrsquos Instruction No12 It was not unnatural that he should wish to see thesituation in the north for himself and to make contact withthe commanders there Allowances must be made for ageneral who takes over the command in the crisis of alosing battle But now there was no time He should nothave left the summit of the remaining controls and havebecome involved in the delays and strains of personalmovement We may note in detail what followed On themorning of the 20th Weygand installed in Gamelinrsquos placemade arrangements to visit the Northern Armies on the21st After learning that the roads to the north were cut bythe Germans he decided to fly His plane was attackedand forced to land at Calais The hour appointed for hisconference at Ypres had to be altered to 3 PM on the 21stHere he met King Leopold and General Billotte Lord Gortwho had not been notified of time and place was notpresent and the only British officer in attendance wasAdmiral Keyes who was attached to the King and had nomilitary command The King described this conference asldquofour hours of confused talkingrdquo It discussed the co-ordination of the three armies the execution of theWeygand plan and if that failed the retirement of the Britishand French to the Lys and the Belgians to the Yser At 8 PM General Weygand had to leave Lord Gort did not arrivetill eight when he received an account of the proceedingsfrom General Billotte Weygand drove back to Calaisembarked on a submarine for Dieppe and returned toParis Billotte drove off in his car to deal with the crisis andwithin the hour was killed in a motor collision Thus all wasagain in suspense


On the 21st Ironside returned and reported that Lord Gorton receiving the Cabinet instructions had put the followingpoints to him(1) That the southward march would involve a rearguardaction from the Scheldt at the same time as an attack intoan area already strongly held by the enemy armoured andmobile formations During such a movement both flankswould have to be protected(2) That sustained offensive operations were difficult in viewof the administrative situation and(3) That neither the French First Army nor the Belgianswere likely to be able to conform to such a manoeuvre ifattemptedIronside added that confusion reigned in the French HighCommand in the north that General Billotte had failed tocarry out his duties of co-ordination for the past eight daysand appeared to have no plans that the BritishExpeditionary Force were in good heart and had so far hadonly about five hundred battle casualties He gave a vividdescription of the state of the roads crowded with refugeesscourged by the fire of German aircraft He had had a roughtime himselfTwo fearsome alternatives therefore presented themselvesto the War Cabinet The first the British Army at all costswith or without French and Belgian co-operation to cut itsway to the south and the Somme a task which Lord Gortdoubted its ability to perform the second to fall back onDunkirk and face a sea evacuation under hostile air attackwith the certainty of losing all the artillery and equipmentthen so scarce and precious Obviously great risks shouldbe run to achieve the first but there was no reason why allpossible precautions and preparations should not be taken


for the sea evacuation if the southern plan failed Iproposed to my colleagues that I should go to France tomeet Reynaud and Weygand and come to a decision Dillwas to meet me there from General Georgesrsquo Headquarters

This was the moment when my colleagues felt it right toobtain from Parliament the extraordinary powers for which abill had been prepared during the last few days Thismeasure would give the Government practically unlimitedpower over the life liberty and property of all His Majestyrsquossubjects in Great Britain In general terms of law the powersgranted by Parliament were absolute The Act was toldquoinclude power by Order in Council to make such DefenceRegulations making provision for requiring persons to placethemselves their services and their property at thedisposal of His Majesty as appear to him to be necessary orexpedient for securing the public safety the defence of theRealm the maintenance of public order or the efficientprosecution of any war in which His Majesty may beengaged or for maintaining supplies or services essentialto the life of the communityrdquoIn regard to persons the Minister of Labour wasempowered to direct anyone to perform any servicerequired The regulation giving him this power included afair wages clause which was inserted in the Act to regulatewage conditions Labour supply committees were to be setup in important centres The control of property in thewidest sense was imposed in equal manner Control of allestablishments including banks was imposed under theauthority of Government orders Employers could berequired to produce their books and excess profits were tobe taxed at 100 per cent A Production Council to be


presided over by Mr Greenwood was to be formed and aDirector of Labour Supply to be appointedThis bill was accordingly presented to Parliament on theafternoon of the 22d by Mr Chamberlain and Mr Attlee thelatter himself moving the second reading Both theCommons and the Lords with their immense Conservativemajorities passed it unanimously through all its stages in asingle afternoon and it received the Royal Assent that night

For Romans in Romersquos quarrelSpared neither land nor goldNor son nor wife nor limb nor lifeIn the brave days of old

Such was the temper of the hour

When I arrived in Paris on May 22 there was a new settingGamelin was gone Daladier was gone from the war sceneReynaud was both Prime Minister and Minister of War Asthe German thrust had definitely turned seaward Paris wasnot immediately threatened Grand Quartier Geacuteneacuteral (GQG) was still at Vincennes M Reynaud drove me downthere about noon In the garden some of those figures I hadseen round Gamelin ndash one a very tall cavalry officer ndash werepacing moodily up and down ldquoCrsquoest lrsquoancien reacutegimerdquoremarked the aide-de-camp Reynaud and I were broughtinto Weygandrsquos room and afterwards to the map roomwhere we had the great maps of the Supreme CommandWeygand met us In spite of his physical exertions and anight of travel he was brisk buoyant and incisive Hemade an excellent impression upon all He unfolded his


plan of war He was not content with a southward march orretreat for the Northern Armies They should strikesoutheast from around Cambrai and Arras in the generaldirection of St Quentin thus taking in flank the Germanarmoured divisions at present engaged in what he calledthe St Quentin-Amiens pocket Their rear he thoughtwould be protected by the Belgian Army which would coverthem towards the east and if necessary towards the northMeanwhile a new French army under General Fregraverecomposed of eighteen to twenty divisions drawn fromAlsace from the Maginot Line from Africa and from everyother quarter were to form a front along the Somme Theirleft hand would push forward through Amiens to Arras andthus by their utmost efforts establish contact with the armiesof the north The enemy armour must be kept underconstant pressure ldquoThe Panzer divisions must notrdquo saidWeygand ldquobe allowed to keep the initiativerdquo All necessaryorders had been given so far as it was possible to giveorders at all We were now told that General Billotte towhom he had imparted his whole plan had just been killedin the motor accident Dill and I were agreed that we had nochoice and indeed no inclination except to welcome theplan I emphasised that ldquoit was indispensable to reopencommunications between the armies of the north and thoseof the south by way of Arrasrdquo I explained that Lord Gortwhile striking southwest must also guard his path to thecoast To make sure there was no mistake about what wassettled I myself dictated a reacutesumeacute of the decisions andshowed it to Weygand who agreed I reported accordinglyto the Cabinet and sent the following telegram to Lord Gort

22V40I flew to Paris this morning with Dill and others The

conclusions which were reached between ReynaudWeygand and ourselves are summarised below They


accord exactly with general directions you havereceived from the War Office You have our bestwishes in the vital battle now opening towardsBapaume and Cambrai

It was agreed1 That the Belgian Army should withdraw to the line

of the Yser and stand there the sluices being opened2 That the British Army and the French First Army

should attack southwest towards Bapaume andCambrai at the earliest moment certainly tomorrow ndashwith about eight divisions ndash and with the BelgianCavalry Corps on the right of the British

3 That as this battle is vital to both armies and theBritish communications depend upon freeing Amiensthe British Air Force should give the utmost possiblehelp both by day and by night while it is going on

4 That the new French Army Group which isadvancing upon Amiens and forming a line along theSomme should strike northward and join hands with theBritish divisions who are attacking southward in thegeneral direction of Bapaume

It will be seen that Weygandrsquos new plan did not differexcept in emphasis from the cancelled Instruction No 12 ofGeneral Gamelin Nor was it out of harmony with thevehement opinion which the War Cabinet had expressedon the 19th The Northern Armies were to shoulder theirway southward by offensive action destroying if possiblethe armoured incursion They were to be met by a helpfulthrust through Amiens by the new French Army Groupunder General Fregravere This would be most important if itcame true In private I complained to M Reynaud that Gorthad been left entirely without orders for four consecutivedays Even since Weygand had assumed command threedays had been lost in taking decisions The change in theSupreme Command was right The resultant delay was evilI slept the night at the Embassy The air raids were trivialthe guns were noisy but one never heard a bomb Very


different indeed were the experiences of Paris from theordeal which London was soon to endure I had a keendesire to go to see my friend General Georges at hisheadquarters at Compiegravegne Our liaison officer with himBrigadier Swayne was with me for some time and gave methe picture of the French armies so far as he knew it whichwas only part of the way I was persuaded that it would bebetter not to intrude at this time when this vast andcomplicated operation was being attempted in the teeth ofevery form of administrative difficulty and frequentbreakdowns in communicationIn the absence of any supreme war direction events andthe enemy had taken control On the 17th Gort had begunto direct troops to the line Ruyaulcourt-Arleux and togarrison Arras and was constantly strengthening hissouthern flank The French Seventh Army less theSixteenth Corps which had suffered heavily in theWalcheren fighting had moved south to join the FirstFrench Army It had traversed the British rear withoutserious disturbance On the 20th Gort had informed bothGenerals Billotte and Blanchard that he proposed to attacksouthward from Arras on May 21 with two divisions and anarmoured brigade and Billotte had agreed to co-operatewith two French divisions from the First French Army Thisarmy of thirteen divisions was gathered in an oblong somenineteen miles by ten ndash Maulde-Valenciennes-Denain-Douai The enemy had crossed the Scheldt on the 20tharound Oudenarde and the three British corps which stillfaced east withdrew on the 23d to the defences we haderected in the winter along the Belgian frontier from whichthey had advanced so eagerly twelve days before On thisday the BEF were put on half rations The impression ofFrench helplessness derived from many sources led me toprotest to Reynaud



Prime Minister to MReynaud (Copy toLord Gort)

23V40

Communications of Northern Armies have been cutby strong enemy armoured forces Salvation of thesearmies can only be obtained by immediate execution ofWeygandrsquos plan I demand the issue to the Frenchcommanders in north and south and Belgian GHQ ofthe most stringent orders to carry this out and turndefeat into victory Time is vital as supplies are short

I reported this message to the War Cabinet when they metat 1130 AM pointing out that the whole success of theWeygand plan was dependent on the French taking theinitiative which they showed no signs of doing We metagain at 7 PM

And the next day

Prime Minister to MReynaud for GeneralWeygand

24V40

General Gort wires that co-ordination of northernfront is essential with armies of three different nationsHe says he cannot undertake this co-ordination as heis already fighting north and south and is threatened onhis lines of communications At the same time SirRoger Keyes tells me that up to 3 PM today (23d)Belgian Headquarters and King had received nodirective How does this agree with your statement thatBlanchard and Gort are main dans la main Appreciatefully difficulties of communication but feel no effectiveconcert of operations in northern area against whichenemy are concentrating Trust you will be able torectify this Gort further says that any advance by himmust be in the nature of sortie and that relief mustcome from south as he has not (repeat not) ammuni-


tion for serious attack Nevertheless we are instructinghim to persevere in carrying out your plan We have nothere even seen your own directive and have noknowledge of the details of your northern operationsWill you kindly have this sent through French Mission atearliest All good wishes

Some account of the small battle fought by the Britisharound Arras must be given here General Franklyn whocommanded intended to occupy the area Arras-Cambrai-Bapaume He had the 5th and 50th British Divisions andthe 1st Army Tank Brigade His plan was to attack with thisarmour and one brigade of each division the whole underGeneral Martel round the western and southern sides ofArras with an immediate objective on the river SenseacuteeThe French were to co-operate with two divisions on theeast to the Cambrai-Arras road The British divisionsconsisted of only two brigades each and the tanksnumbered sixty-five Mark I and eighteen Mark II all ofwhose tracks the life of which was short were wearing outThe attack began at 2 PM on May 21 and soon founditself engaged with much stronger opposition than wasexpected French support on the eastern flank did notmaterialise and on the western was limited to one lightmechanised division The enemy armour actually consistedof about four hundred tanks of the 7th and 8th GermanArmoured Divisions a general named Rommelcommanding the former


At first the attack prospered and four hundred prisonerswere taken but the line of the river Senseacutee was notreached and the German counter-attack in overwhelmingnumbers with full air support caused heavy casualties The12th Lancers presently reported strong enemy columnsmoving towards St Pol and threatening to turn the westernflank During the night the Army Tank Brigade the 13thBrigade of the 5th Division and the 151st Brigade of the50th Division gradually withdrew to the river Scarpe Herethree British brigades stood until the afternoon of the 22dand in this neighbourhood repulsed various attacks We stillheld Arras but the enemy gradually tended to swing roundtowards Beacutethune The French light mechanised divisionguarding our western flank was forced from Mont St Eloi


and the enemy tanks soon after approached Souchez By 7PM on the 23d the British eastern flank was under heavypressure and the enemy reaching Lens had encircled thewestern flank Thus the position was precarious We werehopelessly outnumbered beset by masses of armour andalmost surrounded At 10 PM General Franklyn informedGeneral Headquarters that unless his force was withdrawnduring the night its retirement would become impossibleHe was told that orders to withdraw had been sent himthree hours before The operation had some temporaryeffect on the enemy they recorded it at the time as ldquoheavyBritish counterattacks with armourrdquo which caused themconsiderable anxietyIn pursuance of the Weygand plan Gort proposed toGeneral Blanchard who now commanded the northerngroup that two British divisions one French division andthe French Cavalry Corps should attack southward betweenthe Canal du Nord and the Scheldt Canal Two Frenchdivisions had in fact twice previously reached the outskirtsof Cambrai but on each occasion they were bombed andwithdrew In all these days this was the only offensiveaction of the French First Army

In London we had no knowledge of the progress of thisforlorn attempt at Arras to break the encircling lineHowever during the 24th very reproachful telegramsarrived from Reynaud The shorter of his two messagestells the story

You wired me [he said] this morning that you hadinstructed General Gort to continue to carry out theWeygand plan General Weygand now informs methat according to a telegram from General Blanchardthe British Army had carried out on its own initiative a


retreat of twenty-five miles towards the ports at a timewhen our troops moving up from the south are gainingground towards the north where they were to meettheir allies

This action of the British Army is in direct oppositionto the formal orders renewed this morning by GeneralWeygand This retreat has naturally obliged GeneralWeygand to change all his arrangements and he iscompelled to give up the idea of closing the gap andrestoring a continuous front I need not lay any stressupon the gravity of the possible consequences

Up to this time General Weygand had been counting onGeneral Fregraverersquos army advancing northward on AmiensAlbert and Peacuteronne They had in fact made no noticeableprogress and were still forming and assembling Thefollowing are my replies to M Reynaud

25V40My telegram last night told you all we knew over

here and we have still heard nothing from Lord Gort tocontradict it But I must tell you that a staff officer hasreported to the War Office confirming the withdrawal ofthe two divisions from the Arras region which yourtelegram to me mentioned General Dill who should bewith Lord Gort has been told to send a staff officer byair at the earliest moment As soon as we know whathas happened I will report fully It is clear howeverthat the Northern Army is practically surrounded andthat all its communications are cut except throughDunkirk and Ostend

25V40We have every reason to believe that Gort is still

persevering in southward move All we know is that hehas been forced by the pressure on his western flankand to keep communication with Dunkirk for indispens-able supplies to place parts of two divisions betweenhimself and the increasing pressure of the Germanarmoured forces which in apparently irresistible


strength have successively captured Abbeacuteville andBoulogne are menacing Calais and Dunkirk and havetaken St Omer How can he move southward anddisengage his northern front unless he throws out thisshield on his right hand Nothing in the movements ofthe BEF of which we are aware can be any excusefor the abandonment of the strong pressure of yournorthward move across the Somme which we trust willdevelop

Secondly you complained of heavy materials beingmoved from Havre Only materials moved away weregas shells which it was indiscreet to leave Also someof the stores have been moved from the north to thesouth side of the river at Havre

Thirdly should I become aware that extremepressure of events has compelled any departure fromthe plan agreed I shall immediately inform you Dillwho was this morning wholly convinced that the solehope of any effective extrication of our Army lies in thesouthward move and in the active advance of GeneralFregravere is now with Gort You must understand thathaving waited for the southward move for a week afterit became obvious[ly necessary] we find ourselves nowripped from the coast by the mass of the enemyrsquosarmoured vehicles We therefore have no choice but tocontinue the southward move using such flank guardprotection to the westward as is necessary

General Spears will be with you tomorrow morningand it will probably be quickest to send him back whenthe position is clear

There was a very strong feeling in Cabinet and high militarycircles that the abilities and strategic knowledge of Sir JohnDill who had been since April 23 Vice-Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff should find their full scope in his appointmentas our principal Army adviser No one could doubt that his


professional standing was in many ways superior to that ofIronsideAs the adverse battle drew to its climax I and mycolleagues greatly desired that Sir John Dill should becomeCIGS We had also to choose a Commander-in-Chief forthe British Island if we were invaded Late at night on May25 Ironside Dill Ismay myself and one or two others inmy room at Admiralty House were trying to measure theposition General Ironside volunteered the proposal that heshould cease to be CIGS but declared himself quitewilling to command the British Home Armies Consideringthe unpromising task that such a command was at the timethought to involve this was a spirited and selfless offer Itherefore accepted General Ironsidersquos proposal and thehigh dignities and honours which were later conferred uponhim arose from my appreciation of his bearing at thismoment in our affairs Sir John Dill became CIGS on May27 The changes were generally judged appropriate for thetime being


4The March to the Sea May 24 to May 31

Review of the BattlemdashGeneral Halderrsquos Accountof Hitlerrsquos Personal Intervention mdash Halt of theGerman Armour mdash The Truth from the GermanStaff DiariesmdashA Separate Cause for the Halt atthe Decisive PointmdashThe Defence of Boulogne mdashThe Drama of Calais mdash The Consequences ofProlonged DefencemdashGort Abandons theWeygand PlanmdashHis Decision of May 25 mdash Fillingthe Belgian GapmdashWithdrawal of the British Armyto the Dunkirk BridgeheadsmdashExtrication of theFour British Divisions from LillemdashA Question tothe Chiefs of Staff mdash Their AnswermdashMy Messageto Lord Gort mdash And to Admiral KeyesmdashGeneralPownallrsquos Account of the Gort mdash BlanchardMeeting on the Morning of May 28 mdash Surrender ofthe Belgian Army May 28 mdash Decisive BattleFought by General Brooke and the Second CorpsMay 28 mdash Withdrawal to the BridgeheadmdashEscapeby Sea of Half the French First Army

WE MAY NOW REVIEW up to this point the course of thismemorable battleOnly Hitler was prepared to violate the neutrality of Belgiumand Holland Belgium would not invite the Allies in until shewas herself attacked Therefore the military initiative restedwith Hitler On May 10 he struck his blow The First ArmyGroup with the British in the centre instead of standing


behind their fortifications leaped forward into Belgium on avain because belated mission of rescue The French hadleft the gap opposite the Ardennes ill fortified and weaklyguarded An armoured inroad on a scale never known inwar broke the centre of the French line of armies and inforty-eight hours threatened to cut all the northern armiesalike from their southern communications and from the seaBy the 14th at the latest the French High Command shouldhave given imperative orders to these armies to make ageneral retreat at full speed accepting not only risks butheavy losses of material This issue was not faced in itsbrutal realism by General Gamelin The French commanderof the northern group Billotte was incapable of taking thenecessary decisions himself Confusion reigned throughoutthe armies of the threatened left wingAs the superior power of the enemy was felt they fell backAs the turning movement swung round their right theyformed a defensive flank If they had started back on the14th they could have been on their old line by the 17th andwould have had a good chance of fighting their way out Atleast three mortal days were lost From the 17th onwardsthe British War Cabinet saw clearly that an immediatefighting march southward would alone save the BritishArmy They were resolved to press their view upon theFrench Government and General Gamelin but their owncommander Lord Gort was doubtful whether it waspossible to disengage the fighting fronts and still more tobreak through at the same time On the 19th GeneralGamelin was dismissed and Weygand reigned in his steadGamelinrsquos ldquoInstruction No 12rdquo his last order though fivedays late was sound in principle and also in conformitywith the main conclusions of the British War Cabinet andChiefs of Staff The change in the supreme command orwant of command led to another three daysrsquo delay The


spirited plan which General Weygand proposed aftervisiting the northern armies was never more than a paperscheme In the main it was the Gamelin plan rendered stillmore hopeless by further delayIn the hideous dilemma which now presented itself weaccepted the Weygand plan and made loyal and persistentthough now ineffectual efforts to carry it out until the 25thwhen all the communications being cut our weak counter-attack being repulsed with the loss of Arras the Belgianfront being broken and King Leopold about to capitulate allhope of escape to the southward vanished There remainedonly the sea Could we reach it or must we be surroundedand broken up in the open field In any case the wholeartillery and equipment of our army irreplaceable for manymonths must be lost But what was that compared withsaving the army the nucleus and structure upon whichalone Britain could build her armies of the future LordGort who had from the 25th onwards felt that evacuationby sea was our only chance now proceeded to form abridgehead around Dunkirk and to fight his way into it withwhat strength remained All the discipline of the British andthe qualities of their commanders who included BrookeAlexander and Montgomery were to be needed Muchmore was to be needed All that man could do was doneWould it be enough

A much-disputed episode must now be examined GeneralHalder Chief of the German General Staff has declaredthat at this moment Hitler made his only effective directpersonal intervention in the battle He became according tothis authority ldquoalarmed about the armoured formationsbecause they were in considerable danger in a difficult


country honeycombed with canals without being able toattain any vital resultsrdquo He felt he could not sacrificearmoured formations uselessly as they were essential tothe second stage of the campaign He believed no doubtthat his air superiority would be sufficient to prevent a large-scale evacuation by sea He therefore according to Haldersent a message to him through Brauchitsch ordering ldquothearmoured formations to be stopped the points even takenbackrdquo Thus says Halder the way to Dunkirk was clearedfor the British Army At any rate we intercepted a Germanmessage sent in clear at 1142 AM on May 24 to the effectthat the attack on the line Dunkirk-Hazebrouck-Merville wasto be discontinued for the present Halder states that herefused on behalf of Supreme Army Headquarters tointerfere in the movement of Army Group Rundstedt whichhad clear orders to prevent the enemy from reaching thecoast The quicker and more complete the success herehe argued the easier it would be later to repair the loss ofsome tanks The next day he was ordered to go withBrauchitsch to a conferenceThe excited discussion finished with a definite order byHitler to which he added that he would ensure execution ofhis order by sending personal liaison officers to the frontKeitel was sent by plane to Army Group Rundstedt andother officers to the front command posts ldquoI have neverbeen ablerdquo says General Halder ldquoto figure how Hitlerconceived the idea of the useless endangering of thearmoured formations It is most likely that Keitel who wasfor a considerable time in Flanders in the First World Warhad originated these ideas by his talesrdquoOther German generals have told much the same storyand have even suggested that Hitlerrsquos order was inspired bya political motive to improve the chances of peace withEngland after France was beaten Authentic documentary


evidence has now come to light in the shape of the actualdiary of Rundstedtrsquos headquarters written at the time Thistells a different tale At midnight on the 23d orders camefrom Brauchitsch at OKH placing the Fourth Army underRundstedt for ldquothe last actrdquo of ldquothe encirclement battlerdquo Nextmorning Hitler visited Rundstedt who represented to himthat his armour which had come so far and so fast wasmuch reduced in strength and needed a pause wherein toreorganise and regain its balance for the final blow againstan enemy who his staff diary says was ldquofighting withextraordinary tenacityrdquo Moreover Rundstedt foresaw thepossibility of attacks on his widely dispersed forces fromnorth and south in fact the Weygand Plan which if it hadbeen feasible was the obvious Allied counter-stroke Hitlerldquoagreed entirelyrdquo that the attack east of Arras should becarried out by infantry and that the mobile formationsshould continue to hold the line Lens-Beacutethune-Aire-StOmer-Gravelines in order to intercept the enemy forcesunder pressure from Army Group B in the northeast Healso dwelt on the paramount necessity of conserving thearmoured forces for further operations However very earlyon the 25th a fresh directive was sent from Brauchitsch asthe Commander-in-Chief ordering the continuation of theadvance by the armour Rundstedt fortified by Hitlerrsquosverbal agreement would have none of it He did not passon the order to the Fourth Army Commander Kluge whowas told to continue to husband the Panzer divisions Klugeprotested at the delay but it was not till next day the 26ththat Rundstedt released them although even then heenjoined that Dunkirk was not yet itself to be directlyassaulted The diary records that the Fourth Army protestedat this restriction and its Chief of Staff telephoned on the27th ldquoThe picture in the Channel ports is as follows Bigships come up the quayside boards are put down and the


men crowd on the ships All material is left behind But weare not keen on finding these men newly equipped upagainst us laterrdquoIt is therefore certain that the armour was halted that thiswas done on the initiative not of Hitler but of RundstedtRundstedt no doubt had reasons for his view both in thecondition of the armour and in the general battle but heought to have obeyed the formal orders of the ArmyCommand or at least told them what Hitler had said inconversation There is general agreement among theGerman commanders that a great opportunity was lost

There was however a separate cause which affected themovements of the German armour at the decisive pointAfter reaching the sea at Abbeacuteville on the night of the 20ththe leading German armoured and motorised columns hadmoved northward along the coast by Etaples towardsBoulogne Calais and Dunkirk with the evident intention ofcutting off all escape by sea This region was lighted in mymind from the previous war when I had maintained themobile Marine Brigade operating from Dunkirk against theflanks and rear of the German armies marching on Paris Idid not therefore have to learn about the inundation systembetween Calais and Dunkirk or the significance of theGravelines waterline The sluices had already beenopened and with every day the floods were spreading thusgiving southerly protection to our line of retreat Thedefence of Boulogne but still more of Calais to the latesthour stood forth upon the confused scene and garrisonswere immediately sent there from England Boulogneisolated and attacked on May 22 was defended by twobattalions of the Guards and one of our few anti-tank


batteries with some French troops After thirty-six hoursrsquoresistance it was reported to be untenable and Iconsented to the remainder of the garrison including theFrench being taken off by sea This was effected by eightdestroyers on the night of May 23ndash24 with a loss of only twohundred men I regretted this decisionSome days earlier I had placed the conduct of the defenceof the Channel ports directly under the Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff with whom I was in constant touch I nowresolved that Calais should be fought to the death and thatno evacuation by sea could be allowed to the garrisonwhich consisted of one battalion of the Rifle Brigade one ofthe 60th Rifles the Queen Victoria Rifles and a battalion ofthe Royal Tank Regiment with twenty-one Light and twenty-seven Cruiser tanks and an equal number of Frenchmen Itwas painful thus to sacrifice these splendid trained Regulartroops of which we had so few for the doubtful advantageof gaining two or perhaps three days and the unknownuses that could be made of these days The Secretary ofState for War and the CIGS agreed to this hard measureThe telegrams and minutes tell the tale


23V40

Apart from the general order issued I trust last nightby Weygand for assuring the southward movement ofthe armies via Amiens it is imperative that a clear lineof supply should be opened up at the earliest momentto Gortrsquos army by Dunkirk Calais or Boulogne Gortcannot remain insensible to the peril in which he is nowplaced and he must detach even a division orwhatever lesser force is necessary to meet our forcepushing through from the coast If the regiment of


armoured vehicles including Cruiser tanks has actuallylanded at Calais this should improve the situation andshould encourage us to send the rest of the SecondBrigade of that Armoured Division in there This coastalarea must be cleaned up if the major operation ofwithdrawal is to have any chance The intruders behindthe line must be struck at and brought to bay Therefugees should be driven into the fields and parkedthere as proposed by General Weygand so that theroads can be kept clear Are you in touch with Gort bytelephone and telegraph and how long does it take tosend him a cyphered message Will you kindly tell oneof your staff officers to send a map to Downing Streetwith the position so far as it is known today of the nineBritish divisions Do not reply to this yourself


24V40

I cannot understand the situation around Calais TheGermans are blocking all exits and our regiment oftanks is boxed up in the town because it cannot facethe field guns planted on the outskirts Yet I expect theforces achieving this are very modest Why then arethey not attacked Why does not Lord Gort attack themfrom the rear at the same time that we make a sortiefrom Calais Surely Gort can spare a brigade or two toclear his communications and to secure the suppliesvital to his army Here is a general with nine divisionsabout to be starved out and yet he cannot send a forceto clear his communications What else can be soimportant as this Where could a reserve be betteremployed

This force blockading Calais should be attacked atonce by Gort by the Canadians from Dunkirk and by asortie of our boxed-up tanks Apparently the Germanscan go anywhere and do anything and their tanks canact in twos and threes all over our rear and even whenthey are located they are not attacked Also our tanksrecoil before their field guns but our field guns do notlike to take on their tanks If their motorised artillery farfrom its base can block us why cannot we with the


artillery of a great army block them hellip The responsibili-ty for cleansing the communications with Calais andkeeping them open rests primarily with the BEF

This did less than justice to our troops But I print it as Iwrote it at the time


24V40

Vice Chief of the Naval Staff informs me that [an]order was sent at 2 AM to Calais saying thatevacuation was decided in principle but this is surelymadness The only effect of evacuating Calais wouldbe to transfer the forces now blocking it to DunkirkCalais must be held for many reasons but specially tohold the enemy on its front The Admiralty say they arepreparing twenty-four naval twelve-pounders whichwith SAP1 will pierce any tank Some of these will beready this evening


25V40

I must know at earliest why Gort gave up Arras andwhat actually he is doing with the rest of his army Is hestill persevering in Weygandrsquos plan or has he becomelargely stationary If the latter what do you considerthe probable course of events in the next few days andwhat course do you recommend Clearly he must notallow himself to be encircled without fighting a battleShould he [not] do this by fighting his way to the coastand destroying the armoured troops which standbetween him and the sea with overwhelming force ofartillery while covering himself and the Belgian frontwhich would also curl back by strong rearguardsTomorrow at latest this decision must be taken

It should surely be possible for Dill to fly home fromany aerodrome momentarily clear and RAF shouldsend a whole squadron to escort him



25V40

Pray find out who was the officer responsible forsending the order to evacuate Calais yesterday and bywhom this very lukewarm telegram I saw this morningwas drafted in which mention is made of ldquofor the sakeof Allied solidarityrdquo This is not the way to encouragemen to fight to the end Are you sure there is no streakof defeatist opinion in the General Staff


25V40

Something like this should be said to the Brigadierdefending Calais Defence of Calais to the utmost is ofthe highest importance to our country and our Armynow First it occupies a large part of the enemyrsquosarmoured forces and keeps them from attacking ourline of communication Secondly it preserves a sally-port from which portions of the British Army may maketheir way home Lord Gort has already sent troops toyour aid and the Navy will do all possible to keep yousupplied The eyes of the Empire are upon the defenceof Calais and His Majestyrsquos Government are confidentthat you and your gallant regiment will perform anexploit worthy of the British name

This message was sent to Brigadier Nicholson at about 2 PM on May 25The final decision not to relieve the garrison was taken onthe evening of May 26 Till then the destroyers were heldready Eden and Ironside were with me at the AdmiraltyWe three came out from dinner and at 9 PM did the deedIt involved Edenrsquos own regiment in which he had longserved and fought in the previous struggle One has to eatand drink in war but I could not help feeling physically sickas we afterwards sat silent at the table


Here was the message to the BrigadierEvery hour you continue to exist is of the greatest

help to the BEF Government has therefore decidedyou must continue to fight Have greatest possibleadmiration for your splendid stand Evacuation will not(repeat not) take place and craft required for abovepurpose are to return to Dover Verity and Windsor tocover Commander minesweeping and his retirement

Calais was the crux Many other causes might haveprevented the deliverance of Dunkirk but it is certain thatthe three days gained by the defence of Calais enabled theGravelines waterline to be held and that without this evenin spite of Hitlerrsquos vacillations and Rundstedtrsquos orders allwould have been cut off and lost

Upon all this there now descended a simplifyingcatastrophe The Germans who had hitherto not pressedthe Belgian front severely on the 24th of May broke theBelgian line on either side of Courtrai which is but thirtymiles from Ostend and Dunkirk The King of the Belgianssoon considered the situation hopeless and preparedhimself for capitulationBy May 23 the First and Second Corps of the BritishExpeditionary Force withdrawn by stages from Belgiumwere back again on the frontier defences north and east ofLille which they had built for themselves during the winterThe German scythe-cut round our southern flank hadreached the sea and we had to shield ourselves from thisAs the facts forced themselves upon Gort and hisheadquarters troops had successfully been sent topositions along the canal line La Basseacutee-Beacutethune-Aire-StOmer-Watten These with elements of the French


Sixteenth Corps touched the sea at the Gravelineswaterline The British Third Corps was responsible in themain for this curled-in flank facing south There was nocontinuous line but only a series of defended ldquostopsrdquo at themain crossings some of which like St Omer and Wattenhad already fallen to the enemy The indispensable roadsnorthward from Cassel were threatened Gortrsquos reserveconsisted only of the two British divisions the 5th and 50thwhich had as we have seen just been so narrowlyextricated from their southerly counterattack made at Arrasin forlorn fulfilment of the Weygand plan At this date thetotal frontage of the BEF was about ninety mileseverywhere in close contact with the enemyTo the south of the BEF lay the First French Army havingtwo divisions in the frontier defences and the remaindercomprising eleven divisions in no good shape cramped inthe area north and east of Douai This army was underattack from the southeast claw of the German encirclementOn our left the Belgian Army was being driven back fromthe Lys Canal at many places and with their retirementnorthward a gap was developing north of MeninIn the evening of the 25th Lord Gort took a vital decisionHis orders still were to pursue the Weygand plan of asoutherly attack towards Cambrai in which the 5th and50th Divisions in conjunction with the French were to beemployed The promised French attack northward from theSomme showed no sign of reality The last defenders ofBoulogne had been evacuated Calais still held out Gortnow abandoned the Weygand plan There was in his viewno longer hope of a march to the south and to the SommeMoreover at the same time the crumbling of the Belgiandefence and the gap opening to the north created a newperil dominating in itself A captured order of the GermanSixth Army showed that one corps was to march


northwestward towards Ypres and another corps westwardtowards Wytschaete How could the Belgians withstand thisdouble thrustConfident in his military virtue and convinced of thecomplete breakdown of all control either by the British andFrench Governments or by the French Supreme CommandGort resolved to abandon the attack to the southward toplug the gap which a Belgian capitulation was about toopen in the north and to march to the sea At this momenthere was the only hope of saving anything from destructionor surrender At 6 PM he ordered the 5th and 50thDivisions to join the Second British Corps to fill theimpending Belgian gap He informed General Blanchardwho had succeeded Billotte in command of the First ArmyGroup of his action and this officer acknowledging theforce of events gave orders at 1130 PM for a withdrawalon the 26th to a line behind the Lys Canal west of Lille witha view to forming a bridgehead around DunkirkEarly on May 26 Gort and Blanchard drew up their plan forwithdrawal to the coast As the First French Army hadfarther to go the first movements of the BEF on the nightof May 2627 were to be preparatory and rearguards of theBritish First and Second Corps remained on the frontierdefences till the night of May 2728 In all this Lord Gort hadacted upon his own responsibility But by now we also athome with a somewhat different angle of information hadalready reached the same conclusions On the 26th atelegram from the War Office approved his conduct andauthorised him ldquoto operate towards the coast forthwith inconjunction with the French and Belgian armiesrdquo Theemergency gathering on a vast scale of naval vessels of allkinds and sizes was already in full swing


The reader must now look at the diagram which shows thegeneral areas held on the night of May 2526 by the Britishdivisions



On the western flank of the corridor to the sea the positionremained largely unchanged during the 26th The localitiesheld by the 48th and 44th Divisions came under relativelylittle pressure The 2d Division however had heavy fightingon the Aire and La Basseacutee Canals and they held theirground Farther to the east a strong German attackdeveloped around Carvin jointly defended by British andFrench troops The situation was restored by thecounterattack of two battalions of the 50th Division whichwere in bivouac close by On the left of the British line the5th Division with the 143d Brigade of the 48th Divisionunder command had travelled through the night and atdawn took over the defence of the Ypres-Comines Canal toclose the gap which had opened between the British andBelgian armies They were only just in time Soon after theyarrived the enemy attacked and the fighting was heavy allday Three battalions of the 1st Division in reserve weredrawn in The 50th Division after bivouacking south of Lillemoved northward to prolong the flank of the 5th Divisionaround Ypres The Belgian Army heavily attackedthroughout the day and with their right flank driven inreported that they had no forces with which to regain touchwith the British line and also that they were unable to fallback to the line of the Yser Canal in conformity with theBritish movementMeanwhile the organisation of the bridgeheads aroundDunkirk was proceeding The French were to hold fromGravelines to Bergues and the British thence along thecanal by Furnes to Nieuport and the sea The variousgroups and parties of all arms which were arriving fromboth directions were woven into this line Confirming theorders of the 26th Lord Gort received from the War Office atelegram despatched at 1 PM on the 27th telling him thathis task henceforward was ldquoto evacuate the maximum force


possiblerdquo I had informed M Reynaud the day before thatthe policy was to evacuate the British Expeditionary Forceand had requested him to issue corresponding orders Suchwas the breakdown in communications that at 2 PM on the27th the commander of the First French Army issued anorder to his corps ldquoLa bataille sera livreacutee sans esprit derecul sur la position de la LysrdquoFour British divisions and the whole of the First FrenchArmy were now in dire peril of being cut off around LilleThe two arms of the German encircling movement strove toclose the pincers upon them Although we had not in thosedays the admirable map rooms of more coherent periodsand although no control of the battle from London waspossible I had for three days past been harrowed by theposition of the mass of Allied troops around Lille includingour four fine divisions This however was one of those rarebut decisive moments when mechanical transport exercisesits rights When Gort gave the order all these four divisionscame back with surprising rapidity almost in a nightMeanwhile by fierce battles on either side of the corridorthe rest of the British army kept the path open to the seaThe pincer-claws which were delayed by the 2d Divisionand checked for three days by the 5th Division eventuallymet on the night of May 29 in a manner similar to the greatRussian operation round Stalingrad in 1942 The trap hadtaken two and a half days to close and in that time fourBritish divisions and a great part of the First French Armyexcept the Fifth Corps which was lost withdrew in goodorder through the gap in spite of the French having onlyhorse transport and in spite of the main road to Dunkirkbeing already cut and the secondary roads filled withretiring troops long trains of transport and many thousandsof refugees


The question about our ability to go on alone which I hadasked Mr Chamberlain to examine with other Ministers tendays before was now put formally by me to our militaryadvisers I drafted the reference purposely in terms whichwhile giving a lead left freedom to the Chiefs of Staff toexpress their view whatever it might be I knew beforehandthat they were absolutely determined but it is wise to havewritten records of such decisions I wished moreover to beable to assure Parliament that our resolve was backed byprofessional opinion Here it is with the answer

We have reviewed our report on ldquoBritish Strategy ina Certain Eventualityrdquo in the light of the following termsof reference remitted to us by the Prime Minister

ldquoIn the event of France being unable to continue inthe war and becoming neutral with the Germansholding their present position and the Belgian armybeing forced to capitulate after assisting the BritishExpeditionary Force to reach the coast in the event ofterms being offered to Britain which would place herentirely at the mercy of Germany through disarmamentcession of naval bases in the Orkneys etc what arethe prospects of our continuing the war alone againstGermany and probably Italy Can the Navy and the AirForce hold out reasonable hopes of preventing seriousinvasion and could the forces gathered in this islandcope with raids from the air involving detachments notgreater than ten thousand men it being observed thata prolongation of British resistance might be verydangerous for Germany engaged in holding down thegreater part of Europerdquo

2 Our conclusions are contained in the followingparagraphs

3 While our Air Force is in being our Navy and AirForce together should be able to prevent Germanycarrying out a serious seaborne invasion of this country


4 Supposing Germany gained complete airsuperiority we consider that the Navy could hold up aninvasion for a time but not for an indefinite period

5 If with our Navy unable to prevent it and our AirForce gone Germany attempted an invasion our coastand beach defences could not prevent German tanksand infantry getting a firm footing on our shores In thecircumstances envisaged above our land forces wouldbe insufficient to deal with a serious invasion

6 The crux of the matter is air superiority OnceGermany had attained this she might attempt tosubjugate this country by air attack alone

7 Germany could not gain complete air superiorityunless she could knock out our Air Force and theaircraft industries some vital portions of which areconcentrated at Coventry and Birmingham

8 Air attacks on the aircraft factories would be madeby day or by night We consider that we should be ableto inflict such casualties on the enemy by day as toprevent serious damage Whatever we do however byway of defensive measures ndash and we are pressing onwith these with all despatch ndash we cannot be sure ofprotecting the large industrial centres upon which ouraircraft industries depend from serious materialdamage by night attack The enemy would not have toemploy precision bombing to achieve this effect

9 Whether the attacks succeed in eliminating theaircraft industry depends not only on the materialdamage by bombs but on the moral effect on theworkpeople and their determination to carry on in theface of wholesale havoc and destruction

10 If therefore the enemy presses home nightattacks on our aircraft industry he is likely to achievesuch material and moral damage within the industrialarea concerned as to bring all work to a standstill

11 It must be remembered that numerically theGermans have a superiority of four to one Moreoverthe German aircraft factories are well dispersed andrelatively inaccessible

12 On the other hand so long as we have acounter-offensive bomber force we can carry outsimilar attacks on German industrial centres and by


moral and material effect bring a proportion of them toa standstill

13 To sum up our conclusion is that prima facieGermany has most of the cards but the real test iswhether the morale of our fighting personnel and civilpopulation will counterbalance the numerical andmaterial advantages which Germany enjoys Webelieve it will

This report which of course was written at the darkestmoment before the Dunkirk Deliverance was signed notonly by the three Chiefs of Staff Newall Pound andIronside but by the three Vice-Chiefs Dill Phillips andPeirse Reading it in after years I must admit that it wasgrave and grim But the War Cabinet and the few otherMinisters who saw it were all of one mind There was nodiscussion Heart and soul we were together

I now addressed myself to Lord Gort27V40

At this solemn moment I cannot help sending youmy good wishes No one can tell how it will go Butanything is better than being cooped up and starvedout I venture these few remarks First cannon ought tokill tanks and they may as well be lost doing that asany other way Second I feel very anxious aboutOstend till it is occupied by a brigade with artilleryThird very likely the enemy tanks attacking Calais aretired and anyhow busy on Calais A column directedupon Calais while it is still holding out might have agood chance Perhaps they will be less formidablewhen attacked themselves

2 It is now necessary to tell the Belgians I amsending following telegram to Keyes but your personalcontact with the King is desirable Keyes will help Weare asking them to sacrifice themselves for us


3 Presume [our] troops know they are cutting theirway home to Blighty Never was there such a spur forfighting We shall give you all that the Navy and AirForce can do Anthony Eden is with me now and joinshis good wishes to mine

[Enclosure]Prime Minister to Admiral KeyesImpart following to your friend [the King of the

Belgians] Presume he knows that British and Frenchare fighting their way to coast between Gravelines andOstend inclusive and that we propose to give fullestsupport from Navy and Air Force during hazardousembarkation What can we do for him Certainly wecannot serve Belgiumrsquos cause by being hemmed in andstarved out Our only hope is victory and England willnever quit the war whatever happens till Hitler is beat orwe cease to be a State Trust you will make sure heleaves with you by aeroplane before too late Shouldour operation prosper and we establish [an] effectivebridgehead we would try if desired to carry someBelgian divisions to France by sea Vitally importantBelgium should continue in war and safety [of] Kingrsquosperson essential

My telegram did not reach Admiral Keyes until after hisreturn to England on the 28th In consequence thisparticular message was not delivered to King Leopold Thefact is not however important because on the afternoon ofthe 27th between five and six orsquoclock Admiral Keyes spoketo me on the telephone The following passage is takenfrom his report

At about 5 PM on the 27th when the King told mehis Army had collapsed and he was asking for acessation of hostilities a cipher telegram was sent toGort and to the War Office by wireless The War Officereceived it at 554 PM I motored at once to La Panne


and telephoned to the Prime Minister The PrimeMinister was not at all surprised in view of the repeatedwarnings but he told me that I must make everyendeavour to persuade the King and Queen to come toEngland with me and dictated a message which hesaid I ought to have received that afternoon

27V40ldquoBelgian Embassy here assumes from Kingrsquos

decision to remain that he regards the war as lost andcontemplates separate peace

ldquoIt is in order to dissociate itself from this that theconstitutional Belgian Government has reassembled onforeign soil Even if present Belgian Army has to laydown its arms there are two hundred thousandBelgians of military age in France and greaterresources than Belgium had in 1914 on which to fightback By present decision the King is dividing the nationand delivering it into Hitlerrsquos protection Please conveythese considerations to the King and impress upon himthe disastrous consequences to the Allies and toBelgium of his present choicerdquo

I gave King Leopold the Prime Ministerrsquos messagebut he said that he had made up his mind that he muststay with his Army and peoplehellip

At home I issued the following general injunction

(Strictly confidential) 28V40In these dark days the Prime Minister would be

grateful if all his colleagues in the Government as wellas important officials would maintain a high morale intheir circles not minimising the gravity of events butshowing confidence in our ability and inflexible resolve


to continue the war till we have broken the will of theenemy to bring all Europe under his domination

No tolerance should be given to the idea that Francewill make a separate peace but whatever may happenon the Continent we cannot doubt our duty and weshall certainly use all our power to defend the Islandthe Empire and our Cause

During the morning of the 28th Lord Gort met GeneralBlanchard again I am indebted to General Pownall LordGortrsquos Chief of Staff for this record made by him at the time

Blanchardrsquos enthusiasm at the Cassel meeting hadevaporated when he visited us today He had noconstructive suggestions or plans We read to him thetelegram ordering us to proceed to the coast with aview to embarkation He was horrified And that wasstrange for what other reason did he think that he andGort had been ordered to form bridgeheads To whatelse could such a preliminary move lead We pointedout that we had both received similar instructionsregarding the bridgeheads What had happened nowwas that we had got from our Government the next andlogical step (which had no doubt been communicatedto the French Government) whereas he had receivedas yet no such corresponding order This pacified himsomewhat but by no means entirely Then we said thatwe too like him wanted to keep the British and theFirst French Army together in this their last phasePresumably therefore the First French Army wouldcontinue the retirement tonight keeping aligned withus Whereat he went completely off the deep end ndash itwas impossible he declared We explained to him asclearly as the human tongue can explain the factors inthe situation The threat from the Germans on ournortheastern flank would probably not develop instrength for the next twenty-four hours (though when itdid come it would be serious indeed) What was ofimmediate importance was the threat to our longsouthwestern flank There as he well knew advanceguards of German infantry divisions supported by


artillery had made attacks yesterday at various pointsThough the main points Wormhould CasselHazebrouck had held there had been some penetra-tion The Germans might be relied upon to press theseadvantages and we could be sure that the main bodiesof the divisions would soon deploy and force them-selves right across our line of withdrawal to the sea (awithdrawal which had been ordered for us if not forhim) There was therefore not a moment to be lost ingetting back from the Lys and we must get backtonight at least to the line Ypres-Poperinghe-Cassel Towait till tomorrow night was to give two days to theGermans to get behind us an act of madness Wethought it unlikely that we could get even thirty per centof our forces away even if we reached the sea manyindeed in forward positions would never reach it Buteven if we could only save a small proportion of highlytrained officers and men it would be something usefulto the continuance of the war Everything possible musttherefore be done and the one thing that was possibleif only in part was to get back some way tonighthellip

Then came a liaison officer from General Priouxnow commanding the First Army The liaison officer toldBlanchard that Prioux had decided that he could notwithdraw any farther tonight and therefore intended toremain in the quadrangle of canals whose northeasterncorner is Armentiegraveres and southwestern cornerBeacutethune This seemed to decide Blanchard againstwithdrawal We begged him for the sake of the FirstArmy and of the Allied cause to order Prioux to bringback at least some of his army in line with us Not all ofthem could be so tired or so far away that it wasimpossible For every man brought back there was atleast some chance of embarkation whereas every manwho remained behind would certainly be eaten up Whynot try then There was nothing to be gained by nottrying for those who did try there was at least somehope But there was no shaking him He declared thatevacuation from the beach was impossible ndash no doubtthe British Admiralty had arranged it for the BEF butthe French Marine would never be able to do it for


French soldiers It was therefore idle to try ndash the chancewasnrsquot worth the effort involved he agreed with Prioux

He then asked in terms whether it was thereforeGortrsquos intention to withdraw tonight to the line Ypres-Poperinghe-Cassel or not knowing that in doing soGort would be going without the French First Army Towhich Gort replied that he was going In the first placehe had been ordered to re-embark and to do sonecessitated immediate withdrawal To wait anothertwenty-four hours would mean that he would not beable to carry out his orders for the troops would be cutoff In the second place and apart from the formalaspect of obeying orders it was madness to leave thetroops forward in their present exposed positionsThere they would certainly be overwhelmed very soonFor these reasons therefore and with great regret itwas necessary for the BEF to withdraw even if theFirst French Army did not do sohellip



In the early hours of the 28th the Belgian Armysurrendered Lord Gort had intimation of this only one hourbefore the event but the collapse had been foreseen threedays earlier and in one fashion or another the gap wasplugged I announced this event to the House in far moremoderate terms than those M Reynaud had thought it rightto use

The House will be aware that the King of theBelgians yesterday sent a plenipotentiary to theGerman Command asking for a suspension of arms onthe Belgian front The British and French Governmentsinstructed their generals immediately to dissociatethemselves from this procedure and to persevere in theoperations in which they are now engaged Howeverthe German Command has agreed to the Belgianproposals and the Belgian Army ceased to resist theenemyrsquos will at four orsquoclock this morning

I have no intention of suggesting to the House thatwe should attempt at this moment to pass judgmentupon the action of the King of the Belgians in hiscapacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian ArmyThis army has fought very bravely and has bothsuffered and inflicted heavy losses The BelgianGovernment has dissociated itself from the action ofthe King and declaring itself to be the only legalGovernment of Belgium has formally announced itsresolve to continue the war at the side of the Allies

Concern was expressed by the French Government that myreference to King Leopoldrsquos action was in sharp contrast tothat of M Reynaud I thought it my duty when speaking inthe House on June 4 after a careful examination of thefuller facts then available and in justice not only to our


French Ally but also to the Belgian Government now inLondon to state the truth in plain terms

At the last moment when Belgium was alreadyinvaded King Leopold called upon us to come to hisaid and even at the last moment we came He and hisbrave efficient Army nearly half a million strongguarded our left flank and thus kept open our only lineof retreat to the sea Suddenly without prior consulta-tion with the least possible notice without the advice ofhis Ministers and upon his own personal act he sent aplenipotentiary to the German Command surrenderedhis Army and exposed our whole flank and means ofretreat

All this day of the 28th the escape of the British Army hungin the balance On the front from Comines to Ypres andthence to the sea facing east and attempting to fill theBelgian gap General Brooke and his Second Corps foughta magnificent battle For two days past the 5th Division hadheld Comines against all attacks but as the Belgianswithdrew northward and then capitulated the gap widenedbeyond repair The protection of the flank of the BEF wasnow their task First the 50th Division came in to prolongthe line then the 4th and 3d Divisions newly withdrawnfrom east of Lille hastened in motor transports to extendthe wall of the vital corridor that led to Dunkirk The Germanthrust between the British and Belgian armies was not to beprevented but its fatal consequence an inward turn acrossthe Yser which would have brought the enemy onto thebeaches behind our fighting troops was foreseen andeverywhere forestalledThe Germans sustained a bloody repulse Orders weregiven to the British artillery both field and medium to fire


off all their ammunition at the enemy and the tremendousfire did much to quell the German assault All the time onlyabout four miles behind Brookersquos struggling front vastmasses of transport and troops poured back into thedeveloping bridgehead of Dunkirk and were fitted withskilful improvisation into its defences Moreover within theperimeter itself the main east-west road was at one timecompletely blocked by vehicles and a one-way track wascleared only by bulldozers hurling them into the ditches oneither sideIn the afternoon of the 28th Gort ordered a generalwithdrawal to the bridgehead which now ran Gravelines-Bergues-Furnes-Nieuport On this front the British divisionsstood from right to left and from Bergues to the sea byNieuport in the following order 46th 42d 1st 50th 3dand 4th By the 29th a large part of the BEF had arrivedwithin the perimeter and by this time the naval measuresfor evacuation were beginning to attain their full effect OnMay 30 General Headquarters reported that all Britishdivisions or the remains of them had come inMore than half the First French Army found their way toDunkirk where the great majority were safely embarkedBut the line of retreat of at least five divisions was cut by theGerman pincer movement west of Lille On the 28th theyattempted to break out westward but in vain the enemyclosed in upon them from all sides All through the nextthree days the French in Lille fought on graduallycontracting fronts against increasing pressure until on theevening of the 31st short of food and with their ammunitionexhausted they were forced to surrender About fiftythousand men thus fell into German hands TheseFrenchmen under the gallant leadership of GeneralMolinieacute had for four critical days contained no less thanseven German divisions which otherwise could have joined


in the assaults on the Dunkirk perimeter This was asplendid contribution to the escape of their more fortunatecomrades and of the British Expeditionary Force

It was a severe experience for me bearing so heavy anover-all responsibility to watch during these days inflickering glimpses this drama in which control wasimpossible and intervention more likely to do harm thangood There is no doubt that by pressing in all loyalty theWeygand plan of retirement to the Somme as long as wedid our dangers already so grave were increased ButGortrsquos decision in which we speedily concurred toabandon the Weygand plan and march to the sea wasexecuted by him and his staff with masterly skill and willever be regarded as a brilliant episode in British militaryannals


5The Deliverance of Dunkirk May 26 to

June 4

ldquoHard and Heavy Tidingsrdquomdash A Demonstration ofMinisters mdashServiceof Intercession and Prayer mdashThe Gathering of the Little Ships mdash SevenHundred Vessels mdash Three Vital Factors mdash TheMosquito Armada mdash Bringing off the French mdashFinal Orders to Lord Gort mdash A Possible Conse-quence mdash Gort Transfers the Dunkirk Commandto Alexander mdash My Third Visit to Paris May 31 mdashGeneral Spears and Marshal Peacutetain mdash TheEvacuation Complete mdash My Statement toParliament June 4 mdashSignificance of the AirVictory mdash Britainrsquos Resolve

THERE WAS A SHORT SERVICE of intercession and prayerin Westminster Abbey The English are loth to expose theirfeelings but in my stall in the choir I could feel the pent-uppassionate emotion and also the fear of the congregationnot of death or wounds or material loss but of defeat andthe final ruin of Britain

It was Tuesday May 28 and I did not attend the Houseuntil that day week There was no advantage to be gainedby a further statement in the interval nor did Membersexpress a wish for one But everyone realised that the fateof our Army and perhaps much else might well be decided


by then ldquoThe Houserdquo I said ldquoshould prepare itself for hardand heavy tidings I have only to add that nothing whichmay happen in this battle can in any way relieve us of ourduty to defend the world cause to which we have vowedourselves nor should it destroy our confidence in our powerto make our way as on former occasions in our historythrough disaster and through grief to the ultimate defeat ofour enemiesrdquo I had not seen many of my colleaguesoutside the War Cabinet except individually since theformation of the Government and I thought it right to havea meeting in my room at the House of Commons of allMinisters of Cabinet rank other than the War CabinetMembers We were perhaps twenty-five round the table Idescribed the course of events and I showed them plainlywhere we were and all that was in the balance Then I saidquite casually and not treating it as a point of specialsignificance ldquoOf course whatever happens at Dunkirk weshall fight onrdquoThere occurred a demonstration which considering thecharacter of the gathering ndash twenty-five experiencedpoliticians and Parliament men who represented all thedifferent points of view whether right or wrong before thewar ndash surprised me Quite a number seemed to jump upfrom the table and come running to my chair shouting andpatting me on the back There is no doubt that had I at thisjuncture faltered at all in the leading of the nation I shouldhave been hurled out of office I was sure that everyMinister was ready to be killed quite soon and have all hisfamily and possessions destroyed rather than give in Inthis they represented the House of Commons and almostall the people It fell to me in these coming days andmonths to express their sentiments on suitable occasionsThis I was able to do because they were mine also There


was a white glow overpowering sublime which ranthrough our island from end to end

Accurate and excellent accounts have been written of theevacuation of the British and French armies from DunkirkEver since the 20th the gathering of shipping and smallcraft had been proceeding under the control of AdmiralRamsay who commanded at Dover On the evening of the26th (657 PM) an Admiralty signal put ldquoOperationDynamordquo into play and the first troops were brought homethat night After the loss of Boulogne and Calais only theremains of the port of Dunkirk and the open beaches nextto the Belgian frontier were in our hands At this time it wasthought that the most we could rescue was about 45000men in two days Early the next morning May 27emergency measures were taken to find additional smallcraft ldquofor a special requirementrdquo This was no less than thefull evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force It wasplain that large numbers of such craft would be required forwork on the beaches in addition to bigger ships whichcould load in Dunkirk Harbour On the suggestion of Mr HC Riggs of the Ministry of Shipping the various boatyardsfrom Teddington to Brightlingsea were searched byAdmiralty officers and yielded upwards of forty serviceablemotor-boats or launches which were assembled atSheerness on the following day At the same time lifeboatsfrom liners in the London docks tugs from the Thamesyachts fishing-craft lighters barges and pleasure-boats ndashanything that could be of use along the beaches ndash werecalled into service By the night of the 27th a great tide ofsmall vessels began to flow towards the sea first to ourChannel ports and thence to the beaches of Dunkirk andthe beloved Army


The Admiralty did not hesitate to give full rein to thespontaneous movement which swept the seafaringpopulation of our south and southeastern shores Everyonewho had a boat of any kind steam or sail put out forDunkirk and the preparations fortunately begun a weekearlier were now aided by the brilliant improvisation ofvolunteers on an amazing scale The numbers arriving onthe 29th were small but they were the forerunners of nearlyfour hundred small craft which from the 31st were destinedto play a vital part by ferrying from the beaches to the off-lying ships almost a hundred thousand men In these days Imissed the head of my Admiralty map room Captain Pimand one or two other familiar faces They had got hold of aDutch schuit which in four days brought off eight hundredsoldiers Altogether there came to the rescue of the Armyunder the ceaseless air bombardment of the enemy abouteight hundred and fifty vessels of which nearly sevenhundred were British and the rest Allied

Here is the official list in which ships not engaged inembarking troops are omitted


BRITISH SHIPS

ALLLIED SHIPS

Meanwhile ashore around Dunkirk the occupation of theperimeter was effected with precision The troops arrivedout of chaos and were formed in order along the defenceswhich even in two days had grown Those men who were inbest shape turned about to form the line Divisions like the2d and 5th which had suffered most were held in reserveon the beaches and were then embarked early In the firstinstance there were to be three corps on the front but bythe 29th with the French taking a greater share in the


defences two sufficed The enemy had closely followed thewithdrawal and hard fighting was incessant especially onthe flanks near Nieuport and Bergues As the evacuationwent on the steady decrease in the number of troops bothBritish and French was accompanied by a correspondingcontraction of the defence On the beaches among thesand dunes for three four or five days scores ofthousands of men dwelt under unrelenting air attackHitlerrsquos belief that the German Air Force would renderescape impossible and that therefore he should keep hisarmoured formations for the final stroke of the campaignwas a mistaken but not unreasonable view



Three factors falsified his expectations First the incessantair-bombing of the masses of troops along the seashore didthem very little harm The bombs plunged into the softsand which muffled their explosions In the early stagesafter a crashing air raid the troops were astonished to findthat hardly anybody had been killed or woundedEverywhere there had been explosions but scarcelyanyone was the worse A rocky shore would have producedfar more deadly results Presently the soldiers regarded theair attacks with contempt They crouched in the sand duneswith composure and growing hope Before them lay thegrey but not unfriendly sea Beyond the rescuing ships andndash HomeThe second factor which Hitler had not foreseen was theslaughter of his airmen British and German air quality wasput directly to the test By intense effort Fighter Commandmaintained successive patrols over the scene and foughtthe enemy at long odds Hour after hour they bit into theGerman fighter and bomber squadrons taking a heavy tollscattering them and driving them away Day after day thiswent on till the glorious victory of the Royal Air Force wasgained Wherever German aircraft were encounteredsometimes in forties and fifties they were instantlyattacked often by single squadrons or less and shot downin scores which presently added up into hundreds Thewhole Metropolitan Air Force our last sacred reserve wasused Sometimes the fighter pilots made four sorties a dayA clear result was obtained The superior enemy werebeaten or killed and for all their bravery mastered or evencowed This was a decisive clash Unhappily the troops onthe beaches saw very little of this epic conflict in the airoften miles away or above the clouds They knew nothingof the loss inflicted on the enemy All they felt was thebombs scourging the beaches cast by the foes who had


got through but did not perhaps return There was even abitter anger in the Army against the Air Force and some ofthe troops landing at Dover or at Thames ports in theirignorance insulted men in Air Force uniform They shouldhave clasped their hands but how could they know InParliament I took pains to spread the truthBut all the aid of the sand and all the prowess in the airwould have been vain without the sea The instructionsgiven ten or twelve days before had under the pressure andemotion of events borne amazing fruit Perfect disciplineprevailed ashore and afloat The sea was calm To and frobetween the shore and the ships plied the little boatsgathering the men from the beaches as they waded out orpicking them from the water with total indifference to the airbombardment which often claimed its victims Theirnumbers alone defied air attack The Mosquito Armada asa whole was unsinkable In the midst of our defeat glorycame to the island people united and unconquerable andthe tale of the Dunkirk beaches will shine in whateverrecords are preserved of our affairsNotwithstanding the valiant work of the small craft it mustnot be forgotten that the heaviest burden fell on the shipsplying from Dunkirk Harbour where two-thirds of the menwere embarked The destroyers played the predominantpart as the casualty lists show Nor must the great partplayed by the personnel ships with their mercantile crewsbe overlooked

The progress of the evacuation was watched with anxiouseyes and growing hope On the evening of the 27th LordGortrsquos position appeared critical to the Naval authoritiesand Captain Tennant RN from the Admiralty who had


assumed the duties of Senior Naval Officer at Dunkirksignalled for all available craft to be sent to the beachesimmediately as ldquoevacuation tomorrow night isproblematicalrdquo The picture presented was grim evendesperate Extreme efforts were made to meet the call anda cruiser eight destroyers and twenty-six other vesselswere sent The 28th was a day of tension which graduallyeased as the position on land was stabilised with thepowerful help of the Royal Air Force The naval plans werecarried through despite severe losses on the 29th whenthree destroyers and twenty-one other vessels were sunkand many others damagedThere was never any question of our leaving the Frenchbehind Here was my order before any request or complaintfrom the French was received

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar CIGS andGeneral Ismay

29V40

(Original to CIGS)It is essential that the French should share in such

evacuations from Dunkirk as may be possible Nor mustthey be dependent only upon their own shippingresources Arrangements must be concerted at oncewith the French Missions in this country or ifnecessary with the French Government so that noreproaches or as few as possible may arise It mightperhaps be well if we evacuated the two Frenchdivisions from Dunkirk and replaced them pro tem withour own troops thus simplifying the command But letme have the best proposals possible and advise mewhether there is any action I should take


Prime Minister toGeneral Spears (Paris)

29V40

Following for Reynaud for communication toWeygand and Georges

We have evacuated nearly 50000 from Dunkirk andbeaches and hope another 30000 tonight Front maybe beaten in at any time or piers beaches andshipping rendered unusable by air attack and also byartillery fire from the southwest No one can tell howlong present good flow will last or how much we cansave for future We wish French troops to share inevacuation to fullest possible extent and Admiraltyhave been instructed to aid French Marine as requiredWe do not know how many will be forced to capitulatebut we must share this loss together as best we canand above all bear it without reproaches arising frominevitable confusion stresses and strains

As soon as we have reorganised our evacuatedtroops and prepared forces necessary to safeguard ourlife against threatened and perhaps imminent invasionwe shall build up a new BEF from St Nazaire I ambringing Regulars from India and Palestine Australiansand Canadians are arriving soon At present we areremoving equipment south of Amiens beyond what isneeded for five divisions But this is only to get intoorder and meet impending shock and we shall shortlysend you new scheme for reinforcement of our troopsin France I send this in all comradeship Do nothesitate to speak frankly to me

On the 30th I held a meeting of the three Service Ministersand the Chiefs of Staff in the Admiralty War Room Weconsidered the events of the day on the Belgian coast Thetotal number of troops brought off had risen to 120000including only 6000 French 850 vessels of all kinds were atwork A message from Admiral Wake Walker at Dunkirk


said that in spite of intense bombardment and air attack4000 men had been embarked in the previous hour Healso thought that Dunkirk itself would probably be untenableby the next day I emphasised the urgent need of getting offmore French troops To fail to do so might do irreparableharm to the relations between ourselves and our ally I alsosaid that when the British strength was reduced to that of acorps we ought to tell Lord Gort to embark and return toEngland leaving a corps commander in charge The BritishArmy would have to stick it out as long as possible so thatthe evacuation of the French could continueKnowing well the character of Lord Gort I wrote out in myown hand the following order to him which was sentofficially by the War Office at 2 PM on the 30th

Continue to defend the present perimeter to theutmost in order to cover maximum evacuation nowproceeding well Report every three hours through LaPanne If we can still communicate we shall send youan order to return to England with such officers as youmay choose at the moment when we deem yourcommand so reduced that it can be handed over to acorps commander You should now nominate thiscommander If communications are broken you are tohand over and return as specified when your effectivefighting force does not exceed the equivalent of threedivisions This is in accordance with correct militaryprocedure and no personal discretion is left you in thematter On political grounds it would be a needlesstriumph to the enemy to capture you when only a smallforce remained under your orders The corpscommander chosen by you should be ordered to carryon the defence in conjunction with the French andevacuation whether from Dunkirk or the beaches butwhen in his judgment no further organised evacuationis possible and no further proportionate damage can beinflicted on the enemy he is authorised in consultation


with the senior French commander to capitulateformally to avoid useless slaughter

It is possible that this last message influenced other greatevents and the fortunes of another valiant commanderWhen I was at the White House at the end of December1941 I learned from the President and Mr Stimson of theapproaching fate of General MacArthur and the Americangarrison at Corregidor I thought it right to show them theway in which we had dealt with the position of aCommander-in-Chief whose force was reduced to a smallfraction of his original command The President and MrStimson both read the telegram with profound attentionand I was struck by the impression it seemed to make uponthem A little later in the day Mr Stimson came back andasked for a copy of it which I immediately gave him It maybe (for I do not know) that this influenced them in the rightdecision which they took in ordering General MacArthur tohand over his command to one of his subordinate generalsand thus saved for all his future glorious services the greatCommander who would otherwise have perished or passedthe war as a Japanese captive I should like to think thiswas true

On the 30th members of Lord Gortrsquos staff in conferencewith Admiral Ramsay at Dover informed him that daylighton June 1 was the latest time up to which the easternperimeter might be expected to hold Evacuation wastherefore pressed on with the utmost urgency to ensure sofar as possible that a British rearguard of no more than


about four thousand men would then remain ashore Laterit was found that this number would be insufficient todefend the final covering positions and it was decided tohold the British sector until midnight June 12 evacuationproceeding meanwhile on the basis of full equality betweenFrench and British forcesSuch was the situation when on the evening of May 31 LordGort in accordance with his orders handed over hiscommand to Major-General Alexander and returned toEngland

To avoid misunderstandings by keeping personal contact itwas necessary for me to fly to Paris on May 31 for ameeting of the Supreme War Council With me in the planecame Mr Attlee and Generals Dill and Ismay I also tookGeneral Spears who had flown over on the 30th with thelatest news from Paris This brilliant officer and Member ofParliament was a friend of mine from the First Great WarHalf French by birth liaison officer between the left of theFrench and the right of the British Armies he had taken meround the Vimy Ridge in 1916 and had made me friendswith General Fayolle who commanded the Thirty-ThirdFrench Corps Speaking French with a perfect accent andbearing five wound stripes on his sleeve he was apersonality at this moment fitted to our anxious relationsWhen Frenchmen and Englishmen are in trouble togetherand arguments break out the Frenchman is often volubleand vehement and the Englishman unresponsive or evenrude But Spears could say things to the high Frenchpersonnel with an ease and force which I have never seenequalled


This time we did not go to the Quai drsquoOrsay but to MReynaudrsquos room at the War Office in the Rue Saint-Dominique Attlee and I found Reynaud and Marshal Peacutetainopposite to us as the only French Ministers This was thefirst appearance of Peacutetain now Vice-President of theCouncil at any of our meetings He wore plain clothes OurAmbassador Dill Ismay and Spears were with us andWeygand and Darlan Captain de Margerie head ofReynaudrsquos private office and a M Baudouin of theSecretariat represented the FrenchThe first question was the position in Norway I said that theBritish Government was of the considered opinion that theNarvik area should be evacuated at once Our troops therethe destroyers involved and a hundred anti-aircraft gunswere badly wanted elsewhere We therefore proposed anevacuation beginning on June 2 The British Navy wouldtransport and repatriate the French forces the King ofNorway and any Norwegian troops who wished to comeReynaud said that the French Government agreed with thispolicy The destroyers would be urgently required in theMediterranean in the event of war with Italy The sixteenthousand men would be very valuable on the line of theAisne and the Somme This matter was therefore settledI then turned to Dunkirk The French seemed to have nomore idea of what was happening to the northern armiesthan we had about the main French front When I told themthat 165000 men of whom 15000 were French had beentaken off they were astonished They naturally drewattention to the marked British preponderance I explainedthat this was due largely to the fact that there had beenmany British administrative units in the back area who hadbeen able to embark before fighting troops could be sparedfrom the front Moreover the French up to the present had


had no orders to evacuate One of the chief reasons why Ihad come to Paris was to make sure that the same orderswere given to the French troops as to the British The threeBritish divisions now holding the centre would cover theevacuation of all the Allied forces That and the sea-transport would be the British contribution to offset theheavy Allied losses which must now be faced His MajestyrsquosGovernment had felt it necessary in the dire circumstancesto order Lord Gort to take off fighting men and leave thewounded behind If present hopes were confirmed 200000able-bodied troops might be got away This would bealmost a miracle Four days ago I would not have wageredon more than 50000 as a maximum I dwelt upon ourterrible losses in equipment Reynaud paid a handsometribute to the work of the British Navy and Air Force forwhich I thanked him We then spoke at some length uponwhat could be done to rebuild the British forces in FranceMeanwhile Admiral Darlan had drafted a telegram toAdmiral Abrial at Dunkirk

(1) A bridgehead shall be held round Dunkirk withthe divisions under your command and those underBritish command

(2) As soon as you arc convinced that no troopsoutside the bridgehead can make their way to thepoints of embarkation the troops holding thebridgehead shall withdraw and embark the Britishforces embarking first

I intervened at once to say that the British would notembark first but that the evacuation should proceed onequal terms between the British and the French ndashldquoBras-dessus bras-dessousrdquo The British would form therearguard This was agreedThe conversation next turned to Italy I expressed theBritish view that if Italy came in we should strike at her at


once in the most effective manner Many Italians wereopposed to war and all should be made to realise itsseverity I proposed that we should strike by air-bombing atthe northwestern industrial triangle enclosed by the threecities of Milan Turin and Genoa Reynaud agreed that theAllies must strike at once and Admiral Darlan said he had aplan ready for the naval and aerial bombardment of Italyrsquosoil supplies largely stored along the coast between thefrontier and Naples The necessary technical discussionswere arrangedI then mentioned my desire that more Ministers of theAdministration I had just formed should become acquaintedwith their French opposite numbers as soon as possibleFor instance I should like Mr Bevin the Minister of Labourand trade-union leader to visit Paris Mr Bevin wasshowing great energy and under his leadership the Britishworking class was now giving up holidays and privileges toa far greater extent than in the last war Reynaud cordiallyassentedAfter some talk about Tangier and the importance ofkeeping Spain out of the war I spoke on the generaloutlook I said

The Allies must maintain an unflinching front againstall their enemieshellip The United States had been rousedby recent events and even if they did not enter the warwould soon be prepared to give us powerful aid Aninvasion of England if it took place would have a stillmore profound effect on the United States England didnot fear invasion and would resist it most fiercely inevery village and hamlet It was only after her essentialneed of troops had been met that the balance of herarmed forces could be put at the disposal of her Frenchallyhellip I was absolutely convinced we had only to carryon the fight to conquer Even if one of us should bestruck down the other must not abandon the struggleThe British Government were prepared to wage war


from the New World if through some disaster Englandherself were laid waste If Germany defeated either allyor both she would give no mercy we should bereduced to the status of vassals and slaves forever Itwould be better far that the civilisation of WesternEurope with all its achievements should come to atragic but splendid end than that the two greatdemocracies should linger on stripped of all that madelife worth living

Mr Attlee then said that he entirely agreed with my viewThe British people now realise the danger with

which they are faced and know that in the event of aGerman victory everything they have built up will bedestroyed The Germans kill not only men but ideasOur people are resolved as never before in their history

Reynaud thanked us for what we had said He was surethat the morale of the German people was not up to thelevel of the momentary triumph of their army If Francecould hold the Somme with the help of Britain and ifAmerican industry came in to make good the disparity inarms then we could be sure of victory He was mostgrateful he said for my renewed assurance that if onecountry went under the other would not abandon thestruggleThe formal meeting then endedAfter we rose from the table some of the principals talkedtogether in the bay window in a somewhat differentatmosphere Chief among these was Marshal PeacutetainSpears was with me helping me out with my French andspeaking himself The young Frenchman Captain deMargerie had already spoken about fighting it out in AfricaBut Marshal Plainrsquos attitude detached and sombre gaveme the feeling that he would face a separate peace Theinfluence of his personality his reputation his serene


acceptance of the march of adverse events apart from anywords he used was almost overpowering to those underhis spell One of the Frenchmen I cannot remember whosaid in their polished way that a continuance of militaryreverses might in certain eventualities enforce amodification of foreign policy upon France Here Spearsrose to the occasion and addressing himself particularly toMarshal Peacutetain said in perfect French ldquoI suppose youunderstand M le Mareacutechal that that would meanblockaderdquo Someone else said ldquoThat would perhaps beinevitablerdquo But then Spears to Peacutetainrsquos face ldquoThat wouldnot only mean blockade but bombardment of all Frenchports in German handsrdquo I was glad to have this said I sangmy usual song we would fight on whatever happened orwhoever fell out

Again we had a night of petty raids and in the morning Ideparted Here was the information that awaited me on myreturn

Prime Minister toGeneral Weygand

1VI40

Crisis in evacuation now reached Five FighterSquadrons acting almost continuously is the most wecan do but six ships several filled with troops sunk bybombing this morning Artillery fire menacing onlypracticable channel Enemy closing in on reducedbridgehead By trying to hold on till tomorrow we maylose all By going tonight much may certainly be savedthough much will be lost Nothing like numbers ofeffective French troops you mention believed inbridgehead now and we doubt whether such largenumbers remain in area Situation cannot be fully


judged by Admiral Abrial in the fortress nor by you norby us here We have therefore ordered GeneralAlexander commanding British sector of bridgehead tojudge in consultation with Admiral Abrial whether to tryto stay over tomorrow or not Trust you will agree

May 31 and June 1 saw the climax though not the end atDunkirk On these two days over 132000 men were safelylanded in England nearly one-third of them having beenbrought from the beaches in small craft under fierce airattack and shell fire On June 1 from early dawn onward theenemy bombers made their greatest efforts often timedwhen our own fighters had withdrawn to refuel Theseattacks took heavy toll of the crowded shipping whichsuffered almost as much as in all the previous week Onthis single day our losses by air attack by mines E-boatsor other misadventure were thirty-one ships sunk andeleven damagedThe final phase was carried through with much skill andprecision For the first time it became possible to planahead instead of being forced to rely on hourlyimprovisations At dawn on June 2 about four thousandBritish with seven antiaircraft guns and twelve anti-tankguns remained with the considerable French forces holdingthe contracting perimeter of Dunkirk Evacuation was nowpossible only in darkness and Admiral Ramsay determinedto make a massed descent on the harbour that night withall his available resources Besides tugs and small craftforty-four ships were sent that evening from Englandincluding eleven destroyers and fourteen minesweepersForty French and Belgian vessels also participated Beforemidnight the British rearguard was embarkedThis was not however the end of the Dunkirk story Wehad been prepared to carry considerably greater numbersof French that night than had offered themselves The


result was that when our ships many of them still emptyhad to withdraw at dawn great numbers of French troopsmany still in contact with the enemy remained ashore Onemore effort had to be made Despite the exhaustion ofshipsrsquo companies after so many days without rest or respitethe call was answered On June 4 26175 Frenchmen werelanded in England over 21000 of them in British ships

BRITISH AND ALLIED TROOPS LANDED IN ENGLAND

Finally at 223 PM that day the Admiralty in agreementwith the French announced that ldquoOperation Dynamordquo wasnow completed

Parliament assembled on June 4 and it was my duty to laythe story fully before them both in public and later in secretsession The narrative requires only a few extracts from myspeech which is extant It was imperative to explain notonly to our own people but to the world that our resolve tofight on was based on serious grounds and was no meredespairing effort It was also right to lay bare my ownreasons for confidence


We must be very careful not to assign to thisdeliverance the attributes of a victory Wars are not wonby evacuations But there was a victory inside thisdeliverance which should be noted It was gained bythe Air Force Many of our soldiers coming back havenot seen the Air Force at work they saw only thebombers which escaped its protective attack Theyunderrate its achievements I have heard much talk ofthis that is why I go out of my way to say this I will tellyou about it

This was a great trial of strength between the Britishand German Air Forces Can you conceive a greaterobjective for the Germans in the air than to makeevacuation from these beaches impossible and to sinkall these ships which were displayed almost to theextent of thousands Could there have been anobjective of greater military importance and significancefor the whole purpose of the war than this They triedhard and they were beaten back they were frustratedin their task We got the Army away and they havepaid fourfold for any losses which they have inflictedhellipAll of our types and all our pilots have been vindicatedas superior to what they have at present to face


When we consider how much greater would be ouradvantage in defending the air above this islandagainst an overseas attack I must say that I find inthese facts a sure basis upon which practical andreassuring thoughts may rest I will pay my tribute tothese young airmen The great French Army was verylargely for the time being cast back and disturbed bythe onrush of a few thousands of armoured vehiclesMay it not also be that the cause of civilisation itself willbe defended by the skill and devotion of a fewthousand airmen

We are told that Herr Hitler has a plan for invadingthe British Isles This has often been thought of beforeWhen Napoleon lay at Boulogne for a year with his flat-bottomed boats and his Grand Army he was told bysomeone ldquoThere are bitter weeds in Englandrdquo Thereare certainly a great many more of them since theBritish Expeditionary Force returned

The whole question of Home Defence againstinvasion is of course powerfully affected by the factthat we have for the time being in this island incompa-rably stronger military forces than we have ever had atany moment in this war or the last But this will notcontinue We shall not be content with a defensive warWe have our duty to our Ally We have to reconstituteand build up the British Expeditionary Force onceagain under its gallant Commander-in-Chief Lord GortAll this is in train but in the interval we must put ourdefences in this island into such a high state oforganisation that the fewest possible numbers will berequired to give effective security and that the largestpossible potential of offensive effort may be realisedOn this we are now engaged

I ended in a passage which was to prove as will beseen a timely and important factor in United Statesdecisions

Even though large tracts of Europe and many old

and famous States have fallen or may fall into the gripof the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazirule we shall not flag or fail We shall go on to the endwe shall fight in France we shall fight in the seas and


oceans we shall fight with growing confidence andgrowing strength in the air we shall defend our islandwhatever the cost may be we shall fight on thebeaches we shall fight on the landing-grounds weshall fight in the fields and in the streets we shall fightin the hills we shall never surrender and even if whichI do not for a moment believe this island or a large partof it were subjugated and starving then our Empirebeyond the seas armed and guarded by the BritishFleet would carry on the struggle until in Godrsquos goodtime the New World with all its power and might stepsforth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old


6The Rush for the Spoils

Traditional British and Italian Friendship mdashAdvantages to Italy and Mussolini of Neutrality mdashMy Message to Mussolini on Becoming PrimeMinister mdash His Hard Response mdash Reynaudrsquos Visitto London of May 26 mdash France and Britain InvitePresident Roosevelt to Intervene mdash My TelegramConveying the Cabinet Decision of May 28 mdashPreparations to Strike at Italy Should She DeclareWar mdash Italy and Yugoslavia mdash The ItalianDeclaration of War mdash The Attack on the AlpineFront Stopped by the French Army mdash CianorsquosLetter to Me of December 23 1943 mdash PresidentRooseveltrsquos Denunciation of Italy mdash My Telegramto Him of June 11 mdash Anglo-Soviet Relations mdashMolotovrsquos Congratulations upon German Victoriesmdash Sir Stafford Cripps Appointed Ambassador toMoscow mdash My Letter to Stalin of June 25 1940 mdashThe Soviet Share of the Spoil

THE FRIENDSHIP between the British and Italian peoplessprang from the days of Garibaldi and Cavour Every stagein the liberation of Northern Italy from Austria and everystep towards Italian unity and independence hadcommanded the sympathies of Victorian Liberalism Thishad bred a warm and enduring response The declarationin the original Treaty of Triple Alliance between ItalyGermany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire stipulated thatin no circumstances should Italy be drawn into war with


Great Britain British influence had powerfully contributed tothe Italian accession to the Allied cause in the First WorldWar The rise of Mussolini and the establishment ofFascism as a counter to Bolshevism had in its early phasesdivided British opinion on party lines but had not affectedthe broad foundations of good will between the peoplesWe have seen that until Mussolinirsquos designs againstAbyssinia had raised grave issues he had ranged himselfwith Great Britain in opposition to Hitlerism and Germanambitions I have told in the previous volume the sad tale ofhow the Baldwin-Chamberlain policy about Abyssiniabrought us the worst of both worlds how we estranged theItalian dictator without breaking his power and how theLeague of Nations was injured without Abyssinia beingsaved We have also seen the earnest but futile effortsmade by Mr Chamberlain Sir Samuel Hoare and LordHalifax to win back during the period of appeasementMussolinirsquos lost favour And finally there was the growth ofMussolinirsquos conviction that Britainrsquos sun had set and thatItalyrsquos future could with German help be founded on theruins of the British Empire This had been followed by thecreation of the Berlin-Rome Axis in accordance with whichItaly might well have been expected to enter the waragainst Britain and France on its very first dayIt was certainly only common prudence for Mussolini to seehow the war would go before committing himself and hiscountry irrevocably The process of waiting was by nomeans unprofitable Italy was courted by both sides andgained much consideration for her interests manyprofitable contracts and time to improve her armamentsThus the twilight months had passed It is an interestingspeculation what the Italian fortunes would have been if thispolicy had been maintained The United States with itslarge Italian vote might well have made it clear to Hitler that


an attempt to rally Italy to his side by force of arms wouldraise the gravest issues Peace prosperity and growingpower would have been the prize of a persistent neutralityOnce Hitler was embroiled with Russia this happy statemight have been almost indefinitely prolonged with ever-growing benefits and Mussolini might have stood forth inthe peace or in the closing year of the war as the wiseststatesman the sunny peninsula and its industrious andprolific people had known This was a more agreeablesituation than that which in fact awaited himAt the time when I was Chancellor of the Exchequer underMr Baldwin in the years after 1924 I did what I could topreserve the traditional friendship between Italy and BritainI made a debt settlement with Count Volpi which contrastedvery favourably with the arrangements made with France Ireceived the warmest expressions of gratitude from theDuce and with difficulty escaped the highest decorationMoreover in the conflict between Fascism and Bolshevismthere was no doubt where my sympathies and convictionslay On the two occasions in 1927 when I met Mussolini ourpersonal relations had been intimate and easy I wouldnever have encouraged Britain to make a breach with himabout Abyssinia or roused the League of Nations againsthim unless we were prepared to go to war in the lastextreme He like Hitler understood and in a way respectedmy campaign for British rearmament though he was veryglad British public opinion did not support my viewIn the crisis we had now reached of the disastrous Battle ofFrance it was clearly my duty as Prime Minister to do myutmost to keep Italy out of the conflict and though I did notindulge in vain hopes I at once used what resources andinfluence I might possess Six days after becoming Head ofthe Government I wrote at the Cabinetrsquos desire the appeal


to Mussolini which together with his answer was publishedtwo years later in very different circumstances

Prime Minister toSignor Mussolini

16V40

Now that I have taken up my office as Prime Ministerand Minister of Defence I look back to our meetings inRome and feel a desire to speak words of good will toyou as Chief of the Italian nation across what seems tobe a swiftly widening gulf Is it too late to stop a river ofblood from flowing between the British and Italianpeoples We can no doubt inflict grievous injuries uponone another and maul each other cruelly and darkenthe Mediterranean with our strife If you so decree itmust be so but I declare that I have never been theenemy of Italian greatness nor ever at heart the foe ofthe Italian lawgiver It is idle to predict the course of thegreat battles now raging in Europe but I am sure thatwhatever may happen on the Continent England willgo on to the end even quite alone as we have donebefore and I believe with some assurance that we shallbe aided in increasing measure by the United Statesand indeed by all the Americas

I beg you to believe that it is in no spirit of weaknessor of fear that I make this solemn appeal which willremain on record Down the ages above all other callscomes the cry that the joint heirs of Latin and Christiancivilisation must not be ranged against one another inmortal strife Hearken to it I beseech you in all honourand respect before the dread signal is given It willnever be given by us

The response was hard It had at least the merit of candour

Signer Mussolini toPrime Minister

18V40


I reply to the message which you have sent me inorder to tell you that you are certainly aware of gravereasons of an historical and contingent character whichhave ranged our two countries in opposite campsWithout going back very far in time I remind you of theinitiative taken in 1935 by your Government to organiseat Geneva sanctions against Italy engaged in securingfor herself a small space in the African sun withoutcausing the slightest injury to your interests andterritories or those of others I remind you also of thereal and actual state of servitude in which Italy findsherself in her own sea If it was to honour yoursignature that your Government declared war onGermany you will understand that the same sense ofhonour and of respect for engagements assumed in theItalian-German Treaty guides Italian policy today andtomorrow in the face of any event whatsoever

From this moment we could have no doubt of Mussolinirsquosintention to enter the war at his most favourable momentHis resolve had in fact been made as soon as the defeat ofthe French armies was obvious On May 13 he had toldCiano that he would declare war on France and Britainwithin a month His official decision to declare war on anydate suitable after June 5 was imparted to the Italian Chiefsof Staff on May 29 At Hitlerrsquos request the date waspostponed to June 10

On May 26 while the fate of the Northern Armies hung inthe balance and no one could be sure that any wouldescape Reynaud flew over to England to have a talk withus about this topic which had not been absent from ourminds The Italian declaration of war must be expected atany moment Thus France would burn upon another frontand a new foe would march hungrily upon her in the SouthCould anything be done to buy off Mussolini That was the


question posed I did not think there was the slightestchance and every fact that the French Premier used as anargument for trying only made me surer there was no hopeHowever Reynaud was under strong pressure at homeand we on our side wished to give full consideration to ourAlly whose one vital weapon her Army was breaking inher hand M Reynaud has published a full account of hisvisit and especially of his conversations1 Lord Halifax MrChamberlain Mr Attlee and Mr Eden were also at ourmeetings Although there was no need to marshal thegrave facts M Reynaud dwelt not obscurely upon thepossible French withdrawal from the war He himself wouldfight on but there was always the possibility that he mightsoon be replaced by others of a different temperWe had already on May 25 at the instance of the FrenchGovernment made a joint request to President Roosevelt tointervene In this message Britain and France authorisedhim to state that we understood Italy had territorialgrievances against them in the Mediterranean that wewere disposed to consider at once any reasonable claimsthat the Allies would admit Italy to the Peace Conferencewith a status equal to that of any belligerent and that wewould invite the President to see that any agreementreached now would be carried out The President actedaccordingly but his addresses were repulsed by the Italiandictator in the most abrupt manner At our meeting withReynaud we had already this answer before us The FrenchPremier now suggested more precise proposals Obviouslyif these were to remedy Italyrsquos ldquostate of servitude in her ownseardquo they must affect the status both of Gibraltar and SuezFrance was prepared to make similar concessions aboutTunis


We were not able to show any favour to these ideas Thiswas not because it was wrong to examine them or becauseit did not seem worth while at this moment to pay a heavyprice to keep Italy out of the war My own feeling was that atthe pitch in which our affairs lay we had nothing to offerwhich Mussolini could not take for himself or be given byHitler if we were defeated One cannot easily make abargain at the last gasp Once we started negotiating forthe friendly mediation of the Duce we should destroy ourpower of fighting on I found my colleagues very stiff andtough All our minds ran much more on bombing Milan andTurin the moment Mussolini declared war and seeing howhe liked that Reynaud who did not at heart disagreeseemed convinced or at least content The most we couldpromise was to bring the matter before the Cabinet andsend a definite answer the next day Reynaud and Ilunched alone together at the Admiralty The followingtelegram the greater part of which is my own wordingembodies the conclusions of the War Cabinet


28V40

I have with my colleagues examined with the mostcareful and sympathetic attention the proposal for anapproach by way of precise offer of concessions toSignor Mussolini that you have forwarded to me todayfully realising the terrible situation with which we areboth faced at this moment

2 Since we last discussed this matter the new factwhich has occurred namely the capitulation of theBelgian Army has greatly changed our position for theworse for it is evident that the chance of withdrawingthe armies of Generals Blanchard and Gort from theChannel ports has become very problematical The firsteffect of such a disaster must be to make it impossible


at such a moment for Germany to put forward anyterms likely to be acceptable and neither we nor youwould be prepared to give up our independence withoutfighting for it to the end

3 In the formula prepared last Sunday by LordHalifax it was suggested that if Signor Mussolini wouldco-operate with us in securing a settlement of allEuropean questions which would safeguard ourindependence and form the basis of a just and durablepeace for Europe we should be prepared to discuss hisclaims in the Mediterranean You now propose to addcertain specific offers which I cannot suppose wouldhave any chance of moving Signor Mussolini andwhich once made could not be subsequently with-drawn in order to induce him to undertake the rocircle ofmediator which the formula discussed on Sundaycontemplated

4 I and my colleagues believe that Signor Mussolinihas long had it in mind that he might eventually fill thisrocircle no doubt counting upon substantial advantages forItaly in the process But we are convinced that at thismoment when Hitler is flushed with victory andcertainly counts on early and complete collapse ofAllied resistance it would be impossible for SignorMussolini to put forward proposals for a conferencewith any success I may remind you also that thePresident of the USA has received a wholly negativereply to the proposal which we jointly asked him tomake and that no response has been made to theapproach which Lord Halifax made to the ItalianAmbassador here last Saturday

5 Therefore without excluding the possibility of anapproach to Signor Mussolini at some time we cannotfeel that this would be the right moment and I ambound to add that in my opinion the effect on themorale of our people which is now firm and resolutewould be extremely dangerous You yourself can bestjudge what would be the effect in France

6 You will ask then how is the situation to beimproved My reply is that by showing that after theloss of our two [Northern] armies and the support of ourBelgian ally we still have stout hearts and confidence in


ourselves we shall at once strengthen our hands innegotiations and draw the admiration and perhaps thematerial help of the USA Moreover we feel that aslong as we stand together our undefeated Navy andour Air Force which is daily destroying German fightersand bombers at a formidable rate afford us the meansof exercising in our common interest a continuouspressure upon Germanyrsquos internal life

7 We have reason to believe that the Germans tooare working to a time-table and that their losses andthe hardships imposed on them together with the fearof our air raids is undermining their courage It wouldindeed be a tragedy if by too hasty an acceptance ofdefeat we threw away a chance that was almost withinour grasp of securing an honourable issue from thestruggle

8 In my view if we both stand out we may yet saveourselves from the fate of Denmark or Poland Oursuccess must depend first on our unity then on ourcourage and endurance

This did not prevent the French Government from making afew days later a direct offer of their own to Italy of territorialconcessions which Mussolini treated with disdain ldquoHe wasnot interestedrdquo said Ciano to the French Ambassador onJune 3 ldquoin recovering any French territories by peacefulnegotiation He had decided to make war on Francerdquo2 Thiswas only what we had expected

I now gave daily a series of directions to make sure that ifwe were subjected to this odious attack by Mussolini weshould be able to strike back at once



28V40

Pray bring the following before the COS Commit-tee

What measures have been taken in the event ofItalyrsquos going to war to attack Italian forces in Abyssiniasending rifles and money to the Abyssinian insurgentsand generally to disturb that country

I understand General Smuts has sent a Unionbrigade to East Africa Is it there yet When will it beWhat other arrangements are made What is thestrength of the Khartoum garrison including troops inthe Blue Nile Province This is the opportunity for theAbyssinians to liberate themselves with Allied help

2 If France is still our ally after an Italian declarationof war it would appear extremely desirable that thecombined fleets acting from opposite ends of theMediterranean should pursue an active offensiveagainst Italy It is important that at the outset collisionshould take place both with the Italian Navy and AirForce in order that we can see what their quality reallyis and whether it has changed at all since the last warThe purely defensive strategy contemplated byCommander-in-Chiepound Mediterranean ought not to beaccepted Unless it is found that the fighting qualities ofthe Italians are high it will be much better that the Fleetat Alexandria should sally forth and run some risks thanthat it should remain in a posture so markedlydefensive Risks must be run at this juncture in alltheatres

3 I presume that the Admiralty have a plan in theevent of France becoming neutral

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay (andothers)

29V40

We must have eight battalions from Palestine homeat the earliest moment I regard the Mediterranean asclosed to troopships The choice is therefore between


the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf Let this alternativeroute [across the desert to the Gulf] be examined thisafternoon and Admiralty be consulted and report tome on relative times and safety The Australians can beleft in Palestine for the moment but the HighCommissioner like others must conform to thesupreme requirements of the State

Admiralty should say whether it would be possible topick these men up at the Cape in the big liners for extraspeed

Prime Minister to FirstLord of the Admiralty

30V40

What measures have been taken to seize all Italianships at the moment of war How many are there inBritish ports and what can be done about them on theseas or in foreign ports Will you kindly pass this to theproper Department immediately

At the Supreme War Council in Paris on May 31 which hasalready been described it was agreed that the Allies shouldundertake offensive operations against selected objectivesin Italy at the earliest possible moment and that the Frenchand British naval and air staffs should concert their plansWe had also agreed that in the event of Italian aggressionagainst Greece of which there were indications we shouldmake sure that Crete did not fall into enemy hands Ipursued the same theme in my minutes

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forAir and Chief of AirStaff

2VI40

It is of the utmost importance in view of the[possible] raids on Lyons and Marseilles that weshould be able to strike back with our heavy bombers at


Italy the moment she enters the war I considertherefore that these squadrons should be flown to theiraerodromes in Southern France at the earliest momentwhen French permission can be obtained and when theservicing units are ready for their reception

Pray let me know at our meeting tonight what youpropose

Prime Minister to S ofS for Air and CAS

6VI40

It is of the highest importance that we should strikeat Italy the moment war breaks out or an overbearingultimatum is received Please let me know the exactposition of the servicing units which are on their way tothe southern aerodromes in France

An early Italian plan favoured particularly by Ciano hadbeen that Italian action in Europe should be confined to thelaunching of an attack on Yugoslavia thus consolidatingItalyrsquos power in Eastern Europe and strengthening herpotential economic position Mussolini himself was for atime won over to this idea Graziani records that at the endof April the Duce told him ldquoWe must bring Yugoslavia toher knees we have need of raw materials and it is in hermines that we must find them In consequence my strategicdirective is ndash defensive in the west (France) and offensive inthe east (Yugoslavia) Prepare a study of the problemrdquo3Graziani claims that he advised strongly against committingthe Italian armies short as they were of equipmentparticularly of artillery to a repetition of the Isonzocampaign of 1915 There were also political argumentsagainst the Yugoslav plan The Germans were anxious atthis moment to avoid disturbing Eastern Europe Theyfeared it would provoke British action in the Balkans and


might inadvertently tempt Russia to further activity in theEast I was not aware of this aspect of Italian policy

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forForeign Affairs

6VI40

I have hitherto argued against going to war with Italybecause she attacked [ie if she were to attack]Yugoslavia and have wished to see whether it was aserious attack upon Yugoslavian independence ormerely taking some naval bases in the AdriaticHowever this situation has changed Italy is continuallythreatening to go to war with England and France andnot by ldquothe back doorrdquo We are so near a break withItaly on grounds which have nothing to do withYugoslavia that it would seem that our main aim mightwell be now to procure this Balkan mobilisation Willyou think this over

In spite of the extreme efforts made by the United States ofwhich Mr Hull has given an impressive account in hismemoirs4 nothing could turn Mussolini from his courseOur preparations to meet the new assault and complicationwere well advanced when the moment came On June 10at 445 PM the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs informedthe British Ambassador that Italy would consider herself atwar with the United Kingdom from 1 PM the next day Asimilar communication was made to the FrenchGovernment When Ciano delivered his note to the FrenchAmbassador M Franccedilois-Poncet remarked as he reachedthe door ldquoYou too will find the Germans are hard mastersrdquoThe British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine received the


announcement with perfect composure and apparentindifference He asked only one question Was Cianorsquosstatement early news or was it in fact the declaration ofwar Ciano replied it was the latter Loraine then made aformal bow and left the room without another word5 Fromhis balcony in Rome Mussolini announced to well-organisedcrowds that Italy was at war with France and Britain It wasas Ciano is said to have apologetically remarked later onldquoA chance which comes only once in five thousand yearsrdquoSuch chances though rare are not necessarily goodForthwith the Italians attacked the French troops on theAlpine front and Great Britain reciprocally declared war onItaly The five Italian ships detained at Gibraltar were seizedand orders were given to the Navy to intercept and bringinto controlled ports all Italian vessels at sea On the nightof the 12th our bomber squadrons after a long flight fromEngland which meant light loads dropped their first bombsupon Turin and Milan We looked forward however to amuch heavier delivery as soon as we could use the Frenchairfields at MarseillesIt may be convenient at this point to dispose of the briefFranco-Italian campaign The French could only musterthree divisions with fortress troops equivalent to three moreto meet invasion over the Alpine passes and along theRiviera coast by the western group of Italian armies Thesecomprised thirty-two divisions under Prince UmbertoMoreover strong German armour rapidly descending theRhone Valley soon began to traverse the French rearNevertheless the Italians were still confronted and evenpinned down at every point on the new front by the FrenchAlpine units even after Paris had fallen and Lyons was inGerman hands When on June 18 Hitler and Mussolini metat Munich the Duce had little cause to boast A new Italian


offensive was therefore launched on June 21 The FrenchAlpine positions however proved impregnable and themajor Italian effort towards Nice was halted in the suburbsof Mentone But although the French army on thesoutheastern borders saved its honour the German marchto the south behind them made further fighting impossibleand the conclusion of the armistice with Germany waslinked with a French request to Italy for the cessation ofhostilities

My account of this Italian tragedy may fittingly be closedhere by the letter which the unlucky Ciano wrote me shortlybefore his execution at the orders of his father-in-law

Verona December 23 1943Signer ChurchillYou will not be surprised that as I approach the hour

of my death I should turn to you whom I profoundlyadmire as the champion of a crusade though you did atone time make an unjust statement against me

I was never Mussolinirsquos accomplice in that crimeagainst our country and humanity that of fighting sideby side with the Germans Indeed the opposite is thetruth and if last August I vanished from Rome it wasbecause the Germans had convinced me that mychildren were in imminent danger After they hadpledged themselves to take me to Spain they deportedme and my family against my will to Bavaria Now Ihave been nearly three months in the prisons of Veronaabandoned to the barbarous treatment of the SS Myend is near and I have been told that in a few days mydeath will be decided which to me will be no more norless [than] a release from this daily martyrdom And Iprefer death to witnessing the shame and irreparabledamage of an Italy which has been under Hundomination


The crime which I am now about to expiate is that ofhaving witnessed and been disgusted by the coldcruel and cynical preparation for this war by Hitler andthe Germans I was the only foreigner to see at closequarters this loathsome clique of bandits preparing toplunge the world into a bloody war Now in accordancewith gangster rule they are planning to suppress adangerous witness But they have miscalculated foralready a long time ago I put a diary of mine andvarious documents in a safe place which will provemore than I myself could the crimes committed bythose people with whom later that tragic and vilepuppet Mussolini associated himself through his vanityand disregard of moral values

I have made arrangements that as soon as possibleafter my death these documents of the existence ofwhich Sir Percy Loraine was aware at the time of hisMission in Rome should be put at the disposal of theAllied Press

Perhaps what I am offering you today is but little butthat and my life are all I can offer to the cause of libertyand justice in the triumph of which I fanatically believe

This testimony of mine should be brought to light sothat the world may know may hate and may rememberand that those who will have to judge the future shouldnot be ignorant of the fact that the misfortune of Italywas not the fault of her people but due to the shamefulbehaviour of one man

Yours sincerelyG CLANO

A speech from President Roosevelt had been announcedfor the night of the 10th About midnight I listened to it witha group of officers in the Admiralty War Room where I stillworked When he uttered the scathing words about Italy


ldquoOn this tenth day of June 1940 the hand that held thedagger has struck it into the back of its neighborrdquo there wasa deep growl of satisfaction I wondered about the Italianvote in the approaching presidential election but I knewthat Roosevelt was a most experienced American partypolitician although never afraid to run risks for the sake ofhis resolves It was a magnificent speech instinct withpassion and carrying to us a message of hope While theimpression was strong upon me and before going to bed Iexpressed my gratitude


11VI40

We all listened to you last night and were fortified bythe grand scope of your declaration Your statementthat the material aid of the United States will be given tothe Allies in their struggle is a strong encouragement ina dark but not unhopeful hour Everything must bedone to keep France in the fight and to prevent anyidea of the fall of Paris should it occur becoming theoccasion of any kind of parley The hope with whichyou inspire them may give them the strength topersevere They should continue to defend every yardof their soil and use the full fighting force of their ArmyHitler thus baffled of quick results will turn upon usand we are preparing ourselves to resist his fury anddefend our island Having saved the BEF we do notlack troops at home and as soon as divisions can beequipped on the much higher scale needed forContinental service they will be despatched to FranceOur intention is to have a strong army fighting in Francefor the campaign of 1941 I have already cabled youabout aeroplanes including flying-boats which are soneedful to us in the impending struggle for the life ofGreat Britain But even more pressing is the need fordestroyers The Italian outrage makes it necessary forus to cope with a much larger number of submarines


which may come out into the Atlantic and perhaps bebased on Spanish ports To this the only counter isdestroyers Nothing is so important as for us to havethe thirty or forty old destroyers you have already hadreconditioned We can fit them very rapidly with ourAsdics and they will bridge the gap of six monthsbefore our wartime new construction comes into playWe will return them or their equivalents to you withoutfail at six monthsrsquo notice if at any time you need themThe next six months are vital If while we have to guardthe East Coast against invasion a new heavy German-Italian submarine attack is launched against ourcommerce the strain may be beyond our resourcesand the ocean traffic by which we live may bestrangled Not a day should be lost I send you myheartfelt thanks and those of my colleagues for all youare doing and seeking to do for what we may nowindeed call the Common Cause

The rush for the spoils had begun But Mussolini was notthe only hungry animal seeking prey To join the Jackalcame the BearI have recorded in the previous volume the course of Anglo-Soviet relations up till the outbreak of war and the hostilityverging upon an actual breach with Britain and Francewhich arose during the Russian invasion of FinlandGermany and Russia now worked together as closely astheir deep divergences of interest permitted Hitler andStalin had much in common as totalitarians and theirsystems of government were akin M Molotov beamed onthe German Ambassador Count Schulenburg on everyimportant occasion and was forward and fulsome in hisapproval of German policy and praise for Hitlerrsquos militarymeasures When the German assault had been made uponNorway he had said (April 7) that ldquothe Soviet Government


understood the measures which were forced uponGermany The English had certainly gone much too farThey had disregarded completely the rights of neutralnationshellip We wish Germany complete success in herdefensive measuresrdquo6 Hitler had taken pains to informStalin on the morning of May 10 of the onslaught he hadbegun upon France and the neutral Low Countries ldquoI calledon Molotovrdquo wrote Schulenburg ldquoHe appreciated the newsand added that he understood that Germany had to protectherself against Anglo-French attack He had no doubt of oursuccessrdquo7

Although these expressions of their opinion were of courseunknown till after the war we were under no illusions aboutthe Russian attitude We nonetheless pursued a patientpolicy of trying to re-establish relations of a confidentialcharacter with Russia trusting to the march of events andto their fundamental antagonisms to Germany It wasthought wise to use the abilities of Sir Stafford Cripps asAmbassador to Moscow He willingly accepted this bleakand unpromising task We did not at that time realisesufficiently that Soviet Communists hate extreme left-wingpoliticians even more than they do Tories or Liberals Thenearer a man is to Communism in sentiment the moreobnoxious he is to the Soviets unless he joins the partyThe Soviet Government agreed to receive Cripps asAmbassador and explained this step to their Naziconfederates ldquoThe Soviet Unionrdquo wrote Schulenburg toBerlin on May 29 ldquois interested in obtaining rubber and tinfrom England in exchange for lumber There is no reasonfor apprehension concerning Crippsrsquos mission since thereis no reason to doubt the loyal attitude of the Soviet Uniontowards us and since the unchanged direction of Sovietpolicy towards England precludes damage to Germany orvital German interests There are no indications of any kind


here for belief that the latest German successes causealarm or fear of Germany in the Soviet Governmentrdquo8

The collapse of France and the destruction of the Frencharmies and of all counter-poise in the West ought to haveproduced some reaction in Stalinrsquos mind but nothingseemed to warn the Soviet leaders of the gravity of theirown peril On June 18 when the French defeat was totalSchulenburg reported ldquoMolotov summoned me thisevening to his office and expressed the warmestcongratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendidsuccess of the German armed forcesrdquo9 This was almostexactly a year from the date when these same armedforces taking the Soviet Government by complete surprisefell upon Russia in cataracts of fire and steel We now knowthat only four months later in 1940 Hitler definitely decidedupon a war of extermination against the Soviets and beganthe long vast stealthy movement of these much-congratulated German armies to the East No recollectionof their miscalculation and former conduct ever preventedthe Soviet Government and its Communist agents andassociates all over the world from screaming for a SecondFront in which Britain whom they had consigned to ruinand servitude was to play a leading partHowever we comprehended the future more truly thanthese cold-blooded calculators and understood theirdangers and their interest better than they did themselves Inow addressed myself for the first time to Stalin

Prime Minister toMonsieur Stalin

25VI40

At this time when the face of Europe is changinghourly I should like to take the opportunity of your


receiving His Majestyrsquos new Ambassador to ask thelatter to convey to you a message from myself

Geographically our two countries lie at the oppositeextremities of Europe and from the point of view ofsystems of government it may be said that they standfor widely differing systems of political thought But Itrust that these facts need not prevent the relationsbetween our two countries in the international spherefrom being harmonious and mutually beneficial

In the past ndash indeed in the recent past ndash ourrelations have it must be acknowledged beenhampered by mutual suspicions and last August theSoviet Government decided that the interests of theSoviet Union required that they should break offnegotiations with us and enter into a close relation withGermany Thus Germany became your friend almost atthe same moment as she became our enemy

But since then a new factor has arisen which Iventure to think makes it desirable that both ourcountries should re-establish our previous contact sothat if necessary we may be able to consult together asregards those affairs in Europe which must necessarilyinterest us both At the present moment the problembefore all Europe ndash our two countries included ndash is howthe States and peoples of Europe are going to reacttowards the prospect of Germany establishing ahegemony over the Continent

The fact that both our countries lie not in Europe buton her extremities puts them in a special position Weare better enabled than others less fortunately placedto resist Germanyrsquos hegemony and as you know theBritish Government certainly intend to use theirgeographical position and their great resources to thisend

In fact Great Britainrsquos policy is concentrated on twoobjects ndash one to save herself from German dominationwhich the Nazi Government wishes to impose and theother to free the rest of Europe from the dominationwhich Germany is now in process of imposing on it

The Soviet Union is alone in a position to judgewhether Germanyrsquos present bid for the hegemony ofEurope threatens the interests of the Soviet Union and


if so how best these interests can be safeguarded But Ihave felt that the crisis through which Europe andindeed the world is passing is so grave as to warrantmy laying before you frankly the position as it presentsitself to the British Government This I hope willensure that in any discussion that the Soviet Govern-ment may have with Sir S Cripps there should be nomisunderstanding as to the policy of His MajestyrsquosGovernment or of their readiness to discuss fully withthe Soviet Government any of the vast problemscreated by Germanyrsquos present attempt to pursue inEurope a methodical process by successive stages ofconquest and absorption

There was of course no answer I did not expect one SirStafford Cripps reached Moscow safely and even had aninterview of a formal and frigid character with M Stalin

Meanwhile the Soviet Government was busy collecting itsspoils On June 14 the day Paris fell Moscow had sent anultimatum to Lithuania accusing her and the other BalticStates of military conspiracy against the USSR anddemanding radical changes of government and militaryconcessions On June 15 Red Army troops invaded thecountry and the President Smetona fled into East PrussiaLatvia and Estonia were exposed to the same treatmentPro-Soviet Governments must be set up forthwith andSoviet garrisons admitted into these small countriesResistance was out of the question The President of Latviawas deported to Russia and Mr Vyshinsky arrived tonominate a Provisional Government to manage newelections In Estonia the pattern was identical On June 19Zhdanov arrived in Tallinn to instal a similar regime OnAugust 36 the pretense of pro-Soviet friendly and


democratic Governments was swept away and the Kremlinannexed the Baltic States to the Soviet UnionThe Russian ultimatum to Rumania was delivered to theRumanian Minister in Moscow at 10 PM on June 26 Thecession of Bessarabia and the northern part of the provinceof Bukovina was demanded and an immediate replyrequested by the following day Germany though annoyedby this precipitate action of Russia which threatened hereconomic interests in Rumania was bound by the terms ofthe German-Soviet pact of August 1939 which recognisedthe exclusive political interest of Russia in these areas ofSoutheast Europe The German Government thereforecounselled Rumania to yield


7Back to France June 4 to June 12

High Morale of the ArmymdashMy First Thoughts andDirective June 2 1940 mdash The Lost Equipment mdashThe President General Marshall and MrStettiniusmdashAn Act of Faith mdash The DoubleTensions of JunemdashReconstitution of the BritishArmymdashIts Fearful Lack of Modern WeaponsmdashDecision to Send Our Only Two Well-ArmedDivisions to FrancemdashThe Battle of France FinalPhasemdashDestruction of the Fifty-First HighlandDivision June 1112 mdashldquoAuld Scotland Stands forSomething StillrdquomdashMy Fourth Visit to France BriaremdashWeygand and PeacutetainmdashGeneral GeorgesSummonedmdashMussolini Strikes mdash My Discussionwith WeygandmdashThe French Prevent the Royal AirForce from Bombing Milan and TurinmdashTheGermans Enter Paris mdash Renewed ConferenceNext MorningmdashAdmiral Darlanrsquos Promise mdashFarewell to GQG mdash Our Journey HomemdashMyReport to the War Cabinet of the Conference

WHEN IT WAS KNOWN how many men had been rescuedfrom Dunkirk a sense of deliverance spread in the islandand throughout the Empire There was a feeling of intenserelief melting almost into triumph The safe home-comingof a quarter of a million men the flower of our Army was amilestone in our pilgrimage through years of defeat Theachievement of the Southern Railway and the Movements


Branch of the War Office of the staffs at the ports in theThames Estuary and above all at Dover where over twohundred thousand men were handled and rapidlydistributed throughout the country is worthy of the highestpraise The troops returned with nothing but rifles andbayonets and a few hundred machine guns and wereforthwith sent to their homes for seven daysrsquo leave Theirjoy at being once again united with their families did notovercome a stern desire to engage the enemy at theearliest moment Those who had actually fought theGermans in the field had the belief that given a fair chancethey could beat them Their morale was high and theyrejoined their regiments and batteries with alacrityAll the Ministers and departmental officers permanent ornewly chosen acted with confidence and vigour night andday and there are many tales to be told besides this onePersonally I felt uplifted and my mind drew easily and freelyfrom the knowledge I had gathered in my life I wasexhilarated by the salvation of the Army I present for whatthey are worth the directives to the Departments andsubmissions to the War Cabinet which I issued day by dayIsmay carried them to the Chiefs of Staff and Bridges tothe War Cabinet and the Departments Mistakes werecorrected and gaps filled Amendments and improvementswere often made but in the main to the degree perhaps ofninety per cent action was taken and with a speed andeffectiveness which no dictatorship could rivalHere were my first thoughts at the moment when it becamecertain that the Army had escaped


2VI40


Notes for COS etc by the Minister of DefenceThe successful evacuation of the BEF has

revolutionised the Home Defence position As soon asthe BEF units can be reformed on a Home Defencebasis we have a mass of trained troops in the countrywhich would require a raid to be executed on aprohibitively large scale Even 200000 men would notbe beyond our compass The difficulties of a descentand its risks and losses increase with every addition tothe first 10000 We must at once take a new view ofthe situation Certain questions must be consideredchiefly by the War Office but also by the Joint Staffs

1 What is the shortest time in which the BEF canbe given a new fighting value

2 Upon what scheme would they be organised Willit be for service at Home in the first instance and onlysecondarily despatch to France On the whole I preferthis

3 The BEF in France must immediately bereconstituted otherwise the French will not continue inthe war Even if Paris is lost they must be adjured tocontinue a gigantic guerrilla A scheme should beconsidered for a bridgehead and area of disembarka-tion in Brittany where a large army can be developedWe must have plans worked out which will show theFrench that there is a way through if they will only besteadfast

4 As soon as the BEF is reconstituted for HomeDefence three divisions should be sent to join our twodivisions south of the Somme or wherever the Frenchleft may be by then It is for consideration whether theCanadian Division should not go at once Pray let mehave a scheme

5 Had we known a week ago what we now knowabout the Dunkirk evacuation Narvik would havepresented itself in a different light Even now thequestion of maintaining a garrison there for someweeks on a self-contained basis should be reconsid-ered I am deeply impressed with the vice and peril ofchopping and changing The letter of the Minister ofEconomic Warfare as well as the telegram of some


days ago from the C-in-C must however receive onefinal weighing

6 Ask Admiralty to supply a latest return of the stateof the destroyer flotillas showing what reinforcementshave arrived or are expected within the month of Juneand how many will come from repair

7 It should now be possible to allow the eightRegular battalions in Palestine to be relieved by theeight native battalions from India before they arebrought home as brought home they must be toconstitute the cadres of the new BEF

8 As soon as the Australians land the big shipsshould be turned round and should carry eight or tenTerritorial battalions to Bombay They should bring backa second eight Regular battalions from India andafterwards carry to India a second eight or tenTerritorial battalions from England It is for considera-tion how far the same principle should be applied tobatteries in India

9 Our losses in equipment must be expected todelay the fruition of our expansion of the BEF fromthe twenty divisions formerly aimed at by Z l + 12months to no more than fifteen divisions by Z + 18 butwe must have a project to put before the French Theessence of this should be the armoured division the51st the Canadians and two Territorial divisions underLord Gort by mid-July and the augmenting of this forceby six divisions formed from the twenty-four Regularbattalions in conjunction with Territorials a secondCanadian division an Australian division and twoTerritorial divisions by Z + 18 Perhaps we may even beable to improve on this

10 It is of the highest urgency to have at least half adozen Brigade groups formed from the Regulars of theBEF for Home Defence

11 What air co-operation is arranged to cover thefinal evacuation tonight It ought to be possible toreduce the pressure on the rearguard at this criticalmoment

I close with a general observation As I havepersonally felt less afraid of a German attempt at


invasion than of the piercing of the French line on theSomme or Aisne and the fall of Paris I have naturallybelieved the Germans would choose the latter Thisprobability is greatly increased by the fact that they willrealise that the armed forces in Great Britain are nowfar stronger than they have ever been and that theirraiding parties would not have to meet half-trainedformations but the men whose mettle they havealready tested and from whom they have recoiled notdaring seriously to molest their departure The next fewdays before the BEF or any substantial portion of itcan be reorganised must be considered as still critical

There was of course a darker side to Dunkirk We had lostthe whole equipment of the Army to which all the firstfruitsof our factories had hitherto been given

7000 tons of ammunition90000 rifles

2300 Guns120000 vehicles

8000 Bren guns400 anti-tank rifles

Many months must elapse even if the existing programmeswere fulfilled without interruption by the enemy before thisloss could be repairedHowever across the Atlantic in the United States strongemotions were already stirring in the breasts of its leadingmen A precise and excellent account of these events isgiven by Mr Stettinius2 the worthy son of my old Munitionscolleague of the First World War one of our truest friends


It was at once realised that the bulk of the British Army hadgot away only with the loss of all their equipment As earlyas June 1 the President sent out orders to the War andNavy Departments to report what weapons they couldspare for Britain and France At the head of the AmericanArmy as Chief of Staff was General Marshall not only asoldier of proved quality but a man of commanding visionHe instantly directed his Chief of Ordnance and hisAssistant Chief of Staff to survey the entire list of theAmerican reserve ordnance and munitions stocks In forty-eight hours the answers were given and on June 3Marshall approved the lists The first list comprised half amillion 30 calibre rifles out of two million manufactured in1917 and 1918 and stored in grease for more than twentyyears For these there were about 250 cartridges apieceThere were 900 soixante-quinze field guns with a millionrounds 80000 machine guns and various other items Inhis excellent book about American supplies Mr Stettiniussays ldquoSince every hour counted it was decided that theArmy should sell (for 37 million dollars) everything on thelist to one concern which could in turn resell immediately tothe British and Frenchrdquo The Chief of Ordnance Major-General Wesson was told to handle the matter andimmediately on June 3 all the American Army depots andarsenals started packing the material for shipment By theend of the week more than six hundred heavily loadedfreight cars were rolling towards the Army docks at RaritanNew Jersey up the river from Gravesend Bay By June 11a dozen British merchant ships moved into the bay andanchored and loading from lighters beganBy these extraordinary measures the United States leftthemselves with the equipment for only 1800000 men theminimum figure stipulated by the American ArmyMobilisation Plan All this reads easily now but at that time


it was a supreme act of faith and leadership for the UnitedStates to deprive themselves of this very considerablemass of arms for the sake of a country which many deemedalready beaten They never had need to repent of it As willpresently be recounted we ferried these precious weaponssafely across the Atlantic during July and they formed notonly a material gain but an important factor in allcalculations made by friend or foe about invasion

Mr Cordell Hull has a passage in his memoirs 3 which isrelevant at this point

In response to Reynaudrsquos almost pitiful pleas forbacking the President urged Mr Churchill to sendplanes to France but the Prime Minister refused Bullitt[the United States Ambassador in Paris] outraged bythis decision communicated to the President and meon June 5 his fear that the British might be conservingtheir Air Force and Fleet so as to use them asbargaining points in negotiations with Hitler ThePresident and I however thought differently Francewas finished but we were convinced that Britain underChurchillrsquos indomitable leadership intended to fight onThere would be no negotiations between London andBerlin Only the day before Bullittrsquos telegram Churchillhad made his magnificent speech in the House ofCommons The President and I believed Mr Churchillmeant what he said Had we had any doubt of Britainrsquosdetermination to keep on fighting we would not havetaken the steps we did to get material aid to her Therewould have been no logic in sending arms to Britain ifwe had thought that before they arrived thereChurchillrsquos Government would surrender to Germany


The month of June was particularly trying to all of usbecause of the dual and opposite stresses to which in ournaked condition we were subjected by our duty to Franceon the one hand and the need to create an effective armyat home and to fortify the island on the other The doubletension of antagonistic but vital needs was most severeNevertheless we followed a firm and steady policy withoutundue excitement First priority continued to be given tosending whatever trained and equipped troops we had inorder to reconstitute the British Expeditionary Force inFrance After that our efforts were devoted to the defenceof the island first by re-forming and re-equipping theRegular Army secondly by fortifying the likely landing-places thirdly by arming and organising the population sofar as was possible and of course by bringing homewhatever forces could be gathered from the Empire At thistime the most imminent dangers seemed to be the landingof comparatively small but highly mobile German tankforces which would rip us up and disorganise our defenceand also parachute descents In close contact with the newSecretary of State for War Anthony Eden I busied myselfon all thisThe following scheme was devised by the Secretary ofState and the War Office for reconstituting the Army inaccordance with the directives which had been issuedSeven mobile brigade groups were already in existenceThe divisions returned from Dunkirk were reconstituted re-equipped as fast as possible and took up their stations Intime the seven brigade groups were absorbed into the re-formed divisions There were available fourteen Territorialdivisions of high-quality men who had been nine monthsardently training under war conditions and were partlyequipped One of these the 52d was already fit for serviceoverseas There was a second armoured division and four


Army tank brigades in process of formation but withouttanks There was the 1st Canadian Division fully equippedIt was not men that were lacking but arms Over eightythousand rifles were retrieved from the communicationsand bases south of the Seine and by the middle of Juneevery fighting man in the Regular forces had at least apersonal weapon in his hand We had very little fieldartillery even for the Regular Army Nearly all the new 25-pounders had been lost in France There remained aboutfive hundred 18-pounders 45-inch and 6-inch howitzersThere were only 103 cruiser 132 infantry and 252 lighttanks Fifty of the infantry tanks were at home in a battalionof the Royal Tank Regiment and the remainder were intraining-schools Never has a great nation been so nakedbefore her foes

From the beginning I kept in the closest contact with my oldfriends now at the head of the Governments of Canada andSouth Africa

Prime Minister to MrMackenzie King

5VI40

British situation vastly improved by miraculousevacuation of BEF which gives us an army in theisland more than capable when re-equipped of copingwith any invading force likely to be landed Alsoevacuation was a main trial of strength between Britishand German Air Forces Germans have been unable toprevent evacuation though largely superior in numbersand have suffered at least three times our loss Fortechnical reasons British Air Force would have manymore advantages in defending the air above the island


than in operating overseas Principal remaining dangeris of course air[craft] factories but if our air defence isso strong that enemy can only come on dark nightsprecision will not be easy I therefore feel solidconfidence in British ability to continue the war defendthe island and the Empire and maintain the blockade

I do not know whether it will be possible to keepFrance in the war or not I hope they will even at theworst maintain a gigantic guerrilla We are reconstitut-ing the BEF out of other units

We must be careful not to let Americans view toocomplacently prospect of a British collapse out ofwhich they would get the British Fleet and theguardianship of the British Empire minus Great BritainIf United States were in the war and England [were]conquered locally it would be natural that eventsshould follow the above course But if Americacontinued neutral and we were overpowered I cannottell what policy might be adopted by a pro-Germanadministration such as would undoubtedly be set up

Although President is our best friend no practicalhelp has [reached us] from the United States as yetWe have not expected them to send military aid butthey have not even sent any worthy contribution indestroyers or planes or by a visit of a squadron of theirFleet to southern Irish ports Any pressure which youcan apply in this direction would be invaluable

We are most deeply grateful to you for all your helpand for [the four Canadian] destroyers which havealready gone into action against a U-boat Kindestregards

Smuts far off in South Africa and without the latestinformation upon the specialised problems of Insular AirDefence naturally viewed the tragedy of France accordingto orthodox principles ldquoConcentrate everything at thedecisive pointrdquo I had the advantage of knowing the factsand of the detailed advice of Air Marshal Dowding head ofFighter Command If Smuts and I had been together forhalf an hour and I could have put the data before him we


should have agreed as we always did on large militaryissues


9VI40

We are of course doing all we can both from the airand by sending divisions as fast as they can beequipped to France It would be wrong to send the bulkof our fighters to this battle and when it was lost as isprobable be left with no means of carrying on the war Ithink we have a harder longer and more hopeful dutyto perform Advantages of resisting German air attackin this island where we can concentrate very powerfulfighter strength and hope to knock out four or fivehostiles to one of ours are far superior to fighting inFrance where we are inevitably outnumbered andrarely exceed two to one ratio of destruction and whereour aircraft are often destroyed at exposed aero-dromes This battle does not turn on the score or so offighter squadrons we could transport with their plant inthe next month Even if by using them up we held theenemy Hitler could immediately throw his whole [air]strength against our undefended island and destroy ourmeans of future production by daylight attack Theclassical principles of war which you mention are in thiscase modified by the actual quantitative data Isee onlyone way through now to wit that Hitler should attackthis country and in so doing break his air weapon Ifthis happens he will be left to face the winter withEurope writhing under his heel and probably with theUnited States against him after the presidential electionis over

Am most grateful to you for cable Please alwaysgive me your counsel my old and valiant friend


Apart from our last twenty-five Fighter Squadrons on whichwe were adamant we regarded the duty of sending aid tothe French Army as paramount The movement of the 52dDivision to France under previous orders was due to beginon June 7 These orders were confirmed The 3d Divisionunder General Montgomery was put first in equipment andassigned to France The leading division of the CanadianArmy which had concentrated in England early in the yearand was well armed was directed with the full assent ofthe Dominion Government to Brest to begin arriving thereon June 11 for what might by this time already be deemeda forlorn hope The two French light divisions evacuatedfrom Norway were also sent home together with all theFrench units and individuals we had carried away fromDunkirkThat we should have sent our only two formed divisionsthe 52d Lowland Division and the 1st Canadian Divisionover to our failing French ally in this mortal crisis when thewhole fury of Germany must soon fall upon us must be setto our credit against the very limited forces we had beenable to put in France in the first eight months of warLooking back on it I wonder how when we were resolvedto continue the war to the death and under the threat ofinvasion and France was evidently falling we had thenerve to strip ourselves of the remaining effective militaryformations we possessed This was only possible becausewe understood the difficulties of the Channel crossingwithout the command of the sea or the air or the necessarylanding craft

We had still in France behind the Somme the 51stHighland Division which had been withdrawn from the


Maginot Line and was in good condition and the 52dLowland Division which was arriving in Normandy Therewas also our 1st (and only) Armoured Division less thetank battalion and the support group which had been sentto Calais This however had lost heavily in attempts tocross the Somme as part of Weygandrsquos plan By June 1 itwas reduced to one-third of its strength and was sent backacross the Seine to refit At the same time a compositeforce known as ldquoBeauman Forcerdquo was scraped togetherfrom the bases and lines of communication in France Itconsisted of nine improvised infantry battalions armedmainly with rifles and very few anti-tank weapons It hadneither transport nor signalsThe Tenth French Army with this British contingent tried tohold the line of the Somme The 51st Division alone had afront of sixteen miles and the rest of the army was equallystrained On June 4 with a French division and Frenchtanks they attacked the German bridgehead at Abbevillebut without successOn June 5 the final phase of the Battle of France beganThe French front consisted of the Second Third andFourth Groups of Armies The Second defended the Rhinefront and the Maginot Line the Fourth stood along theAisne and the Third from the Aisne to the mouth of theSomme This Third Army Group comprised the SixthSeventh and Tenth Armies and all the British forces inFrance formed part of the Tenth Army All this immenseline in which there stood at this moment nearly one and ahalf million men or perhaps sixty-five divisions was now tobe assaulted by one hundred and twenty-four Germandivisions also formed in three army groups namelyCoastal Sector Bock Central Sector Rundstedt EasternSector Leeb These attacked on June 5 June 9 and June15 respectively On the night of June 5 we learned that a


German offensive had been launched that morning on aseventy-mile front from Amiens to the Laon-Soissons roadThis was war on the largest scaleWe have seen how the German armour had been hobbledand held back in the Dunkirk battle in order to save it forthe final phase in France All this armour now rolled forwardupon the weak and improvised or quivering French frontbetween Paris and the sea It is here only possible to recordthe battle on the coastal flank in which we played a partOn June 7 the Germans renewed their attack and twoarmoured divisions drove towards Rouen so as to split theTenth French Army The left French Ninth Corps includingthe Highland Division two French infantry divisions andtwo cavalry divisions or what was left of them wereseparated from the rest of the Tenth Army front ldquoBeaumanForcerdquo supported by thirty British tanks now attempted tocover Rouen On June 8 they were driven back to theSeine and that night the Germans entered the city The51st Division with the remnants of the French Ninth Corpswas cut off in the Rouen-Dieppe cul-de-sac


We had been intensely concerned lest this division shouldbe driven back to the Havre peninsula and thus beseparated from the main armies and its commander Major-General Fortune had been told to fall back if necessary inthe direction of Rouen This movement was forbidden bythe already disintegrating French command Repeatedurgent representations were made by us but they were ofno avail A dogged refusal to face facts led to the ruin of theFrench Ninth Corps and our 51st Division On June 9 whenRouen was already in German hands our men had butnewly reached Dieppe thirty-five miles to the north Onlythen were orders received to withdraw to Havre A forcewas sent back to cover the movement but before the mainbodies could move the Germans interposed Striking fromthe east they reached the sea and the greater part of the51st Division with many of the French was cut off It was a


case of gross mismanagement for this very danger wasvisible a full three days beforeOn the 10th after sharp fighting the division fell backtogether with the French Ninth Corps to the perimeter of StValeacutery expecting to be evacuated by sea Meanwhile allour other forces in the Havre peninsula were embarkingspeedily and safely During the night of the 11th and 12thfog prevented the ships from evacuating the troops from StValeacutery By morning on the 12th the Germans had reachedthe sea cliffs to the south and the beach was under directfire White flags appeared in the town The French corpscapitulated at eight orsquoclock and the remains of the HighlandDivision were forced to do so at 1030 AM Only 1350British officers and men and 930 French escaped eightthousand fell into German hands I was vexed that theFrench had not allowed our division to retire on Rouen ingood time but had kept it waiting till it could neither reachHavre nor retreat southward and thus forced it to surrenderwith their own troops The fate of the Highland Division washard but in after years not unavenged by those Scots whofilled their places re-created the division by merging it withthe 9th Scottish and marched across all the battlefieldsfrom Alamein to final victory beyond the RhineSome lines of Dr Charles Murrayrsquos written in the FirstWorld War came into my mind and it is fitting to print themhere

Half-mast the castle banner droopsThe Lairdrsquos lament was played yestreenAnrsquo mony a widowed cottar wifeIs greetinrsquo at her shank aleen


In Freedomrsquos cause for ane that farsquosWersquoll glean the glens anrsquo send them threeTo clip the reivinrsquo eaglersquos clawsAnrsquo drook his feathers irsquo the seaFor gallant loons in brochs anrsquo toonsAre leavinrsquo shop anrsquo yaird anrsquo millArsquo keen to show baith friend anrsquo foeAuld Scotland counts for something still

About eleven orsquoclock the morning of June 11 there was amessage from Reynaud who had also cabled to thePresident The French tragedy had moved and sliddownward For several days past I had pressed for ameeting of the Supreme Council We could no longer meetin Paris We were not told what were the conditions thereCertainly the German spearheads were very close I hadhad some difficulty in obtaining a rendezvous but this wasno time to stand on ceremony We must know what the


French were going to do Reynaud now told me that hecould receive us at Briare near Orleacuteans The seat ofgovernment was moving from Paris to Tours GrandQuartier Geacuteneacuteral was near Briare He specified the airfieldto which I should come Nothing loth I ordered theFlamingo to be ready at Hendon after luncheon and havingobtained the approval of my colleagues at the morningCabinet we started about two orsquoclock Before leaving Icabled to the President


11VI40

The French have sent for me again which meansthat crisis has arrived Am just off Anything you cansay or do to help them now may make the difference

We are also worried about Ireland An AmericanSquadron at Berehaven would do no end of good I amsure

This was my fourth journey to France and since militaryconditions evidently predominated I asked the Secretary ofState for War Mr Eden to come with me as well asGeneral Dill now CIGS and of course Ismay TheGerman aircraft were now reaching far down into theChannel and we had to make a still wider sweep Asbefore the Flamingo had an escort of twelve HurricanesAfter a couple of hours we alighted at a small landing-ground There were a few Frenchmen about and soon acolonel arrived in a motor-car I displayed the smilingcountenance and confident air which are thought suitablewhen things are very bad but the Frenchman was dull andunresponsive I realised immediately how very far things


had fallen even since we were in Paris a week before Afteran interval we were conducted to the chateau where wefound M Reynaud Marshal Peacutetain General Weygand theAir General Vuillemin and some others including therelatively junior General de Gaulle who had just beenappointed Under-Secretary for National Defence Hard byon the railway was the Headquarters train in which some ofour party were accommodated The chacircteau possessed butone telephone in the lavatory It was kept very busy withlong delays and endless shouted repetitionsAt seven orsquoclock we entered into conference GeneralIsmay kept a record I merely reproduce my lastingimpressions which in no way disagree with it There wereno reproaches or recriminations We were all up againstbrute facts We British did not know where exactly the frontline lay and certainly there was anxiety about some dart bythe German armour ndash even upon us In effect thediscussion ran on the following lines I urged the FrenchGovernment to defend Paris I emphasised the enormousabsorbing power of the house-to-house defence of a greatcity upon an invading army I recalled to Marshal Peacutetain thenights we had spent together in his train at Beauvais afterthe British Fifth Army disaster in 1918 and how he as I putit not mentioning Marshal Foch had restored the situationI also reminded him how Clemenceau had said ldquoI will fightin front of Paris in Paris and behind Parisrdquo The Marshalreplied very quietly and with dignity that in those days hehad a mass of manoeuvre of upwards of sixty divisionsnow there was none He mentioned that there were thensixty British divisions in the line Making Paris into a ruinwould not affect the final eventThen General Weygand exposed the military position sofar as he knew it in the fluid battle proceeding fifty or sixtymiles away and he paid a high tribute to the prowess of the


French Army He requested that every reinforcementshould be sent ndash above all that every British fighter airsquadron should immediately be thrown into the battleldquoHererdquo he said ldquois the decisive point Now is the decisivemoment It is therefore wrong to keep any squadrons backin Englandrdquo But in accordance with the Cabinet decisiontaken in the presence of Air Marshal Dowding whom I hadbrought specially to a Cabinet meeting I replied ldquoThis isnot the decisive point and this is not the decisive momentThat moment will come when Hitler hurls his Luftwaffeagainst Great Britain If we can keep command of the airand if we can keep the seas open as we certainly shallkeep them open we will win it all back for yourdquo4 Twenty-five fighter squadrons must be maintained at all costs forthe defence of Britain and the Channel and nothing wouldmake us give up these We intended to continue the warwhatever happened and we believed we could do so for anindefinite time but to give up these squadrons woulddestroy our chance of life At this stage I asked that GeneralGeorges the Commander-in-Chief of the NorthwesternFront who was in the neighbourhood should be sent forand this was accordingly donePresently General Georges arrived After being apprised ofwhat had passed he confirmed the account of the Frenchfront which had been given by Weygand I again urged myguerrilla plan The German Army was not so strong asmight appear at their points of impact If all the Frencharmies every division and brigade fought the troops ontheir front with the utmost vigour a general standstill mightbe achieved I was answered by statements of the frightfulconditions on the roads crowded with refugees harried byunresisted machine-gun fire from the German aeroplanesand of the wholesale flight of vast numbers of inhabitantsand the increasing breakdown of the machinery of


government and of military control At one point GeneralWeygand mentioned that the French might have to ask foran armistice Reynaud at once snapped at him ldquoThat is apolitical affairrdquo According to Ismay I said ldquoIf it is thoughtbest for France in her agony that her Army shouldcapitulate let there be no hesitation on our accountbecause whatever you may do we shall fight on forever andever and everrdquo When I said that the French Army fightingon wherever it might be could hold or wear out a hundredGerman divisions General Weygand replied ldquoEven if thatwere so they would still have another hundred to invadeand conquer you What would you do thenrdquo On this I saidthat I was not a military expert but that my technicaladvisers were of opinion that the best method of dealingwith German invasion of the island of Britain was to drownas many as possible on the way over and knock the otherson the head as they crawled ashore Weygand answeredwith a sad smile ldquoAt any rate I must admit you have a verygood anti-tank obstaclerdquo These were the last striking wordsI remember to have heard from him In all this miserablediscussion it must be borne in mind that I was haunted andundermined by the grief I felt that Britain with her forty-eightmillion population had not been able to make a greatercontribution to the land war against Germany and that sofar nine-tenths of the slaughter and ninety-nine-hundredthsof the suffering had fallen upon France and upon FrancealoneAfter another hour or so we got up and washed our handswhile a meal was brought to the conference table In thisinterval I talked to General Georges privately andsuggested first the continuance of fighting everywhere onthe home front and a prolonged guerrilla in themountainous regions and secondly the move to Africawhich a week before I had regarded as ldquodefeatistrdquo My


respected friend who although charged with much directresponsibility had never had a free hand to lead the Frencharmies did not seem to think there was much hope ineither of theseI have written lightly of the happenings of these days buthere to all of us was real agony of mind and soul

At about ten orsquoclock everyone took his place at the dinner Isat on M Reynaudrsquos right and General de Gaulle was onmy other side There was soup an omelette or somethingcoffee and light wine Even at this point in our awfultribulation under the German scourge we were quitefriendly But presently there was a jarring interlude Thereader will recall the importance I had attached to strikinghard at Italy the moment she entered the war and thearrangement that had been made with full Frenchconcurrence to move a force of British heavy bombers tothe French airfields near Marseilles in order to attack Turinand Milan All was now in readiness to strike Scarcely hadwe sat down when Air Vice-Marshal Barratt commandingthe British Air Force in France rang up Ismay on thetelephone to say that the local authorities objected to theBritish bombers taking off on the grounds that an attack onItaly would only bring reprisals upon the South of Francewhich the British were in no position to resist or preventReynaud Weygand Eden Dill and I left the table andafter some parleying Reynaud agreed that orders shouldbe sent to the French authorities concerned that thebombers were not to be stopped But later that night AirMarshal Barratt reported that the French people near theairfields had dragged all kinds of country carts and lorries


onto them and that it had been impossible for the bombersto start on their missionPresently when we left the dinner table and sat with somecoffee and brandy M Reynaud told me that Marshal Peacutetainhad informed him that it would be necessary for France toseek an armistice and that he had written a paper upon thesubject which he wished him to read ldquoHe has notrdquo saidReynaud ldquohanded it to me yet He is still ashamed to do itrdquoHe ought also to have been ashamed to support eventacitly Weygandrsquos demand for our last twenty-fivesquadrons of fighters when he had made up his mind thatall was lost and that France should give in Thus we allwent unhappily to bed in this disordered chateau or in themilitary train a few miles away The Germans entered Parison the 14th

Early in the morning we resumed our conference AirMarshal Barratt was present Reynaud renewed his appealfor five more squadrons of fighters to be based in Franceand General Weygand said that he was badly in need ofday bombers to make up for his lack of troops I gave theman assurance that the whole question of increased airsupport for France would be examined carefully andsympathetically by the War Cabinet immediately I got backto London but I again emphasised that it would be a vitalmistake to denude the United Kingdom of its essentialHome defencesTowards the end of this short meeting I put the followingspecific questions

(1) Will not the mass of Paris and its suburbspresent an obstacle dividing and delaying the enemy asin 1914 or like Madrid


(2) May this not enable a counter-stroke to beorganised with British and French forces across thelower Seine

(3) If the period of co-ordinated war ends will thatnot mean an almost equal dispersion of the enemyforces Would not a war of columns and [attacks] uponthe enemy communications be possible Are theenemy resources sufficient to hold down all thecountries at present conquered as well as a large partof France while they are fighting the French Army andGreat Britain

(4) Is it not possible thus to prolong the resistanceuntil the United States come in

General weygand while agreeing with the conception of thecounter-stroke on the lower Seine said that he hadinadequate forces to implement it He added that in hisjudgment the Germans had got plenty to spare to holddown all the countries at present conquered as well as alarge part of France Reynaud added that the Germans hadraised fifty-five divisions and had built four thousand to fivethousand heavy tanks since the outbreak of war This wasof course an immense exaggeration of what they had builtIn conclusion I expressed in the most formal manner myhope that if there was any change in the situation theFrench Government would let the British Government knowat once in order that they might come over and see themat any convenient spot before they took any final decisionswhich would govern their action in the second phase of thewarWe then took leave of Peacutetain Weygand and the staff of GQG and this was the last we saw of them Finally I tookAdmiral Darlan apart and spoke to him alone ldquoDarlan youmust never let them get the French Fleetrdquo He promisedsolemnly that he would never do so


The morning was cloudy thus making it impossible for thetwelve Hurricanes to escort us We had to choose betweenwaiting till it cleared up or taking a chance in the FlamingoWe were assured that it would be cloudy all the way It wasurgently necessary to get back home Accordingly westarted alone calling for an escort to meet us if possibleover the Channel As we approached the coast the skiescleared and presently became cloudless Eight thousandfeet below us on our right hand was Havre burning Thesmoke drifted away to the eastward No new escort was tobe seen Presently I noticed some consultations going onwith the captain and immediately after we dived to ahundred feet or so above the calm sea where aeroplanesare often invisible What had happened I learned later thatthey had seen two German aircraft below us firing at fishing-boats We were lucky that their pilots did not look upwardThe new escort met us as we approached the Englishshore and the faithful Flamingo alighted safely at Hendon

At five orsquoclock that evening I reported to the War Cabinetthe results of my missionI described the condition of the French armies as it hadbeen reported to the conference by General Weygand Forsix days they had been fighting night and day and theywere now almost wholly exhausted The enemy attacklaunched by one hundred and twenty divisions withsupporting armour had fallen on forty French divisionswhich had been outmanoeuvred and outmatched at everypoint The enemyrsquos armoured forces had caused greatdisorganisation among the headquarters of the higher


formations which were unwieldy and when on the moveunable to exercise control over the lower formations TheFrench armies were now on the last line on which theycould attempt to offer an organised resistance This linehad already been penetrated in two or three places and ifit collapsed General Weygand would not be responsible forcarrying on the struggleGeneral Weygand evidently saw no prospect of the Frenchgoing on fighting and Marshal Peacutetain had quite made uphis mind that peace must be made He believed thatFrance was being systematically destroyed by theGermans and that it was his duty to save the rest of thecountry from this fate I mentioned his memorandum to thiseffect which he had shown to Reynaud but had not left withhim ldquoThere could be no doubtrdquo I said ldquothat Peacutetain was adangerous man at this juncture he had always been adefeatist even in the last warrdquo On the other hand MReynaud had seemed quite determined to fight on andGeneral de Gaulle who had attended the conference withhim was in favour of carrying on a guerrilla warfare Hewas young and energetic and had made a very favourableimpression on me I thought it probable that if the presentline collapsed Reynaud would turn to him to takecommand Admiral Darlan also had declared that he wouldnever surrender the French Navy to the enemy in the lastresort he had said he would send it over to Canada but inthis he might be overruled by the French politiciansIt was clear that France was near the end of organisedresistance and a chapter in the war was now closing TheFrench might by some means continue the struggle Theremight even be two French Governments one which madepeace and one which organised resistance from theFrench colonies carrying on the war at sea through theFrench Fleet and in France through guerrillas It was too


early yet to tell Though for a period we might still have tosend some support to France we must now concentrateour main efforts on the defence of our island


8Home Defence June

Intense British Effort mdash Imminent Dangers mdash TheQuestion of ldquoCommandosrdquomdash Local DefenceVolunteers Renamed ldquoHome Guardrdquomdash Lack ofMeans of Attacking Enemy Tanks mdash MajorJefferisrsquo Experimental Establishment mdash TheldquoStickyrdquo Bomb mdash Help for de Gaullersquos Free Frenchmdash Arrangements for Repatriation of Other FrenchTroops mdash Care of French Wounded mdash FreeingBritish Troops for Intensive Training mdash The Pressand Air Raids mdash Danger of German Use ofCaptured European Factories mdash QuestionsArising in the Middle East and India mdash Question ofArming the Jewish Colonists in Palestine mdashProgress of Our Plan of Defence mdash The GreatAnti-Tank Obstacle and Other Measures

THE READER OF THESE PAGES in future years shouldrealise how dense and baffling is the veil of the UnknownNow in the full light of the after-time it is easy to see wherewe were ignorant or too much alarmed where we werecareless or clumsy Twice in two months we had beentaken completely by surprise The overrunning of Norwayand the breakthrough at Sedan with all that followed fromthese proved the deadly power of the German initiativeWhat else had they got ready ndash prepared and organised tothe last inch Would they suddenly pounce out of the bluewith new weapons perfect planning and overwhelming


force upon our almost totally unequipped and disarmedisland at any one of a dozen or score of possible landing-places Or would they go to Ireland He would have beena very foolish man who allowed his reasoning howeverclean-cut and seeming sure to blot out any possibilityagainst which provision could be madeldquoDepend upon itrdquo said Doctor Johnson ldquowhen a manknows he is going to be hanged in a month it concentrateshis mind wonderfullyrdquo I was always sure we should win butnevertheless I was highly geared-up by the situation andvery thankful to be able to make my views effective June 6seems to have been for me an active and not barren dayMy minutes dictated as I lay in bed in the morning andpondered on the dark horizon show the variety of topicsupon which it was necessary to give directionsFirst I called upon the Minister of Supply (Mr HerbertMorrison) for an account of the progress of various devicesconnected with our rockets and sensitive fuzes for useagainst aircraft on which some progress had been madeand upon the Minister of Aircraft Production (LordBeaverbrook) for weekly reports on the design andproduction of automatic bomb-sights and low-altitude RDF (Radio Direction Finding) and AI (Air Interception) I didthis to direct the attention of these two new Ministers withtheir vast departments to those topics in which I hadalready long been especially interested I asked theAdmiralty to transfer at least fifty trained and half-trainedpilots temporarily to Fighter Command Fifty-five actuallytook part in the great air battle I called for a plan to beprepared to strike at Italy by air raids on Turin and Milanshould she enter the war against us I asked the War Officefor plans for forming a Dutch Brigade in accordance withthe desires of the exiled Netherlands Government andpressed the Foreign Secretary for the recognition of the


Belgian Government apart from the prisoner King as thesole constitutional Belgian authority and for theencouragement of mobilisation in Yugoslavia as a counterto Italian threats I asked that the aerodromes atBardufosse and Skaarnlands which we had constructed inthe Narvik area and were about to abandon should bemade unusable for as long as possible by means ofdelayed-action bombs buried in them I remembered howeffectively the Germans had by this method delayed ouruse in 1918 of the railways when they finally retreatedAlas we had no bombs of long-delay in any numbers I wasworried about the many ships lying in Malta Harbour undervarious conditions of repair in view of impending Italianhostility I wrote a long minute to the Minister of Supplyabout timber felling and production at home This was oneof the most important methods of reducing the tonnage ofour imports Besides we should get no more timber fromNorway for a long time to come Many of these minutes willbe found in the AppendixI longed for more Regular troops with which to rebuild andexpand the Army Wars are not won by heroic militias


6VI40

1 It is more than a fortnight since I was told thateight battalions could leave India and arrive in thiscountry in forty-two days from the orderrsquos being givenThe order was given Now it is not till June 6 [ietoday] that the first eight battalions leave India on theirvoyage round the Cape arriving only July 25

2 The Australians are coming in the big ships butthey seem to have wasted a week at Capetown andare now only proceeding at eighteen knots instead of


the twenty I was assured were possible It is hopedthey will be here about the 15th Is this so At any ratewhenever they arrive the big ships should beimmediately filled with Territorials ndash the more the betterndash preferably twelve battalions and sent off to India atfull speed As soon as they arrive in India they shouldembark another eight Regular battalions for thiscountry making the voyage again at full speed Theyshould then take another batch of Territorials to IndiaFuture transferences can be discussed laterhellip All I amasking now is that the big ships should go to and fro atfull speed

3 I am very sorry indeed to find the virtual deadlockwhich local objections have imposed upon thebattalions from Palestine It is quite natural that GeneralWavell should look at the situation only from his ownviewpoint Here we have to think of building up a goodarmy in order to make up as far as possible for thelamentable failure to support the French by anadequate BEF during the first year of the war Do yourealise that in the first year of the late war we broughtforty-seven divisions into action and that these weredivisions of twelve battalions plus one Pioneerbattalion not nine as now We are indeed the victimsof a feeble and weary departmentalism

4 Owing to the saving of the BEF I have beenwilling to wait for the relief of the eight battalions fromPalestine by eight native Indian battalions providedthese latter were sent at once but you give me no time-table for this I have not yet received any report onwhether it is possible to send these British battalionsand their Indian relief via Basra and the Persian GulfPerhaps you would very kindly let me have this in thefirst instance

5 I am prepared also to consider as an alternativeor an immediate step the sending home [ie to Britain]of the rest of the Australian Corps Perhaps you will letme have a note on this showing especially dates atwhich the moves can be made

6 You must not think I am ignoring the position inthe Middle East On the contrary it seems to me thatwe should draw upon India much more largely and that


a ceaseless stream of Indian units should be passinginto Palestine and Egypt via Bombay and [by] Karachiacross the desert route India is doing nothing worthspeaking of at the present time In the last war not onlydid we have all the [British] Regular troops out [of India]in the first nine months (many more than are therenow) but also an Indian Corps fought by Christmas inFrance Our weakness slowness lack of grip and driveare very apparent on the background of what was donetwenty-five years ago I really think that you Lloyd andAmery ought to be able to lift our affairs in the East andMiddle East out of the catalepsy by which they aresmitten

This was a time when all Britain worked and strove to theutmost limit and was united as never before Men andwomen toiled at the lathes and machines in the factories tillthey fell exhausted on the floor and had to be draggedaway and ordered home while their places were occupiedby newcomers ahead of time The one desire of all themales and many women was to have a weapon TheCabinet and Government were locked together by bondsthe memory of which is still cherished by all The sense offear seemed entirely lacking in the people and theirrepresentatives in Parliament were not unworthy of theirmood We had not suffered like France under the Germanflail Nothing moves an Englishman so much as the threatof invasion the reality unknown for a thousand years Vastnumbers of people were resolved to conquer or die Therewas no need to rouse their spirit by oratory They were gladto hear me express their sentiments and give them goodreasons for what they meant to do or try to do The onlypossible divergence was from people who wished to do


even more than was possible and had the idea that frenzymight sharpen actionOur decision to send our only two well-armed divisions backto France made it all the more necessary to take everypossible measure to defend the island against directassault Our most imminent dangers at home seemed to beparachute descents or even worse the landing ofcomparatively small but highly mobile German tank forceswhich would rip up and disorganise our defence as theyhad done when they got loose in France In close contactwith the new Secretary of State for War my thoughts anddirections were increasingly concerned with Home DefenceThe fact that we were sending so much to France made itall the more necessary to make the best of what we had leftfor ourselves


18VI40

I should like to be informed upon (1) the coastalwatch and coastal batteries (2) the gorging of theharbours and defended inlets (ie the making of thelandward defences) (3) the troops held in immediatesupport of the foregoing (4) the mobile columns andbrigade groups (5) the General Reserve

Someone should explain to me the state of thesedifferent forces including the guns available in eacharea I gave directions that the 8th Tank Regimentshould be immediately equipped with the supply ofinfantry and cruiser tanks until they have fifty-two newtanks all well armoured and well gunned What hasbeen done with the output of this month and lastmonth Make sure it is not languishing in depots butpasses swiftly to troops General Carr is responsible forthis Let him report

What are the ideas of C-in-C HF about StormTroops We have always set our faces against this


idea but the Germans certainly gained in the last warby adopting it and this time it has been a leading causeof their victory There ought to be at least twentythousand Storm Troops or ldquoLeopardsrdquo [eventually calledldquoCommandosrdquo] drawn from existing units ready tospring at the throat of any small landings or descentsThese officers and men should be armed with the latestequipment tommy guns grenades etc and should begiven great facilities in motor-cycles and armoured cars

Mr Edenrsquos plan of raising Local Defence Volunteers whichhe had proposed to the Cabinet on May 13 met with animmediate response in all parts of the country


22VI40

Could I have a brief statement of the LDV positionshowing the progress achieved in raising and armingthem and whether they are designed for observation orfor serious fighting What is their relationship to thepolice the Military Command and the RegionalCommissioners From whom do they receive theirorders and to whom do they report It would be a greatcomfort if this could be compressed on one or twosheets of paper

I had always hankered for the name ldquoHome Guardrdquo I hadindeed suggested it in October 1939



26VI40

I donrsquot think much of the name ldquoLocal DefenceVolunteersrdquo for your very large new force The wordldquolocalrdquo is uninspiring Mr Herbert Morrison suggested tome today the title ldquoCivic Guardrdquo but I think ldquoHomeGuardrdquo would be better Donrsquot hesitate to change onaccount of already having made armlets etc if it isthought the title of Home Guard would be morecompulsive


27VI40

I hope you like my suggestion of changing the nameldquoLocal Defence Volunteersrdquo which is associated withLocal Government and Local Option to ldquoHome GuardrdquoI found everybody liked this in my tour yesterday

The change was accordingly made and the mightyorganisation which presently approached one and a halfmillion men and gradually acquired good weapons rolledforward

In these days my principal fear was of German tankscoming ashore Since my mind was attracted to landingtanks on their coasts I naturally thought they might havethe same idea We had hardly any anti-tank guns orammunition or even ordinary field artillery The plight towhich we were reduced in dealing with this danger may bemeasured from the following incident I visited our beachesin St Margaretrsquos Bay near Dover The Brigadier informedme that he had only three anti-tank guns in his brigade


covering four or five miles of this highly menaced coastlineHe declared that he had only six rounds of ammunition foreach gun and he asked me with a slight air of challengewhether he was justified in letting his men fire one singleround for practice in order that they might at least knowhow the weapon worked I replied that we could not affordpractice rounds and that fire should be held for the lastmoment at the closest rangeThis was therefore no time to proceed by ordinary channelsin devising expedients In order to secure quick action freefrom departmental processes upon any bright idea orgadget I decided to keep under my own hand as Ministerof Defence the experimental establishment formed by MajorJefferis at Whitchurch While engaged upon the fluvialmines in 1939 I had had useful contacts with this brilliantofficer whose ingenious inventive mind proved as will beseen fruitful during the whole war Lindemann was in closetouch with him and me I used their brains and my powerMajor Jefferis and others connected with him were at workupon a bomb which could be thrown at a tank perhapsfrom a window and would stick upon it The impact of avery high explosive in actual contact with a steel plate isparticularly effective We had the picture in mind thatdevoted soldiers or civilians would run close up to the tankand even thrust the bomb upon it though its explosion costthem their lives There were undoubtedly many who wouldhave done it I thought also that the bomb fixed on a rodmight be fired with a reduced charge from rifles


6VI40

It is of the utmost importance to find some projectilewhich can be fired from a rifle at a tank like a rifle


grenade or from an anti-tank rifle like a trench-mortarbomb The ldquostickyrdquo bomb seems to be useful for the firstof these but perhaps this is not so Anyhow concen-trate attention upon finding something that can be firedfrom anti-tank rifles or from ordinary rifles

I pressed the matter hard


16VI40

Who is responsible for making the ldquostickyrdquo bomb Iam told that a great sloth is being shown in pressingthis forward Ask General Carr to report today upon theposition and to let me have on one sheet of paper theback history of the subject from the moment when thequestion was first raised

The matter is to be pressed forward from day to dayand I wish to receive a report every three days


24VI40

I minuted some days ago about the ldquostickyrdquo bombsAll preparations for manufacture should proceed inanticipation that the further trials will be successful Letme have a time-table showing why it is that delay hascrept into all this process which is so urgent


24VI40

I understand that the trials were not entirelysuccessful and the bomb failed to stick on tanks whichwere covered with dust and mud No doubt some moresticky mixture can be devised and Major Jefferisshould persevere

Any chortling by officials who have been slothful inpushing this bomb over the fact that at present it has


not succeeded will be viewed with great disfacour byme

In the end the ldquostickyrdquo bomb was accepted as one of ourbest emergency weapons We never had to use it at homebut in Syria where equally primitive conditions prevailed itproved its value

We had evidently to do our utmost to form French forceswhich might aid General de Gaulle in keeping the truepersonification of France alive

Prime Minister to FirstLord of the Admiraltyand other ServiceMinisters

27VI40

1 The French naval personnel at Aintree Campnumbering 13600 equally with the 5530 military atTrentham Park the 1900 at Arrow Park and the detailsat Blackpool are to be immediately repatriated toFrench territory ie Morocco in French ships now inour hands

2 They should be told we will take them to FrenchAfrica because all French metropolitan ports are inGerman hands and that the French Government willarrange for their future movements

3 If however any wish to remain here to fightagainst Germany they must immediately make thisclear Care must be taken that no officer or man is sentback into French jurisdiction against his will Theshipping is to be ready tomorrow The troops shouldmove under their own officers and carry their personalarms but as little ammunition as possible Somearrangements should be made for their pay TheFrench material on board ships from Narvik will be


taken over by us with the ammunition from theLombardy and other ships as against expenses towhich we are put

4 Great care is to be taken of the French woundedAll who can be moved without danger should be sentback direct to France if possible The French Govern-ment should be asked where they wish them deliveredand if at French metropolitan ports should arrange withthe Germans for their safe entry otherwise Casablan-ca All dangerous cases must be dealt with here

5 Apart from any volunteers in the above groups ofpersonnel who may wish to stay there must be manyindividuals who have made their way here hoping tocontinue to fight These also should be given the optionof returning to France or serving in the French unitsunder General de Gaulle who should be told of ourdecisions and given reasonable facilities to collect hispeople I have abandoned the hope that he couldaddress the formed bodies as their morale hasdeteriorated too fast

My desire that our own Army should regain its poise andfighting quality was at first hampered because so manytroops were being absorbed in fortifying their own localitiesor sectors of the coast


25VI40

It is shocking that only 57000 men [civilians] arebeing employed on all these [defence] worksMoreover I fear that the troops are being used in largenumbers on fortifications At the present stage theyshould be drilling and training for at least eight hours aday including one smart parade every morning All the


labour necessary should be found from civilian sourcesI found it extremely difficult to see even a singlebattalion on parade in East Anglia during my visit Thefighting troops in the Brigade Groups should neither beused for guarding vulnerable points nor for makingfortifications Naturally a change like this cannot bemade at once but let me have your proposals forbringing it about as soon as possible

Prime Minister toMinister of Information

26VI40

The press and broadcast should be asked to handleair raids in a cool way and on a diminishing tone ofpublic interest The facts should be chronicled withoutundue prominence or headlines The people should beaccustomed to treat air raids as a matter of ordinaryroutine Localities affected should not be mentionedwith any precision Photographs showing shatteredhouses should not be published unless there issomething very peculiar about them or to illustrate howwell the Anderson shelters work It must be clear thatthe vast majority of people are not at all affected by anysingle air raid and would hardly sustain any evilimpression if it were not thrust before them Everyoneshould learn to take air raids and air-raid alarms as ifthey were no more than thunderstorms Pray try toimpress this upon the newspaper authorities andpersuade them to help If there is difficulty in this Iwould myself see the Newspaper ProprietorsrsquoAssociation but I hope this will not be necessary Thepress should be complimented on their work so far inthis matter


27VI40


Enclosed [dates of troop convoys from India] makeme anxious to know how you propose to use theseeight fine Regular battalions Obviously they will be areinforcement for your shock troops One wouldsuppose they might make the infantry of two divisionswith five good Territorial battalions added to eachdivision total eighteen Should they not also yield up acertain number of officers and NCOrsquos to stiffen theTerritorial battalions so attached You would thus havesix brigades of infantry quite soon Alas I fear theartillery must lag behind but not I trust for long

As rumours grew of peace proposals and a message wassent to us from the Vatican through Berne I thought it rightto send the following minute to the Foreign Secretary

28VI40I hope it will be made clear to the Nuncio that we do

not desire to make any inquiries as to terms of peacewith Hitler and that all our agents are strictly forbiddento entertain any such suggestions

But here is the record of a qualm

Prime Minister toProfessor Lindemann

29VI40

While we are hastening our preparations for airmastery the Germans will be organising the wholeindustries of the captured countries for air productionand other war production suitable [for use] against us Itis therefore a race They will not be able to get thecaptured factories working immediately and meanwhilewe shall get round the invasion danger through thegrowth of our defences and Army strength But whatsort of relative outputs must be faced next year unlesswe are able to bomb the newly acquired Germanplants Germany also being relieved from the need ofkeeping a gigantic army in constant contact with the


French Army must have spare capacity for the air andother methods of attacking us Must we not expect thiswill be very great How soon can it come into playHitherto I have been looking at the next three monthsbecause of the emergency but what about 1941 Itseems to me that only immense American supplies canbe of use in turning the corner

As the month of June ground itself out the sense ofpotential invasion at any moment grew upon us all


30VI40

The Admiralty charts of tides and state of the moonHumber Thames Estuary Beachy Head should bestudied with a view to ascertaining on which daysconditions will be most favourable to a sea-bornelanding The Admiralty view is sought

A landing or descent in Ireland was always a deep anxietyto the Chiefs of Staff But our resources seemed to me toolimited for serious troop movements


30VI40

It would be taking an undue risk to remove one ofour only two thoroughly equipped divisions out of GreatBritain at this juncture Moreover it is doubtful whetherthe Irish situation will require the use of divisionalformations complete with their technical vehicles as iffor Continental war The statement that it would taketen days to transport a division from this country toIreland even though every preparation can be made


beforehand is not satisfactory Schemes should beprepared to enable two or three lightly equippedbrigades to move at short notice and in not more thanthree days into Northern Ireland Duplicate transportshould be sent on ahead It would be a mistake to sendany large force of artillery to Ireland It is not at all likelythat a naval descent will be effected there Air-bornedescents cannot carry much artillery Finally nothingthat can happen in Ireland can be immediately decisive

In bringing home the troops from Palestine I had difficultieswith both my old friends the Secretary of State for IndiaMr Amery and the Secretary of State for the ColoniesLord Lloyd who was a convinced anti-Zionist and pro-ArabI wished to arm the Jewish colonists Mr Amery at the IndiaOffice had a different view from mine about the part whichIndia should play I wanted Indian troops at once to comeinto Palestine and the Middle East whereas the Viceroyand the India Office were naturally inclined to a long-termplan of creating a great Indian Army based upon Indianmunition factories

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forIndia (Mr Amery)

22VI40

1 We have already very large masses of troops inIndia of which no use is being made for the generalpurposes of the war The assistance of India this time isincomparably below that of 1914-18hellip It seems to mevery likely that the war will spread to the Middle Eastand the climates of Iraq Palestine and Egypt are wellsuited to Indian troops I recommend their organisationin brigade groups each with a proportion of artillery on


the new British model I should hope that six or eight ofthese groups could be ready this winter They shouldinclude some brigades of Gurkhas

2 The process of liberating the Regular Britishbattalions must continue and I much regret that afortnightrsquos delay has become inevitable in returning youthe Territorial battalions in exchange You shouldreassure the Viceroy that it is going forward

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forthe Colonies (LordLloyd)

28VI40

The failure of the policy which you favour is provedby the very large numbers of sorely needed troops you[we] have to keep in Palestine

6 battalions of infantry9 regiments of yeomanry8 battalions of Australian infantry

ndash the whole probably more than twenty thousand

men This is the price we have to pay for the anti-Jewish policy which has been persisted in for someyears Should the war go heavily into Egypt all thesetroops will have to be withdrawn and the position of theJewish colonists will be one of the greatest dangerIndeed I am sure that we shall be told we cannotwithdraw these troops though they include some of ourbest and are vitally needed elsewhere If the Jewswere properly armed our forces would becomeavailable and there would be no danger of the Jewsattacking the Arabs because they are entirelydependent upon us and upon our command of theseas I think it is little less than a scandal that at a time


when we are fighting for our lives these very largeforces should be immobilised in support of a policywhich commends itself only to a section of theConservative Party

I had hoped you would take a broad view of thePalestine situation and would make it an earnestobjective to set the British garrison free I couldcertainly not associate myself with such an answer asyou have drawn up for me I do not at all admit thatArab feeling in the Near East and India would beprejudiced in the manner you suggest Now that wehave the Turks in such a friendly relationship theposition is much more secure

For the first time in a hundred and twenty-five years apowerful enemy was now established across the narrowwaters of the English Channel Our re-formed RegularArmy and the larger but less well-trained Territorials had tobe organised and deployed to create an elaborate systemof defences and to stand ready if the invader came todestroy him ndash for there could be no escape It was for bothsides ldquoKill or Curerdquo Already the Home Guard could beincluded in the general framework of defence On June 25General Ironside Commander-in-Chief Home Forcesexposed his plans to the Chiefs of Staff They were ofcourse scrutinised with anxious care by the experts and Iexamined them myself with no little attention On the wholethey stood approved There were three main elements inthis early outline of a great future plan first an entrenchedldquocrustrdquo on the probable invasion beaches of the coastwhose defenders should fight where they stood supportedby mobile reserves for immediate counter-attack secondlya line of anti-tank obstacles manned by the Home Guardrunning down the east centre of England and protecting


London and the great industrial centres from inroads byarmoured vehicles thirdly behind that line the mainreserves for major counter-offensive actionCeaseless additions and refinements to this first plan wereeffected as the weeks and months passed but the generalconception remained All troops if attacked should standfirm not in linear only but in all-round defence whilst othersmoved rapidly to destroy the attackers whether they camefrom sea or air Men who had been cut off from immediatehelp would not have merely remained in position Activemeasures were prepared to harass the enemy from behindto interfere with his communications and to destroymaterial as the Russians did with great results when theGerman tide flowed over their country a year later Manypeople must have been bewildered by the innumerableactivities all around them They could understand thenecessity for wiring and mining the beaches the anti-tankobstacles at the defiles the concrete pillboxes at thecrossroads the intrusions into their houses to fill an atticwith sandbags onto their golf-courses or most fertile fieldsand gardens to burrow out some wide anti-tank ditch Allthese inconveniences and much more they accepted ingood part But sometimes they must have wondered ifthere was a general scheme or whether lesser individualswere not running amok in their energetic use of newlygranted powers of interference with the property of thecitizenThere was however a central plan elaborate co-ordinated and all-embracing As it grew it shaped itselfthus the over-all command was maintained at GeneralHeadquarters in London All Great Britain and NorthernIreland were divided into seven commands these againinto areas of corps and divisional commands Commandscorps and divisions were each required to hold a proportion


of their resources in mobile reserve only the minimumbeing detailed to hold their own particular defencesGradually there were built up in rear of the beaches zonesof defence in each divisional area behind these similarcorps zones and command zones the whole systemamounting in depth to a hundred miles or more And behindthese was established the main anti-tank obstacle runningacross Southern England and northward intoNottinghamshire Above all was the final reserve directlyunder the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces This itwas our policy to keep as large and mobile as possibleWithin this general structure were many variations Each ofour ports on the east and south coasts was a special studyDirect frontal attack upon a defended port seemed anunlikely contingency and all were made into strong-pointsequally capable of defence from the landward or theseaward side It astonishes me that when this principle offortifying the gorges was so universally accepted andrigorously enforced by all military authorities at home nosimilar measures were adopted at Singapore by thesuccession of high officers employed there But this is alater story Obstacles were placed on many thousandsquare miles of Britain to impede the landing of air-bornetroops All our aerodromes radar stations and fuel depotsof which even in the summer of 1940 there were threehundred and seventy-five needed defence by specialgarrisons and by their own airmen Many thousands ofldquovulnerable pointsrdquondash bridges power-stations depots vitalfactories and the like ndash had to be guarded day and nightfrom sabotage or sudden onset Schemes were ready forthe immediate demolition of resources helpful to the enemyif captured The destruction of port facilities the cratering ofkey roads the paralysis of motor transport and oftelephones and telegraph stations of rolling stock or


permanent way before they passed out of our control wereplanned to the last detail Yet despite all these wise andnecessary precautions in which the civilian departmentsgave unstinted help to the military there was no question ofa ldquoscorched-earth policyrdquo England was to be defended byits people not destroyed


9The French Agony

Telegram to President RooseveltmdashMy Visit toToursmdashIncreasing DegenerationmdashM BaudouinmdashThe Great MandelmdashConversation with ReynaudmdashMy Refusal to Release France from the Obligationof March 28 1940 mdash Resolute Attitude of MMHerriot and Jeanneney mdashldquoLrsquoHomme du DestinrdquomdashFrench Government Decide to Move to BordeauxmdashPresident Roosevelt to M Reynaud June 13 mdashMy Telegram to the PresidentmdashAnd to ReynaudmdashldquoIndissoluble Union of France and BritainrdquomdashDisappointing Telegram from the PresidentmdashMyTelegram to the President of June 1415 mdash AGrave SuggestionmdashGreat Battle of June 9 Alongthe AisnemdashDefeat of the FrenchmdashForlornResistance on the Maginot LinemdashOur SlenderContributionmdashGeneral Brookersquos New Commandmdash Talk of a Bridgehead in BrittanymdashBrookeDeclares the Military Situation HopelessmdashI AgreemdashOur Troops Withdraw and Re-embark June1617 mdash The Peacutetain Government Asks for anArmisticemdashA Second Dunkirk EvacuationmdashAHundred and Fifty Thousand British and Forty-twoThousand Poles Carried to BritainmdashThe ldquoLancas-triardquo HorrormdashMy Message of June 16 to theDominion Prime MinistersmdashMy Hopes of the AirBattle over Britain


FUTURE GENERATIONS may deem it noteworthy that thesupreme question of whether we should fight on alonenever found a place upon the War Cabinet agenda It wastaken for granted and as a matter of course by these menof all parties in the State and we were much too busy towaste time upon such unreal academic issues We wereunited also in viewing the new phase with good confidenceIt was decided to tell the Dominions the whole facts I wasinvited to send a message in the same sense to PresidentRoosevelt and also to sustain the determination of theFrench Government and assure them of our utmost support


12VI40

I spent last night and this morning at the French GQG where the situation was explained to me in thegravest terms by Generals Weygand and Georges Youhave no doubt received full particulars from Mr BullittThe practical point is what will happen when and if theFrench front breaks Paris is taken and GeneralWeygand reports formally to his Government thatFrance can no longer continue what he calls ldquoco-ordinated warrdquo The aged Marshal Peacutetain who wasnone too good in April and July 1918 is I fear readyto lend his name and prestige to a treaty of peace forFrance Reynaud on the other hand is for fighting onand he has a young General de Gaulle who believesmuch can be done Admiral Darlan declares he willsend the French Fleet to Canada It would bedisastrous if the two big modern ships fell into badhands It seems to me that there must be manyelements in France who will wish to continue thestruggle either in France or in the French colonies or inboth This therefore is the moment for you tostrengthen Reynaud the utmost you can and try to tipthe balance in favour of the best and longest possible


French resistance I venture to put this point beforeyou although I know you must understand it as well asI do

On June 13 I made my last visit to France for four yearsalmost to a day The French Government had nowwithdrawn to Tours and tension had mounted steadily Itook Edward Halifax and General Ismay with me and MaxBeaverbrook volunteered to come too In trouble he isalways buoyant This time the weather was cloudless andwe sailed over in the midst of our Hurricane squadronmaking however a rather wider sweep to the southwardthan before Arrived over Tours we found the airport hadbeen heavily bombed the night before but we and all ourescort landed smoothly in spite of the craters Immediatelyone sensed the increasing degeneration of affairs No onecame to meet us or seemed to expect us We borrowed aservice car from the Station Commander and motored intothe city making for the preacutefecture where it was said theFrench Government had their headquarters No one ofconsequence was there but Reynaud was reported to bemotoring in from the country and Mandel was also to arrivesoonIt being already nearly two orsquoclock I insisted uponluncheon and after some parleyings we drove throughstreets crowded with refugeesrsquo cars most of them with amattress on top and crammed with luggage We found acafeacute which was closed but after explanations we obtaineda meal During luncheon I was visited by M Baudouin anofficial of the French Foreign Office whose influence hadrisen in these latter days He began at once in his soft silkymanner about the hopelessness of the French resistance If


the United States would declare war on Germany it mightbe possible for France to continue What did I think aboutthis I did not discuss the question further than to say that Ihoped America would come in and that we should certainlyfight on He afterwards I was told spread it about that I hadagreed that France should surrender unless the UnitedStates came inWe then returned to the preacutefecture where Mandel Ministerof the Interior awaited us This faithful former secretary ofClemenceau and a bearer forward of his lifersquos messageseemed in the best of spirits He was energy and defiancepersonified His luncheon an attractive chicken wasuneaten on the tray before him He was a ray of sunshineHe had a telephone in each hand through which he wasconstantly giving orders and decisions His ideas weresimple fight on to the end in France in order to cover thelargest possible movement into Africa This was the lasttime I saw this valiant Frenchman The restored FrenchRepublic rightly shot to death the hirelings who murderedhim His memory is honoured by his countrymen and theirAlliesPresently M Reynaud arrived At first he seemeddepressed General Weygand had reported to him that theFrench armies were exhausted The line was pierced inmany places refugees were pouring along all the roadsthrough the country and many of the troops were indisorder The Generalissimo felt it was necessary to ask foran armistice while there were still enough French troops tokeep order until peace could be made Such was themilitary advice He would send that day a further messageto Mr Roosevelt saying that the last hour had come andthat the fate of the Allied cause lay in Americarsquos handHence arose the alternative of armistice and peace


M Reynaud proceeded to say that the Council of Ministershad on the previous day instructed him to inquire whatwould be Britainrsquos attitude should the worst come Hehimself was well aware of the solemn pledge that noseparate peace would be entered into by either allyGeneral Weygand and others pointed out that France hadalready sacrificed everything in the common cause Shehad nothing left but she had succeeded in greatlyweakening the common foe It would in thosecircumstances be a shock if Britain failed to concede thatFrance was physically unable to carry on if France was stillexpected to fight on and thus deliver up her people to thecertainty of corruption and evil transformation at the handsof ruthless specialists in the art of bringing conqueredpeoples to heel That then was the question which he hadto put Would Great Britain realise the hard facts with whichFrance was facedThe official British record reads as follows

Mr Churchill said that Great Britain realised howmuch France had suffered and was suffering Her ownturn would come and she was ready She grieved tofind that her contribution to the land struggle was atpresent so small owing to the reverses which had beenmet with as a result of applying an agreed strategy inthe North The British had not yet felt the German lashbut were aware of its force They nevertheless had butone thought to win the war and destroy HitlerismEverything was subordinate to that aim no difficultiesno regrets could stand in the way He was well assuredof British capacity for enduring and persisting forstriking back till the foe was beaten They wouldtherefore hope that France would carry on fightingsouth of Paris down to the sea and if need be fromNorth Africa At all costs time must be gained Theperiod of waiting was not limitless a pledge from theUnited States would make it quite short The alternative


course meant destruction for France quite as certainlyHitler would abide by no pledges If on the other handFrance remained in the struggle with her fine Navy hergreat Empire her Army still able to carry on guerrillawarfare on a gigantic scale and if Germany failed todestroy England which she must do or go under ifthen Germanyrsquos might in the air was broken then thewhole hateful edifice of Nazidom would topple overGiven immediate help from America perhaps even adeclaration of war victory was not so far off At allevents England would fight on She had not and wouldnot alter her resolve no terms no surrender Thealternatives for her were death or victory That was hisanswer to M Reynaudrsquos question

M Reynaud replied that he had never doubtedEnglandrsquos determination He was however anxious toknow how the British Government would react in acertain contingency The French Government ndash thepresent one or another ndash might say ldquoWe know you willcarry on We would also if we saw any hope of avictory But we see no sufficient hopes of an earlyvictory We cannot count on American help There is nolight at the end of the tunnel We cannot abandon ourpeople to indefinite German domination We mustcome to terms We have no choicehelliprdquo It was alreadytoo late to organise a redoubt in Brittany Nowherewould a genuine French Government have a hope ofescaping capture on French soilhellip The question toBritain would therefore take the form ldquoWill youacknowledge that France has given her best her youthand life-blood that she can do no more and that she isentitled having nothing further to contribute to thecommon cause to enter into a separate peace whilemaintaining the solidarity implicit in the solemnagreement entered into three months previouslyrdquo

Mr Churchill said that in no case would Britainwaste time and energy in reproaches and recrimina-tions That did not mean that she would consent toaction contrary to the recent agreement The first stepought to be M Reynaudrsquos further message putting thepresent position squarely to President Roosevelt Let


them await the answer before considering anythingelse If England won the war France would be restoredin her dignity and in her greatness

All the same I thought the issue raised at this point was soserious that I asked to withdraw with my colleagues beforeanswering it So Lords Halifax and Beaverbrook and therest of our party went out into a dripping but sunlit gardenand talked things over for half an hour On our return Irestated our position We could not agree to a separatepeace however it might come Our war aim remained thetotal defeat of Hitler and we felt that we could still bring thisabout We were therefore not in a position to releaseFrance from her obligation Whatever happened we wouldlevel no reproaches against France but that was a differentmatter from consenting to release her from her pledge Iurged that the French should now send a new appeal toPresident Roosevelt which we would support from LondonM Reynaud agreed to do this and promised that theFrench would hold on until the result of his final appeal wasknownBefore leaving I made one particular request to MReynaud Over four hundred German pilots the bulk ofwhom had been shot down by the RAF were prisoners inFrance Having regard to the situation they should behanded over to our custody M Reynaud willingly gave thispromise but soon he had no power to keep it TheseGerman pilots all became available for the Battle of Britainand we had to shoot them down a second time

At the end of our talk M Reynaud took us into theadjoining room where MM Herriot and Jeanneney thePresidents of the Chamber and Senate respectively were


seated Both these French patriots spoke with passionateemotion about fighting on to the death As we went downthe crowded passage into the courtyard I saw General deGaulle standing stolid and expressionless at the doorwayGreeting him I said in a low tone in French ldquoLrsquohomme dudestinrdquo He remained impassive In the courtyard theremust have been more than a hundred leading Frenchmenin frightful misery Clemenceaursquos son was brought up tome I wrung his hand The Hurricanes were already in theair and I slept sound on our swift and uneventful journeyhome This was wise for there was a long way to go beforebedtime

After our departure from Tours at about half-past five MReynaud met his Cabinet again at Cangeacute They were vexedthat I and my colleagues had not come there to join themWe should have been very willing to do so no matter howlate we had to fly home But we were never invited nor didwe know there was to be a French Cabinet meetingAt Cangeacute the decision was taken to move the FrenchGovernment to Bordeaux and Reynaud sent off histelegram to Roosevelt with its desperate appeal for theentry on the scene at least of the American FleetAt 1015 PM I made my new report to the Cabinet Myaccount was endorsed by my two companions While wewere still sitting Ambassador Kennedy arrived withPresident Rooseveltrsquos reply to Reynaudrsquos appeal of June 10

President Roosevelt toM Reynaud

13VI40


Your message of June 10 has moved me verydeeply As I have already stated to you and to MrChurchill this Government is doing everything in itspower to make available to the Allied Governments thematerial they so urgently require and our efforts to dostill more are being redoubled This is so because ofour faith in and our support of the ideals for which theAllies are fighting

The magnificent resistance of the French and BritishArmies has profoundly impressed the American people

I am personally particularly impressed by yourdeclaration that France will continue to fight on behalfof Democracy even if it means slow withdrawal evento North Africa and the Atlantic It is most important toremember that the French and British Fleets continue[in] mastery of the Atlantic and other oceans also toremember that vital materials from the outside world arenecessary to maintain all armies

I am also greatly heartened by what Prime MinisterChurchill said a few days ago about the continuedresistance of the British Empire and that determinationwould seem to apply equally to the great FrenchEmpire all over the world Naval power in world affairsstill carries the lessons of history as Admiral Darlanwell knows

We all thought the President had gone a very long way Hehad authorised Reynaud to publish his message of June10 with all that that implied and now he had sent thisformidable answer If upon this France decided to endurethe further torture of the war the United States would bedeeply committed to enter it At any rate it contained twopoints which were tantamount to belligerence first apromise of all material aid which implied active assistancesecondly a call to go on fighting even if the Governmentwere driven right out of France I sent our thanks to thePresident immediately and I also sought to commend thePresidentrsquos message to Reynaud in the most favourableterms Perhaps these points were stressed unduly but it


was necessary to make the most of everything we had orcould get


13VI40

Ambassador Kennedy will have told you about theBritish meeting today with the French at Tours of whichI showed him our record I cannot exaggerate its criticalcharacter They were very nearly gone Weygand hadadvocated an armistice while he still has enough troopsto prevent France from lapsing into anarchy Reynaudasked us whether in view of the sacrifices andsufferings of France we would release her from theobligation about not making a separate peaceAlthough the fact that we have unavoidably been out ofthis terrible battle weighed with us I did not hesitate inthe name of the British Government to refuse consentto an armistice or separate peace I urged that thisissue should not be discussed until a further appeal hadbeen made by Reynaud to you and the United Stateswhich I undertook to second Agreement was reachedon this and a much better mood prevailed for themoment in Reynaud and his Ministers

Reynaud felt strongly that it would be beyond hispower to encourage his people to fight on without hopeof ultimate victory and that that hope could only bekindled by American intervention up to the extreme limitopen to you As he put it they wanted to see light at theend of the tunnel

While we were flying back here your magnificentmessage was sent and Ambassador Kennedy broughtit to me on my arrival The British Cabinet wereprofoundly impressed and desire me to express theirgratitude for it but Mr President I must tell you that itseems to me absolutely vital that this message shouldbe published tomorrow June 14 in order that it mayplay the decisive part in turning the course of worldhistory It will I am sure decide the French to denyHitler a patched-up peace with France He needs this


peace in order to destroy us and take a long stepforward to world mastery All the far-reaching plansstrategic economic political and moral which yourmessage expounds may be still-born if the French cutout now Therefore I urge that the message should bepublished now We realise fully that the moment Hitlerfinds he cannot dictate a Nazi peace in Paris he willturn his fury onto us We shall do our best to withstandit and if we succeed wide new doors are open uponthe future and all will come out even at the end of theday

To M Reynaud I sent this message13VI40

On returning here we received a copy of PresidentRooseveltrsquos answer to your appeal of June 10 Cabinetis united in considering this magnificent document asdecisive in favour of the continued resistance of Francein accordance with your own declaration of June 10about fighting before Paris behind Paris in a provinceor if necessary in Africa or across the Atlantic Thepromise of redoubled material aid is coupled withdefinite advice and exhortation to France to continuethe struggle even under the grievous conditions whichyou mentioned If France on this message of PresidentRooseveltrsquos continues in the field and in the war wefeel that the United States is committed beyond recallto take the only remaining step namely becoming abelligerent in form as she already has constitutedherself in fact Constitution of United States makes itimpossible as you foresaw for the President to declarewar himself but if you act on his reply now receivedwe sincerely believe that this must inevitably follow Weare asking the President to allow publication of themessage but even if he does not agree to this for aday or two it is on the record and can afford the basisfor your action I do beg you and your colleagueswhose resolution we so much admired today not tomiss this sovereign opportunity of bringing about theworld-wide oceanic and economic coalition which must


be fatal to Nazi domination We see before us a definiteplan of campaign and the light which you spoke ofshines at the end of the tunnel

Finally in accordance with the Cabinetrsquos wishes I sent aformal message of good cheer to the French Governmentin which the note of an indissoluble union between our twocountries was struck for the first time


13VI40

In this solemn hour for the British and Frenchnations and for the cause of Freedom and Democracyto which they have avowed themselves His MajestyrsquosGovernment desire to pay to the Government of theFrench Republic the tribute which is due to the heroicfortitude and constancy of the French armies in battleagainst enormous odds Their effort is worthy of themost glorious traditions of France and has inflicteddeep and long-lasting injury upon the enemyrsquos strengthGreat Britain will continue to give the utmost aid in herpower We take this opportunity of proclaiming theindissoluble union of our two peoples and of our twoEmpires We cannot measure the various forms oftribulation which will fall upon our peoples in the nearfuture We are sure that the ordeal by fire will only fuzethem together into one unconquerable whole Werenew to the French Republic our pledge and resolve tocontinue the struggle at all costs in France in thisisland upon the oceans and in the air wherever it maylead us using all our resources to the utmost limit andsharing together the burden of repairing the ravages ofwar We shall never turn from the conflict until Francestands safe and erect in all her grandeur until thewronged and enslaved states and peoples have beenliberated and until civilisation is freed from thenightmare of Nazidom That this day will dawn we are


more sure than ever It may dawn sooner than we nowhave the right to expect

All these three messages were drafted by me before I wentto bed after midnight on the 13th They were writtenactually in the small hours of the 14thThe next day arrived a telegram from the Presidentexplaining that he could not agree to the publication of hismessage to Reynaud He himself according to MrKennedy had wished to do so but the State Departmentwhile in full sympathy with him saw the gravest dangersThe President thanked me for my account of the meeting atTours and complimented the British and FrenchGovernments on the courage of their troops He renewedthe assurances about furnishing all possible material andsupplies but he then said he had told AmbassadorKennedy to inform me that his message of the 14th was inno sense intended to commit and did not commit theGovernment of the United States to military participationThere was no authority under the American Constitutionexcept Congress which could make any commitment of thatnature He bore particularly in mind the question of theFrench Fleet Congress at his desire had appropriated fiftymillion dollars for the purpose of supplying food andclothing to civilian refugees in France Finally he assuredme that he appreciated the significance and weight of whatI had set forth in my messageThis was a disappointing telegramAround our table we all fully understood the risks thePresident ran of being charged with exceeding hisconstitutional authority and consequently of being defeatedon this issue at the approaching election on which our fateand much more depended I was convinced that he wouldgive up life itself to say nothing of public office for the


cause of world freedom now in such awful peril But whatwould have been the good of that Across the Atlantic Icould feel his suffering In the White House the torment wasof a different character from that of Bordeaux or LondonBut the degree of personal stress was not unequalIn my reply I tried to arm the President with somearguments which he could use to others about the dangerto the United States if Europe fell and Britain failed Thiswas no matter of sentiment but of life and death

Former NavalPerson toPresidentRoosevelt

14-15VI40

I am grateful to you for your telegram and I havereported its operative passages to Reynaud to whom Ihad imparted a rather more sanguine view He will Iam sure be disappointed at non-publication Iunderstand all your difficulties with American publicopinion and Congress but events are movingdownward at a pace where they will pass beyond thecontrol of American public opinion when at last it isripened Have you considered what offers Hitler maychoose to make to France He may say ldquoSurrender theFleet intact and I will leave you Alsace-Lorrainerdquo oralternatively ldquoIf you do not give me your ships I willdestroy your townsrdquo I am personally convinced thatAmerica will in the end go to all lengths but thismoment is supremely critical for France A declarationthat the United States will if necessary enter the warmight save France Failing that in a few days Frenchresistance may have crumpled and we shall be leftalone

Although the present Government and I personallywould never fail to send the Fleet across the Atlantic ifresistance was beaten down here a point may be


reached in the struggle where the present Ministers nolonger have control of affairs and when very easy termscould be obtained for the British island by theirbecoming a vassal state of the Hitler Empire A pro-German Government would certainly be called intobeing to make peace and might present to a shatteredor a starving nation an almost irresistible case for entiresubmission to the Nazi will The fate of the British Fleetas I have already mentioned to you would be decisiveon the future of the United States because if it werejoined to the fleets of Japan France and Italy and thegreat resources of German industry overwhelming seapower would be in Hitlerrsquos hands He might of courseuse it with a merciful moderation On the other hand hemight not This revolution in sea power might happenvery quickly and certainly long before the United Stateswould be able to prepare against it If we go down youmay have a United States of Europe under the Nazicommand far more numerous far stronger far betterarmed than the New World

I know well Mr President that your eye will alreadyhave searched these depths but I feel I have the rightto place on record the vital manner in which Americaninterests are at stake in our battle and that of France

I am sending you through Ambassador Kennedy apaper on destroyer strength prepared by the NavalStaff for your information If we have to keep as weshall the bulk of our destroyers on the East Coast toguard against invasion how shall we be able to copewith a German-Italian attack on the food and trade bywhich we live The sending of the thirty-five destroyersas I have already described will bridge the gap until ournew construction comes in at the end of the year Hereis a definite practical and possibly decisive step whichcan be taken at once and I urge most earnestly thatyou will weigh my words


Meanwhile the situation on the French front went from badto worse The German operations northwest of Paris inwhich our 51st Division had been lost had brought theenemy by June 9 to the lower reaches of the Seine andthe Oise On the southern banks the dispersed remnants ofthe Tenth and Seventh French Armies were hastilyorganising a defence they had been riven asunder and toclose the gap the garrison of the capital the so-calledArmeacutee de Paris had been marched out and interposedFarther to the east along the Aisne the Sixth Fourth andSecond Armies were in far better shape They had hadthree weeks in which to establish themselves and to absorbsuch reinforcements as had been sent During all the periodof Dunkirk and of the drive to Rouen they had been leftcomparatively undisturbed but their strength was small forthe hundred miles they had to hold and the enemy hadused the time to concentrate against them a great mass ofdivisions to deliver the final blow On June 9 it fell Despitea dogged resistance for the French were now fighting withgreat resolution bridgeheads were established south of theriver from Soissons to Rethel and in the next two daysthese were expanded until the Marne was reachedGerman Panzer divisions which had played so decisive apart in the drive down the coast were brought across to jointhe new battle Eight of these in two great thrusts turnedthe French defeat into a rout The French armiesdecimated and in confusion were quite unable to withstandthis powerful assembly of superior numbers equipmentand technique In four days by June 16 the enemy hadreached Orleacuteans and the Loire while to the east the otherthrust had passed through Dijon and Besanccedilon almost tothe Swiss frontier


West of Paris the remains of the Tenth Army theequivalent of no more than two divisions had been pressedback south-westward from the Seine towards Alenccedilon Thecapital fell on the 14th its defending armies the Seventhand the Armeacutee de Paris were scattered a great gap nowseparated the exiguous French and British forces in thewest from the rest and the remains of the once proud Armyof FranceAnd what of the Maginot Line the shield of France and itsdefenders Until June 14 no direct attack was made andalready some of the active formations leaving behind thegarrison troops had started to join if they could the fast-withdrawing armies of the centre But it was too late Onthat day the Maginot Line was penetrated beforeSaarbruecken and across the Rhine by Colmar theretreating French were caught up in the battle and unableto extricate themselves Two days later the Germanpenetration to Besanccedilon had cut off their retreat More thanfour hundred thousand men were surrounded without hope


of escape Many encircled garrisons held out desperatelythey refused to surrender until after the armistice whenFrench officers were despatched to give them the orderThe last forts obeyed on June 30 the commanderprotesting that his defences were still intact at every pointThus the vast disorganised battle drew to its conclusion allalong the French front It remains only to recount theslender part which the British were able to play

General Brooke had won distinction in the retreat toDunkirk and especially by his battle in the gap opened bythe Belgian surrender We had therefore chosen him tocommand the British troops which remained in France andall reinforcements until they should reach sufficientnumbers to require the presence of Lord Gort as an ArmyCommander Brooke had now arrived in France and on the14th he met Generals Weygand and Georges Weygandstated that the French forces were no longer capable oforganised resistance or concerted action The French Armywas broken into four groups of which its Tenth Army wasthe westernmost Weygand also told him that the AlliedGovernments had agreed that a bridgehead should becreated in the Brittany peninsula to be held jointly by theFrench and British troops on a line running roughly northand south through Rennes He ordered him to deploy hisforces on a defensive line running through this townBrooke pointed out that this line of defence was a hundredand fifty kilometres long and required at least fifteendivisions He was told that the instructions he was receivingmust be regarded as an orderIt is true that on June 11 at Briare Reynaud and I hadagreed to try to draw a kind of ldquoTorres Vedras linerdquo across


the foot of the Brittany peninsula Everything however wasdissolving at the same time and the plan for what it wasworth never reached the domain of action In itself the ideawas sound but there were no facts to clothe it with realityOnce the main French armies were broken or destroyedthis bridgehead precious though it was could not havebeen held for long against concentrated German attack Buteven a few weeksrsquo resistance here would have maintainedcontact with Britain and enabled large French withdrawalsto Africa from other parts of the immense front now torn toshreds If the battle in France was to continue it could beonly in the Brest peninsula and in wooded or mountainousregions like the Vosges The alternative for the French wassurrender Let none therefore mock at the conception of abridgehead in Brittany The Allied armies underEisenhower then an unknown American colonel bought itback for us later at a high priceGeneral Brooke after his talk with the French commandersand having measured from his own headquarters a scenewhich was getting worse every hour reported to the WarOffice and by telephone to Mr Eden that the position washopeless All further reinforcements should be stopped andthe remainder of the British Expeditionary Force nowamounting to a hundred and fifty thousand men should bere-embarked at once On the night of June 14 as I wasthought to be obdurate he rang me up on a telephone linewhich by luck and effort was open and pressed this viewupon me I could hear quite well and after ten minutes Iwas convinced that he was right and we must go Orderswere given accordingly He was released from Frenchcommand The back-loading of great quantities of storesequipment and men began The leading elements of theCanadian Division which had landed got back into theirships and the 52d Division which apart from its 157th


Brigade had not yet been committed to action retreated onBrest No British troops operating under the Tenth FrenchArmy were withdrawn but all else of ours took to the shipsat Brest Cherbourg St Malo and St Nazaire On June 15our troops were released from the orders of the TenthFrench Army and next day when it carried out a furtherwithdrawal to the south they moved towards CherbourgThe 157th Brigade after heavy fighting was extricated thatnight and retiring in their lorries embarked during the nightof June 1718 On June 17 it was announced that thePeacutetain Government had asked for an armistice ordering allFrench forces to cease fighting without evencommunicating this information to our troops GeneralBrooke was consequently told to come away with all menhe could embark and any equipment he could saveWe repeated now on a considerable scale though withlarger vessels the Dunkirk evacuation Over twentythousand Polish troops who refused to capitulate cut theirway to the sea and were carried by our ships to Britain TheGermans pursued our forces at all points In the Cherbourgpeninsula they were in contact with our rearguard ten milessouth of the harbour on the morning of the 18th The lastship left at 4 PM when the enemy were within three milesof the port Very few prisoners were caughtIn all there were evacuated from all French harbours136000 British troops and 310 guns a total with the Polesof 156000 men This reflects great credit on GeneralBrookersquos embarkation staff of whom the chief General deFonblanque a British officer died shortly afterwards as theresult of his exertionsAt Brest and the Western ports the evacuations werenumerous The German air attack on the transports washeavy One frightful incident occurred on the 17th at St


Nazaire The 20000-ton liner Lancastria with five thousandmen on board was bombed and set on fire just as she wasabout to leave A mass of flaming oil spread over the waterround the ship and upwards of three thousand menperished The rest were rescued under continued air attackby the devotion of the small craft When this news came tome in the quiet Cabinet Room during the afternoon Iforbade its publication saying ldquoThe newspapers have gotquite enough disaster for today at leastrdquo I had intended torelease the news a few days later but events crowdedupon us so black and so quickly that I forgot to lift the banand it was some years before the knowledge of this horrorbecame public

To lessen the shock of the impending French surrender itwas necessary at this time to send a message to theDominion Prime Ministers showing them that our resolve tocontinue the struggle although alone was not based uponmere obstinacy or desperation and to convince them bypractical and technical reasons of which they might well beunaware of the real strength of our position I thereforedictated the following statement on the afternoon of June16 a day already filled with much business

Prime Minister to thePrime Ministers ofCanada AustraliaNew Zealand andSouth Africa

16VI40

[After some sentences of introduction particular toeach]


I do not regard the situation as having passedbeyond our strength It is by no means certain that theFrench will not fight on in Africa and at sea butwhatever they do Hitler will have to break us in thisisland or lose the war Our principal danger is hisconcentrated air attack by bombing coupled withparachute and air-borne landings and attempts to runan invading force across the sea This danger hasfaced us ever since the beginning of the war and theFrench could never have saved us from it as he couldalways switch onto us Undoubtedly it is aggravated bythe conquests Hitler has made upon the Europeancoast close to our shores Nevertheless in principle thedanger is the same I do not see why we should not beable to meet it The Navy has never pretended toprevent a raid of five or ten thousand men but we donot see how a force of say eighty to a hundredthousand could be transported across the sea and stillless maintained in the teeth of superior sea power Aslong as our Air Force is in being it provides a powerfulaid to the Fleet in preventing sea-borne landings andwill take a very heavy toll of air-borne landings

Although we have suffered heavy losses byassisting the French and during the Dunkirk evacuationwe have managed to husband our air-fighter strength inspite of poignant appeals from France to throw itimprovidently into the great land battle which it couldnot have turned decisively I am happy to tell you that itis now as strong as it has ever been and that the flowof machines is coming forward far more rapidly thanever before in fact pilots have now become the limitingfactor at the moment Our fighter aircraft have beenwont to inflict a loss of two or two and a half to oneeven when fighting under the adverse conditions inFrance During the evacuation of Dunkirk which was asort of No Manrsquos Land we inflicted a loss of three orfour to one and often saw German formations turnaway from a quarter of their numbers of our planes Butall air authorities agree that the advantage in defendingthis country against an oversea air attack will be stillgreater because first we shall know pretty well by ourvarious devices where they are coming and because


our squadrons lie close enough together to enable usto concentrate against the attackers and provideenough to attack both the bombers and the protectingfighters at the same time All their shot-down machineswill be total losses many of ours and our pilots will fightagain Therefore I do not think it by any meansimpossible that we may so maul them that they will finddaylight attacks too expensive

The major danger will be from night attack on ouraircraft factories but this again is far less accuratethan daylight attack and we have many plans forminimising its effect Of course their numbers are muchgreater than ours but not so much greater as todeprive us of a good and reasonable prospect ofwearing them out after some weeks or even months ofair struggle Meanwhile of course our bomber forcewill be striking continually at their key points especiallyoil refineries and air factories and at their congestedand centralised war industry in the Ruhr We hope ourpeople will stand up to this bombardment as well as theenemy It will on both sides be on an unprecedentedscale All our information goes to show that theGermans have not liked what they have got so far

It must be remembered that now that the BEF ishome and largely rearmed or rearming if not upon aContinental scale at any rate good enough for Homedefence we have far stronger military forces in thisisland than we have ever had in the late war or in thiswar Therefore we hope that such numbers of theenemy as may be landed from the air or by sea-borneraid will be destroyed and be an example to those whotry to follow No doubt we must expect novel forms ofattack and attempts to bring tanks across the sea Weare preparing ourselves to deal with these as far as wecan foresee them No one can predict or guarantee thecourse of a life-and-death struggle of this character butwe shall certainly enter upon it in good heart

I have given you this full explanation to show youthat there are solid reasons behind our resolve not toallow the fate of France whatever it may be to deter usfrom going on to the end I personally believe that thespectacle of the fierce struggle and carnage in our


island will draw the United States into the war andeven if we should be beaten down through the superiornumbers of the enemyrsquos Air Force it will always bepossible as I indicated to the House of Commons in mylast speech to send our fleets across the oceanswhere they will protect the Empire and enable it tocontinue the war and the blockade I trust in conjunc-tion with the United States until the Hitler reacutegimebreaks under the strain We shall let you know at everystage how you can help being assured that you will doall in human power as we for our part are entirelyresolved to do

I composed this in the Cabinet Room and it was typed as Ispoke The door to the garden was wide open and outsidethe sun shone warm and bright Air Chief Marshal Newallthe Chief of the Air Staff sat on the terrace meanwhile andwhen I had finished revising the draft I took it out to him incase there were any improvements or corrections to bemade He was evidently moved and presently said heagreed with every word I was comforted and fortifiedmyself by putting my convictions upon record and when I


read the message over the final time before sending it off Ifelt a glow of sober confidence This was certainly justifiedby what happened All came true


10The Bordeaux Armistice

The FrenchGovernment Moves to BordeauxmdashGeneral Weygandrsquos Attitude mdash Weygand andReynaud mdash M Chautempsrsquo Insidious Proposal mdashThe FrenchDecision to Ask for TermsmdashBritishInsistence on the Safeguarding of the French FleetmdashMy Telegram to Reynaud of June 16 mdash A NewIssue ArisesmdashBritish Offer of Indissoluble Unionwith FrancemdashHigh Hopes of General de Gaullethat This Would Strengthen M ReynaudmdashMReynaudrsquos Satisfaction mdash My Telegram of June16 SuspendedmdashPlan for Me to Visit Bordeaux byCruiser with the Labour and Liberal Party LeadersFrustrated mdash Unfavourable Reception of theBritish Offer mdash Fall of the Reynaud Cabinet mdashReynaudrsquos Resignation mdash A Conversation with MMonnet and General de Gaulle in Downing StreetmdashMarshal Peacutetain Forms a French Government foran Armistice mdash My Message to Marshal Peacutetainand General Weygand June 17 mdash My Broadcastof June 17 mdash General Spears Plans the Escapeof General de Gaulle mdash Further Talk of Resis-tance in Africa mdash Mandelrsquos Intentions mdash AdmiralDarlanrsquos TrapmdashVoyage of the ldquoMassiliardquomdash Mandelat Casablanca mdash Mr Duff Cooperrsquos MissionmdashFateoftheFrench Patriots mdash A HypotheticalSpeculation mdash My Settled Conviction


WE MUST NOW QUIT the field of military disaster for theconvulsions in the French Cabinet and the personages whosurrounded it at BordeauxIt is not easy to establish the exact sequence of events TheBritish War Cabinet sat almost continuously and messageswere sent off from time to time as decisions were taken Asthey took two or three hours to transmit in cipher andprobably another hour to deliver the telephone was freelyused by the officials of the Foreign Office to convey thesubstance to our Ambassador and he also used thetelephone frequently in reply Therefore there are overlapsand short-circuits which are confusing Events were movingat such a speed on both sides of the Channel that it wouldbe misleading to present the tale as if it were an orderlyflow of argument and decisionM Reynaud reached the new seat of government fromTours in the evening of the 14th He received the BritishAmbassador about nine orsquoclock Sir Ronald Campbellinformed him that His Majestyrsquos Government intended toinsist on the terms of the agreement of March 28 bindingboth parties not to make any terms with the enemy He alsooffered to provide all the necessary shipping in the event ofthe French Government resolving to move to North AfricaBoth these statements were in accordance with theAmbassadorrsquos current instructionsOn the morning of the 15th Reynaud again received theAmbassador and told him that he had definitely decided todivide the Government in half and to establish a centre ofauthority beyond the sea Such a policy would obviouslycarry with it the removal of the French Fleet to ports beyondGerman power Later that morning President Rooseveltrsquosreply to Reynaudrsquos appeal of June 13 was receivedAlthough I had made the best of it in my telegram to the


French Premier I knew it was bound to disappoint himMaterial aid if Congress approved was offered but therewas no question of any American entry into the war Francehad no reason to expect such a declaration at this momentand the President had not either the power to give it himselfor to obtain it from Congress There had been no meetingsof the Council of Ministers since that at Cangeacute near Tourson the evening of the 13th The Ministers having now allreached Bordeaux the Council was summoned for theafternoon

General Weygand had been for some days convinced thatall further resistance was vain He therefore wished to forcethe French Government to ask for an armistice while theFrench Army still retained enough discipline and strength tomaintain internal order on the morrow of defeat He had aprofound lifelong dislike of the parliamentary reacutegime of theThird Republic As an ardently religious Catholic he saw inthe ruin which had overwhelmed his country thechastisement of God for its abandonment of the Christianfaith He therefore used the power of his supreme militaryposition far beyond the limits which his professionalresponsibilities great as they were justified or required Heconfronted the Prime Minister with declarations that theFrench armies could fight no more and that it was time tostop a horrible and useless massacre before generalanarchy supervenedPaul Reynaud on the other hand realised that the battle inFrance was over but still hoped to carry on the war fromAfrica and the French Empire and with the French FleetNone of the other states overrun by Hitler had withdrawnfrom the war Physically in their own lands they were


gripped but from overseas their Governments had kept theflag flying and the national cause alive Reynaud wished tofollow their example and with much more solid resourcesHe sought a solution on the lines of the Dutch capitulationThis while it left the Army whose chiefs had refused tofight any longer free to lay down its arms wherever it was incontact with the enemy nevertheless preserved to theState its sovereign right to continue the struggle by all themeans in its powerThis issue was fought out between the Premier and theGeneralissimo at a stormy interview before the Councilmeeting Reynaud offered Weygand written authority fromthe Government to order the ldquoCease Firerdquo Weygandrefused with indignation the suggestion of a militarysurrender ldquoHe would never accept the casting of thisshame upon the banners of the French Armyrdquo The act ofsurrender which he deemed imperative must be that of theGovernment and of the State to which the army hecommanded would dutifully conform In so acting GeneralWeygand though a sincere and unselfish man behavedwrongly He asserted the right of a soldier to dominate theduly constituted Government of the Republic and thus tobring the whole resistance not only of France but of herEmpire to an end contrary to the decision of his politicaland lawful chiefApart from these formalities and talk about the honour ofthe French Army there stood a practical point An armisticeformally entered into by the French Government wouldmean the end of the war for France By negotiation part ofthe country might be left unoccupied and part of the Armyfree whereas if the war were continued from overseas allwho had not escaped from France would be controlleddirectly by the Germans and millions of Frenchmen wouldbe carried off to Germany as prisoners of war without the


protection of any agreement This was a substantialargument but it belonged to the Government of theRepublic and not to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army todecide upon it Weygandrsquos position that because the Armyunder his orders would in his opinion fight no more theFrench Republic must give in and order its armed forces toobey an order which he was certainly willing to carry outfinds no foundation in the law and practice of civilised statesor in the professional honour of a soldier In theory at leastthe Prime Minister had his remedy He could have repliedldquoYou are affronting the Constitution of the Republic You aredismissed from this moment from your command I willobtain the necessary sanction from the PresidentrdquoUnfortunately M Reynaud was not sufficiently sure of hisposition Behind the presumptuous General loomed theillustrious Marshal Peacutetain the centre of the band ofdefeatist Ministers whom Reynaud had so recently and soimprovidently brought into the French Government andCouncil and who were all resolved to stop the war Behindthese again crouched the sinister figure of Laval who hadinstalled himself at Bordeaux City Hall surrounded by aclique of agitated Senators and Deputies Lavalrsquos policy hadthe force and merit of simplicity France must not only makepeace with Germany she must change sides she mustbecome the ally of the conqueror and by her loyalty andservices against the common foe across the Channel saveher interests and her provinces and finish up on thevictorious side Evidently M Reynaud exhausted by theordeals through which he had passed had not the life orstrength for so searching a personal ordeal which wouldindeed have taxed the resources of an Oliver Cromwell orof a Clemenceau of Stalin or of HitlerIn the discussions on the afternoon of the 15th at which thePresident of the Republic was present Reynaud having


explained the situation to his colleagues appealed toMarshal Peacutetain to persuade General Weygand to theCabinet view He could not have chosen a worse envoyThe Marshal left the room There was an interval After awhile he returned with Weygand whose position he nowsupported At this serious juncture M Chautemps animportant Minister slid in an insidious proposal which worethe aspect of a compromise and was attractive to thewaverers He stated in the name of the Leftist elements ofthe Cabinet that Reynaud was right in affirming that anagreement with the enemy was impossible but that it wouldbe prudent to make a gesture which would unite FranceThey should ask the Germans what the conditions ofarmistice would be remaining entirely free to reject them Itwas not of course possible to embark on this slippery slopeand stop The mere announcement that the FrenchGovernment were asking the Germans on what terms anarmistice would be granted was sufficient in itself to destroywhat remained of the morale of the French Army Howcould the soldier be ordered to cast away his life inobdurate resistance after so fatal a signal had been givenHowever combined with the demonstration which they hadwitnessed from Peacutetain and Weygand the Chautempssuggestion had a deadly effect on the majority It wasagreed to ask His Majestyrsquos Government how they wouldview such a step informing them at the same time that inno circumstances would the surrender of the Fleet beallowed Reynaud now rose from the table and declared hisintention to resign But the President of the Republicrestrained him and declared that if Reynaud went he wouldgo too When the confused discussion was resumed noclear distinction was drawn between declining to surrenderthe French Fleet to the Germans and putting it out ofGerman power by sailing it to ports outside France It wasagreed that the British Government should be asked to


consent to the inquiry about the German terms Themessage was immediately despatched

The next morning Reynaud received the BritishAmbassador again and was told that the British wouldaccept the French request on the condition that the FrenchFleet was placed beyond German power ndash in fact that itshould be directed to British ports These instructions hadbeen telephoned to Campbell from London to save time Ateleven orsquoclock the distracted Council of Ministers met againPresident Lebrun being present The President of theSenate M Jeanneney was brought in to endorse both onhis own behalf and on that of his colleague the President ofthe Chamber M Herriot the proposal of the Premier totransfer the Government to North Africa Up rose MarshalPeacutetain and read a letter which it is believed had beenwritten for him by another hand resigning from the CabinetHaving finished his speech he prepared to leave the roomHe was persuaded by the President of the Republic toremain on the condition that an answer would be given tohim during the day The Marshal had also complained ofthe delay in asking for an armistice Reynaud replied that ifone asked an ally to free one from an obligation it wascustomary to await the answer The session then closedAfter luncheon the Ambassador brought to Reynaud thetextual answer of the British Government of which he hadalready given the telephoned purport in his conversation ofthe morning

In these days the War Cabinet were in a state of unusualemotion The fall and the fate of France dominated their


minds Our own plight and what we should have to faceand face alone seemed to take a second place Grief forour ally in her agony and desire to do anything in humanpower to aid her was the prevailing mood There was alsothe overpowering importance of making sure of the FrenchFleet It was in this spirit that a proposal for ldquoan indissolubleunionrdquo between France and Britain was conceivedI was not the prime mover I first heard of a definite plan ata luncheon at the Carlton Club on the 15th at which werepresent Lord Halifax M Corbin Sir Robert Vansittart andone or two others It was evident that there had beenconsiderable discussion beforehand On the 14th Vansittartand Desmond Morton had met M Monnet and M Pleven(members of the French Economic Mission in London) andbeen joined by General de Gaulle who had flown over tomake arrangements for shipping to carry the FrenchGovernment and as many French troops as possible toAfrica These gentlemen had evolved the outline of adeclaration for a Franco-British Union with the object apartfrom its general merits of giving M Reynaud some newfact of a vivid and stimulating nature with which to carry amajority of his Cabinet into the move to Africa and thecontinuance of the war My first reaction was unfavourableI asked a number of questions of a critical character andwas by no means convinced However at the end of ourlong Cabinet that afternoon the subject was raised I wassomewhat surprised to see the staid stolid experiencedpoliticians of all parties engage themselves so passionatelyin an immense design whose implications andconsequences were not in any way thought out I did notresist but yielded easily to these generous surges whichcarried our resolves to a very high level of unselfish andundaunted action


When the War Cabinet met the next morning we firstaddressed ourselves to the answer to be given to MReynaudrsquos request sent the night before for the formalrelease of France from her obligations under the Anglo-French Agreement The Cabinet authorised the followingreply which at their request I went into the next room anddrafted myself It was despatched from London at 1235 PM on the 16th It endorsed and repeated in a formalmanner the telephoned instructions sent to Campbell earlyin the morning

Foreign Office to Sir R CampbellPlease give M Reynaud the following message

which has been approved by the Cabinet

Mr Churchill toM Reynaud

16 June1940 1235PM

Our agreement forbidding separate negotiationswhether for armistice or peace was made with theFrench Republic and not with any particular Frenchadministration or statesman It therefore involves thehonour of France Nevertheless provided but onlyprovided that the French Fleet is sailed forthwith forBritish harbours pending negotiations His MajestyrsquosGovernment give their full consent to an inquiry by theFrench Government to ascertain the terms of anarmistice for France His Majestyrsquos Government beingresolved to continue the war wholly exclude them-selves from all part in the above-mentioned inquiryconcerning an armistice

Early in the afternoon a second message in similar termswas sent by the Foreign Office to Sir Ronald Campbell(June 16 310 PM)Both messages were stiff and embodied the main purposeof the War Cabinet at their morning meeting


Foreign Office to Sir R CampbellYou should inform M Reynaud as followsWe expect to be consulted as soon as any armistice

terms are received This is necessary not merely invirtue of Treaty forbidding separate peace or armisticebut also in view of vital consequences of any armisticeto ourselves having regard especially to the fact thatBritish troops are fighting with French Army You shouldimpress on French Government that in stipulating forremoval of French Fleet to British ports we have in mindFrench interests as well as our own and are convincedthat it will strengthen the hands of the FrenchGovernment in any armistice discussions if they canshow that the French Navy is out of reach of theGerman forces As regards the French Air Force weassume that every effort will be made to fly it to NorthAfrica unless indeed the French Government wouldprefer to send it to this country

We count on the French Government doing all theycan both before and during any armistice discussions toextricate the Polish Belgian and Czech troops atpresent in France and to send them to North AfricaArrangements are being made to receive Polish andBelgian Governments in this country

We reassembled at three orsquoclock that same afternoon Irecalled to the Cabinet that at the conclusion of our meetingthe day before there had been some discussion on aproposal for the issue of some further declaration of closerunion between France and Great Britain I had seenGeneral de Gaulle in the morning and he had impressedon me that some dramatic move was essential to give MReynaud the support which he needed to keep hisGovernment in the war and suggested that a proclamationof the indissoluble union of the French and British peopleswould serve the purpose Both General de Gaulle and M


Corbin had been concerned at the sharpness of thedecision reached by the War Cabinet that morning andembodied in the telegrams already despatched I had heardthat a new declaration had been drafted for considerationand that General de Gaulle had telephoned to M ReynaudAs a result it had seemed advisable to suspend action forthe moment A telegram had therefore been sent to SirRonald Campbell instructing him to suspend deliveryaccordinglyThe Foreign Secretary then said that after our morningmeeting he had seen Sir Robert Vansittart whom he hadpreviously asked to draft some dramatic announcementwhich might strengthen M Reynaudrsquos hand Vansittart hadbeen in consultation with General de Gaulle M Monnet MPleven and Major Morton Between them they had drafteda proclamation General de Gaulle had impressed uponthem the need for publishing the document as quickly aspossible and wished to take the draft back with him toFrance that night De Gaulle had also suggested that Ishould go to meet M Reynaud next dayThe draft statement was passed round and everyone readit with deep attention All the difficulties were immediatelyapparent but in the end a Declaration of Union seemed tocommand general assent I stated that my first instinct hadbeen against the idea but that in this crisis we must not letourselves be accused of lack of imagination Somedramatic announcement was clearly necessary to keep theFrench going The proposal could not be lightly turnedaside and I was encouraged at finding so great a body ofopinion in the War Cabinet favourable to itAt 355 PM we were told that the French Council ofMinisters would meet at five to decide whether furtherresistance was possible Secondly General de Gaulle had


been informed by M Reynaud on the telephone that if afavourable answer on the proposed proclamation of unitywas received by five orsquoclock M Reynaud felt he could holdthe position On this the War Cabinet approved the finaldraft proclamation of an Anglo-French Union andauthorised its despatch to M Reynaud by the hand ofGeneral de Gaulle This was telephoned to M Reynaudforthwith The War Cabinet further invited me Mr Attleeand Sir Archibald Sinclair representing the three Britishparties to meet M Reynaud at the earliest moment todiscuss the draft proclamation and related questionsHere is the final draft

DECLARATION OF UNIONAt this most fateful moment in the history of the

modern world the Governments of the United Kingdomand the French Republic make this declaration ofindissoluble union and unyielding resolution in theircommon defence of justice and freedom againstsubjection to a system which reduces mankind to a lifeof robots and slaves

The two Governments declare that France andGreat Britain shall no longer be two nations but oneFranco-British Union

The constitution of the Union will provide for jointorgans of defence foreign financial and economicpolicies

Every citizen of France will enjoy immediatelycitizenship of Great Britain every British subject willbecome a citizen of France

Both countries will share responsibility for the repairof the devastation of war wherever it occurs in theirterritories and the resources of both shall be equallyand as one applied to that purpose

During the war there shall be a single War Cabinetand all the forces of Britain and France whether onland sea or in the air will be placed under its directionIt will govern from wherever it best can The two


Parliaments will be formally associated The Nations ofthe British Empire are already forming new armiesFrance will keep her available forces in the field on thesea and in the air The Union appeals to the UnitedStates to fortify the economic resources of the Alliesand to bring her powerful material aid to the commoncause

The Union will concentrate its whole energy againstthe power of the enemy no matter where the battlemay be

And thus we shall conquer

Of all this Parliament was informed in due course But theissue by then had ceased to countI did not as has been seen draft the statement myself Itwas composed around the table and I made mycontribution to it I then took it into the next room where deGaulle was waiting with Vansittart Desmond Morton andM Corbin The General read it with an air of unwontedenthusiasm and as soon as contact with Bordeaux couldbe obtained began to telephone it to M Reynaud Hehoped with us that this solemn pledge of union andbrotherhood between the two nations and empires wouldgive the struggling French Premier the means to carry hisGovernment to Africa with all possible forces and order theFrench Navy to sail for harbours outside impending Germancontrol

We must now pass to the other end of the wire The BritishAmbassador delivered the two messages in answer to theFrench request to be released from their obligation ofMarch 28 According to his account M Reynaud who wasin a dejected mood did not take them well He at onceremarked that the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean


Fleet to British ports would invite the immediate seizure ofTunis by Italy and also create difficulties for the BritishFleet He had got no further than this when my messagetelephoned by General de Gaulle came through ldquoIt actedrdquosaid the Ambassador ldquolike a tonicrdquo Reynaud said that for adocument like that he would fight to the last In came at thatmoment M Mandel and M Marin They obviously wereequally relieved M Reynaud then left ldquowith a light steprdquo toread the document to the President of the Republic Hebelieved that armed with this immense guarantee hewould be able to carry his Council with him on the policy ofretiring to Africa and waging war My telegram instructingthe Ambassador to delay the presentation of the two stiffmessages or anyhow to suspend action upon them arrivedimmediately after the Premier had gone A messenger wastherefore sent after him to say that the two earliermessages should be considered asldquocancelledrdquoldquoSuspendedrdquo would have been a better wordThe War Cabinet had not altered its position in any respectWe felt however that it would be better to give theDeclaration of Union its full chance under the mostfavourable conditions If the French Council of Ministerswere rallied by it the greater would carry the less and theremoval of the Fleet from German power would followautomatically If our offer did not find favour our rights andclaims would revive in their full force We could not tell whatwas going on inside the French Government nor know thatthis was the last time we should ever be able to deal withM ReynaudI had spoken to him on the telephone some time this dayproposing that I should come out immediately to see him Inview of the uncertainty about what was happening or aboutto happen at Bordeaux my colleagues in the War Cabinetwished me to go in a cruiser and a rendezvous was duly


arranged for the next day off the Brittany coast I ought tohave flown But even so it would have been too lateThe following was sent from the Foreign Office

To Sir RCampbellBordeaux

June 16645 PM

The PM accompanied by the Lord Privy SealSecretary of State for Air and three Chiefs of Staff andcertain others arrive at Concarneau at 12 noontomorrow the 17th in a cruiser for a meeting with MReynaud General de Gaulle has been informed of theabove and has expressed the view that time andrendezvous would be convenient We suggest themeeting be held on board as arousing less attention HMS Berkeley has been warned to be at the disposal ofM Reynaud and party if desired

And also from the Foreign Secretary by telephone at 8 PMJune 16

Following is reason why you have been asked tosuspend action on my last two telegrams

After consultation with General de Gaulle PM hasdecided to meet M Reynaud tomorrow in Brittany tomake a further attempt to dissuade the FrenchGovernment from asking for an armistice For thispurpose on the advice of General de Gaulle he willoffer to M Reynaud to join in issuing forthwith adeclaration announcing immediate constitution ofclosest Anglo-French Union in all spheres in order tocarry on the war Text of draft declaration as authorisedby HMG is contained in my immediately followingtelegram You should read this text to M Reynaud atonce

An outline of this proposed declaration has alreadybeen telephoned by General de Gaulle to M Reynaudwho has replied that such a declaration by the two


Governments would make all the difference to thedecision of the French Government General isreturning tonight with copy

Our War Cabinet sat until six orsquoclock on the 16th andthereafter I set out on my mission I took with me theleaders of the Labour and Liberal Parties the three Chiefsof Staff and various important officers and officials Aspecial train was waiting at Waterloo We could reachSouthampton in two hours and a night of steaming at thirtyknots in the cruiser would bring us to the rendezvous bynoon on the 17th We had taken our seats in the train Mywife had come to see me off There was an odd delay instarting Evidently some hitch had occurred Presently myprivate secretary arrived from Downing Street breathlesswith the following message from Campbell at Bordeaux

Ministerial crisis has openedhellip Hope to have newsby midnight Meanwhile meeting arranged for tomorrowimpossible

On this I returned to Downing Street with a heavy heart

The final scene in the Reynaud Cabinet was as followsThe hopes which M Reynaud had founded upon theDeclaration of Union were soon dispelled Rarely has sogenerous a proposal encountered such a hostile receptionThe Premier read the document twice to the Council Hedeclared himself strongly for it and added that he wasarranging a meeting with me for the next day to discuss thedetails But the agitated Ministers some famous somenobodies torn by division and under the terrible hammer ofdefeat were staggered Some we are told had heardabout it by a tapping of telephones These were the


defeatists Most were wholly unprepared to receive such far-reaching themes The overwhelming feeling of the Councilwas to reject the whole plan Surprise and mistrustdominated the majority and even the most friendly andresolute were baffled The Council had met expecting toreceive the answer to the French request on which theyhad all agreed that Britain should release France from herobligations of March 28 in order that the French might askthe Germans what their terms of armistice would be It ispossible even probable that if our formal answer had beenlaid before them the majority would have accepted ourprimary condition about sending their Fleet to Britain or atleast would have made some other suitable proposal andthus have freed them to open negotiations with the enemywhile reserving to themselves a final option of retirement toAfrica if the German conditions were too severe But nowthere was a classic example of ldquoOrder counter-orderdisorderrdquoPaul Reynaud was quite unable to overcome theunfavourable impression which the proposal of Anglo-French Union created The defeatist section led by MarshalPeacutetain refused even to examine it Violent charges weremade ldquoIt was a last-minute planrdquoldquoa surpriserdquoldquoa scheme toput France in tutelage or to carry off her colonial empirerdquo Itrelegated France so they said to the position of aDominion Others complained that not even equality ofstatus was offered to the French because Frenchmen wereto receive only the citizenship of the British Empire insteadof that of Great Britain while the British were to be citizensof France This suggestion is contradicted by the textBeyond these came other arguments Weygand hadconvinced Peacutetain without much difficulty that England waslost High French military authorities ndash perhaps Weygandhimself ndash had advised ldquoIn three weeks England will have


her neck wrung like a chickenrdquo To make a union with GreatBritain was according to Peacutetain ldquofusion with a corpserdquoYbarnegaray who had been so stout in the previous warexclaimed ldquoBetter be a Nazi province At least we knowwhat that meansrdquo Senator Reibel a personal friend ofGeneral Weygandrsquos declared that this scheme meantcomplete destruction for France and anyhow definitesubordination to England In vain did Reynaud reply ldquoIprefer to collaborate with my allies rather than with myenemiesrdquo And Mandel ldquoWould you rather be a Germandistrict than a British Dominionrdquo But all was in vainWe are assured that Reynaudrsquos statement of our proposalwas never put to a vote in the Council It collapsed of itselfThis was a personal and fatal reverse for the strugglingPremier which marked the end of his influence andauthority upon the Council All further discussion turnedupon the armistice and asking the Germans what termsthey would give and in this M Chautemps was cool andsteadfast Our two telegrams about the Fleet were neverpresented to the Council The demand that it should besailed to British ports as a prelude to the negotiations withthe Germans was never considered by the ReynaudCabinet which was now in complete decomposition Hereagain there was no vote At about eight orsquoclock Reynaudutterly exhausted by the physical and mental strain to whichhe had for so many days been subjected sent hisresignation to the President and advised him to send forMarshal Peacutetain This action must be judged precipitate Hestill seems to have cherished the hope that he could keephis rendezvous with me the next day and spoke of this toGeneral Spears ldquoTomorrow there will be anotherGovernment and you will no longer speak for anyonerdquo saidSpearsAccording to Campbell (sent by telephone June 16)


M Reynaud who had been so heartened thisafternoon by PMrsquos magnificent message told us laterthat forces in favour of ascertaining terms of armisticehad become too strong for him He had read themessage twice to Council of Ministers and explained itsimport and the hope which it held out for the future Ithad been of no avail

We worked on him for half an hour encouraginghim to try to get rid of the evil influences among hiscolleagues After seeing M Mandel for a moment wethen called for second time today on the President ofSenate M Jeanneney whose views (like those ofPresident of Chamber) are sound in hope of his beingable to influence President of Republic to insist on MReynaud forming new Government

We begged him to make it very clear to Presidentthat offer contained in PMrsquos message would not beextended to a Government which entered intonegotiation with enemy

An hour or so later M Reynaud informed us that hewas beaten and had handed in his resignationCombination of Marshal Peacutetain and General Weygand(who were living in another world and imagined theycould sit round a green table discussing armistice termsin the old manner) had proved too much for weakmembers of Government on whom they worked bywaving the spectre of revolution

On the afternoon of June 16 M Monnet and General deGaulle visited me in the Cabinet Room The General in hiscapacity of Under-Secretary of State for National Defencehad just ordered the French ship Pasteur which wascarrying weapons to Bordeaux from America to proceedinstead to a British port Monnet was very active upon aplan to transfer all French contracts for munitions inAmerica to Britain if France made a separate peace He


evidently expected this and wished to save as much aspossible from what seemed to him to be the wreck of theworld His whole attitude in this respect was most helpfulThen he turned to our sending all our remaining fighter airsquadrons to share in the final battle in France which wasof course already over I told him that there was nopossibility of this being done Even at this stage he used theusual arguments ndashldquothe decisive battlerdquoldquonow or neverrdquoldquoifFrance falls all fallsrdquo and so forth But I could not doanything to oblige him in this field My two French visitorsthen got up and moved towards the door Monnet leadingAs they reached it de Gaulle who had hitherto scarcelyuttered a single word turned back and taking two or threepaces towards me said in English ldquoI think you are quiterightrdquo Under an impassive imperturbable demeanour heseemed to me to have a remarkable capacity for feelingpain I preserved the impression in contact with this verytall phlegmatic man ldquoHere is the Constable of Francerdquo Hereturned that afternoon in a British aeroplane which I hadplaced at his disposal to Bordeaux But not for long

Forthwith Marshal Peacutetain formed a French Governmentwith the main purpose of seeking an immediate armisticefrom Germany Late on the night of June 16 the defeatistgroup of which he was the head was already so shapedand knit together that the process did not take long MChautemps (ldquoto ask for terms is not necessarily to acceptthemrdquo) was Vice-President of the Council GeneralWeygand whose view was that all was over held theMinistry of Defence Admiral Darlan was Minister of Marineand M Baudouin Minister for Foreign Affairs


The only hitch apparently arose over M Laval TheMarshalrsquos first thought had been to offer him the post ofMinister of Justice Laval brushed this aside with disdainHe demanded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from whichposition alone he conceived it possible to carry out his planof reversing the alliances of France finishing up Englandand joining as a minor partner the New Nazi EuropeMarshal Peacutetain surrendered at once to the vehemence ofthis formidable personality M Baudouin who had alreadyundertaken the Foreign Office for which he knew himself tobe utterly inadequate was quite ready to give it up Butwhen he mentioned the fact to M Charles-RouxPermanent Under-Secretary to the Ministry of ForeignAffairs the latter was indignant He enlisted the support ofWeygand When Weygand entered the room andaddressed the illustrious Marshal Laval became so furiousthat both the military chiefs were overwhelmed TheGeneral fled and the Marshal submitted The permanentofficial however stood firm He refused point-blank toserve under Laval Confronted with this the Marshal againsubsided and after a violent scene Laval departed in wrathand dudgeonThis was a critical moment When four months later onOctober 28 Laval eventually became Foreign Ministerthere was a new consciousness of military values Britishresistance to Germany was by then a factor Apparently theisland could not be entirely discounted Anyhow its neckhad not been ldquowrung like a chickenrsquos in three weeksrdquo Thiswas a new fact and a fact at which the whole French nationrejoiced


Our telegram of the 16th had made our assent to inquiriesabout an armistice conditional upon the sailing of theFrench Fleet to British harbours It had already beenpresented formally to Marshal Peacutetain The War Cabinetapproved at my suggestion a further messageemphasising the point But we were talking to the voidOn the 17th also I sent a personal message to MarshalPeacutetain and General Weygand of which copies were to befurnished by our Ambassador to the French President andAdmiral Darlan

I wish to repeat to you my profound conviction thatthe illustrious Marshal Peacutetain and the famous GeneralWeygand our comrades in two great wars against theGermans will not injure their ally by delivering over tothe enemy the fine French Fleet Such an act wouldscarify their names for a thousand years of history Yetthis result may easily come by frittering away these fewprecious hours when the Fleet can be sailed to safety inBritish or American ports carrying with it the hope ofthe future and the honour of France

In order that these appeals might not lack personalreinforcement on the spot we sent the First Sea Lord whobelieved himself to be in intimate personal and professionaltouch with Admiral Darlan the First Lord Mr A VAlexander and Lord Lloyd Secretary of State for theColonies so long known as a friend of France All thesethree laboured to make what contacts they could with thenew Ministers during the 19th They received many solemnassurances that the Fleet would never be allowed to fallinto German hands But no more French warships movedbeyond the reach of the swiftly approaching German power


At the desire of the Cabinet I had broadcast the followingstatement on the evening of June 17

The news from France is very bad and I grieve forthe gallant French people who have fallen into thisterrible misfortune Nothing will alter our feelingstowards them or our faith that the genius of France willrise again What has happened in France makes nodifference to our actions and purpose We havebecome the sole champions now in arms to defend theworld cause We shall do our best to be worthy of thishigh honour We shall defend our island home andwith the British Empire we shall fight on unconquerableuntil the curse of Hitler is lifted from the brows ofmankind We are sure that in the end all will come right

On the morning of the 17th I mentioned to my colleaguesin the Cabinet a telephone conversation which I had hadduring the night with General Spears who said he did notthink he could perform any useful service in the newstructure at Bordeaux He spoke with some anxiety aboutthe safety of General de Gaulle Spears had apparentlybeen warned that as things were shaping it might be wellfor de Gaulle to leave France I readily assented to a goodplan being made for this So that very morning ndash the 17th ndashde Gaulle went to his office in Bordeaux made a number ofengagements for the afternoon as a blind and then droveto the airfield with his friend Spears to see him off Theyshook hands and said good-bye and as the plane began tomove de Gaulle stepped in and slammed the door Themachine soared off into the air while the French police andofficials gaped De Gaulle carried with him in this smallaeroplane the honour of France


That same evening he made his memorable broadcast tothe French people One passage should be quoted here

France is not alone She has a vast Empire behindher She can unite with the British Empire which holdsthe seas and is continuing the struggle She can utiliseto the full as England is doing the vast industrialresources of the United States

Other Frenchmen who wished to fight on were not sofortunate When the Peacutetain Government was formed theplan of going to Africa to set up a centre of power outsideGerman control was still open It was discussed at ameeting of the Peacutetain Cabinet on June 18 The sameevening President Lebrun Peacutetain and the Presidents of theSenate and the Chamber met together There seems tohave been general agreement at least to send arepresentative body to North Africa Even the Marshal wasnot hostile He himself intended to stay but saw no reasonwhy Chautemps Vice-President of the Council should notgo and act in his name When rumours of an impendingexodus ran round agitated Bordeaux Weygand was hostileSuch a move he thought would wreck the ldquohonourablerdquoarmistice negotiations which had already been begun byway of Madrid on French initiative on June 17 Laval wasdeeply alarmed He feared that the setting-up of aneffective resistance administration outside France wouldfrustrate the policy on which he was resolved Weygandand Laval set to work on the clusters of Deputies andSenators crowded into BordeauxDarlan as Minister of Marine took a different view To packoff all the principal critics of his conduct in a ship seemed atthe moment to him a most convenient solution of manydifficulties Once aboard all those who went would be in hispower and there would be plenty of time for the


Government to settle what to do With the approval of thenew Cabinet he offered passages on the armed auxiliarycruiser Massilia to all political figures of influence whowished to go to Africa The ship was to sail from the mouthof the Gironde on the 20th Many however who hadplanned to go to Africa including Jeanneney and Herriotsuspected a trap and preferred to travel overland throughSpain The final party apart from refugees consisted oftwenty-four Deputies and one Senator and includedMandel Campinchi and Daladier who had all been activelypressing for the move to Africa On the afternoon of the21st the Massilia sailed On the 23d the shiprsquos radioannounced that the Peacutetain Government had accepted andsigned the armistice with Germany Campinchi immediatelytried to persuade the captain to set his course for Englandbut this officer no doubt had his instructions and met hisformer political chief of two days before with a bleak refusalThe unlucky band of patriots passed anxious hours till onthe evening of June 24 the Massilia anchored atCasablancaMandel now acted with his usual decision He had withDaladier drafted a proclamation setting up a resistanceadministration in North Africa with himself as Premier Hewent on shore and after calling on the British Consulestablished himself at the Hocirctel Excelsior He thenattempted to send his proclamation out through the HavasAgency When General Noguegraves read its text he wasdisturbed He intercepted the message and it wastelegraphed not to the world but to Darlan and Peacutetain Theyhad now made up their minds to have no alternative andpotentially rival Government outside German powerMandel was arrested at his hotel and brought before thelocal court but the magistrate afterwards dismissed byVichy declared there was no case against him and set him


free He was however by the orders of Governor-GeneralNoguegraves rearrested and put back on the Massilia whichhenceforth was detained in the harbour under strict controlwithout its passengers having any communication with theshoreWithout of course knowing any of the facts here set forth Iwas already concerned about the fate of Frenchmen whowished to fight on


24VI40

It seems most important to establish now before thetrap closes an organisation for enabling French officersand soldiers as well as important technicians whowish to fight to make their way to various ports A sortof ldquounderground railwayrdquo as in the olden days of slaveryshould be established and a Scarlet Pimpernelorganisation set up I have no doubt there will be asteady flow of determined men and we need all we canget for the defence of the French colonies TheAdmiralty and Air Force must co-operate General deGaulle and his Committee would of course be theoperative authority

At our meeting of the War Cabinet late at night on June 25we heard among other things that a ship with a largenumber of prominent French politicians on board hadpassed Rabat We decided to establish contact with themat once Mr Duff Cooper the Minister of Informationaccompanied by Lord Gort started for Rabat at dawn in aSunderland flying-boat They found the town in mourningFlags were flying at half-mast church bells were tolling anda solemn service was taking place in the cathedral tobewail the defeat of France All their attempts to get intouch with Mandel were prevented The Deputy Governor


named Morice declared not only on the telephone but in apersonal interview which Duff Cooper demanded that hehad no choice but to obey the orders of his superiors ldquoIfGeneral Noguegraves tells me to shoot myself I will gladly obeyUnfortunately the orders he has given me are more cruelrdquoThe former French Ministers and Deputies were in fact tobe treated as escaped prisoners Our mission had nochoice but to return the way they came A few days later(July 1) I gave instructions to the Admiralty to try to cut outthe Massilia and rescue those on board No plan couldhowever be made and for nearly three weeks she layunder the batteries of Casablanca after which the wholeparty were brought back to France and disposed of as theVichy Government thought convenient to themselves andagreeable to their German masters Mandel began his longand painful internment which ended in his murder byGerman orders at the end of 1944 Thus perished the hopeof setting up a strong representative French Governmenteither in Africa or in London

Although vain the process of trying to imagine what wouldhave happened if some important event or decision hadbeen different is often tempting and sometimes instructiveThe manner of the fall of France was decided on June 16by a dozen chances each measured by a hairrsquos-breadth IfPaul Reynaud had survived the 16th I should have beenwith him at noon on the 17th accompanied by the mostpowerful delegation that has ever left our shores armedwith plenary powers in the name of the British nationCertainly we should have confronted Peacutetain WeygandChautemps and the rest with our blunt proposition ldquoNorelease from the obligation of March 28 unless the FrenchFleet is sailed to British ports On the other hand we offer


an indissoluble Anglo-French Union Go to Africa and let usfight it out togetherrdquo Surely we should have been aided bythe President of the Republic by the Presidents of the twoFrench Chambers and by all that resolute band whogathered behind Reynaud Mandel and de Gaulle It seemsto me probable that we should have uplifted and convertedthe defeatists round the table or left them in a minority oreven under arrestBut let us pursue this ghostly speculation further TheFrench Government would have retired to North Africa TheAnglo-French Super-State or Working Committee to whichit would probably in practice have reduced itself wouldhave faced Hitler The British and French Fleets from theirharbours would have enjoyed complete mastery of theMediterranean and free passage through it for all troopsand supplies Whatever British air force could be sparedfrom the defence of Britain and what was left of the Frenchair force nourished by American production and based onthe French North African airfields would soon have becomean offensive factor of the first importance Malta instead ofbeing for so long a care and peril would at once have takenits place as our most active naval base Italy could havebeen attacked with heavy bombing from Africa far easierthan from England Her communications with the Italianarmies in Libya and Tripolitania would have been effectivelysevered Using no more fighter aircraft than we actuallyemployed in the defence of Egypt and sending to theMediterranean theatre no more troops than we actuallysent or held ready to send we might well with the remainsof the French Army have transferred the war from the Eastto the Central Mediterranean and during 1941 the entireNorth African shore might have been cleared of Italianforces


France would never have ceased to be one of the principalbelligerent allies and would have been spared the fearfulschism which rent and still rends her people Her homelandno doubt would have lain prostrate under the German rulebut that was only what actually happened after the Anglo-American descent in November 1942Now that the whole story is before us no one can doubtthat the armistice did not spare France a pangIt is still more shadowy to guess what Hitler would havedone Would he have forced his way through Spain with orwithout Spanish agreement and after assaulting andperhaps capturing Gibraltar have invaded Tangier andMorocco This was an area which deeply concerned theUnited States and was ever prominent in PresidentRooseveltrsquos mind How could Hitler have made this majorattack through Spain on Africa and yet fight the Battle ofBritain He would have had to choose If he chose Africawe with the command of the sea and the French basescould have moved both troops and air forces into Moroccoand Algeria quicker than he and in greater strength Weshould certainly have welcomed in the autumn and winterof 1940 a vehement campaign in or from a friendly FrenchNorthwest AfricaSurveying the whole scene in the afterlight it seemsunlikely that Hitlerrsquos main decision and the major events ofthe war namely the Battle of Britain and the German surgeto the East would have been changed by the retirement ofthe French Government to North Africa After the fall ofParis when Hitler danced his jig of joy he naturally dealtwith very large propositions Once France was prostrate hemust if possible conquer or destroy Great Britain His onlyother choice was Russia A major operation through Spaininto Northwest Africa would have prejudiced both these


tremendous adventures or at least have prevented hisattack on the Balkans I have no doubt that it would havebeen better for all the Allies if the French Government hadgone to North Africa And that this would have remainedtrue whether Hitler followed them and us thither or notOne day when I was convalescing at Marrakech in January1944 General Georges came to luncheon In the course ofcasual conversation I aired the fancy that perhaps theFrench Governmentrsquos failure to go to Africa in June 1940had all turned out for the best At the Peacutetain trial in August1945 the General thought it right to state this in evidence Imake no complaint but my hypothetical speculation on thisoccasion does not represent my considered opinion eitherduring the war or now


11Admiral Darlan and the French Fleet

Oran

Would Britain Surrender mdash My Speech of June18 mdash Strong Rally of the DominionsmdashEnduringComradeship with the French PeoplemdashldquoTheirFinest HourrdquomdashWords and Deeds mdash Reply to LordLothian June 22 mdash Telegram to Mr MackenzieKing June 24 mdash Telegram of June 27 to GeneralSmutsmdashTo Lord Lothian June 28 mdash AdmiralDarlanrsquos Opportunity mdash His ObsessionmdashHis FatalChoicemdashSolid Reasons for Confidence of WarCabinet and Chiefs of Staff mdash The French NavymdashArmistice Article 8 mdashA Dire DecisionmdashldquoOperationCatapultrdquo Zero Day July 3 mdash Distribution of theFrench Fleet at the End of JunemdashPortsmouth andPlymouth mdash Distress of the British Admirals atGibraltarmdashThe War Cabinet Inflexible mdash OurTerms to the FrenchmdashThe Tragedy of OranmdashAlexandria Dakar and Martinique mdash My Reportto Parliament July 4 mdash Admonition to All BritishMinisters and Officialsmdash Tumultuous Approval ofthe House of CommonsmdashWorld Impression onElimination of French Navy mdash His MajestyrsquosGovernment Would Stop at NothingmdashThe Geniusof FrancemdashAppendix to Chapter Admiral DarlanrsquosFinal Letter to Me

AFTER THE COLLAPSE of France the question which arosein the minds of all our friends and foes was ldquoWould Britainsurrender toordquo So far as public statements count in the


teeth of events I had in the name of His MajestyrsquosGovernment repeatedly declared our resolve to fight onalone After Dunkirk on June 4 I had used the expressionldquoif necessary foryears if necessary alonerdquo This was not inserted withoutdesign and the French Ambassador in London had beeninstructed the next day to inquire what I actually meant Hewas told ldquoexactly what was saidrdquo I could remind the Houseof my remark when I addressed it on June 18 the morrowof the Bordeaux collapse I then gave ldquosome indication ofthe solid practical grounds on which we based our inflexibleresolve to continue the warrdquo I was able to assureParliament that our professional advisers of the threeServices were confident that there were good andreasonable hopes of ultimate victory I told them that I hadreceived from all the four Dominion Prime Ministersmessages in which they endorsed our decision to fight onand declared themselves ready to share our fortunes ldquoIncasting up this dread balance-sheet and contemplating ourdangers with a disillusioned eye I see great reasons forvigilance and exertion but none whatever for panic or fearrdquoI added

During the first four years of the last war the Alliesexperienced nothing but disaster and disappoint-menthellip We repeatedly asked ourselves the questionldquoHow are we going to winrdquo and no one was ever ableto answer it with much precision until at the end quitesuddenly quite unexpectedly our terrible foe collapsedbefore us and we were so glutted with victory that inour folly we threw it away

However matters may go in France or with theFrench Government or other French Governments wein this island and in the British Empire will never loseour sense of comradeship with the French peoplehellip Iffinal victory rewards our toils they shall share the gainsndash aye and freedom shall be restored to all We abate


nothing of our just demands not one jot or tittle do werecedehellip Czechs Poles Norwegians Dutch Belgianshave joined their causes to our own All these shall berestored

What General Weygand called the Battle of Franceis over I expect that the Battle of Britain is about tobegin Upon this battle depends the survival ofChristian civilisation Upon it depends our own Britishlife and the long continuity of our institutions and ourEmpire The whole fury and might of the enemy mustvery soon be turned on us Hitler knows that he willhave to break us in this island or lose the war If we canstand up to him all Europe may be free and the life ofthe world may move forward into broad sunlit uplandsBut if we fail then the whole world including the UnitedStates including all that we have known and cared forwill sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made moresinister and perhaps more protracted by the lights ofperverted science Let us therefore brace ourselves toour duties and so bear ourselves that if the BritishEmpire and its Commonwealth last for a thousandyears men will say ldquoThis was their finest hourrdquo

All these often-quoted words were made good in the hourof victory But now they were only words Foreigners whodo not understand the temper of the British race all over theglobe when its blood is up might suppose that they wereonly a bold front set up as a good prelude for peacenegotiations Hitlerrsquos need to finish the war in the West wasobvious He was in a position to offer the most temptingterms To those who like myself had studied his moves itdid not seem impossible that he would consent to leaveBritain and her Empire and Fleet intact and make a peacewhich would have secured him that free hand in the East ofwhich Ribbentrop had talked to me in 1937 and which washis heartrsquos main desire So far we had not done him muchharm We had indeed only added our own defeat to histriumph over France Can one wonder that astute


calculators in many countries ignorant as they mostly wereof the problems of overseas invasion and of the quality ofour air force and who dwelt under the overwhelmingimpression of German might and terror were notconvinced Not every Government called into being byDemocracy or by Despotism and not every nation whilequite alone and as it seemed abandoned would havecourted the horrors of invasion and disdained a fair chanceof peace for which many plausible excuses could bepresented Rhetoric was no guarantee Anotheradministration might come into being ldquoThe warmongershave had their chance and failedrdquo America had stood aloofNo one was under any obligation to Soviet Russia Whyshould not Britain join the spectators who in Japan and inthe United States in Sweden and in Spain might watchwith detached interest or even relish a mutually destructivestruggle between the Nazi and Communist EmpiresFuture generations will find it hard to believe that the issuesI have summarised here were never thought worth a placeupon the Cabinet agenda or even mentioned in our mostprivate conclaves Doubts could be swept away only bydeeds The deeds were to come

Meanwhile 1 telegraphed to Lord Lothian who at thedesire of the United States naval authorities had askedanxiously whether ammunition for the British Fleet andmaterial for its repair ought not to be sent from Englandacross the Atlantic

22VI40There is no warrant for such precautions at the

present time


I also sent the following telegrams to my Dominion friends

To Mr MackenzieKing

24VI40

If you will read again my telegram of June 5 you willsee that there is no question of trying to make a bargainwith the United States about their entry into the war andour despatch of the Fleet across the Atlantic should theMother Country be defeated On the contrary I doubtvery much the wisdom of dwelling upon the lastcontingency at the present time I have good confi-dence in our ability to defend this island and I see noreason to make preparation for or give any counte-nance to the transfer of the British Fleet I shall myselfnever enter into any peace negotiations with Hitler butobviously I cannot bind a future Government which ifwe were deserted by the United States and beatendown here might very easily be a kind of Quisling affairready to accept German overlordship and protection Itwould be a help if you would impress this danger uponthe President as I have done in my telegrams to him

All good wishes and we are very glad your grandCanadian Division is with us in our fight for Britain

To Smuts I cabled again27VI40

Obviously we have first to repulse any attack onGreat Britain by invasion and show ourselves able tomaintain our development of air power This can onlybe settled by trial If Hitler fails to beat us here he willprobably recoil eastward Indeed he may do this evenwithout trying invasion to find employment for his Armyand take the edge off the winter strain upon him

I do not expect the winter strain will prove decisivebut to try to hold all Europe down in a starving conditionwith only Gestapo and military occupation and no large


theme appealing to the masses is not an arrangementwhich can last long

Development of our air power particularly in regionsunaffected by bombing should cause him ever-increasing difficulties possibly decisive difficulties inGermany no matter what successes he has in Europeor Asia

Our large Army now being created for HomeDefence is being formed on the principle of attack andopportunity for large-scale offensive amphibiousoperations may come in 1940 and 1941 We are stillworking on the fifty-five-division basis here but as ourmunitions supply expands and Empire resources aremobilised larger numbers may be possible After all weare now at last on interior lines Hitler has vast hungryareas to defend and we have the command of theseas Choice of objectives in Western Europe istherefore wide

I send you these personal notes in order to keep inclosest contact with your thoughts which ever weighwith me

It was with good confidence that we entered upon thesupreme test

Prime Minister to LordLothian (Washington)

28VI40

No doubt I shall make some broadcast presently butI donrsquot think words count for much now Too muchattention should not be paid to eddies of United Statesopinion Only force of events can govern them Up tillApril they were so sure the Allies would win that theydid not think help necessary Now they are so sure weshall lose that they do not think it possible I feel goodconfidence we can repel invasion and keep alive in theair Anyhow we are going to try Never cease toimpress on President and others that if this countrywere successfully invaded and largely occupied afterheavy fighting some Quisling Government would be


formed to make peace on the basis of our becoming aGerman Protectorate In this case the British Fleetwould be the solid contribution with which this PeaceGovernment would buy terms Feeling in Englandagainst United States would be similar to Frenchbitterness against us now We have really not had anyhelp worth speaking of from the United States so far[The rifles and field guns did not arrive till the end ofJuly The destroyers had been refused] We knowPresident is our best friend but it is no use trying todance attendance upon Republican and DemocraticConventions What really matters is whether Hitler ismaster of Britain in three months or not I think not Butthis is a matter which cannot be argued beforehandYour mood should be bland and phlegmatic No one isdownhearted here

In the closing days at Bordeaux Admiral Darlan becamevery important My contacts with him had been few andformal I respected him for the work he had done in re-creating the French Navy which after ten years of hisprofessional control was more efficient than at any timesince the French Revolution When in November 1939 hehad visited England we gave him an official dinner at theAdmiralty In response to the toast he began by remindingus that his great-grandfather had been killed at the Battle ofTrafalgar I therefore thought of him as one of those goodFrenchmen who hate England Our Anglo-French navaldiscussions in January had also shown how very jealousthe Admiral was of his professional position in relation towhoever was the political Minister of Marine This hadbecome a positive obsession and I believe played adefinite part in his action


For the rest Darlan had been present at most of theconferences which I have described and as the end of theFrench resistance approached he had repeatedly assuredme that whatever happened the French Fleet should neverfall into German hands Now at Bordeaux came the fatefulmoment in the career of this ambitious self-seeking andcapable Admiral His authority over the Fleet was for allpractical purposes absolute He had only to order the shipsto British American or French colonial harbours ndash somehad already started ndash to be obeyed In the morning of June17 after the fall of M Reynaudrsquos Cabinet he declared toGeneral Georges that he was resolved to give the orderThe next day Georges met him in the afternoon and askedhim what had happened Darlan replied that he hadchanged his mind When asked why he answered simplyldquoI am now Minister of Marinerdquo This did not mean that hehad changed his mind in order to become Minister ofMarine but that being Minister of Marine he had a differentpoint of viewHow vain are human calculations of self-interest Rarelyhas there been a more convincing example Admiral Darlanhad but to sail in any one of his ships to any port outsideFrance to become the master of all French interests beyondGerman control He would not have come like General deGaulle with only an unconquerable heart and a few kindredspirits He would have carried with him outside the Germanreach the fourth Navy in the world whose officers and menwere personally devoted to him Acting thus Darlan wouldhave become the chief of the French Resistance with amighty weapon in his hand British and American dockyardsand arsenals would have been at his disposal for themaintenance of his fleet The French gold reserve in theUnited States would have assured him once recognised ofample resources The whole French Empire would have


rallied to him Nothing could have prevented him from beingthe Liberator of France The fame and power which he soardently desired were in his grasp Instead he went forwardthrough two years of worrying and ignominious office to aviolent death a dishonoured grave and a name long to beexecrated by the French Navy and the nation he hadhitherto served so well

There is a final note which should be struck at this point Ina letter which Darlan wrote to me on December 4 19421just three weeks before his assassination he vehementlyclaimed that he had kept his word As this letter states hiscase and should be on record I print it at the end of thischapter It cannot be disputed that no French ship was evermanned by the Germans or used against us by them in thewar This was not entirely due to Admiral Darlanrsquosmeasures but he had certainly built up in the minds of theofficers and men of the French Navy that at all costs theirships should be destroyed before being seized by theGermans whom he disliked as much as the English

Those of us who were responsible at the summit in Londonunderstood the physical structure of our island strength andwere sure of the spirit of the nation The confidence withwhich we faced the immediate future was not founded aswas commonly supposed abroad upon audacious bluff orrhetorical appeal but upon a sober consciousness andcalculation of practical facts When I spoke in the House ofCommons I founded myself upon realities which I andothers had carefully studied ndash some for many years I will


presently analyse in detail the invasion problem as I and myexpert advisers saw it in these memorable days But first ofall there was one step to take It was obvious and it wasdireThe addition of the French Navy to the German and ItalianFleets with the menace of Japan measureless upon thehorizon confronted Great Britain with mortal dangers andgravely affected the safety of the United States Article 8 ofthe Armistice prescribed that the French Fleet except thatpart left free for safeguarding French Colonial interestsldquoshall be collected in ports to be specified and theredemobilised and disarmed under German or Italian controlrdquoIt was therefore clear that the French war vessels wouldpass into that control while fully armed It was true that inthe same article the German Government solemnlydeclared that they had no intention of using them for theirown purposes during the war But who in his senses wouldtrust the word of Hitler after his shameful record and thefacts of the hour Furthermore the article excepted fromthis assurance ldquothose units necessary for coast surveillanceand mine-sweepingrdquo The interpretation of this lay with theGermans Finally the Armistice could at any time be voidedon any pretext of non-observance There was in fact nosecurity for us at all At all costs at all risks in one way oranother we must make sure that the Navy of France didnot fall into wrong hands and then perhaps bring us andothers to ruinThe War Cabinet never hesitated Those Ministers who theweek before had given their whole hearts to France andoffered common nationhood resolved that all necessarymeasures should be taken This was a hateful decision themost unnatural and painful in which I have ever beenconcerned It recalled the episode of the destruction of theDanish Fleet in Copenhagen Harbour by Nelson in 1801


but now the French had been only yesterday our dear alliesand our sympathy for the misery of France was sincere Onthe other hand the life of the State and the salvation of ourcause were at stake It was Greek tragedy But no act wasever more necessary for the life of Britain and for all thatdepended upon it I thought of Danton in 1793 ldquoThecoalesced Kings threaten us and we hurl at their feet as agage of battle the head of a Kingrdquo The whole event was inthis order of ideas

The French Navy was disposed in the following mannerTwo battleships four light cruisers (or contre-torpilleurs)some submarines including a very large one the Surcoufeight destroyers and about two hundred smaller butvaluable minesweeping and anti-submarine craft lay for themost part at Portsmouth and Plymouth These were in ourpower At Alexandria there were a French battleship fourFrench cruisers three of them modern eight-inch cruisersand a number of smaller ships These were covered by astrong British battle squadron At Oran at the other end ofthe Mediterranean and at its adjacent military port of Mers-el-Kebir were two of the finest vessels of the French fleetthe Dunkerque and the Strasbourg modern battle cruisersmuch superior to the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and builtfor the express purpose of being superior to them Thesevessels in German hands on our trade routes would havebeen most disagreeable With them were two Frenchbattleships several light cruisers and a number ofdestroyers submarines and other vessels At Algiers wereseven cruisers of which four were eight-inch armed and atMartinique an aircraft-carrier and two light cruisers AtCasablanca lay the Jean Bart newly arrived from Saint


Nazaire but without her guns This was one of the keyships in the computation of world naval strength It wasunfinished and could not be finished at Casablanca It mustnot go elsewhere The Richelieu which was far nearercompletion had reached Dakar She could steam and herfifteen-inch guns could fire There were many other Frenchships of minor importance in various ports Finally atToulon a number of warships were beyond our reachldquoOperation Catapultrdquo comprised the simultaneous seizurecontrol or effective disablement or destruction of all theaccessible French Fleet


1VII40

1 The Admiralty are retaining Nelson and her fourdestroyers in home waters and ldquoOperation Catapultrdquoshould go forward aiming at daybreak the 3d

2 During the night of 2d3d all necessary measuresshould be taken at Portsmouth and Plymouth atAlexandria and if possible at Martinique on the samelines as Catapult The reactions to these measures atDakar and Casablanca must be considered and everyprecaution taken to prevent the escape of valuableunits

On account of the pressure of events I added alsoThe Admiralty should endeavour to raise the flotillas

in the narrow seas to a strength of forty destroyers withadditional cruiser support An effort should be made toreach this strength during the next two or three daysand hold it for the following fortnight when the positioncan be reviewed The losses in the Western approach-es must be accepted meanwhile I should like also adaily return of the numbers of craft on patrol oravailable between Portsmouth and the Tyne


On the night of July 3 all the French vessels at Portsmouthand Plymouth were taken under British control The actionwas sudden and necessarily a surprise Overwhelmingforce was employed and the whole transaction showedhow easily the Germans could have taken possession ofany French warships lying in ports which they controlled InBritain the transfer except in the Surcouf was amicableand the crews came willingly ashore In the Surcouf twoBritish officers were wounded one leading seaman killedand an able seaman wounded One Frenchman was killedin the scuffle but the utmost endeavours were made withsuccess to reassure and comfort the French sailors Manyhundreds volunteered to join us The Surcouf afterrendering distinguished service perished on February 191942 with all her gallant French crew

The deadly stroke was in the Western Mediterranean Hereat Gibraltar Vice-Admiral Somerville with ldquoForce Hrdquoconsisting of the battle cruiser Hood the battleships Valiantand Resolution the aircraft-carrier Ark Royal two cruisersand eleven destroyers received orders sent from theAdmiralty at 225 AM on July 1

Be prepared for ldquoCatapultrdquo July 3

Among Somervillersquos officers was Captain Holland a gallantand distinguished officer lately Naval Attacheacute in Paris andwith keen French sympathies who was influential In theearly afternoon of July 1 the Vice-Admiral telegraphed

After talk with Holland and others Vice-AdmiralldquoForce Hrdquo is impressed with their view that the use of


force should be avoided at all costs Holland considersoffensive action on our part would alienate all Frenchwherever they are

To this the Admiralty replied at 620 PMFirm intention of HMG that if French will not accept

any of your alternatives they are to be destroyed

Shortly after midnight (108 AM July 2) Admiral Somervillewas sent the following carefully conceived text of thecommunication to be made to the French Admiral

It is impossible for us your comrades up to now toallow your fine ships to fall into the power of theGerman or Italian enemy We are determined to fighton to the end and if we win as we think we shall weshall never forget that France was our Ally that ourinterests are the same as hers and that our commonenemy is Germany Should we conquer we solemnlydeclare that we shall restore the greatness and territoryof France For this purpose we must make sure thatthe best ships of the French Navy are not used againstus by the common foe In these circumstances HisMajestyrsquos Government have instructed me to demandthat the French Fleet now at Mers-el-Kebir and Oranshall act in accordance with one of the followingalternatives

(a) Sail with us and continue to fight for victoryagainst the Germans and Italians

(b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to aBritish port The reduced crews will be repatriated atthe earliest moment

If either of these courses is adopted by you we willrestore your ships to France at the conclusion of thewar or pay full compensation if they are damagedmeanwhile

(c) Alternatively if you feel bound to stipulate thatyour ships should not be used against the Germans orItalians unless these break the Armistice then sailthem with us with reduced crews to some French portin the West Indies ndash Martinique for instance ndash where


they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction or perhapsbe entrusted to the United States and remain safe untilthe end of the war the crews being repatriated

If you refuse these fair offers I must with profoundregret require you to sink your ships within six hours

Finally failing the above I have the orders of HisMajestyrsquos Government to use whatever force may benecessary to prevent your ships from falling intoGerman or Italian hands

In the evening of the 2d I requested the Admiralty to sendthe Vice-Admiral the following message (despatched 1055PM)

You are charged with one of the most disagreeableand difficult tasks that a British Admiral has ever beenfaced with but we have complete confidence in youand rely on you to carry it out relentlessly

The Admiral sailed at daylight and was off Oran at about930 He sent Captain Holland himself in a destroyer to waitupon the French Admiral Gensoul After being refused aninterview Holland sent by messengers the documentalready quoted Admiral Gensoul replied in writing that in nocase would the French warships be allowed to fall intactinto German and Italian hands and that force would be metwith forceAll day negotiations continued Captain Holland waiting inhis destroyer off the boom The distress of the BritishAdmiral and his principal officers was evident to us from thesignals which had passed Nothing but the most directorders compelled them to open fire on those who had beenso lately their comrades At the Admiralty also there wasmanifest emotion But there was no weakening in theresolve of the War Cabinet I sat all the afternoon in theCabinet Room in frequent contact with my principal


colleagues and the First Lord and First Sea Lord A finalsignal was despatched at 626 PM

French ships must comply with our terms or sinkthemselves or be sunk by you before dark

But the action had already begun At 554 AdmiralSomerville opened fire upon this powerful French fleetwhich was also protected by its shore batteries At 60 PMhe reported that he was heavily engaged Thebombardment lasted for some ten minutes and wasfollowed by heavy attacks by our naval aircraft launchedfrom the Ark Royal The battleship Bretagne was blown upThe Dunkerque ran aground The battleship Provence wasbeached The Strasbourg escaped and though attackedand damaged by torpedo aircraft reached Toulon as didalso the cruisers from AlgiersAt Alexandria after protracted negotiations with AdmiralCunningham the French Admiral Godfrey agreed todischarge his oil fuel to remove important parts of his gun-mechanisms and to repatriate some of his crews At Dakaron July 8 an attack was made on the battleship Richelieu bythe aircraft-carrier Hermes and most gallantly by a motor-boat The Richelieu was hit by an air torpedo and seriouslydamaged The French aircraft-carrier and two light cruisersat Martinique were immobilised after long-drawn-outdiscussions under an agreement with the United StatesOn July 4 I reported at length to the House of Commonswhat we had done Although the battle-cruiser Strasbourghad escaped from Oran and the effective disablement ofthe Richelieu had not then been reported the measures wehad taken had removed the French Navy from majorGerman calculations I spoke for an hour or more thatafternoon and gave a detailed account of all these sombreevents as they were known to me I have nothing to add to


the account which I then gave to Parliament and to theworld I thought it better for the sake of proportion to endupon a note which placed this mournful episode in truerelation with the plight in which we stood I therefore read tothe House the admonition which I had with Cabinetapproval circulated through the inner circles of thegoverning machine the day before

On what may be the eve of an attempted invasion orbattle for our native land the Prime Minister desires toimpress upon all persons holding responsible positionsin the Government in the Fighting Services or in theCivil Departments their duty to maintain a spirit of alertand confident energy While every precaution must betaken that time and means afford there are no groundsfor supposing that more German troops can be landedin this country either from the air or across the seathan can be destroyed or captured by the strong forcesat present under arms The Royal Air Force is inexcellent order and at the highest strength yet attainedThe German Navy was never so weak nor the BritishArmy at home so strong as now The Prime Ministerexpects all His Majestyrsquos servants in high places to setan example of steadiness and resolution They shouldcheck and rebuke the expression of loose and ill-digested opinions in their circles or by their subordi-nates They should not hesitate to report or ifnecessary remove any persons officers or officialswho are found to be consciously exercising a disturbingor depressing influence and whose talk is calculated tospread alarm and despondency Thus alone will theybe worthy of the fighting men who in the air on thesea and on land have already met the enemy withoutany sense of being outmatched in martial qualities

The House was very silent during the recital but at the endthere occurred a scene unique in my own experienceEverybody seemed to stand up all around cheering forwhat seemed a long time Up till this moment theConservative Party had treated me with some reserve and


it was from the Labour benches that I received the warmestwelcome when I entered the House or rose on seriousoccasions But now all joined in solemn stentorian accordThe elimination of the French Navy as an important factoralmost at a single stroke by violent action produced aprofound impression in every country Here was this Britainwhich so many had counted down and out which strangershad supposed to be quivering on the brink of surrender tothe mighty power arrayed against her striking ruthlessly ather dearest friends of yesterday and securing for a while toherself the undisputed command of the sea It was madeplain that the British War Cabinet feared nothing and wouldstop at nothing This was true

The Peacutetain Government had moved to Vichy on July 1 andproceeded to set itself up as the Government ofUnoccupied France On receiving the news of Oran theyordered retaliation by air upon Gibraltar and a few bombswere dropped upon the harbour from their African stationsOn July 5 they formally broke off relations with GreatBritain On July 11 President Lebrun gave place to MarshalPeacutetain who was installed as Chief of the State by anenormous majority of 569 against 80 with 17 abstentionsand many absenteesThe genius of France enabled her people to comprehendthe whole significance of Oran and in her agony to drawnew hope and strength from this additional bitter pangGeneral de Gaulle whom I did not consult beforehand wasmagnificent in his demeanour and France liberated andrestored has ratified his conduct I am indebted to MTeitgen for a tale which should be told In a village nearToulon dwelt two peasant families each of whom had lost


their sailor son by British fire at Oran A funeral service wasarranged to which all their neighbours sought to go Bothfamilies requested that the Union Jack should lie upon thecoffins side by side with the Tricolour and their wisheswere respectfully observed In this we may see how thecomprehending spirit of simple folk touches the sublime

Immense relief spread through the high Government circlesin the United States The Atlantic Ocean seemed to regainits sheltering power and a long vista of time opened out forthe necessary preparations for the safety of the greatRepublic Henceforth there was no more talk about Britaingiving in The only question was would she be invaded andconquered That was the issue which was now to be put tothe proof

APPENDIX

Admiral Darlan to Mr Churchill2

Algiers December 4 1942Dear Mr Prime Minister

On June 12 1940 at Briare at the Headquarters ofGeneral Weygand you took me aside and said to meldquoDarlan I hope that you will never surrender the FleetrdquoI answered you ldquoThere is no question of doing so itwould be contrary to our naval traditions and honourrdquoThe First Lord of the Admiralty Alexander and the FirstSea Lord Pound received the same reply on June 171940 at Bordeaux as did Lord Lloyd If I did notconsent to authorise the French Fleet to proceed toBritish ports it was because I knew that such adecision would bring about the total occupation ofMetropolitan France as well as North Africa


I admit having been overcome by a great bitternessand a great resentment against England as the result ofthe painful events which touched me as a sailorfurthermore it seemed to me that you did not believemy word One day Lord Halifax sent me word by MDupuy that in England my word was not doubted butthat it was believed that I should not be able to keep itThe voluntary destruction of the Fleet at Toulon has justproved that I was right because even though I nolonger commanded the Fleet executed the orderswhich I had given and maintained contrary to thewishes of the Laval Government On the orders of myChief the Marshal I was obliged from January 1941 toApril 1942 to adopt a policy which would preventFrance and its Empire from being occupied andcrushed by the Axis Powers This policy was by theforce of events opposed to yours What else could Ido At that time you were not able to help us and anygesture towards you would have led to the mostdisastrous consequences for my country If we had notassumed the obligation to defend the Empire by ourown forces (I always refused German aid even inSyria) the Axis would have come to Africa and our ownArmy would have been discarded the First British Armyundoubtedly would not be before Tunis today withFrench troops at its side to combat the Germans andItalians

When the Allied forces landed in Africa on Novem-ber 8 I at first executed the orders I had receivedThen as soon as this became impossible I ordered thecessation of the fighting in order to avoid unnecessarybloodshed and a fight which was contrary to theintimate sentiments of those engaged Disavowed byVichy and not wishing to resume the fight I placedmyself at the disposition of the American militaryauthorities only in that way being able to remain faithfulto my oath On November 11 I learned of the violationof the Armistice Convention by the Germans theoccupation of France and the solemn protest of theMarshal I then considered that I could resume myliberty of action and that remaining faithful to theperson of the Marshal I could follow that road which


was most favourable to the welfare of the FrenchEmpire that of the fight against the Axis Supported bythe high authorities of French Africa and by publicopinion and acting as the eventual substitute of theChief of State I formed the High Commissariat in Africaand ordered the French forces to fight at the side of theAllies Since then French West Africa has recognisedmy authority I should never have been able toaccomplish this result if I had not acted under the aegisof the Marshal and if I were simply represented as adissident I have the conviction that all Frenchmen whonow fight against Germany each in his own manner willfinally achieve a general reconciliation but I believethat for the moment they must continue their separateaction There is a certain resentment notably in FrenchWest Africa which is too active for me to obtain moreas you know I follow my rocircle without attacking anyoneI ask for reciprocity For the moment the only thingwhich counts is to defeat the Axis the French peoplewhen liberated will later choose their political reacutegimeand their leaders

I thank you Mr Prime Minister for having associat-ed yourself with President Roosevelt in declaring thatlike the United States Great Britain wishes the integralre-establishment of French sovereignty as it existed in1939 When my country has recovered its integrity andits liberty my only ambition will be to retire with thesentiment of having served it well

Please accept Mr Prime Minister the assurancesof my highest consideration

FRANCcedilOIS DARLAN Admiral of the Fleet


12The Apparatus of Counter-Attack 1940

My Own Reactions After DunkirkmdashMinute toGeneral Ismay of June 4 mdash Work of June 6 mdash ARetrogression mdash My Old Plans of July 1917 mdashAn Early Idea of Tank-Landing Craft mdash The Germof the ldquoMulberryrdquo Harbours of 1944 mdash Directive toGeneral Ismay on Counter-AttackmdashldquoComman-dosrdquomdash Tank-Landing Craft and ParachutistsmdashMyMinute of July 7 1940 Calling for Beach LandingCraft for Six or Seven Hundred Tanks mdash Minute ofAugust 5 1940 on Programme of ArmouredDivisions mdash Overseas Transportation for TwoDivisions at a Time mdash Creation of the CombinedOperations Command mdash Appointment of SirRoger KeyesmdashThe Joint PlanningCommittee IsPlaced Directly Under the Minister of DefencemdashProgress of the Landing-Craft Construction in1940 and 1941 mdash My Telegram to PresidentRoosevelt of July 25 1941 mdash My ConsistentPurpose to Land Large Armies in Europe

MY FIRST REACTION to the ldquoMiracle of Dunkirkrdquo had beento turn it to proper use by mounting a counter-offensiveWhen so much was uncertain the need to recover theinitiative glared forth June 4 was much occupied for me bythe need to prepare and deliver the long and seriousspeech to the House of Commons of which some accounthas been given but as soon as this was over I made haste


to strike the note which I thought should rule our minds andinspire our actions at this moment


4VI40

We are greatly concerned ndash and it is certainly wiseto be so ndash with the dangers of the German landing inEngland in spite of our possessing the command of theseas and having very strong defence by fighters in theair Every creek every beach every harbour hasbecome to us a source of anxiety Besides this theparachutists may sweep over and take Liverpool orIreland and so forth All this mood is very good if itengenders energy But if it is so easy for the Germansto invade us in spite of sea-power some may feelinclined to ask the question ldquoWhy should it be thoughtimpossible for us to do anything of the same kind tothemrdquo The completely defensive habit of mind whichhas ruined the French must not be allowed to ruin allour initiative It is of the highest consequence to keepthe largest numbers of German forces all along thecoasts of the countries they have conquered and weshould immediately set to work to organise raidingforces on these coasts where the populations arefriendly Such forces might be composed of self-contained thoroughly equipped units of say onethousand up to not more than ten thousand whencombined Surprise would be ensured by the fact thatthe destination would be concealed until the lastmoment What we have seen at Dunkirk shows howquickly troops can be moved off (and I suppose on) toselected points if need be How wonderful it would be ifthe Germans could be made to wonder where theywere going to be struck next instead of forcing us to tryto wall in the island and roof it over An effort must bemade to shake off the mental and moral prostration tothe will and initiative of the enemy from which we suffer


Ismay conveyed this to the Chiefs of Staff and in principle itreceived their cordial approval and was reflected in many ofthe decisions which we took Out of it gradually sprang apolicy My thought was at this time firmly fixed on tankwarfare not merely defensive but offensive This requiredthe construction of large numbers of tank-landing vesselswhich henceforward became one of my constant cares Asall this was destined to become of major importance in thefuture I must now make a retrogression into a subjectwhich had long ago lain in my mind and was now revived

I had always been fascinated by amphibious warfare andthe idea of using tanks to run ashore from speciallyconstructed landing craft on beaches where they were notexpected had long been in my mind Ten days before Irejoined Mr Lloyd Georgersquos Government as Minister ofMunitions on July 17 1917 I had prepared without expertassistance a scheme for the capture of the two Frisianislands Borkum and Sylt The object was to secure anoverseas base for flotillas and cruisers and for such airforces as were available in those days in order to force thenaval fighting in which we had a great numericalsuperiority and by re-establishing close blockade relievethe pressure of the U-boat war then at its height againstour Atlantic supply-line and the movement of the Americanarmies to France Mr Lloyd George was impressed with theplan and had it specially printed for the Admiralty and theWar CabinetIt contained the following paragraph 22c which has neveryet seen the light of day

The landing of the troops upon the island [of Borkumor Sylt] under cover of the guns of the Fleet [should be]


aided by gas and smoke from torpedo-proof transportsby means of bullet-proof lighters Approximately onehundred should be provided for landing a division Inaddition a number ndash say fifty ndashtank-landing lightersshould be provided each carrying a tank or tanks [and]fitted for wire-cutting in its bow By means of adrawbridge or shelving bow [the tanks] would landunder [their] own power and prevent the infantry frombeing held up by wire when attacking the gorges of theforts and batteries This is a new feature and removesone of the very great previous difficulties namely therapid landing of [our] field artillery to cut wire

And further paragraph 27There is always the danger of the enemy getting

wind of our intentions and reinforcing his garrisons withgood troops beforehand at any rate so far as Borkumabout which he must always be very sensitive isconcerned On the other hand the landing could beeffected under the shields of lighters proof againstmachine-gun bullets and too numerous to be seriouslyaffected by heavy gunfire [ie the fire of heavy guns]and tanks employed in even larger numbers than arehere suggested especially the quick-moving tank andlighter varieties would operate in an area where nopreparations could have been made to receive themThese may be thought new and important favourableconsiderations

In this paper also I had an alternative plan for making anartificial island in the shallow waters of Horn Reef (to thenorthward)

Paragraph 30 One of the methods suggested forinvestigation is as follows A number of flat-bottomedbarges or caissons made not of steel but of concreteshould be prepared in the Humber at Harwich and in


the Wash the Medway and the Thames Thesestructures would be adapted to the depths in whichthey were to be sunk according to a general plan Theywould float when empty of water and thus could betowed across to the site of the artificial island Onarrival at the buoys marking the island sea-cockswould be opened and they would settle down on thebottom They could subsequently be gradually filledwith sand as opportunity served by suction dredgersThese structures would range in size from 50rsquo X 40rsquo X20rsquo to 120rsquo X 80rsquo X 40rsquo By this means a torpedo- andweather-proof harbour like an atoll would be created inthe open sea with regular pens for the destroyers andsubmarines and alighting platforms for aeroplanes

This project if feasible is capable of greatelaboration and it might be applied in various placesConcrete vessels can perhaps be made to carry acomplete heavy-gun turret and these on theadmission of water to their outer chambers would siton the sea floor like the Solent forts at the desiredpoints Other sinkable structures could be made tocontain storerooms oil tanks or living chambers It isnot possible without an expert inquiry to do more herethan indicate the possibilities which embrace nothingless than the creation transportation in piecesassemblement and posing of an artificial island anddestroyer base

31 Such a scheme if found mechanically soundavoids the need of employing troops and all the risks ofstorming a fortified island It could be applied as asurprise for although the construction of these concretevessels would probably be known in Germany thenatural conclusion would be that they were intended foran attempt to block up the river mouths which indeed isan idea notto be excluded Thus until the island orsystem of breakwaters actually began to grow theenemy would not penetrate the design

A yearrsquos preparation would however be required

For nearly a quarter of a century this paper had slumberedin the archives of the Committee of Imperial Defence I did


not print it in The World Crisis of which it was to have beena chapter for reasons of space and because it was neverput into effect This was fortunate because the ideasexpressed were in this war more than ever vital and theGermans certainly read my war books with attentionIndeed a staff study of the writings of anyone in my positionwould be a matter of normal routine The underlyingconceptions of this old paper were deeply imprinted in mymind and in the new emergency formed the foundation ofaction which after a long interval found memorableexpression in the vast fleet of tank-landing craft of 1943 andin the ldquoMulberryrdquo harbours of 1944

On this same not unfertile 6th of June 1940 flushed withthe sense of deliverance and the power to plan ahead Ibegan a long series of Minutes in which the design andconstruction of tank-landing craft was ordered and steadilypressed


6VI40

Further to my Minute of yesterday [dated June 4]about offensive action when the Australians arrive it isa question whether they should not be organised indetachments of 250 equipped with grenades trench-mortars tommy-guns armoured vehicles and the likecapable of acting against an attack in this country butalso capable of landing on the friendly coasts now heldby the enemy We have got to get out of our minds theidea that the Channel ports and all the country betweenthem are enemy territory What arrangements are beingmade for good agents in Denmark Holland Belgiumand along the French coast Enterprises must be


prepared with specially trained troops of the hunterclass who can develop a reign of terror down thesecoasts first of all on the ldquobutcher and boltrdquo policy butlater on or perhaps as soon as we are organised wecould surprise Calais or Boulogne kill and capture theHun garrison and hold the place until all the prepara-tions to reduce it by siege or heavy storm have beenmade and then away The passive-resistance war inwhich we have acquitted ourselves so well must cometo an end I look to the Joint Chiefs of the Staff topropose me measures for a vigorous enterprising andceaseless offensive against the whole German-occupied coastline Tanks and AFVs [ArmouredFighting Vehicles] must be made in flat-bottomed boatsout of which they can crawl ashore do a deep raidinland cutting a vital communication and then backleaving a trail of German corpses behind them It isprobable that when the best troops go on to the attackof Paris only the ordinary German troops of the line willbe left The lives of these must be made an intensetorment The following measures should be taken

1 Proposals for organising the striking companies2 Proposals for transporting and landing tanks on

the beach observing that we are supposed to have thecommand of the sea while the enemy have not

3 A proper system of espionage and intelligencealong the whole coasts

4 Deployment of parachute troops on a scale equalto five thousand

5 Half a dozen of our fifteen-inch guns should belined up [ie with inner tubes] immediately to fire fifty orsixty miles and should be mounted either on railwaymountings or on steel and concrete platforms so as tobreak up the fire of the German guns that will certainlyin less than four months be firing across the Channel

Action in many directions followed accordingly TheldquoStriking Companiesrdquo emerged under the name ofldquoCommandosrdquo ten of which were now raised from theRegular Army and the Royal Marines The nucleus of thisorganisation had begun to take shape in the Norwegian


campaign An account will be given in its proper place ofthe cross-Channel heavy guns I regret however that Iallowed the scale I had proposed for British parachutetroops to be reduced from five thousand to five hundred

I recurred at intervals to the building of landing craft onwhich my mind constantly dwelt both as a peril to us and inthe future a project against the enemy Development ofsmall assault craft had been started before the outbreak ofwar and a few had been employed at Narvik Most of thesehad been lost either there or at Dunkirk Now we requirednot only the small craft which could be lifted in the troop-carrying ships but sea-going vessels capable themselvesof transporting tanks and guns to the assault and landingthem onto the beaches


7VII40

What is being done about designing and planningvessels to transport tanks across the sea for a Britishattack on enemy countries This might well be remittedas a study to Mr Hopkins former Chief Constructor ofthe Navy who must have leisure now that CultivatorNo 61 is out of fashion These must be able to movesix or seven hundred vehicles in one voyage and landthem on the beach or alternatively take them off thebeaches as well of course as landing them on quaysndash if it be possible to combine the two


5VIII40

I asked the other day for a forecast of the develop-ment of the armoured divisions which will be required in


1941 ndash namely five by the end of March and oneadditional every month until a total of ten is reached atthe end of August 1941 and also for the compositionof each division in armoured and ancillary vehicles of allkinds

Pray let me know how far the War Office plans haveproceeded and whether the number of tanks orderedcorresponds with a programme of these dimensions

Let me further have a report on the progress of themeans of transportation overseas which should beadequate to the movement at one moment of twoarmoured divisions Who is doing this ndash Admiralty orMinistry of Supply I suggested that Mr Hopkins mighthave some spare time available


9VIII40

Get me a further report about the designs and typesof vessels to transport armoured vehicles by sea andland on[to] beaches

In July I created a separate Combined OperationsCommand under the Chiefs of Staff for the study andexercise of this form of warfare and Admiral of the Fleet SirRoger Keyes became its chief His close personal contactwith me and with the Defence Office served to overcomeany departmental difficulties arising from this unusualappointment

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay and SirEdward Bridges

17VII40

I have appointed Admiral of the Fleet Sir RogerKeyes as Director of Combined Operations He shouldtake over the duties and resources now assigned toGeneral Bourne General Bourne should be informedthat owing to the larger scope now to be given to these


operations it is essential to have an officer of higherrank in charge and that the change in no way reflectsupon him or those associated with him Evidently he willhave to co-operate effectively I formed a high opinionof this officerrsquos work as Adjutant-General RoyalMarines and in any case the Royal Marines must playa leading part in this organisation

Pending any further arrangements Sir Roger Keyeswill form contact with the Service Departments throughGeneral Ismay as representing the Minister of Defence

I have already explained how smoothly the office of Ministerof Defence came into being and grew in authority At theend of August I took the only formal step which I everfound necessary Hitherto the Joint Planning Committeehad worked under the Chiefs of Staff and looked to them astheir immediate and official superiors I felt it necessary tohave this important though up till now not very effectivebody under my personal control Therefore I asked the WarCabinet to give approval to this definite change in our warmachine This was readily accorded me by all mycolleagues and I gave the following instructions

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay andSir Edward Bridges

24VIII40

The Joint Planning Committee will from Monday nextwork directly under the orders of the Minister ofDefence and will become a part of the Minister ofDefencersquos office ndash formerly the CID SecretariatAccommodation will be found for them at RichmondTerrace They will retain their present positions in andcontacts with the three Service Departments They willwork out the details of such plans as are communicated


to them by the Minister of Defence They may initiateplans of their own after reference to General IsmayThey will of course be at the service of the Chiefs ofStaff Committee for the elaboration of any matters sentto them

2 All plans produced by the Joint PlanningCommittee or elaborated by them under instructions asabove will be referred to the Chiefs of Staff Committeefor their observations

3 Thereafter should doubts and differences exist orin important cases all plans will be reviewed by theDefence Committee of the War Cabinet which willconsist of the Prime Minister the Lord Privy Seal andLord Beaverbrook and the three Service Ministers thethree Chiefs of the Staff with General Ismay being inattendance

4 The Prime Minister assumes the responsibility ofkeeping the War Cabinet informed of what is in handbut the relation of the Chiefs of Staff to the War Cabinetis unaltered

The Chiefs of Staff accepted this change without seriousdemur Sir John Dill however wrote a Minute to theSecretary of State for War on which I was able to reassurehim


31VIII40

There is no question of the Joint Planning Commit-tee ldquosubmitting military advicerdquo to me They are merelyto work out plans in accordance with directions which Ishall give The advice as to whether these plans or anyvariants of them should be adopted will rest as atpresent with the Chiefs of Staff It is quite clear that theChiefs of Staff also have their collective responsibilityfor advising the Cabinet as well as the Prime Minister orMinister of Defence It has not been thought necessary


to make any alteration in their constitutional positionMoreover I propose to work with and through them asheretofore

I have found it necessary to have direct access toand control of the Joint Planning Staffs because after ayear of war I cannot recall a single plan initiated by theexisting machinery I feel sure that I can count uponyou and the other two Service Ministers to help me ingiving a vigorous and positive direction to the conductof the war and in overcoming the dead weight or inertiaand delay which has so far led us to being forestalledon every occasion by the enemy

It will of course be necessary from time to time toincrease the number of the Joint Planning Staffs

In practice the new procedure worked in an easy andagreeable manner and I cannot recall any difficulties whicharose

Henceforth intense energy was imparted to thedevelopment of all types of landing craft and a specialdepartment was formed in the Admiralty to deal with thesematters By October 1940 the trials of the first Landing-Craft Tank (LCT) were in progress Only about thirty ofthese were built as they proved too small An improveddesign followed many of which were built in sections formore convenient transport by sea to the Middle East wherethey began to arrive in the summer of 1941 These provedtheir worth and as we gained experience the capabilities oflater editions of these strange craft steadily improved TheAdmiralty were greatly concerned at the inroads which thisnew form of specialised production might make into theresources of the shipbuilding industry Fortunately it provedthat the building of LCT could be delegated toconstructional engineering firms not engaged in


shipbuilding and thus the labour and plant of the largershipyards need not be disturbed This rendered possiblethe large-scale programme which we contemplated butalso placed a limit on the size of the craftThe LCT was suitable for cross-Channel raidingoperations or for more extended work in the Mediterraneanbut not for long voyages in the open sea The need arosefor a larger more seaworthy vessel which besidestransporting tanks and other vehicles on ocean voyagescould also land them over beaches like the LCT I gavedirections for the design of such a vessel which was firstcalled an ldquoAtlantic LCTrdquo but was soon renamed ldquoLandingShip Tankrdquo (LST) The building of these inevitablyimpinged on the resources of our hard-pressed shipyardsThus of the first design nicknamed in the Admiralty theldquoWinetterdquo only three were built others were ordered in theUnited States and Canada but were superseded by a laterdesign Meanwhile we converted three shallow-drafttankers to serve the same purpose and these too rendereduseful service later onBy the end of 1940 we had a sound conception of thephysical expression of amphibious warfare The productionof specialised craft and equipment of many kinds wasgathering momentum and the necessary formations tohandle all this new material were being developed andtrained under the Combined Operations Command Specialtraining centres for this purpose were established both athome and in the Middle East All these ideas and theirpractical manifestation we presented to our Americanfriends as they took shape The results grew steadily acrossthe years of struggle and thus in good time they formed theapparatus which eventually played an indispensable part inour greatest plans and deeds Our work in this field in theseearlier years had such a profound effect on the future of the


war that I must anticipate events by recording some of thematerial progress which we made laterIn the summer of 1941 the Chiefs of Staff pointed out thatthe programme of landing-craft construction was relatedonly to small-scale operations and that our ultimate returnto the Continent would demand a much greater effort thanwe could then afford By this time the Admiralty hadprepared a new design of the landing ship tank (LST)and this was taken to the United States where the detailswere jointly worked out In February 1942 this vessel wasput into production in America on a massive scale Itbecame the LST(2) which figured so prominently in allour later operations making perhaps the greatest singlecontribution to the solution of the stubborn problem oflanding heavy vehicles over beaches Ultimately over athousand of these were builtMeanwhile the production of small craft of many types foruse in a Continental assault was making steady progresson both sides of the Atlantic All these required transport tothe scene of action in the ships carrying the assaultingtroops Thus an immense conversion programme wasinitiated to fit British and American troopships to carry thesecraft as well as great quantities of other specialisedequipment These ships became known as ldquoLanding ShipsInfantryrdquo (LSI) Some were commissioned into the RoyalNavy others preserved their mercantile status and theirmasters and crews served them with distinction in all ouroffensive operations Such ships could ill be spared fromthe convoys carrying the endless stream of reinforcementsto the Middle East and elsewhere yet this sacrifice had tobe made In 1940 and 1941 our efforts in this field werelimited by the demands of the U-boat struggle Not morethan seven thousand men could be spared for landing-craftproduction up to the end of 1940 nor was this number


greatly exceeded in the following year However by 1944no less than seventy thousand men in Britain alone werededicated to this stupendous task besides much largernumbers in the United States

As all our work in this sphere had a powerful bearing on thefuture of the war I print at this point a telegram which I sentto President Roosevelt in 1941

25VII41We have been considering here our war plans not

only for the fighting of 1942 but also for 1943 Afterproviding for the security of essential bases it isnecessary to plan on the largest scale the forcesneeded for victory In broad outline we must aim first atintensifying the blockade and propaganda Then wemust subject Germany and Italy to a ceaseless andever-growing air bombardment These measures maythemselves produce an internal convulsion or collapseBut plans ought also to be made for coming to the aid of the conquered populations by landing armies ofliberation when opportunity is ripe For this purpose itwill be necessary not only to have great numbers oftanks but also of vessels capable of carrying them andlanding them direct onto beaches It ought not to bedifficult for you to make the necessary adaptation insome of the vast numbers of merchant vessels you arebuilding so as to fit them for tank-landing ships

And a little later

Prime Minister to FirstSea Lord

8IX41

My idea was not that the President should buildWinettes as such apart from any already arranged for


but that out of the great number of merchant vesselsbeing constructed in the United States for 1942 hewould fit out a certain number with bows and side-portsto enable tanks to be landed from them on beaches orinto tank-landing craft which would take them to thebeaches

Please help me to explain this point to him showingwhat kind of alteration would be required in theAmerican merchant ships now projected

In view of the many accounts which are extant andmultiplying of my supposed aversion from any kind of large-scale opposed-landing such as took place in Normandy in1944 it may be convenient if I make it clear that from thevery beginning I provided a great deal of the impulse andauthority for creating the immense apparatus and armadafor the landing of armour on beaches without which it isnow universally recognised that all such major operationswould have been impossible I shall unfold this theme stepby step in these volumes by means of documents written byme at the time which show a true and consistent purposeon my part in harmony with the physical facts and a closecorrespondence with what was actually done


13At Bay July 1940

Can Britain Survive mdash Anxiety in the UnitedStatesmdashResolute Demeanour of the British Nationmdash The Relief of Simplicitymdash Hitlerrsquos Peace OfferJuly 19 mdash Our ResponsemdashGerman DiplomaticApproaches RejectedmdashThe King of SwedenrsquosDeacutemarche mdash I Visit the Threatened CoastsmdashGeneral Montgomery and the Third Division atBrightonmdashThe Importance of Buses mdash MyContacts with General BrookemdashBrooke SucceedsIronside in Command of the Home ArmymdashStimulus of Invasion ExcitementmdashSome Direc-tives and Minutes of JulymdashThe Defence of LondonmdashConditions in the Threatened Coastal ZonesmdashStatistics on the Growth and Equipment of theArmymdashLindemannrsquos DiagramsmdashThe CanadianSecond Division Retrieved from Ice-landmdashNeed toPrevent Enemy Concentration of Shipping in theChannelmdashArrival of the American RiflesmdashSpecialPrecautionsmdashThe French Seventy-FivesmdashTheGrowth of the German Channel BatteriesmdashOurCounter-Measures mdash My Visits to AdmiralRamsay at DovermdashProgress ofOur BatteriesCoaxed and UrgedmdashThe Monitor ldquoErebusrdquomdashTheDefence of the Kentish Promontory mdash BritishHeavy-Gun Concentration SeptembermdashOurRising Strength mdash An Ordeal Averted


IN THESE SUMMER DAYS OF 1940 after the fall of Francewe were all alone None of the British Dominions or India orthe Colonies could send decisive aid or send what theyhad in time The victorious enormous German armiesthoroughly equipped and with large reserves of capturedweapons and arsenals behind them were gathering for thefinal stroke Italy with numerous and imposing forces haddeclared war upon us and eagerly sought our destructionin the Mediterranean and in Egypt In the Far East Japanglared inscrutably and pointedly requested the closing ofthe Burma Road against supplies for China Soviet Russiawas bound to Nazi Germany by her pact and lent importantaid to Hitler in raw materials Spain which had alreadyoccupied the International Zone of Tangier might turnagainst us at any moment and demand Gibraltar or invitethe Germans to help her attack it or mount batteries tohamper passage through the Straits The France of Peacutetainand Bordeaux soon moved to Vichy might any day beforced to declare war upon us What was left at Toulon ofthe French Fleet seemed to be in German power Certainlywe had no lack of foesAfter Oran it became clear to all countries that the BritishGovernment and nation were resolved to fight on to thelast But even if there were no moral weakness in Britainhow could the appalling physical facts be overcome Ourarmies at home were known to be almost unarmed exceptfor rifles There were in fact hardly five hundred field gunsof any sort and hardly two hundred medium or heavy tanksin the whole country Months must pass before our factoriescould make good even the munitions lost at Dunkirk Canone wonder that the world at large was convinced that ourhour of doom had struck


Deep alarm spread through the United States and indeedthrough all the surviving free countries Americans gravelyasked themselves whether it was right to cast away any oftheir own severely limited resources to indulge a generousthough hopeless sentiment Ought they not to strain everynerve and nurse every weapon to remedy their ownunpreparedness It needed a very sure judgment to riseabove these cogent matter-of-fact arguments Thegratitude of the British nation is due to the noble Presidentand his great officers and high advisers for never even inthe advent of the third-term presidential election losing theirconfidence in our fortunes or our willThe buoyant and imperturbable temper of Britain which Ihad the honour to express may well have turned the scaleHere was this people who in the years before the war hadgone to the extreme bounds of pacifism and improvidencewho had indulged in the sport of party politics and whothough so weakly armed had advanced lightheartedly intothe centre of European affairs now confronted with thereckoning alike of their virtuous impulses and neglectfularrangements They were not even dismayed They defiedthe conquerors of Europe They seemed willing to havetheir island reduced to a shambles rather than give in Thiswould make a fine page in history But there were othertales of this kind Athens had been conquered by SpartaThe Carthaginians made a forlorn resistance to Rome Notseldom in the annals of the past ndash and how much moreoften in tragedies never recorded or long-forgotten ndash hadbrave proud easygoing states and even entire racesbeen wiped out so that only their name or even no mentionof them remainsFew British and very few foreigners understood the peculiartechnical advantages of our insular position nor was it


generally known how even in the irresolute years before thewar the essentials of sea and latterly air defence had beenmaintained It was nearly a thousand years since Britainhad seen the fires of a foreign camp on English soil At thesummit of British resistance everyone remained calmcontent to set their lives upon the cast That this was ourmood was gradually recognised by friends and foesthroughout the whole world What was there behind themood That could only be settled by brute force

There was also another aspect One of our greatestdangers during June lay in having our last reserves drawnaway from us into a wasting futile French resistance inFrance and the strength of our air forces gradually worndown by their flights or transference to the Continent IfHitler had been gifted with supernatural wisdom he wouldhave slowed down the attack on the French front makingperhaps a pause of three or four weeks after Dunkirk on theline of the Seine and meanwhile developing hispreparations to invade England Thus he would have had adeadly option and could have tortured us with the hooks ofeither deserting France in her agony or squandering the lastresources for our future existence The more we urged theFrench to fight on the greater was our obligation to aidthem and the more difficult it would have become to makeany preparations for defence in England and above all tokeep in reserve the twenty-five squadrons of fighter aircrafton which all depended On this point we should never havegiven way but the refusal would have been bitterlyresented by our struggling ally and would have poisoned allour relations It was even with an actual sense of relief thatsome of our high commanders addressed themselves toour new and grimly simplified problem As the


commissionaire at one of the Service clubs in London saidto a rather downcast member ldquoAnyhow sir wersquore in theFinal and itrsquos to be played on the Home Groundrdquo

The strength of our position was not even at this dateunderrated by the German High Command Ciano tells howwhen he visited Hitler in Berlin on July 7 1940 he had along conversation with General von Keitel Keitel like Hitlerspoke to him about the attack on England He repeated thatup to the present nothing definite had been decided Heregarded the landing as possible but considered it anldquoextremely difficult operation which must be approachedwith the utmost caution in view of the fact that theintelligence available on the military preparedness of theisland and on the coastal defences is meagre and not veryreliablerdquo1 What would appear to be easy and also essentialwas a major air attack upon the airfields factories and theprincipal communication centres in Great Britain It wasnecessary however to bear in mind that the British AirForce was extremely efficient Keitel calculated that theBritish had about fifteen hundred machines ready fordefence and counter-attack He admitted that recently theoffensive action of the British Air Force had been greatlyintensified Bombing missions were carried out withnoteworthy accuracy and the groups of aircraft whichappeared numbered up to eighty machines at a time Therewas however in England a great shortage of pilots andthose who were now attacking the German cities could notbe replaced by the new pilots who were completelyuntrained Keitel also insisted upon the necessity of strikingat Gibraltar in order to disrupt the British imperial systemNeither Keitel nor Hitler made any reference to the duration


of the war Only Himmler said incidentally that the warought to be finished by the beginning of OctoberSuch was Cianorsquos report He also offered Hitler at ldquotheearnest wish of the Ducerdquo an army of ten divisions and anair component of thirty squadrons to take part in theinvasion The army was politely declined Some of the airsquadrons came but as will be presently related fared ill

On July 19 Hitler delivered his triumphant speech in theReichstag in which after predicting that I would shortlytake refuge in Canada he made what has been called hisPeace Offer The operative sentences were

In this hour I feel it to be my duty before my ownconscience to appeal once more to reason andcommon sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhereI consider myself in a position to make this appealsince I am not a vanquished foe begging favours butthe victor speaking in the name of reason I can see noreason why this war need go on I am grieved to thinkof the sacrifices it must claimhellip Possibly Mr Churchillwill brush aside this statement of mine by saying it ismerely born of fear and doubt of final victory In thatcase I shall have relieved my conscience in regard tothe things to come

This gesture was accompanied during the following days bydiplomatic representations through Sweden the UnitedStates and at the Vatican Naturally Hitler would be veryglad after having subjugated Europe to his will to bring thewar to an end by procuring British acceptance of what hehad done It was in fact an offer not of peace but ofreadiness to accept the surrender by Britain of all she hadentered the war to maintain As the German ChargeacutedrsquoAffaires in Washington had attempted some


communication with our Ambassador there I sent thefollowing telegram

20VII40I do not know whether Lord Halifax is in town today

but Lord Lothian should be told on no account to makeany reply to the German Charge drsquoAffairesrsquo message

My first thought however was a solemn formal debate inboth Houses of Parliament I therefore wrote at the sametime to Mr Chamberlain and Mr Attlee

20VII40It might be worth while meeting Hitlerrsquos speech by

resolutions in both Houses These resolutions shouldbe proposed by private Peers and Members On theother hand the occasion will add to our burdens Whatdo you say

My colleagues thought that this would be making too muchof the matter upon which we were all of one mind It wasdecided instead that the Foreign Secretary should dismissHitlerrsquos gesture in a broadcast On the night of the 22d heldquobrushed asiderdquo Hitlerrsquos ldquosummons to capitulate to his willrdquoHe contrasted Hitlerrsquos picture of Europe with the picture ofthe Europe for which we were fighting and declared thatldquowe shall not stop fighting until Freedom is securerdquo In facthowever the rejection of any idea of a parley had alreadybeen given by the British press and by the BBC withoutany prompting from His Majestyrsquos Government as soon asHitlerrsquos speech was heard over the radioCiano in his account of another meeting with Hitler on July20 observes

The reaction of the English Press to yesterdayrsquosspeech has been such as to allow of no prospect of anunderstanding Hitler is therefore preparing to strike themilitary blow at England He stresses that Germanyrsquos


strategic position as well as her sphere of influenceand of economic control are such as to have alreadygreatly weakened the possibilities of resistance byGreat Britain which will collapse under the first blowsThe air attack already began some days ago and iscontinually growing in intensity The reaction of the anti-aircraft defences and of the British fighters is notseriously hindering the German air attack The decisiveoffensive operation is now being studied since thefullest preparations have been made2

Ciano also records in his diaries that ldquoLate in the evening ofthe 19th when the first cold British reaction to the speecharrived a sense of ill-concealed disappointment spreadamong the Germansrdquo Hitler ldquowould like an understandingwith Great Britain He knows that war with the British will behard and bloody and knows also that people everywhereare averse from bloodshedrdquo Mussolini on the other handldquofears that the English may find in Hitlerrsquos much too cunningspeech a pretext to begin negotiationsrdquoldquoThatrdquo remarksCiano ldquowould be sad for Mussolini because now more thanever he wants warrdquo3 He need not have fretted himself Hewas not to be denied all the war he wantedThere was no doubt continuous German diplomatic activitybehind the scenes and when on August 3 the King ofSweden thought fit to address us on the subject Isuggested to the Foreign Secretary the following replywhich formed the basis of the official answer

On October 12 1939 His Majestyrsquos Governmentdefined at length their position towards German peaceoffers in maturely considered statements to ParliamentSince then a number of new hideous crimes have beencommitted by Nazi Germany against the smaller Statesupon her borders Norway has been overrun and isnow occupied by a German invading army Denmarkhas been seized and pillaged Belgium and Hollandafter all their efforts to placate Herr Hitler and in spite


of all the assurances given to them by the GermanGovernment that their neutrality would be respectedhave been conquered and subjugated In Hollandparticularly acts of long-prepared treachery andbrutality culminated in the massacre of Rotterdamwhere many thousands of Dutchmen were slaughteredand an important part of the city destroyed

These horrible events have darkened the pages ofEuropean history with an indelible stain His MajestyrsquosGovernment see in them not the slightest cause torecede in any way from their principles and resolves asset forth in October 1939 On the contrary theirintention to prosecute the war against Germany byevery means in their power until Hitlerism is finallybroken and the world relieved from the curse which awicked man has brought upon it has been strength-ened to such a point that they would rather all perish inthe common ruin than fail or falter in their duty Theyfirmly believe however that with the help of God theywill not lack the means to discharge their task Thistask may be long but it will always be possible forGermany to ask for an armistice as she did in 1918 orto publish her proposals for peace Before howeverany such requests or proposals could even beconsidered it would be necessary that effectiveguarantees by deeds not words should be forthcomingfrom Germany which would ensure the restoration ofthe free and independent life of CzechoslovakiaPoland Norway Denmark Holland Belgium andabove all France as well as the effectual security ofGreat Britain and the British Empire in a general peace

I addedThe ideas set forth in the Foreign Office memo

appear to me to err in trying to be too clever and toenter into refinements of policy unsuited to the tragicsimplicity and grandeur of the times and the issues atstake At this moment when we have had no sort ofsuccess the slightest opening will be misjudgedIndeed a firm reply of the kind I have outlined is the


only chance of extorting from Germany any offerswhich are not fantastic

On the same day I issued the following statement to thepress

3VIII40The Prime Minister wishes it to be known that the

possibility of German attempts at invasion has by nomeans passed away The fact that the Germans arenow putting about rumours that they do not intend aninvasion should be regarded with a double dose of thesuspicion which attaches to all their utterances Oursense of growing strength and preparedness must notlead to the slightest relaxation of vigilance or moralalertness

At the end of June the Chiefs of Staff through GeneralIsmay had suggested to me at the Cabinet that I shouldvisit the threatened sectors of the east and south coastsAccordingly I devoted a day or two every week to thisagreeable task sleeping when necessary in my train whereI had every facility for carrying on my regular work and wasin constant contact with Whitehall I inspected the Tyne andthe Humber and many possible landing places TheCanadian Division soon to be reinforced to a corps by thedivision sent to Iceland did an exercise for me in Kent Iexamined the landward defences of Harwich and DoverOne of my earliest visits was to the 3d Divisioncommanded by General Montgomery an officer whom Ihad not met before My wife came with me The 3d Divisionwas stationed near Brighton It had been given the highestpriority in re-equipment and had been about to sail forFrance when the French resistance ended General


Montgomeryrsquos headquarters were at Lancing College nearwhich he showed me a small exercise of which the centralfeature was a flanking movement of Bren-gun carriers ofwhich he could at that moment muster only seven or eightAfter this we drove together along the coast throughShoreham and Hove till we came to the familiar Brightonfront of which I had so many schoolboy memories Wedined in the Royal Albion Hotel which stands opposite theend of the pier The hotel was entirely empty a great dealof evacuation having taken place but there were still anumber of people airing themselves on the beaches or theparade I was amused to see a platoon of the GrenadierGuards making a sandbag machine-gun post in one of thekiosks of the pier like those where in my childhood I hadoften admired the antics of the performing fleas It waslovely weather I had very good talks with the General andenjoyed my outing thoroughly However

(Action this Day)Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar

3VII40

I was disturbed to find the 3d Division spread alongthirty miles of coast instead of being as I had imaginedheld back concentrated in reserve ready to moveagainst any serious head of invasion But much moreastonishing was the fact that the infantry of this divisionwhich is otherwise fully mobile are not provided withthe buses necessary to move them to the point ofaction4 This provision of buses waiting always readyand close at hand is essential to all mobile units andto none more than the 3d Division while spread aboutthe coast

I heard the same complaint from Portsmouth that thetroops there had not got their transport ready and close


at hand Considering the great masses of transportboth buses and lorries which there are in this countryand the large numbers of drivers brought back from theBEF it should be possible to remedy thesedeficiencies at once I hope at any rate that the GOC 3d Division will be told today to take up as he wouldlike to do the large number of buses which are evennow plying for pleasure traffic up and down the sea-front at Brighton

In mid-July the Secretary of State for War recommendedthat General Brooke should replace General Ironside incommand of our Home Forces On July 19 in the course ofmy continuous inspection of the invasion sectors I visitedthe Southern Command Some sort of tactical exercise waspresented to me in which no fewer than twelve tanks ()were able to participate All the afternoon I drove withGeneral Brooke who commanded this front His recordstood high Not only had he fought the decisive flank-battlenear Ypres during the retirement to Dunkirk but he hadacquitted himself with singular firmness and dexterity incircumstances of unimaginable difficulty and confusionwhen in command of the new forces we had sent to Franceduring the first three weeks of June I also had a personallink with Alan Brooke through his two gallant brothers ndash thefriends of my early military life5

These connections and memories did not decide myopinion on the grave matters of selection but they formed apersonal foundation upon which my unbroken wartimeassociation with Alan Brooke was maintained and ripenedWe were four hours together in the motor-car on this Julyafternoon 1940 and we seemed to be in agreement on themethods of Home Defence After the necessary


consultations with others I approved the Secretary of Statefor Warrsquos proposal to place Brooke in command of theHome Forces in succession to General Ironside Ironsideaccepted his retirement with the soldierly dignity which onall occasions characterised his actionsDuring the invasion menace for a year and a half Brookeorganised and commanded the Home Armies andthereafter when he had become CIGS we continuedtogether for three and a half years until victory was won Ishall presently narrate the benefits which I derived from hisadvice in the decisive changes of command in Egypt andthe Middle East in August 1942 and also the heavydisappointment which I had to inflict upon him about thecommand of the cross-Channel invasion ldquoOperationOverlordrdquo in 1944 His long tenure as chairman of theChiefs of Staff Committee during the greater part of the warand his work as CIGS enabled him to render services ofthe highest order not only to the British Empire but also tothe Allied Cause These volumes will record occasionaldifferences between us but also an overwhelming measureof agreement and will witness to a friendship which Icherish

Meanwhile we all faced in ever-increasing detail andtenacity the possibility of invasion Some of my Minutesillustrate this process

(Action this Day)



3VII40

I hear from every side of the need for throwing yourmain emphasis on bombing the ships and barges in allthe ports under German control


2VII40

See the letter [on the defence of London] from MrWedgwood MP which is interesting and characteris-tic What is the position about London I have a veryclear view that we should fight every inch of it and thatit would devour quite a large invading army

Prime Minister to MrWedgwood

5VII40

Many thanks for your letters I am hoping to get agreat many more rifles very soon and to continue theprocess of arming the Home Guard (LDV) You mayrest assured that we should fight every street of Londonand its suburbs It would devour an invading armyassuming one ever got so far We hope however todrown the bulk of them in the salt sea

It is curious that the German Army Commander chargedwith the invasion plan used this same word ldquodevourrdquo aboutLondon and determined to avoid it


4VII40

What is being done to encourage and assist thepeople living in threatened seaports to make suitableshelters for themselves in which they could remainduring an invasion Active measures must be takenforthwith Officers or representatives of the local


authority should go round explaining to families that ifthey decide not to leave in accordance with our generaladvice they should remain in the cellars andarrangements should be made to prop up the buildingoverhead They should be assisted in this both withadvice and materials Their gas-masks should beinspected All this must be put actively in operation fromtoday The process will stimulate voluntary evacuationand at the same time make reasonable provision forthose who remain


5VII40

Clear instructions should now be issued about thepeople living in the threatened coastal zones (1) Theyshould be encouraged as much as possible to departvoluntarily both by the pressure of a potentialcompulsory order hanging over them and also by local(not national) propaganda through their RegionalCommissioners or local bodies Those who wish tostay or can find nowhere to go on their own should betold that if invasion impact occurs in their town or villageon the coast they will not be able to leave till the battleis over They should therefore be encouraged andhelped to put their cellars in order so that they havefairly safe places to go to They should be supplied withwhatever form of Anderson shelter is now available (Ihear there are new forms not involving steel) Onlythose who are trustworthy should be allowed to stay Alldoubtful elements should be removed

Pray have precise proposals formulated upon theselines for my approval

Prime Minister toProfessor Lindemann(Copy to GeneralIsmay)

7VII40

I want my ldquoSrdquo Branch to make a chart of all the thirtydivisions showing their progress towards completeequipment Each division would be represented by a


square divided into sections officers and men riflesBren guns Bren-gun carriers anti-tank rifles antitankguns field artillery medium ditto (if any) transportsufficient to secure mobility of all three brigadessimultaneously etc As and when a proportion of thesesubsidiary squares is completed a chart can be paintedred I should like to see this chart every week A similardiagram can be prepared for the Home Guard In thiscase it is only necessary to show rifles and uniforms


7VII40

You shared my astonishment yesterday at thestatement made to us by General McNaughton that thewhole of the 2d Canadian Division was destined forIceland It would surely be a very great mistake to allowthese fine troops to be employed in so distant a theatreApparently the first three battalions have already gonethere No one was told anything about this We requiretwo Canadian divisions to work as a corps as soon aspossible

I am well aware of the arguments about trainingetc but they did not convince me We ought to haveanother thorough re-examination of this point Surely itshould be possible to send second-line Territorialtroops to Iceland where they should fortify themselvesat the key points and then to have say one very high-class battalion of the ldquoGubbinsrdquo type in order to strike atany landing I should be most grateful if you would dealwith this


7VII40

1 I cannot understand how we can tolerate themovement at sea along the French coast of anyvessels without attacking them It is not sufficient surelyto use the air only Destroyers should be sent under airescort Are we really to resign ourselves to the


Germans building up a large armada under our nosesin the Channel and conducting vessels through theStraits of Dover with impunity This is the beginning ofa new and very dangerous threat which must becountered

2 I should be glad of a report not only on the pointsmentioned above but also on the state of our minefieldthere and how it is to be improved Is it true the mineshave become defective after ten months If so severalnew rows should be laid Why should not an effort bemade to lay a minefield by night in the French passageand lie in wait for any craft sent to sweep a channelthrough it We really must not be put off from assertingour sea power by the fact that the Germans are holdingthe French coast If German guns open upon us aheavy ship should be sent to bombard them underproper air protection


During this month of July American weapons inconsiderable quantities were safely brought across theAtlantic This seemed to me so vital that I issued reiteratedinjunctions for care in their transportation and reception


7VII40

I have asked the Admiralty to make very specialarrangements for bringing in your rifle convoys Theyare sending four destroyers far out to meet them andall should arrive during the 9th You can ascertain thehour from the Admiralty I was so glad to hear that youwere making all preparations for the unloading


reception and distribution of these rifles At least onehundred thousand ought to reach the troops that verynight or in the small hours of the following morningSpecial trains should be used to distribute them and theammunition according to a plan worked out beforehandexactly and directed from the landing-port by somehigh officer thoroughly acquainted with it It would seemlikely that you would emphasise early distribution to thecoastal districts so that all the Home Guard in thedanger areas should be the first served Perhaps youwould be good enough to let me know beforehand whatyou decide


8VII40

Have any steps been taken to load the later portionsof American ammunition rifles and guns upon fasterships than was the case last time What are the shipsin which the latest consignments are being packed andwhat are their speeds Will you kindly ascertain thisfrom the Admiralty


27VII40

The great consignments of rifles and guns togetherwith their ammunition which are now approaching thiscountry are entirely on a different level from anythingelse we have transported across the ocean except theCanadian Division itself Do not forget that two hundredthousand rifles mean two hundred thousand men asthe men are waiting for the rifles The convoysapproaching on July 31 are unique and a special effortshould be made to ensure their safe arrival The loss ofthese rifles and field guns would be a disaster of thefirst order

When the ships from America approached our shores withtheir priceless arms special trains were waiting in all theports to receive their cargoes The Home Guard in every


county in every town in every village sat up all through thenights to receive them Men and women worked night andday making them fit for use By the end of July we were anarmed nation so far as parachute or air-borne landingswere concerned We had become a ldquohornetrsquos nestrdquoAnyhow if we had to go down fighting (which I did notanticipate) a lot of our men and some women hadweapons in their hands The arrival of the first instalment ofthe half-million 300 rifles for the Home Guard (albeit withonly about fifty cartridges apiece of which we dared onlyissue ten and no factories yet set in motion) enabled us totransfer three hundred thousand 303 British-type rifles tothe rapidly expanding formations of the Regular ArmyAt the seventy-fives with their thousand rounds apiecesome fastidious experts presently turned their noses upThere were no limbers and no immediate means ofprocuring more ammunition Mixed calibres complicateoperations But I would have none of this and during all1940 and 1941 these nine hundred seventy-fives were agreat addition to our military strength for Home DefenceArrangements were devised and men were drilled to runthem up on planks into lorries for movement When you arefighting for existence any cannon is better than no cannonat all and the French seventy-five although outdated bythe British twenty-five-pounder and the German field gun-howitzer was still a splendid weapon

We had watched with attention the growth of the Germanheavy batteries along the Channel coast during August andSeptember By far the strongest concentration of thisartillery was around Calais and Cape Gris-Nez with theapparent purpose not only of forbidding the Straits to our


warships but also of commanding the shortest route acrossthem We now know that by the middle of September thefollowing batteries were already mounted and ready for usein this region alone

(a) Siegfried battery south of Gris-Nez with four 38-cm guns(b) Friedrich-August battery north of Boulogne withthree 305-cm guns(c) Grosser Kurfuerst battery at Gris-Nez with four 28-cm guns(d) Prinz Heinrich battery between Calais and Blanc-Ncz with two 28-cm guns(e) Oldenburg battery east of Calais with two 24-cmguns(f) M1 M2 M3 M4 batteries in the sector of Gris-Nez ndash Calais with a total of 14 17-cm guns

Besides this no fewer than thirty-five heavy and mediumbatteries of the German Army as well as seven batteries ofcaptured guns were sited along the French coast fordefensive purposes by the end of AugustThe orders which I had given in June for arming the Doverpromontory with guns that could fire across the Channelhad borne fruit though not on the same scale I took apersonal interest in the whole of this business I visitedDover several times in these anxious summer months Inthe citadel of the castle large underground galleries andchambers had been cut in the chalk and there was a widebalcony from which on clear days the shores of Francenow in the hands of the enemy could be seen AdmiralRamsay who commanded was a friend of mine He wasthe son of a colonel of the 4th Hussars under whom I had


served in my youth and I had often seen him as a child onthe Barrack Square at Aldershot When three years beforethe war he had resigned his position as Chief of the Staff tothe Home Fleet through a difference with its Commander-in-Chief it was to me that he had come to seek advice I hadlong talks with him and together with the Dover FortressCommander visited our rapidly improving defencesI carefully studied there and at home the Intelligencereports which almost daily showed the progress of theGerman batteries The series of Minutes which I dictatedabout the Dover guns during August show my very greatdesire to break up some of the heaviest battery-sites beforetheir guns could reply I certainly thought this ought to havebeen done in August as we had at least three of the veryheaviest guns capable of firing across the Channel Lateron the Germans became too strong for us to court a duel


3VIII40

1 The fourteen-inch gun I ordered to be mounted atDover should be ready in ample time to deal with thisnew German battery It certainly should not fire until allthe guns are in position The plan for the shoot mayhowever now be made and I should like to know whatarrangements for spotting aircraft protected by Fightersin strength will be prepared for that joyous occasionAlso when the two guns 135rsquos on railway mountingswill be ready and whether they can reach the targetmentioned Several other camouflaged guns should beput up at various points with arrangements to makesuitable flashes smoke and dust Let me know whatarrangements can be devised I presume work on therailway extensions for the 135rsquos is already in handPlease report


2 The movement of the German warshipssouthward to Kiel creates a somewhat differentsituation from that dealt with in C-in-C Home Fleetrsquosappreciation asked for some time ago about aninvasion across the narrow waters supported by heavyships The Admiralty should be asked whether C-in-Crsquos attention should not be drawn to the altereddispositions of the enemy in case he has anythingfurther to say


8VIII40

I am impressed by the speed and efficiency withwhich the emplacement for the fourteen-inch gun atDover has been prepared and the gun itself mountedWill you tell all those who have helped in thisachievement how much I appreciate the sterling effortthey have made

The enemy batteries first opened fire on August 22engaging a convoy without effect and later firing onDover They were replied to by one of our fourteen-inchguns which was now in action Thenceforward therewere artillery duels at irregular intervals Dover wasengaged six times in September the heaviest daybeing September 9 when over a hundred and fiftyshells were fired Very little damage was done toconvoys


25VIII40

I shall be much obliged if you will make proposals fora shoot by Erebus6 against the German batteries atGris-Nez I was very glad to hear you thought thispracticable It is most desirable There is no reason whyit should wait for the railway guns though of course ifthey were ready they could follow on with the fourteen-inch at daybreak We ought to smash these batteries Ihope we have not got to wait for the next moon for


Erebus and I shall be glad to know what are the moon-conditions which you deem favourable

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay and COS Committee

27VIII40

It would not seem unreasonable that the enemyshould attempt gradually to master the Doverpromontory and command the Channel at its narrowestpoint This would be a natural preliminary to invasion Itwould give occasion for continued fighting with our AirForce in the hope of exhausting them by numbers Itwould tend to drive our warships from all the Channelbases The concentration of many batteries on theFrench coast must be expected What are we doing indefence of the Dover promontory by heavy artilleryTen weeks ago I asked for heavy guns One has beenmounted Two railway guns are expected Now we aretold these will be very inaccurate on account of super-charging We ought to have a good many more heavyguns lined up inside to smaller calibre with stiffer riflingand a range of at least fifty miles and firing at twenty-five or thirty miles would then become more accurate Ido not understand why I have not yet receivedproposals on this subject We must insist uponmaintaining superior artillery positions on the Doverpromontory no matter what form of attack they areexposed to We have to fight for the command of theStraits by artillery to destroy the enemyrsquos batteries andto multiply and fortify our own

I have sent on other papers a request for a surpriseattack by Erebus which should be able to destroy thebatteries at Gris-Nez She has an armoured deckagainst air-bombing What is being done about thisWhen is she going into action The Air Ministry shouldof course co-operate The operation would take anoffensive turn We should require spotting aircraft byday It may be that the first squadrons of Hurricanesfitted with Merlin 20 would be the best for this If Erebusis attacked from the air she should be stronglydefended and action sought with the enemy air force


Pray let me have your plans


30VIII40

Further to my previous Minute on defence of theKentish promontory we must expect that very powerfulbatteries in great numbers will be rapidly brought intobeing on the French coast It would be a naturalthought for the Germans to try to dominate the Straitsby artillery At present we are ahead of them with ourfourteen-inch and two 135 railway guns The Admiralat Dover should be furnished in addition as soon aspossible with a large number of the most modern six-inch or eight-inch guns I understand the Admiralty isconsidering taking guns from [HMS] Newcastle orGlasgow which are under long repair A recordevolution should be made of getting one or two of theseturrets mounted Report to me about this and datesThere is a 92 Army experimental gun and mountingand surely we have some twelve-inch on railwaymountings If our ships cannot use the Straits theenemy must not be able to Even if guns cannot fireonto the French shore they are none the less veryvaluable

Some of our heavy artillery ndash the eighteen-inchhowitzer and the 92rsquos ndash should be planted in positionswhence they could deny the ports and landings to theenemy and as CIGS mentioned support the counter-attack which would be launched against any attemptedbridgehead Much of this mass of artillery I saved fromthe last war has done nothing and has been underreconditioning for a whole year

Let me have a good programme for using it tosupport counter-strokes and deny landings both northand south of the Thames Farther north I have seenalready some very good heavy batteries

I should like also to be informed of the real [actual]lines of defence drawn up between Dover and Londonand Harwich and London Now that the coast isfinished there is no reason why we should not develop


these lines which in no way detract from the principleof vehement counter-attack

But the most urgent matter is one or two modern six-inch to shoot all German craft up to thirty-five thousandyards

I am also endeavouring to obtain from United Statesat least a pair of their sixteen-inch coast-defenceweapons These fire forty-five thousand yards throwinga ton and a quarter without being super-charged Theyshould therefore be very accurate General StrongUnited States Army mentioned this to me as apromising line He thought without committing hisGovernment that the United States Army might beprepared to take a couple of these guns and theircarriages away from some of their twin batteries

Let me know all details about these guns It ought tobe possible to make the concrete foundation in threemonths and I expect it would take as long to get theseguns over here There are very few ships that can carrythem on their decks

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay andFirst Sea Lord

31VIII40

It becomes particularly urgent to attack the batterieson the French shore Yesterdayrsquos photographs showguns being actually hoisted up into position and it willbe wise to fire on them before they are able to replyThere are quite enough guns in position already I trusttherefore Erebus will not be delayed as every day ourtask will become harder

It seems most necessary to damage and delay thedevelopment of the hostile batteries in view of the factthat we are so far behindhand with our own

At the beginning of September our heavy-gun strengthtowards the sea was


Pre-War Coast Defence92-inch two6-inch sixRecent Additions14-inch (Naval) one92-inch two (railway mountings)6-inch (Naval) two4-inch (Naval) two

These were soon to be further reinforced by two 135-inchguns from the old battleship Iron Duke which were beingerected on railway mountings and a battery of four 55-inchguns from HMS Hood Many of these additional gunswere manned by the Royal Navy and Royal MarinesAlthough still inferior in numbers to the enemy we thus hada powerful fire concentrationIn addition one of the eighteen-inch howitzers I had savedafter the First World War and twelve twelve-inch howitzerswere installed for engaging enemy landings All these weremobile and would have brought a terrible fire on anylanding-area

As the months of July and August passed without anydisaster we settled ourselves down with increasingassurance that we could make a long and hard fight Ourgains of strength were borne in upon us from day to dayThe entire population laboured to the last limit of itsstrength and felt rewarded when they fell asleep after theirtoil or vigil by a growing sense that we should have timeand that we should win All the beaches now bristled with


defences of various kinds The whole country wasorganised in defensive localities The factories poured outtheir weapons By the end of August we had over twohundred and fifty new tanks The fruits of the American ldquoActof Faithrdquo had been gathered The whole trainedprofessional British Army and its Territorial comrades drilledand exercised from morn till night and longed to meet thefoe The Home Guard overtopped the million mark andwhen rifles were lacking grasped lustily the shotgun thesporting rifle the private pistol or when there was nofirearm the pike and the club No Fifth Column existed inBritain though a few spies were carefully rounded up andexamined What few Communists there were lay lowEveryone else gave all they had to giveWhen Ribbentrop visited Rome in September he said toCiano ldquoThe English Territorial defence is non-existent Asingle German division will suffice to bring about acomplete collapserdquo This merely shows his ignorance Ihave often wondered however what would have happenedif two hundred thousand German storm troops had actuallyestablished themselves ashore The massacre would havebeen on both sides grim and great There would have beenneither mercy nor quarter They would have used terrorand we were prepared to go all lengths I intended to usethe slogan ldquoYou can always take one with yourdquo I evencalculated that the horrors of such a scene would in the lastresort turn the scale in the United States But none of theseemotions was put to the proof Far out on the grey waters ofthe North Sea and the Channel coursed and patrolled thefaithful eager flotillas peering through the night High in theair soared the fighter pilots or waited serene at a momentrsquosnotice around their excellent machines This was a timewhen it was equally good to live or die


14The Invasion Problem

Former Studies of Invasion mdash The New Air Powermdash My Statement to Parliament of June 18 mdashTheFirst Rumours June 27 1940 mdashMy Note of June28 mdashMy Note on ldquoInvasionrdquo of July 10 mdashImpor-tance of Mobile ReservesmdashTwo Thousand Milesof British Coastline mdash The First Sea LordrsquosMemorandum mdash Distribution of Potential AttackmdashIDouble His Estimate for SafetymdashMy Minute ofAugust 5 1940 mdashMy Suggested Distribution ofOur Army mdash Coincidence of Chiefs of Staff Viewmdash Our Emphasis on East Coast mdash The GermansChoose the South Coast mdash We Turn Our Front mdashChange in Our Dispositions Between August andSeptember mdash Persisting Dangers from Across theNorth Sea mdash Tension in July and August

AFTER DUNKIRK and still more when three weeks later theFrench Government capitulated the questions whetherHitler would or secondly could invade and conquer ourisland rose as we have seen in all British minds I was nonovice at this problem As First Lord I had for three yearsbefore the First Great War taken part in all the discussionsof the Committee of Imperial Defence upon the point Onbehalf of the Admiralty I had always argued that at least twodivisions out of our Expeditionary Force of six should bekept at home until the Territorial Army and other wartimeforces became militarily effective As Admiral ldquoTugrdquo Wilson


put it ldquoThe Navy cannot play international football without agoal-keeperrdquo However when at the outbreak of that warwe found ourselves with the Navy fully mobilised the GrandFleet safe beyond hostile ken at sea all surprisestreacheries and accidents left behind us we felt ourselvesable at the Admiralty to be better than our word At theextraordinary meeting of Ministers and high militaryauthorities which Mr Asquith summoned to the CabinetRoom on August 5 1914 I declared formally with the fullagreement of the First Sea Lord (Prince Louis ofBattenberg) that the Navy would guarantee the protectionof the island against invasion or serious raid even if all theRegular troops were immediately sent to the great battleimpending in France So far as we were concerned thewhole Army could go In the course of the first six weeks allthe six divisions wentSea-power when properly understood is a wonderful thingThe passage of an army across salt water in the face ofsuperior fleets and flotillas is an almost impossible featSteam had added enormously to the power of the Navy todefend Great Britain In Napoleonrsquos day the same windwhich would carry his flat-bottomed boats across theChannel from Boulogne would drive away our blockadingsquadrons But everything that had happened since thenhad magnified the power of the superior navy to destroy theinvaders in transit Every complication which modernapparatus had added to armies made their voyage morecumbrous and perilous and the difficulties of theirmaintenance when landed probably insuperable At thatformer crisis in our island fortunes we possessed superiorand as it proved ample sea-power The enemy wasunable to gain a major sea battle against us He could notface our cruiser forces In flotillas and light craft weoutnumbered him tenfold Against this must be set the


incalculable chances of weather particularly fog But even ifthis were adverse and a descent were effected at one ormore points the problem of maintaining a hostile line ofcommunication and of nourishing any lodgments remainedunsolved Such was the position in the First Great WarBut now there was the air What effect had this sovereigndevelopment produced upon the invasion problemEvidently if the enemy could dominate the narrow seas onboth sides of the Straits of Dover by superior air power thelosses of our flotillas would be very heavy and mighteventually be fatal No one would wish except on asupreme occasion to bring heavy battleships or largecruisers into waters commanded by the German bombersWe did not in fact station any capital ships south of theForth or east of Plymouth But from Harwich the NoreDover Portsmouth and Portland we maintained a tirelessvigilant patrol of light fighting vessels which steadilyincreased in number By September they exceeded eighthundred which only a hostile air power could destroy andthen only by degreesBut who had the power in the air In the Battle of Francewe had fought the Germans at two and three to one andinflicted losses in similar proportion Over Dunkirk wherewe had to maintain continuous patrol to cover the escape ofthe Army we had fought at four or five to one with successand profit Over our own waters and exposed coasts andcounties Air Chief Marshal Dowding contemplated profitablefighting at seven or eight to one The strength of theGerman Air Force at this time taken as a whole so far aswe knew ndash and we were well informed ndash apart fromparticular concentrations was about three to one Althoughthese were heavy odds at which to fight the brave andefficient German foe I rested upon the conclusion that inour own air over our own country and its waters we could


beat the German Air Force And if this were true our navalpower would continue to rule the seas and oceans andwould destroy all enemies who set their course towards usThere was of course a third potential factor Had theGermans with their renowned thoroughness and foresightsecretly prepared a vast armada of special landing craftwhich needed no harbours or quays but could land tankscannon and motor-vehicles anywhere on the beaches andwhich thereafter could supply the landed troops As hadbeen shown such ideas had risen in my mind long ago in1917 and were now being actually developed as the resultof my directions We had however no reason to believethat anything of this kind existed in Germany though it isalways best when counting the cost not to exclude theworst It took us four years of intense effort and experimentand immense material aid from the United States to providesuch equipment on a scale equal to the Normandy landingMuch less would have sufficed the Germans at thismoment But they had only a few Siebel ferriesThus the invasion of England in the summer and autumn of1940 required from Germany local naval superiority and airsuperiority and immense special fleets and landing craftBut it was we who had the naval superiority it was we whoconquered the mastery in the air and finally we believedas we now know rightly that they had not built or conceivedany special craft These were the foundations of my thoughtabout invasion in 1940 from which I gave from day to daythe instructions and directives which these chapters contain

I laid the broad outlines plainly before Parliament on June18


The Navy has never pretended to be able to preventraids by bodies of five or ten thousand men flungsuddenly across and thrown ashore at several pointson the coast some dark night or foggy morning Theefficacy of sea-power especially under modernconditions depends upon the invading force being oflarge size It has to be of large size in view of ourmilitary strength to be of any use If it is of large sizethen the Navy have something they can find and meetand as it were bite on Now we must remember thateven five divisions however lightly equipped wouldrequire two hundred to two hundred and fifty ships andwith modern air reconnaissance and photography itwould not be easy to collect such an armada marshalit and conduct it across the sea with any powerfulnaval forces to escort it and there would be very greatpossibilities to put it mildly that this armada would beintercepted long before it reached the coast and all themen drowned in the sea or at the worst blown topieces with their equipment while trying to land

As early as the end of June some reports indicated that theenemyrsquos plans might include the Channel and Iimmediately called for inquiry


27VI40

It seems difficult to believe that any large force oftransports could be brought to the Channel portswithout our being aware of it or that any system ofmining would prevent our sweepers from clearing a wayfor attack on such transports on passage However itwould be well if the Chiefs of the Staff gave theirattention to this rumour


Anyhow the possibility of a cross-Channel invasionimprobable though it was at that time had to be mostclosely examined I was not entirely satisfied with themilitary dispositions It was imperative that the Army shouldknow the exact task assigned to it and above all should notfritter away strength in a sedentary dispersion along thethreatened coasts or exhaust the national resources bymanning unduly all the coasts Therefore I wrote


28VI40

Note by the Prime Minister to COS Committee1 See papers by Vice-Chiefs of Staff and further

papers by COS Committee2 It is prudent to block off likely sections of the

beaches with a good defence and to make secure allcreeks and harbours on the east coast The south coastis less immediately dangerous No serious invasion ispossible without a harbour with its quays etc No onecan tell should the Navy fail on what part of the eastcoast the impact will fall Perhaps there will be severallodgments Once these are made all troops employedon other parts of the coastal crust will be as useless asthose in the Maginot Line Although fighting on thebeaches is favourable to the defence this advantagecannot be purchased by trying to guard all the beachesThe process must be selective But if time permitsdefended sectors may be widened and improved

3 Every effort should be made to man coastdefences with sedentary troops well sprinkled withexperienced late-war officers The safety of the countrydepends [however] on having a large number (now onlynine but should soon be fifteen) ldquoLeopardrdquo brigadegroups which can be directed swiftly ie within fourhours to the points of lodgment Difficulties of landingon beaches are serious even when the invader hasreached them but difficulties of nourishing a lodgment


when exposed to heavy attack by land air and sea arefar greater All therefore depends on rapid resoluteengagement of any landed forces which may slipthrough the sea-control This should not be beyond ourmeans provided the field troops are not consumed inbeach defences and are kept in a high condition ofmobility crouched and ready to spring

4 In the unhappy event of the enemy capturing aport larger formations with artillery will be necessaryThere should be four or five good divisions held ingeneral reserve to deal with such an improbablemisfortune The scale of lodgment to be anticipatedshould be not more than ten thousand men landed atthree points simultaneously ndash say thirty thousand in allthe scale of air attack not more than fifteen thousandlanded simultaneously at two or three points in all Theenemy will not have strength to repeat such descentsoften It is very doubtful whether air-borne troops canbe landed in force by night by day they should be aneasy prey [to our Air Force]

5 The tank story is somewhat different and it isright to minimise by local cannon and obstacles thelanding places of tanks The Admiralty should reportupon the size character and speed of potential tank-carrying barges or floats whether they will be self-propelled or towed and by what craft As they canhardly go above seven miles an hour they should bedetected in summertime after they have started andeven in fog or haze the RDF stations should givewarning while they are still several hours from land Thedestroyers issuing from the sally-ports must strike atthese with gusto The arrangement of stops and blocksheld by local sedentary forces should be steadilydeveloped and anti-tank squads formed Our own tankreserve must engage the surviving invader tanks andno doubt it is held in a position which allows swift railing[transport by rail] to the attacked area

6 Parachutists Fifth-Columnists and enemy motor-cyclists who may penetrate or appear in disguise inunexpected places must be left to the Home Guardreinforced by special squads Much thought must begiven to the [enemy] trick of wearing British uniform


7 In general I find myself in agreement with theCommander-in-Chiefrsquos plan but all possible field troopsmust be saved from the beaches and gathered into theldquoLeopardrdquo brigades and other immediate mobilesupports Emphasis should be laid upon the mainreserve The battle will be won or lost not on thebeaches but by the mobile brigades and the mainreserve Until the Air Force is worn down by prolongedair fighting and destruction of aircraft supply the powerof the Navy remains decisive against any seriousinvasion

8 The above observations apply only to theimmediate summer months We must be much betterequipped and stronger before the autumn

In July there was growing talk and anxiety on the subjectboth inside the British Government and at large In spite ofceaseless reconnaissance and all the advantages of airphotography no evidence had yet reached us of largeassemblies of transport in the Baltic or in the Rhine orScheldt harbours and we were sure that no movementeither of shipping or self-propelled barges through theStraits into the Channel had taken place Neverthelesspreparation to resist invasion was the supreme task beforeus all and intense thought was devoted to it throughout ourwar circle and Home Command

INVASION


Prime Minister to C-in-C Home ForcesCIGS and GeneralIsmay

10VII40

I find it very difficult to visualise the kind of invasionall along the coast by troops carried in small craft andeven in boats I have not seen any serious evidence oflarge masses of this class of craft being assembled


and except in very narrow waters it would be a mosthazardous and even suicidal operation to commit alarge army to the accidents of the sea in the teeth ofour very numerous armed patrolling forces TheAdmiralty have over a thousand armed patrollingvessels of which two or three hundred are always atsea the whole being well manned by competentseafaring men A surprise crossing should beimpossible and in the broader parts of the North Seathe invaders should be an easy prey as part of theirvoyage would be made by daylight Behind thesepatrolling craft are the flotillas of destroyers of whichforty destroyers are now disposed between the Humberand Portsmouth the bulk being in the narrowestwaters The greater part of these are at sea every nightand rest in the day They would therefore probablyencounter the enemy vessels in transit during the nightbut also could reach any landing point or points on thefront mentioned in two or three hours They couldimmediately break up the landing craft interrupt thelanding and fire upon the landed troops who howeverlightly equipped would have to have some proportionof ammunition and equipment carried onto the beachesfrom their boats The flotillas would however needstrong air support from our fighter aircraft during theirintervention from dawn onward The provision of the air-fighter escort for our destroyers after daybreak isessential to their most powerful intervention on thebeaches

2 You should see the Commander-in-Chiefrsquos (HomeFleet) reply to the question put to him by the desire ofthe Cabinet ie what happens if the enemy cover thepassage of their invading army with their heavywarships The answer is that as far as we know atpresent they have no heavy ships not under long repairexcept those at Trondheim1 which are closely watchedby our very largely superior forces When the Nelsonand Barham are worked up after refit in a few daysrsquotime (the 13th and 16th) it would be easily possible tomake two forces of British heavy ships either of whichwould be sufficiently strong thus the danger of a


northern outbreak could be contained and at the sametime a dart to the south by the Trondheim ships couldbe rapidly countered Moreover the cruisers in theThames and Humber are themselves strong enoughwith the flotillas to attack effectively any light cruiserswith which the enemy could cover an invasion I feeltherefore that it will be very difficult for the enemy toplace large well-equipped bodies of troops on the eastcoast of England whether in formed bodies or flungpiecemeal on the beaches as they get across Evengreater difficulties would attend expeditions in largervessels seeking to break out to the northward It mayfurther be added that at present there are no signs ofany assemblies of ships or small craft sufficient tocause anxiety except perhaps in Baltic ports Frequentreconnaissance by the air and the constant watching byour submarines should give timely warning and ourminefields are an additional obstruction

3 Even more unlikely is it that the south coast wouldbe attacked We know that no great mass of shippingexists in the French ports and that the numbers ofsmall boats there are not great The Dover barrage isbeing replenished and extended to the French shoreThis measure is of the utmost consequence and theAdmiralty are being asked to press it forward constantlyand rapidly They do not think that any importantvessels warships or transports have come through theStraits of Dover Therefore I find it difficult to believethat the south coast is in serious danger at the presenttime Of course a small raid might be made uponIreland from Brest But this also would be dangerous tothe raiders while at sea

4 The main danger is from the Dutch and Germanharbours which bear principally upon the coast fromDover to the Wash As the nights lengthen this dangerzone will extend northward but then again theweather becomes adverse and the ldquofishing-boatinvasionrdquo far more difficult Moreover with cloud theenemy air support may be lacking at the moment of hisimpact

5 I hope therefore relying on the above reasoningwhich should be checked with the Admiralty that you


will be able to bring an ever larger proportion of yourformed divisions back from the coast into support orreserve so that their training may proceed in thehighest forms of offensive warfare and counter-attackand that the coast as it becomes fortified will beincreasingly confided to troops other than those of theformed divisions and also to the Home Guard I amsure you will be in agreement with this view in principleand the only question open would be the speed of thetransformation Here too I hope we shall be agreedthat the utmost speed shall rule

6 Air-borne attack is not dealt with in this note Itdoes not alter its conclusions

It will be noted that my advisers and I deemed the eastcoast more likely to be attacked during July and Augustthan the south coast There was in fact no chance of eitherassault during these two months As will presently bedescribed the German plan was to invade across theChannel with medium ships (four thousand to five thousandtons) and small craft and we now know that they never hadany hope or intention of moving an army from the Baltic andNorth Sea ports in large transports still less did they makeany plans for an invasion from the Biscay ports This doesnot mean that in choosing the south coast as their targetthey were thinking rightly and we wrongly The east-coastinvasion was by far the more formidable if the enemy hadhad the means to attempt it There could of course be nosouth-coast invasion unless or until the necessary shippinghad passed southward through the Straits of Dover and hadbeen assembled in the French Channel ports Of thisduring July there was no signWe had nonetheless to prepare against all variants and yetat the same time avoid the dispersion of our mobile forces


and to gather reserves This nice and difficult problem couldonly be solved in relation to the news and events from weekto week The British coastline indented with innumerableinlets is over two thousand miles in circumference withoutincluding Ireland The only way of defending so vast aperimeter any part or parts of which may be simultaneouslyor successively attacked is by lines of observation andresistance around the coast or frontiers with the object ofdelaying an enemy and meanwhile creating the largestpossible reserves of highly trained mobile troops sodisposed as to be able to reach any point assailed in theshortest time for strong counter-attack When in the lastphases of the war Hitler found himself encircled andconfronted with a similar problem he made as we shallsee the gravest possible mistakes in handling it He hadcreated a spiderrsquos web of communications but he forgot thespider With the example of the unsound Frenchdispositions for which such a fatal penalty had just beenexacted fresh in our memories we did not forget the ldquomassof manoeuvrerdquo and I ceaselessly inculcated this policy tothe utmost extent that our growing resources would allowThe views in my paper of July 10 were in general harmonywith Admiralty thought and two days later Admiral Poundsent me a full and careful statement which he and theNaval Staff had drawn up in pursuance of it Naturally andproperly the dangers we had to meet were forcefully statedBut in summing up Admiral Pound said

It appears probable that a total of some hundredthousand men might reach these shores without beingintercepted by naval forces hellip but the maintenance oftheir line of supply unless the German Air Force hadovercome both our Air Force and our Navy seemspractically impossiblehellip If the enemy undertook thisoperation he would do so in the hope that he could


make a quick rush on London living on the country ashe went and force the Government to capitulate

The First Sea Lord divided the hundred-thousand maximumfigure both as to enemy ports of departure and the possibleimpact on our coasts as in the following table

I was content with this estimate As the enemy could notbring heavy weapons with them and would speedily havethe supply lines of any lodgments cut the invading strengthseemed even in July to be well within the capacity of ourrapidly improving army I remitted the two documents to theStaffs and Home Command

MIINUTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

15VII40The Chiefs of Staff and Home Defence should

consider these papers The First Sea Lordrsquos memoran-dum may be taken as a working basis and although Ipersonally believe that the Admiralty will in fact bebetter than their word and that the invadersrsquo losses intransit would further reduce the scale of attack yet thepreparations of the land forces should be such as tomake assurance doubly sure Indeed for the landforces the scale of attack might well be doublednamely 200000 men distributed as suggested [ie inthe proportion suggested] by the First Sea Lord OurHome Army is already at a strength when it should beable to deal with such an invasion and its strength israpidly increasing

I should be very glad if our plans to meet invasionon shore could be reviewed on this basis so that theCabinet may be informed of any modifications It should


be borne in mind that although the heaviest attackwould seem likely to fall in the north yet the sovereignimportance of London and the narrowness of the seasin this quarter make the south the theatre where thegreatest precautions must be taken

There was general acceptance of this basis and for thenext few weeks we proceeded upon it Upon the action tobe taken by our main Fleet in the narrow waters preciseorders were issued with which I was in full agreement OnJuly 20 after considerable discussion with Admiral Forbesthe Commander-in-Chief the following decisions werepromulgated by the Admiralty

(1) Their Lordships do not expect our heavy ships togo south to break up an expedition landing on our coastin the absence of any reports indicating the presence ofenemy heavy ships

(2) If enemy heavy ships support an expeditionaccepting the risks involved in an approach to our coastin the southern part of the North Sea then it is essentialthat our heavy ships should move south against themalso accepting risks

In order to reach more definite conclusions about thevarying probabilities and scales of attack on our extendedcoastline so as to avoid undue spreading of our forces Isent the Chiefs of the Staff a further Minute early in August


MINUTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OFDEFENCE

5VIII40Bearing in mind the immense cost in war energy and

the disadvantages of attempting to defend the wholecoast of Great Britain and the dangers of being undulycommitted to systems of passive defence I should beglad if the following notes could be borne in mind


1 Our first line of defence against invasion must beas ever the enemyrsquos ports Air reconnaissancesubmarine watching and other means of obtaininginformation should be followed by resolute attacks withall our forces available and suitable upon anyconcentrations of enemy shipping

2 Our second line of defence is the vigilantpatrolling of the sea to intercept any invadingexpedition and to destroy it in transit

3 Our third line is the counter-attack upon theenemy when he makes any landfall and particularlywhile he is engaged in the act of landing This attackwhich has long been ready from the sea must bereinforced by air action and both sea and air attacksmust be continued so that it becomes impossible for theinvader to nourish his lodgments

4 The land defences and the Home Army aremaintained primarily for the purpose of making theenemy come in such large numbers as to afford aproper target to the sea and air forces abovementioned and to make hostile preparations andmovements noticeable to air and other forms ofreconnaissance

5 However should the enemy succeed in landing atvarious points he should be made to suffer as much aspossible by local resistance on the beaches combinedwith the aforesaid attack from the sea and the air Thisforces him to use up his ammunition and confines himto a limited area The defence of any part of the coastmust be measured not by the forces on the coast butby the number of hours within which strong counter-attacks by mobile troops can be brought to bear uponthe landing places Such attacks should be hurled withthe utmost speed and fury upon the enemy at hisweakest moment which is not as is sometimessuggested when actually getting out of his boats butwhen sprawled upon the shore with his communica-tions cut and his supplies running short It ought to bepossible to concentrate ten thousand men fullyequipped within six hours and twenty thousand menwithin twelve hours upon any point where a seriouslodgment has been effected The withholding of the


reserves until the full gravity of the attack is known is anice problem for the Home Command

6 It must be admitted that the task of the Navy andAir Force in preventing invasion becomes more difficultin the Narrow Seas namely from the Wash to DoverThis sector of the coast front is also nearest to thesupreme enemy objective London The sector fromDover to Landrsquos End is far less menaced because theNavy and Air Force must make sure that no mass ofshipping still less protecting warships can be passedinto the French Channel ports At present the scale ofattack on this wide front is estimated by the Admiralty atno more than five thousand men2 Doubling this forgreater security it should be possible to make goodarrangements for speedy counter-attack in superiornumbers and at the same time to achieve largeeconomies of force on this southern sector in which thebeach troops should be at their minimum and themobile reserves at their maximum These mobilereserves must be available to move to the southeasternsectors at short notice Evidently this situation can bejudged only from week to week

7 When we come to the west coast of Britain a newset of conditions rules The enemy must commit himselfto the broad seas and there will be plenty of time if hisapproach is detected to attack him with cruisers andflotillas The Admiralty dispositions should conform tothis need The enemy has at present no warships toescort him Should we for instance care to sendtwelve thousand men unescorted in merchant ships toland on the Norwegian coast or in the Skagerrak andKattegat in face of superior sea-power and air-powerIt would be thought madness

8 However to make assurance triply sure theAdmiralty should pursue their plan of laying a strongminefield from Cornwall to Ireland covering the BristolChannel and the Irish Sea from southward attack Thisminefield is all the more necessary now that by theadoption of the northabout route for commerce we havetransferred a large part of our patrolling craft from the


[south-]western approaches which have becomepermanently more empty and un-watched

9 The establishment of this minefield will simplifyand mitigate all questions of local defence north of itspoint of contact with Cornwall We must consider thissector from Cornwall to the Mull of Cantyre as the leastvulnerable to sea-borne invasion Here the works ofdefence should be confined to guarding by a few gunsor land torpedo tubes the principal harbours and givinga moderate scale of protection to their gorges3 It is notadmissible to lavish our limited resources upon thissector

10 North of the Mull of Cantyre to Scapa Flow theShetlands and the Faroes all lies in the orbit of themain Fleet The voyage of an expedition from theNorwegian coast would be very hazardous and itsarrival anywhere right round to Cromarty Firth would notraise immediately decisive issues The enemy who isnow crouched would then be sprawled His advancewould lie in difficult and sparsely inhabited country Hecould be contained until sufficient forces were broughtto bear and his communications immediately cut fromthe sea This would make his position all the moredifficult as the distances to any important objective aremuch longer and he would require considerablewheeled transport It would be impossible to fortify alllanding points in this sector and it would be a waste ofenergy to attempt to do so A much longer period maybe allowed for counter-attack than in the southeastopposite London

11 From Cromarty Firth to the Wash is the secondmost important sector ranking next after the Wash toDover Here however all the harbours and inlets aredefended both from the sea and from the rear and itshould be possible to counter-attack in superior forcewithin twenty-four hours The Tyne must be regardedas the second major objective after London for here(and to a lesser extent at the Tees) grievous damagecould be done by an invader or large-scale raider in ashort time On the other hand the sea and air


conditions are more favourable to us than to thesouthward

12 The Combined Staffs should endeavour toassign to all these sectors their relative scales ofvulnerability and defence both in the number of menemployed in the local defence of beaches and ofharbours and also in the number of days or hourswithin which heavy counter-attacks should be possibleAs an indication of these relative scales of attack anddefence I set down for consideration the following

The Chiefs of Staff Committee after another review of allour information replied to this paper by a report fromColonel Hollis who acted as their Secretary


Prime Minister 13VIII40The Chiefs of Staff have examined in consultation

with the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces yourMinute [of August 5] and find themselves in completeagreement with the principles enunciated in paragraphs1 to 5

2 The Commander-in-Chief assures us that theparamount importance of immediate counter-attackupon the enemy should he obtain a temporary footingon these shores has been impressed on all ranks andthat it is his policy to bring back divisions into reserveas soon as they are adequately trained and equippedfor offensive operations

3 The Chiefs of Staff also agree with yourassessment of the relative scales of vulnerability to sea-borne attack of the various sectors of the coast Indeedit is remarkable how closely the present distribution of


Home Defence divisions corresponds with your figuresin paragraph 12 This is worked out as follows

4 Your theoretical scales of defence are

5 A force of ten divisions if distributed in the aboveproportions would give three divisions on Sector Forth-Wash five divisions on Sector Wash-Dover and so onThere are in fact twenty-six active divisions in thisisland and if your figures are multiplied by 26 andcompared with actual distribution of these twenty-sixdivisions the following picture results

6 The similarity between the two sets of figures iseven closer than appears at first sight by reason of thefact that the reserve divisions located immediately northand northwest of London are available for deploymentin either the sector Wash-Dover or the sector Dover-Portsmouth and therefore the number of ldquoavailablerdquodivisions for these two sectors is variable A total offifteen divisions is available on the combined sectorsagainst your suggested requirements of 1675

7 The Chiefs of Staff point out that your figures arebased on scales of sea-borne attack whereas the


actual distribution takes into account the threat from air-borne attack as well Thus although we may seem atpresent to be slightly overinsured along the southcoast the reason for this is that our defences there canbe brought under the enemy fighter ldquoumbrellardquo and canbe subjected to assault across the Channel atcomparatively short range

Even while these documents were being considered andprinted the situation had begun to change in a decisivemanner Our excellent Intelligence confirmed that theldquoOperation Sea Lionrdquo had been definitely ordered by Hitlerand was in active preparation It seemed certain that theman was going to try Moreover the front to be attackedwas altogether different from or additional to the eastcoast on which the Chiefs of the Staff the Admiralty and Iin full agreement still laid the major emphasisBut thereafter came a rapid transformation A large numberof self-propelled barges and motor-boats began to pass bynight through the Straits of Dover creeping along theFrench coast and gradually assembling in all the FrenchChannel ports from Calais to Brest Our daily photographsshowed this movement with precision It had not beenfound possible to relay our minefields close to the Frenchshore We immediately began to attack the vessels intransit with our small craft and Bomber Command wasconcentrated upon the new set of invasion ports nowopening upon us At the same time a great deal ofinformation came to hand about the assembly of a GermanArmy or Armies of Invasion along this stretch of the hostilecoast of movement on the railways and of largeconcentrations in the Pas de Calais and Normandy Lateron two mountain divisions with mules evidently meant to


scale the Folkestone cliffs were reported near BoulogneMeanwhile large numbers of powerful long-range batteriesall along the French Channel coast came into existenceIn response to the new menace we began to shift ourweight from one leg to the other and to improve all ourfacilities for moving our increasingly large mobile reservestowards the southern front About the end of the first weekof August General Brooke now Commander-in-ChiefHome Forces pointed out that the threat of invasion wasdeveloping equally on the south coast All the time ourforces were increasing in numbers efficiency mobility andequipment

The change in our dispositions between August andSeptember was as follows

Thus in the last half of September we were able to bringinto action on the south coast front including Dover sixteendivisions of high quality of which three were armoureddivisions or their equivalent in brigades all of which wereadditional to the local coastal defence and could come intoaction with great speed against any invasion landing Thisprovided us with a punch or series of punches whichGeneral Brooke was well poised to deliver as might berequired and no one more capable


All this while we could not feel any assurance that the inletsand river mouths from Calais to Terschelling andHeligoland with all that swarm of islands off the Dutch andBelgian coasts (the ldquoRiddle of the Sandsrdquo of the previouswar) might not conceal other large hostile forces with smallor moderate-sized ships An attack from Harwich rightround to Portsmouth Portland or even Plymouth centringupon the Kent promontory seemed to impend We hadnothing but negative evidence that a third wave of invasionharmonised with the others might not be launched from theBaltic through the Skagerrak in large ships This wasindeed essential to a German success because in no otherway could heavy weapons reach the landed armies or largedepots of supply be established in and around store-shipsstranded near the east-coast beachesWe now entered upon a period of extreme tension andvigilance We had of course all this time to maintain heavyforces north of the Wash right up to Cromarty andarrangements were perfected to draw from these shouldthe assault declare itself decidedly in the south Theabundant intricate railway system of the island and ourcontinued mastery of our home air would have enabled usto move with certainty another four or five divisions toreinforce the southern defence if it were necessary on thefourth fifth and sixth days after the enemyrsquos full effort hadbeen exposedA very careful study was made of the moon and the tidesWe thought that the enemy would like to cross by night andland at dawn and we now know the German ArmyCommand felt like this too They would also be glad of ahalf-moonlight on the way over so as to keep their orderand make their true landfall Measuring it all with precisionthe Admiralty thought the most favourable conditions for the


enemy would arise between the 15th and 30th ofSeptember Here also we now find that we were inagreement with our foes We had little doubt of our ability todestroy anything that got ashore on the Dover promontoryor on the sector of coast from Dover to Portsmouth or evenPortland As all our thoughts at the summit moved togetherin harmonious and detailed agreement one could not helpliking the picture which presented itself with growingdefinition Here perhaps was the chance of striking a blowat the mighty enemy which would resound throughout theworld One could not help being inwardly excited alike bythe atmosphere and the evidence of Hitlerrsquos intentionswhich streamed in upon us There were indeed somewho on purely technical grounds and for the sake of theeffect the total defeat and destruction of his expeditionwould have on the general war were quite content to seehim tryIn July and August we had asserted air mastery over GreatBritain and were especially powerful and dominant over thehome counties of the southeast The Canadian Army Corpsstood most conveniently posted between London andDover Their bayonets were sharp and their hearts werehigh Proud would they have been to strike the decisiveblow for Britain and Freedom Similar passions burned in allbreasts Vast intricate systems of fortifications defendedlocalities anti-tank obstacles block-houses pillboxes andthe like laced the whole area The coastline bristled withdefences and batteries and at the cost of heavier lossesthrough reduced escorts in the Atlantic and also by newconstruction coming into commission the flotillas grewsubstantially in numbers and quality We had brought thebattleship Revenge and the old target-ship and dummy-battleship Centurion and a cruiser to Plymouth The HomeFleet was at its maximum strength and could operate


without much risk to the Humber and even to the Wash Inall respects therefore we were fully preparedFinally we were already not far from the equinoctial galescustomary in October Evidently September was the monthfor Hitler to strike if he dared and the tides and the moon-phase were favourable in the middle of that month

There was some talk in Parliament after the danger hadpassed away of the ldquoinvasion scarerdquo Certainly those whoknew most were the least scared Apart from mastery of theair and command of the sea we had as large (if not so wellequipped) an army fresh and ardent as that whichGermany assembled in Normandy four years later tooppose our return to the Continent In that case althoughwe landed a million men in the first month with vastapparatus and with every other condition favourable thebattle was long and severe and nearly three months wererequired to enlarge the area originally seized and break outinto the open field But these were values only to be testedand known in the future

It is time to go over to the other camp and set forth theenemyrsquos preparations and plans as we now know them


15Operation Sea Lion

Plan of the German Admiralty mdash Their ConditionsMet by the Conquest of France and the LowCountries mdash Meeting with the Fuehrer of July 21mdash Hitler Comprehends the Difficulties but Givesthe Order mdash Controversy Between the GermanNavy and Army Staffs mdash Raeder and Halder atVariance ndash The Compromise Plan Agreed mdashFurther Misgivings of the German Admiralty mdashBoth German Navy and Army Chiefs Cast theBurden on Goering and the Air mdash GoeringAccepts mdash Hitler Postpones D-Day mdash BritishCounter-Activities mdash The ldquoCromwellrdquo Order ofSeptember 7 mdashA Healthy Tonic mdash GermanIgnorance of Amphibious Warfare mdash ServiceDisunion mdash The Germans Stake All on the AirBattle

SOON AFTER WAR BROKE OUT on September 3 1939 theGerman Admiralty as we have learnt from their capturedarchives began their staff study of the invasion of BritainUnlike us they had no doubt that the only way was acrossthe narrow waters of the English Channel They neverconsidered any other alternative If we had known this itwould have been an important relief An invasion across theChannel came upon our best-defended coast the old sea-front against France where all the ports were fortified andour main flotilla bases and in later times most of our


airfields and air-control stations for the defence of Londonwere established There was no part of the island where wecould come into action quicker or in such great strengthwith all three Services Admiral Raeder was anxious not tobe found wanting should the demand to invade Britain bemade upon the German Navy At the same time he askedfor a lot of conditions The first of these was the entirecontrol of the French Belgian and Dutch coasts harboursand river mouths Therefore the project slumbered duringthe Twilight WarSuddenly all these conditions were surprisingly fulfilled andit must have been with some misgivings but alsosatisfaction that on the morrow of Dunkirk and the Frenchsurrender he could present himself to the Fuehrer with aplan On May 21 and again on June 20 he spoke to Hitleron the subject not with a view to proposing an invasion butin order to make sure that if it were ordered the planning indetail should not be rushed Hitler was sceptical saying thatldquohe fully appreciated the exceptional difficulties of such anundertakingrdquo He also nursed the hope that England wouldsue for peace It was not until the last week in June that theSupreme Headquarters turned to this idea nor till July 2that the first directive was issued for planning the invasionof Britain as a possible event ldquoThe Fuehrer has decidedthat under certain conditions ndash the most important of whichis achieving air superiority ndash a landing in England may takeplacerdquo On July 16 Hitler issued his directive ldquoSinceEngland in spite of her militarily hopeless position showsno sign of coming to terms I have decided to prepare alanding operation against England and if necessary to carryit outhellip The preparations for the entire operation must becompleted by mid-Augustrdquo Active measures in everydirection were already in progress


The German Navy Plan of which it is clear I had receivedan inkling in June was essentially mechanical Under thecover of heavy-gun batteries firing from Gris-Nez towardsDover and a very strong artillery protection along theFrench coast in the Straits they proposed to make a narrowcorridor across the Channel on the shortest convenient lineand to wall this in by minefields on either side with outlyingU-boat protection Through this the Army was to be ferriedover and supplied in a large number of successive wavesThere the Navy stopped and on this the German ArmyChiefs were left to address themselves to the problemConsidering that we could with our overwhelming navalsuperiority tear these minefields to pieces with small craftunder superior air power and also destroy the dozen orscore of U-boats concentrated to protect them this was atthe outset a bleak proposition Nevertheless after the fall ofFrance anyone could see that the only hope of avoiding along war with all that it might entail was to bring Britain toher knees The German Navy itself had been as we haverecorded knocked about in a most serious manner in thefighting off Norway and in their crippled condition theycould not offer more than minor support to the Army Stillthey had their plan and no one could say that they hadbeen caught unawares by good fortuneThe German Army Command had from the first regardedthe invasion of England with considerable qualms Theyhad made no plans or preparations for it and there hadbeen no training As the weeks of prodigious deliriousvictory succeeded one another they were emboldenedThe responsibility for the safe crossing was notdepartmentally theirs and once landed in strength they feltthat the task was within their power Indeed already in


August Admiral Raeder felt it necessary to draw theirattention to the dangers of the passage during whichperhaps the whole of the army forces employed might belost Once the responsibility for putting the Army across wasdefinitely thrust upon the Navy the German Admiraltybecame consistently pessimisticOn July 21 the heads of the three Services met theFuehrer He informed them that the decisive stage of thewar had already been reached but that England had notyet recognised it and still hoped for a turn of fate He spokeof the support of England by the United States and of apossible change in German political relations with SovietRussia The execution of ldquoSea Lionrdquo he said must beregarded as the most effective means of bringing about arapid conclusion of the war After his long talks with AdmiralRaeder Hitler had begun to realise what the crossing of theChannel with its tides and currents and all the mysteries ofthe sea involved He described ldquoSea Lionrdquo as ldquoanexceptionally bold and daring undertakingrdquoldquoEven if the wayis short this is not just a river crossing but the crossing of asea which is dominated by the enemy This is not a case ofa single-crossing operation as in Norway operationalsurprise cannot be expected a defensively prepared andutterly determined enemy faces us and dominates the seaarea which we must use For the Army operation fortydivisions will be required The most difficult part will be thematerial reinforcements and stores We cannot count onsupplies of any kind being available to us in Englandrdquo Theprerequisites were complete mastery of the air theoperational use of powerful artillery in the Dover Straits andprotection by minefields ldquoThe time of yearrdquo he said ldquois animportant factor since the weather in the North Sea and inthe Channel during the second half of September is verybad and the fogs begin in the middle of October The main


operation must therefore be completed by September 15for after that date co-operation between the Luftwaffe andthe heavy weapons becomes too unreliable But as air co-operation is decisive it must be regarded as the principalfactor in fixing the daterdquoA vehement controversy conducted with no little asperityarose in the German staffs about the width of the front andthe number of points to be attacked The Army demanded aseries of landings along the whole English southern coastfrom Dover to Lyme Regis west of Portland They alsodesired an ancillary landing north of Dover at RamsgateThe German Naval Staff now stated that the most suitablearea for the safe crossing of the English Channel wasbetween the North Foreland and the western end of the Isleof Wight On this the Army Staff developed a plan for alanding of 100000 men followed almost immediately by160000 more at various points from Dover westward toLyme Bay Colonel-General Halder Chief of the Army Staffdeclared that it was necessary to land at least four divisionsin the Brighton area He also required landings in the areaDeal-Ramsgate at least thirteen divisions must bedeployed as far as possible simultaneously at points alongthe whole front In addition the Luftwaffe demandedshipping to transport fifty-two AA batteries with the firstwaveThe Chief of the Naval Staff however made it clear thatnothing like so large or rapid a movement was possible Hecould not physically undertake to escort a landing fleetacross the whole width of the area mentioned All he hadmeant was that within these limits the Army should pick thebest place The Navy had not enough strength even withair supremacy to protect more than one passage at a timeand they thought the narrowest parts of the Straits of Doverthe least difficult To carry the whole of the 160000 men of


the second wave and their equipment in a single operationwould require two million tons of shipping Even if thisfantastic requirement could have been met such quantitiesof shipping could not have been accommodated in the areaof embarkation Only the first echelons could be thrownacross for the formation of narrow bridgeheads and at leasttwo days would be needed to land the second eacutechelons ofthese divisions to say nothing of the second six divisionswhich were thought indispensable He further pointed outthat a broad-front landing would mean three to five and ahalf hoursrsquo difference in the times of high water at thevarious points selected Either therefore unfavourable tideconditions must be accepted at some places orsimultaneous landings renounced This objection musthave been very difficult to answerMuch valuable time had been consumed in theseexchanges of memoranda It was not until August 7 that thefirst verbal discussion took place between General Halderand the Chief of the Naval Staff At this meeting Haldersaid ldquoI utterly reject the Navyrsquos proposals From the Armyviewpoint I regard it as complete suicide I might just as wellput the troops that have been landed straight through thesausage-machinerdquo The Naval Chief of Staff rejoined thathe must equally reject the landing on a broad front as thatwould lead only to a sacrifice of the troops on the passageover In the end a compromise decision was given by Hitlerwhich satisfied neither the Army nor the Navy A SupremeCommand Directive issued on August 27 decided that ldquotheArmy operations must allow for the facts regarding availableshipping space and security of the crossing anddisembarkationrdquo All landings in the Deal-Rams-gate areawere abandoned but the front was extended fromFolkestone to Bognor Thus it was nearly the end of Augustbefore even this measure of agreement was reached and


of course everything was subject to victory being gained inthe air battle which had now been raging for six weeksOn the basis of the frontage at last fixed the final plan wasmade The military command was entrusted to Rundstedtbut shortage of shipping reduced his force to thirteendivisions with twelve in reserve The Sixteenth Army fromports between Rotterdam and Boulogne were to land in theneighbourhood of Hythe Rye Hastings and Eastbournethe Ninth Army from ports between Boulogne and Havreattacking between Brighton and Worthing Dover was to becaptured from the landward side then both armies wouldadvance to the covering line of Canterbury-Ashford-Mayfield-Arundel In all eleven divisions were to be landedin the first waves A week after the landing it was hopedoptimistically to advance yet farther to GravesendReigate Petersfield Portsmouth In reserve lay the SixthArmy with divisions ready to reinforce or if circumstancesallowed to extend the frontage of attack to Weymouth Itwould have been easy to increase these three armies oncethe bridgeheads were gained ldquobecauserdquo says GeneralHalder ldquono military forces were facing the Germans on theContinentrdquo There was indeed no lack of fierce and well-armed troops but they required shipping and safeconveyanceOn the Naval Staff fell the heaviest initial task Germanyhad about 1200000 tons of seagoing shipping available tomeet all her needs To embark the invasion force wouldrequire more than half this amount and would involve greateconomic disturbance By the beginning of September theNaval Staff were able to report that the following had beenrequisitioned


168 transports (of 700000 tons)1910 Barges419 tugs and trawlers1600 motor-boats

All this armada had to be manned and brought to theassembly ports by sea and canal Meanwhile since earlyJuly we had made a succession of attacks on the shippingin Wilhelmshaven Kiel Cuxhaven Bremen and Emdenand raids were made on small craft and barges in Frenchports and Belgian canals When on September 1 the greatsouthward flow of invasion shipping began it was watchedreported and violently assailed by the Royal Air Forcealong the whole front from Antwerp to Havre The GermanNaval Staff recorded

The enemyrsquos continuous fighting defence off thecoast his concentration of bombers on the ldquoSea Lionrdquo


embarkation ports and his coastal reconnaissanceactivities indicate that he is now expecting animmediate landing

And againThe English bombers however and the mine-laying

forces of the British Air Force hellip are still at fulloperational strength and it must be confirmed that theactivity of the British forces has undoubtedly beensuccessful even if no decisive hindrance has yet beencaused to German transport movement

Yet despite delays and damage the German Navycompleted the first part of their task The ten per centmargin for accidents and losses they had provided was fullyexpended What survived however did not fall short of theminimum they had planned to have for the first stageBoth Navy and Army now cast their burden on the GermanAir Force All this plan of the corridor with its balustrades ofminefields to be laid and maintained under the German AirForce canopy against the overwhelming superiority of theBritish flotillas and small craft depended upon the defeat ofthe British Air Force and the complete mastery of the air byGermany over the Channel and Southeast England andnot only over the crossing but over the landing points Boththe older Services passed the buck to ReichsmarshalGoeringGoering was by no means unwilling to accept thisresponsibility because he believed that the German AirForce with its large numerical superiority would aftersome weeks of hard fighting beat down the British airdefence destroy their airfields in Kent and Sussex andestablish a complete domination of the Channel But apartfrom this he felt assured that the bombing of England andparticularly of London would reduce the decadent peace-


loving British to a condition in which they would sue forpeace more especially if the threat of invasion grewsteadily upon their horizonThe German Admiralty were by no means convincedindeed their misgivings were profound They consideredldquoSea Lionrdquo should be launched only in the last resort and inJuly they had recommended the postponement of theoperation till the spring of 1941 unless the unrestricted airattack and the unlimited U-boat warfare should ldquocause theenemy to negotiate with the Fuehrer on his own termsrdquo ButFeldmarshal Keitel and General Jodl were glad to find theAir Supreme Commander so confidentThese were great days for Nazi Germany Hitler haddanced his jig of joy before enforcing the humiliation of theFrench Armistice at Compiegravegne The German Armymarched triumphantly through the Arc de Triomphe anddown the Champs Elyseacutees What was there they could notdo Why hesitate to play out a winning hand Thus each ofthe three Services involved in the operation ldquoSea Lionrdquoworked upon the hopeful factors in their own theme and leftthe ugly side to their companionsAs the days passed doubts and delays appeared andmultiplied Hitlerrsquos order of July 16 had laid down that allpreparations were to be completed by the middle of AugustAll three Services saw that this was impossible And at theend of July Hitler accepted September 15 as the earliest D-Day reserving his decision for action until the results of theprojected intensified air battle could be knownOn August 30 the Naval Staff reported that owing to Britishcounteraction against the invasion fleet preparations couldnot be completed by September 15 At their request D-Daywas postponed to September 21 with a proviso of ten daysrsquoprevious warning This meant that the preliminary order had


to be issued on September 11 On September 10 theNaval Staff again reported their various difficulties from theweather which is always tiresome and from British counter-bombing They pointed out that although the necessarynaval preparations could in fact be completed by the 21stthe stipulated operational condition of undisputed airsuperiority over the Channel had not been achieved On the11th therefore Hitler postponed the preliminary order bythree days thus setting back the earliest D-Day to the 24thon the 14th he further put it off

On the 14th Admiral Raeder expressed the view that(1) The present air situation does not provide

conditions for carrying out the operation as the risk isstill too great

(2) If the ldquoSea Lionrdquo operation fails this will mean agreat gain in prestige for the British and the powerfuleffect of our attacks will thus be annulled

(3) Air attacks on England particularly on Londonmust continue without interruption If the weather isfavourable an intensification of the attacks is to beaimed at without regard to ldquoSea Lionrdquo The attacksmust have a decisive outcome

(4) ldquoSea Lionrdquo however must not yet be cancelledas the anxiety of the British must be kept up ifcancellation became known to the outside world thiswould be a great relief to the British

On the 17th the postponement became indefinite and forgood reason in their view as in ours Raeder continues

(1) The preparations for a landing on the Channelcoast are extensively known to the enemy who isincreasingly taking counter-measures Symptoms arefor example operational use of his aircraft for attacksand reconnaissances over the German operational


harbours frequent appearance of destroyers off thesouth coast of England in the Straits of Dover and onthe Franco-Belgian coast stationing of his patrolvessels off the north coast of France Churchillrsquos lastspeech etc

(2) The main units of the Home Fleet are being heldin readiness to repel the landing though the majority ofthe units are still in western bases

(3) Already a large number of destroyers (over thirty)have been located by air reconnaissance in thesouthern and southeastern harbours

(4) All available information indicates that theenemyrsquos naval forces are solely occupied with thistheatre of operations

During August the corpses of about forty German soldierswere washed up at scattered points along the coastbetween the Isle of Wight and Cornwall The Germans hadbeen practising embarkations in the barges along theFrench coast Some of these barges put out to sea in orderto escape British bombing and were sunk either bybombing or bad weather This was the source of awidespread rumour that the Germans had attempted aninvasion and had suffered very heavy losses either bydrowning or by being burnt in patches of sea covered withflaming oil We took no steps to contradict such tales whichspread freely through the occupied countries in a wildlyexaggerated form and gave much encouragement to theoppressed populations In Brussels for instance a shopexhibited menrsquos bathing-suits marked ldquoFor ChannelswimmingrdquoOn September 7 the information before us showed that thewesterly and southerly movement of barges and smallships to posts between Ostend and Havre was in progress


and as these assembly harbours were under heavy Britishair attack it was not likely the ships would be brought tothem until shortly before the actual attempt The strikingstrength of the German Air Force between Amsterdam andBrest had been increased by the transfer of a hundred andsixty bomber aircraft from Norway and short-range dive-bomber units were observed on the forward airfields in thePas de Calais area Four Germans captured a few daysearlier after landing from a rowing-boat on the southeastcoast had confessed to being spies and said that they wereto be ready at any time during the next fortnight to reportthe movement of British reserve formations in the areaIpswich-London-Reading-Oxford Moon and tide conditionsbetween the 8th and 10th of September were favourable forinvasion on the southeast coast On this the Chiefs of Staffconcluded that the possibility of invasion had becomeimminent and that the defence forces should stand by atimmediate noticeThere was however at that time no machinery at GeneralHeadquarters Home Forces by which the existing eighthoursrsquo notice for readiness could be brought to ldquoreadinessfor immediate actionrdquo by intermediate stages The code-word ldquoCromwellrdquo which meant ldquoinvasion imminentrdquo wastherefore issued by Home Forces at 8 PM September 7to the eastern and southern commands implying actionstations for the forward coastal divisions It was also sent toall formations in the London area and to the 4th and 7thCorps in GHQ Reserve It was repeated for information toall other commands in the United Kingdom On this insome parts of the country the Home Guard commandersacting on their own initiative called out the Home Guard byringing the church bells This led to rumours of enemyparachutist landings and also that German E-boats wereapproaching the coast Neither I nor the Chiefs of Staff


were aware that the decisive code-word ldquoCromwellrdquo hadbeen used and the next morning instructions were given todevise intermediate stages by which vigilance could beincreased on future occasions without declaring an invasionimminent Even on receipt of the code-word ldquoCromwellrdquo theHome Guard were not to be called out except for specialtasks and also church bells were to be rung only by orderof a Home Guard who had himself seen as many as twenty-five parachutists landing and not because other bells hadbeen heard or for any other reason As may be imaginedthis incident caused a great deal of talk and stir but nomention of it was made in the newspapers or Parliament Itserved as a useful tonic and rehearsal for all concerned

Having traced the German invasion preparations steadilymounting to a climax we have seen how the early mood oftriumph changed gradually to one of doubt and finally tocomplete loss of confidence in the outcome Confidencewas in fact already destroyed in 1940 and despite therevival of the project in 1941 it never again held theimagination of the German leaders as it had done in thehalcyon days following the fall of France During the fatefulmonths of July and August we see the Naval CommanderRaeder endeavouring to teach his military and aircolleagues about the grave difficulties attending large-scaleamphibious war He realised his own weakness and thelack of time for adequate preparation and sought to imposelimits on the grandiose plans advanced by Halder forlanding immense forces simultaneously over a wide frontMeanwhile Goering with soaring ambition was determinedto achieve spectacular victory with his air force alone andwas disinclined to play the humbler rocircle of working to a


combined plan for the systematic reduction of opposing seaand air forces in the invasion areaIt is apparent from the records that the German HighCommand were very far from being a co-ordinated teamworking together with a common purpose and with a properunderstanding of each otherrsquos capabilities and limitationsEach wished to be the brightest star in the firmamentFriction was apparent from the outset and so long asHalder could thrust responsibility onto Raeder he did littleto bring his own plans into line with practical possibilitiesIntervention by the Fuehrer was necessary but seems tohave done little to improve the relations between theServices In Germany the prestige of the Army wasparamount and the military leaders regarded their navalcolleagues with some condescension It is impossible toresist the conclusion that the German Army was reluctant toplace itself in the hands of its sister Service in a majoroperation When questioned after the war about theseplans General Jodl impatiently remarked ldquoOurarrangements were much the same as those of JuliusCaesarrdquo Here speaks the authentic German soldier inrelation to the sea affair having little conception of theproblems involved in landing and deploying large militaryforces on a defended coast exposed to all the hazards ofthe seaIn Britain whatever our shortcomings we understood thesea affair very thoroughly For centuries it has been in ourblood and its traditions stir not only our sailors but thewhole race It was this above all things which enabled us toregard the menace of invasion with a steady gaze Thesystem of control of operations by the three Chiefs of Staffconcerted under a Minister of Defence produced a standardof team-work mutual understanding and ready co-operation unrivalled in the past When in course of time our


opportunity came to undertake great invasions from thesea it was upon a foundation of solid achievement inpreparation for the task and with a full understanding of thetechnical needs of such vast and hazardous undertakingsHad the Germans possessed in 1940 well-trainedamphibious forces equipped with all the apparatus ofmodern amphibious war their task would still have been aforlorn hope in the face of our sea and air power In factthey had neither the tools nor the training

We have seen how our many anxieties and self-questionings led to a steady increase in the confidence withwhich from the beginning we had viewed the invasionproject On the other hand the more the German HighCommand and the Fuehrer looked at the venture the lessthey liked it We could not of course know each otherrsquosmoods and valuations but with every week from the middleof July to the middle of September the unknown identity of


views upon the problem between the German and BritishAdmiralties between the German Supreme Command andthe British Chiefs of Staff and also between the Fuehrerand the author of this book became more definitelypronounced If we could have agreed equally well aboutother matters there need have been no war It was ofcourse common ground between us that all dependedupon the battle in the air The question was how this wouldend between the combatants and in addition the Germanswondered whether the British people would stand up to theair bombardment the effect of which in these days wasgreatly exaggerated or whether they would crumple andforce His Majestyrsquos Government to capitulate About thisReichsmarshal Goering had high hopes and we had nofears

END OF BOOK ONE


Book TwoAlone


1The Battle of Britain

The Decisive StrugglemdashHitlerrsquos DilemmamdashThreePhases ndash Advantages of Fighting in Onersquos OwnAir mdashldquoSea Lionrdquo and the Air AssaultmdashTheGerman Raid Against Tyneside mdash Massacre ofthe Heinkels mdash Lord Beaverbrookrsquos HourmdashMrErnest Bevin and LabourmdashCabinet Solidarity mdashChecking German LossesmdashFirst Attacks onLondonmdashUneasiness of the German Naval StaffmdashMy Broadcast of September 11 mdash The HardStrain from August 24 to September 6 mdash TheArticulation of Fighter Command EndangeredmdashAQuarter of Our Pilots Killed or Disabled in aFortnight mdash Goeringrsquos Mistake of Turning onLondon Too SoonmdashA Breathing SpacemdashSeptember 15 the Culminating DatemdashWithNumber 11 GroupmdashAir Vice-Marshal ParkmdashTheGroup Operations RoommdashThe Attack Begins mdashAll Reserves EmployedmdashA Cardinal VictorymdashHitler Postpones ldquoSea Lionrdquo September 17 mdashAfterlight on Claims and Losses mdash Honour for All

OUR FATE now depended up on victory in the air TheGerman leaders had recognised that all their plans for theinvasion of Britain depended on winning air supremacyabove the Channel and the chosen landing places on oursouth coast The preparation of the embarkation ports theassembly of the transports the minesweeping of the


passages and the laying of the new minefields wereimpossible without protection from British air attack For theactual crossing and landings complete mastery of the airover the transports and the beaches was the decisivecondition The result therefore turned upon the destructionof the Royal Air Force and the system of airfields betweenLondon and the sea We now know that Hitler said toAdmiral Raeder on July 31 ldquoIf after eight days of intensiveair war the Luftwaffe has not achieved considerabledestruction of the enemyrsquos air force harbours and navalforces the operation will have to be put off till May 1941rdquoThis was the battle that had now to be foughtI did not myself at all shrink mentally from the impendingtrial of strength I had told Parliament on June 4 ldquoThe greatFrench Army was very largely for the time being cast backand disturbed by the onrush of a few thousand armouredvehicles May it not also be that the cause of civilisationitself will be defended by the skill and devotion of a fewthousand airmenrdquo And to Smuts on June 9 ldquoI see onlyone sure way through now ndash to wit that Hitler should attackthis country and in so doing break his air weaponrdquo Theoccasion had now arrivedAdmirable accounts have been written of the strugglebetween the British and German Air Forces whichconstitutes the Battle of Britain In Air Chief MarshalDowdingrsquos despatch and the Air Ministry pamphlet number156 the essential facts are fully recorded as they wereknown to us in 1941 and 1943 We have now also accessto the views of the German High Command and of theirinner reactions in the various phases It appears that theGerman losses in some of the principal combats were agood deal less than we thought at the time and that reportson both sides were materially exaggerated But the mainfeatures and the outline of this famous conflict upon which


the life of Britain and the freedom of the world dependedare not in disputeThe German Air Force had been engaged to the utmostlimit in the Battle of France and like the German Navyafter the Norway Campaign they required a period ofweeks or months for recovery This pause was convenientto us too for all but three of our fighter squadrons had atone time or another been engaged in the Continentaloperations Hitler could not conceive that Britain would notaccept a peace offer after the collapse of France LikeMarshal Peacutetain Weygand and many of the Frenchgenerals and politicians he did not understand theseparate aloof resources of an island state and like theseFrenchmen he misjudged our will-power We had travelleda long way and learned a lot since Munich During themonth of June he had addressed himself to the newsituation as it gradually dawned upon him and meanwhilethe German Air Force recuperated and redeployed for theirnext task There could be no doubt what this would beEither Hitler must invade and conquer England or he mustface an indefinite prolongation of the war with all itsincalculable hazards and complications There was alwaysthe possibility that victory over Britain in the air would bringabout the end of the British resistance and that actualinvasion even if it became practicable would also becomeunnecessary except for the occupying of a defeatedcountryDuring June and early July the German Air Force revivedand regrouped its formations and established itself on allthe French and Belgian airfields from which the assault hadto be launched and by reconnaissance and tentative forayssought to measure the character and scale of theopposition which would be encountered It was not until July10 that the first heavy onslaught began and this date is


usually taken as the opening of the battle Two other datesof supreme consequence stand out August 15 andSeptember 15 There were also three successive butoverlapping phases in the German attack First from July10 to August 18 the harrying of British convoys in theChannel and of our southern ports from Dover to Plymouthwhereby our Air Force should be tested drawn into battleand depleted whereby also damage should be done tothose seaside towns marked as objectives for theforthcoming invasion In the second phase August 24 toSeptember 27 a way to London was to be forced by theelimination of the Royal Air Force and its installationsleading to the violent and continuous bombing of thecapital This would also cut communications with thethreatened shores But in Goeringrsquos view there was goodreason to believe that a greater prize was here in sight noless than throwing the worldrsquos largest city into confusionand paralysis the cowing of the Government and thepeople and their consequent submission to the Germanwill Their Navy and Army Staffs devoutly hoped thatGoering was right As the situation developed they sawthat the RAF was not being eliminated and meanwhiletheir own urgent needs for the ldquoSea Lionrdquo adventure wereneglected for the sake of destruction in LondonAnd then when all were disappointed when invasion wasindefinitely postponed for lack of the vital need airsupremacy there followed the third and last phase Thehope of daylight victory had faded the Royal Air Forceremained vexatiously alive and Goering in Octoberresigned himself to the indiscriminate bombing of Londonand the centres of industrial production


In the quality of the fighter aircraft there was little to chooseThe Germansrsquo were faster with a better rate of climb oursmore manoeuvrable better armed Their airmen wellaware of their greater numbers were also the proud victorsof Poland Norway the Low Countries France ours hadsupreme confidence in themselves as individuals and thatdetermination which the British race displays in fullestmeasure when in supreme adversity One importantstrategical advantage the Germans enjoyed and skilfullyused their forces were deployed on many and widelyspread bases whence they could concentrate upon us ingreat strengths and with feints and deceptions as to thetrue points of attack But the enemy may have under-ratedthe adverse conditions of fighting above and across theChannel compared with those which had prevailed inFrance and Belgium That they regarded them as serious isshown by the efforts they made to organise an efficient SeaRescue Service German transport planes marked with theRed Cross began to appear in some numbers over theChannel in July and August whenever there was an airfight We did not recognise this means of rescuing enemypilots who had been shot down in action in order that theymight come and bomb our civil population again Werescued them ourselves whenever it was possible andmade them prisoners of war But all German airambulances were forced or shot down by our fighters ondefinite orders approved by the War Cabinet The Germancrews and doctors on these machines professedastonishment at being treated in this way and protestedthat it was contrary to the Geneva Convention There wasno mention of such a contingency in the GenevaConvention which had not contemplated this form ofwarfare The Germans were not in a strong position tocomplain in view of all the treaties laws of war and


solemn agreements which they had violated withoutcompunction whenever it suited them They soonabandoned the experiment and the work of sea rescue forboth sides was carried out by our small craft on which ofcourse the Germans fired on every occasion

By August the Luftwaffe had gathered 2669 operationalaircraft comprising 1015 bombers 346 dive-bombers 933fighters and 375 heavy fighters The Fuehrerrsquos DirectiveNumber 17 authorised the intensified air war againstEngland on August 5 Goering never set much store byldquoSea Lionrdquo his heart was in the ldquoabsoluterdquo air war Hisconsequent distortion of the arrangements disturbed theGerman Naval Staff The destruction of the Royal Air Forceand our aircraft industry was to them but a means to anend when this was accomplished the air war should beturned against the enemyrsquos warships and shipping Theyregretted the lower priority assigned by Goering to the navaltargets and they were irked by the delays On August 6they reported to the Supreme Command that thepreparations for German mine-laying in the Channel areacould not proceed because of the constant British threatfrom the air On August 10 the Naval Staffrsquos War Diaryrecords

Preparations for ldquoSea Lionrdquo particularly mine-clearance are being affected by the inactivity of theLuftwaffe which is at present prevented from operatingby the bad weather and for reasons not known to theNaval Staff the Luftwaffe has missed opportunitiesafforded by the recent very favourable weatherhellip

The continuous heavy air fighting of July and early Augusthad been directed upon the Kent promontory and the


Channel coast Goering and his skilled advisers formed theopinion that they must have drawn nearly all our fightersquadrons into this southern struggle They thereforedecided to make a daylight raid on the manufacturing citiesnorth of the Wash The distance was too great for their first-class fighters the ME 109rsquos They would have to risk theirbombers with only escorts from the Me 110rsquos whichthough they had the range had nothing like the qualitywhich was what mattered now This was nevertheless areasonable step for them to take and the risk was well runAccordingly on August 15 about a hundred bombers withan escort of forty ME 110rsquos were launched againstTyneside At the same time a raid of more than eighthundred planes was sent to pin down our forces in theSouth where it was thought they were already all gatheredBut now the dispositions which Dowding had made of theFighter Command were signally vindicated The danger hadbeen foreseen Seven Hurricane or Spitfire squadrons hadbeen withdrawn from the intense struggle in the South torest in and at the same time to guard the North They hadsuffered severely but were nonetheless deeply grieved toleave the battle The pilots respectfully represented thatthey were not at all tired Now came an unexpectedconsolation These squadrons were able to welcome theassailants as they crossed the coast Thirty German planeswere shot down most of them heavy bombers (Heinkel111rsquos with four trained men in each crew) for a British lossof only two pilots injured The foresight of Air MarshalDowding in his direction of Fighter Command deserves highpraise but even more remarkable had been the restraintand the exact measurement of formidable stresses whichhad reserved a fighter force in the North through all theselong weeks of mortal conflict in the South We must regardthe generalship here shown as an example of genius in the


art of war Never again was a daylight raid attemptedoutside the range of the highest-class fighter protectionHenceforth everything north of the Wash was safe by dayAugust 15 was the largest air battle of this period of thewar five major actions were fought on a front of fivehundred miles It was indeed a crucial day In the South allour twenty-two squadrons were engaged many twicesome three times and the German losses added to thosein the North were seventy-six to our thirty-four This was arecognisable disaster to the German Air ForceIt must have been with anxious minds that the German AirChiefs measured the consequences of this defeat whichboded ill for the future The German Air Force howeverhad still as their target the port of London all that immenseline of docks with their masses of shipping and the largestcity in the world which did not require much accuracy to hit

During these weeks of intense struggle and ceaselessanxiety Lord Beaverbrook rendered signal service At allcosts the fighter squadrons must be replenished withtrustworthy machines This was no time for red tape andcircumlocution although these have their place in a well-ordered placid system All his remarkable qualities fittedthe need His personal buoyancy and vigour were a tonic Iwas glad to be able sometimes to lean on him He did notfail This was his hour His personal force and geniuscombined with so much persuasion and contrivance sweptaside many obstacles Everything in the supply pipelinewas drawn forward to the battle New or repaired airplanesstreamed to the delighted squadrons in numbers they hadnever known before All the services of maintenance andrepair were driven to an intense degree I felt so much his


value that on August 2 with the Kingrsquos approval I invitedhim to join the War Cabinet At this time also his eldest sonMax Aitken gained high distinction and eleven victories asa fighter-pilotAnother Minister I consorted with at this time was ErnestBevin Minister of Labour and National Service with thewhole man-power of the nation to manage and animate Allthe workers in the munitions factories were ready to takehis direction In October he too joined the War CabinetThe trade-unionists cast their slowly framed jealouslyguarded rules and privileges upon the altar where wealthrank privilege and property had already been laid I wasmuch in harmony with both Beaverbrook and Bevin in thewhite-hot weeks Afterwards they quarrelled which was apity and caused much friction But at this climax we wereall together I cannot speak too highly of the loyalty of MrChamberlain or of the resolution and efficiency of all myCabinet colleagues Let me give them my salute

I was most anxious to form a true estimate of the Germanlosses With all strictness and sincerity it is impossible forpilots fighting often far above the clouds to be sure howmany enemy machines they have shot down or how manytimes the same machine has been claimed by others


17VIII40

Lord Beaverbrook told me that in Thursdayrsquos actionupwards of eighty German machines had been pickedup on our soil Is this so If not how many


I asked C-in-C Fighter Command if he coulddiscriminate in this action between the fighting over theland and over the sea This would afford a good meansof establishing for our own satisfaction the results whichare claimed

Prime Minister to CAS

17VIII40

While our eyes are concentrated on the results ofthe air fighting over this country we must not overlookthe serious losses occurring in the Bomber CommandSeven heavy bombers last night and also twenty-oneaircraft now destroyed on the ground ndash the bulk atTangmere ndash total twenty-eight These twenty-eightadded to the twenty-two Fighters make our loss fifty onthe day and very much alters the picture presented bythe German loss of seventy-five In fact on the day wehave lost two to three

Let me know the types of machines destroyed onthe ground


21VIII40

The important thing is to bring the German aircraftdown and to win the battle and the rate at whichAmerican correspondents and the American public areconvinced that we are winning and that our figures aretrue stands at a much lower level They will find outquite soon enough when the German air attack isplainly shown to be repulsed It would be a pity to teasethe Fighter Command at the present time when thebattle is going on from hour to hour and whencontinuous decisions have to be taken about air-raidwarnings etc I confess I should be more inclined to letthe facts speak for themselves There is somethingrather obnoxious in bringing correspondents down to airsquadrons in order that they may assure the Americanpublic that the fighter pilots are not bragging and lying


about their figures We can I think afford to be a bitcool and calm about all this

I should like you to see on other papers an inquiry Ihave been making of my own in order to check up onthe particular day when MAP [Ministry of AircraftProduction] said they picked up no fewer than eightyGerman machines brought down over the land aloneThis gives us a very good line for our own purposes Imust say I am a little impatient about the Americanscepticism The event is what will decide all

On August 20 I could report to ParliamentThe enemy is of course far more numerous than we

are But our new production already largely exceedshis and the American production is only just beginningto flow in Our bomber and fighter strengths now afterall this fighting are larger than they have ever beenWe believe that we should be able to continue the airstruggle indefinitely and as long as the enemy pleasesand the longer it continues the more rapid will be ourapproach first towards that parity and then into thatsuperiority in the air upon which in large measure thedecision of the war depends

Up till the end of August Goering did not take anunfavourable view of the air conflict He and his circlebelieved that the English ground organisation and aircraftindustry and the fighting strength of the RAF had alreadybeen severely damaged They estimated that since August8 we had lost 1115 aircraft against the German losses of467 But of course each side takes a hopeful view and it isin the interest of their leaders that they should There was aspell of fine weather in September and the Luftwaffe hopedfor decisive results Heavy attacks fell upon our aerodromeinstallations round London and on the night of the 6th sixty-


eight aircraft attacked London followed on the 7th by thefirst large-scale attack of about three hundred On this andsucceeding days during which our anti-aircraft guns weredoubled in numbers very hard and continuous air fightingtook place over the capital and the Luftwaffe were stillconfident through their overestimation of our losses But wenow know that the German Naval Staff in anxious regardfor their own interests and responsibilities wrote in theirdiary on September 10

There is no sign of the defeat of the enemyrsquos airforce over Southern England and in the Channel areaand this is vital to a further judgment of the situationThe preliminary attacks by the Luftwaffe have indeedachieved a noticeable weakening of the enemyrsquos fighterdefence so that considerable German fightersuperiority can be assumed over the English areaHowever hellip we have not yet attained the operationalconditions which the Naval Staff stipulated to theSupreme Command as being essential for theenterprise namely undisputed air supremacy in theChannel area and the elimination of the enemyrsquos airactivity in the assembly area of the German navalforces and ancillary shippinghellip It would be inconformity with the time-table preparations for ldquoSeaLionrdquo if the Luftwaffe now concentrated less on Londonand more on Portsmouth and Dover as well as on thenaval ports in and near the operational areahellip

As by this time Hitler had been persuaded by Goering thatthe major attack on London would be decisive the NavalStaff did not venture to appeal to the Supreme Commandbut their uneasiness continued and on the 12th theyreached this sombre conclusion

The air war is being conducted as an ldquoabsolute airwarrdquo without regard to the present requirements of thenaval war and outside the framework of operation ldquoSeaLionrdquo In its present form the air war cannot assistpreparations for ldquoSea Lionrdquo which are predominantly in


the hands of the Navy In particular one cannot discernany effort on the part of the Luftwaffe to engage theunits of the British Fleet which are now able to operatealmost unmolested in the Channel and this will proveextremely dangerous to the transportation Thus themain safeguard against British naval forces would haveto be the minefields which as repeatedly explained tothe Supreme Command cannot be regarded asreliable protection for shipping

The fact remains that up to now the intensified airwar has not contributed towards the landing operationhence for operational and military reasons theexecution of the landing cannot yet be considered

I stated in a broadcast on September 11Whenever the weather is favourable waves of

German bombers protected by fighters often three orfour hundred at a time surge over this islandespecially the promontory of Kent in the hope ofattacking military and other objectives by daylightHowever they are met by our fighter squadrons andnearly always broken up and their losses averagethree to one in machines and six to one in pilots

This effort of the Germans to secure daylightmastery of the air over England is of course the cruxof the whole war So far it has failed conspicuously Ithas cost them very dear and we have felt strongerand actually are relatively a good deal stronger thanwhen the hard fighting began in July There is no doubtthat Herr Hitler is using up his fighter force at a veryhigh rate and that if he goes on for many more weekshe will wear down and ruin this vital part of his air forceThat will give us a great advantage

On the other hand for him to try to invade thiscountry without having secured mastery in the air wouldbe a very hazardous undertaking Nevertheless all hispreparations for invasion on a great scale are steadilygoing forward Several hundreds of self-propelled


barges are moving down the coasts of Europe fromthe German and Dutch harbours to the ports ofNorthern France from Dunkirk to Brest and beyondBrest to the French harbours in the Bay of Biscay

Besides this convoys of merchant ships in tens anddozens are being moved through the Straits of Doverinto the Channel dodging along from port to port underthe protection of the new batteries which the Germanshave built on the French shore There are nowconsiderable gatherings of shipping in the GermanDutch Belgian and French harbours ndash all the way fromHamburg to Brest Finally there are some preparationsmade of ships to carry an invading force from theNorwegian harbours

Behind these clusters of ships or barges there standlarge numbers of German troops awaiting the order togo on board and set out on their very dangerous anduncertain voyage across the seas We cannot tell whenthey will try to come we cannot be sure that in fact theywill try at all but no one should blind himself to the factthat a heavy full-scale invasion of this island is beingprepared with all the usual German thoroughness andmethod and that it may be launched now ndash uponEngland upon Scotland or upon Ireland or upon allthree

If this invasion is going to be tried at all it does notseem that it can be long delayed The weather maybreak at any time Besides this it is difficult for theenemy to keep these gatherings of ships waiting aboutindefinitely while they are bombed every night by ourbombers and very often shelled by our warships whichare waiting for them outside

Therefore we must regard the next week or so as avery important period in our history It ranks with thedays when the Spanish Armada was approaching theChannel and Drake was finishing his game of bowls orwhen Nelson stood between us and Napoleonrsquos GrandArmy at Boulogne We have read all about this in thehistory books but what is happening now is on a fargreater scale and of far more consequence to the life


and future of the world and its civilisation than thosebrave old days

In the fighting between August 24 and September 6 thescales had tilted against Fighter Command During thesecrucial days the Germans had continuously appliedpowerful forces against the airfields of South and SoutheastEngland Their object was to break down the day fighterdefence of the capital which they were impatient to attackFar more important to us than the protection of Londonfrom terror-bombing was the functioning and articulation ofthese airfields and the squadrons working from them In thelife-and-death struggle of the two air forces this was adecisive phase We never thought of the struggle in termsof the defence of London or any other place but only whowon in the air There was much anxiety at FighterHeadquarters at Stanmore and particularly at theheadquarters of Number Eleven Fighter Group at UxbridgeExtensive damage had been done to five of the grouprsquosforward airfields and also to the six sector stationsManston and Lympne on the Kentish coast were on severaloccasions and for days unfit for operating fighter aircraftBiggin Hill Sector Station to the south of London was soseverely damaged that for a week only one fightersquadron could operate from it If the enemy had persistedin heavy attacks against the adjacent sectors and damagedtheir operations rooms or telephone communications thewhole intricate organisation of Fighter Command mighthave been broken down This would have meant notmerely the maltreatment of London but the loss to us of theperfected control of our own air in the decisive area As willbe seen in the Minutes printed in the Appendix I was led to


visit several of these stations particularly Manston (August28) and Biggin Hill which is quite near my home Theywere getting terribly knocked about and their runways wereruined by craters It was therefore with a sense of relief thatFighter Command felt the German attack turn on to Londonon September 7 and concluded that the enemy hadchanged his plan Goering should certainly havepersevered against the airfields on whose organisation andcombination the whole fighting power of our air force at thismoment depended By departing from the classicalprinciples of war as well as from the hitherto accepteddictates of humanity he made a foolish mistakeThis same period (August 24 to September 6) had seriouslydrained the strength of Fighter Command as a whole TheCommand had lost in this fortnight 103 pilots killed and 128seriously wounded while 466 Spitfires and Hurricanes hadbeen destroyed or seriously damaged Out of a total pilotstrength of about a thousand nearly a quarter had beenlost Their places could only be filled by 260 new ardentbut inexperienced pilots drawn from training units in manycases before their full courses were complete The nightattacks on London for ten days after September 7 struck atthe London docks and railway centres and killed andwounded many civilians but they were in effect for us abreathing space of which we had the utmost needDuring this period I usually managed to take two afternoonsa week in the areas under attack in Kent or Sussex in orderto see for myself what was happening For this purpose Iused my train which was now most conveniently fitted andcarried a bed a bath an office a connectible telephoneand an effective staff I was thus able to work continuouslyapart from sleeping and with almost all the facilitiesavailable at Downing Street


We must take September 15 as the culminating date Onthis day the Luftwaffe after two heavy attacks on the 14thmade its greatest concentrated effort in a resumed daylightattack on LondonIt was one of the decisive battles of the war and like theBattle of Waterloo it was on a Sunday I was at Chequers Ihad already on several occasions visited the headquartersof Number 11 Fighter Group in order to witness the conductof an air battle when not much had happened Howeverthe weather on this day seemed suitable to the enemy andaccordingly I drove over to Uxbridge and arrived at theGroup Headquarters Number 11 Group comprised nofewer than twenty-five squadrons covering the whole ofEssex Kent Sussex and Hampshire and all theapproaches across them to London Air Vice-Marshal Parkhad for six months commanded this group on which ourfate largely depended From the beginning of Dunkirk allthe daylight actions in the South of England had alreadybeen conducted by him and all his arrangements andapparatus had been brought to the highest perfection Mywife and I were taken down to the bomb-proof OperationsRoom fifty feet below ground All the ascendancy of theHurricanes and Spitfires would have been fruitless but forthis system of underground control centres and telephonecables which had been devised and built before the war bythe Air Ministry under Dowdingrsquos advice and impulseLasting credit is due to all concerned In the South ofEngland there were at this time Number 11 Group HQ andsix subordinate fighter station centres All these were ashas been described under heavy stress The SupremeCommand was exercised from the Fighter Headquarters atStanmore but the actual handling of the direction of the


squadrons was wisely left to Number 11 Group whichcontrolled the units through its fighter stations located ineach countyThe Group Operations Room was like a small theatreabout sixty feet across and with two storeys We took ourseats in the dress circle Below us was the large-scale map-table around which perhaps twenty highly trained youngmen and women with their telephone assistants wereassembled Opposite to us covering the entire wall wherethe theatre curtain would be was a gigantic blackboarddivided into six columns with electric bulbs for the sixfighter stations each of their squadrons having a sub-column of its own and also divided by lateral lines Thusthe lowest row of bulbs showed as they were lighted thesquadrons which were ldquoStanding Byrdquo at two minutesrsquo noticethe next row those ldquoAt Readinessrdquo five minutes then ldquoAtAvailablerdquo twenty minutes then those which had taken offthe next row those which had reported having seen theenemy the next ndash with red lights ndash those which were inaction and the top row those which were returning homeOn the left-hand side in a kind of glass stage-box were thefour or five officers whose duty it was to weigh andmeasure the information received from our Observer Corpswhich at this time numbered upwards of fifty thousand menwomen and youths Radar was still in its infancy but itgave warning of raids approaching our coast and theobservers with field-glasses and portable telephones wereour main source of information about raiders flyingoverland Thousands of messages were therefore receivedduring an action Several roomfuls of experienced people inother parts of the underground headquarters sifted themwith great rapidity and transmitted the results from minuteto minute directly to the plotters seated around the table on


the floor and to the officer supervising from the glass stage-boxOn the right hand was another glass stage-box containingArmy officers who reported the action of our anti-aircraftbatteries of which at this time in the Command there weretwo hundred At night it was of vital importance to stopthese batteries firing over certain areas in which our fighterswould be closing with the enemy I was not unacquaintedwith the general outlines of this system having had itexplained to me a year before the war by Dowding when Ivisited him at Stanmore It had been shaped and refined inconstant action and all was now fused together into a mostelaborate instrument of war the like of which existednowhere in the worldldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo said Park as we went down ldquowhetheranything will happen today At present all is quietrdquoHowever after a quarter of an hour the raid-plotters beganto move about An attack of ldquo40 plusrdquo was reported to becoming from the German stations in the Dieppe area Thebulbs along the bottom of the wall display panel began toglow as various squadrons came to ldquoStand Byrdquo Then inquick succession ldquo20 plusrdquoldquo40 plusrdquo signals were receivedand in another ten minutes it was evident that a seriousbattle impended On both sides the air began to fillOne after another signals came in ldquo40 plusrdquoldquo60 plusrdquo therewas even an ldquo80 plusrdquo On the floor table below us themovement of all the waves of attack was marked bypushing discs forward from minute to minute along differentlines of approach while on the blackboard facing us therising lights showed our fighter squadrons getting into theair till there were only four or five left ldquoAt Readinessrdquo Theseair battles on which so much depended lasted little morethan an hour from the first encounter The enemy had


ample strength to send out new waves of attack and oursquadrons having gone all out to gain the upper air wouldhave to refuel after seventy or eighty minutes or land torearm after a five-minute engagement If at this moment ofrefuelling or rearming the enemy were able to arrive withfresh unchallenged squadrons some of our fighters couldbe destroyed on the ground It was therefore one of ourprincipal objects to direct our squadrons so as not to havetoo many on the ground refuelling or rearmingsimultaneously during daylightPresently the red bulbs showed that the majority of oursquadrons were engaged A subdued hum arose from thefloor where the busy plotters pushed their discs to and froin accordance with the swiftly changing situation Air Vice-Marshal Park gave general directions for the disposition ofhis fighter force which were translated into detailed ordersto each fighter station by a youngish officer in the centre ofthe dress circle at whose side I sat Some years after Iasked his name He was Lord Willoughby de Broke (I methim next in 1947 when the Jockey Club of which he was asteward invited me to see the Derby He was surprised thatI remembered the occasion) He now gave the orders forthe individual squadrons to ascend and patrol as the resultof the final information which appeared on the map-tableThe Air Marshal himself walked up and down behindwatching with vigilant eye every move in the gamesupervising his junior executive hand and only occasionallyintervening with some decisive order usually to reinforce athreatened area In a little while all our squadrons werefighting and some had already begun to return for fuel Allwere in the air The lower line of bulbs was out There wasnot one squadron left in reserve At this moment Parkspoke to Dowding at Stanmore asking for three squadronsfrom Number 12 Group to be put at his disposal in case of


another major attack while his squadrons were rearmingand refuelling This was done They were specially neededto cover London and our fighter aerodromes becauseNumber 11 Group had already shot their boltThe young officer to whom this seemed a matter of routinecontinued to give his orders in accordance with the generaldirections of his Group Commander in a calm lowmonotone and the three reinforcing squadrons were soonabsorbed I became conscious of the anxiety of theCommander who now stood still behind his subordinatersquoschair Hitherto I had watched in silence I now asked ldquoWhatother reserves have werdquoldquoThere are nonerdquo said Air Vice-Marshal Park In an account which he wrote about itafterwards he said that at this I ldquolooked graverdquo Well Imight What losses should we not suffer if our refuellingplanes were caught on the ground by further raids of ldquo40plusrdquo or ldquo50 plusrdquo The odds were great our margins smallthe stakes infiniteAnother five minutes passed and most of our squadronshad now descended to refuel In many cases our resourcescould not give them overhead protection Then it appearedthat the enemy were going home The shifting of the discson the table below showed a continuous eastwardmovement of German bombers and fighters No new attackappeared In another ten minutes the action was endedWe climbed again the stairways which led to the surfaceand almost as we emerged the ldquoAll Clearrdquo soundedldquoWe are very glad sir you have seen thisrdquo said Park ldquoOfcourse during the last twenty minutes we were so chokedwith information that we couldnrsquot handle it This shows youthe limitation of our present resources They have beenstrained far beyond their limits todayrdquo I asked whether anyresults had come to hand and remarked that the attack


appeared to have been repelled satisfactorily Park repliedthat he was not satisfied that we had intercepted as manyraiders as he had hoped we should It was evident that theenemy had everywhere pierced our defences Many scoresof German bombers with their fighter escort had beenreported over London About a dozen had been broughtdown while I was below but no picture of the results of thebattle or of the damage or losses could be obtainedIt was 430 PM before I got back to Chequers and Iimmediately went to bed for my afternoon sleep I musthave been tired by the drama of Number 11 Group for I didnot wake till eight When I rang John Martin my principalprivate secretary came in with the evening budget of newsfrom all over the world It was repellent This had gonewrong here that had been delayed there an unsatisfactoryanswer had been received from so-and-so there had beenbad sinkings in the Atlantic ldquoHoweverrdquo said Martin as hefinished this account ldquoall is redeemed by the air We haveshot down a hundred and eighty-three for a loss of underfortyrdquo

Although post-war information has shown that the enemyrsquoslosses on this day were only fifty-six September 15 was thecrux of the Battle of Britain That same night our BomberCommand attacked in strength the shipping in the portsfrom Boulogne to Antwerp At Antwerp particularly heavylosses were inflicted On September 17 as we now knowthe Fuehrer decided to postpone ldquoSea Lionrdquo indefinitely Itwas not till October 12 that the invasion was formally calledoff till the following spring In July 1941 it was postponedagain by Hitler till the spring of 1942 ldquoby which time theRussian campaign will be completedrdquo This was a vain but


an important imagining On February 13 1942 AdmiralRaeder had his final interview on ldquoSea Lionrdquo and got Hitlerto agree to a complete ldquostand-downrdquo Thus perishedldquoOperation Sea Lionrdquo And September 15 may stand as thedate of its demise

The German Naval Staff were in hearty accord with all thepostponements indeed they instigated them The Armyleaders made no complaint On the l7th I said in Parliament

The process of waiting keyed up to concert pitch dayafter day is apt in time to lose its charm of noveltySundayrsquos action was the most brilliant and fruitful of anyfought up to that date by the fighters of the Royal AirForcehellip We may await the decision of this long airbattle with sober but increasing confidence

An impartial observer Brigadier-General Strong AssistantChief of the United States War Plans Division and Head ofthe American Military Mission which had been sent toLondon to observe the results of the Luftwaffe attacksarrived back in New York on the 19th and reported that theLuftwaffe ldquohad made no serious inroad on the strength ofthe RAF that the military damage done by airbombardment had been comparatively small and thatBritish claims of German aircraft losses were lsquoon theconservative sidersquordquoYet the Battle of London was still to be fought out Althoughinvasion had been called off it was not till September 27that Goering gave up hope that his method of winning thewar might succeed In October though London received itsfull share the German effort was spread by day and night infrequent small-scale attacks on many places Concentration


of effort gave way to dispersion the battle of attritionbegan Attrition But whose

In cold blood with the knowledge of the after-time we maystudy the actual losses of the British and German AirForces in what may well be deemed one of the decisivebattles of the world From the table our hopes and fearsmay be contrasted with what happenedNo doubt we were always oversanguine in our estimates ofenemy scalps In the upshot we got two to one of theGerman assailants instead of three to one as we believedand declared But this was enough The Royal Air Force farfrom being destroyed was triumphant A strong flow offresh pilots was provided The aircraft factories upon whichnot only our immediate need but our power to wage a longwar depended were mauled but not paralysed Theworkers skilled and unskilled men and women alike stoodto their lathes and manned the workshops under fire as ifthey were batteries in action ndash which indeed they were Atthe Ministry of Supply Herbert Morrison spurred all in hiswide sphere ldquoGo to itrdquo he adjured and to it they wentSkilful and ever-ready support was given to the air fightingby the Anti-Aircraft Command under General Pile Theirmain contribution came later The Observer Corps devotedand tireless were hourly at their posts The carefullywrought organisation of Fighter Command without whichall might have been vain proved equal to months ofcontinuous strain All played their part



Further tables will be found in Appendix CAt the summit the stamina and valour of our fighter pilotsremained unconquerable and supreme Thus Britain wassaved Well might I say in the House of Commons ldquoNeverin the field of human conflict was so much owed by somany to so fewrdquo


2The Blitz

Successive Phases of the German Attack mdashGoering Assumes Command of the Air BattlemdashHisAttempt to Conquer LondonmdashHitlerrsquos Boast mdashFifty-Seven Nightsrsquo Bombardment (September 7to November 3)mdashGeneral Pilersquos BarragemdashSomePersonal NotesmdashDowning Street and the AnnexemdashMr Chamberlainrsquos Fortitude After His MajorOperation mdash He Consents to Leave LondonmdashADinner at Number 10 mdash My Lucky Inspiration mdashThe Bomb in the Treasury CourtyardmdashBurningPall MallmdashDestruction ofthe Carlton ClubmdashCourage of the PeoplemdashThe Margate Restaurantand the War Damage Insurance SchememdashRulesfor the Public DepartmentsmdashThe ldquoAlertrdquo and theldquoAlarmrdquomdash The ldquoBanshee Howlingsrdquomdash The CabinetAdvances Its Meal TimesmdashOur Expectation thatLondon Would be Reduced to RubblemdashHaughtyMood of Parliament mdash I Persuade Them to Actwith Prudence mdash Their Good Fortune

THE GERMAN AIR ASSAULT on Britain is a tale of dividedcounsels conflicting purposes and never fullyaccomplished plans Three or four times in these monthsthe enemy abandoned a method of attack which wascausing us severe stress and turned to something newBut all these stages overlapped one another and cannot bereadily distinguished by precise dates Each one merged


into the next The early operations sought to engage our airforces in battle over the Channel and the south coast nextthe struggle was continued over our southern countiesprincipally Kent and Sussex the enemy aiming to destroyour air-power organisation then nearer to and over Londonthen London became the supreme target and finally whenLondon triumphed there was a renewed dispersion to theprovincial cities and to the sole life-line by the Mersey andthe ClydeWe have seen how very hard they had run us in the attackon the south-coast airfields in the last week of August andthe first week of September But on September 7 Goeringpublicly assumed command of the air battle and turnedfrom daylight to night attack and from the fighter airfields ofKent and Sussex to the vast built-up areas of LondonMinor raids by daylight were frequent indeed constant andone great daylight attack was still to come but in the mainthe whole character of the German offensive was alteredFor fifty-seven nights the bombing of London wasunceasing This constituted an ordeal for the worldrsquos largestcity the results of which no one could measure beforehandNever before was so wide an expanse of houses subjectedto such bombardment or so many families required to faceits problems and its terrorsThe sporadic raiding of London towards the end of Augustwas promptly answered by us in a retaliatory attack onBerlin Because of the distance we had to travel this couldonly be on a very small scale compared with attacks onLondon from nearby French and Belgian airfields The WarCabinet were much in the mood to hit back to raise thestakes and to defy the enemy I was sure they were rightand believed that nothing impressed or disturbed Hitler somuch as his realisation of British wrath and will-power Inhis heart he was one of our admirers He took of course


full advantage of our reprisal on Berlin and publiclyannounced the previously settled German policy ofreducing London and other British cities to chaos and ruinldquoIf they attack our citiesrdquo he declared on September 4 ldquowewill simply rub out theirsrdquo He tried his bestThe first German aim had been the destruction of our air-power the second was to break the spirit of the Londoneror at least render uninhabitable the worldrsquos largest city Inthese new purposes the enemy did not succeed Thevictory of the Royal Air Force had been gained by the skilland daring of our pilots by the excellence of our machinesand by their wonderful organisation Other virtues not lesssplendid not less indispensable to the life of Britain werenow to be displayed by millions of ordinary humble peoplewho proved to the world the strength of a communitynursed in freedom

From September 7 to November 3 an average of twohundred German bombers attacked London every nightThe various preliminary raids which had been made uponour provincial cities in the previous three weeks had led to aconsiderable dispersion of our anti-aircraft artillery andwhen London first became the main target there were butninety-two guns in position It was thought better to leavethe air free for our night-fighters working under Number 11Group Of these there were six squadrons of Blenheimsand Defiants Night-fighting was in its infancy and very fewcasualties were inflicted on the enemy Our batteriestherefore remained silent for three nights in successionTheir own technique was at this time woefully imperfectNevertheless in view of the weakness of our night-fightersand of their unsolved problems it was decided that the anti-


aircraft gunners should be given a free hand to fire atunseen targets using any methods of control they liked Inforty-eight hours General Pile commanding the Air DefenceArtillery had more than doubled the number of guns in thecapital by withdrawals from the provincial cities Our ownaircraft were kept out of the way and the batteries weregiven their chanceFor three nights Londoners had sat in their houses orinadequate shelters enduring what seemed to be an utterlyunresisted attack Suddenly on September 10 the wholebarrage opened accompanied by a blaze of searchlightsThis roaring cannonade did not do much harm to theenemy but gave enormous satisfaction to the populationEveryone was cheered by the feeling that we were hittingback From that time onward the batteries fired regularlyand of course practice ingenuity and grinding needsteadily improved the shooting A slowly increasing toll wastaken of the German raiders Upon occasions the batterieswere silent and the night-fighters whose methods werealso progressing came on the scene The night raids wereaccompanied by more or less continuous daylight attacksby small groups or even single enemy planes and thesirens often sounded at brief intervals throughout the wholetwenty-four hours To this curious existence the sevenmillion inhabitants of London accustomed themselves

In the hope that it may lighten the hard course of thisnarrative I record a few personal notes about the ldquoBlitzrdquowell knowing how many thousands have far more excitingtales to tellWhen the bombardment first began the idea was to treat itwith disdain In the West End everybody went about his


business and pleasure and dined and slept as he usuallydid The theatres were full and the darkened streets werecrowded with casual traffic All this was perhaps a healthyreaction from the frightful squawk which the defeatistelements in Paris had put up on the occasion when theywere first seriously raided in May I remember dining in asmall company when very lively and continuous raids weregoing on The large windows of Stornoway House openedupon the Green Park which flickered with the flashes of theguns and was occasionally lit by the glare of an explodingbomb I felt that we were taking unnecessary risks Afterdinner we went to the Imperial Chemicals Buildingoverlooking the Embankment From these high stonebalconies there was a splendid view of the river At least adozen fires were burning on the south side and while wewere there several heavy bombs fell one near enough formy friends to pull me back behind a substantial stone pillarThis certainly confirmed my opinion that we should have toaccept many restrictions upon the ordinary amenities of lifeThe group of Government buildings around Whitehall wererepeatedly hit Downing Street consists of houses twohundred and fifty years old shaky and lightly built by theprofiteering contractor whose name they bear At the timeof the Munich alarm shelters had been constructed for theoccupants of Number 10 and Number 11 and the rooms onthe garden level had had their ceilings propped up with awooden under-ceiling and strong timbers It was believedthat this would support the ruins if the building was blown orshaken down but of course neither these rooms nor theshelters were effective against a direct hit During the lastfortnight of September preparations were made to transfermy Ministerial Headquarters to the more modern and solidGovernment offices looking over St Jamesrsquos Park byStoreyrsquos Gate These quarters we called ldquothe Annexerdquo


Below them were the War Room and a certain amount ofbomb-proof sleeping accommodation The bombs at thistime were of course smaller than those of the later phasesStill in the interval before the new apartments were readylife at Downing Street was exciting One might as well havebeen at a battalion headquarters in the line

In these months we held our evening Cabinets in the WarRoom in the Annexe basement To get there from DowningStreet it was necessary to walk through the Foreign Officequadrangle and then clamber through the working partieswho were pouring in the concrete to make the War Roomand basement offices safer I did not realise what a trial thiswas to Mr Chamberlain with all the consequences of hismajor operation upon him Nothing deterred him and hewas never more spick and span or cool and determinedthan at the last Cabinets which he attendedOne evening in late September 1940 I looked out of theDowning Street front door and saw workmen pilingsandbags in front of the low basement windows of theForeign Office opposite I asked what they were doing Iwas told that after his operation Mr Neville Chamberlainhad to have special periodical treatment and that it wasembarrassing to carry this out in the shelter of Number 11where at least twenty people were gathered during theconstant raids so a small private place was being preparedover there for him Every day he kept all his appointmentsreserved efficient faultlessly attired But here was thebackground It was too much I used my authority I walkedthrough the passage between Number 10 and Number 11and found Mrs Chamberlain I said ldquoHe ought not to behere in this condition You must take him away till he is well


again I will send all the telegrams to him each dayrdquo Shewent off to see her husband In an hour she sent me wordldquoHe will do what you wish We are leaving tonightrdquo I neversaw him again In less than two months he was no more Iam sure he wanted to die in harness This was not to be

Another evening (October 14) stands out in my mind Wewere dining in the garden room of Number 10 when theusual night raid began My companions were ArchieSinclair Oliver Lyttelton and Moore-Brabazon The steelshutters had been closed Several loud explosions occurredaround us at no great distance and presently a bomb fellperhaps a hundred yards away on the Horse GuardsParade making a great deal of noise Suddenly I had aprovidential impulse The kitchen at Number 10 DowningStreet is lofty and spacious and looks out onto one of thecourts of the Treasury through a large plate-glass windowabout twenty-five feet high The butler and parlour maidcontinued to serve the dinner with complete detachmentbut I became acutely aware of this big window behindwhich Mrs Landemare the cook and Nellie the kitchenmaid never turning a hair were at work I got up abruptlywent into the kitchen told the butler to put the dinner on thehot plate in the dining-room and ordered the cook andother servants into the shelter such as it was I had beenseated again at table only about three minutes when areally very loud crash close at hand and a violent shockshowed that the house had been struck My detective cameinto the room and said much damage had been done Thekitchen the pantry and the offices on the Treasury sidewere shattered


We went into the kitchen to view the scene Thedevastation was complete The bomb had fallen fifty yardsaway on the Treasury and the blast had smitten the largetidy kitchen with all its bright saucepans and crockery intoa heap of black dust and rubble The big plate-glasswindow had been hurled in fragments and splinters acrossthe room and would of course have cut its occupants ifthere had been any to pieces But my fortunate inspirationwhich I might so easily have neglected had come in thenick of time The underground Treasury shelter across thecourt had been blown to pieces by a direct hit and the threecivil servants who were doing Home Guard night-duty therewere killed All however were buried under tons of brickrubble and we did not know who was missingAs the raid continued and seemed to grow in intensity weput on our tin hats and went out to view the scene from thetop of the Annexe buildings Before doing so however Icould not resist taking Mrs Landemare and the others fromthe shelter to see their kitchen They were upset at the sightof the wreck but principally on account of the generaluntidinessArchie and I went up to the cupola of the Annexe buildingThe night was clear and there was a wide view of LondonIt seemed that the greater part of Pall Mall was in flames Atleast five fierce fires were burning there and others in StJamesrsquos Street and Piccadilly Farther back over the river inthe opposite direction there were many conflagrations ButPall Mall was the vivid flame-picture Gradually the attackdied down and presently the ldquoAll Clearrdquo sounded leavingonly the blazing fires We went downstairs to my newapartments on the first floor of the Annexe and there foundCaptain David Margesson the Chief Whip who wasaccustomed to live at the Carlton Club He told us the club


had been blown to bits and indeed we had thought by thesituation of the fires that it must have been hit He was inthe club with about two hundred and fifty members andstaff It had been struck by a heavy bomb The whole of thefaccedilade and the massive coping on the Pall Mall side hadfallen into the street obliterating his motor-car which wasparked near the front door The smoking-room had beenfull of members and the whole ceiling had come downupon them When I looked at the ruins next day it seemedincredible that most of them should not have been killedHowever by what seemed a miracle they had all crawledout of the dust smoke and rubble and though many wereinjured not a single life was lost When in due course thesefacts came to the notice of the Cabinet our Labourcolleagues facetiously remarked ldquoThe Devil looks after hisownrdquo Mr Quintin Hogg had carried his father a former LordChancellor on his shoulders from the wreck as Aeneashad borne Pater Anchises from the ruins of TroyMargesson had nowhere to sleep and we found himblankets and a bed in the basement of the AnnexeAltogether it was a lurid evening and considering thedamage to buildings it was remarkable that there were notmore than five hundred people killed and about a couple ofthousand injured

One day after luncheon the Chancellor of the ExchequerKingsley Wood came to see me on business at Number10 and we heard a very heavy explosion take place acrossthe river in South London I took him to see what hadhappened The bomb had fallen in Peckham It was a verybig one ndash probably a land-mine It had completely destroyedor gutted twenty or thirty small three-story houses andcleared a considerable open space in this very poor district


Already little pathetic Union Jacks had been stuck up amidthe ruins When my car was recognised the people camerunning from all quarters and a crowd of more than athousand was soon gathered All these folk were in a highstate of enthusiasm They crowded round us cheering andmanifesting every sign of lively affection wanting to touchand stroke my clothes One would have thought I hadbrought them some fine substantial benefit which wouldimprove their lot in life I was completely undermined andwept Ismay who was with me records that he heard anold woman say ldquoYou see he really cares Hersquos cryingrdquoThey were tears not of sorrow but of wonder andadmiration ldquoBut see look hererdquo they said and drew me tothe centre of the ruins There was an enormous craterperhaps forty yards across and twenty feet deep Cockedup at an angle on the very edge was an Anderson shelterand we were greeted at its twisted doorway by a youngishman his wife and three children quite unharmed butobviously shell-jarred They had been there at the momentof the explosion They could give no account of theirexperiences But there they were and proud of it Theirneighbours regarded them as enviable curiosities Whenwe got back into the car a harsher mood swept over thishaggard crowd ldquoGive it rsquoem backrdquo they cried and ldquoLetthem have it toordquo I undertook forthwith to see that theirwishes were carried out and this promise was certainlykept The debt was repaid tenfold twentyfold in the frightfulroutine bombardment of German cities which grew inintensity as our air power developed as the bombs becamefar heavier and the explosives more powerful Certainly theenemy got it all back in good measure pressed down andrunning over Alas for poor humanity


Another time I visited Margate An air raid came upon usand I was conducted into their big tunnel where quite largenumbers of people lived permanently When we came outafter a quarter of an hour we looked at the still-smokingdamage A small restaurant had been hit Nobody had beenhurt but the place had been reduced into a litter ofcrockery utensils and splintered furniture The proprietorhis wife and the cooks and waitresses were in tearsWhere was their home Where was their livelihood Hereis a privilege of power I formed an immediate resolve Onthe way back in my train I dictated a letter to the Chancellorof the Exchequer laying down the principle that all damagefrom the fire of the enemy must be a charge upon the Stateand compensation be paid in full and at once Thus theburden would not fall alone on those whose homes orbusiness premises were hit but would be borne evenly onthe shoulders of the nation Kingsley Wood was naturally alittle worried by the indefinite character of this obligationBut I pressed hard and an insurance scheme was devisedin a fortnight which afterwards played a substantial part inour affairs In explaining this to Parliament on September 5I said

It is very painful to me to see as I have seen in myjourneys about the country a small British house orbusiness smashed by the enemyrsquos fire and to see thatwithout feeling assured that we are doing our best tospread the burden so that we all stand in togetherDamage by enemy action stands on a different footingfrom any other kind of loss or damage because thenation undertakes the task of defending the lives andproperty of its subjects and taxpayers against assaultsfrom outside Unless public opinion and the judgment ofthe House were prepared to separate damage resultingfrom the fire of the enemy from all other forms of warloss and unless the House was prepared to draw thedistinction very sharply between war damage by bomb


and shell and the other forms of loss which areincurred we could not attempt to deal with this matterotherwise we should be opening up a field to whichthere would be no bounds If however we were able toembark upon such a project as would give completeinsurance at any rate up to a certain minimum figurefor everyone against war damage by shell or bomb Ithink it would be a very solid mark of the confidencewhich after some experience we are justified in feelingabout the way in which we are going to come throughthis war

The Treasury went through various emotions about thisinsurance scheme First they thought it was going to betheir ruin but when after May 1941 the air raids ceased forover three years they began to make a great deal ofmoney and considered the plan provident andstatesmanlike However later on in the war when theldquodoodle-bugsrdquo and rockets began the account swung theother way and eight hundred and thirty millions have in factalready been paid out I am very glad it is so

Our outlook at this time was that London except for itsstrong modern buildings would be gradually and soonreduced to a rubble-heap I was deeply anxious about thelife of the people of London the greater part of whomstayed slept and took a chance where they were Thebrick and concrete shelters were multiplying rapidly TheTubes offered accommodation for a good many Therewere several large shelters some of which held as many asseven thousand people who camped there in confidencenight after night little knowing what the effect of a direct hitwould have been upon them I asked that brick traversesshould be built in these as fast as possible About the


Tubes there was an argument which was ultimatelyresolved by a compromise

Prime Minister to SirEdward BridgesHome Secretary andMinister of Transport

21IX40

1 When I asked at the Cabinet the other day whythe Tubes could not be used to some extent even atthe expense of transport facilities as air-raid shelters Iwas assured that this was most undesirable and thatthe whole matter had been reviewed before thatconclusion was reached I now see that the AldwychTube is to be used as a shelter Pray let me have moreinformation about this and what has happened tosupersede the former decisive arguments

2 I still remain in favour of a widespread utilisationof the Tubes by which I mean not only the stations butthe railway lines and I should like a short report on onesheet of paper showing the numbers that could beaccommodated on various sections and the structuralchanges that would be required to fit these sections fortheir new use Is it true for instance that 750000people could be accommodated in the Aldwych sectionalone We may well have to balance the relativedemands of transport and shelter

3 I am awaiting the report of the Home Secretary onthe forward policy of ndash

(1) Making more shelters(2) Strengthening existing basements(3) Making empty basements and premises

available(4) Most important Assigning fixed places by tickets

to a large proportion of the people thus keeping themwhere we want them and avoiding crowding

In this new phase of warfare it became important to extractthe optimum of work not only from the factories but even


more from the departments in London which were underfrequent bombardment during both the day and night Atfirst whenever the sirens gave the alarm all the occupantsof a score of Ministries were promptly collected and leddown to the basements for what these were worth Prideeven was being taken in the efficiency and thoroughnesswith which this evolution was performed In many cases itwas only half a dozen aeroplanes which approached ndashsometimes only one Often they did not arrive A petty raidmight bring to a standstill for over an hour the wholeexecutive and administrative machine in LondonI therefore proposed the stage ldquoAlertrdquo operative on thesiren warning as distinct from the ldquoAlarmrdquo which should beenforced only when the spotters on the roof or ldquoJimCrowsrdquo as they came to be called reported ldquoImminentdangerrdquo which meant that the enemy were actuallyoverhead or very near Schemes were worked outaccordingly In order to enforce rigorous compliance whilewe lived under these repeated daylight attacks I called fora weekly return of the number of hours spent by the staff ofeach department in the shelters

Prime Minister to SirEdward Bridges andGeneral Ismay

17IX40

Please report by tomorrow night the number ofhours on September 16 that the principal offices inLondon were in their dug-outs and out of action throughair alarm

2 General Ismay should find out how the AirMinistry and Fighter Command view the idea that nored warning should be given when only two or threeaircraft are approaching London


Prime Minister to SirHorace Wilson and SirEdward Bridges

19IX40

Let me have a further return [of time lost inGovernment Departments owing to air-raid warnings]for the 17th and 18th and henceforward daily from allMinistries including the Service Departments Thesereturns will be circulated to heads of all Departments atthe same time as they are sent to me Thus it will bepossible to see who are doing best If all returns are notreceived on any day from some Departments thosethat are should nevertheless be circulated

This put everybody on their mettle Eight of these returnswere actually furnished It was amusing to see that thefighting Departments were for some time in the worstposition Offended and spurred by this implied reproachthey very quickly took their proper place The loss of hoursin all Departments was reduced to a fraction Presently ourfighters made daylight attack too costly to the enemy andthis phase passed away In spite of the almost continuousalerts and alarms which were sounded hardly a singleGovernment Department was hit during daylight when itwas full of people nor any loss of life sustained But howmuch time might have been wasted in the functioning of thewar machine if the civil and military staffs had shown anyweakness or been guided up the wrong alleyAs early as September 1 before the heavy night attacksbegan I had addressed the Home Secretary and others

Air-raid Warnings and Precautions1 The present system of air-raid warnings was

designed to cope with occasional large mass raids ondefinite targets not with waves coming over several


times a day and still less with sporadic bombersroaming about at nights We cannot allow large parts ofthe country to be immobilised for hours every day andto be distracted every night The enemy must not bepermitted to prejudice our war effort by stopping work inthe factories which he has been unable to destroy

2 There should be instituted therefore a newsystem of warnings

The AlertThe AlarmThe All ClearThe Alert should not interrupt the normal life of the

area People not engaged on national work could ifthey desired take refuge or put their children in a placeof safety But in general they should learn and they dolearn to adapt themselves to their dangers and takeonly such precautions as are compatible with theirduties and imposed by their temperament

3 The air-raid services should be run on anincreased nucleus staff and not all be called out everytime as on a present red warning The lookout systemshould be developed in all factories where war work isproceeding and should be put into effect when theAlert is given the lookouts would have full authority togive local factory or office alarms The signal for theAlert might be given during the day by the hoisting of adisplay of yellow flags by a sufficient number ofspecially charged air-raid wardens At night flickeringyellow (or perhaps red) lamps could be employed Theuse of electric street lighting should be studied and thepossibility of sounding special signals on the telephone

4 The Alarm is a direct order to ldquoTake coverrdquo and forthe full manning of all ARP positions This will verylikely synchronise with or precede by only a briefinterval the actual attack The routine in each casemust be subject to local conditions

The signal for the Alarm would be the siren It wouldprobably be unnecessary to supplement this by light ortelephone signals

5 The All Clear could be sounded as at present Itwould end the Alarm period If the Alert continued theflags would remain hoisted if the enemy had definitely


turned back the Alert flags and lights would beremoved

The use of the Alert and Alarm signals might vary indifferent parts of the country In areas subject tofrequent attack such as East Kent South andSoutheast London Southeast Anglia BirminghamDerby Liverpool Bristol and some other places theAlert would be a commonplace The Alarm woulddenote actual attack This would also apply to theWhitehall district In other parts of the country asomewhat less sparing use of the Alarm might bejustified in order to keep the air-raid services fromdeteriorating

6 In Government offices in London no one shouldbe forced to take cover until actual firing has begun andthe siren ordering the Alarm under the new conditionshas been sounded No one is to stop work merelybecause London is under Alert conditions

I had to give way about the sirens or ldquoBanshee howlingsrdquoas I described them to Parliament

Prime Minister toHome Secretary andothers concerned

14IX40

I promised the House that new regulations about air-raid warnings sirens whistles Jim Crow etc shouldbe considered within the past week However theintensification of raiding has made it inexpedient toabolish the sirens at this moment I shall be gladhowever to have a short statement prepared of what isthe practice which has in fact developed during the lastweek


One felt keenly for all the poor people most of them in theirlittle homes with nothing over their heads


3IX40

In spite of the shortage of materials a great effortshould be made to help people to drain their Andersonshelters which reflect so much credit on your nameand to make floors for them against the winter rainBricks on edge placed loosely together without mortarcovered with a piece of linoleum would be quite goodbut there must be a drain and a sump I am prepared tohelp you in a comprehensive scheme to tackle thisInstruction can be given on the broadcast and ofcourse the Regional Commissioners and localauthorities should be used Let me have a plan

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay andPrivate Office

11IX40

Please call for reports on whether any seriouseffects are being produced by the air attack on ndash

(1) food supplies and distribution(2) numbers of homeless and provision therefor(3) exhaustion of Fire Brigade personnel(4) sewage in London area(5) gas and electricity(6) water supplies in London area(7) General Ismay to find out what is the practical

effect of the bombing on Woolwich production Seealso my report from the Minister of Supply


12IX40


Will you kindly convey to the Cabinet and Ministersthe suggestion which I make that our hours should besomewhat advanced Luncheon should be at oneorsquoclock and Cabinet times moved forward by half anhour In principle it will be convenient if we aim at anearlier dinner-hour say 715 PM Darkness fallsearlier and for the next few weeks severe bombingmay be expected once the protection of the fighteraircraft is withdrawn It would be a good thing if staffsand servants could be under shelter as early aspossible and Ministers are requested to arrange towork in places of reasonable security during the nightraids and especially to find places for sleeping wherethey will not be disturbed by anything but a direct hit

I propose to ask Parliament when it meets at theusual time on Tuesday to meet in these occasionalsittings at 11 AM and separate at 4 or 5 PM This willallow Members to reach their homes and I hope theirshelters by daylight We must adapt ourselves to theseconditions which will probably be accentuated Indeedit is likely we shall have to move our office hoursforward by another half-hour as the days shorten

Parliament also required guidance about the conduct of itswork in these dangerous days Members felt that it wastheir duty to set an example This was right but it mighthave been pushed too far I had to reason with theCommons to make them observe ordinary prudence andconform to the peculiar conditions of the time I convincedthem in secret session of the need to take necessary andwell-considered precautions They agreed that their daysand hours of sitting should not be advertised and tosuspend their debates when the Jim Crow reported to theSpeaker ldquoImminent dangerrdquo Then they all trooped downdutifully to the crowded ineffectual shelters that had beenprovided It will always add to the renown of the British


Parliament that its Members continued to sit and dischargetheir duties through all this period The Commons are verytouchy in such matters and it would have been easy tomisjudge their mood When one Chamber was damagedthey moved to another and I did my utmost to persuadethem to follow wise advice with good grace Theirmigrations will be recorded in due course In shorteveryone behaved with sense and dignity It was also luckythat when the Chamber was blown to pieces a few monthslater it was by night and not by day when empty and notfull With our mastery of the daylight raids there cameconsiderable relief in personal convenience But during thefirst few months I was never free from anxiety about thesafety of the Members After all a free sovereignParliament fairly chosen by universal suffrage able to turnout the Government any day but proud to uphold it in thedarkest days was one of the points which were in disputewith the enemy Parliament wonI doubt whether any of the dictators had as much effectivepower throughout his whole nation as the British WarCabinet When we expressed our desires we weresustained by the peoplersquos representatives and cheerfullyobeyed by all Yet at no time was the right of criticismimpaired Nearly always the critics respected the nationalinterest When on occasions they challenged us theHouses voted them down by overwhelming majorities andthis in contrast with totalitarian methods without theslightest coercion intervention or use of the police orSecret Service It was a proud thought that ParliamentaryDemocracy or whatever our British public life can be calledcan endure surmount and survive all trials Even the threatof annihilation did not daunt our Members but thisfortunately did not come to pass


3ldquoLondon Can Take Itrdquo

Grim and Gay mdash Passion in the United States mdashThe London DrainsmdashDanger o f Epidemics mdashBroken WindowsmdashThe Delayed-Action Bombs mdashMinutes Thereupon mdash The UXB Detachmentsmdash The Peril Mastered mdash Heavy Parachute Minesmdash The Question of Reprisals mdash Later GermanExperiences Compared with Ours mdash Need ofSecurity for the Central Government mdashldquoPaddockrdquoRehearsal mdash Herbert Morrison Succeeds JohnAnderson as Home Secretary mdash The IncendiaryAttacks Begin mdash The National Fire Service mdash CivilDefence a Fourth Arm of the Crown mdash Power ofLondon to Take Punishment mdash PermanentArrangements for Safeguarding the War Machinemdash I Am Placed in Safety in Piccadilly Under-ground mdash Return to the Annexe mdash AnotherChange of the German PlanmdashThe ProvincialCities mdash Coventry mdash Birmingham mdash Attacks onthe Ports mdash Great Burning of the City of LondonDecember 29 1940 mdashThe King at BuckinghamPalace mdash His Majestyrsquos Mastery of Business mdash AThought for the Future

THESE WERE THE TIMES When the English andparticularly the Londoners who had the place of honourwere seen at their best Grim and gay dogged andserviceable with the confidence of an unconquered peoplein their bones they adapted themselves to this strange new


life with all its terrors with all its jolts and jars One eveningwhen I was leaving for an inspection on the east coast onmy way to Kingrsquos Cross the sirens sounded the streetsbegan to empty except for long queues of very tired palepeople waiting for the last bus that would run An autumnmist and drizzle shrouded the scene The air was cold andraw Night and the enemy were approaching I felt with aspasm of mental pain a deep sense of the strain andsuffering that was being borne throughout the worldrsquoslargest capital city How long would it go on How muchmore would they have to bear What were the limits of theirvitality What effects would their exhaustion have upon ourproductive warmaking power1

Away across the Atlantic the prolonged bombardment ofLondon and later of other cities and seaports aroused awave of sympathy in the United States stronger than anyever felt before or since in the English-speaking worldPassion flamed in American hearts and in none more thanin the heart of President Roosevelt The temperature rosesteadily in the United States I could feel the glow of millionsof men and women eager to share the suffering burning tostrike a blow As many Americans as could get passagescame bringing whatever gifts they could and their respectreverence deep love and comradeship were very inspiringHowever this was only September and we had manymonths before us of this curious existenceUnder the pressure of the bombardment the shelters anddefences grew continually I was worried principally onthree counts The first was the drains When you had six orseven million people living in a great built-up area thesmashing of their sewers and water supply seemed to me avery great danger Could we keep the sewage systemworking or would there be a pestilence What would


happen if the drains got into the water supply Actuallyearly in October the main sewage outfall was destroyed andwe had to let all our sewage flow into the Thames whichstank first of sewage and afterwards of the floods ofchemicals we poured into it But all was masteredSecondly I feared that the long nights for millions in thecrowded street-shelters ndash only blast-proof at that ndash wouldproduce epidemics of influenza diphtheria the commoncold and what-not But it appeared that Nature had alreadyprovided against this danger Man is a gregarious animaland apparently the mischievous microbes he exhales fightand neutralise each other They go out and devour eachother and Man walks off unharmed If this is notscientifically correct it ought to be The fact remains thatduring this rough winter the health of the Londoners wasactually above the average Moreover the power ofenduring suffering in the ordinary people of every countrywhen their spirit is roused seems to have no boundsMy third fear was a glass famine Sometimes whole streetshad every window-frame smashed by the blast of a singlebomb In a series of Minutes I inquired anxiously about thisand proposed to stop all export of glass forthwith I washowever reassured by facts and figures and this dangeralso never came to pass

In the middle of September a new and damaging form ofattack was used against us Large numbers of delayed-action bombs were now widely and plentifully cast upon usand became an awkward problem Long stretches ofrailway line important junctions the approaches to vitalfactories airfields main thoroughfares had scores of timesto be blocked off and denied to us in our need These


bombs had to be dug out and exploded or renderedharmless This was a task of the utmost peril especially atthe beginning when the means and methods had all to belearned by a series of decisive experiences I have alreadyrecounted in Volume I the drama of dismantling themagnetic mine but this form of self-devotion now becamecommonplace while remaining sublime I had always takenan interest in the delayed-action fuze which had firstimpressed itself on me in 1918 when the Germans hadused it on a large scale to deny us the use of the railwaysby which we planned to advance into Germany I had urgedits use by us both in Norway and in the Kiel Canal There isno doubt that it is a most effective agent in warfare onaccount of the prolonged uncertainty which it creates Wewere now to taste it ourselves A special organisation todeal with it was set up under General King a highlycapable energetic officer whom I interviewed myself atChequers In a series of Minutes I tried to stimulate thework


13IX40

As I telephoned to you last night it appears to be ofhigh importance to cope with the UXB [unexplodedbombs] in London and especially on the railways Thecongestion in the marshalling yards is becoming acutemainly from this cause It would be well to bring inclearance parties both from the north and the west andalso to expand as rapidly as possible General Kingrsquosorganisation It must be planned on large enough linesto cope with this nuisance which may soon wear agraver aspect



21IX40

The rapid disposal of unexploded bombs is of thehighest importance Any failure to grapple with thisproblem may have serious results on the production ofaircraft and other vital war material The work of thebomb-disposal squads must be facilitated by theprovision of every kind of up-to-date equipment Thepaper which I have received from the Secretary ofState for War shows the experiments on foot and theequipment being planned Priority 1 (a) should beallotted to the production of the equipment requiredand to any further requirements which may come tolight


14IX40

I hear that there is a special type of auger manufac-tured in the United States which is capable of boring inthe space of less than an hour a hole of such a sizeand depth as would take two to three days to digmanually

You should I think consider ordering a number ofthese appliances for the use of the bomb-disposalsquads The essence of this business is to reach thebomb and deal with it with the least possible delay

These augers may perhaps be expensive but theywill pay for themselves many times over by the savingthey will effect in life and property Besides I considerthat we owe it to these brave men to provide them withthe very best technical equipment


28IX40

I am told that there is good evidence to show thatthe system of dealing with time-bombs by trepanning2


is proving very successful In view of the serious andgrowing trouble that is being caused by these bombs Ishould like to be assured that this method is being usedon a large enough scale Will you please let me have areport on the extent to which trepanning is being used

Special companies were formed in every city town anddistrict Volunteers pressed forward for the deadly gameTeams were formed which had good or bad luck Somesurvived this phase of our ordeal Others ran twenty thirtyor even forty courses before they met their fate Theunexploded-bomb (UXB) detachments presentedthemselves wherever I went on my tours Somehow orother their faces seemed different from those of ordinarymen however brave and faithful They were gaunt theywere haggard their faces had a bluish look with brightgleaming eyes and exceptional compression of the lipswithal a perfect demeanour In writing about our hard timeswe are apt to overuse the word ldquogrimrdquo It should have beenreserved for the UXB disposal squads3

One squad I remember which may be taken as symbolic ofmany others It consisted of three people ndash the Earl ofSuffolk his lady private secretary and his rather agedchauffeur They called themselves ldquothe Holy Trinityrdquo Theirprowess and continued existence got around among allwho knew Thirty-four unexploded bombs did they tacklewith urbane and smiling efficiency But the thirty-fifthclaimed its forfeit Up went the Earl of Suffolk in his HolyTrinity But we may be sure that as for Mr Valiant-for-Truth ldquoall the trumpets sounded for them on the other siderdquo


Very quickly but at heavy sacrifice of our noblest thedevotion of the UXB detachments mastered the peril In amonth I could write


9X40

We have not heard much lately about the delayed-action bomb which threatened to give so much troubleat the beginning of September I have a sort of feelingthat things are easier in this respect Let me have areport showing how many have been cast upon uslately and how many have been handled successfullyor remain a nuisance

Is the easement which we feel due to the enemyrsquosnot throwing them or to our improved methods ofhandling4

About the same time the enemy began to drop byparachute numbers of naval mines of a weight andexplosive power never carried by aircraft before Manyformidable explosions took place To this there was nodefence except reprisal The abandonment by the Germansof all pretence of confining the air war to military objectiveshad also raised this question of retaliation I was for it but Iencountered many conscientious scruples

Prime Minister to VCAS

6IX40

I never suggested any departure from our mainpolicy but I believe that moral advantage would begained in Germany at the present time if on two or


three nights in a month a number of minor unexpectedwidespread attacks were made upon the smallerGerman centers You must remember that thesepeople are never told the truth and that wherever theair force has not been they are probably told that theGerman defences are impregnable Many factors haveto be taken into consideration and some of them arethose which are not entirely technical I hope thereforeyou will consider my wish and make me proposals forgiving effect to it as opportunity serves

Among those who demurred was my friend Admiral TomPhillips Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay for COS Committee(Admiral Phillips tosee)

19IX40

1 It was not solely on moral grounds that wedecided against retaliation upon Germany It pays usbetter to concentrate upon limited high-class militaryobjectives Moreover in the indiscriminate warfare theenemyrsquos lack of skill in navigation etc does not tellagainst him so much

2 However the dropping of large mines byparachute proclaims the enemyrsquos entire abandonmentof all pretence of aiming at military objectives At fivethousand feet he cannot have the slightest idea whathe is going to hit This therefore proves the ldquoact-of-terrorrdquo intention against the civil population We mustconsider whether his morale would stand up to this aswell as ours Here is a simple war thought

3 My inclination is to say that we will drop a heavyparachute mine on German cities for everyone hedrops on ours and it might be an intriguing idea tomention a list of cities that would be black-listed for thispurpose I do not think they would like it and there is


no reason why they should not have a period ofsuspense

4 The time and character of the announcement is apolitical decision Meanwhile I wish to know when thetackle could be ready Let care be taken to make aforthcoming response to this Let officers be set topropose the best method on a substantial scale in theshortest time It would be better to act by parachutemines upon a number of German towns not hithertotouched but if we have to use thousand-pound air-bombs which we have because otherwise the delaywould be too long let the case be stated

5 I wish to know by Saturday night what is the worstform of proportionate retaliation ie equal retaliationthat we can inflict upon ordinary German cities for whatthey are now doing to us by means of the parachutemine Today we were informed that thirty-six had beendropped but by tomorrow it may be a hundred Well letit be a hundred and make the best plan possible on thatscale for action within say a week or ten days If wehave to wait longer so be it but make sure there is noobstruction

6 Pending the above information I agree that weshould not make a wail or a whine about what hashappened Let me have practical propositions bySaturday night

A month later I was still pressing for retaliation but oneobjection after another moral and technical obstructed it


16X40

I see it reported that last night a large number ofland mines were dropped here many of which have notyet gone off and that great harm was done

Let me have your proposals forthwith for effectiveretaliation upon Germany


I am informed that it is quite possible to carry similarmines or large bombs to Germany and that thesquadrons wish to use them but that the Air Ministryare refusing permission I trust that due considerationwill be given to my views and wishes It is now aboutthree weeks since I began pressing for similartreatment of German military objectives to that whichthey are meting out to us Who is responsible forparalysing action

It is difficult to compare the ordeal of the Londoners in thewinter of 1940ndash41 with that of the Germans in the last threeyears of the war In this latter phase the bombs were muchmore powerful and the raids far more intense On the otherhand long preparation and German thoroughness hadenabled a complete system of bomb-proof shelters to bebuilt into which all were forced to go by iron routine Wheneventually we got into Germany we found cities completelywrecked but strong buildings standing up above theground and spacious subterranean galleries where theinhabitants slept night after night although their houses andproperty were being destroyed all round In many casesonly the rubble-heaps were stirred But in London althoughthe attack was less overpowering the securityarrangements were far less developed Apart from theTubes there were no really safe places There were veryfew basements or cellars which could withstand a direct hitVirtually the whole mass of the London population lived andslept in their homes or in their Anderson shelters under thefire of the enemy taking their chance with British phlegmafter a hard dayrsquos work Not one in a thousand had anyprotection except against blast and splinters But there wasas little psychological weakening as there was physicalpestilence Of course if the bombs of 1943 had beenapplied to the London of 1940 we should have passed intoconditions which might have pulverised all human


organisation However everything happens in its turn andin its relation and no one has a right to say that Londonwhich was certainly unconquered was not alsounconquerableLittle or nothing had been done before the war or during thepassive period to provide bomb-proof strongholds fromwhich the central government could be carried onElaborate plans had been made to move the seat ofGovernment from London Complete branches of manydepartments had already been moved to Harrogate BathCheltenham and elsewhere Accommodation had beenrequisitioned over a wide area providing for all Ministersand important functionaries in the event of an evacuation ofLondon But now under the bombardment the desire andresolve of the Government and of Parliament to remain inLondon was unmistakable and I shared this feeling to thefull I like others had often pictured the destructionbecoming so overpowering that a general move anddispersal would have to be made But under the impact ofthe event all our reactions were in the contrary sense

Prime Minister to SirEdward BridgesGeneral Ismay orColonel Jacob andPrivate Office

14IX40

1 I have not at any time contemplated wholesalemovement from London of black or yellow CivilServants5 Anything of this nature is so detrimental thatit could only be forced upon us by Central Londonbecoming practically uninhabitable Moreover newresorts of Civil Servants would soon be identified andharassed and there is more shelter in London thananywhere else


2 The movement of the high control from theWhitehall area to ldquoPaddockrdquo or other citadels stands ona different footing We must make sure that the centreof Government functions harmoniously and vigorouslyThis would not be possible under conditions of almostcontinuous air raids A movement to ldquoPaddockrdquo byeacutechelons of the War Cabinet War Cabinet SecretariatChiefs of the Staff Committee and Home Forces GHQ must now be planned and may even begin in someminor respects War Cabinet Ministers should visit theirquarters in ldquoPaddockrdquo and be ready to move there atshort notice They should be encouraged to sleep thereif they want quiet nights Secrecy cannot be expectedbut publicity must be forbidden

We must expect that the Whitehall-Westminster areawill be the subject of intensive air attack any time nowThe German method is to make the disruption of theCentral Government a vital prelude to any major assaultupon the country They have done this everywhereThey will certainly do it here where the landscape canbe so easily recognised and the river and its highbuildings afford a sure guide both by day and nightWe must forestall this disruption of the CentralGovernment

3 It is not necessary to move the Admiralty yetThey are well provided for The Air Ministry shouldbegin to get from one leg to the other The War Officeand Home Forces must have all their preparationsmade

4 Pray concert forthwith all the necessary measuresfor moving not more than two or three hundred principalpersons and their immediate assistants to the newquarters and show how it should be done step by stepLet me have this by Sunday night in order that I mayput a well-thought-out scheme before the Cabinet onMonday On Monday the Cabinet will meet either in theCabinet Room or in the Central War Room inaccordance with the rules already prescribed


On the line of sticking it out in London it was necessary toconstruct all kinds of strongholds under or above groundfrom which the Executive with its thousands of officialscould carry out their duties A citadel for the War Cabinethad already been prepared near Hampstead with officesbedrooms and wire and fortified telephone communicationThis was called ldquoPaddockrdquo On September 29 I prescribeda dress rehearsal so that everybody should know what todo if it got too hot ldquoI think it important that lsquoPaddockrsquo shouldbe broken in Thursday next therefore the Cabinet willmeet there At the same time other Departments should beencouraged to try a preliminary move of a skeleton staff Ifpossible lunch should be provided for the Cabinet andthose attending itrdquo We held a Cabinet meeting atldquoPaddockrdquo far from the light of day and each Minister wasrequested to inspect and satisfy himself about his sleepingand working apartments We celebrated this occasion by avivacious luncheon and then returned to Whitehall Thiswas the only time ldquoPaddockrdquo was ever used by MinistersOver the War Room and offices in the basement of theAnnexe we floated-in six feet of steel and concrete andmade elaborate arrangements for ventilation water supplyand above all telephones As these offices were far belowthe level of the Thames only two hundred yards away carehad to be taken that those in them were not trapped by aninrush of water

October came in raw and rough But it seemed that Londonwas adapting itself to the new peculiar conditions ofexistence or death Even in some directions there was aneasement


Transport into and out of the Whitehall area became anoutstanding problem with the frequently repeated dailyraids the rush hour and the breakdowns on the railways Icast about for some solution

Prime Minister to SirHorace Wilson

12X40

About a fortnight ago I directed that the talk aboutfour days a week for Civil Servants should stopbecause I feared the effect in the factories of such anannouncement I am however now coming round tothe idea of a five-day week sleeping in for four nights(and where possible feeding in) and three nights andtwo days away at home This of course would applyonly to people who work in London and live in thesuburbs I see such queues at the bus stops and nodoubt it is going to become increasingly difficult to getin and out of London quickly Each Department shouldwork out a scheme to suit their own and their staffrsquosconvenience The same amount of work must becrowded into the five days as is now done Effortsshould also be made to stagger the hours of arrival anddeparture so as to get as many away as possiblebefore the rush hour and spread the traffic over the day

Let me have your views on this together withproposals for action in a circular to Departments

Nothing came of this plan which broke down under detailedexamination

The retirement of Mr Chamberlain enforced by graveillness led to important Ministerial changes Mr HerbertMorrison had been an efficient and vigorous Minister ofSupply and Sir John Anderson had faced the Blitz of


London with firm and competent management By the earlydays of October the continuous attack on the largest city inthe world was so severe and raised so many problems of asocial and political character in its vast harassed populationthat I thought it would be a help to have a long-trainedParliamentarian at the Home Office which was now alsothe Ministry of Home Security London was bearing thebrunt Herbert Morrison was a Londoner versed in everyaspect of metropolitan administration He had unrivalledexperience of London government having been leader ofthe County Council and in many ways the principal figure inits affairs At the same time I needed John Andersonwhose work at the Home Office had been excellent as LordPresident of the Council in the wider sphere of the HomeAffairs Committee to which an immense mass of businesswas referred with great relief to the Cabinet This alsolightened my own burden and enabled me to concentrateupon the military conduct of the war in which mycolleagues seemed increasingly disposed to give melatitudeI therefore invited these two high Ministers to change theiroffices It was no bed of roses which I offered HerbertMorrison These pages certainly cannot attempt to describethe problems of London government when often night afternight ten or twenty thousand people were made homelessand when nothing but the ceaseless vigil of the citizens asfire guards on the roofs prevented uncontrollableconflagrations when hospitals filled with mutilated men andwomen were themselves struck by the enemyrsquos bombswhen hundreds of thousands of weary people crowdedtogether in unsafe and insanitary shelters whencommunications by road and rail were ceaselessly brokendown when drains were smashed and light power andgas paralysed and when nevertheless the whole fighting


toiling life of London had to go forward and nearly a millionpeople be moved in and out for their work every night andmorning We did not know how long it would last We hadno reason to suppose that it would not go on getting worseWhen I made the proposal to Mr Morrison he knew toomuch about it to treat it lightly He asked for a few hoursrsquoconsideration but in a short time he returned and said hewould be proud to shoulder the job I highly approved hismanly decisionIn Mr Chamberlainrsquos day a Civil Defence Committee of theCabinet had already been set up This met regularly everymorning to review the whole situation In order to makesure that the new Home Secretary was armed with all thepowers of State I also held a weekly meeting usually onFridays of all authorities concerned The topics discussedwere often far from pleasant

Quite soon after the Ministerial movements a change in theenemyrsquos method affected our general policy Till now thehostile attack had been confined almost exclusively to high-explosive bombs but with the full moon of October 15when the heaviest attack of the month fell upon us about480 German aircraft dropped 386 tons of high-explosiveand in addition 70000 incendiary bombs Hitherto we hadencouraged the Londoners to take cover and every effortwas being made to improve their protection But now ldquoTothe basementsrdquo must be replaced by ldquoTo the roofsrdquo It fell tothe new Minister of Home Security to institute this policy Anorganisation of fire-watchers and fire-services on a giganticscale and covering the whole of London (apart frommeasures taken in provincial cities) was rapidly brought intobeing At first the fire-watchers were volunteers but the


numbers required were so great and the feeling that everyman should take his turn upon the roster so strong that fire-watching soon became compulsory This form of servicehad a bracing and buoyant effect upon all classes Womenpressed forward to take their share Large-scale systems oftraining were developed to teach the fire-watchers how todeal with the various kinds of incendiaries which were usedagainst us Many became adept and thousands of fireswere extinguished before they took hold The experience ofremaining on the roof night after night under fire with noprotection but a tin hat soon became habitual

Mr Morrison presently decided to consolidate the fourteenhundred local fire brigades into a single National FireService and to supplement this with a great fire guard ofcivilians trained and working in their spare time The fireguard like the roof-watchers was at first recruited on avoluntary basis but like them it became by general consentcompulsory The National Fire Service gave us theadvantages of greater mobility a universal standard oftraining and equipment and formally recognised ranks Theother Civil Defence forces produced regional columns readyat a minutersquos notice to go anywhere The name CivilDefence Service was substituted for the pre-war title of Air-Raid Precautions (ARP) Good uniforms were providedfor large numbers and they became conscious of being afourth arm of the Crown In all this work Herbert Morrisonwas ably assisted by a brave woman whose death we havelately mourned Ellen Wilkinson She was out and about inthe shelters at all hours of the day and night and took aprominent part in the organisation of the fire guard The


Womenrsquos Voluntary Services under the inspiring leadershipof Lady Reading also played an invaluable part

I was glad that if any of our cities were to be attacked thebrunt should fall on London London was like some hugeprehistoric animal capable of enduring terrible injuriesmangled and bleeding from many wounds and yetpreserving its life and movement The Anderson shelterswere widespread in the working-class districts of two-storeyhouses and everything was done to make them habitableand to drain them in wet weather Later the Morrison shelterwas developed which was no more than a heavy kitchentable made of steel with strong wire sides capable ofholding up the ruins of a small house and thus giving ameasure of protection Many owed their lives to it For therest ldquoLondon could take itrdquo They took all they got andcould have taken more Indeed at this time we saw no endbut the demolition of the whole metropolis Still as I pointedout to the House of Commons at the time the law ofdiminishing returns operates in the case of the demolition oflarge cities Soon many of the bombs would only fall uponhouses already ruined and only make the rubble jumpOver large areas there would be nothing more to burn ordestroy and yet human beings might make their homeshere and there and carry on their work with infiniteresource and fortitude At this time anyone would havebeen proud to be a Londoner The admiration of the wholecountry was given to London and all the other great citiesin the land braced themselves to take their bit as and whenit came and not to be outdone Indeed many personsseemed envious of Londonrsquos distinction and quite anumber came up from the country in order to spend a night


or two in town share the task and see the fun We had tocheck this tendency for administrative reasons

As we could see no reason why the hostile bombing ofLondon should not go on throughout the war it wasnecessary to make long-term plans for safely housing thecentral Government machine


22X40

We now know the probable limits of the enemy airattack on London and that it will be severe andprotracted It is probable indeed that the bombing ofWhitehall and the centre of Government will becontinuous until all old or insecure buildings have beendemolished It is therefore necessary to provide assoon as possible accommodation in the strongesthouses and buildings that exist or are capable of beingfortified for the large nucleus staffs and personnelconnected with the governing machine and theessential Ministers and Departments concerned in theconduct of the war This becomes inevitable as aconsequence of our decision not to be beaten out ofLondon and to release to the War Office or otherDepartments the accommodation hitherto reserved inthe West of England for the Black Move We must doone thing or the other and having made our decisioncarry it out thoroughly

2 The accommodation at Paddock is quite unsuitedto the conditions which have arisen The War Cabinetcannot live and work there for weeks on end whileleaving the great part of their staffs less well providedfor than they are now in Whitehall Apart from thecitadel of Paddock there is no adequate accommoda-tion or shelter and anyone living in Neville Court would


have to be running to and fro on every Jim Crowwarning Paddock should be treated as a last resortand in the meantime should be used by someDepartment not needed in the very centre of London

3 Nearly all the Government buildings and theshelters beneath them are either wholly unsafe orincapable of resisting a direct hit The older buildingslike the Treasury fall to pieces as we have seen andthe shelters beneath them offer no trustworthyprotection The Foreign Office and Board of Tradeblocks on either side of King Charles Street are stronglybuilt and give a considerable measure of protection intheir basements I have approved the provision of asubstantial measure of overhead cover above the WarRoom and Central War Room offices and HomeForces location in the Board of Trade Building This willtake a month or six weeks with perpetual hammeringWe must press on with this But even when finished itwill not be proof Richmond Terrace is quite inadequate-ly protected and essential work suffers from conditionsprevailing there The Board of Trade have been invitedto move to new premises and certainly the bulk of theirstaff should find accommodation out of LondonHowever this move of the Board of Trade must beconsidered as part of the general plan

4 There are several strong modern buildings inLondon of steel and cement construction built with aneye to air-raid conditions These should immediately beprepared to receive the War Cabinet and its Secretari-at and also to provide safe living accommodation forthe essential Ministers We need not be afraid of havingtoo much proof accommodation as increasing numberswill certainly have to be provided for It is essential thatthe central work of the Government should proceedunder conditions which ensure its efficiency

5 I have already asked for alternative accommoda-tion for Parliament but no satisfactory plan has yetbeen made The danger to both Houses during theirsessions is serious and it is only a question of timebefore these buildings and chambers are struck Wemust hope they will be struck when not occupied bytheir Members The protection provided below the


Houses of Parliament is totally inadequate against adirect hit The Palace of Westminster and the Whitehallarea is an obvious prime target of the enemy and Idare say already more than fifty heavy bombs havefallen in the neighbourhood The Cabinet has alreadyfavoured the idea of a trial trip being made by theHouses of Parliament in some alternative accommoda-tion I propose to ask for an adjournment from Thursdaynext for a fortnight by which time it is hoped some plancan be made in London for their meeting

6 I consider that a War Cabinet Minister whoshould keep in close touch with the Chancellor of theExchequer should be entrusted with the generaldirection and supervision of the important andextensive works which are required and that Lord Reithand his Department should work for this purpose underCabinet supervision If my colleagues agree I will askLord Beaverbrook who has already concerned himselfin the matter to take general charge

Lord Beaverbrook was thus entrusted with the task ofmaking a large number of bomb-proof strongholds capableof housing the whole essential staffs of many Departmentsof State and a dozen of them several connected bytunnels survive in London today None of these werefinished till long after the aeroplane raids were over andfew were used during the pilotless-aircraft and rocketattacks which came in 1944 and 1945 However althoughthese buildings were never used for the purposes for whichthey were prepared it was good to feel we had them underour lee The Admiralty on their own constructed the vastmonstrosity which weighs upon the Horse Guards Paradeand the demolition of whose twenty-foot-thick steel andconcrete walls will be a problem for future generationswhen we reach a safer world


Towards the middle of October Josiah Wedgwood beganto make a fuss in Parliament about my not having anabsolutely bomb-proof shelter for the night raids He was anold friend of mine and had been grievously wounded in theDardanelles He had always been a single-taxer Later hebroadened his views on taxation and joined the LabourParty His brother was the Chairman of the RailwayExecutive Committee Before the war they had had theforesight to construct a considerable underground office inPiccadilly It was seventy feet below the surface andcovered with strong high buildings Although one bombhad penetrated eighty feet in marshy subsoil there was nodoubt this depth with buildings overhead gave safety toanyone in it I began to be pressed from all sides to resortto this shelter for sleeping purposes Eventually I agreedand from the middle of October till the end of the year Iused to go there once the firing had started to transact myevening business and sleep undisturbed One felt a naturalcompunction at having much more safety than most otherpeople but so many pressed me that I let them have theirway After about forty nights in the railway shelter theAnnexe became stronger and I moved back to it Hereduring the rest of the war my wife and I lived comfortablyWe felt confidence in this solid stone building and only onvery rare occasions went down below the armour My wifeeven hung up our few pictures in the sitting-room which Ihad thought it better to keep bare Her view prevailed andwas justified by the event From the roof near the cupola ofthe Annexe there was a splendid view of London on clearnights They made a place for me with overhead cover fromsplinters and one could walk in the moonlight and watchthe fireworks In 1941 I used to take some of my American


visitors up there from time to time after dinner They werealways most interested

On the night of November 3 for the first time in nearly twomonths no alarm sounded in London The silence seemedquite odd to many They wondered what was wrong On thefollowing night the enemyrsquos attacks were widely dispersedthroughout the island and this continued for a while Therehad been another change in the policy of the Germanoffensive Although London was still regarded as theprincipal target a major effort was now to be made tocripple the Industrial centres of Britain Special squadronshad been trained with new navigational devices to attackspecific key-centres For instance one formation wastrained solely for the destruction of the Rolls-Royce aero-engine works at Hillington Glasgow All this was amakeshift and interim plan The invasion of Britain hadbeen temporarily abandoned and the attack upon Russiahad not yet been mounted or expected outside Hitlerrsquosintimate circle The remaining winter months weretherefore to be for the German Air Force a period ofexperiment both in technical devices in night-bombing andin attacks upon British sea-borne trade together with anattempt to break down our production military and civilThey would have done much better to have stuck to onething at a time and pressed it to a conclusion But they werealready baffled and for the time being unsure of themselvesThese new bombing tactics began with the blitz onCoventry on the night of November 14 London seemed toolarge and vague a target for decisive results but Goeringhoped that provincial cities or munition centres might beeffectively obliterated The raid started early in the dark


hours of the 14th and by dawn nearly five hundred Germanaircraft had dropped six hundred tons of high-explosivesand thousands of incendiaries On the whole this was themost devastating raid which we sustained The centre ofCoventry was shattered and its life for a spell completelydisrupted Four hundred people were killed and many moreseriously injured The German radio proclaimed that ourother cities would be similarly ldquoCoventratedrdquo Neverthelessthe all-important aero-engine and machine-tool factorieswere not brought to a standstill nor was the populationhitherto untried in the ordeal of bombing put out of actionIn less than a week an emergency reconstructioncommittee did wonderful work in restoring the life of the cityOn November 15 the enemy switched back to London witha very heavy raid in full moonlight Much damage wasdone especially to churches and other monuments Thenext target was Birmingham and three successive raidsfrom the 19th to the 22d of November inflicted muchdestruction and loss of life Nearly eight hundred peoplewere killed and over two thousand injured but the life andspirit of Birmingham survived this ordeal When I visited thecity a day or two later to inspect its factories and see formyself what had happened an incident to me charmingoccurred It was the dinner-hour and a very pretty younggirl ran up to the car and threw a box of cigars into it Istopped at once and she said ldquoI won the prize this week forthe highest output I only heard you were coming an houragordquo The gift must have cost her two or three pounds Iwas very glad (in my official capacity) to give her a kiss Ithen went on to see the long mass grave in which so manycitizens and their children had been newly buried The spiritof Birmingham shone brightly and its million inhabitantshighly organised conscious and comprehending rode highabove their physical suffering


During the last week of November and the beginning ofDecember the weight of the attack shifted to the portsBristol Southampton and above all Liverpool were heavilybombed Later on Plymouth Sheffield Manchester LeedsGlasgow and other munitions centres passed through thefire undaunted It did not matter where the blow struck thenation was as sound as the sea is saltThe climax raid of these weeks came once more toLondon on Sunday December 29 All the painfullygathered German experience was expressed on thisoccasion It was an incendiary classic The weight of theattack was concentrated upon the City of London itself Itwas timed to meet the dead-low-water hour The water-mains were broken at the outset by very heavy high-explosive parachute mines Nearly fifteen hundred fires hadto be fought The damage to railway stations and dockswas serious Eight Wren churches were destroyed ordamaged The Guildhall was smitten by fire and blast andSt Paulrsquos Cathedral was only saved by heroic exertions Avoid of ruin at the very centre of the British world gapesupon us to this day But when the King and Queen visitedthe scene they were received with enthusiasm farexceeding any Royal festivalDuring this prolonged ordeal of which several months werestill to come the King was constantly at BuckinghamPalace Proper shelters were being constructed in thebasement but all this took time Also it happened severaltimes that His Majesty arrived from Windsor in the middle ofan air raid Once he and the Queen had a very narrowescape I have His Majestyrsquos permission to record theincident in his own words

Friday September 13 1940


We went to London [from Windsor] and found an airraid in progress The day was very cloudy and it wasraining hard The Queen and I went upstairs to a smallsitting-room overlooking the Quadrangle (I could notuse my usual sitting-room owing to the broken windowsby former bomb damage) All of a sudden we heard thezooming noise of a diving aircraft getting louder andlouder and then saw two bombs falling past theopposite side of Buckingham Palace into the Quadran-gle We saw the flashes and heard the detonations asthey burst about eighty yards away The blast blew inthe windows opposite to us and two great craters hadappeared in the Quadrangle From one of these craterswater from a burst main was pouring out and flowinginto the passage through the broken windows Thewhole thing happened in a matter of seconds and wewere very quickly out into the passage There were sixbombs two in the Forecourt two in the Quadrangleone wrecked the Chapel and one in the garden

The King who as a sub-lieutenant had served in the Battleof Jutland was exhilarated by all this and pleased that heshould be sharing the dangers of his subjects in the capitalI must confess that at the time neither I nor any of mycolleagues were aware of the peril of this particular incidentHad the windows been closed instead of open the whole ofthe glass would have splintered into the faces of the Kingand Queen causing terrible injuries So little did they makeof it all that even I who saw them and their entourage sofrequently only realised long afterwards when makinginquiries for writing this book what had actually happenedIn those days we viewed with stern and tranquil gaze theidea of going down fighting amid the ruins of Whitehall HisMajesty had a shooting-range made in the BuckinghamPalace garden at which he and other members of hisfamily and his equerries practised assiduously with pistolsand tommy-guns Presently I brought the King an American


short-range carbine from a number which had been sent tome This was a very good weaponAbout this time the King changed his practice of receivingme in a formal weekly audience at about five orsquoclock whichhad prevailed during my first two months of office It wasnow arranged that I should lunch with him every TuesdayThis was certainly a very agreeable method of transactingState business and sometimes the Queen was present Onseveral occasions we all had to take our plates and glassesin our hands and go down to the shelter which was makingprogress to finish our meal The weekly luncheons becamea regular institution After the first few months His Majestydecided that all servants should be excluded and that weshould help ourselves and help each other During the fourand a half years that this continued I became aware of theextrordinary diligence with which the King read all thetelegrams and public documents submitted to him Underthe British Constitutional system the Sovereign has a rightto be made acquainted with everything for which hisMinisters are responsible and has an unlimited right ofgiving counsel to his Government I was most careful thateverything should be laid before the King and at our weeklymeetings he frequently showed that he had masteredpapers which I had not yet dealt with It was a great help toBritain to have so good a King and Queen in those fatefulyears and as a convinced upholder of constitutionalmonarchy I valued as a signal honour the gracious intimacywith which I as First Minister was treated for which Isuppose there has been no precedent since the days ofQueen Anne and Marlborough during his years of power


This brings us to the end of the year and for the sake ofcontinuity I have gone ahead of the general war Thereader will realise that all this clatter and storm was but anaccompaniment to the cool processes by which our wareffort was maintained and our policy and diplomacyconducted Indeed I must record that at the summit theseinjuries failing to be mortal were a positive stimulant toclarity of view faithful comradeship and judicious action Itwould be unwise how-ever to suppose that if the attackhad been ten or twenty times as severe ndash or even perhapstwo or three times as severe ndash the healthy reactions I havedescribed would have followed


4The Wizard War

A Hidden Conflict mdash Lindemannrsquos Services mdashProgress of RadarmdashThe German Beam mdash MrJonesrsquos Tale mdash Principle of the Split Beam orldquoKnickebeinrdquomdash Twisting the BeammdashGoeringrsquosPurblind Obstinacy mdash The X-Apparatus mdashCoventry November 1415 mdashThe Decoy Fires mdashThe Y-Apparatus Forestalled mdash Frustration of theLuftwaffe mdash Triumph of British Science mdash OurFurther PlansmdashThe Rocket Batteries mdash GeneralPilersquos Command and the Air Defences of GreatBritain mdash The Aerial Mine Curtains mdash TheProximity Fuze mdash The Prospect of Counter-AttackmdashThe Expansion of ldquoAir Defence Great Britainrdquo

DURING THE HUMAN STRUGGLE between the British andGerman Air Forces between pilot and pilot between anti-aircraft batteries and aircraft between ruthless bombingand the fortitude of the British people another conflict wasgoing on step by step month by month This was a secretwar whose battles were lost or won unknown to the publicand only with difficulty comprehended even now to thoseoutside the small high scientific circles concerned No suchwarfare had ever been waged by mortal men The terms inwhich it could be recorded or talked about wereunintelligible to ordinary folk Yet if we had not mastered itsprofound meaning and used its mysteries even while wesaw them only in the glimpse all the efforts all the prowess


of the fighting airmen all the bravery and sacrifices of thepeople would have been in vain Unless British sciencehad proved superior to German and unless its strangesinister resources had been effectively brought to bear onthe struggle for survival we might well have been defeatedand being defeated destroyedA wit wrote ten years ago ldquoThe leaders of thought havereached the horizons of human reason but all the wires aredown and they can only communicate with us byunintelligible signalsrdquo Yet upon the discerning of thesesignals and upon the taking of right and timely action on theimpressions received depended our national fate and muchelse I knew nothing about science but I knew something ofscientists and had had much practice as a Minister inhandling things I did not understand I had at any rate anacute military perception of what would help and whatwould hurt of what would cure and of what would kill Myfour yearsrsquo work upon the Air Defence Research Committeehad made me familiar with the outlines of radar problems Itherefore immersed myself so far as my faculties allowed inthis Wizard War and strove to make sure that all thatcounted came without obstruction or neglect at least to thethreshold of action There were no doubt greater scientiststhan Frederick Lindemann though his credentials andgenius command respect But he had two qualifications ofvital consequence to me First as these pages haveshown he was my trusted friend and confidant of twentyyears Together we had watched the advance and onset ofworld disaster Together we had done our best to sound thealarm And now we were in it and I had the power to guideand arm our effort How could I have the knowledgeHere came the second of his qualities Lindemann coulddecipher the signals from the experts on the far horizonsand explain to me in lucid homely terms what the issues


were There are only twenty-four hours in the day of whichat least seven must be spent in sleep and three in eatingand relaxation Anyone in my position would have beenruined if he had attempted to dive into depths which noteven a lifetime of study could plumb What I had to graspwere the practical results and just as Lindemann gave mehis view for all it was worth in this field so I made sure byturning on my power-relay that some at least of theseterrible and incomprehensible truths emerged in executivedecisions

Progress in every branch of radar was constant andunceasing during 1939 but even so the Battle of Britainfrom July to September 1940 was as I have describedfought mainly by eye and ear I comforted myself at first inthese months with the hope that the fogs and mist andcloud which accompany the British winter and shroud theisland with a mantle would at least give a great measure ofprotection against accurate bombing by day and still morein darknessFor some time the German bombers had navigated largelyby radio beacons Scores of these were planted likelighthouses in various parts of the Continent each with itsown call-sign and the Germans using ordinary directionalwireless could fix their position by the angles from whichany two of these transmissions came To counter this wesoon installed a number of stations which we calledldquoMeaconsrdquo These picked up the German signals amplifiedthem and sent them out again from somewhere inEngland The result was that the Germans trying to homeon their beams were often led astray and a number ofhostile aircraft were lost in this manner Certainly one


German bomber landed voluntarily in Devonshire thinking itwas FranceHowever in June I received a painful shock ProfessorLindemann reported to me that he believed the Germanswere preparing a device by means of which they would beable to bomb by day or night whatever the weather It nowappeared that the Germans had developed a radio beamwhich like an invisible searchlight would guide thebombers with considerable precision to their target Thebeacon beckoned to the pilot the beam pointed to thetarget They might not hit a particular factory but they couldcertainly hit a city or town No longer therefore had we onlyto fear the moonlight nights in which at any rate our fighterscould see as well as the enemy but we must even expectthe heaviest attacks to be delivered in cloud and fogLindemann told me also that there was a way of bendingthe beam if we acted at once but that I must see some ofthe scientists particularly the Deputy Director of IntelligenceResearch at the Air Ministry Dr R V Jones a former pupilof his at Oxford Accordingly with anxious mind I convenedon June 21 a special meeting in the Cabinet Room atwhich about fifteen persons were present including SirHenry Tizard and various Air Force Commanders A fewminutes late a youngish man ndash who as I afterwards learnthad thought his sudden summons to the Cabinet Roommust be a practical joke ndash hurried in and took his seat at thebottom of the table According to plan I invited him to openthe discussionFor some months he told us hints had been coming fromall sorts of sources on the Continent that the Germans hadsome novel mode of night-bombing on which they placedgreat hopes In some way it seemed to be linked with thecode-word ldquoKnickebeinrdquo (curtsey) which our Intelligence had


several times mentioned without being able to explain Atfirst it had been thought that the enemy had got agents toplant beacons in our cities on which their bombers couldhome but this idea had proved untenable Some weeksbefore two or three curious squat towers had beenphotographed in odd positions near the coast They did notseem the right shape for any known form of radio or radarNor were they in places which could be explained on anysuch hypothesis Recently a German bomber had beenshot down with apparatus which seemed more elaboratethan was required for night-landing by the Lorenz beamwhich appeared to be the only known use for which it mightbe intended For this and various other reasons which hewove together into a cumulative argument it looked as ifthe Germans might be planning to navigate and bomb onsome sort of system of beams A few days before undercross-examination on these lines a German pilot hadbroken down and admitted that he had heard thatsomething of the sort was in the wind Such was the gist ofMr Jonesrsquos taleFor twenty minutes or more he spoke in quiet tonesunrolling his chain of circumstantial evidence the like ofwhich for its convincing fascination was never surpassed bytales of Sherlock Holmes or Monsieur Lecoq As I listenedthe Ingoldsby Legends jingled in my mind

But now one Mr JonesComes forth and deponesThat fifteen years since he had heard certaingroans

On his way to Stone Henge (to examine the stonesDescribed in a work of the late Sir John Soanersquos)


That hersquod followed the moansAnd led by their tonesFound a Raven a-picking a Drummer-boyrsquos bones

When Mr Jones had finished there was a general air ofincredulity One high authority asked why the Germansshould use a beam assuming that such a thing waspossible when they had at their disposal all the ordinaryfacilities of navigation Above twenty thousand feet thestars were nearly always visible All our own pilots werelaboriously trained in navigation and it was thought theyfound their way about and to their targets very well Othersround the table appeared concerned

I will now explain in the kind of terms which I personally canunderstand how the German beam worked and how wetwisted it Like the searchlight beam the radio beam cannotbe made very sharp it tends to spread but if what is calledthe ldquosplit-beamrdquo method is used considerable accuracy canbe obtained Let us imagine two searchlight beams parallelone to another both flickering in such a way that the left-hand beam comes on exactly when the right-hand beamgoes out and vice versa If an attacking aircraft was exactlyin the centre between the two beams the pilotrsquos coursewould be continuously illuminated but if it got say a littlebit to the right nearer the centre of the right-hand beamthis would become the stronger and the pilot would observethe flickering light which was no guide By keeping in theposition where he avoided the flickerings he would beflying exactly down the middle where the light from bothbeams is equal And this middle path would guide him to


the target Two split beams from two stations could bearranged to cross over any town in the Midlands orSouthern England The German airman had only to flyalong one beam until he detected the second and then todrop his bombs QEDThis was the principle of the split beam and the celebratedldquoKnickebeinrdquo apparatus upon which Goering founded hishopes and the Luftwaffe were taught to believe that thebombing of English cities could be maintained in spite ofcloud fog and darkness and with all the immunity alikefrom guns and intercepting fighters which these gave to theattacker With their logical minds and deliberate large-scaleplanning the German High Air Command staked theirfortunes in this sphere on a device which like the magneticmine they thought would do us in Therefore they did nottrouble to train the ordinary bomber pilots as ours had beentrained in the difficult art of navigation A far simpler andsurer method lending itself to drill and large numbersproducing results wholesale by irresistible science attractedalike their minds and their nature The German pilotsfollowed the beam as the German people followed theFuehrer They had nothing else to followBut duly forewarned and acting on the instant the simpleBritish had the answer By erecting the proper stations ingood time in our own country we could jam the beam Thiswould of course have been almost immediately realised bythe enemy There was another and superior alternative Wecould put a repeating device in such a position that itstrengthened the signal from one half of the split beam andnot from the other Thus the hostile pilot trying to fly so thatthe signals from both halves of the split beam were equalwould be deflected from the true course The cataract ofbombs which would have shattered or at least tormenteda city would fall fifteen or twenty miles away in an open


field Being master and not having to argue too muchonce I was convinced about the principles of this queer anddeadly game I gave all the necessary orders that very dayin June for the existence of the beam to be assumed andfor all counter-measures to receive absolute priority Theslightest reluctance or deviation in carrying out this policywas to be reported to me With so much going on I did nottrouble the Cabinet or even the Chiefs of the Staff If I hadencountered any serious obstruction I should of coursehave appealed and told a long story to these friendlytribunals This however was not necessary as in thislimited and at that time almost occult circle obedience wasforthcoming with alacrity and on the fringes all obstructionscould be swept awayAbout August 23 the first new Knickebein stations nearDieppe and Cherbourg were trained on Birmingham and alarge-scale night offensive began We had of course ourldquoteething troublesrdquo to get through but within a few days theKnickebein beams were deflected or jammed and for thenext two months the critical months of September andOctober the German bombers wandered around Englandbombing by guesswork or else being actually led astrayOne instance happened to come to my notice An officer inmy Defence Office sent his wife and two young children tothe country during the London raids Ten miles away fromany town they were much astonished to see a series ofenormous explosions occurring three fields away Theycounted over a hundred heavy bombs They wonderedwhat the Germans could be aiming at and thanked Godthey were spared The officer mentioned the incident thenext day but so closely was the secret kept so narrow wasthe circle so highly specialised the information that nosatisfactory explanation could be given to him even in his


intimate position The very few who knew exchangedcelestial grinsThe German air crews soon suspected that their beamswere being mauled There is a story that during these twomonths nobody had the courage to tell Goering that hisbeams were twisted or jammed In his ignorance hepledged himself that this was impossible Special lecturesand warnings were delivered to the German Air Forceassuring them that the beam was infallible and that anyonewho cast doubt on it would be at once thrown out Wesuffered as has been described heavily under the Blitzand almost anyone could hit London anyhow Of coursethere would in any case have been much inaccuracy butthe whole German system of bombing was so muchdisturbed by our counter-measures added to the normalpercentage of error that not more than one-fifth of theirbombs fell within the target areas We must regard this asthe equivalent of a considerable victory because even thefifth part of the German bombing which we got was quiteenough for our comfort and occupation

The Germans after internal conflicts at last revised theirmethods It happened fortunately for them that one of theirformations Kampf Gruppe 100 was using a special beamof its own It called its equipment the ldquoX apparatusrdquo a nameof mystery which when we came across it threw up anintriguing challenge to our Intelligence By the middle ofSeptember we had found out enough about it to designcounter-measures but this particular jamming equipmentcould not be produced for a further two months Inconsequence Kampf Gruppe 100 could still bomb withaccuracy The enemy hastily formed a pathfinder group


from it which they used to raise fires in the target area byincendiary bombs and these became the guide for the restof the de-Knickebeined LuftwaffeCoventry on November 1415 was the first target attackedby the new method Although our new jamming had nowstarted a technical error prevented it from becomingeffective for another few months Even so our knowledgeof the beams was helpful From the settings of the hostilebeams and the times at which they played we couldforecast the target and the time route and height of attackOur night-fighters had alas at this date neither thenumbers nor the equipment to make much use of theinformation It was nevertheless invaluable to our fire-fighting and other Civil Defence services These could oftenbe concentrated in the threatened area and specialwarnings given to the population before the attack startedPresently our counter-measures improved and caught upwith the attack Meanwhile decoy fires code-namedldquoStarfishrdquo on a very large scale were lighted by us with theright timing in suitable open places to lead the main attackastray and these sometimes achieved remarkable resultsBy the beginning of 1941 we had mastered the ldquoXapparatusrdquo but the Germans were also thinking hard andabout this time they brought in a new aid called the ldquoYapparatusrdquo Whereas the two earlier systems had both usedcross-beams over the target the new system used only onebeam together with a special method of range-finding byradio by which the aircraft could be told how far it wasalong the beam When it reached the correct distance itdropped its bombs By good fortune and the genius anddevotion of all concerned we had divined the exact methodof working the ldquoY apparatusrdquo some months before theGermans were able to use it in operations and by the timethey were ready to make it their pathfinder we had the


power to render it useless On the very first night when theGermans committed themselves to the ldquoY apparatusrdquo ournew counter-measures came into action against them Thesuccess of our efforts was manifest from the acrimoniousremarks heard passing between the pathfinding aircraft andtheir controlling ground stations by our listeninginstruments The faith of the enemy air crews in their newdevice was thus shattered at the outset and after manyfailures the method was abandoned The bombing ofDublin on the night of May 3031 1941 may well havebeen an unforeseen and unintended result of ourinterference with ldquoYrdquoGeneral Martini the German chief in this sphere has sincethe war admitted that he had not realised soon enough thatthe ldquohigh-frequency warrdquo had begun and that he underratedthe British Intelligence and counter-measures organisationOur exploitation of the strategic errors which he made in theBattle of the Beams diverted enormous numbers of bombsfrom our cities during a period when all other means ofdefence either had failed or were still in their childhoodThese were however rapidly improving under the pressureof potentially mortal attack Since the beginning of the warwe had brought into active production a form of air-borneradar called ldquoAIrdquo on which the Air Defence ResearchCommittee had fruitfully laboured from 1938 onward andwith which it was hoped to detect and close on enemybombers This apparatus was too large and toocomplicated for a pilot to operate himself It was thereforeinstalled in two-seater Blenheims and later in Beaufightersin which the observer operated the radar and directed hispilot until the enemy aircraft became visible and could befired on ndash usually at night about a hundred yards away Ihad called this device in its early days ldquothe Smellerrdquo andlonged for its arrival in action This was inevitably a slow


process However it began A widespread method ofground-control interception grew up and came into use TheBritish pilots with their terrible eight-gun batteries in whichcannon-guns were soon to play their part began to close ndashno longer by chance but by system ndash upon the almostdefenceless German bombersThe enemyrsquos use of the beams now became a positiveadvantage to us They gave clear warning of the time anddirection of the attacks and enabled the night-fightersquadrons in the areas affected and all their apparatus tocome into action at full force and in good time and all theanti-aircraft batteries concerned to be fully manned anddirected by their own intricate science of which more laterDuring March and April the steadily rising rate of loss ofGerman bombers had become a cause of serious concernto the German war chiefs The ldquoerasingrdquo of British cities hadnot been found so easy as Hitler had imagined It was withrelief that the German Air Force received their orders inMay to break off the night attacks on Great Britain and toprepare for action in another theatreThus the three main attempts to conquer Britain after thefall of France were successively defeated or prevented Thefirst was the decisive defeat of the German Air Force in theBattle of Britain during July August and SeptemberInstead of destroying the British Air Force and the stationsand air factories on which it relied for its life and future theenemy themselves in spite of their preponderance innumbers sustained losses which they could not bear Oursecond victory followed from our first The German failure togain command of the air prevented the cross-Channelinvasion The prowess of our fighter pilots and theexcellence of the organisation which sustained them had infact rendered the same service ndash under conditionsindescribably different ndash as Drake and his brave little ships


and hardy mariners had done three hundred and fifty yearsbefore when after the Spanish Armada was broken anddispersed the Duke of Parmarsquos powerful army waitedhelplessly in the Low Countries for the means of crossingthe Narrow SeasThe third ordeal was the indiscriminate night-bombing ofour cities in mass attacks This was overcome and brokenby the continued devotion and skill of our fighter pilots andby the fortitude and endurance of the mass of the peopleand notably the Londoners who together with the civilorganisations which upheld them bore the brunt But thesenoble efforts in the high air and in the flaming streets wouldhave been in vain if British science and British brains hadnot played the ever-memorable and decisive part which thischapter records

There is a useful German saying ldquoThe trees do not grow upto the skyrdquo Nevertheless we had every reason to expectthat the air attack on Britain would continue in an indefinitecrescendo Until Hitler actually invaded Russia we had noright to suppose it would die away and stop We thereforestrove with might and main to improve the measures anddevices by which we had hitherto survived and to find newones The highest priority was assigned to all forms of radarstudy and application Scientists and technicians wereengaged and organised on a very large scale Labour andmaterial were made available to the fullest extent Othermethods of striking down the hostile bomber were soughttirelessly and for many months to come these efforts werespurred by repeated costly and bloody raids upon ourports and cities I will mention three developmentsconstantly referred to in the Appendices to this Volume in


which at Lindemannrsquos prompting and in the light of whatwe had studied together on the Air Defence ResearchCommittee of pre-war years I took special interest andused my authority These were first the massed dischargeof rockets as a reinforcement of our anti-aircraft batteriessecondly the laying of aerial mine curtains in the path of araiding force by means of bombs with long wiresdescending by parachutes thirdly the search for fuzes sosensitive that they did not need to hit their target but wouldbe set off by merely passing near an aircraft Of these threemethods on which we toiled with large expenditure of ourresources some brief account must now be givenNone of these methods could come to fruition in 1940 Atleast a year stood between us and practical relief By thetime we were ready to go into action with our newapparatus and methods the enemy attack they weredesigned to meet came suddenly to an end and for nearlythree years we enjoyed almost complete immunity from itCritics have therefore been disposed to underrate the valueof these efforts which could only be proved by major trialand in any case in no way obstructed other developmentsin the same sphere

By itself beam-distortion was not enough Once having hitthe correct target it was easy for the German bombersunless they were confused by our ldquoStarfishrdquo decoy fires toreturn again to the glow of the fires they had lit the nightbefore Somehow they must be clawed down For this wedeveloped two new devices rockets and aerial mines Byfitting our antiaircraft batteries with radar it was possible topredict the position of an enemy aircraft accurately enoughprovided it continued to fly in a straight line at the same


speed but this is hardly what experienced pilots do Ofcourse they zigzagged or ldquoweavedrdquo and this meant that inthe twenty or thirty seconds between firing the gun and theexplosion of the shell they might well be half a mile or sofrom the predicted pointA wide yet intense burst of fire round the predicted pointwas an answer Combinations of a hundred guns wouldhave been excellent if the guns could have been producedand the batteries manned and all put in the right place atthe right time This was beyond human power to achieveBut a very simple cheap alternative was available in therocket or as it had been called for secrecy the UnrotatedProjectile (UP) Even before the war Dr Crow in the daysof the Air Defence Research Committee had developedtwo-inch and three-inch rockets which could reach almostas high as our anti-aircraft guns The three-inch rocketcarried a much more powerful warhead than a three-inchshell It was not so accurate On the other hand rocketprojectors had the inestimable advantage that they could bemade very quickly and easily in enormous numbers withoutburdening our hard-driven gun factories Thousands ofthese UP projectors were made and some millions ofrounds of ammunition General Sir Frederick Pile an officerof great distinction who was in command of our anti-aircraftground defences throughout the war and who wassingularly free from the distaste for novel devices so oftenfound in professional soldiers welcomed this accession tohis strength He formed these weapons into huge batteriesof ninety-six projectors each manned largely by the HomeGuard which could produce a concentrated volume of firefar beyond the power of anti-aircraft artilleryI worked in increasing intimacy throughout the war withGeneral Pile and always found him ingenious andserviceable in the highest degree He was at his best not


only in these days of expansion when his command rose toa peak of over three hundred thousand men and womenand twenty-four hundred guns apart from the rockets butalso in the period which followed after the air attack onBritain had been beaten off Here was a time when his taskwas to liberate the largest possible numbers of men fromstatic defence by batteries and without diminishing thepotential fire-power to substitute the largest proportion ofwomen and Home Guard for regulars and technicians Butthis is a story which must be told in its proper placeThe task of General Pilersquos command was not merely helpedby the work of our scientists as the battle developed theiraid was the foundation on which all stood In the daylightattacks of the Battle of Britain the guns had accounted fortwo hundred and ninety-six enemy aircraft and probablydestroyed or damaged seventy-four more But the nightraids gave them new problems which with their existingequipment of only searchlights and sound locators couldnot be surmounted In four months from October 1 onlyabout seventy aircraft were destroyed Radar came to therescue The first of these sets for directing gunfire was usedin October and Mr Bevin and I spent most of the nightwatching them The searchlight beams were not fitted tillDecember However much training and experience wereneeded in their use and many modifications andrefinements in the sets themselves were found necessaryGreat efforts were made in all this wide field and the springof 1941 brought a full rewardDuring the attacks on London in the first two weeks of Mayndash the last of the German offensive ndash over seventy aircraftwere destroyed or more than the four winter months hadyielded Of course in the meanwhile the number of gunshad grown In December there had been 1450 heavy gunsand 650 light in May there were 1687 heavy guns 790


light with about 40 rocket batteries1 But the great increasein the effectiveness of our gun defences was due in itsorigin to the new inventions and technical improvementswhich the scientists put into the soldiersrsquo hands and ofwhich the soldiers made such good use

By the middle of 1941 when at last the rocket batteriesbegan to come into service in substantial numbers airattack had much diminished so that they had few chancesof proving themselves But when they did come into actionthe number of rounds needed to bring down an aircraft waslittle more than that required by the enormously more costlyand scanty anti-aircraft guns of which we were so shortThe rockets were good in themselves and also an additionto our other means of defenceShells or rockets alike are of course only effective if theyreach the right spot and explode at the right momentEfforts were therefore made to produce aerial minessuspended on long wires floating down on parachuteswhich could be laid in the path of the enemy air squadronsIt was impossible to pack these into shells But a rocketwith much thinner walls has more room A certain amountof three-inch rocket ammunition which could lay an aerialminefield on wires seven hundred feet long at heights up totwenty thousand feet was made and held ready for useagainst mass attacks on London The advantage of suchminefields over shell-fire is of course that they remainlethal for anything up to a minute For wherever the winghits the wire it pulls up the mine until it reaches the aircraftand explodes There is thus no need for exact fuze-settingas with ordinary shells


Aerial mines could of course be placed in position byrockets laid by aircraft or simply raised on small balloonsThe last method was ardently supported by the AdmiraltyIn fact however the rockets were never brought into actionon any considerable scale By the time they weremanufactured in large numbers mass attacks by bombershad ceased Nevertheless it was surprising and fortunatethat the Germans did not develop this counter to our mass-bombing raids in the last three years of the war Even a fewminelaying aircraft would have been able to lay andmaintain a minefield over any German city which wouldhave taken a toll of our bombers the more deadly asnumbers grew

There was another important aspect In 1940 the dive-bomber seemed to be a deadly threat to our ships and key-factories One might think that aircraft diving on a shipwould be easy to shoot down as the gunner can aimstraight at them without making allowance for their motionBut an aeroplane end on is a very small target and acontact fuze will work only in the rare event of a direct hitTo set a time fuze so that the shell explodes at the exactmoment when it is passing the aircraft is almost impossibleAn error in timing of one-tenth of a second causes a miss ofmany hundreds of feet It therefore seemed worth while totry to make a fuze which would detonate automaticallywhen the projectile passed near to the target whether itactually hit it or notAs there is little space in the head of a shell the roomierhead of the three-inch rocket was attractive While I wasstill at the Admiralty in 1940 we pressed this idea Photo-electric (PE) cells were used which produced an electrical


impulse whenever there was a change of light such as theshade of the enemy plane By February 1940 we had amodel which I took to the Cabinet and showed mycolleagues after one of our meetings When a matchboxwas thrown past the fuze it winked perceptibly with itsdemonstration lamp The cluster of Ministers who gatheredround including the Prime Minister were powerfullyimpressed But there is a long road between a grimacingmodel and an armed mass-production robot We workedhard at the production of the so-called PE fuzes but hereagain by the time they were ready in any quantity ourdanger and their hour had for the moment passedAttempts were made in 1941 to design a similar proximityfuze using a tiny radar set arranged to explode thewarhead when the projectile passed near the aircraftSuccessful preliminary experiments were made but beforethis fuze was developed in England the Americans towhom we imparted our knowledge actually succeeded notonly in perfecting the instrument but in reducing its size somuch that the whole thing could be put into the head notmerely of a rocket but of a shell These so-called ldquoProximityFuzesrdquo made in the United States were used in greatnumbers in the last year of the war and proved potentagainst the small unmanned aircraft (V-1) with which wewere assailed in 1944 and also in the Pacific againstJapanese aircraft

The final phase of ldquoThe Wizard Warrdquo was of course theradar developments and inventions required for our counter-attack upon Germany These suggested themselves tosome extent from our own experiences and defensiveefforts The part they played will be described in future


volumes In September 1940 we had nearly nine longmonths ahead of us of heavy battering and suffering beforethe tide was to turn It may be claimed that while strugglingnot without success against the perils of the hour we bentour thoughts steadily upon the future when better timesmight come

AIR DEFENCE GREAT BRITAIN


5The United States Destroyers and

West Indian Bases

My Appeal for Fifty American Destroyers mdash LordLothianrsquos Helpfulness mdash My Telegram toPresident Roosevelt of July 31 mdash Our Offer toLease Bases in the West Indies mdash My Objectionsto Bargaining About the Fleet mdash Further Telegramto the President of August 15 mdashThe PresidentrsquosStatement mdash My Speech in Parliament of August20 mdashTelegram to the President of August 22 mdashAnd of August 25 mdashAnd of August 27 mdashOur FinalOffer mdash My Assurance About the Fleet of August31 mdashStatement to Parliament of September 5

ON MAY 15 as already narrated I had in my first telegramto President Roosevelt after becoming Prime Ministerasked for ldquothe loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers tobridge the gap between what we have now and the largenew construction we put in hand at the beginning of thewar This time next year we shall have plenty but if in theinterval Italy comes in against us with another hundredsubmarines we may be strained to breaking-pointrdquo Irecurred to this in my cable of June 11 after Italy hadalready declared war upon us ldquoNothing is so important asfor us to have the thirty or forty old destroyers you havealready had reconditioned We can fit them very rapidly withour Asdicshellip The next six months are vitalrdquo At the end ofJuly when we were alone and already engaged in thefateful air battle with the prospect of imminent invasion


behind it I renewed my request I was well aware of thePresidentrsquos good will and of his difficulties For thatreason I had endeavoured to put before him in the bluntterms of various messages the perilous position which theUnited States would occupy if British resistance collapsedand Hitler became master of Europe with all its dockyardsand navies less what we had been able to destroy ordisable

It was evident as this discussion proceeded that thetelegrams I had sent in June dwelling on the graveconsequences to the United States which might follow fromthe successful invasion and subjugation of the BritishIslands played a considerable part in high American circlesAssurances were requested from Washington that theBritish Fleet would in no circumstances be handed over tothe Germans We were very ready to give theseassurances in the most solemn form As we were ready todie they cost nothing I did not however wish at this timeon what might be the eve of invasion and at the height ofthe air battle to encourage the Germans with the idea thatsuch contingencies had ever entered our minds Moreoverby the end of August our position was vastly improved Thewhole Regular Army was re-formed and to a considerableextent rearmed The Home Guard had come into active lifeWe were inflicting heavy losses on the German Air Forceand were far more than holding our own Every argumentabout invasion that had given me confidence in June andJuly was doubled before September


We had at this time in Washington a singularly gifted andinfluential Ambassador I had known Philip Kerr who hadnow succeeded as Marquess of Lothian from the old daysof Lloyd George in 1919 and before and we had differedmuch and often from Versailles to Munich and later As thetension of events mounted not only did Lothian develop abroad comprehension of the scene but his eye penetrateddeeply He had pondered on the grave implications of themessages I had sent to the President during the collapse ofFrance about the possible fate of the British Fleet if Englandwere invaded and conquered In this he moved with theruling minds in Washington who were deeply perturbednot only by sympathy for Britain and her cause but naturallyeven more by anxiety for the life and safety of the UnitedStatesLothian was worried by the last words of my speech in theHouse of Commons on June 4 when I had said ldquoWe shallnever surrender and even if which I do not for a momentbelieve this island or a large part of it were subjugated andstarving then our Empire beyond the seas armed andguarded by the British Fleet will carry on the struggle untilin Godrsquos good time the New World with all its power andmight steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of theOldrdquo He thought these words had given encouragement ldquotothose who believed that even though Great Britain wentunder the Fleet would somehow cross the Atlantic tothemrdquo The reader is aware of the different language I hadbeen using behind the scenes I had explained my positionat the time to the Foreign Secretary and to the Ambassador

Prime Minister to LordLothian

9VI40


My last words in speech were of course addressedprimarily to Germany and Italy to whom the idea of awar of continents and a long war are at presentobnoxious also to [the] Dominions for whom we aretrustees I have nevertheless always had in mind yourpoint and have raised it in various telegrams toPresident as well as to Mackenzie King If Great Britainbroke under invasion a pro-German Government mightobtain far easier terms from Germany by surrenderingthe Fleet thus making Germany and Japan masters ofthe New World This dastard deed would not be doneby His Majestyrsquos present advisers but if some QuislingGovernment were set up it is exactly what they woulddo and perhaps the only thing they could do and thePresident should bear this very clearly in mind Youshould talk to him in this sense and thus discourageany complacent assumption on United Statesrsquo part thatthey will pick up the debris of the British Empire by theirpresent policy On the contrary they run the terrible riskthat their sea-power will be completely overmatchedMoreover islands and naval bases to hold the UnitedStates in awe would certainly be claimed by the NazisIf we go down Hitler has a very good chance ofconquering the world

I hope the foregoing will be a help to you in yourconversations

Nearly a month passed before any result emerged Thencame an encouraging telegram from the Ambassador Hesaid (July 56) that informed American opinion was at lastbeginning to realise that they were in danger of losing theBritish Fleet altogether if the war went against us and if theyremained neutral It would however be extremely difficultto get American public opinion to consider letting us haveAmerican destroyers unless it could be assured that in theevent of the United States entering the war the British Fleetor such of it as was afloat would cross the Atlantic if GreatBritain were overrun


At the end of July under the increasing pressure from somany angles at once I took the matter up again


31VII40

It is some time since I ventured to cable personallyto you and many things both good and bad havehappened in between It has now become most urgentfor you to let us have the destroyers motor-boats andflying-boats for which we have asked The Germanshave the whole French coastline from which to launchU-boats and dive-bomber attacks upon our trade andfood and in addition we must be constantly prepared torepel by sea-action threatened invasion in the NarrowWaters and also to deal with break-outs from Norwaytowards Ireland Iceland Shetlands and FaroesBesides this we have to keep control of the exits fromthe Mediterranean and if possible the command of thatinland sea itself and thus to prevent the war spreadingseriously into Africa

We have a large construction of destroyers and anti-U-boat craft coming forward but the next three or fourmonths open the gap of which I have previously toldyou Latterly the air attack on our shipping has becomeinjurious In the last ten days we have had the followingdestroyers sunk Brazen Codrington Delight Wrenand the following damaged Beagle Boreas BrilliantGriffin Montrose Walpole Whitshed total eleven Allthis in the advent of any attempt which may be made atinvasion Destroyers are frightfully vulnerable to air-bombing and yet they must be held in the air-bombingarea to prevent sea-borne invasion We could notsustain the present rate of casualties for long and if wecannot get a substantial reinforcement the whole fate ofthe war may be decided by this minor and easilyremediable factor


This is a frank account of our present situation and Iam confident now that you know exactly how we standthat you will leave nothing undone to ensure that fifty orsixty of your oldest destroyers are sent to me at once Ican fit them very quickly with Asdics and use themagainst U-boats on the western approaches and sokeep the more modern and better-gunned craft for theNarrow Seas against invasion Mr President with greatrespect I must tell you that in the long history of theworld this is a thing to do now Large construction iscoming to me in 1941 but the crisis will be reachedlong before 1941 I know you will do all in your powerbut I feel entitled and bound to put the gravity andurgency of the position before you

If the destroyers were given the motor-boats andflying-boats which would be invaluable could surelycome in behind them

I am beginning to feel very hopeful about this war ifwe can get round the next three or four months The airis holding well We are hitting that man hard both inrepelling attacks and in bombing Germany But the lossof destroyers by air attack may well be so serious as tobreak down our defence of the food and trade routesacross the Atlantic

Tonight the latest convoys of rifles cannon andammunition are coming in Special trains are waiting totake them to the troops and Home Guard who will takea lot of killing before they give them up I am sure thatwith your comprehension of the sea affair you will notlet this crux of the battle go wrong for want of thesedestroyers

Three days later I telegraphed to our Ambassador

3VIII40[The] second alternative ie [granting of] bases [in

British possessions] is agreeable but we prefer that itshould be on lease indefinitely and not sale It isunderstood that this will enable us to secure destroyersand flying-boats at once You should let Colonel Knoxand others know that a request on these lines will be


agreeable to ushellip It is as you say vital to settlequickly Now is the time when we want the destroyersWe can fit them with Asdics in about ten days from thetime they are in our hands all preparations having beenmade We should also be prepared to give a number ofAsdics sets to the United States Navy and assist intheir installation and explain their working Go ahead onthese lines full steam

Profound and anxious consultations had taken place atWashington and in the first week of August the suggestionwas made to us through Lord Lothian that the fifty old butreconditioned American destroyers which lay in the eastcoast Navy yards might be traded off to us in exchange fora series of bases in the West Indian islands and alsoBermuda There was of course no comparison betweenthe intrinsic value of these antiquated and inefficient craftand the immense permanent strategic security afforded tothe United States by the enjoyment of the island bases Butthe threatened invasion the importance of numbers in theNarrow Seas made our need clamant Moreover thestrategic value of these islands counted only against theUnited States They were in the old days the stepping-stone by which America could be attacked from Europe orfrom England Now with air power it was all the moreimportant for American safety that they should be in friendlyhands or in their own But the friendly hands might fail inthe convulsive battle now beginning for the life of BritainBelieving as I have always done that the survival of Britainis bound up with the survival of the United States itseemed to me and to my colleagues that it was an actualadvantage to have these bases in American hands 1therefore did not look upon the question from any narrowBritish point of viewThere was another reason wider and more powerful thaneither our need for the destroyers or the American need for


the bases The transfer to Great Britain of fifty Americanwarships was a decidedly unneutral act by the UnitedStates It would according to all the standards of historyhave justified the German Government in declaring warupon them The President judged that there was no dangerand I felt there was no hope of this simple solution of manydifficulties It was Hitlerrsquos interest and method to strike hisopponents down one by one The last thing he wished wasto be drawn into war with the United States before he hadfinished with Britain Nevertheless the transfer of destroyersto Britain in August 1940 was an event which brought theUnited States definitely nearer to us and to the war and itwas the first of a long succession of increasingly unneutralacts in the Atlantic which were of the utmost service to us Itmarked the passage of the United States from being neutralto being non-belligerent Although Hitler could not afford toresent it all the world as will be seen understood thesignificance of the gestureFor all these reasons the War Cabinet and Parliamentapproved the policy of leasing the bases to obtain thedestroyers provided we could persuade the West Indianisland Governments concerned to make what was to thema serious sacrifice and disturbance of their life for the sakeof the Empire On August 6 Lothian cabled that thePresident was anxious for an immediate reply about thefuture of the Fleet He wished to be assured that if Britainwere overrun the Fleet would continue to fight for theEmpire overseas and would not either be surrendered orsunk This was it was said the argument which wouldhave the most effect on Congress in the question ofdestroyers The prospects of legislative action he thoughtwere steadily improvingI expressed my own feelings to the Foreign Secretary


7VIII40The position is I think quite clear We have no

intention of surrendering the British Fleet or of sinkingit voluntarily Indeed such a fate is more likely toovertake the German Fleet ndash or what is left of it Thenation would not tolerate any discussion of what weshould do if our island were overrun Such a discus-sion perhaps on the eve of an invasion would beinjurious to public morale now so high Moreover wemust never get into a position where the United StatesGovernment might say ldquoWe think the time has come foryou to send your Fleet across the Atlantic in accor-dance with our understanding or agreement when wegave you the destroyersrdquo

We must refuse any declaration such as issuggested and confine the deal solely to the colonialleases

I now cabled to Lothian7VIII40

We need the fifty or sixty destroyers very much andhope we shall obtain them In no other way could theUnited States assist us so effectively in the next threeor four months We were as you know very ready tooffer the United States indefinite lease facilities fornaval and air bases in West Indian islands and to dothis freely on grounds of inevitable common associationof naval and military interests of Great Britain and theUnited States It was therefore most agreeable to usthat Colonel Knox should be inclined to suggest actionon these or similar lines as an accompaniment to theimmediate sending of the said destroyers But all thishas nothing to do with any bargaining or declarationabout the future disposition of the British Fleet It wouldobviously be impossible for us to make or agree to anydeclaration being made on such a subject I haverepeatedly warned you in my secret telegrams andthose to the President of the dangers United Stateswould run if Great Britain were successfully invaded


and a British Quisling Government came into office tomake the best terms possible for the survivinginhabitants I am very glad to find that these dangersare regarded as serious and you should in no wiseminimise them We have no intention of relieving UnitedStates from any well-grounded anxieties on this pointMoreover our position is not such as to bring thecollapse of Britain into the arena of practical discussionI have already several weeks ago told you that there isno warrant for discussing any question of thetransference of the Fleet to American or Canadianshores I should refuse to allow the subject even to bementioned in any Staff conversations still less that anytechnical preparations should be made or evenplanned Above all it is essential you should realisethat no such declaration could ever be assented to byus for the purpose of obtaining destroyers or anythinglike that Pray make it clear at once that we could neveragree to the slightest compromising of our full liberty ofaction nor tolerate any such defeatist announcementthe effect of which would be disastrous

Although in my speech of June 4 I thought it well toopen up to German eyes the prospects of indefiniteoceanic war this was a suggestion in the making ofwhich we could admit no neutral partner Of course ifthe United States entered the war and became an allywe should conduct the war with them in common andmake of our own initiative and in agreement with themwhatever were the best dispositions at any period in thestruggle for the final effectual defeat of the enemy Youforesaw this yourself in your first conversation with thePresident when you said you were quite sure that weshould never send any part of our Fleet across theAtlantic except in the case of an actual war alliance

To the President I telegraphed

15VIII40I need not tell you how cheered I am by your

message or how grateful I feel for your untiring effortsto give us all possible help You will I am sure send useverything you can for you know well that the worth of


every destroyer that you can spare to us is measured inrubies But we also need the motor torpedo-boatswhich you mentioned and as many flying-boats andrifles as you can let us have We have a million menwaiting for rifles

The moral value of this fresh aid from yourGovernment and people at this critical time will be verygreat and widely felt

We can meet both the points you considernecessary to help you with Congress and with othersconcerned but I am sure that you will not misunder-stand me if I say that our willingness to do so must beconditional on our being assured that there will be nodelay in letting us have the ships and flying-boats Asregards an assurance about the British Fleet I am ofcourse ready to reiterate to you what I told Parliamenton June 4 We intend to fight this out here to the endand none of us would ever buy peace by surrenderingor scuttling the Fleet But in any use you may make ofthis repeated assurance you will please bear in mindthe disastrous effect from our point of view andperhaps also from yours of allowing any impression togrow that we regard the conquest of the British Islandsand its naval bases as any other than an impossiblecontingency The spirit of our people is splendid Neverhave they been so determined Their confidence in theissue has been enormously and legitimately strength-ened by the severe air fighting in the past week Asregards naval and air bases I readily agree to yourproposals for ninety-nine-year leases which are fareasier for us than the method of purchase I have nodoubt that once the principle is agreed between us thedetails can be adjusted and we can discuss them atleisure It will be necessary for us to consult theGovernments of Newfoundland and Canada about theNewfoundland base in which Canada has an interestWe are at once proceeding to seek their consent

Once again Mr President let me thank you for yourhelp and encouragement which mean so much to us


Lothian thought this reply admirable and said there was areal chance now that the President would be able to get thefifty destroyers without legislation This was still uncertainbut he thought we should send some British destroyercrews to Halifax and Bermuda without any delay It wouldcreate the worst impression in America if destroyers weremade available and no British crews were ready totransport them across the Atlantic Moreover the fact thatour crews were already waiting on the spot would help toimpress the urgency of the case on CongressAt his press conference on August 16 the President madethe following statement

lsquoThe United States Government is holding conversa-tions with the Government of the British Empire withregard to acquisition of naval and air bases for thedefence of the Western Hemisphere and especially thePanama Canal The United States Government iscarrying on conversations with the Canadian Govern-ment on the defence of the Western hemisphere

According to the newspapers the President stated that theUnited States would give Great Britain something in returnbut that he did not know what this would be Heemphasised more than once that the negotiations for the airbases were in no way connected with the question ofdestroyers Destroyers were he said not involved in theprospective arrangements

The President having always to consider Congress andalso the Navy authorities in the United States was ofcourse increasingly drawn to present the transaction to hisfellow-countrymen as a highly advantageous bargainwhereby immense securities were gained in these


dangerous times by the United States in return for a fewflotillas of obsolete destroyers This was indeed true butnot exactly a convenient statement for me Deep feelingswere aroused in Parliament and the Government at theidea of leasing any part of these historic territories and ifthe issue were presented to the British as a naked trading-away of British possessions for the sake of the fiftydestroyers it would certainly encounter vehementopposition I sought therefore to place the transaction onthe highest level where indeed it had a right to standbecause it expressed and conserved the enduring commoninterests of the English-speaking worldWith the consent of the President I presented the questionto Parliament on August 20 in words which have notperhaps lost their meaning with time

Presently we learned that anxiety was also felt in theUnited States about the air and naval defence of theirAtlantic seaboard and President Roosevelt hasrecently made it clear that he would like to discuss withus and with the Dominion of Canada and withNewfoundland the development of American naval andair facilities in Newfoundland and in the West IndiesThere is of course no question of any transference ofsovereignty ndash that has never been suggested ndash or ofany action being taken without the consent or againstthe wishes of the various Colonies concerned but forour part His Majestyrsquos Government are entirely willing toaccord defence facilities to the United States on aninety-nine yearsrsquo leasehold basis and we feel surethat our interests no less than theirs and the interestsof the Colonies themselves and of Canada andNewfoundland will be served thereby These areimportant steps Undoubtedly this process means thatthese two great organisations of the English-speakingdemocracies the British Empire and the United Stateswill have to be somewhat mixed up together in some oftheir affairs for mutual and general advantage For myown part looking out upon the future I do not view the


process with any misgivings I could not stop it if Iwished no one can stop it Like the Mississippi it justkeeps rolling along Let it roll Let it roll on ndash full Hoodinexorable irresistible benignant to broader lands andbetter days


22VIII40

I am most grateful for all you are doing on ourbehalf I had not contemplated anything in the nature ofa contract bargain or sale between us It is the factthat we had decided in Cabinet to offer you naval andair facilities off the Atlantic Coast quite independently ofdestroyers or any other aid Our view is that we are twofriends in danger helping each other as far as we canWe should therefore like to give you the facilitiesmentioned without stipulating for any return and even iftomorrow you found it too difficult to transfer thedestroyers etc our offer still remains open becausewe think it is in the general good

2 I see difficulties and even risks in the exchangeof letters now suggested or in admitting in any way thatthe munitions which you send us are a payment for thefacilities Once this idea is accepted people willcontrast on each side what is given and received Themoney value of the armaments would be computed andset against the facilities and some would think onething about it and some another

3 Moreover Mr President as you well know eachisland or location is a case by itself If for instancethere were only one harbour or site how is it to bedivided and its advantages shared In such a case weshould like to make you an offer of what we think isbest for both rather than to embark upon a close-cutargument as to what ought to be delivered in return forvalue received

4 What we want is that you shall feel safe on yourAtlantic seaboard so far as any facilities in possessionsof ours can make you safe and naturally if you put in


money and make large developments you must havethe effective security of a long lease Therefore I wouldrather rest at this moment upon the general declarationmade by me in the House of Commons yesterday bothon this point and as regards the future of the FleetThen if you will set out in greater detail what you wantwe will at once tell you what we can do and thereafterthe necessary arrangements technical and legal canbe worked out by our experts Meanwhile we are quitecontent to trust entirely to your judgment and thesentiments of the people of the United States about anyaid in munitions etc you feel able to give us But thiswould be entirely a separate spontaneous act on thepart of the United States arising out of their view of theworld struggle and how their own interests stand inrelation to it and the causes it involves

5 Although the air attack has slackened in the lastfew days and our strength is growing in many ways Ido not think that bad man has yet struck his full blowWe are having considerable losses in merchant shipson the northwestern approaches now our only channelof regular communication with the oceans and yourfifty destroyers if they came along at once would be aprecious help

Lothian now cabled that Mr Sumner Welles had told himthat the constitutional position made it ldquoutterly impossiblerdquofor the President to send the destroyers as a spontaneousgift they could come only as a quid pro quo Under theexisting legislation neither the Chief of the Staff nor theGeneral Board of the Navy were able to give the certificatethat the ships were not essential to national defencewithout which the transfer could not be legally made exceptin return for a definite consideration which they would certifyadded to the security of the United States The Presidenthad tried to find another way out but there was none



25VIII40

I fully understand the legal and constitutionaldifficulties which make you wish for a formal contractembodied in letters but I venture to put before you thedifficulties and even dangers which I foresee in thisprocedure For the sake of the precise list of instrumen-talities mentioned which in our sore need we greatlydesire we are asked to pay undefined concessions inall the islands and places mentioned from Newfound-land to British Guiana ldquoas may be required in thejudgment of the United Statesrdquo Suppose we could notagree to all your experts asked for should we not beexposed to a charge of breaking our contract for whichwe had already received value Your commitment isdefinite ours unlimited Much though we need thedestroyers we should not wish to have them at the riskof a misunderstanding with the United States orindeed any serious argument If the matter is to berepresented as a contract both sides must be definedwith far more precision on our side than has hithertobeen possible But this might easily take some time

As I have several times pointed out we need thedestroyers chiefly to bridge the gap between now andthe arrival of our new construction which I set on footon the outbreak of war This construction is veryconsiderable For instance we shall receive by the endof February new destroyers and new mediumdestroyers 20 corvettes which are a handy type ofsubmarine-hunter adapted to ocean work 60 motortorpedo-boats 37 motor anti-submarine boats 25Fairmiles a wooden anti-submarine patrol boat 104seventy-two-foot launches 29 An even greater inflowwill arrive in the following six months It is just in thegap from September to February inclusive while thisnew crop is coming in and working up that your fiftydestroyers would be invaluable With them we couldminimise shipping losses in the northwesternapproaches and also take a stronger line againstMussolini in the Mediterranean Therefore time is all-


important We should not however be justified in thecircumstances if we gave a blank cheque on the wholeof our transatlantic possessions merely to bridge thisgap through which anyhow we hope to make ourway though with added risk and suffering This I amsure you will see sets forth our difficulties plainly

2 Would not the following procedure be acceptableI would offer at once certain fairly well-defined facilitieswhich will show you the kind of gift we have in mindand your experts could then discuss these or anyvariants of them with ours ndash we remaining the finaljudge of what we can give All this we will do freelytrusting entirely to the generosity and good will of theAmerican people as to whether they on their part wouldlike to do something for us But anyhow it is the settledpolicy of His Majestyrsquos Government to offer you andmake available to you when desired solid and effectivemeans of protecting your Atlantic seaboard I havealready asked the Admiralty and the Air Ministry to drawup in outline what we are prepared to offer leavingyour experts to suggest alternatives I propose to sendyou this outline in two or three days and to publish it indue course In this way there can be no possibledispute and the American people will feel more warmlytowards us because they will see we are playing thegame by the worldrsquos cause and that their safety andinterests are dear to us

3 If your law or your Admiral requires that any helpyou may choose to give us must be presented as aquid pro quo I do not see why the British Governmenthave to come into that at all Could you not say that youdid not feel able to accept this fine offer which wemake unless the United States matched it in someway and that therefore the Admiral would be able tolink the one with the other

4 I am so grateful to you for all the trouble you havebeen taking and I am sorry to add to your burdensknowing what a good friend you have been to us


27VIII40


Lord Lothian has cabled me the outline of thefacilities you have in mind Our naval and air expertsstudying the question from your point of view hadreached practically the same conclusions except thatin addition they thought Antigua might be useful as abase for flying-boats To this also you would be verywelcome Our settled policy is to make the UnitedStates safe on their Atlantic seaboard ldquobeyond aperadventurerdquo to quote a phrase you may remember1

2 We are quite ready to make you a positive offeron these lines forthwith There would of course haveto be an immediate conference on details but for thereasons which I set out in my last telegram we do notlike the idea of an arbiter should any difference arisebecause we feel that as donors we must remain thefinal judges of what the gift is to consist of within thegeneral framework of the facilities which will have beenpromised and always on the understanding that weshall do our best to meet United States wishes

3 The two letters dratted by Lord Lothian to theSecretary of State are quite agreeable to us The onlyreason why I do not wish the second letter to bepublished is that I think it is much more likely that theGerman Government will be the one to surrender orscuttle its fleet or what is left of it In this as you areaware they have already had some practice You willremember that I said some months ago in one of myprivate cables to you that any such action on our partwould be a dastard act and that is the opinion of everyone of us

4 If you felt able after our offer had been made to letus have the ldquoinstrumentalitiesrdquo2 which have beenmentioned or anything else you think proper this couldbe expressed as an act not in payment or considerationfor but in recognition of what we had done for thesecurity of the United States

5 Mr President this business has becomeespecially urgent in view of the recent menace whichMussolini is showing to Greece If our business is putthrough on big lines and in the highest spirit of goodwill it might even now save that small historic country


from invasion and conquest Even the next forty-eighthours are important


27VIII40

Lord Lothianrsquos account of President Rooseveltrsquosrequest should now be put into the first person in casea public declaration is required in our name Forinstance ldquoHis Majestyrsquos Government make thefollowing offer to the President of the United StateslsquoWe are prepared in friendship and good will to meetyour representatives immediately in order to considerthe provision of effective naval and air bases in thefollowing islandsrsquordquo etc

Let me have a draft on these lines so that I candictate a cable The draft should be in my hands thismorning

Accordingly27VIII40

His Majestyrsquos Government make the following offerto the President of the United States

We are prepared in friendship and good will to meetyour representatives forthwith in order to consider thelease for ninety-nine years of areas for the establish-ment of naval and air bases in the following places

NEWFOUNDLAND ANTIGUABERMUDA ST LUCIABAHAMAS TRINIDADJAMAICA BRITISH

GUIANASubject to later settlements on points of detailhellip

At the same time I suggested the following text of thetelegram for publication which the President might send meto elicit the assurance he desired


The Prime Minister of Great Britain is reported tohave stated on June 4 1940 to Parliament in effectthat if during the course of the present war in whichGreat Britain and British Colonies are engaged thewaters surrounding the British Isles should becomeuntenable for British ships-of-war a British Fleet wouldin no event be surrendered or sunk but would be sentoverseas for the defence of other parts of the Empire

The Government of the United States wouldrespectfully inquire whether the foregoing statementrepresents the settled policy of the British Government

The President adopted this version and I sent him thefollowing agreed reply

You ask Mr President whether my statement inParliament on June 4 1940 about Great Britain neversurrendering or scuttling her Fleet ldquorepresents thesettled policy of His Majestyrsquos Governmentrdquo It certainlydoes I must however observe that these hypotheticalcontingencies seem more likely to concern the GermanFleet or what is left of it than our own

Thus all was happily settled and on September 5 using thelanguage of understatement I duly informed the House ofCommons and obtained their acquiescence and indeedgeneral consentThe memorable transactions between Great Britain and theUnited States which were foreshadowed when I lastaddressed the House have now been completed As far asI can make out they have been completed to the generalsatisfaction of the British and American peoples and to theencouragement of our friends all over the world It would bea mistake to try to read into the official notes which havepassed more than the documents bear on their face Theexchanges which have taken place are simply measures ofmutual assistance rendered to one another by two friendlynations in a spirit of confidence sympathy and good will


These measures are linked together in a formal agreementThey must be accepted exactly as they stand Only veryignorant persons would suggest that the transfer ofAmerican destroyers to the British flag constitutes theslightest violation of international law or affects in thesmallest degree the non-belligerency of the United StatesI have no doubt that Herr Hitler will not like this transferenceof destroyers and I have no doubt that he will pay theUnited States out if he ever gets the chance That is why Iam very glad that the army air and naval frontiers of theUnited States have been advanced along a wide arc intothe Atlantic Ocean and that this will enable them to takedanger by the throat while it is still hundreds of miles awayfrom their homeland The Admiralty tell us also that they arevery glad to have these fifty destroyers and that they willcome in most conveniently to bridge the gap which as Ihave previously explained to the House inevitablyintervenes before our considerable wartime programme ofnew construction comes into serviceI suppose the House realises that we shall be a good dealstronger next year on the sea than we are now althoughthat is quite strong enough for the immediate work in handThere will be no delay in bringing the American destroyersinto active service in fact British crews are already meetingthem at the various ports where they are being deliveredYou might call it the long arm of coincidence I really do notthink that there is any more to be said about the wholebusiness at the present time This is not the appropriateoccasion for rhetoric Perhaps I may however veryrespectfully offer this counsel to the House When youhave got a thing where you want it it is a good thing toleave it where it is


Thus we obtained the fifty American destroyers Wegranted ninety-nine-year leases of the air and naval basesspecified in the West Indies and Newfoundland to theUnited States And thirdly I repeated my declaration aboutnot scuttling or surrendering the British Fleet in the form ofan assurance to the President I regarded all these asparallel transactions and as acts of good will performed ontheir merits and not as bargains The President found itmore acceptable to present them to Congress as aconnected whole We neither of us contradicted each otherand both countries were satisfied The effects in Europewere profound


6Egypt and the Middle East 1940 June mdash

Julymdash August

Mussolini Prepares to Invade EgyptmdashOurCompeting Anxieties mdash The Italian Strength inNorth Africa mdash Concentration Towards theEgyptian FrontiermdashBeads on the StringmdashInitiativeof Our Covering TroopsmdashAmphibious PossibilitiesmdashNeed to Reinforce with Tanks and OtherWeaponsmdashMy Complaints of DispersionmdashTheKenya FrontmdashPalestinemdashNeed to Send Forth anArmoured Brigade and Later the SecondArmoured DivisionmdashThe Mediterranean Short Cutmdash The Tanks Have to Go Round the CapemdashPlans for Cutting the Italian Coastal Road from theSeamdashMinisterial Committee on the Middle East mdashGeneral Wavell Comes Home for ConferencemdashHard and Tense Discussions with HimmdashDirectiveof August 16 mdash Assembly of the Army of the NilemdashIts Tactical EmploymentmdashThe SomalilandEpisodemdashA Vexatious Rebuff mdashMy MinutesThereuponmdashIncrease in Italian Forces in AlbaniamdashMy Report on the General Situation to the PrimeMinisters of Australia and New Zealand

WITH THE DISAPPEARANCE of France as a combatant andwith Britain set on her struggle for life at home Mussolinimight well feel that his dream of dominating theMediterranean and rebuilding the former Roman Empirewould come true Relieved from any need to guard against


the French in Tunis he could still further reinforce thenumerous army he had gathered for the invasion of EgyptThe eyes of the world were fixed upon the fate of the BritishIsland upon the gathering of the invading German armiesand upon the drama of the struggle for air mastery Thesewere of course our main preoccupations In manycountries we were presumed to be at the last gasp Ourconfident and resolute bearing was admired by our friendsbut its foundations were deemed unsure Nevertheless theWar Cabinet were determined to defend Egypt against allcomers with whatever resources could be spared from thedecisive struggle at home All the more was this difficultwhen the Admiralty declared themselves unable to passeven military convoys through the Mediterranean onaccount of the air dangers All must go round the CapeThus we might easily rob the Battle of Britain withouthelping the Battle of Egypt It is odd that while at the timeeveryone concerned was quite calm and cheerful writingabout it afterwards makes one shiver

When Italy declared war on June 10 1940 the BritishIntelligence estimated ndash we now know correctly ndash that apartfrom her garrisons in Abyssinia Eritrea and Somalilandthere were about 215000 Italian troops in the North Africancoastal provinces These were disposed as follows inTripolitania six metropolitan and two militia divisions inCyrenaica two metropolitan and two militia divisionsbesides frontier forces equal to three divisions a total offifteen divisions The British forces in Egypt consisted of the7th Armoured Division two-thirds of the 4th Indian Divisionone-third of the New Zealand Division and fourteen Britishbattalions and two regiments of the Royal Artilleryungrouped in higher formations the whole amounting to


perhaps fifty thousand men From these both the defenceof the western frontier and the internal security of Egypt hadto be provided We therefore had heavy odds against usin the field and the Italians had also many more aircraftDuring July and August the Italians became active at manypoints There was a threat from Kassala on the White Nilewestward towards Khartoum Alarm was spread in Kenyaby the fear of an Italian expedition marching four hundredmiles south from Abyssinia towards the Tana River andNairobi Considerable Italian forces advanced into BritishSomaliland But all these anxieties were petty comparedwith the Italian invasion of Egypt which was obviouslybeing prepared on the greatest scale For some time pastMussolini had been steadily moving his forces eastwardtowards Egypt Even before the war a magnificent road hadbeen made along the coast from the main base at Tripolithrough Tripolitania Cyrenaica and Libya to the Egyptianfrontier Along this road there had been for many months aswelling stream of military traffic Large magazines wereslowly established and filled at Benghazi Derna TobrukBardia and Sollum The length of this road was over athousand miles and all these swarming Italian garrisonsand supply depots were strung along it like beads on astringAt the head of the road and near the Egyptian frontier anItalian army of seventy or eighty thousand men with a gooddeal of modern equipment had been patiently gatheredand organised Before this army glittered the prize of EgyptBehind it stretched the long road back to Tripoli and afterthat the sea If this force built up in driblets week by weekfor years could advance continually eastward conqueringall who sought to bar the path its fortunes would be brightIf it could gain the fertile regions of the Delta all worryabout the long road back would vanish On the other hand


if ill-fortune befell it only a few would ever get home In thefield army and in the series of great supply depots all alongthe coast there were by the autumn at least three hundredthousand Italians who could even if unmolested retreatwestward along the road only gradually or piecemeal Forthis they required many months And if the battle were loston the Egyptian border if the armyrsquos front were broken andif time were not given to them all were doomed to captureor death However in July 1940 it was not known who wasgoing to win the battleOur foremost defended position at that time was therailhead at Mersa Matruh There was a good road westwardto Sidi Barani but thence to the frontier at Sollum there wasno road capable of maintaining any considerable strengthfor long near the frontier A small covering mechanisedforce had been formed of some of our finest Regulartroops consisting of the 7th Hussars (light tanks) the 11thHussars (armoured cars) and two motor battalions of the60th Rifles and Rifle Brigade with two regiments ofmotorised Royal Horse Artillery Orders had been given toattack the Italian frontier posts immediately on the outbreakof war Accordingly within twenty-four hours the 11thHussars crossed the frontier took the Italians who had notheard that war had been declared by surprise andcaptured prisoners The next night June 12 they had asimilar success and on June 14 with the 7th Hussars andone company of the 60th Rifles captured the frontier fortsat Capuzzo and Maddalena taking two hundred and twentyprisoners On the 16th they raided deeper destroyedtwelve tanks intercepted a convoy on the Tobruk-Bardiaroad and captured a generalIn this small but lively warfare our troops felt they had theadvantage and soon conceived themselves to be mastersof the desert Until they came up against large formed


bodies or fortified posts they could go where they likedcollecting trophies from sharp encounters When armiesapproach each other it makes all the difference whichowns only the ground on which it stands or sleeps andwhich one owns all the rest I saw this in the Boer Warwhere we owned nothing beyond the fires of our camps andbivouacs whereas the Boers rode where they pleased allover the countryEver-growing enemy forces were now arriving from thewest and by the middle of July the enemy had re-established his frontier line with two divisions and elementsof two more Early in August our covering force wasrelieved by the support group of the 7th Armoured Divisioncomprising the 3d Cold-stream Guards the first 60th Riflesthe 2d Rifle Brigade the 11th Hussars one squadron of the6th Royal Tank Battalion and two mechanised batteries RHA one of which was antitank This small forcedistributed over a front of sixty miles continued to harassthe enemy with increasing effect The published Italiancasualties for the first three months of war were nearly thirty-five hundred men of whom seven hundred were prisonersOur own losses barely exceeded a hundred and fifty Thusthe first phase in the war which Italy had declared upon theBritish Empire opened favourably for us

It was proposed by the Middle East Command underGeneral Wavell to await the shock of the Italian onslaughtnear the fortified position of Mersa Matruh Until we couldgather an army this seemed the only course open Itherefore proposed the following tasks First to assemblethe largest fighting force possible to face the Italianinvaders For this it was necessary to run risks in many


other quarters I was pained to see the dispersions whichwere tolerated by the military authorities Khartoum and theBlue Nile certainly required strengthening against the Italian-Abyssinian border but what was the sense of keepingtwenty-five thousand men including the Union Brigade ofSouth Africa and two brigades of excellent West Africantroops idle in Kenya I had ridden over some of thiscountry north of the Tana River in 1906 It is a very fine-looking country but without much to eat The idea of anItalian expedition of fifteen or twenty thousand men withartillery and modern gear traversing the four or fivehundred miles before they could reach Nairobi seemedridiculous Behind the Kenya front would lie the broad-gauge Uganda Railway We had the command of the seaand could move troops to and fro by sea and rail with afacility incomparable to anything that could be achieved byenemy land movements On account of our superiorcommunications it was our interest to fight an Italianexpedition as near to Nairobi and the broad-gauge railwayas possible For this large numbers of troops were notrequired They were more needed in the Egyptian Delta Igot something but only after a prolonged hard fight againstthe woolly theme of being safe everywhereI did my utmost to draw upon Singapore and bring theAustralian division which had arrived there first to India fortraining and thence to the Western Desert Palestinepresented a different aspect We had a mass of fine troopssprawled over Palestine an Australian division a NewZealand brigade our own choice Yeomanry division all inarmoured cars or about to be the Household Cavalry stillwith horses but longing for modern weapons with lavishadministrative services I wished to arm the Jews at Tel-Aviv who with proper weapons would have made a goodfight against all comers Here I encountered every kind of


resistance My second preoccupation was to ensure thatfreedom of movement through the Mediterranean wasfought for against the weak Italians and the grave airdanger in order that Malta might be made impregnable Itseemed to me most important to pass military convoysespecially of tanks and guns through the Mediterraneaninstead of all round the Cape This seemed a prize worthmany hazards To send a division from Britain round theCape to Egypt was to make sure it could not fight anywherefor three months but these were precious months and wehad very few divisions Finally there was our island nowunder pretty direct menace of invasion How far could wedenude our home and citadel for the sake of the MiddleEast

In July 1940 I began as the telegrams and Minutes showto concern myself increasingly about the Middle EastAlways this long coastal road bulked in my mind Again andagain I recurred to the idea of cutting it by the landing ofstrong but light forces from the sea We had not of courseat that time proper tank-landing craft Yet it should havebeen possible to improvise the necessary tackle for such anoperation If used in conjunction with a heavy battle it mighthave effected a valuable diversion of enemy troops fromthe front


10VII40

Bring the following before the COS CommitteeHave any plans been made in the event of large

forces approaching the Egyptian border from Libya tocut the coastal motor road upon which they would be


largely dependent for supplies of all kinds It is notsufficient merely to bombard by air or from the sea Butif a couple of brigades of good troops could take sometown or other suitable point on the communicationsthey might with sea-power behind them cause aprolonged interruption require heavy forces to bemoved against them and then withdraw to strike againat some other point Of course such an operationwould not be effective until considerable forces of theenemy had already passed the point of interception Itmay be however that the desert itself affords freemovement to the enemyrsquos supplies I wonder whetherthis is so and if so why the Italians were at pains toconstruct this lengthy road

I still do not see why it should not have been possible tomake a good plan It is however a fact that none of ourcommanders either in the Middle East or in Tunis wereever persuaded to make the attempt But General Patton in1943 made several most successful turning movements ofthis character during the conquest of Sicily and gaineddefinite advantages thereby It was not until Anzio in 1944that I succeeded in having this experiment tried This ofcourse was on a far larger scale nor did it in spite of thesuccess of the landing achieve the decisive results forwhich we all hoped But that is another story

I was anxious that the case of the Middle East should bestrongly presented by a group of Ministers all experiencedin war and deeply concerned in that theatre


10VII40


I think it would be well to set up a small standingMinisterial Committee consisting of the Secretaries ofState for War [Mr Eden] India [Mr Amery] and theColonies [Lord Lloyd] to consult together upon theconduct of the war in the Middle East (in which they areall three concerned) and to advise me as Minister ofDefence upon the recommendations I should make tothe Cabinet Will you kindly put this into the properform The Secretary of State for War has agreed totake the chair

Mr Eden reported to his Committee the shortage of troopsequipment and resources in the Middle East and that theCIGS was equally perturbed The Committee urged thefull equipment of the armoured division already in Egypt butfar below strength and also recommended the provision ofa second armoured division at the earliest moment when itcould be spared from home The Chiefs of Staff endorsedthese conclusions the CIGS observing that the momentmust be chosen in relation to declining risks at home andincreasing risks abroad On July 31 Mr Eden consideredthat we might be able to spare some tanks in a few weeksrsquotime and that if they were to reach the Middle East by theend of September we might have to send them and theother equipment through the Mediterranean In spite of therising tension about invasion at home I was in fullagreement with all this trend of thought and brought theextremely harassing choice before the Cabinet severaltimesThe other aspects of the Middle East pressed upon me


23VII40

Where is the South African Union Brigade of tenthousand men Why is it playing no part in the Middle


East We have agreed today to send further reinforce-ments of Hurricanes and other modern aircraft to theSouth African Air Force What is happening to theconcert of the campaign in the Middle East What hasbeen done by the Committee of Ministers I recently setup Now that large naval operations are contemplatedin the Mediterranean it is all the more essential that theattack on the Italian position in Abyssinia should bepressed and concerted by all means Make sure I havea report about the position which I can consider onThursday morning

I felt an acute need of talking over the serious eventsimpending in the Libyan Desert with General Wavellhimself I had hot met this distinguished officer on whom somuch was resting and I asked the Secretary of State forWar to invite him over for a week for consultation when anopportunity could be found He arrived on August 8 Hetoiled with the Staffs and had several long conversationswith me and Mr Eden The command in the Middle East atthat time comprised an extraordinary amalgam of militarypolitical diplomatic and administrative problems of extremecomplexity It took more than a year of ups and downs forme and my colleagues to learn the need of dividing theresponsibilities of the Middle East between a Commander-in-Chief a Minister of State and an Intendant-General tocope with the supply problem While not in full agreementwith General Wavellrsquos use of the resources at his disposal Ithought it best to leave him in command I admired his finequalities and was impressed with the confidence so manypeople had in himThe discussions both oral and written were severe Asusual I put my case in black and white



10VIII40

I am very much obliged to you for explaining to meso fully the situation in Egypt and Somaliland We haveyet to discuss the position in Kenya and Abyssinia Imentioned the very large forces which you have inKenya namely the Union Brigade of six thousandwhite South Africans probably as fine material asexists for warfare in spacious countries the EastAfrican settlers who should certainly amount to twothousand men thoroughly used to the country the twoWest African Brigades brought at much inconveniencefrom the West Coast numbering six thousand at leasttwo brigades of Kingrsquos African Rifles (KAR) the wholeat least twenty thousand men ndash there may be moreWhy should these all stand idle in Kenya waiting for anItalian invasion to make its way across the very difficultdistances from Abyssinia to the south or preparingthemselves for a similar difficult inroad into Abyssiniawhich must again entail long delays while all the timethe fate of the Middle East and much else may bedecided at Alexandria or on the Canal

Without of course knowing the exact conditionslocally I should suppose that a reasonable dispositionwould be to hold Kenya with the settlers and the KAR and delay any Italian advance southward it beingso much easier to bring troops round by sea than forthe Italians to make their way overland Thus we canalways reinforce them unexpectedly and swiftly Thiswould allow the Union Brigade and the two WestAfrican Brigades to come round at once into the Deltagiving you a most valuable reinforcement in thedecisive theatre at the decisive moment What is theuse of having the command of the sea if it is not to passtroops to and fro with great rapidity from one theatre toanother I am sure I could persuade General Smuts toallow this movement of the Union Brigade Perhaps youwill let me have your views on this by tomorrow nightas time is so short



12VIII40

1 I am not at all satisfied about the Union Brigadeand the West African Brigade in Kenya These forcesas now disposed would play no part in the criticalattacks now being developed against Egypt Khartoumand Somaliland It is always considered a capitalblemish on military operations that large bodies oftroops should be standing idle while decisions arereached elsewhere Without further information Icannot accept the statement that the South AfricanBrigade is so far untrained that it cannot go into actionThe Natal Carbineers were much further advanced intraining before the war than our British Territorials andthey have presumably been embodied since thedeclaration I cannot see why the Union Brigade as awhole should be considered in any way inferior toBritish Territorial units Anyhow they are certainly goodenough to fight Italians I have asked for full particularsof their embodiment and training in each case

2 I do not consider that proper use is being made ofthe large forces in Palestine The essence of thesituation depends on arming the Jewish colonistssufficiently to enable them to undertake their owndefence so that if necessary for a short time the wholeof Palestine can be left to very small British forces Aproposal should be made to liberate immediately alarge portion of the garrison including the YeomanryCavalry Division I do not understand why theAustralians and New Zealanders who have beentraining in Palestine for at least six months should beable to provide only one brigade for service in EgyptHow many of them are there and what are the facts oftheir training These men were brought at greatexpense from Australia having been selected as thefirst volunteers for service in Europe Many of them hadprevious military training and have done nearly a yearrsquostraining since the war broke out How disgraceful itwould be if owing to our mishandling of this important


force only one brigade took part in the decisiveoperations for the defence of Egypt

3 The two West African brigades could certainly bebrought to Khartoum via Port Soudan It is a very goodpolicy to mix native units from various sources so thatone lot can be used to keep the other in disciplineThese two brigades ought to be moved immediately tothe Soudan so that the Indian Division can be used inEgypt or Somaliland as soon as it arrives I do not knowwhy these brigades were taken away from West Africaif the only use to be made of them was to garrisonKenya

4 Let me have a return of the white settlers ofmilitary age in Kenya Are we to believe they have notformed any local units for the defence of their ownprovince If not the sooner they are made to realisetheir position the better No troops ought to be in Kenyaat the present time other than the settlers and the KAR Considering the risks and trouble we are taking toreinforce Egypt from home it cannot be accepted thatforces on the spot should not be used to the highestcapacity at the critical moment

5 Let me have a full account of the two Britishdivisions in the Delta It is misleading to think indivisions in this area nor can any plea that they are notproperly equipped in every detail be allowed toprejudice the employment of these fine Regular troops

6 Surely the statement that the enemyrsquos armouredforces and vehicles can move just as easily along thedesert as along the coastal road requires furtherexamination This might apply to caterpillar vehiclesbut these would suffer severely if forced to make longjourneys over the rocky and soft deserts Anyhowwheeled transport would be hampered in the desertunless provided with desert-expanded india-rubbertyres of a special type Are the Italian vehicles so fittedand to what extent

7 What arrangements have been made toldquodepotabiliserdquo1 for long periods any wells or watersupplies we do not require for ourselves Has a storeof delayed-action fuzes been provided for mines in


roadways which are to be abandoned Make sure thata supply of the longest delayed-action fuzes ie up toat least a fortnight (but I hope they run longer now) aresent to Egypt by the first ship to go through Examinewhether it is not possible to destroy the asphalt of thetarmac road as it is abandoned by chemical action ofheavy petroleum oil or some other treatment

8 Let me have a statement in full and exact detail ofall units in the Middle East including Polish and Frenchvolunteers and arrivals

I should be glad to discuss all these points tonight

As a result of the Staff discussions on August 10 Dill withEdenrsquos ardent approval wrote me that the War Office werearranging to send immediately to Egypt one cruiser tankbattalion of fifty-two tanks one light tank regiment (fifty-twotanks) and one infantry tank battalion of fifty tankstogether with forty-eight anti-tank guns twenty Bofors lightanti-aircraft forty-eight twenty-five-pounder field guns fivehundred Bren guns and two hundred and fifty anti-tankrifles with the necessary ammunition These would start assoon as they could be loaded The only question open waswhether they should go round the Cape or take a chancethrough the Mediterranean I pressed the Admiralty hard aswill be seen in a later chapter for direct convoy through theMediterranean Much discussion proceeded on this latterpoint Meanwhile the Cabinet approved the embarkationand despatch of the armoured force leaving the finaldecision about which way they should go till the convoyapproached Gibraltar This option remained open to us tillAugust 26 by which time we should know a good dealmore about the imminence of any Italian attack No timewas lost The decision to give this blood-transfusion while


we braced ourselves to meet a mortal danger was at onceawful and right No one faltered

The following directive which we had thrashed outtogether was finally drafted by me and the Cabinetapproved it without amendment in accord with the Chiefs ofStaff


16VIII40

(General directive for Commander-in-Chief MiddleEast)

1 A major invasion of Egypt from Libya must beexpected at any time now It is necessary therefore toassemble and deploy the largest possible army uponand towards the western frontier All political andadministrative considerations must be set in propersubordination to this

2 The evacuation of Somaliland is enforced upon usby the enemy but is none the less strategicallyconvenient All forces in or assigned to Somalilandshould be sent to Aden to the Soudan via PortSoudan or to Egypt as may be thought best

3 The defence of Kenya must rank after thedefence of the Soudan There should be time after thecrisis in Egypt and the Soudan is passed to reinforceKenya by sea and rail before any large Italianexpedition can reach the Tana River We can alwaysreinforce Kenya faster than Italy can pass troops thitherfrom Abyssinia or Italian Somaliland

4 Accordingly either the two West African Brigadesor two brigades of the KAR should be movedforthwith to Khartoum General Smuts is being asked toallow the Union Brigade or a large part of it to move to


the Canal Zone and the Delta for internal securitypurposes Arrangements should be made to continuetheir training The Admiralty are being asked to reporton shipping possibilities in the Indian Ocean and RedSea

5 In view of the increased air attack which may beexpected in the Red Sea following upon the Italianconquest of British Somaliland the air reinforcement ofAden becomes important

6 The two brigades one of Regulars and the otherAustralian which are held ready in Palestine shouldnow move into the Delta in order to clear the Palestinecommunications for the movement of further reservesas soon as they can be equipped for field service ororganised for internal security duties

7 However immediately three or four regiments ofBritish cavalry without their horses should take overthe necessary duties in the Canal Zone liberating thethree Regular battalions there for general reserve of theField Army of the Delta

8 The rest of the Australians in Palestine number-ing six battalions will thus [also] be available at fivedaysrsquo notice to move into the Delta for internal securityor other emergency employment The Polish Brigadeand the French Volunteer Unit should move to the Deltafrom Palestine as may be convenient and join thegeneral reserve

9 The movement of the Indian division nowembarking or in transit should be accelerated to theutmost Unless some of the troops evacuated fromSomaliland and not needed for Aden are foundsufficient to reinforce the Soudan in addition toreinforcements from Kenya this whole division as ismost desirable should proceed to Suez to join theArmy of the Delta [later called the Army of the Nile] Inaddition to the above at least three batteries of Britishartillery although horse-drawn must be embarkedimmediately from India for Suez Admiralty to arrangetransport

10 Most of the above movements should becompleted between September 15 and October 1 andon this basis the Army of the Delta should comprise


(1) The British Armoured Force in Egypt(2) The four British battalions at Mersa Matruh the

two at Alexandria and the two in Cairo ndash total eight(3) The three battalions from the Canal Zone(4) The reserve British Brigade from Palestine ndash

total fourteen British Regular infantry battalions(5) The New Zealand Brigade(6) The Australian Brigade from Palestine(7) The Polish Brigade(8) Part of the Union Brigade from East Africa(9) The Fourth Indian Division now in rear of Mersa

Matruh(10) The new Indian division in transit(11) The eleven thousand men in drafts arriving

almost at once at Suez(12) All the artillery (one hundred and fifty guns) now

in the Middle East or en route from India(13) The Egyptian Army so far as it can be used for

field operations 11 The above should constitute by October 1 at the

latest thirty-nine battalions together with the armouredforces a total of 56000 men and 212 guns This isexclusive of internal security troops

(Part II)12 It is hoped that the armoured brigade from

England of three regiments of tanks will be passedthrough the Mediterranean by the Admiralty If this isimpossible their arrival round the Cape may becounted upon during the first fortnight in October Thearrival of this force in September must be deemed soimportant as to justify a considerable degree of risk inits transportation

(Part III Tactical employment of the above force13 The Mersa Matruh position must be fortified

completely and with the utmost speed The sector heldby the three Egyptian battalions must be taken over bythree British battalions making the force homoge-neous This must be done even if the Egyptian


Government wish to withdraw the artillery now in thehands of these three battalions The possibility ofreinforcing by sea the Mersa Matruh position andcutting enemy communications once they have passedby on their march to the Delta must be studied with theNaval Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean FleetAlternatively a descent upon the communications atSollum or farther west may be preferred

14 All water supplies between Mersa Matruh andthe Alexandria defences must be rendered ldquode-potablerdquo2 A special note on this is attached Noattempt should be made to leave small parties todefend the wells near the coast in this region The 4thIndian Division should withdraw upon Alexandria whennecessary or be taken off by sea The road from Sollumto Mersa Matruh and still more the tarmac road fromMersa Matruh to Alexandria must be renderedimpassable as it is abandoned by delayed-actionmines or by chemical treatment of the asphalt surface

15 A main line of defence to be held by the wholeArmy of the Delta with its reserves suitably disposedmust be prepared (as should long ago have been done)from Alexandria along the edge of the cultivated zoneand irrigation canals of the Delta For this purpose thestrongest concrete and sandbag works and pillboxesshould be built or completed from the sea to thecultivated zone and the main irrigation canal Thepipeline forward of this line should be extended as fastas possible The Delta zone is the most effectiveobstacle to tanks of all kinds and can be lightly held bysandbag works to give protection to Egypt and form avery strong extended flank for the Alexandria front Abroad strip four or five miles wide should be inundatedfrom the flood waters of the Nile controlled at AssouanAmid or behind this belt a series of strong posts armedwith artillery should be constructed

16 In this posture then the Army of the Delta willawait the Italian invasion It must be expected that theenemy will advance in great force limited only butseverely by the supply of water and petrol He willcertainly have strong armoured forces in his right hand


to contain and drive back our weaker forces unlessthese can be reinforced in time by the armouredregiment from Great Britain He will mask if he cannotstorm Mersa Matruh But if the main line of the Delta isdiligently fortified and resolutely held he will be forcedto deploy an army whose supply of water petrol foodand ammunition will be difficult Once the army isdeployed and seriously engaged the action against hiscommunications from Mersa Matruh by bombardmentfrom the sea by descent at Sollum or even muchfarther west would be a deadly blow to him

17 The campaign for the defence of the Deltatherefore resolves itself into strong defence with theleft arm from Alexandria inland and a reaching-out withthe right hand using sea-power upon his communica-tions At the same time it is hoped that the [our]reinforcements [acting] from Malta will hamper thesending of further reinforcements ndash Italian or German ndashfrom Europe into Africa

18 All this might be put effectively in train byOctober 1 provided we are allowed the time If not wemust do what we can All trained or Regular unitswhether fully equipped or not must be used in defenceof the Delta All armed white men and also Indian orforeign units must be used for internal security TheEgyptian Army must be made to play its part in supportof the Delta front thus leaving only riotous crowds to bedealt with in Egypt proper

Pray let the above be implemented and be ready todiscuss it in detail with me at 430 PM August 16

With this General Wavell returned to Cairo in the third weekof August

I now have to record a small but at the time vexatiousmilitary episode The Italians using vastly superior forcesdrove us out of Somaliland This story requires to be told


Until December 1939 our policy in a war with Italy was toevacuate Somaliland but in that month General Ironside CIGS declared for defence of the territory and in the lastresort to hold Berbera Defences were to be prepared todefend the Tug Argen Gap through the hills One Britishbattalion (the Black Watch) two Indian and two EastAfrican battalions with the Somaliland Camel Corps andone African light battery with small detachments of anti-tank and anti-aircraft units were gathered by the beginningof August General Wavell on July 21 telegraphed to theWar Office that withdrawal without fighting would bedisastrous for our influence and that Somaliland might be avaluable base for further offensive action Fighting beganduring his visit to London and he told the Middle EastMinisterial Committee that although the strategicdisadvantages of the loss of Somaliland would be slight itwould be a blow to our prestigeThe Italians entered British Somaliland on August 3 withthree battalions of Italian infantry fourteen of colonialinfantry two groups of pack artillery and detachments ofmedium tanks light tanks and armoured cars These largeforces advanced upon us on August 10 and a new Britishcommander General Godwin Austen arrived on the nightof the 11th In his instructions he had been told ldquoYour taskis to prevent any Italian advance beyond the mainpositionhellip You will take the necessary steps for withdrawalif necessaryrdquo Fighting took place on the 12th and 13th andone of our four key-positions was captured from us afterheavy artillery bombardment On the night of the 15thGeneral Godwin Austen determined to withdraw This hesaid ldquowas the only course to save us from disastrousdefeat and annihilationrdquo The Middle East Headquartersauthorised evacuation and this was successfully achievedunder a strong rearguard of the Black Watch


I was far from satisfied with the tactical conduct of thisaffair which remains on record as our only defeat at Italianhands At this particular moment when formidable eventsimpended in Egypt and when so much depended on ourprestige the rebuff caused injury far beyond its strategicscale There was much jubilation in Italy and Mussoliniexulted in the prospects of his attack on the Nile ValleyGeneral Wavell however defended the local commanderaffirming that the fighting had been severeIn view of the great business we had together I did notpress my view further either with the War Office or withGeneral Wavell

Our information at this time showed a rapid increase in theItalian forces in Albania and a consequent menace toGreece As the German preparations for the invasion ofBritain grew in scale and became more evident it wouldhave been particularly inconvenient to lessen our bombingattack on the German and Dutch river mouths and Frenchports where barges were being collected I had formed nodecision in my own mind about moving bomber squadronsaway from home It is often wise however to have plansworked out in detail Strange as it may seem the Air Forceexcept in the air is the least mobile of all the Services Asquadron can reach its destination in a few hours but itsestablishment depots fuel spare parts and workshopstake many weeks and even months to develop

(Action this day)


Prime Minister to CAS and GeneralIsmay

28VIII40

Pray let me have proposals for moving at least fourheavy bombing squadrons to Egypt in addition toanything now in progress These squadrons willoperate from advanced bases in Greece as far as maybe convenient should Greece be forced into the war byItaly They would refuel there before attacking ItalyMany of the finest targets including the Italian Fleetwill be open to such attacks It is better to operate fromGreece should she come in than from Malta in itspresent undefended state The report should be briefand should simply show the method the difficultiesand the objectives together with a time-table It is notnecessary to argue the question of policy which will bedecided by the Defence Committee of the CabinetMaking the best plan possible will not commit the AirMinistry or anyone else to the adoption of the plan butevery effort is to be made to solve its difficuties

I cannot better end this chapter than by the report I gave ofthe situation in August to the Prime Ministers of Australiaand New ZealandThis followed up my message of June 16

Prime Minister to thePrime Ministers ofAustralia and NewZealand

11VIII40

The combined Staffs are preparing a paper on thePacific situation but I venture to send you in advance abrief foreword We are trying our best to avoid war with


Japan both by conceding on points where theJapanese military clique can perhaps force a ruptureand by standing up where the ground is less danger-ous as in arrests [by the Japanese] of individuals I donot think myself that Japan will declare war unlessGermany can make a successful invasion of BritainOnce Japan sees that Germany has either failed ordares not try I look for easier times in the Pacific Inadopting against the grain a yielding policy towardsJapanese threats we have always in mind yourinterests and safety

Should Japan nevertheless declare war on us herfirst objective outside the Yellow Sea would probably bethe Dutch East Indies Evidently the United Stateswould not like this What they would do we cannot tellThey give no undertaking of support but their mainfleet in the Pacific must be a grave preoccupation to theJapanese Admiralty In this first phase of an Anglo-Japanese war we should of course defend Singaporewhich if attacked ndash which is unlikely ndash ought to stand along siege We should also be able to base on Ceylona battle cruiser and a fast aircraft-carrier which with allthe Australian and New Zealand cruisers anddestroyers which would return to you would act as avery powerful deterrent upon the hostile raiding cruisers

We are about to reinforce with more first-class unitsthe Eastern Mediterranean Fleet This fleet could ofcourse at any time be sent through the Canal into theIndian Ocean or to relieve Singapore We do not wantto do this even if Japan declares war until it is found tobe vital to your safety Such a transference would entailthe complete loss of the Middle East and all prospectof beating Italy in the Mediterranean would be goneWe must expect heavy attacks on Egypt in the nearfuture and the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet is neededto help in repelling them If these attacks succeed theEastern Fleet would have to leave the Mediterraneaneither through the Canal or by Gibraltar In either casea large part of it would be available for your protectionWe hope however to maintain ourselves in Egypt andto keep the Eastern Fleet at Alexandria during the firstphase of an Anglo-Japanese war should that occur No


one can lay down beforehand what is going to happenWe must just weigh events from day to day and useour available resources to the utmost

A final question arises whether Japan havingdeclared war would attempt to invade Australia or NewZealand with a considerable army We think this veryunlikely first because Japan is absorbed in Chinasecondly would be gathering rich prizes in the DutchEast Indies and thirdly would fear very much to sendan important part of her fleet far to the southwardleaving the American Fleet between it and home Ifhowever contrary to prudence and self-interest Japanset about invading Australia or New Zealand on a largescale I have the explicit authority of the Cabinet toassure you that we should then cut our losses in theMediterranean and sacrifice every interest except onlythe defence and feeding of this island on which alldepends and would proceed in good time to your aidwith a fleet able to give battle to any Japanese forcewhich could be placed in Australian waters and able toparry any invading force or certainly cut its communica-tions with Japan

We hope however that events will take a differentturn By gaining time with Japan the present dangeroussituation may be got over We are vastly stronger hereat home than when I cabled to you in May We have alarge army now beginning to be well equipped Wehave fortified our beaches We have a strong reserve ofmobile troops including our Regular Army andAustralian New Zealand and Canadian contingentswith several armoured divisions or brigades ready tostrike in counter-attack at the head of any successfullodgment We have ferried over from the United Statestheir grand aid of nearly a thousand guns and sixhundred thousand rifles with ammunition completeRelieved of the burden of defending France our Armyis becoming daily more powerful and munitions aregathering Besides this we have the Home Guard of1500000 men many of them war veterans and mostwith rifles or other arms

The Royal Air Force continues to show that sameindividual superiority over the enemy on which I


counted so much in my cable to you of June 16Yesterdayrsquos important action in the Channel showedthat we could attack against odds of three to one andinflict losses of three and a half to one Astoundingprogress has been made by Lord Beaverbrook inoutput of the best machines Our fighter and bomberstrength is nearly double what it was when I cabledyou and we have a very large reserve of machines inhand I do not think the German Air Force has thenumbers or quality to overpower our air defences

The Navy increases in strength each month and weare now beginning to receive the immense programmestarted at the declaration of war Between June andDecember 1940 over five hundred vessels large andsmall but many most important will join the Fleet TheGerman Navy is weaker than it has ever beenScharnhorst and Gneisenau are both in dock damagedBismarck has not yet done her trials Tirpitz is threemonths behind Bismarck There are available now inthis critical fortnight after which the time for invasion isgetting very late only one pocket-battleship a couple ofeight-inch Hippers two light cruisers and perhaps ascore of destroyers To try to transport a large army aswould now be needed for success across the seasvirtually without escort in the face of our Navy and airforce only to meet our powerful military force on shorestill more to maintain such an army and nourish itslodgments with munitions and supplies would be a veryunreasonable act On the other hand if Hitler fails toinvade and conquer Britain before the weather breakshe has received his first and probably fatal check

We therefore feel a sober and growing conviction ofour power to defend ourselves successfully and topersevere through the year or two that may benecessary to gain victory



7The Mediterranean Passage

The New SituationmdashFrance Out Italy InmdashAdmiralCunningham at AlexandriamdashSuccessful Action offCalabriamdashIncreasing Naval BurdensmdashMediter-ranean InhibitionsmdashMy Minute of July 12 and theFirst Sea Lordrsquos ReplymdashMy Minute of July 15 mdashAdmiral Cunninghamrsquos Views on SendingReinforcements Through the MediterraneanmdashTheFirst Sea Lordrsquos Minute of July 23 mdash The Plan forldquoOperation HatsrdquomdashMy Efforts to Send the TanksThrough the MediterraneanmdashMy Minute of August13 mdash Failure to Persuade the AdmiraltymdashConductof ldquoOperation HatsrdquomdashSuccessful Daring mdash Needfor Bombarding VesselsmdashMy Telegram to AdmiralCunningham of September 8 mdash Hard Efforts toSuccour Malta Air DefencemdashAdmiral SomervillersquosExcursionsmdashThe Takoradi Route to Egypt OpenedmdashA Vital Trickle mdash Malta Still in the Foreground

UNTIL THE FRENCH COLLAPSE the control of theMediterranean had been shared between the British andFrench Fleets At Gibraltar we had maintained a small forceof cruisers and destroyers watching the Straits In theEastern Basin lay our Mediterranean Fleet based onAlexandria This had been reinforced earlier in the yearwhen the Italian attitude became menacing to a force offour battleships seven cruisers twenty-two destroyers oneaircraft-carrier and twelve submarines The French


Mediterranean Fleet comprised five capital ships oneaircraft-carrier fourteen cruisers and many smaller shipsNow France was out and Italy was in The numericallypowerful Italian Fleet included six battleships including twoof the latest type (Littorios) mounting fifteen-inch guns buttwo of the older ships were being reconstructed and werenot immediately ready for service Besides this their Fleetcomprised nineteen modern cruisers seven of which wereof the eight-inch-gun type one hundred and twentydestroyers and torpedo-boats and over a hundredsubmarinesIn addition a strong Italian Air Force was ranged against usSo formidable did the situation appear at the end of Junethat Admiralty first thoughts contemplated the abandonmentof the Eastern Mediterranean and concentration atGibraltar I resisted this policy which though justified onpaper by the strength of the Italian Fleet did not correspondto my impressions of the fighting values and also seemedto spell the doom of Malta It was resolved to fight it out atboth ends On July 3 the Chiefs of Staffs prepared a paperabout the Mediterranean in which they stressed theimportance of the Middle East as a war theatre butrecognised that for the time being our policy must begenerally defensive The possibility of a German attack onEgypt must be taken seriously but so long as the Fleetcould be retained in the Eastern Mediterranean our existingforces were enough to deal with purely local attackWe have seen how at the end of June Force H wasconstituted at Gibraltar under Admiral Somerville Itcomprised the Hood Resolution and Valiant the carrierArk Royal two cruisers and eleven destroyers With thiswe had done the deed at Oran In the EasternMediterranean we found in Admiral Andrew Cunninghaman officer of the highest qualities and dauntless character


Immediately upon the Italian declaration of war he put tosea in search of the enemy The Royal Air Force attackedTobruk and sank the old Italian cruiser San Giorgio TheFleet bombarded Bardia from the sea Submarines on bothsides were active and we destroyed ten of the enemy forthe loss of three of our own from deep mining before theend of JuneOn July 8 whilst covering the passage of a convoy fromMalta to Alexandria Admiral Cunningham became aware ofthe presence of powerful Italian forces It was evident fromthe intensity of Italian air attacks that the enemy also wasengaged in an important operation and we now know thatthey planned to lead the British Admiral into an area wherehe could be subjected to concentrated attack by the fullweight of the Italian Air Force and submarines AdmiralCunningham at once seized the initiative and despite hisinferiority in numbers boldly turned to interpose his fleetbetween the enemy and their baseOn the following day contact was made and an action atlong range ensued in which one enemy battleship and twocruisers were hit without any damage being suffered by theBritish Fleet The enemy refused to stand and fight andthanks to his superior speed was able to escape pursuedby Admiral Cunningham to a point within twenty-five milesof the Italian mainland Throughout this and the next twodays the intense air attacks continued without success andthe convoy though frequently bombed reached Alexandriasafely This spirited action established the ascendancy ofthe British Fleet in the Mediterranean and Italian prestigesuffered a blow from which it never recovered Ten dayslater the Sydney an Australian cruiser with a Britishdestroyer flotilla sank an Italian cruiser Our first contactswith the new enemy were therefore by no meansdiscouraging


The burdens which lay upon the Admiralty at this time werehowever heavy in the extreme The invasion dangerrequired a high concentration of flotillas and small craft inthe Channel and North Sea The U-boats which had byAugust begun to work from Biscayan ports took severe tollof our Atlantic convoys without suffering many lossesthemselves Until now the Italian fleet had never beentested The possibility of a Japanese declaration of warwith all that it would bring upon our Eastern Empire couldnever be excluded from our thoughts It is therefore notstrange that the Admiralty viewed with the deepest anxietyall risking of warships in the Mediterranean and were sorelytempted to adopt the strictest defensive at Gibraltar andAlexandria I on the other hand did not see why the largenumbers of ships assigned to the Mediterranean should notplay an active part from the outset Malta had to bereinforced both with air squadrons and troops Although allcommercial traffic was rightly suspended and all largetroop convoys to Egypt must go round the Cape I could notbring myself to accept the absolute closure of the inlandsea Indeed I hoped that by running a few special convoyswe might arrange and provoke a trial of strength with theItalian Fleet I hoped that this might happen and Malta beproperly garrisoned and equipped with airplanes and AAguns before the appearance which I already dreaded ofthe Germans in this theatre All through the summer andautumn months I engaged in friendly though tensediscussion with the Admiralty upon this part of our war effort


12VII40


I thought that Illustrious might well go to theMediterranean and exchange with ArkRoyal In thiscase Illustrious could take perhaps a good lot ofHurricanes to Malta As we have a number ofHurricanes surplus at the moment could not the MaltaGladiator pilots fly the Hurricanes themselves Thiswould not diminish our flying strength in this country

The operation against Lulea [in the Baltic] hasbecome less important now that the Germans havecontrol of all the French and Belgian orefields We mustlook to the Mediterranean for action

You were going to let me have your plan forexchanging destroyers of more endurance with theMediterranean flotilla Could I have this with dates

To this Admiral Pound replied through the First Lord thesame day

We have now gained experience of the airconditions in the Western Mediterranean and as soonas the present operation on which the Eastern Fleet isemployed is completed we shall know pretty well whatwe are faced with in the Eastern Mediterranean

There is no doubt that both Force H and the EasternMediterranean Fleet work under a grave disadvantageinasmuch as it is not possible to give them fighterprotection as we do in the North Sea when ships are inthe bombing area

At the moment we are faced with the immediateproblem of getting aircraft and A-A guns to Malta andaircraft to Alexandria I am not at all certain that the riskof passing a ship with all these available stores throughthe Mediterranean is not too great and that it might notbe better to accept the delay of sending her round theCape

There is also the question of Illustrious to beconsidered but this need not be settled immediately asshe must first come home to embark a full complementof Fulmar fighters

Arrangements arc being made to replace some ofthe destroyers at Gibraltar by others with longerendurance but the date on which they leave will


probably be dependent on the escorting of the ship Ihave referred to above to Gibraltar

Prime Minister to theFirst Sea Lord

15VII40

1 It is now three weeks since I vetoed the proposalto evacuate the Eastern Mediterranean and bringAdmiral Cunninghamrsquos fleet to Gibraltar I hope therewill be no return to that project Anyone can see the riskfrom air attack which we run in the Central Mediter-ranean From time to time and for sufficient objects thisrisk will have to be faced Warships are meant to gounder fire Our position would be very different if I hadbeen assisted in my wish in October of last year toreconstruct the Royal Sovereign class with heavy anti-aircraft armour on their decks at a cost to their speedthrough increased bulging The difficulties which werepresented at every stage were such as to destroy thisproposal and we are no further on than we were a yearago If we had the Royal Sovereigns armoured andtheir guns cocked up or some of them we couldassault the Italian coasts by bombardment withcomparative impunity1 The various Boards ofAdmiralty which preceded this war altogetherunderrated the danger of air attack and authorisedsweeping statements to Parliament on the ability ofships of war to cope with it Now there is a tendency toproceed to the other extreme and consider it wrong toendanger His Majestyrsquos ships by bringing them underair bombardment as must from time to time benecessary in pursuance of operationshellip

It may be taken for certain that the scale of theenemyrsquos air attack will increase in the Mediterranean asthe Germans come there

2 It becomes of high and immediate importance tobuild up a very strong anti-aircraft defence at Maltaand to base several squadrons of our best fighteraircraft there This will have to be done under the fire of


the enemy I should be glad to know the full scale ofdefence which was proposed in various papers I haveseen The emplacements should be made forthwith Iunderstand that a small consignment of AA guns andHurricanes is now being procured and that the mainequipment is to follow later It may well be possible atthe end of this month to detach the larger consignmentfrom our home defence The urgent first consignmentshould reach Malta at the earliest moment The storesmay be divided between several ships so as to avoidlosing all if one is hit The immense delay involved inpassing these ships round the Cape cannot beaccepted So far as Malta is concerned it is not seenhow the dangers will be avoided by this deacutetour thevoyage from Alexandria to Malta being if anythingmore dangerous than the voyage from Gibraltar toMalta

3 Illustrious Considering that in the North Sea andAtlantic we are on the defensive and that no one wouldpropose to bring Illustrious into the narrow waters northand south of Dover where we have already good shore-based aircraft our aircraft-carriers in home waters willbe able to operate some distance from the enemyrsquoscoast In the Mediterranean on the other hand wemust take the offensive against Italy and endeavourespecially to make Malta once again a Fleet base forspecial occasions Illustrious with her armoured deckwould seem to be better placed in the Mediterraneanand the Ark Royal in the home theatre The delays inbringing Illustrious into service have been very greatand I should be glad to know when the Fulmar [fastfighter aircraft] will be embarked and she be ready toexchange with Ark Royal

4 I am very glad that arrangements will be made tosend out destroyers of longer radius to Gibraltar and tobring home the short-radius vessels to the Narrow Seas


Meanwhile Admiralty policy had again been most carefullyscrutinised and on July 15 the intention to maintain astrong force in the Eastern Mediterranean was reiterated ina signal to the Commander-in-Chief This message statedthat in the East the chief British task would be to destroy theenemy naval forces although they had a numericalpreponderance In the West Force H would control thewestern exit from the Mediterranean and undertakeoffensive operations against the coast of Italy I was ingeneral agreement with this strong policy The Commander-in-Chief was invited to say what heavy ships he considerednecessary for the two forces and if redistribution werethought desirable to advise whether the exchange shouldtake place through the Mediterranean or round the CapeIn reply he asked that both the Valiant and the Barhamshould join him This would give him four battleships withthe best available gun-range and speed He could thendispense with the Royal Sovereign as with her poor deckprotection and inferior speed she was a constant source ofanxiety Furthermore he required two carriers including theIllustrious and two eight-inch cruisers He agreed with theFirst Sea Lord that in the Western Mediterranean a forcecomprising the Hood and the Ark Royal with either one ortwo ldquoRrdquo class battleships would meet requirements Withthese forces he considered that the Mediterranean could bedominated and the Eastern basin held indefinitely providedthat Malta was adequately protected by fighters and that hisresources at Alexandria were built-up In conclusion hesaid ldquoBy carrying out a concerted movement it should bepossible to pass reinforcements through the Mediterraneanbut it would probably be desirable to do it all in oneoperationrdquo


We thus reached a considerable measure of agreement inour talks at the Admiralty It was common ground betweenus that Admiral Cunninghamrsquos fleet should be reinforced bya battleship an aircraft carrier and two cruisers and at thesame time the opportunity should be taken to run a convoyof store ships to Malta from Alexandria Thereafter on July23 the First Sea Lord in the course of a Minute to the FirstLord and me said

Full consideration has been given as to whether it ispossible to pass through the Mediterranean not onlythe additional fighting ships which are being added tothe Eastern Mediterranean force but also merchantvessels containing spare ammunition for the Fleet high-angle guns for Malta and aircraft for Malta and theMiddle East The Commander-in-Chief is definitely ofthe opinion that under existing conditions it will beunsound to attempt to pass through the CentralMediterranean merchant vessels containing valuablecargoes as if one or more ships were damaged in sucha way as to reduce their speed it would be necessaryto scuttle them I am entirely in agreement with theCommander-in-Chief

Thus it came about that the plan for the important operationwhich followed under the code name ldquoHatsrdquo did not includeprovision for the passage of merchant ships None the lesswith the full support of Admiral Cunningham it challengedthe Italian Fleet and Air Force in the Central MediterraneanI was now well content with the main decisions which theAdmiralty were taking and hoped that they might lead to atrial of strength All preparations therefore went forwardA few weeks later the bold and far-reaching step of the WarCabinet with the full agreement of the Chiefs of Staff tosend nearly half our best available tanks to Egypt in spite ofthe invasion menace raised the question of theMediterranean passage again and in a sharper way I was


of course in full accord with sending the tanks but I fearedthat if they went round the Cape they might arrive too latefor the battle on which the fate of Egypt depended TheFirst Sea Lord was at first inclined to run the risk but onfurther study he thought it would complicate operationldquoHatsrdquo which now held the centre of the Admiralty stage Itinvolved sending at least two fast mechanical transportships (16 knots) from Gibraltar to Malta and this wasregarded as more dangerous than sending them by theroute from Alexandria This led to further discussion


11VIII40

I cannot accept this proposal [ie to use the Caperoute for sending the tanks to Egypt] which deprives usof invaluable resources [fifty Infantry tanks or ldquoIrdquo tanks]during a most critical period without making themavailable for the Middle East at the moment when theyare most needed there I must ask the Admiralty tomake further proposals and overcome the difficulties Ifnecessary could not the personnel be distributedamong the destroyers a larger force of destroyersbeing sent through from Force ldquoHrdquo to the EasternMediterranean and returned thereafter in the sameway as the six destroyers are now being sent westwardby Admiral Cunningham

There is no objection to the 3d Hussars (thepersonnel of a tank regiment) going by the Cape asGeneral Wavell can make temporary arrangements formanning [the tanks] in the meanwhile so long as hegets their light tanks I am prepared to risk the fiftyInfantry tanks in the Mediterranean provided theirpersonnel is distributed among HM ships but therecan be no question of them or their personnel going bythe Cape thus making sure they are out of everythingfor two months The personnel sent through the


Mediterranean must be cut down to essentials thebalance going round

Pray let me have further proposals by tomorrow(Monday)


13VIII40

1 Just before the French went out of the warAdmiral Darlan bombarded Genoa in full daylightwithout any Asdic destroyer protection or any aircraftprotection and returned to Toulon unscathed TheEastern Mediterranean Fleet has three times advancedto the centre of the Mediterranean and returned toAlexandria with only one ship ndashGloucesterndash hit by onebomb A few weeks ago a fast and a slow convoy wereconducted uninjured from Malta to Alexandria ndash twodays of their voyage being beset by Italian aircraft

2 The Admiralty now propose to send six destroyersfrom Alexandria to meet Force ldquoHrdquo These destroyerswhich will certainly be detected from the air will bewithin air-attacking distance of the very numerous fastItalian cruiser forces in their home bases Thismovement should be rightly condemned as hazardousin the extreme but for the just estimation in which Italiannaval enterprise is held by C-in-C Mediterranean andthe Admiralty

3 We are now told that it is too dangerous for thepowerful forces we shall have in motion in the nearfuture to carry through to the Eastern Mediterraneantwo MT [mechanical transport] ships steaming incompany at only fifteen knots Yet at the same time weare asked to spend vast sums fortifying a large part ofthe western coasts of Britain against what the Admiraltydeclare is a possible invasion by twelve thousand menembarked and shipped [from the River] Gironde [orfrom] St Nazaire who are to be sent to their destina-tion without any warship protection of any kind If it isheld to be a feasible operation to move twelvethousand men unescorted onto the Irish or Britishwestern coasts in the face of the full British sea-power


can this be reconciled with the standard of danger-values now adopted in the Mediterranean

4 No one can see where or when the main attackon Egypt will develop It seems however extremelylikely that if the Germans are frustrated in an invasionof Great Britain or do not choose to attempt it they willhave great need to press and aid the Italians to theattack of Egypt The month of September must beregarded as critical in the extreme

5 In these circumstances it is very wrong that weshould attempt to send our armoured brigade round theCape thus making sure that during September it canplay no part either in the defence of England or Egypt

6 I request that the operation of passing at least twoMT ships through with the Eastern reinforcementsmay be re-examined The personnel can be distributedin the warships and it is a lesser risk from the point ofview of the general war to pass the MT ships throughthe Mediterranean than to have the whole armouredbrigade certainly out of action going round the CapeSo long as the personnel are properly distributedamong the warships I am prepared to take the fullresponsibility for the possible loss of the armouredvehicles

I was not able to induce the Admiralty to send the armouredbrigade or at least their vehicles through theMediterranean I was both grieved and vexed at thisThough my friendship for Admiral Pound and confidence inhis judgment were never affected sharp argument wasmaintained The professional responsibility was his and nonaval officer with whom I ever worked would run more risksthan he We had gone through a lot together If he wouldnot do it no one else would If I could not make him no oneelse could I knew the Admiralty too well to press them ormy great friend and comrade Pound or the First Lord forwhom I had high esteem beyond a certain point Myrelations with the Admiralty were too good to be imperilledby a formal appeal to the Cabinet against them


When on August 15 I brought the question before theCabinet finally I said that I had hoped to persuade theAdmiralty to fit the two armoured regiments into ldquoOperationHatsrdquo If the tank-units proceeded through theMediterranean they would arrive in Alexandria aboutSeptember 5 if by the Cape about three weeks laterHowever the Chief of the Imperial General Staff did notconsider that an attack in force by the Italians wasimminent and this was also General Wavellrsquos view Havingdone my utmost in favour of the short cut I thought that theWar Cabinet ought not to take the responsibility ofoverruling the judgment of the commanders and Iacquiesced in the longer voyage round the Cape withregret The Chiefs of Staff however prepared an alternativeplan for the short cut should the position in the Middle Eastsuddenly worsen before ldquoOperation Hatsrdquo was actuallylaunched Two fast MT ships carrying Cruiser and ldquoIrdquo tankswould accompany the naval forces through theMediterranean The decision was to be taken before thereinforcements passed Gibraltar In the event reportsreceived from the Middle East were not considered to justifyputting the alternative plan into force and the whole convoycontinued on its way round the CapeldquoOperation Hatsrdquo was carried out successfully and withoutloss between August 30 and September 5 AdmiralCunningham left Alexandria on August 30 and on theevening of the 31st his aircraft reported the approach of anenemy force of two battleships and seven cruisers Hopesof an engagement were raised but evidently the Italianswere not seeking trouble and nothing happened Thefollowing evening our aircraft again made contact with theenemy who were now retiring to Taranto ThereafterAdmiral Cunninghamrsquos ships moved about with completefreedom to the east and south of Malta and were not


seriously molested from the air The convoy reached Maltasafely only one ship being damaged by air attackMeanwhile the reinforcements consisting of the Valiant butnot her unreconstructed sister-ship the Barham the aircraft-carrier Illustrious and two anti-aircraft cruisersaccompanied by Admiral Somerville with Force ldquoHrdquo wereapproaching from Gibraltar The Valiant and the cruisershad no difficulty in landing much-needed guns andammunition in Malta and then joined Admiral Cunninghamto the eastward on September 3 During the return passageto Alexandria the fleet attacked Rhodes and Scarpanto andeasily repulsed an E-boat attack Admiral Somervillersquos forcereturned to Gibraltar without being molested in any wayAll this convinced me that it would have been a fair riskespecially compared with those we were resolutely runningin seriously depleting our armour at home in the teeth of theenemyrsquos invasion preparations to transport the armouredbrigade through the Malta channel and that it would nowbe in Egypt instead of more than three weeks away Noserious disaster did in fact occur in Egypt during those threeweeks Nevertheless an exaggerated fear of Italian aircrafthad been allowed to hamper naval operations I thoughtand think the event proved my case Towards the end ofNovember Admiral Somerville with Force ldquoHrdquo did in factsuccessfully escort a convoy to Malta from the westwardand on the way fought a partial action near Sardinia withthat part of the Italian Fleet which had escaped damage atTaranto One ship of this convoy passed on to Alexandriatogether with three more store ships from Malta escortedby further Fleet reinforcements for the EasternMediterranean This was the first time that a merchant shipmade the complete passage of the Mediterranean after theItalian entry into the war The reader will see in the nextvolume how a still more hazardous exploit was performed


by the Navy in sending tanks to Egypt in 1941 when theGerman Air Force was fully established in Sicily


7IX40

1 The course of ldquoOperation Hatsrdquo makes me quitesure that it was wrong to recede from the idea ofpassing the armoured vehicles through the Mediter-ranean If you will read my Minute reciting all thereasons why this course should be adopted you will seethat they are reinforced by new facts nowhellip


7IX40

I should be glad if you would let me have a shortresume of the different occasions when I pressed asFirst Lord for the preparation of the Ramillies classships to withstand air bombardment by thick deckarmour and larger bulges If those ships had been putin hand when I repeatedly pressed for them to be weshould now have the means of attacking the Italianshores which might be productive of the highestpolitical and military results Even now there is adisposition to delay taking this most necessary stepand no substitute is offered

I have not yet heard from you in reply to the Minute Isent you renewing this project of reconstruction in thehope that we may not be equally destitute of bombard-ing vessels next year I shall be glad to have a talk withyou on this subject when I have refreshed my mind withthe papers

This issue could never at any moment be decided withoutbalancing other bitter needs in new construction It was on


this rock and not on differences of principle that my wishesfinally foundered


8IX40

Following for Sir Andrew Cunningham C-in-CEastern Mediterranean from Prime Minister andMinister of Defence

I congratulate you on the success of the recentoperation in the Eastern and Central Mediterraneanand upon the accession to your Fleet of two of ourfinest units with other valuable vessels I am sorryhowever that the armoured brigade which is sonecessary to the defence of Egypt and Alexandria isstill separated by more than three weeks from its sceneof action I hope you will find it possible to review thenaval situation in the light of the experience gainedduring ldquoHatsrdquo and the arrival of Illustrious and ValiantNot only the paper strength of the Italian Navy but alsothe degree of resistance which they may be inclined tooffer should be measured It is of high importance tostrike at the Italians this autumn because as timepasses the Germans will be more likely to lay stronghands upon the Italian war machine and then thepicture will be very different We intend to strengthenthe anti-aircraft defences of Malta by every possiblemeans and some novel weapons of which I have highhopes will shortly be sent there for experiment I trustthat Malta may become safe for temporary visits of theFleet at an earlier date than April 1941 If in themeanwhile you have any proposals for offensive actionto make they should be transmitted to the Admiralty Ishall be glad if you will also concert with the Army andAir Force plans for an operation against the Italiancommunications in Libya which at the right time couldbe used to hamper any large-scale offensive againstEgypt The advantages of gaining the initiative areobviously very great I hope the Fulmars [the fast fighterplanes which had at last reached our aircraft-carriers]


have made a good impression The battle here for airmastery continues to be severe but firm confidence isfelt in its eventual outcome

It is surprising that the violent impact of the air upon ourcontrol of the Mediterranean had not been more plainlyforeseen by the British Government before the war and bytheir expert advisers In any case however we had fallenso far behind in the air race with Germany that the defenceof Britain made an overwhelming demand on the alreadyoutnumbered forces we possessed Until the Battle ofBritain had been decisively won every reinforcement ofaircraft to the Mediterranean and Egypt had been an act ofacute responsibility Even in the winter months when wefelt we were masters of our own daylight air at home it wasvery hard under the full fury of the Blitz to send away fighteraircraft either to Malta or to Egypt It was also most painfulto take from bombarded British cities and vital seaports andmunitions factories the anti-aircraft guns and shells sorelyneeded for their protection and to send these either allround the Cape to Egypt or at much peril direct to MaltaThe reinforcement of Maltarsquos hitherto neglected airdefences was pressed forward in spite of losses anddisappointments Among the tasks of Admiral Somervillersquosforce at Gibraltar was the convoying of fighter aircraft in acarrier to within flying distance of Malta The first of theseefforts was made in the beginning of August when twelveHurricanes were flown into the island from the aircraft-carrier Argus Until their arrival the air defence of Maltaconsisted of three Gladiators known locally by theaffectionate names of ldquoFaithrdquoldquoHoperdquo and ldquoCharityrdquo Wemade a second attempt in November but there was atragedy Nine aircraft out of fourteen which had beenlaunched from the Argus four hundred miles to thewestward of the island ran out of fuel on the way through a


change of wind and perished at sea with their devotedpilots Never again were the margins cut so fine andthough many similar operations took place in the futurenever did such a catastrophe recur

It had also become necessary to find a way of sendingaircraft to the Middle East which would avoid both thedangers of the Mediterranean and the fearful delay aroundthe Cape An overland route from West Africa would savemany vital days and some shipping The machines hadeither to be flown ashore from an aircraft-carrier ordismantled and crated for the voyage and thenreassembled at some port for their flight The choice laybetween Lagos and TakoradiAfter careful examination Takoradi was chosen and asearly as August 211940 an operating party arrived Thecourse lay by Kano to Khartoum and eventually to Cairo atotal distance of 3700 miles Considerable workshops andaccommodation had to be built at Takoradi and variousrefuelling and rest stations provided along the route Adozen crated Hurricanes and Blenheims arrived by sea onSeptember 5 followed next day by thirty Hurricanes landedfrom the carrier Argus The first delivery flight left Takoradion September 20 and arrived at Khartoum four days laterBy the end of the year a trickle of a hundred and sevenplanes had reached Egypt in this wayAlthough a quick start had been made many monthsrsquo workwere needed before the route was organised The climateat Takoradi and the local malaria harassed the menerecting the crated aircraft The use of the carriers waslimited by other clamant needs Weather hampered the airconvoys The number of aircraft unserviceable awaiting


spares along the route piled up The heavy wear onengines in their flight over vast barren sandy spacesreduced their fighting life Terrible teething trouble had to beovercome None of this aircraft supply was effective in1940 But if we had not begun in good time the Army of theNile and all its ventures could not have lived through thetragic events of 1941

By the close of 1940 the British Navy had once more firmlyestablished itself in the Mediterranean The defences ofMalta had been considerably strengthened by AdmiralSomervillersquos excursions to carry in AA and otherequipment Admiral Cunninghamrsquos offensive policy in theEastern Basin had also yielded excellent resultsEverywhere despite the Italian air strength we held theinitiative and Malta remained in the foreground of eventsas an advanced base for offensive operations against theItalian communications with their forces in Africa


8September Tensions

Climax of the Air Battle mdash Intense Strain upon theFighter Pilots mdash Evidences of the ImpendingInvasion mdash Disappointing Bombing on Concentra-tions ofBarges mdash Britain Braced mdash MunitionsPolicy mdash My General Directive mdash A Survey of1941 Requirements in Material mdash An EightMonthsrsquo ProgrammemdashMy October Note onPriorities mdash Laggards mdash Climax at Home and inEgypt mdash The Perils of FogmdashNeed for De WildeAmmunition mdash Achievements of the Ministry ofAircraft ProductionmdashPolicy of Creating Comman-dos Enforced mdash Advance of Marshal GrazianirsquosArmy September 13 mdashTheir Halt at Sidi Barranimdash Arrival of the Armoured Brigade in Egypt mdashParlous Conditions at MaltamdashTroubles that NeverHappened

SEPTEMBER like June was a month of extreme opposingstresses for those who bore the responsibility for British wardirection The air battle already described on which alldepended raged with its greatest fury and rose steadily toits climax The victory of the Royal Air Force on September15 is seen now in retrospect to have marked its decisiveturning-point But this was not apparent at the time norcould we tell whether even heavier attacks were not to beexpected or how long they would go on The fine weatherfacilitated daylight fighting on the largest scale Hitherto we


had welcomed this but when I visited Air Vice-Marshal Parkat Number 11 Group in the third week of September Inoticed a slight but definite change in outlook I askedabout the weather and was told it was set fair for somedays to come This however did not seem to be as populara prospect as it had been at the beginning of the month Ihad the distinct feeling that a break in the weather would nolonger be regarded as a misfortuneIt happened while I was there in Parkrsquos room with severalofficers that an officer brought in a notification from the AirMinistry that all supplies of De Wilde ammunition wereexhausted This was the favourite of the fighter pilots Thefactory on which it depended had been bombed I saw thatthis hit Park hard but after a gulp and a pause he repliedmagnificently ldquoWe fought them without it before and wecan fight them without it againrdquoIn my talks with Air Marshal Dowding who usually motoredover from Uxbridge to Chequers during the week-ends thesense of Fighter Command being at its utmost strain wasevident The weekly figures over which I pored showed wehad adequate numbers provided the weight of the hostileattack did not increase But the physical and mentalstresses upon the pilots were not reflected on the papercharts For all their sublime devotion often facing odds offive and six to one for all the sense of superiority whichtheir continued success and the enemyrsquos heavy lossescreated there are limits to human endurance There is sucha thing as sheer exhaustion both of the spirit and theanimal I thought of Wellingtonrsquos mood in the afternoon ofthe Battle of Waterloo ldquoWould God that night or Bluecherwould comerdquo This time we did not want BluecherMeanwhile all the evidences of impending Germaninvasion multiplied Upwards of three thousand self-


propelled barges were counted on our air photographs inthe Dutch Belgian and French ports and river mouths Wecould not tell exactly what reserves of larger vessels mightnot be gathered in the Rhine estuary or in the Baltic fromwhich the Kiel Canal was still open In my examination ofthe invasion problem I have set forth the reasoning onwhich I based my confidence that we should beat them ifthey came and consequently that they would not comeand continued to contemplate the issue with a steady gazeAll the same it was impossible to watch these growingpreparations week after week in the photographs andreports of agents without a sense of awe A thing like thisgets hold of you bit by bit The terrible enemy would notcome unless he had solid assurance of victory and plansmade with German thoroughness Might there not also besurprises Might there be tank-landing craft or some cleverimprovisation of them What else might there not be Allour night-bombing was concentrated on the invasion portswhere every night German rehearsal exercises of marchingon and off the barges and other vessels seemed to betaking place The results of our bombing of the masses ofbarges which crowded the basins or lay along the quaysjudged by the photographs had several times disappointedme


23IX40

What struck me about these photographs was theapparent inability of the bombers to hit these very largemasses of barges I should have thought that sticks ofexplosive bombs thrown along these oblongs wouldhave wrought havoc and it is very disappointing to see


that they all remained intact and in order with just a fewapparently damaged at the entrance

Can nothing be done to improve matters

As already mentioned the Chiefs of Staff were on thewhole of the opinion that invasion was imminent while Iwas sceptical and expressed a contrary view Neverthelessit was impossible to quell that inward excitement whichcomes from the prolonged balancing of terrible thingsCertainly we strained every nerve to be ready Nothing wasneglected that could be achieved by the care and ingenuityof our commanders the vigilance of our now large andformidable armies and the unquenchable and fearlessspirit of our whole people

The whole of our war production and its priorities nowrequired to be reviewed in the light of our exclusion from theContinent In this I worked in consultation with the Ministerof Supply and others concerned At the beginning of thismonth after much labour in my small circle and carefulchecking I prepared for the Cabinet a general directiveupon munitions which was intended to govern our affairs in1941

THE MUNITIONS SITUATION

MEMORANDUM BY THE PRIME MINISTER

September 3 19401 The Navy can lose us the war but only the Air

Force can win it Therefore our supreme effort must beto gain overwhelming mastery in the air The Fightersare our salvation but the Bombers alone provide themeans of victory We must therefore develop thepower to carry an ever-increasing volume of explosivesto Germany so as to pulverise the entire industry and


scientific structure on which the war effort andeconomic life of the enemy depend while holding himat armrsquos length from our island In no other way atpresent visible can we hope to overcome the immensemilitary power of Germany and to nullify the furtherGerman victories which may be apprehended as theweight of their force is brought to bear upon African orOriental theatres The Air Force and its action on thelargest scale must therefore subject to what is saidlater claim the first place over the Navy or the Army

2 The weapon of blockade has become bluntedand rendered as far as Germany is concerned lesseffectual on account of their land conquests and powerto rob captive or intimidated peoples for their ownbenefit There remain no very important specialcommodities the denial of which will hamper their wareffort The Navy is at present somewhat pressed in itstask of keeping open the communications but as thiscondition is removed by new Admiralty measures bythe arrival of the American destroyers and by theincreasing output of anti-U-boat craft from our ownyards we may expect a marked improvement It is ofthe utmost importance that the Admiralty should directtheir attention to aggressive schemes of war and to thebombardment of enemy or enemy-held coastsparticularly in the Mediterranean The production of anti-U-boat craft must proceed at the maximum until furtherorders each slip being filled as it is vacated The NavalProgramme does not impinge markedly upon the Airand should cede some of its armour-plate to tankproduction

3 The decision to raise the Army to a strength offifty-five divisions as rapidly as possible does not seemto require any reconsideration Within this we shouldaim at ten armoured divisions five by the spring sevenby the summer and ten by the end of 1941 Theexecution of these programmes of armament supply willtax our munitions factories to the full I agree inprinciple with the proposals of the Minister of Supply[Mr Herbert Morrison] for handling the ammunitionsupply problem and also that firings on the 191718scale are not to be expected in the present war


4 Intense efforts must be made to complete theequipment of our Army at home and of our Army in theMiddle East The most serious weak points are tanksand small-arms ammunition particularly the specialtypes anti-tank guns and rifles and even more theirammunition trench mortars and still more theirammunition and rifles We hope to obtain an additionaltwo hundred and fifty thousand rifles from the UnitedStates but it is lamentable that we should be told thatno more than half a million additional rifles can bemanufactured here before the end of 1941 Surely aslarge numbers of our Regular Army proceed abroadthe need of the Home Guard and of garrison troops forhome defence on a far larger scale than at present willbe felt A substantial increase in rifle-making capacity isnecessary

5 The danger of invasion will not disappear with thecoming of winter and may confront us with novelpossibilities in the coming year The enemyrsquos need tostrike down this country will naturally increase as thewar progresses and all kinds of appliances for crossingthe seas that do not now exist may be devised Actualinvasion must be regarded as perpetually threatenedbut unlikely to materialise as long as strong forcesstand in this island Apart from this the only majortheatre of war which can be foreseen in 194041 is theMiddle East Here we must endeavour to bring intoaction British Australasian and Indian forces on ascale which should only be limited by sea transport andlocal maintenance We must expect to fight in Egyptand the Soudan in Turkey Syria or Palestine andpossibly in Iraq and Persia Fifteen British divisions sixAustralasian and at least six Indian divisions should beprepared for these theatres these forces not beinghowever additional to the fifty-five divisions which havebeen mentioned One would not imagine that theammunition expenditure would approach the last-warscale Air power and mechanised troops will be thedominant factors

6 There remain the possibilities of amphibiousaggressive warfare against the enemy or enemy-heldterritory in Europe or North Africa But the needs of


such operations will be provided by the arms andsupplies already mentioned in general terms

7 Our task as the Minister of Supply rightly remindsus is indeed formidable when the gigantic scale ofGerman military and aviation equipment is consideredThis war is not however a war of masses of menhurling masses of shells at each other It is by devisingnew weapons and above all by scientific leadershipthat we shall best cope with the enemyrsquos superiorstrength If for instance the series of inventions nowbeing developed to find and hit enemy aircraft bothfrom the air and from the ground irrespective ofvisibility realise what is hoped from them not only thestrategic but the munitions situation would beprofoundly altered And if the UP [unrotatedprojectiles] weapon can be provided with ammunitionpredictors and other aids which realise an accuracy ofhitting three or four times as great as that which nowexists the ground will have taken a long step towardsthe re-conquest of the air The Navy will regain much ofits old freedom of movement and power to takeoffensive action And the Army will be able to land atmany points without the risk of being ldquoNamsossedrdquo1We must therefore regard the whole sphere of RDF[Radar] with its many refinements and measurelesspossibilities as ranking in priority with the Air Force ofwhich it is in fact an essential part The multiplication ofthe high-class scientific personnel as well as thetraining of those who will handle the new weapons andresearch work connected with them should be the veryspearpoint of our thought and effort Very great reliefsmay be expected in anti-aircraft guns and ammunitionalthough it is at present too soon to alter present plans

8 Apart from a large-scale invasion which isunlikely there is no prospect of any large expenditureor wastage of military munitions before the spring of1941 Although heavy and decisive fighting maydevelop at any time in the Middle East the difficulties oftransport both of reinforcements and of supplies willrestrict numbers and expenditure We have thereforebefore us if not interrupted a period of eight months in


which to make an enormous improvement in our outputof warlike equipment and in which steady and rapidaccumulations may be hoped for It is upon thispurpose that all our resources of credit materials andabove all of skilled labour must be bent

This policy was generally accepted by my colleagues andthe action of all Departments conformed to it

I found it necessary in October to add a further note aboutPriorities which were a source of fierce contention betweenthe different Departments each striving to do its utmost

PRIORITIES


October 15 1940The very highest priority in personnel and material

should be assigned to what may be called the Radiosphere This demands scientists wireless experts andmany classes of highly skilled labour and high-gradematerial On the progress made much of the winning ofthe war and our future strategy especially Navaldepends We must impart a far greater accuracy to theAA guns and a far better protection to our warshipsand harbours Not only research and experiments butproduction must be pushed hopefully forward frommany directions and after repeated disappointmentswe shall achieve success

2 The IA priority must remain with aircraft produc-tion for the purpose of executing approved targetprogrammes It must be an obligation upon them tocontrive by every conceivable means not to let thispriority be abused and needlessly hamper other vitaldepartments For this purpose they should specify their


requirements in labour and material beforehand quarterby quarter or if practicable month by month andmake all surplus available for others immediately Thepriority is not to be exercised in the sense that aircraftproduction is completely to monopolise the supplies ofany limited commodity Where the condition prevailsthat the approved MAP demands absorb the totalsupply a special allocation must be made even atprejudice to aircraft production to provide the minimumessential needs of other departments or branches Thisallocation if not agreed will be decided on the Cabinetlevel

3 At present we are aiming at five armoureddivisions and armoured brigades equivalent to threemore This is not enough We cannot hope to competewith the enemy in numbers of men and must thereforerely upon an exceptional proportion of armouredfighting vehicles Ten armoured divisions is the target toaim for to the end of 1941 For this purpose the Armymust searchingly review their demands for mechanisedtransport and large purchases of MT must be made inthe United States The home Army working in thissmall island with highly developed communications ofall kinds cannot enjoy the same scale of transportwhich divisions on foreign service require Improvisationand makeshift must be their guides A staff officerrenders no service to the country who aims at idealstandards and thereafter simply adds and multipliesuntil impossible totals are reached A report should befurnished of mechanical transport first second andthird line of British divisions ndash

(1) For foreign service(2) For home service(3) For troops on the beaches

Any attempt to make heavy weather out of this

problem is a failure to aid us in our need


Wherever possible in England horse transportshould be used to supplement MT We improvidentlysold a great many of our horses to the Germans butthere are still a good many in Ireland

4 Special aid and occasional temporary prioritiesmust be given to the laggard elements Among thesestand out the following

(1) Rifles(2) Small-arms ammunition ndash above all the

special types

Intense efforts must be made to bring the new

factories into production The fact that scarcely anyimprovement is now expected until the end of the yearndash ie sixteen months after the outbreak of war ndash isgrave Twelve months should suffice for a cartridgefactory We have been mercifully spared from the worstconsequences of this failure through the armies notbeing in action as was anticipated

Trench mortar ammunition and A T gun ammuni-tion are also in a shocking plight and must be helped

All these laggards must be the subject of weeklyreports to the Production Council and to me

5 The Navy must exercise its existing priorities inrespect of small craft and anti-U-boat building Thisapplies also to merchant shipbuilding and to craft forlanding operations Delay must be accepted upon alllarger vessels that cannot finish in 1941 Plans must bemade to go forward with all processes and parts whichdo not clash with prior needs The utmost possible steeland armour-plate must be ordered in America

By the middle of September the invasion menace seemedsufficiently glaring to arrest further movement of vital unitsto the East especially as they had to go round the CapeAfter a visit to the Dover sector where the electricatmosphere was compulsive I suspended for a few weeks


the despatch of the New Zealanders and the remaining twotank battalions to the Middle East At the same time I keptour three fast transports ldquothe Glen [Line] shipsrdquo as theywere called in hand for an emergency dash through theMediterranean

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay for theChiefs of StaffCommittee

17IX40

In all the circumstances it would be impossible towithdraw the New Zealand Brigade from their forwardposition on the Dover promontory The two cruiser-tankbattalions cannot go Would it not be better to keep theAustralians back and delay the whole convoy until thethird week in October After all none of these forcesgoing round the Cape can possibly arrive in time toinfluence the impending battle in Egypt But they mayplay a big part here Perhaps by the third week inOctober the Admiralty will be prepared to run greaterrisks Anyhow we cannot afford to make sure that theNew Zealanders and the tank battalions are out ofaction throughout October in either theatre


19IX40

Be careful that the Glen ships are not got out of theway so that it will be impossible to take the armouredreinforcements through the Mediterranean if the need issufficient to justify the risk I donrsquot want to be told thereare no suitable vessels available

Let me know what other ships would be available ifwe should decide to run a convoy from west to eastthrough the Mediterranean about the third week inOctober


Although it was a fine September I was frightened of fog

Prime Minister toColonel Jacob

16IX40

Pray send a copy of this report by First Sea Lord[about invasion in fog] to the Chiefs of the Staff for C-in-C Home Forces adding ldquoI consider that fog is thegravest danger as it throws both air forces out ofaction baffles our artillery prevents organised navalattack and specially favours the infiltration tactics bywhich the enemy will most probably seek to secure hislodgments Should conditions of fog prevail thestrongest possible air barrage must be put down uponthe invasion ports during the night and early morning Ishould be glad to be advised of the proposed navalaction by our flotillas both in darkness and at dawn (a)if the fog lies more on the English than the French sideof the Channel (b) if it is uniform on both sides

ldquoAre we proposing to use radio aids to navigationldquoProlonged conditions of stand-by under frequent air

bombardment will be exhausting to the enemyNonetheless fog is our foerdquo

In spite of all the danger it was important not to wear themen out


18IX40

Inquire from the COS Committee whether in viewof the rough weather Alert Number 1 might not bediscreetly relaxed to the next grade

Report to me


18IX40


Make inquiries whether there is no way in which asheet of flaming oil can be spread over one or more ofthe invasion harbours This is no more than the old fire-ship story with modern improvements that was tried atDunkirk in the days of the Armada The Admiralty cansurely think of something


18IX40

The De Wilde ammunition is of extreme importanceAt Number 11 Group the bombing of its factory wasevidently considered a great blow I can quiteunderstand the output dropping to 38000 rounds in theweek while you are moving from Woolwich and gettingreinstated but I trust it will revive again Pray let meknow your future forecast for the next four weeks Ifthere is revival in prospect we might perhaps draw alittle upon our reserve


25IX40

I must show you the comments made upon thelatest returns of small-arms ammunition by myStatistical Department They cause me the greatestanxiety In particular the De Wilde ammunition which isthe most valuable is the most smitten It seems to methat a most tremendous effort must be made not onlyon the whole field of Marks 7 and 8 but on De Wildeand armour-piercing I am well aware of your difficultiesWill you let me know if there is any way in which I canhelp you to overcome them

The reader must pardon this next Minute


18IX40


Surely you can run to a new Admiralty flag It grievesme to see the present dingy object every morning

I was relieved by the results produced by the new Ministryof Aircraft Production


21IX40

The figures you gave me of the improvement inoperational types between May 10 and August 30 aremagnificent If similar figures could be prepared downto September 30 which is not far off I should prefer toread them to the Cabinet rather than circulate them Ifhowever the September figures cannot be got until latein October I will read [what I now have] to the Cabinet

The country is your debtor and of your Ministry


25IX40

These wonderful results achieved under circum-stances of increasing difficulty make it necessary forme to ask you to convey to your Department thewarmest thanks and congratulations from His MajestyrsquosGovernment

Throughout the summer and autumn I wished to help theSecretary of State for War in his conflict with War Officeand Army prejudices about the commandos or stormtroops



25VIII40

I have been thinking over our very informal talk theother night and am moved to write to you because Ihear that the whole position of the commandos is beingquestioned They have been told ldquono more recruitingrdquoand that their future is in the melting-pot I thoughttherefore I might write to let you know how strongly Ifeel that the Germans have been right both in the lastwar and in this in the use they have made of stormtroops In 1918 the infiltrations which were so deadly tous were by storm troops and the final defence ofGermany in the last four months of 1918 rested mainlyupon brilliantly posted and valiantly fought machine-gunnests In this war all these factors are multiplied Thedefeat of France was accomplished by an incrediblysmall number of highly equipped eacutelite while the dullmass of the German Army came on behind made goodthe conquest and occupied it If we are to have anycampaign in 1941 it must be amphibious in itscharacter and there will certainly be many opportuni-ties for minor operations all of which will depend onsurprise landings of lightly equipped nimble forcesaccustomed to work like packs of hounds instead ofbeing moved about in the ponderous manner which isappropriate to the regular formations These havebecome so elaborate so complicated in theirequipment so vast in their transport that it is verydifficult to use them in any operations in which time isvital

For every reason therefore we must develop thestorm troop or commando idea I have asked for fivethousand parachutists and we must also have at leastten thousand of these small ldquobands of brothersrdquo whowill be capable of lightning action In this way alone willthose positions be secured which afterwards will givethe opportunity for highly trained Regular troops tooperate on a larger scale


I hope therefore that you will let me have anopportunity of discussing this with you before anyaction is taken to reverse the policy hitherto adopted orto throw into uncertainty all the volunteers who havebeen gathered together

The resistances of the War Office were obstinate andincreased as the professional ladder was descended Theidea that large bands of favoured ldquoirregularsrdquo with theirunconventional attire and free-and-easy bearing shouldthrow an implied slur on the efficiency and courage of theRegular battalions was odious to men who had given alltheir lives to the organised discipline of permanent unitsThe colonels of many of our finest regiments wereaggrieved ldquoWhat is there they can do that my battalioncannot This plan robs the whole Army of its prestige andof its finest men We never had it in 1918 Why nowrdquo Itwas easy to understand these feelings without sharingthem The War Office responded to their complaints But Ipressed hard


8IX40

You told me that you were in entire agreement withthe views I put forward about the special companiesand ending the uncertainty in which they were placedUnhappily nothing has happened so far of which thetroops are aware They do not know they are not undersentence of disbandment All recruiting has beenstopped although there is a waiting list and they arenot even allowed to call up the men who want to joinand have been vetted and approved Although thesecompanies comprise many of the best and most highlytrained of our personnel they are at present only armed


with rifles which seems a shocking waste should theybe thrown into the invasion melee I hope that you willmake sure that when you give an order it is obeyed withpromptness Perhaps you could explain to me what hashappened to prevent your decision from being madeeffective In my experience of Service Departmentswhich is a long one there is always a danger thatanything contrary to Service prejudices will beobstructed and delayed by officers of the second gradein the machine The way to deal with this is to makesignal examples of one or two When this becomesknown you get a better service afterwards

Perhaps you will tell me about this if you can dinewith me tonight

Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar (Mr Eden)

21IX40

I am not happy about the equipment position of thecommandos It is a waste of this fine material to leavethem without sufficient equipment for training purposesmuch less for operations

Pray let me have a statement showing

1

What equipment has already been issued tothe various commandos

2

What is the output scale of equipment whichthese units are to have

3

What can be issued to them immediately fortraining purposes

I should like to have a return each week showing theprecise position as regards the equipment of thevarious Commandos


Prime Minister to C-in-C Home Forces (SirAlan Brooke)

21IX40

We often hear tales of how the Germans will invadeon an enormous front trying to throw say a quarter ofa million men ashore anyhow and trusting afterwardsto exploit lodgments which are promising For an attackof this kind our beach defence system seems admirablydevised The difficulty of defending an island againstoverseas attack has always consisted in the power ofthe invader to concentrate a very superior force at onepoint or another But if he is going to spread himself outvery widely the bulk of his forces if they reach shorewill come up against equal or superior forces spreadalong the coast It will be a case of one thin line againstanother Whereas I can readily imagine a concentratedattack pressed forward with tremendous numberssucceeding against our thin line I find it difficult to seewhat would be the good of his landing large numbers ofsmall parties none of which would be strong enough tobreak our well-organised shore defence If he is goingto lose say a hundred thousand in the passage andanother hundred and fifty thousand are to be broughtup short at the beaches the actual invasion would berather an expensive process and the enemy wouldhave sustained enormous losses before we had evenset our reserves in motion If therefore there isanything in this alleged German plan it seems to me itshould give us considerable satisfaction Far moredangerous would be the massed attack on a fewparticular selected points

Perhaps you will talk to me about this when we nextmeet


Our anxieties about the Italian invasion of Egypt were itnow appears far surpassed by those of Marshal Grazianiwho commanded it Ciano notes in his diary

August 8 1940 Graziani has come to see me Hetalks about the attack on Egypt as a very seriousundertaking and says that our present preparations arefar from perfect He attacks Badoglio who does notcheck the Ducersquos aggressive spirit ndash a fact which ldquofor aman who knows Africa means that he must suffer fromsoftening of the brain or what is worse from bad faithThe water supply is entirely insufficient We movetoward a defeat which in the desert must inevitablydevelop into a rapid and total disasterrdquo

I reported this to the Duce who was very muchupset about it because in his last conversation withGraziani he had received the impression that theoffensive would start in a few days Graziani did not setany date with me He would rather not attack at all orat any rate not for two or three months Mussoliniconcluded that ldquoone should only give jobs to peoplewho are looking for at least one promotion Grazianirsquosonly anxiety is to remain a Marshalrdquo1

A month later the Commander-in-Chief asked for a furthermonthrsquos postponement Mussolini however replied that ifhe did not attack on Monday he would be replaced TheMarshal answered that he would obey ldquoNeverrdquo says Cianoldquohas a military operation been undertaken so much againstthe will of the commandersrdquoOn September 13 the main Italian army began its long-expected advance across the Egyptian frontier Their forcesamounted to six infantry divisions and eight battalions oftanks Our covering troops consisted of three battalions ofinfantry one battalion of tanks three batteries and twosquadrons of armoured cars They were ordered to make afighting withdrawal an operation for which their quality and


desert-worthiness fitted them The Italian attack openedwith a heavy barrage of our positions near the frontier townof Sollum When the dust and smoke cleared the Italianforces were seen ranged in a remarkable order In frontwere motor-cyclists in precise formation from flank to flankand front to rear behind them were light tanks and manyrows of mechanical vehicles In the words of a Britishcolonel the spectacle resembled ldquoa birthday party in theLong Valley at Aldershotrdquo The 3d Cold-stream Guards whoconfronted this imposing array withdrew slowly and ourartillery took its toll of the generous targets presented tothemFarther south two large enemy columns moved across theopen desert south of the long ridge that runs parallel to thesea and could be crossed only at Halfaya ndash the ldquoHellfirePassrdquo which played its part in all our later battles EachItalian column consisted of many hundreds of vehicles withtanks anti-tank guns and artillery in front and with lorriedinfantry in the centre This formation which was severaltimes adopted we called the ldquoHedgehogrdquo Our forces fellback before these great numbers taking every opportunityto harass the enemy whose movements seemed erraticand indecisive Graziani afterwards explained that at thelast moment he decided to change his plan of anenveloping desert movement and ldquoconcentrate all myforces on the left to make a lightning movement along thecoast to Sidi Barranirdquo Accordingly the great Italian massmoved slowly forward along the coast road by two paralleltracks They attacked in waves of infantry carried in lorriessent forward in fifties The Coldstream Guards fell backskilfully at their convenience from Sollum to successivepositions for four days inflicting severe punishment as theywent


On the 17th the Italian Army reached Sidi Barrani Ourcasualties were forty killed and wounded and the enemyrsquosabout five times as many including a hundred and fiftyvehicles destroyed Here with their communicationslengthened by sixty miles the Italians settled down tospend the next three months They were continuallyharassed by our small mobile columns and sufferedserious maintenance difficulties Mussolini at first wasldquoradiant with joy He has taken the entire responsibility ofthe offensive on his shouldersrdquo says Ciano ldquoand is proudthat he was rightrdquo As the weeks lengthened into monthshis satisfaction diminished It seemed however certain tous in London that in two or three months an Italian army farlarger than any we could gather would renew the advanceto capture the Delta And then there were always theGermans who might appear We could not of courseexpect the long halt which followed Grazianirsquos advance Itwas reasonable to suppose that a major battle would befought at Mersa Matruh The weeks that had alreadypassed had enabled our precious armour to come roundthe Cape without the time-lag so far causing disadvantageIt was now approaching


14IX40

I hope the armoured brigade will be in time I haveno doubt it could have been conducted safely throughthe Mediterranean and the present danger that it willbe too late averted It must however be rememberedthat General Wavell himself joined in the declaration ofthe Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy Army and Airthat the situation in Egypt did not warrant the risk It


was this declaration that made it impossible for me tooverride the Admiralty objections as I would otherwisehave done

(Action this day)Prime Minister toSecretary of State forWar (General Ismayto see)

19IX40

The armoured reinforcements are now in the Gulf ofAden We have been assured that of course GeneralWavell has made all arrangements to get them intoaction as quickly as possible I hope this is so I amsorry that someone like Lord Beaverbrook is not waitingon the quay to do the job of passing them to the fightingline We must do the best we can Has it beenconsidered whether it would be better to carry thesevehicles through the Canal to Alexandria and debarkthem there close to the front or have special trains andrailway cars cranes and other facilities beenaccumulated at Suez Let the alternatives be examinedhere Without waiting for this let a telegram be draftedinquiring about the alternatives and the arrangementsnow made by General Wavell Every day and evenevery hour counts in this matter

All the time I had a fear for Malta which seemed almostdefenceless


21IX40

This telegram [from Governor and C-in-C Malta]confirms my apprehensions about Malta Beachesdefended on an average battalion front of fifteen milesand no reserves for counter-attack worth speaking ofleave the island at the mercy of a landing force You


must remember that we do not possess the commandof the sea around Malta The danger thereforeappears to be extreme I should have thought fourbattalions were needed but owing to the difficulty ofmoving transports from the west we must be contentwith two for the moment We must find two good onesApparently there is no insuperable difficulty inaccommodation

When I look back on all these worries I remember the storyof the old man who said on his deathbed that he had had alot of trouble in his life most of which had never happenedCertainly this is true of my life in September 1940 TheGermans were beaten in the Air Battle of Britain Theoverseas invasion of Britain was not attempted In fact bythis date Hitler had already turned his glare to the East TheItalians did not press their attack upon Egypt The tankbrigade sent all round the Cape arrived in good time notindeed for a defensive battle of Mersa Matruh inSeptember but for a later operation incomparably moreadvantageous We found means to reinforce Malta beforeany serious attack from the air was made upon it and noone dared to try a landing upon the island fortress at anytime Thus September passed


9Dakar

Importance ofAiding General de GaullemdashPlan forLiberating DakarmdashNeed to Support the FreeFrench ForcesmdashMy Minute of August 8 1940 mdashThe War Cabinet Approves ldquoOperation MenacerdquomdashDangers of Delay and LeakagemdashMessage fromldquoJacquesrdquomdashOur Second StringmdashThe FrenchCruisers Sighted mdash A Failure at WhitehallmdashTooLate mdash I Advise the War Cabinet to Abandon theProjectmdashStrong Desire of the Commanders toAttackmdashGeneral de Gaullersquos Persistence mdash TheWar Cabinet Gives Full Discretion to the Comman-dersmdashMy Telegram to General Smuts andPresident RooseveltmdashThe Attack on Dakar mdashShips Versus FortsmdashStubborn Resistance of theVichy French mdash We Suffer Appreciable NavalLossesmdashCabinet and Commanders Agreed toBreak Off mdash Changes of Rocircle at Home and on theSpotmdashJustification of the CommandersmdashParliament Requires No Explanations

AT THIS TIME His Majestyrsquos Government attached greatimportance to aiding General de Gaulle and the FreeFrench to rally the African possessions and colonies ofFrance especially those upon the Atlantic coast Ourinformation was that a large portion of the French officersofficials and traders in all these territories had notdespaired They were stunned by the sudden collapse of


their motherland but being still free from Hitlerrsquos force andPeacutetainrsquos fraud were in no mood to surrender To themGeneral de Gaulle shone as a star in the pitch-black nightDistance gave them time and time gave them opportunityOnce it was clear that Casablanca was beyond ourstrength my mind naturally turned to Dakar In all this thesmall handling committee I formed to advise me personallyon French affairs was convinced and active On theevening of August 3 1940 I sent my general approval fromChequers to a proposal for landing Free French forces inWest Africa General de Gaulle Major-General Spears andMajor Morton had evolved a plan in outline of which theobject was to raise the Free French flag in West Africa tooccupy Dakar and thus consolidate the French colonies inWest and Equatorial Africa for General de Gaulle and laterto rally the French colonies in North Africa General Catrouxwas to come from Indo-China to England and eventuallytake command of the French North African colonies shouldthese be liberated later onOn August 4 the Chiefs of Staff Committee considered thedetails of this plan as worked out further by the JointPlanning Sub-Committee and drew up their report for theWar Cabinet The proposals of the Chiefs of Staff werebased on the three following assumptions first that theforce must be equipped and loaded so that it could land inany French West African port secondly that the expeditionshould consist entirely of Free French troops and have noBritish elements except the ships in which it moved andtheir naval escort thirdly that the matter should be settledas between Frenchmen so that the expedition would landwithout effective oppositionThe strength of the Free French force would be abouttwenty-five hundred men comprising two battalions a


company of tanks sections of artillery and engineers and abomber and a fighter flight for which we should supply theHurricanes This force could be ready at Aldershot onAugust 10 and it was estimated that transports andstoreships could sail from Liverpool on August 13 andtroopships between the 19th and 23d arriving at Dakar onthe 28th or at the other ports Konakri and Duala a fewdays later The War Cabinet approved these proposals attheir meeting on August 5It soon became clear that General de Gaulle required moreBritish support than the Chiefs of Staff had contemplatedThey represented to me that this would involvecommitments larger and more enduring than those whichhad been foreseen and also that the expedition wasbeginning to lose its Free French character Our resourceswere at this time so severely strained that this extensioncould not be lightly accepted However on August 6 Iconferred with General de Gaulle and at 11 PM on August7 I presided over a meeting of the Chiefs of StaffCommittee on the project It was agreed that the best placeto land the Free French force was Dakar I stated that theexpedition must be sufficiently backed by British troops toensure its success and asked for a larger plan on theselines The Chiefs of Staff dwelt upon the conflict between apolicy of improving our relations with Vichy and our interestsin marshalling the French colonies against Germany Theyset forth the danger that General de Gaullersquos movementmight lead to war with Metropolitan France and also withthe French Colonies If nevertheless reports from the FreeFrench agents on the spot and from our ownrepresentatives in the area were favourable theyrecommended that the expedition should go forward


Accordingly in the early hours of August 8 I issued thefollowing directive


8VIII40

1 The telegram from the Governor of Nigeria showsthe danger of German influence spreading quicklythrough the West African colonies of France with theconnivance or aid of the Vichy Government Unless weact with celerity and vigour we may find effective U-boat bases supported by German aviation all downthis coast and it will become barred to us but availablefor the Germans in the same way as the western coastof Europe

2 It is now six weeks since the Cabinet was stronglydisposed to action at Casablanca and Mr Duff Cooperand Lord Gort were despatched Nothing howevercame of this The local French were hostile The Chiefsof the Staff were not able to make any positiveproposals and the situation has markedly deteriorated

3 It would seem extremely important to Britishinterests that General de Gaulle should take Dakar atthe earliest moment If his emissaries report that it canbe taken peaceably so much the better If their reportis adverse an adequate Polish and British force shouldbe provided and full naval protection given Theoperation once begun must be carried through DeGaulle should impart a French character to it and ofcourse once successful his administration will rule Butwe must provide the needful balance of force

4 The Chiefs of the Staff should make a plan forachieving the capture of Dakar For this purpose theyshould consider available (a) de Gaullersquos force and anyFrench warships which can be collected (b) ampleBritish naval force both to dominate French warships inthe neighbourhood and to cover the landing (c) abrigade of Poles properly equipped (d) the Royal


Marine Brigade which was being held available for theAtlantic islands but might well help to put de Gaulleashore first or alternatively commandos from Sir RKeyesrsquos force (e) proper air support either by carrier orby machines working from a British West African colony

5 Let a plan be prepared forthwith and let the datesbe arranged in relation to the Mediterranean operation

6 It is not intended after Dakar is taken that weshall hold it with British forces General de Gaullersquosadministration would be set up and would have tomaintain itself British assistance being limited tosupplies on a moderate scale and of course preventingany sea-borne expedition from Germanised FranceShould de Gaulle be unable to maintain himselfpermanently against air attack or air-borne troops wewill take him off again after destroying all harbourfacilities We should of course in any case take overRichelieu under the French flag and have her repairedThe Poles and the Belgians would also have their goldwhich was moved before the armistice to Africa by theFrench Government for safety recovered for them

7 In working out the above plan time is vital Wehave lost too much already British ships are to be usedas transports whenever convenient and merely hoistFrench colours No question of Orders in Council orlegislation to transfer British transports to the Frenchflag need be considered

8 The risk of a French declaration of war andwhether it should be courted is reserved for the Cabinet

On August 13 I brought the matter before the War Cabinetexplaining that it went farther than the original plan of apurely French expedition The details of a landing of sixdifferent parties at dawn on the beaches near Dakar andthus dispersing the efforts of the defenders assuming therewas opposition were examined by my colleagues The WarCabinet approved the plan subject to consideration by the


Foreign Secretary upon the chances of Vichy Francedeclaring war Measuring the situation as far as I could Idid not believe this would happen I had now become setupon this venture I approved the appointment of Vice-Admiral John Cunningham and Major-General Irwin as thecommanders of the expedition They visited me atChequers on the night of August 12 and we went throughall the aspects of this doubtful and complex affair I draftedtheir instructions myselfI thus undertook in an exceptional degree the initiation andadvocacy of the Dakar expedition to which the code nameldquoMenacerdquo was assigned Of this although I cannot feel wewere well served on all occasions and certainly had badluck I never at any time repented Dakar was a prizerallying the French colonial empire a greater There was afair chance of gaining these results without bloodshed andI felt in my finger-tips that Vichy France would not declarewar The stubborn resistance of Britain the stern mood ofthe United States had lit new hope in French hearts If wewon Vichy could shrug its shoulders If we lost they couldtrade off their resistance with their German masters as avirtue The most serious danger was prolonged fighting Butthese were days in which far more serious risks were thecommonplaces of our daily life I conceived that ourresources albeit strained to the last inch and ounce couldjust manage it With invasion looming up ever nearer andmore imminent we had not shrunk from sending half ourtanks to Wavell for the defence of Egypt Compared to thatthis was a pup Our national War Cabinet Tory Labourand Liberal were hard resolute men imbued with anincreasing sense of playing a winning hand So all theorders were given and everything went forward underunchallengeable authority


Our two dangers were now delay and leakage and the firstaggravated the second At this time the Free French forcesin England were a band of exiled heroes in arms againstthe reigning Government of their country They were readyto fire on their own fellow-countrymen and accept thesinking of French warships by British guns Their leaderslay under sentence of death Who can wonder at still lessblame them for a tenseness of emotion or even forindiscretion The War Cabinet could give orders to our owntroops without anyone but the commanders and the Chiefsof Staff circle having to be informed of our intentions ButGeneral de Gaulle had to carry his gallant band ofFrenchmen with him Many got to know Dakar becamecommon talk among the French troops At a dinner in aLiverpool restaurant French officers toasted ldquoDakarrdquo Ourassault landing craft had to travel on trolleys acrossEngland from near Portsmouth to Liverpool and theirescort wore tropical kit We were all in our wartime infancyThe sealing of the island was not to be compared with whatwe achieved later in the supreme operations of ldquoTorchrdquo andldquoOverlordrdquoThen there were delays We had hoped to strike onSeptember 8 but now it appeared that the main force mustfirst go to Freetown to refuel and make their final poise Theplan was based upon the French troopships reaching Dakarin sixteen days at twelve knots It was found however thatthe ships carrying the mechanical transport could onlymake eight to nine knots and this discovery was reportedonly at a stage of loading when the time lost in reloadinginto faster ships offered no gain In all ten daysrsquo delay fromthe original date became inevitable five days for themiscalculation of the speed of the ships three days forunforeseen loading troubles two days for the refuelling atFreetown We must now be content with September 18


I presided over a meeting of the Chiefs of the Staff andGeneral de Gaulle on August 20 at 1030 PM and am onrecord as summing up the plan as follows

The Anglo-French Armada would arrive at Dakar atdawn aircraft would drop streamers and leaflets overthe town the British squadron would remain on thehorizon and French ships would come towards theport An emissary in a picket boat flying the Tricolourand a white flag would go into the harbour with a letterto the Governor saying that General de Gaulle and hisFree French troops had arrived General de Gaullewould stress in the letter that he had come to freeDakar from the danger of imminent German aggressionand was bringing food and succour to the garrison andinhabitants If the Governor was amenable all would bewell if not and the coast defences opened fire theBritish squadrons would close in If the oppositioncontinued the British warships would open fire on theFrench gun positions but with the utmost restraint Ifdetermined opposition was met with the British forceswould use all means to break down resistance It wasessential that the operation should be completed andGeneral de Gaulle master of Dakar by nightfall

General de Gaulle expressed his agreement

On the 22d we met again and a letter was read from theForeign Secretary to me disclosing a leakage ofinformation Exactly what this leakage amounted to no onecould tell The advantage of sea-power used offensively isthat when a fleet sails no one can be sure where it is goingto strike The seas are broad and the oceans broaderTropical kit was a clue no more definite than the Continentof Africa The wife of a Frenchman in Liverpool who wassuspected of Vichy contacts was known to be convincedthat the Mediterranean was the destination of thetroopships which were gathering in the Mersey Even theword ldquoDakarrdquo if bruited carelessly might be a blind Such


forms of ldquocoverrdquo were carried to remarkable refinements aswe became more experienced and wily I was worried bythe delays and beat against them As to the leakage nonecould tell At any rate on August 27 the Cabinet gave theirfinal general approval for going ahead Our target date wasthen September 19

At 624 PM on September 9 the British Consul-General atTangier cabled to Admiral North commanding the Atlanticstation ldquoa shore appointment at Gibraltarrdquo and repeated tothe Foreign Office

Following received from ldquoJacquesrdquo Frenchsquadron may try to pass the Straits proceedingwestward for unknown destination This attempt maybe timed to take place within the next seventy-twohours

The Admiral was not in the Dakar circle and took nospecial action The telegram was repeated from Tangiersimultaneously to the Foreign Office and received at 750 AM on the 10th At this time we were under almostcontinuous bombardment in London Owing to the recurrentstoppages of work through the air raids arrears hadaccumulated in the cipher branch The message was notmarked ldquoImportantrdquo and was deciphered only in its turn Itwas not ready for distribution until September 14 when atlast it reached the AdmiraltyBut we had a second string At 6 PM on September 10 theBritish Naval Attacheacute in Madrid was officially informed bythe French Admiralty that three French cruisers typeGeorges Leygues and three destroyers had left Toulonand intended to pass the Straits of Gibraltar on the morningof the 11th This was the normal procedure accepted at this


time by the Vichy Government and was a measure ofprudence taken by them only at the latest moment TheBritish Naval Attacheacute reported at once to the Admiralty andalso to Admiral North at Gibraltar The signal was receivedin the Admiralty at 1150 PM on September 10 It wasdeciphered and sent to the Duty Captain who passed it onto the Director of Operations Division (Foreign) It shouldhave been obvious to this officer who was himself fullyinformed of the Dakar expedition that the message was ofdecisive importance He took no instant action on it but letit go forward in the ordinary way with the First Sea Lordrsquostelegrams For this mistake he received in due course theexpression of their lordshipsrsquo displeasureHowever the destroyer Hotspur on patrol in theMediterranean sighted the French ships at 515 AM onSeptember 11 fifty miles to the east of Gibraltar andreported to Admiral North Admiral Somerville whocommanded Force ldquoHrdquo which was based on Gibraltar hadalso received a copy of the Naval Attacheacutersquos signal at eightminutes past midnight that same morning He brought theRenown to one hourrsquos notice for steam at 7 AM andawaited instructions from the Admiralty In consequence ofthe error in the Director of Operations Division and of thedelay at the Foreign Office upon the other message fromthe Consul-General the First Sea Lord knew nothing aboutthe passage of the French warships till Hotspurrsquos signal wasbrought to him during the Chiefs of Staff meeting before theCabinet He at once telephoned the Admiralty to orderRenown and her destroyers to raise steam This hadalready been done He then came to the War Cabinet Butthrough the coincidence of this failure of two separatecommunications ndash one from the Consul-General in Tangierand the other from the Naval Attacheacute in Madrid ndash andthrough lack of appreciation in various quarters all was too


late If the Consul-General had marked the first messageImportant or if either of the admirals at Gibraltar eventhough not in the secret had so considered it themselvesor if the Foreign Office had been working normally or if theDirector of Operations had given the second message thepriority which would have ensured the First Sea Lordrsquosbeing woken up to read it immediately the Renown couldhave stopped and parleyed with the French squadronpending decisive orders which would certainly have beengiven by the War Cabinet or till they could be summonedby meIn the event all our network of arrangements broke downand three French cruisers and three destroyers passed theStraits at full speed (twenty-five knots) at 835 AM on the11th and turned southward down the African coast TheWar Cabinet on being apprised instantly instructed theFirst Lord to order the Renown to get in touch with theFrench ships ask for their destination and make it clearthat they would not be allowed to proceed to any German-occupied ports If they replied that they were going souththey were to be told they could proceed to Casablanca andin this case they were to be shadowed If they tried to gobeyond Casablanca to Dakar they were to be stopped Butthe cruisers were never caught A haze lay overCasablanca on the 12th and 13th One of the reconnoitringBritish aircraft was shot down reports about the presenceof additional warships in Casablanca Harbour wereconflicting and the Renown and her destroyers waited allday and night south of Casablanca to intercept the Frenchsquadron At 420 on the afternoon of the 13th the Renownreceived an air report that there were no cruisers inCasablanca In fact they were already far to the southwardsteaming for Dakar at full speed


There seemed however to be still another chance Ourexpedition and its powerful escort was by now itself south ofDakar approaching Freetown At 1216 AM on September14 the Admiralty signalled to Admiral John Cunninghamtelling him that the French cruisers had left Casablanca at atime unknown and ordering him to prevent them enteringDakar He was to use every ship available including theCumberland and the Ark Royal should operate her aircraftwithout a destroyer screen if this were unavoidable Thecruisers Devonshire Australia and Cumberland and theArk Royal thereupon turned back at maximum speed toestablish a patrol line to the north of Dakar They did notreach their stations until evening on September 14 TheFrench squadron was already anchored in the port withawnings spreadThis chapter of accidents sealed the fate of the Franco-British expedition to Dakar I had no doubt whatever thatthe enterprise should be abandoned The whole scheme ofa bloodless landing and occupation by General de Gaulleseemed to me ruined by the arrival of the French squadronprobably carrying reinforcements good gunners and bitter-minded Vichy officers to decide the Governor to pervertthe garrison and man the batteries It was possiblehowever to cancel the plan without any loss of prestige soimportant to us at this time and indeed without anyoneknowing anything about it The expedition could be divertedto Duala and cover General de Gaullersquos operations againstthe French Cameroons and thereafter the ships andtransports could be dispersed or return homeAccordingly at the meeting of the War Cabinet at noon onSeptember 16 after outlining the history of the Dakaroperation from its inception the serious results of thepostponement of the date originally fixed for September


13 the leakage of information from various sources andthe misfortune of the French warships having slippedthrough the Straits I declared that the whole situation wasaltered and that the operation was now out of the questionThe Cabinet adopted my advice and the following orderswere despatched to the Dakar force at 2 PM that day

His Majestyrsquos Government have decided thatpresence of French cruisers at Dakar renders theexecution of Dakar operation impracticable Alternativeplans have been examined here Landing at Konakridoes not appear to offer any chance of success in viewof difficulty of communications to Bomako the lack oftransport with the force and the probability that forcesfrom Dakar would forestall Moreover close blockadeof Dakar from seaward is not possible with the navalforces available and therefore presence of de Gaullersquosforce at Bomako would not appreciably influencesituation at Dakar Best plan appears to be for Generalde Gaullersquos force to land at Duala with the object ofconsolidating the Cameroons Equatorial Africa andChad and extending influence of de Gaulle toLibreville The British portion of the force would remainfor the present at Freetown

Unless General de Gaulle has any strong objectionsto the latter course it should be put into operationforthwith

The expedition arrived at Freetown on September 17 Allthe leaders reacted vehemently against the idea ofabandoning the enterprise The Admiral and the Generalargued that until it was known to what extent the arrival ofthe Vichy cruisers had raised local morale their presencedid not materially alter the previous naval situation Atpresent they said the cruisers had awnings spread and


two were so berthed as to be virtually impotent whilepresenting excellent bombing targetsHere was another twist in the situation It was very rare atthis stage in the war for commanders on the spot to pressfor audacious courses Usually the pressure to run riskscame from home In this case the General General Irwinhad carefully put all his misgivings on paper before hestarted I was therefore agreeably surprised at the evidentzeal to put this complicated and semi-political operation tothe test If the men on the spot thought it was a time to doand dare we should certainly give them a free hand Itherefore sent at 1152 PM on September 16 the following

You are fully at liberty to consider the whole situationyourselves and consult de Gaulle and we shallcarefully consider then any advice you may give

There soon arrived a vehement protest from General deGaulle who wished to carry out the plan

At the very least [he said] should the BritishGovernment uphold its new and negative decisionconcerning direct action upon Dakar by sea I requestimmediate co-operation of British naval and air forceshere present to support and cover an operation which Ipersonally shall conduct with my own troops againstDakar from the interior1

Our commanders now reported2

At meeting today de Gaulle insisted upon necessityfor early action at Dakarhellip He is advised thatsubstantial support for him is likely to be found in Dakarif agents are sent to foster it action is not undulydeferred and a too-British complexion of the operationavoided His agents are ready at Bathurst and havetheir instructions De Gaulle now proposes original planto enter harbour unopposed should go forward but thatif this fails Free French troops should attempt landing


at Rufisque supported by naval and air action ifnecessary and thence advance on Dakar Britishtroops only to be landed in support if called upon afterbridgehead has been establishedhellip

After careful consideration of all factors we are ofthe opinion that the presence of these three cruisershas not sufficiently increased the risks which werealways accepted to justify the abandonment of theenterprise We accordingly recommend acceptance ofde Gaullersquos new proposal and that should he faillanding of British troops should be undertaken to installhim as previously contemplated Increased strength in[our] naval forces is however considered essential

The operation should be carried out four days afterdecision of His Majestyrsquos Government is received

And finally from Major-General Irwin to the CIGSAs you know I have already accepted risks in this

operation not fully justified on purely military groundsNew information possibly increases those risks but Iconsider them worth accepting in view of obviousresults of success De Gaulle has also committedhimself to complete co-operation with British troops incase of need and he has not shirked responsibility forfighting between Frenchmen

The War Cabinet met for the second time on the 17th at 9 PM Everyone was agreed to let the commanders go aheadas they wished Final decision was postponed till noon thenext day it being plain that no time was being lost as therewas still nearly a week before the blow could be struck Atthe request of the Cabinet I drafted the following messageto the commanders of the Dakar force

We cannot judge relative advantages of alternativeschemes from here We give you full authority to goahead and do what you think is best in order to giveeffect to the original purpose of the expedition Keep usinformed


This was despatched at 120 PM September 18There was nothing to do now but await results On the 19ththe First Sea Lord reported that the French squadron orparts of it were leaving Dakar for the south This made itpretty clear that it had carried Vichy-minded troopstechnicians and authorities to Dakar The probabilities of avigorous resistance were increased out of all proportion tothe new forces involved There would certainly be sharpfighting My colleagues who were tough and also nimble tochange with circumstances as is right in war shared myinstinct to let things rip and the various reports were heardin silenceOn the 20th Admiral Pound told us that the French cruiserPrimauguet intercepted by the Cornwall and Delhi hadagreed to go to Casablanca and was now being escortedthither The three French warships sighted by the Australiaturned out to be the cruisers Georges Leygues Montcalmand Gloire At noon on the 19th the Australia had beenjoined by the Cumberland and they continued to shadowthe Vichy ships till evening These now turned to thenorthward and increased their speed from fifteen to thirty-one knots A chase ensued We were not able to overtakethem At 90 PM however the Gloire had an enginebreakdown and could steam no more than fifteen knotsHer captain agreed to return to Casablanca escorted bythe Australia This pair were due to pass Dakar aboutmidnight and the captain of the Australia told the Gloirethat if he were attacked by submarines he would at oncesink her She no doubt spoke to Dakar and all passed offpleasantly The Cumberland shadowing the other twoVichy warships lost touch in a heavy rainstorm and boththough sighted got back into Dakar without fire being made


upon them The Poitiers when challenged at sea on the17th had already scuttled herself

I kept General Smuts fully informed


22IX40

You will have seen my message about Dakar I havebeen thinking a great deal about what you said in yourvarious messages about not neglecting the Africansphere The de Gaulle movement to rescue the Frenchcolonies has prospered in Equatoria and theCameroons We could not allow these solid gains to bedestroyed by French warships and personnel fromVichy sent probably at German dictation If Dakar fellunder German control and became a U-boat base theconsequences to the Cape route would be deadly Wehave therefore set out upon the business of putting deGaulle into Dakar peaceably if we can forcibly if wemust and the expedition now about to strike seems tohave the necessary force

Naturally the risk of a bloody collision with theFrench sailors and part of the garrison is not a lightone On the whole I think the odds are heavily againstany serious resistance having regard to the low moraleand unhappy plight of this French colony and the ruinand starvation which faces them through our seacontrol Still no one can be sure till we try Theargument that such a risk ought not to be run at a timewhen French opinion encouraged by British resistanceis veering towards us even at Vichy and that anythinglike a second Oran would be a great set-back hasweighed heavily with us Nevertheless we came to theunited conclusion that this objection might not turn outto be valid and must in any case be surpassed by thedangers of doing nothing and of allowing Vichy to


prevail against de Gaulle If Vichy did not declare warafter Oran or under the pressure of our blockade thereis no reason why they should do so if there is a fight atDakar Besides the strategical importance of Dakar andpolitical effects of its capture by de Gaulle there aresixty or seventy millions of Belgian and Polish goldwrongfully held in the interior and the great battleshipRichelieu by no means permanently disabled wouldindirectly come into our hands Anyhow the die is cast

We do not intend to disturb Morocco at present onaccount of the German pressure on Spain and Spanishinterests there We are very hopeful about Syriawhither General Catroux will go next week Animportant battle is now impending at Mersa Matruh andI hope our armoured reinforcements will arrive in time

I am not particularly impressed with the dangers inKenya especially if we lie back and fight from thebroad-gauge railway leaving the enemy the difficultcommunications I am trying to send a few suitabletanks to this theatre which otherwise I feel isoverstocked with troops needed in the Soudan and inthe Delta

It gives me so much pleasure and confidence to betrekking with you along the path we have followedtogether for so many years

To President Roosevelt I telegraphed


23IX40

I was encouraged by your reception of informationconveyed by Lord Lothian about Dakar It would beagainst our joint interests if strong German submarineand aircraft bases were established there It looks as ifthere might be a stiff fight Perhaps not but anyhoworders have been given to ram it through We should bedelighted if you would send some American warships toMonrovia and Freetown and I hope by that time tohave Dakar ready for your call But what really matters


now is that you should put it across the FrenchGovernment that a war declaration would be very badindeed for them in all that concerns United States IfVichy declares war that is the same thing as Germanyand Vichy possessions in the Western Hemispheremust be considered potentially German possessions

Many thanks also for your hint about invasion Weare all ready for them I am very glad to hear about therifles

It is not necessary here to narrate in detail all thathappened during the three days in which Dakar wasattacked These deserve their place in military chroniclesand are a further good example of bad luck Themeteorologists at the Air Ministry had of course carefullystudied climatic conditions on the West African coast Along survey of records reveals uniform regular brightsunlight and clear weather at this season of the year OnSeptember 23 when the Anglo-French armada approachedthe fortress with de Gaulle and his French ships well in thevan fog reigned supreme We had hoped since the greatmajority of the population French and native was on ourside that the appearance of all these ships with the Britishlying far back on the horizon would have decided the actionof the Governor It soon proved however that the Vichypartisans were masters and there can be no doubt that thearrival of the cruisers with their troops had blotted out anyhope of Dakar joining the Free French movement DeGaullersquos two aeroplanes landed on the local airfield andtheir pilots were immediately arrested One of them had onhis person a list of the leading Free French adherents DeGaullersquos emissaries sent under the Tricolour and the whiteflag were rebuffed and others who entered later in alaunch were fired upon and one of them wounded All


hearts were hardened and the British Fleet approachedthrough the mist to within five thousand yards At 10 AM aharbour battery opened fire on one of our wing destroyersThe fire was returned and the engagement soon becamegeneral The destroyers Inglefield and Foresight wereslightly damaged and the Cumberland was struck in theengine-room and had to quit One French submarine wasbombed by an aircraft at periscope depth and one Frenchdestroyer set on fireThere is an age-long argument about ships versus fortsNelson said that a six-gun battery could fight a hundred-gunship-of-the-line Mr Balfour in the Dardanelles inquiry saidin 1916 ldquoIf the ship has guns which can hit the fort atranges where the fort cannot reply the duel is notnecessarily so unequalrdquo On this occasion the British Fleetwith proper spotting could in theory engage and after acertain number of rounds destroy the Dakar batteries of 94-inch guns at 27000 yards But the Vichy forces had at thistime also the battleship Richelieu which proved capable offiring two-gun salvos from fifteen-inch artillery This had tobe taken into account by the British Admiral Above all therewas the fog The firing therefore died away at about 1130and all British and Free French ships retiredIn the afternoon General de Gaulle tried to land his troopsat Rufisque but the fog and the confusion had now becomeso dense that the attempt was abandoned By 430 PM thecommanders decided to withdraw the troopships andresume the operation next day The signal with thisinformation reached London at 719 PM and I thereuponsent the following personal message to the commandertimed at fourteen minutes past ten orsquoclock on September 23

Having begun we must go on to the end Stop atnothing


An ultimatum was sent that night to the Governor of Dakarto which reply was made that he would defend the fortressto the last The commanders answered that they intendedcontinuing the operation Visibility was better than on theprevious day but still poor The shore batteries opened onour ships as they closed and Barham and Resolutionengaged Richelieu at 13600 yards Shortly afterwardsDevonshire and Australia engaged a cruiser and adestroyer damaging the latter The bombardment ended atabout ten orsquoclock by which time Richelieu had been hit by afifteen-inch shell as also had Fort Manuel and a lightcruiser was on fire Moreover one enemy submarine whichhad tried to interfere with our approach had been forced tothe surface by a depth charge the crew surrendering Noneof our ships was hit In the afternoon the bombardment wasrenewed for a short time On this occasion Barham was hitfour times without serious damage The bombardment wasinconclusive except to indicate that the defences werestrong and the garrison determined to resistOn September 25 the action was resumed The weatherwas clear and our fleet bombarded at 21000 yardsrsquo rangewhen they were replied to not only by the very accuratecoastal batteries but by double salvos from the fifteen-inchguns of the Richelieu A smoke-screen used by the Dakarcommander baffled our aim Soon after 9 AM thebattleship Resolution was hit by a torpedo from a Vichysubmarine After this the Admiral decided to withdraw toseaward ldquoin view of the condition of the Resolution thecontinued danger from submarines and the great accuracyand determination of the shore defencesrdquoMeanwhile the Defence Committee which met at 10 AMwithout me had formed the opinion that no pressure shouldbe brought to bear on the commanders to take any action


against their better judgment The Cabinet met at 1130 AM and news of the results of the morningrsquos operationsreached us during the meeting On these tidings it seemedclear that the matter had been pressed as far as prudenceand our resources would allow Several good ships hadbeen severely damaged It was obvious that Dakar wouldbe defended to the death No one could be sure that thefierce passions of protracted fighting would not provoke aFrench declaration of war from Vichy We therefore after apainful discussion were all agreed to push no moreAccordingly I sent the following telegram (127 PMSeptember 25) to the commanders

On all the information now before us includingdamage to Resolution we have decided that theenterprise against Dakar should be abandoned theobvious evil consequences being faced Unlesssomething has happened which we do not know whichmakes you wish to attempt landing in force you shouldforthwith break off You should inform us ldquoMostImmediaterdquo whether you concur but unless the positionhas entirely changed in our favour you should notactually begin landing till you receive our reply

Assuming enterprise abandoned we shall endeav-our to cover Duala by naval force but we cannotsafeguard de Gaullersquos forces [if they remain] atBathurst Question of reinforcing Freetown with troopsis being considered Instructions regarding disposal ofremainder of forces will be given on receipt of yourreply

The commanders made the following reply

Concur in breaking off



25IX40

I much regret we had to abandon Dakar enterpriseVichy got in before us and animated defence withpartisans and gunnery experts All friendly elementswere gripped and held down Several of our ships werehit and to persist with landing in force would have tiedus to an undue commitment when you think of what wehave on our hands already

In the three daysrsquo bombardment no British ships were sunkbut the battleship Resolution was disabled for severalmonths and two destroyers sustained damage whichrequired considerable repairs in home dockyards TwoVichy submarines were sunk the crew of one being savedtwo destroyers were burnt out and beached and thebattleship Richelieu was hit by a fifteen-inch shell anddamaged by two near misses of two-hundred-fifty-poundbombs There was of course no means at Dakar ofrepairing this formidable vessel which had already beenrendered temporarily immobile in July and it could now bedefinitely dismissed as a hostile factor from our calculationsIt is interesting to note the changes of rocircle of the WarCabinet and of its commanders in the enterprise Thecommanders were at first by no means enthusiastic andGeneral Irwin protected himself by a lengthy reasonedmemorandum to the VCIGS in which all the difficultieswere stressed After the expedition had got south of theCanary Islands the French cruiser squadron with itsreinforcements of Vichy partisans carrying with it inphysical as well as moral form the authority of the FrenchRepublic slipped through the Straits of Gibraltar I had no


doubt from that moment that the situation had beentransformed and the War Cabinet on my advice supportedby the Chiefs of the Staff agreed that we should stop theenterprise while time remained and no loss had beenincurred and no failure would be exposedThen the commanders on the spot came forward with theirstrong desire to take action and the War Cabinet quiterightly in my view felt that the commanders should be thejudges and be given a free hand Accordingly the attemptwas made and it was immediately apparent by the efficientand vehement resistance of Dakar that the War Cabinetwere right and rightly advisedAlthough the fighting at Dakar had been far more seriousthan had been expected we were not wrong in ourjudgment that the Vichy Government would not declare warupon Great Britain They contented themselves with airretaliation upon Gibraltar from North Africa On September24 and 25 successive raids were made upon the harbourand dockyard in the first fifty bombs were dropped and inthe second in which about a hundred aircraft took part fourtimes as many The French aviators did not seem to havetheir hearts in the business and most of the bombs fell inthe sea Damage was negligible and no one was hurt Ouranti-aircraft batteries shot down three aircraft Fighting atDakar having ended in a Vichy success the incident wastacitly treated as ldquoquitsrdquoNo blame attached to the British naval and militarycommanders and both were constantly employed until theend of the war the Admiral attaining the highest distinctionIt was one of my rules that errors towards the enemy mustbe lightly judged They were quite right to try if with theirknowledge on the spot they thought they could carry thematter through and the fact that they underestimated the


effect produced on the Vichy garrison by the arrival of thecruisers and their reinforcements was in no way countedagainst them Of General de Gaulle I said in the House ofCommons that his conduct and bearing on this occasionhad made my confidence in him greater than everThe story of the Dakar episode deserves close studybecause it illustrates in a high degree not only theunforeseeable accidents of war but the interplay of militaryand political forces and the difficulties of combinedoperations especially where allies are involved To theworld at large it seemed a glaring example ofmiscalculation confusion timidity and muddle In theUnited States where special interest was taken on accountof the proximity of Dakar to the American continent therewas a storm of unfavourable criticism The AustralianGovernment was distressed At home there were manycomplaints of faulty war direction I decided however thatno explanations should be offered and Parliamentrespected my wish3

In retrospect a brighter view may perhaps be taken of theseevents Students of naval history may be struck by theresemblance of this affair to one which occurred nearlythree centuries ago In 1655 Cromwell despatched a jointnaval and military expedition to seize San Domingo in theWest Indies The attack did not succeed but thecommanders instead of returning empty-handed turnedfailure into success by going on to capture JamaicaAlthough we failed at Dakar we succeeded in arresting theonward progress of the French cruisers and frustrating theirdetermined efforts to suborn the garrisons in French


Equatorial Africa Within a fortnight General de Gaulle wasenabled to establish himself at Duala in the Cameroonswhich became a rallying-point for the Free French causeFree French activities in these regions played their part notonly in halting the penetration of the Vichy virus but inmaking possible through their control of Central Africa thelater development of our transcontinental air transport routefrom Takoradi to the Middle East


10Mr Edenrsquos Mission October 1940

Retirement of Mr Chamberlain mdash CabinetChanges mdash The Leadership of the ConservativeParty mdash Reasons for My Decision to Accept theVacant Post mdash We Reopen the Burma Road mdashMy Telegram to President Roosevelt mdash Growth ofOur Strength on the Desert Front mdash My Com-plaints About the Middle East Administration mdashMalta Anxieties mdash Mr Eden Flies to the MiddleEast mdash My Appreciation of October 13 1940 mdashMr Edenrsquos Conferences with the Generals atCairo mdash His Report and Requests mdash Our GrowingStrength at Mersa Matruh mdash Proposed Meeting ofMr Eden and General Smuts at Khartoum mdash MyDesire for a Forestalling Offensive Against theItaliansmdashNeed for Better Use of Our Resources inthe Middle East

AT THE BEGINNING of October Mr Chamberlainrsquos healthgot far worse The exploratory operation to which he hadsubjected himself in September and from which he hadreturned so courageously to duty had revealed to thedoctors that he was suffering from cancer and that therewas no surgical remedy He now became aware of the truthand that he would never be able to return to his work Hetherefore placed his resignation in my hands In view of thepressure of events I felt it necessary to make the changesin the Government which have been mentioned in an


earlier chapter Sir John Anderson became Lord Presidentof the Council and presided over the Home AffairsCommittee of the Cabinet Mr Herbert Morrison succeededhim as Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security andSir Andrew Duncan became Minister of Supply Thesechanges were effective on October 3Mr Chamberlain also thought it right to resign theleadership of the Conservative Party and I was invited totake his place I had to ask myself the question ndash aboutwhich there may still be various opinions ndash whether theleadership of one great party was compatible with theposition I held from King and Parliament as Prime Ministerof an Administration composed of and officially supportedby all parties I had no doubt about the answer TheConservative Party possessed a very large majority in theHouse of Commons over all other parties combined Owingto the war conditions no election appeal to the nation wasavailable in case of disagreement or deadlock I shouldhave found it impossible to conduct the war if I had had toprocure the agreement in the compulsive days of crisis andduring long years of adverse and baffling struggle not onlyof the leaders of the two minority parties but of the leaderof the Conservative majority Whoever had been chosenand whatever his self-denying virtues he would have hadthe real political power For me there would have been onlythe executive responsibilityThese arguments do not apply in the same degree in timeof peace but I do not feel I could have borne such a trialsuccessfully in war Moreover in dealing with the Labourand Liberal Parties in the coalition it was always animportant basic fact that as Prime Minister and at this timeleader of the largest party I did not depend upon their votesand I could in the ultimate issue carry on in Parliamentwithout them I therefore accepted the position of leader of


the Conservative Party which was pressed upon me and Iam sure that without it and all the steady loyalties whichattached to it I should not have been able to discharge mytask until victory was won Lord Halifax who was the mostprobable alternative choice of the party if I had declinedhimself proposed the motion which was unanimouslyadopted

The summer had crashed its way along with massiverending shocks but with growing assurance of survivalAutumn and winter plunged us into a maze ofcomplications less mortal but more puzzling The invasionchallenge had definitely weakened The Battle of Britain inthe air was won We had bent the German beam OurHome Army and Home Guard had grown vastly morepowerful The equinoctial gales of October stretched roughcapricious hands across the Channel and the Narrow SeasAll the arguments from which I had formerly drawn comfortwere justified and strengthened In the Far East the dangerof a Japanese declaration of war seemed to have recededThey had waited to see what would happen about theinvasion and nothing had happened The Japanese warlords had looked for a certainty But certainties are rare inwar If they had not thought it worth while to strike in Julywhy should they do so now when the life of the BritishEmpire burned brighter and fiercer and world conditionswere less favourable to them We felt ourselves strongenough to reopen the Burma Road when its three monthsrsquoclosure had elapsed The Japanese were experienced insea war and probably thought about it along the same linesas the British Admiralty Nonetheless it was not withoutanxiety that the decision to open the Burma Road and allowsupplies to flow along it into China was taken In this broad


measurement of the unknowable our judgment was notproved wrongI was glad to telegraph to the President news which I wassure would be agreeable to him and to the United States


4X40

After prolonged consideration of all the issuesinvolved we today decided to let the Burma Road bereopened when the three monthsrsquo period expires onOctober 17 The Foreign Secretary and I will announcethis to Parliament on Tuesday 8th I shall say that ourhopes of a just settlement being reached betweenJapan and China have not borne fruit and that theThree-Power Pact revives the Anti-Comintern Pact of1939 and has a clear pointer against the United StatesI know how difficult it is for you to say anything whichwould commit the United States to any hypotheticalcourse of action in the Pacific But I venture to askwhether at this time a simple action might not speaklouder than words Would it not be possible for you tosend an American squadron the bigger the better topay a friendly visit to Singapore There they would bewelcomed in a perfectly normal and rightful way Ifdesired occasion might be taken of such a visit for atechnical discussion of naval and military problems inthose and Philippine waters and the Dutch might beinvited to join Anything in this direction would have amarked deterrent effect upon a Japanese declaration ofwar upon us over the Burma Road opening I should bevery grateful if you would consider action along theselines as it might play an important part in preventingthe spreading of the war

In spite of the Dakar fiasco the Vichy Government isendeavouring to enter into relations with us whichshows how the tides are flowing in France now thatthey feel the German weight and see we are able tohold our own


Although our position in the air is growing steadilystronger both actually and relatively our need foraircraft is urgent Several important factories have beenseriously injured and the rate of production is hamperedby air alarms On the other hand our losses in pilotshave been less than we expected because in fightingover our own soil a very large proportion get downsafely or only wounded When your officers were overhere we were talking in terms of pilots We are nowbeginning to think that aeroplanes will be the limitingfactor so far as the immediate future is concerned

I cannot feel that the invasion danger is past Thegent has taken off his clothes and put on his bathing-suit but the water is getting colder and there is anautumn nip in the air We are maintaining the utmostvigilance

These welcome events at opposite ends of the worldcleared the way for stronger action in the Middle EastEvery nerve had to be strained to make headway againstItaly whose movements were slower than I had expectedStrong reinforcements had reached General Wavell Thetwo tank regiments had arrived in the desert GeneralMaitland-Wilson who commanded the ldquoArmy of the Nilerdquoas it was now called formed a high opinion of thepossibilities of the ldquoMatildasrdquo as the infantry or ldquoIrdquo tankswere nick-named by the troops Our defence position atMersa Matruh was now far more solid and ndash though this Idid not yet knew ndash new thoughts began to stir in Staff andplanning circles at the Middle East Headquarters Obviouslyour next main task was to strengthen our forces in theMiddle East and especially in the Western Desert bothfrom Britain and from India


I was still in argument with the Admiralty about militaryconvoys attempting the passage of the Mediterranean Isaying ldquoYou can now see that we ought to have tried itrdquoand they ldquoThere was not so much hurry after allrdquo I stillremained extremely dissatisfied with the distribution of ourforces already in the Middle East and with the disparity asI judged it between ration and fighting strength I fearedgreatly for Malta I pressed General Wavell and theSecretary of State both directly and through the Chiefs ofStaff on all these points To Mr Eden I wrote


24IX40

There is no difference between us in principle butthe application of the principle raises issues of detailand this is especially true of the denudation of thisisland in the face of the imminent threat of invasionMeanwhile the General Staff continue to press fordiversions from the Middle East such as the SeventhAustralian Division to be used for garrisoning the Malaypeninsula Now the two Indian brigades are to beemployed in these jungles against a possible war withJapan and a still more unlikely Japanese siege ofSingapore The paper on Indian reinforcements wasconsidered last night by me and the Chiefs of the StaffYou will see in it that a division is to be provided forMalaya another for Basra and a corps for Iraq thusabsorbing all the Indian reinforcements available in1941 This geographical distribution or dispersion of ourforces shows the ideas prevailing which are altogethererroneous in a strategic sense However it wasexplained to me that although these forces wereearmarked for particular theatres they could all go tothe Middle East if required I therefore agreed to wordsbeing inserted making this clear Nonetheless the


impression produced by the paragraph dispersing thesedivisions without regard to war needs made anunfavourable impression upon me

We have next to consider the increasing waste oftroops in Kenya and the continued waste in PalestineSome improvement has been made in Palestine butKenya on the contrary is at this moment to have amountain battery sent there instead of to the Soudan Ifear that when General Smuts goes there he willnaturally be influenced by the local situation However Ihope to keep in touch with him by cable

Lastly there is the shocking waste of British Regulartroops on mere police duty in the Canal Zone in Cairoand at Alexandria and the general slackness of theMiddle East Command in concentrating the maximumfor battle and in narrowing the gap between rationstrength and fighting strength I have not had anyanswer to my request for figures on this point

My idea like yours is to gather the strongest armyin the Middle East possible in the next few months andI have indicated on other papers the number ofdivisions I hope can be assembled there But I think thefirst thing would be for the War Office and the EgyptianCommand to make the best use possible of the verylarge number of troops they have already and forwhich we are paying heavily

Further I am much disquieted about the position atMalta It is now agreed that two battalions shall be sentas reinforcements but after how much haggling andboggling and excuses that they could not beaccommodated in the island Have you read GeneralDobbiersquos appreciation and his statement that he has hisbattalions all spread on fifteen-mile fronts each with noreserves not already allocated to the defence ofaerodromes Do you realise there is no command ofthe sea at Malta and that it might be attacked at anytime by an expeditionary force of twenty or thirtythousand men from Italy supported by the ItalianFleet Yet it was proposed that these two battalionsshould go to Freetown to complete the brigade therealthough no enemy can possibly attack Freetown whilewe have the command of the Atlantic Ocean You will I


am sure excuse my putting some of these points toyou because they illustrate tendencies which appear ill-related to the very scheme of war which you have inmind


6X40

Whenever the Fleet is moving from Alexandria to theCentral Mediterranean reinforcements should becarried in to Malta which I consider to be in grievousdanger at the present time These reinforcementsshould be found by taking battalions from the CanalZone and replacing them by dismounted Yeomanry orAustralian details now in Palestine or by South Africanunits presently to be moved from Kenya Pray let mehave proposals on these lines and make sure that atleast one battalion goes to Malta on the next occasionWe cannot waste Regular battalions on internal securityduties in Egypt If they were needed for the Field Armythey would of course be irremovable but that is notwhat they are being used for

I was in such close agreement with the Secretary of Statefor War and felt so much the need of having our views putforward on the spot instead of through endless telegramsthat I now asked him whether he would not make apersonal inspection of the Middle East He was delightedand started immediately He made a thorough tour of thewhole theatre In his absence I took over the War OfficeI also at this time laid the whole military situation as I saw itbefore the Chiefs of Staff



13X40

1 First in urgency is the reinforcement of Malta ndash

(1) by further Hurricane aircraft flown there ascan best be managed

(2) by the convoy now being prepared whichshould carry the largest anti-aircraft outfit possibleas well as the battalions and the battery ndash Iunderstand another MT ship can be madeavailable

(3) by one or better still two more battalionsreleased from police duty on the Canal or inPalestine and carried to Malta when next theFleet moves thither from Alexandria GeneralDobbiersquos latest appreciation bears out thegrievous need of strengthening the garrisonEvery effort should be made to meet his needsobserving that once Malta becomes a thorn in theItalian side the enemyrsquos force may be turnedupon it The movement of these reinforcementsshould therefore precede any marked activity fromMalta

(4) Even three infantry tanks at Malta would beimportant not only in actual defence but as adeterrent if it were known that they were thereSome mock-up tanks also might be exhibitedwhere they would be detected from the air

2 The movement of the Fleet to Malta must awaitthis strengthening of the air defences It is however amost needful and profoundly advantageous step Iwelcome the possibility of basing even light forces uponMalta as they immediately increase its security Iunderstand it is intended they shall sally forth by dayand only lie in harbour as a rule at night It must beobserved that a strong ship like the Valiant can farbetter withstand a hit from a bomb than light craft and


in addition she carries a battery of twenty very high-class AA guns Apart from the stake being higher it isnot seen why if light forces can be exposed in MaltaHarbour well-armoured and well-armed ships cannotuse it too The multiple aerial mine UP weapon givesconsiderable security against dive-bombing

I should be glad to be more fully informed by theAdmiralty about this

Occasional visits by the whole Battle Fleet would bean immense deterrent on hostile attack and also athreat to the [enemy] Libyan communications while theylast

Let me have the number of AA guns now inposition and the whole maximum content [of them in]the new convoy together with estimated dates for theirbeing mounted

3 Relations with Vichy We cannot accept theposition that we must yield to the wishes of Vichy out offear lest they make air raids upon Gibraltar for therewould be no end to that We must reassert ourblockade of the Straits dealing with vessels whetherescorted or unescorted though without violatingSpanish territorial waters We should assemble asufficient force at Gibraltar for this purpose at theearliest date possible Meanwhile we must maintain asgood a blockade of Dakar as possible and protectDuala etc from a counter-stroke by the Frenchcruisers in Dakar The conversations with Vichy if theytake place may reach a modus vivendi fallingsomewhat short of these desiderata Of course if wecould be assured that Vichy or part of Vichy wasgenuinely moving in our direction we could ease up onthem to a very large extent It seems probable that theywill be increasingly inclined to move as we desire and Ipersonally do not believe that hard pressure from uswill prevent this favourable movement It is becomingmore difficult every day for Vichy to lead France intowar with us We must not be too much afraid ofchecking this process because the tide in our favourwill master and overwhelm the disturbing eddies of theblockade and possible sea incidents I do not believethat any trouble will arise with the French which will


prevent the impending movement of our convoy toMalta The chance is there but it is remote and must befaced

4 The greatest prize open to Bomber Command isthe disabling of Bismarck and Tirpitz If Bismarck couldbe set back for three or four months the King George Vcould go to the Eastern Mediterranean to work up andcould therefore play a decisive part in the occupation ofMalta by the Fleet This would speedily transform thestrategic situation in the Mediterranean

5 Should October pass without invasion we shouldbegin the reinforcement of the Middle East by the Caperoute to the utmost extent our shipping permitssending as arranged the armoured units theAustralians and New Zealanders in November anotherBritish division before Christmas and at least four moreduring January February and March All this would bein addition to the necessary drafts Let me know howfar your present programme of sailings conforms to this

6 The time has also come for a further strongreinforcement of the Middle East by bombers and byfighters I should be glad to know how far the Chiefs ofthe Staff would be prepared to go observing thatthough the risk is very great so also is the need

7 Let me see the programme for reinforcing theMediterranean Fleet during the next six months Itshould be possible by the end of the year to send threeflotillas of destroyers to the Eastern Mediterranean andone additional to Gibraltar If King George V must bekept to watch Bismarck Nelson or Rodney should go toAlexandria and either Barham or Queen ElizabethWhat cruiser reinforcements are contemplated Will itbe possible to send Formidable [an aircraft-carrier]thither also and when

8 Agreeably to the despatch of divisions to theMiddle East the Home Army and the Home Guard willbe developed to fill the gap A minimum of twelvemobile divisions must lie in reserve [at home] apartfrom the troops on the beaches at any time

9 It should be possible also to provide by the end ofJuly a striking force for amphibious warfare of sixdivisions of which two should be armoured The


various alternative plans for the employment of such aforce are being studied

Meanwhile Mr Eden was on his journey He ldquowas deeplyimpressed with the rapid progress in recent work on thedefences of Gibraltarrdquo which he said had ldquobeen drivenforward with energy determination and ingenuityrdquo Themorale of the troops was high and the garrison confidentHe was more anxious about the position at Malta andpressed for at least another battalion and a battery oftwenty-five-pounders together of course with continued airreinforcements The Governor General Dobbie thought itimportant that an offensive policy which would provokeretaliation should be avoided at Malta until April 1941 bywhich time the various programmes of reinforcement inaircraft and anti-aircraft guns would be fulfilledOn the 15th Mr Eden reached Cairo He held searchingdiscussions with Generals Wavell and Maitland-Wilsonwho commanded the Desert Army There was goodconfidence about repelling an Italian offensive GeneralWilson estimated that the maximum strength the Italianscould deploy against Matruh was three divisions thelimiting factors being maintenance particularly water andcommunications Against this he had the 7th ArmouredDivision with its newly arrived tank regiments the 4thIndian Division the Matruh garrison of five rifle battalions amachine-gun battalion and eight or nine batteries The 16thBritish Brigade Group and the New Zealand Brigade Grouphad arrived from Palestine An Australian Brigade Group laywest of Alexandria a second Australian brigade wasmoving thither There was also a Polish brigade Theconcentration of these forces wrote Eden was considered


by General Wilson to be sufficient to meet the threat of theenemy and to enable him to defeat it provided he wasassured of adequate air support Eden added thatinundations for which I had asked had been carried out andanti-tank obstacles created He sent a lengthy list ofrequirements particularly aircraft This last was easierasked for than given at the time when the bombing ofLondon was rising to its peak He urged that a company ofldquoIrdquo tanks should be included in the November convoydestination Port Soudan in order to take the offensiveagainst the Italian threat from Kassala on the Blue NileEden also raised at Cairo a pertinent question What actionwould be taken by our forces supposing the Italian attackdid not take place Upon this the generals first spoke oftheir own offensive hopes Eden cabled

It has emerged from our discussion this morningthat infantry tanks [Matildas] can play a much moreimportant role in the fighting in this theatre than we hadthought General Wavell would much like a secondbattalion of ldquoIrdquo tanks and a Brigade Recovery Sectionespecially important to maintain full serviceability

Although no reference had been made in the Secretary ofState for Warrsquos telegram to our taking the offensive I wasvery glad to learn all the good news and urged him tocontinue his inspection


16X40

I have read all your telegrams with deepest interestand realisation of the value of your visit We areconsidering how to meet your needs Meanwhile


continue to master the local situation Do not hurry yourreturn

Eden further arranged for a Turkish Mission to join ourArmy and proposed to General Smuts a meeting atKhartoum to discuss the whole situation and particularlyour Soudan offensive project and my complaints about theovercrowding in Kenya This meeting was fixed for October28 a date which later acquired significance I need scarcelyadd that requests for all kinds of equipment including tenthousand rifles to aid the rebellion in Abyssinia and aboveall for anti-tank guns anti-tank rifles anti-aircraft batteriesand air reinforcements flowed to us in a broadeningstream We did our utmost to meet these needs at theexpense of home defence at this time There was not halfenough for everybody and whatever was given to one manhad to be denied or taken from another also in danger MrEden proposed to fly back by Lagos immediately after hisconference at Khartoum preferring to make a full verbalreport of all he had seen and done I was so muchencouraged by the picture as to become hungry for a turnto the offensive in the Western Desert I thereforetelegraphed to him

26X40Before leaving you should consider searchingly with

your Generals possibilities of a forestalling offensive Icannot form any opinion about it from here but if anyother course was open it would not be sound strategyto await the concentration and deployment ofoverwhelming forces I thought the existing plans forrepelling an attack by a defensive battle and counter-stroke very good but what happens if the enemy do notventure until the Germans arrive in strength Do notsend any answer to this but examine it thoroughly anddiscuss it on return


Please examine in detail the field state of the MiddleEastern Army in order to secure the largest proportionof fighting men and units for the great numbers on ourration strength Study improvisation from White detailsfor the Canal Zone and internal security All Britishbattalions should be mobile and capable of taking partin battle I fear that the proportion of fighting comparedto ration strength is worse in the Middle East thananywhere else Please do not be content with the stockanswers Even Army Ordnance and Service Corpsdepots and other technical details can all help inkeeping order where they are and should be organisedfor use in an emergency Not only the best but thesecond and third best must be made to play their part

Thus on the main issue our minds at home and on the spotwere moving forward in harmony


11Relations with Vichy and Spain

Unity with FrancemdashAmerican and CanadianContacts with Vichy mdash Difficulties of General deGaullemdashMy Broadcast to the French PeopleOctober 21 mdash Its Lasting Effect mdash Need to Insistupon EssentialsmdashThe Toulon FleetmdashPresidentRooseveltrsquos InterventionmdashAdmiralty AnxietiesmdashCorrespondence with the President NovembermdashA Firm Policy About the French Battleships mdashTelegram to General de Gaulle mdash PeacutetainrsquosAssurances to the PresidentmdashBritain and Spainmdash Sir Samuel Hoare Appointed AmbassadormdashGeneral Francorsquos PolicymdashDangers of SpanishHostility mdash Algeciras Bay and the Neutral Groundmdash Artful Diplomacy of the Spanish GovernmentTowards Hitler mdash Francorsquos Dilatory TacticsmdashSuntildeerrsquos MissionmdashRibbentroprsquos Visit to RomeSeptember 19 mdash Increasing Spanish ClaimsmdashHitler and Mussolini at the Brenner Pass October4 mdashHitler and Franco at HendayeOctober 23 mdashHitler and Peacutetain at Montoire October 24 mdashCollaboration Against BritainmdashMy PersonalViews November 14 mdash Peacutetain Breaks with LavalmdashHitlerrsquos Disappointment with SpainmdashFrancorsquosDuplicity and Ingratitude Both to Hitler andMussolinimdashMy Telegram to Sir Samuel Hoare mdashAnd to the President


IN SPITE OF THE ARMISTICE and Oran and the ending ofour diplomatic relations with Vichy I never ceased to feel aunity with France People who have not been subjected tothe personal stresses which fell upon prominent Frenchmenin the awful ruin of their country should be careful in theirjudgments of individuals It is beyond the scope of this storyto enter the maze of French politics But I felt sure that theFrench nation would do its best for the common causeaccording to the facts presented to it When they were toldthat their only salvation lay in following the advice of theillustrious Marshal Peacutetain and that England which hadgiven them so little help would soon be conquered or givein very little choice was offered to the masses But I wassure they wanted us to win and that nothing would givethem more joy than to see us continue the struggle withvigour It was our first duty to give loyal support to Generalde Gaulle in his valiant constancy On August 7 I signed amilitary agreement with him which dealt with practicalneeds His stirring addresses were made known to Franceand the world by the British broadcasts The sentence ofdeath which the Peacutetain Government passed upon himglorified his name We did everything in our power to aidhim and magnify his movementAt the same time it was necessary to keep in touch not onlywith France but even with Vichy I therefore always tried tomake the best of them I was very glad when at the end ofthe year the United States sent an Ambassador to Vichy ofso much influence and character as Admiral Leahy whowas himself so close to the President I repeatedlyencouraged Mr Mackenzie King to keep his representativethe skilful and accomplished M Dupuy at Vichy Here atleast was a window upon a courtyard to which we had noother access On July 25 I sent a Minute to the ForeignSecretary in which I said


I want to promote a kind of collusive conspiracy inthe Vichy Government whereby certain members ofthat Government perhaps with the consent of thosewho remain will levant to North Africa in order to makea better bargain for France from the North African shoreand from a position of independence For this purpose Iwould use both food and other inducements as well asthe obvious arguments

It was in this spirit that I was to receive in October a certainM Rougier who represented himself as acting on thepersonal instructions of Marshal Peacutetain This was notbecause I or my colleagues had any respect for MarshalPeacutetain but only because no road that led to France shouldbe incontinently barred Our consistent policy was to makethe Vichy Government and its members feel that so far aswe were concerned it was never too late to mendWhatever had happened in the past France was ourcomrade in tribulation and nothing but actual war betweenus should prevent her being our partner in victoryThis mood was hard upon de Gaulle who had risked alland kept the flag flying but whose handful of followersoutside France could never claim to be an effectivealternative French Government Nevertheless we did ourutmost to increase his influence authority and power Hefor his part naturally resented any kind of truck on our partwith Vichy and thought we ought to be exclusively loyal tohim He also felt it to be essential to his position before theFrench people that he should maintain a proud and haughtydemeanour towards ldquoperfidious Albionrdquo although an exiledependent upon our protection and dwelling in our midstHe had to be rude to the British to prove to French eyesthat he was not a British puppet He certainly carried outthis policy with perseverance He even one day explainedthis technique to me and I fully comprehended the


extraordinary difficulties of his problem I always admiredhis massive strength

On October 21 I made an appeal by radio to the Frenchpeople I took great pains to prepare this short address asit had to be given in French I was not satisfied with theliteral translation at first provided which did not give thespirit of what I could say in English and could feel in Frenchbut M Dejean one of the Free French Staff in Londonmade a far better rendering which I rehearsed severaltimes and delivered from the basement of the Annexeamid the crashes of an air raid

FrenchmenFor more than thirty years in peace and war I have

marched with you and I am marching still along thesame road To-night I speak to you at your firesideswherever you may be or whatever your fortunes are Irepeat the prayer around the louis drsquoor ldquoDieu proteacutege laFrancerdquo Here at home in England under the fire of theBoche we do not forget the ties and links that unite usto France and we are persevering steadfastly and ingood heart in the cause of European freedom and fairdealing for the common people of all countries forwhich with you we drew the sword When goodpeople get into trouble because they are attacked andheavily smitten by the vile and wicked they must bevery careful not to get at loggerheads with one anotherThe common enemy is always trying to bring thisabout and of course in bad luck a lot of things happenwhich play into the enemyrsquos hands We must just makethe best of things as they come along

Here in London which Herr Hitler says he willreduce to ashes and which his aeroplanes are nowbombarding our people are bearing up unflinchinglyOur air force has more than held its own We arewaiting for the long-promised invasion So are the


fishes But of course this for us is only the beginningNow in 1940 in spite of occasional losses we have asever command of the seas In 1941 we shall have thecommand of the air Remember what that means HerrHitler with his tanks and other mechanical weaponsand also by Fifth Column intrigue with traitors hasmanaged to subjugate for the time being most of thefinest races in Europe and his little Italian accompliceis trotting along hopefully and hungrily but ratherwearily and very timidly at his side They both wish tocarve up France and her Empire as if it were a fowl toone a leg to another a wing or perhaps part of thebreast Not only the French Empire will be devoured bythese two ugly customers but Alsace-Lorraine will goonce again under the German yoke and Nice Savoyand Corsica ndash Napoleonrsquos Corsica ndash will be torn fromthe fair realm of France But Herr Hitler is not thinkingonly of stealing other peoplersquos territories or flinginggobbets of them to his little confederate I tell you trulywhat you must believe when I say this evil man thismonstrous abortion of hatred and defeat is resolved onnothing less than the complete wiping out of the Frenchnation and the disintegration of its whole life andfuture By all kinds of sly and savage means he isplotting and working to quench for ever the fountain ofcharacteristic French culture and of French inspirationto the world All Europe if he has his way will bereduced to one uniform Bocheland to be exploitedpillaged and bullied by his Nazi gangsters You willexcuse my speaking frankly because this is not a timeto mince words It is not defeat that France will now bemade to suffer at German hands but the doom ofcomplete obliteration Army Navy Air Force religionlaw language culture institutions literature historytradition all are to be effaced by the brute strength of atriumphant army and the scientific low-cunning of aruthless Police Force

Frenchmen ndash re-arm your spirits before it is too lateRemember how Napoleon said before one of hisbattles ldquoThese same Prussians who are so boastful to-day were three to one at Jena and six to one atMontmirailrdquo Never will I believe that the soul of France


is dead Never will I believe that her place amongst thegreatest nations of the world has been lost for ever Allthese schemes and crimes of Herr Hitlerrsquos are bringingupon him and upon all who belong to his system aretribution which many of us will live to see The story isnot yet finished but it will not be so long We are on histrack and so are our friends across the Atlantic Oceanand your friends across the Atlantic Ocean If he cannotdestroy us we will surely destroy him and all his gangand all their works Therefore have hope and faith forall will come right

Now what is it we British ask of you in this presenthard and bitter time What we ask at this moment inour struggle to win the victory which we will share withyou is that if you cannot help us at least you will nothinder us Presently you will be able to weight the armthat strikes for you and you ought to do so But evennow we believe that Frenchmen wherever they may befeel their hearts warm and a proud blood tingle in theirveins when we have some success in the air or on thesea or presently ndash for that will come ndash upon the land

Remember we shall never stop never weary andnever give in and that our whole people and Empirehave vowed themselves to the task of cleansingEurope from the Nazi pestilence and saving the worldfrom the new Dark Ages Do not imagine as theGerman-controlled wireless tells you that we Englishseek to take your ships and colonies We seek to beatthe life and soul out of Hitler and Hitlerism That alonethat all the time that to the end We do not covetanything from any nation except their respect ThoseFrenchmen who are in the French Empire and thosewho are in so-called Unoccupied France may see theirway from time to time to useful action I will not go intodetails Hostile ears are listening As for those to whomEnglish hearts go out in full because they see themunder the sharp discipline oppression and spying ofthe Hun ndash as to those Frenchmen in the occupiedregions to them I say when they think of the future letthem remember the words which Gambetta that greatFrenchman uttered after 1870 about the future of


France and what was to come ldquoThink of it alwaysspeak of it neverrdquo

Good night then Sleep to gather strength for themorning For the morning will come Brightly will it shineon the brave and true kindly upon all who suffer for thecause glorious upon the tombs of heroes Thus willshine the dawn Vive la France Long live also theforward march of the common people in all the landstowards their just and true inheritance and towards thebroader and fuller age

There is no doubt that this appeal went home to the heartsof millions of Frenchmen and to this day I am reminded ofit by men and women of all classes in France who alwaystreat me with the utmost kindness in spite of the hard thingsI had to do ndash sometimes to them ndash for our commonsalvation

Indeed it was necessary to insist upon essentials We couldnot relax the blockade of Europe and particularly of Francewhile they remained under Hitlerrsquos domination Althoughfrom time to time to meet American wishes we allowed afew specified ships with medical stores to pass intoUnoccupied France we did not hesitate to stop and searchall other ships seeking or coming out of French portsWhatever Vichy might do for good or ill we would notabandon de Gaulle or discourage accessions to his growingcolonial domain Above all we would not allow any portionof the French Fleetrsquo now immobilised in French colonialharbours to return to France There were times when theAdmiralty were deeply concerned lest France shoulddeclare war and thus add to their many cares I alwaysbelieved that once we had proved our resolve and ability tofight on indefinitely the spirit of the French people would


never allow the Vichy Government to take so unnatural astep Indeed there was by now a strong enthusiasm andcomradeship for Britain and French hopes grew as themonths passed This was recognised even by M Lavalwhen he presently became Foreign Minister to MarshalPeacutetainAs the autumn drew into winter I was concerned with thedanger of the two great French battleships attempting tomake their way back to Toulon where they could becompleted President Rooseveltrsquos envoy Admiral Leahyhad established intimate relations with Marshal Peacutetain Itwas to Roosevelt therefore that I turned and not in vain


20X40

We hear rumours from various sources that theVichy Government are preparing their ships andcolonial troops to aid the Germans against us I do notmyself believe these reports but if the French Fleet atToulon were turned over to Germany it would be a veryheavy blow It would certainly be a wise precaution MrPresident if you would speak in the strongest terms tothe French Ambassador emphasising the disapproba-tion with which the United States would view such abetrayal of the cause of democracy and freedom Theywill pay great heed in Vichy to such a warning

You will have seen what very heavy losses we havesuffered in the northwestern approaches to our last twoconvoys1 This is due to our shortage of destroyers inthe gap period I mentioned to you Thank God your fiftyare now coming along and some will soon be in actionWe ought to be much better off by the end of the yearas we have a lot of our own anti-U-boat vesselscompleting but naturally we are passing through ananxious and critical period with so many small crafthaving to guard against invasion in the Narrow Waters


and with the very great naval effort we are making inthe Mediterranean and the immense amount of convoywork

The President in consequence sent a very severe personalmessage to the Peacutetain Government about the Toulon FleetldquoThe factrdquo he said ldquothat a Government is a prisoner of warof another Power does not justify such a prisoner in servingits conqueror in operations against its former allyrdquo Hereminded the Marshal of the solemn assurances he hadreceived that the French Fleet would not be surrendered Ifthe French Government attempted to permit the Germansto use the French Fleet in hostile operations against theBritish Fleet such action would constitute a flagrant anddeliberate breach of faith with the United StatesGovernment Any agreement of that character would mostdefinitely wreck the traditional friendship between theFrench and American peoples It would create a wave ofbitter indignation against France in American public opinionand would permanently end all American aid to the Frenchpeople If France pursued such a policy the United Statescould make no effort when the proper time came to securefor France the retention of her oversea possessions


26X40

Your cable with terms of splendid warning you gavethe French crossed mine to you about a suggestedmessage to Peacutetain Most grateful for what you havealready done but everything still in balance ForeignOffice tell me they have cabled you our latestinformation of German terms which Peacutetain is said to beresisting In this connection the surrender of bases onthe African shores for air or U-boats would be just asbad as surrender of ships In particular Atlantic bases in


bad hands would be a menace to you and a grievousembarrassment to us I hope therefore you will make itclear to the French that your argument about shipsapplies also to the betrayal of bases

In spite of the invasion threats and air attacks of thelast five months we have maintained a continuous flowof reinforcements round the Cape to Middle East aswell as sending modern aircraft and major units of theFleet I do not think the invasion danger is yet at anend but we are now augmenting our easterntransferences The strain is very great in both theatresand all contributions will be thankfully received

At this time the Admiralty were so deeply concerned aboutthe dangers of a rupture with Vichy that they were inclinedto underrate the disadvantages of letting the two Frenchbattleships return to Toulon On this I gave directions

Prime Minister to FirstLord and First SeaLord (From the train)

2XI40

After the defection of France it was considered vitalnot to allow the Jean Bart and the Richelieu to fall intoenemy hands or to reach harbours where they couldbe completed For this purpose you attacked theRichelieu and claimed to have disabled her to a verylarge extent The Jean Bart is in an unfinished stateand neither ship can be fitted for action in the Africanharbours on the Atlantic where they now lie It is ourdecided policy not to allow these ships to pass into badhands I was therefore surprised to hear the First SeaLord demur to the idea that the Jean Bart should beprevented from returning to Toulon and argue in thesense that she might safely be allowed to do so Toulonhas always been judged by us to be an enemy-controlled harbour It was for this reason that the mostextreme efforts were made unhappily without successto prevent the Strasbourg reaching Toulon I cannot


reconcile this action with the apparent readiness toallow the Jean Bart to proceed there

The Admiralty is held responsible for preventing thereturn of either of these two ships to French ports onthe Atlantic or to the Mediterranean where they couldbe repaired and completed at Toulon and then at anytime betrayed to the Germans or captured by them

Prime Minister toForeign Secretary(From the train)

2XI40

I do not know how imminent the movement of theJean Bart may be I have informed the Admiralty thatthey are responsible for stopping her from entering theMediterranean It would seem therefore very importantthat you should give a clear warning to Vichy that theship in question will be stopped and if necessary sunkif she attempts to go either to a German-controlled portin the Atlantic or to a Mediterranean port which may atany time fall into German hands My private office inLondon is sending you a copy of the Minute I have sentto the First Lord and the First Sea Lord


10XI40

1 We have been much disturbed by reports ofintention of French Government to bring Jean Bart andRichelieu to Mediterranean for completion It is difficultto exaggerate [the] potential danger if this were tohappen and so open the way for these ships to fallunder German control We should feel bound to do ourbest to prevent it

2 We conveyed a warning to French Governmentthrough Ambassador at Madrid a few days ago on thefollowing lines ldquoSuch a step would greatly increase thetemptation to the Germans and Italians to seize theFrench Fleet We doubt not the good faith of theFrench Government but their physical ability toimplement their assurances that they will not let theFleet fall into enemy hands We particularly wish to


avoid any clash between British and French navalforces and therefore hope that if they had thought ofmoving the ships they will now refrain from doing sordquo

3 As we said to French Government we should notquestion good faith of assurances but even if weaccept assurances we can feel no security that they willin fact be able to maintain them once the ships are inFrench ports in the power or reach of the enemy and Imust confess that the desire of French Government tobring these ships back if this turns out to be well-founded seems to me to give cause for some suspicion

4 It would be most helpful if you felt able to give afurther warning at Vichy on this matter for if things wentwrong it might well prove of extreme danger for us both

I kept in close touch with General de Gaulle

Prime Minister toGeneral de Gaulle(Libreville)

10XI40

I feel most anxious for consultation with youSituation between France and Britain has changedremarkably since you left A very strong feeling hasgrown throughout France in our favour as it is seenthat we cannot be conquered and that war will go onWe know Vichy Government is deeply alarmed by thevery stern pressure administered to them by UnitedStates On the other hand Laval and revengeful Darlanare trying to force French declaration of war against usand rejoice in provoking minor naval incidents Wehave hopes of Weygand in Africa and no one mustunderrate advantage that would follow if he wererallied We are trying to arrive at some modus vivendiwith Vichy which will minimise the risk of incidents andwill enable favourable forces in France to develop Wehave told them plainly that if they bomb Gibraltar or


take other aggressive action we shall bomb Vichy andpursue the Vichy Government wherever it chooses togo So far we have had no response You will see howimportant it is that you should be here I therefore hopeyou will be able to tidy up at Libreville and come homeas soon as possible Let me know your plans

On November 13 the President replied to my message ofthe 10th about the possible transfer of the Jean Bart andRichelieu to the Mediterranean for completion He hadimmediately instructed the American Chargeacute drsquoAffaires atVichy to obtain a confirmation or denial of this report and topoint out that it was of vital interest to the Government ofthe United States that these vessels should remain instations where they would not be exposed to control orseizure by a Power which might employ them to ends inconflict with the interests of the United States in the futureof the French Fleet Any such step on the part of Francewould inevitably seriously prejudice Franco-Americanrelations He also offered to buy the ships from the FrenchGovernment if they would sell themThe President also informed me that Peacutetain had stated tothe American Chargeacute drsquoAffaires that the most solemnassurances had been given by him that the French Fleetincluding the two battleships would never fall into thehands of Germany The Marshal said he had given thoseassurances to the United States Government to the BritishGovernment and even to me personally

Again I reiterate them [he said] These ships will beused to defend the possessions and territories ofFrance Unless we are attacked by the British they willnever be used against England Even if I wanted to Icannot sell those ships It is impossible under the termsof the armistice and even if it were possible it wouldnever be permitted by the Germans France is underGermanyrsquos heel and impotent I would gladly sell them


if I were free on condition that they be returned to usafter the war and save them for France in this way Imust repeat I have neither the right nor the possibility ofselling them under present circumstances

Marshal Peacutetain had made this statement with greatseriousness but with no sign of either surprise orresentment at the suggestion President Roosevelt hadfurther instructed the Chargeacute drsquoAffaires to inform MarshalPeacutetain that the American offer remained open both aboutthese vessels as well as about any others in the FrenchNavyOn November 23 the President sent me furtherreassurances Marshal Peacutetain had stated categorically thathe would keep the vessels now at Dakar and Casablancawhere they were and that if there was any change in thisplan he would give the President previous notice

The attitude of Spain was of even more consequence to usthan that of Vichy with which it was so closely linked Spainhad much to give and even more to take away We hadbeen neutral in the sanguinary Spanish Civil War GeneralFranco owed little or nothing to us but much ndash perhaps lifeitself ndash to the Axis Powers Hitler and Mussolini had come tohis aid He disliked and feared Hitler He liked and did notfear Mussolini At the beginning of the World War Spainhad declared and since then strictly observed neutrality Afertile and needful trade flowed between our two countriesand the iron ore from Biscayan ports was important for ourmunitions But now in May the ldquoTwilight Warrdquo was over Themight of Nazi Germany was proved The French front wasbroken The Allied armies of the North were in peril It wasat this moment that I had gladly offered to a former


colleague displaced by the Ministerial changes a newsphere of responsibility for which his gifts andtemperament were suited On May 17 Sir Samuel Hoarehad been appointed Ambassador to Spain and certainly Ibelieve that no one could have carried out better thiswearing delicate and cardinal five yearsrsquo mission Thus wewere very well represented at Madrid not only by theAmbassador and by the Counsellor of the Embassy MrArthur Yencken2 but also by the Naval Attacheacute CaptainHillgarth who had retired from the Navy and lived inMajorca but now returned to duty equipped with profoundknowledge of Spanish affairsGeneral Francorsquos policy throughout the war was entirelyselfish and cold-blooded He thought only of Spain andSpanish interests Gratitude to Hitler and Mussolini for theirhelp never entered his head Nor on the other hand did hebear any grudge to England for the hostility of our Left-Wingparties This narrow-minded tyrant only thought aboutkeeping his blood-drained people out of another war Theyhad had enough of war A million men had beenslaughtered by their brothersrsquo hands Poverty high pricesand hard times froze the stony peninsula No more war forSpain and no more war for Franco Such were thecommonplace sentiments with which he viewed and metthe awful convulsion which now shook the worldHis Majestyrsquos Government was quite content with thisunheroic outlook All we wanted was the neutrality of SpainWe wanted to trade with Spain We wanted her ports to bedenied to German and Italian submarines We wanted notonly an unmolested Gibraltar but the use of the anchorageof Algeciras for our ships and the use of the ground whichjoins the Rock to the mainland for our ever-expanding airbase On these facilities depended in large measure our


access to the Mediterranean Nothing was easier than forthe Spaniards to mount or allow to be mounted a dozenheavy guns in the hills behind Algeciras They had a right todo so at any time and once mounted they could at anymoment be fired and our naval and air bases wouldbecome unusable The Rock might once again stand a longsiege but it would be only a rock Spain held the key to allBritish enterprises in the Mediterranean and never in thedarkest hours did she turn the lock against us So greatwas the danger that for nearly two years we kept constantlyat a few daysrsquo notice an expedition of over five thousandmen and their ships ready to seize the Canary Islands bywhich we could maintain air and sea control over the U-boats and contact with Australasia round the Cape if everthe harbour of Gibraltar were denied to us by the SpaniardsThere was another very simple manner in which the FrancoGovernment could have struck us this destructive blowThey could have allowed Hitlerrsquos troops to traverse thePeninsula besiege and take Gibraltar for them andmeanwhile themselves occupy Morocco and French NorthAfrica This became a deep anxiety after the FrenchArmistice when on June 27 1940 the Germans reachedthe Spanish frontier in force and proposed fraternalceremonial parades in San Sebastian and in towns beyondthe Pyrenees Some German troops actually entered SpainHowever as the Duke of Wellington wrote in April 1820 3

There is no country in Europe in the affairs of whichforeigners can interfere with so little advantage asSpain There is no country in which foreigners are somuch disliked and even despised and whose mannersand habits are so little congenial with those of othernations in Europe

Now a hundred and twenty years later the Spaniardsreeling and quivering under the self-inflicted mutilations of


the civil war were even less sociable They did not wish tohave foreign armies marching about their country Even ifthey were Nazi and Fascist in their ideology these morosepeople would rather have the foreignersrsquo room than theircompany Franco shared these feelings to the full and in amost crafty manner he managed to give effect to them Wecould admire his astuteness especially as it was helpful tous

Like everyone else the Spanish Government wasstaggered by the sudden downfall of France and theexpected collapse or destruction of Britain Lots of peopleall over the world had reconciled themselves to the idea ofthe ldquoNew Order in Europerdquo the ldquoHerrenvolkrdquo and all thatFranco therefore indicated in June that he was prepared tojoin the victors and share in the distribution of the spoilsPartly from appetite and partly also from prudence hemade it clear that Spain had large claims But at thismoment Hitler did not feel the need of allies He likeFranco expected that in a few weeks or even days generalhostilities would cease and England would be suing forterms He therefore showed little interest in the gestures ofactive solidarity from MadridBy August the scene had changed It was certain thatBritain would fight on and probable that the war would belengthy With the contemptuous British rejection of hisldquoPeace Offerrdquo of July 19 Hitler sought allies and to whomshould he turn but to the dictator he had helped and whohad so lately offered to join him But Franco also had adifferent outlook arising from the same causes On August8 the German Ambassador in Madrid informed Berlin thatthe Caudillo still held the same view but that he had certain


requests to make First the assurance that GibraltarFrench Morocco and part of Algeria including Oran shouldbe given to Spain together with various expansions ofterritory in the Spanish African colonies Adequate militaryand economic assistance would also be necessarybecause Spain had only enough grain for eight monthsFinally Franco felt that the intervention of Spain should nottake place until after the German landing in England ldquoinorder to avoid too premature an entry into the war and thusa duration which would be unbearable to Spain and incertain conditions a fountain of danger for the reacutegimerdquo Atthe same time Franco wrote to Mussolini recapitulatingSpanish claims and asking for his support Mussolini repliedon August 25 by urging the Caudillo ldquonot to cut himself offfrom the history of Europerdquo Hitler was embarrassed by thesize of the Spanish claims some of which would embroilhim anew with Vichy The taking of Oran from France wouldalmost certainly lead to the setting-up of a hostile FrenchGovernment in North Africa He balanced the issueMeanwhile the days were passing During September GreatBritain seemed to be holding her own against the Germanair offensive The transfer of the fifty American destroyersmade a profound impression throughout Europe and toSpain it seemed that the United States was moving nearerto the war Franco and his Spaniards therefore pursuedthe policy of raising and defining their claims and making itclear that these must be agreed in advance Supplies alsomust be provided particularly a number of fifteen-inchhowitzers for the Spanish batteries facing Gibraltar All thewhile they paid the Germans in small coin All the Spanishnewspapers were Anglophobe German agents wereallowed to flaunt themselves all over Madrid As theSpanish Foreign Minister Beigbeder was suspected of lackof enthusiasm for Germany a special envoy Serrano


Suntildeer head of the Falange was sent on a formal visit toBerlin to smooth things over and preserve a sense ofcomradeship Hitler harangued him at length dwelling onthe Spanish prejudices against the United States The warhe suggested might well turn into a war of continents ndashAmerica against Europe The islands off West Africa mustbe made secure Later in the day Ribbentrop asked for amilitary base for Germany in the Canaries Suntildeer the pro-German and Falangist refused even to discuss this butdwelt incessantly upon Spanish needs for modern weaponsand food and petrol and for the satisfaction of her territorialdemands at the expense of France All this was necessarybefore Spain could realise her hopes of entering the warRibbentrop went to Rome on September 19 to report andconfer He said that the Fuehrer thought the British attitudewas ldquodictated by desperation and also a complete failure tounderstand realities as well as the hope of interventions bythe Russians and the Americansrdquo Mussolini observed thatldquothe United States are for all practical purposes at the sideof Englandrdquo The sale of the fifty destroyers proved this Headvised an alliance with Japan to paralyse American actionldquoAlthough the American Navy can be considered large inthe quantitative sense it must be regarded as a dilettanteorganisation like the British Armyhelliprdquo The Duce continued

There remains the problem of Yugoslavia andGreece Italy has half a million men on the Yugoslavfrontier and two hundred thousand on the Greekfrontier The Greeks represent for Italy what theNorwegians represented for Germany before the actionof April It is necessary for us to proceed with theliquidation of Greece all the more so as when our landforces will have advanced into Egypt the English Fleetwill not be able to remain at Alexandria and will seekrefuge in Greek ports


At this point they both agreed that the principal object wasto defeat England The only question was how ldquoEither thewarrdquo said Mussolini ldquowill finish before the spring or beprotracted into next yearrdquo The second alternative nowseemed to him the more probable and the Spanish cardmust be played in the most effective way Ribbentropaffirmed that a declaration of war by Spain following uponthe alliance with Japan would be a new and formidableblow for England But Suntildeer had not fixed any date

While the Spaniards became less ardent and moreacquisitive Hitler felt an increased desire for their help Asearly as August 15 General Jodl had pointed out that therewere other means besides direct invasion by which Englandcould be defeated namely prolonged air warfare thestepping-up of U-boat warfare the capture of Egypt and thecapture of Gibraltar Hitler was strongly in favour of theassault on Gibraltar But the Spanish terms were too highand also by the end of September other ideas stirred hismind On September 27 the Tripartite Pact betweenGermany Italy and Japan was signed in Berlin Thisopened wider fields

The Fuehrer now decided to throw his personal influenceinto the scale On October 4 he met Mussolini at theBrenner Pass He spoke of the high demands and dilatoryprocedure of the Spanish Government He feared that togive Spain what she asked would have two immediateconsequences an English occupation of the Spanish basesin the Canaries and the adhesion of the French Empire in


North Africa to de Gaullersquos movement This he said wouldforce the Axis seriously to extend their own sphere ofoperations On the other hand he did not exclude thepossibility of having the French armed forces on his side ina European campaign against Great Britain Mussolinidilated on his plans for the conquest of Egypt Hitler offeredhim special units for this attack Mussolini did not think heneeded them at least before the final phase On theRussian question Hitler remarked ldquoit is necessary to realisethat my distrust of Stalin is equalled by his distrust of merdquoIn any case Molotov was coming in a short time to Berlinand it would be the Fuehrerrsquos task to direct Russiandynamism towards IndiaOn October 23 Hitler went all the way to the Franco-Spanish frontier at Hendaye to meet the Spanish dictatorHere the Spaniards instead of being flattered by hiscondescension demanded according to Hitlerrsquos account toMussolini ldquoobjectives absolutely out of proportion to theirstrengthrdquo Spain demanded rectifications of the Pyreneesfrontier the cession of French Catalonia (French territoryonce historically linked with Spain but actually north of thePyrenees) of Algeria from Oran to Cape Blanco andvirtually the whole of Morocco The conversationsconducted through interpreters lasted nine hours Theyproduced only a vague protocol and an arrangement formilitary conversations ldquoRather than go through it againrdquoHitler told Mussolini later at Florence ldquoI would prefer tohave three or four of my teeth outrdquo4

On the way back from Hendaye the Fuehrer summonedMarshal Peacutetain to meet him at Montoire near Tours Thisinterview had been prepared by Laval who two days earlierhad met Ribbentrop and to his surprise Hitler at this veryplace Hitler and Laval both hoped to rally France to the


defeat of Britain The Marshal and most of his circle were atfirst shocked at this But Laval portrayed the proposedmeeting in glowing terms When asked whether Hitler hadinitiated the idea or whether it had been suggested to himLaval replied

What do you take him for Do you think that Hitlerneeds a nurse He has his own ideas that man Hewants to see the Marshal Besides he has a greatrespect for him This interview between the heads ofthe two States will be an historic event In any casesomething very different from a luncheon at Chequers5

Peacutetain was converted to the plan He thought that hispersonal prestige might weigh with Hitler and that it wasworth while giving him the impression that France would notbe unwilling to ldquocollaboraterdquo At ease in the West Hitlermight turn his thoughts and armies eastwardThe meeting took place in Hitlerrsquos armoured train near atunnel on the afternoon of October 24 ldquoI am happyrdquo saidthe Fuehrer ldquoto shake hands with a Frenchman who is notresponsible for this warrdquoLittle more than shameful civilities resulted The Marshalregretted that close relations had not been developedbetween France and Germany before the war Perhaps itwas not yet too late Hitler pointed out that France hadprovoked the war and was defeated But his aim now wasto crush England Before the United States could help hereffectively Britain would be occupied or else reduced to aheap of ruins His object was to end the war as quickly aspossible for there was no business less profitable than warAll Europe would have to pay the cost and so all Europehad the same interest To what extent would France helpPeacutetain conceded the principle of collaboration but pleadedthat he could not define its limits A procegraves-verbal was


drawn up by which ldquoin accord with the Duce the Fuehrermanifested his determination to see France occupy in theNew Europe the place to which she is entitledrdquo The AxisPowers and France had an identical interest in seeing thedefeat of England accomplished as soon as possibleConsequently the French Government would supportwithin the limits of its ability the measures which the AxisPowers might take for defence Questions of detail wouldbe settled by the Armistice Commission in concert with theFrench delegation The Axis Powers would undertake thatat the conclusion of peace with England France wouldretain in Africa a colonial domain ldquoessentially equivalent towhat she possessed at the momentrdquoAccording to the German record Hitler was disappointedEven Laval had begged him not to press France to makewar against Britain before French opinion was dulyprepared Hitler afterwards spoke of Laval as ldquoa dirty littledemocratic politicordquo but he carried away a more favourableimpression of Marshal Peacutetain The Marshal however isreported to have said when he got back to Vichy ldquoIt willtake six months to discuss this programme and another sixmonths to forget itrdquo But the infamous transaction is notforgotten yet in FranceIn October I had telegraphed to our Ambassador in Madrid

Prime Minister to SirSamuel Hoare

19X40

We admire the way in which you are dealing withyour baffling task I hope you will manage to convey toVichy through the French Ambassador two root ideasFirst that we will let bygones go and work with anyonewho convinces us of his resolution to defeat thecommon foes Secondly that as we are fighting for our


lives as well as for a victory which will relievesimultaneously all the captive States we shall stop atnothing Try to make Vichy feel what we here all takefor certain namely that we have got Hitler beat andthough he may ravage the Continent and the war maylast a long time his doom is certain It passes mycomprehension why no French leaders secede toAfrica where they would have an empire the commandof the seas and all the frozen French gold in the UnitedStates If this had been done at the beginning we mightwell have knocked out Italy by now But surely theopportunity is the most splendid ever offered to daringmen Naturally one would not expect precise responsesto such suggestions but try to put it into their heads ifyou see any opening

The various reports which we received of Montoire did notalter my general view of what our attitude towards Vichyshould be Now in November I expressed my views to mycolleagues in a memorandum

14XI40Although revenge has no part in politics and we

should always be looking forward rather than lookingback it would be a mistake to suppose that a solutionof our difficulties with Vichy will be reached by a policyof mere conciliation and forgiveness The VichyGovernment is under heavy pressure from Germanyand there is nothing that they would like better than tofeel a nice soft cosy forgiving England on their otherside This would enable them to win minor favours fromGermany at our expense and hang on as long aspossible to see how the war goes We on the contraryshould not hesitate when our interests require it toconfront them with difficult and rough situations andmake them feel that we have teeth as well as Hitler

It must be remembered that these men havecommitted acts of baseness on a scale which haveearned them the lasting contempt of the world and thatthey have done this without the slightest authority fromthe French people Laval is certainly filled by the


bitterest hatred of England and is reported to have saidthat he would like to see us ldquocrabouilleacutesrdquo which meanssquashed so as to leave only a grease-spot Undoubted-ly if he had had the power he would have marketedthe unexpected British resistance with his Germanmasters to secure a better price for French help infinishing us off Darlan is mortally envenomed by theinjury we have done to his Fleet Peacutetain has alwaysbeen an anti-British defeatist and is now a dotard Theidea that we can build on such men is vain They mayhowever be forced by rising opinion in France and byGerman severities to change their line in our favourCertainly we should have contacts with them But inorder to promote such favourable tendencies we mustmake sure the Vichy folk are kept well ground betweenthe upper and nether millstones of Germany andBritain In this way they are most likely to be broughtinto a more serviceable mood during the short runwhich remains to them

Marshal Peacutetain became increasingly resentful of Lavalrsquosprodding him along the road which would lead to war withBritain and German occupation of the North AfricanColonies On December 13 Laval arrived at Vichy with theproposal that Peacutetain should come to Paris to be present atthe ceremonial transfer of the ashes of Napoleonrsquos son theDuke of Reichstadt (ldquoLrsquoAiglonrdquo) to the Invalides This wasHitlerrsquos flowery idea of a solemn consecration of the ententereached at MontoirePeacutetain was not however attracted by a parade where thevictor of Verdun would be exhibited on French soil withGerman guards of honour before the tomb of the EmperorNapoleon He was moreover both wearied and fearful ofLavalrsquos methods and aims Members of Peacutetainrsquos stafftherefore arranged the arrest of Laval Energetic German


intervention procured his release but Peacutetain refused toaccept him back as Minister Laval retired in wrath toGerman-occupied Paris I was glad that M Flandin took hisplace as Foreign Minister These events marked a changeat Vichy It seemed that the limits of collaboration had atlast been reached There were at this moment hopes ofbetter French relations with Britain and of more sympatheticunderstanding for Vichy from the United States

It is convenient to carry the Spanish story forward at thispoint Franco now convinced of a long war and of theSpanish abhorrence of any more war and by no meanssure of a German victory used every device ofexasperating delay and exorbitant demands He was by thistime so sure of Suntildeer that on October 18 he made himForeign Minister representing the removal of Beigbeder asa proof of his devotion to the Axis In November Suntildeer wassummoned to Berchtes-gaden and Hitler expressed hisimpatience with Spainrsquos delay in coming into the war Bynow the Battle of Britain had been lost by the German AirForce Italy was already involved in Greece and in NorthAfrica Serrano Suntildeer did not respond as was wished Hedwelt lengthily instead upon the economic difficulties of thePeninsula Three weeks later Admiral Canaris Chief of theGerman Secret Service was sent to Madrid to arrange thedetails of Spainrsquos entry into the war He suggested that theGerman troops should pass the Spanish frontier on January10 in preparation for an attack on Gibraltar on January 30The Admiral was surprised when Franco told him that it wasimpossible for Spain to enter the war on the datementioned It seemed that the Caudillo feared the loss ofAtlantic islands and Spanish colonies to the British NavyHe also emphasised the lack of food and the inability of


Spain to stand a protracted war As the German landing inEngland seemed indefinitely postponed Franco introduceda new condition He would not move at any rate until Suezwas in Axis hands since not till then would he feel sure thatSpain would not be involved in long-drawn-out hostilitiesOn February 6 1941 Hitler wrote a letter to Francoappealing in strong and urgent terms that he should playthe man without further delay Franco replied expressinghis undying loyalty He urged that preparations for theattack on Gibraltar should be continued with renewedvigour As another new point he declared that only Spanishtroops with German equipment must be used for thisenterprise Even if all this was arranged Spain could notenter the war for economic reasons Ribbentrop thereuponreported to the Fuehrer that Franco had no intention ofmaking war Hitler was scandalised but being now setupon the invasion of Russia he did not perhaps like theidea of trying Napoleonrsquos other unsuccessful enterprise theinvasion of Spain at the same time Considerable Spanishforces were now gathered along the Pyrenees and he felt itwas wiser to stick to his method with nations ldquoOne by OnerdquoThus by subtlety and trickery and blandishments of all kindsFranco succeeded in tiding things over and keeping Spainout of the war to the inestimable advantage of Britain whenshe was all aloneWe could not count upon this at the time and I urged thePresident to do all in his power to help forward the policy ofconciliation


23XI40


Our accounts show that situation in Spain isdeteriorating and that the Peninsula is not far fromstarvation point An offer by you of food month bymonth so long as they keep out of the war might bedecisive Small things do not count now and this is atime for very plain talk to them The occupation byGermany of both sides of the Straits would be agrievous addition to our naval strain already severeThe Germans would soon have batteries working byradar [ie they could aim in the darkness] which wouldclose the Straits both by night and day With a majorcampaign developing in the Eastern Mediterranean andthe need to reinforce and supply our armies there allround the Cape we could not contemplate any militaryaction on the mainland at or near the Straits The Rockof Gibraltar will stand a long siege but what is the goodof that if we cannot use the harbour or pass the StraitsOnce in Morocco the Germans will work southwardand U-boats and aircraft will soon be operating freelyfrom Casablanca and Dakar I need not Mr Presidentenlarge upon the trouble this will cause to us or theapproach of trouble to the Western Hemisphere Wemust gain as much time as possible

This great danger had in fact passed away and though wedid not know it it passed forever It is fashionable at thepresent time to dwell on the vices of General Franco and Iam therefore glad to place on record this testimony to theduplicity and ingratitude of his dealings with Hitler andMussolini I shall presently record even greater serviceswhich these evil qualities in General Franco rendered to theAllied cause


12Mussolini Attacks Greece Octoberndash

November 1940

Mussolinirsquos Decision to Attack GreecemdashHis Letterto Hitler of October 19 mdashThe Florence ConferencemdashThe Italian Invasion of Greece October 281940 mdash Reinforcement of Admiral CunninghamrsquosFleetmdashThe Arrival of the ldquoIllustriousrdquomdashOurObligationsmdashImportance of CretemdashTelegrams toMr EdenmdashAir Support for GreecemdashMinute toChief of the Air Staff November 2 1940 mdashWavell-Wilson Plans for an Offensive in LibyamdashSecrecyCauses MisunderstandingmdashFurther Telegrams toMr EdenmdashGreek Need for the Cretan DivisionmdashMr Edenrsquos Latest TelegramsmdashHis ReturnmdashHeUnfolds ldquoOperation CompassrdquomdashGeneral Agree-mentmdashWar Cabinet ApprovesmdashThe Fleet Air ArmAttack the Italian FleetmdashGallant Exploit at TarantomdashHalf the Italian Fleet Disabled for Six MonthsmdashNaval DispositionsmdashMy Desire for an AmphibiousFeature in ldquoCompassrdquomdashMy Telegram to Wavell ofNovember 26 mdashPolicy Towards TurkeymdashAnImproved SituationmdashShortcomings at Suda BaymdashDeath of Mr ChamberlainmdashA Tribute to HisMemory

A FRESH though not entirely unexpected outrage byMussolini with baffling problems and far-reachingconsequences to all our harassed affairs now broke uponthe Mediterranean scene


The Duce took the final decision to attack Greece onOctober 15 1940 That morning a meeting of the Italianwar leaders was held in the Palazzo Venezia He openedthe proceedings in the following words

The object of this meeting is to define the course ofaction ndash in general terms ndash which I have decided toinitiate against Greece In the first instance this actionwill have aims of both a maritime and territorialcharacter The territorial aims will be based on thepossession of the whole coast of Southern Albania hellipand the Ionian islands ndash Zante Cephalonia and Corfundash and the occupation of Salonika When we haveattained these objectives we shall have improved ourposition vis-agrave-vis England in the Mediterranean In thesecond instance hellip the complete occupation of Greecein order to put her out of action and to assure that in allcircumstances she will remain in our politico-economicsphere

Having thus defined the question I have laid downthe date ndash which in my opinion must not be postponedeven for an hour ndash and that is for the 26th of thismonth This is an action which I have matured at lengthfor months before our entry into the war and before thebeginning of the conflicthellip I would add that I foreseeno complications in the north Yugoslavia has everyinterest to keep quiethellip I also exclude complicationsfrom the side of Turkey particularly since Germany hasestablished herself in Rumania and since Bulgaria hasincreased her strength The latter can play a part in ourgame and I shall take the necessary steps so as not tomiss the present unique opportunity for achieving heraspirations in Macedonia and for an outlet to theseahellip1

On October 19 Mussolini wrote to Hitler telling him of thedecision to which he had come Hitler was then on hisjourney to Hendaye and Montoire The letter (the text ofwhich has not come to light) seems to have followed him


round When it finally reached him he at once proposed toMussolini a meeting to discuss the general political situationin Europe This meeting took place in Florence on October28 That morning the Italian attack on Greece had begunIt seems however that Hitler did not choose to make anissue of the Greek adventure He said politely that Germanywas in accord with the Italian action in Greece and thenproceeded to tell the tale of his meetings with Franco andPeacutetain There can be no doubt that he did not like what hadbeen done by his associate A few weeks later after theItalian attack was checked he wrote to Mussolini in hisletter of November 20 ldquoWhen I asked you to receive me atFlorence I began the journey with the hope of being able toexpound my views before the threatened action againstGreece had been taken about which I had heard only ingeneral termsrdquo In the main however he accepted thedecision of his ally

Before dawn on October 28 the Italian Minister in Athenspresented an ultimatum to General Metaxas the Premier ofGreece Mussolini demanded that the whole of Greeceshould be opened to Italian troops At the same time theItalian army in Albania invaded Greece at various pointsThe Greek Government whose forces were by no meansunready on the frontier rejected the ultimatum They alsoinvoked the guarantee given by Mr Chamberlain on April13 1939 This we were bound to honour By the advice ofthe War Cabinet and from his own heart His Majestyreplied to the King of the Hellenes ldquoYour cause is ourcause we shall be fighting against a common foerdquo Iresponded to the appeal of General Metaxas ldquoWe will giveyou all the help in our power We will fight a common foe


and we will share a united victoryrdquo This undertaking wasduring a long story made good

Although we were still heavily outnumbered on paper by theItalian Fleet marked improvements had been made in ourMediterranean strength During September the Valiant thearmoured-deck aircraft-carrier Illustrious and two AAcruisers had come safely through the Mediterranean to joinAdmiral Cunningham at Alexandria Hitherto his ships hadalways been observed and usually bombed by the greatlysuperior Italian Air Force The Illustrious with her modernfighters and latest radar equipment by striking down patrolsand assailants gave a new secrecy to the movements ofour Fleet This advantage was timely Apart from a few airsquadrons a British mission and perhaps some tokentroops we had nothing to give and even these trifles werea painful subtraction from ardent projects already lighting inthe Libyan theatre One salient strategic fact leaped outupon us ndash CRETE The Italians must not have it We mustget it first ndash and at once It was fortunate that at thismoment Mr Eden was in the Middle East and that I thushad a Ministerial colleague on the spot with whom to dealHe was about to return home after his conference withGeneral Smuts at Khartoum I telegraphed to him

29X40I recognise importance of your conference with

Smuts but hope first Wavell and thereafter you willreturn at earliest to Cairo

We here are all convinced an effort should be madeto establish ourselves in Crete and that risks should berun for this valuable prize You will have seen theService telegrams on this subject


Prime Minister to MrEden [at Khartoum]

29X40

It seems of prime importance to hold the best airfieldpossible and a naval fuelling base at Suda BaySuccessful defence of Crete is invaluable aid todefence of Egypt Loss of Crete to [the] Italians [wouldbe a] grievous aggravation [of] all Mediterraneandifficulties So great a prize is worth the risk and almostequal to [a] successful offensive in Libya Pray after anexamination of whole problem with Wavell and Smutsdo not hesitate to make proposals for action on largescale at expense of other sectors and ask for anyfurther aid you require from here including aircraft andanti-aircraft [batteries] We are studying how to meetyour need Consider your return to Cairo indispensable

At the invitation of the Greek Government Suda Bay thebest harbour in Crete was occupied by our forces two dayslater


30X40

What steps are we taking to get news from theGreek front Have we observers there What is ourattacheacute there doing

Why do you not send one of your generals fromEgypt at the head of a military mission to be at theheadquarters of the Greek field army Let them go andsee the fighting and give us some close-up informationabout the relative merits of the two armies I expect tohave a good wire every day or so telling us exactlywhat is happening as far as the Greeks will allow it


30X40


There is no objection to two battalions going toFreetown pending their relief by the West AfricanBrigade after which they can go on to Egypt They arenot to leave England until it is agreed that the WestAfrican Brigade is to go to West Africa

Both Crete and Malta come before Freetown in AAguns and I cannot approve of this diversion at thepresent time Neither can I agree to the diversion of afighter squadron [for Freetown] at this stage The Navyis responsible for preventing any sea-borne expeditionattacking our West African colonies As to the airattack if the French bomb Freetown or Bathurst we willbomb Vichy I do not think this will happen

Prime Minister to AirVice-MarshalLongmore2

1XI40

[In dispatching a Blenheim squadron to Greece] youhave taken a very bold and wise decision I hope toreinforce you as soon as possible

Prime Minister toGeneral Ismay for CAS and for COSCommittee

1XI40

I should propose to make immediate arrangementsto send four additional heavy bomber squadrons(including the one already sent to Malta) to the MiddleEast at once and also four Hurricane fightersquadrons Let me see plans for this movement Ishould like to have a report on this today


1XI40

Mr Eden has asked for ten thousand rifles for theMiddle East Can we not supply these out of the


American packet or is there any small parcel of riflesanywhere in the world to be picked up

Prime Minister to CAS 2XI401 I had in mind that the four bomber squadrons

would fly to Crete or Greece via Malta The personneland ground stores would have to be carried through bycruiser It is essential to have these squadronsoperating at the earliest from bases in Greek territoryupon the Italian Fleet at Taranto and generally againstSouthern For so vital an operation of war the Navywould have to make special exertions and you shouldnot assume that a ship will not be forthcoming at anyrate for such ground personnel stores etc as arenecessary to come into action at this very critical time Isee more difficulty in the vehicles but perhaps somecould come from Egypt and the rest be improvised

2 The fighters are of course more difficult but Ishould hope that they could fly from a carrier to Maltaas was done last time If necessary the Furious wouldhave to help the Ark Royal Could they fly from Malta toan aerodrome in Greece If not could they fly on to acarrier to refuel and thence to Greece In the case ofthe fighters the same arrangements would have to bemade about stores ground personnel etc as with thebombers


2XI40

Greek situation must be held to dominate othersnow We are well aware of our slender resources Aidto Greece must be attentively studied lest wholeTurkish position is lost through proof that Englandnever tries to keep her guarantees I invite you to stayin Cairo for at least another week while these questionsare being studied and we make sure we have done ourbest from both ends Meanwhile another thirty


thousand men are reaching you by November 15which must affect local situation in Egypt

During Mr Edenrsquos earlier conferences and talks withGeneral Wavell and also with General Wilson he posed thequestion What action was intended if the Italian offensivedid not develop He was told in extreme secrecy that a planwas being made to attack the Italians in the Western Desertinstead of waiting for them to open their offensive againstMersa Matruh Neither he nor Wavell imparted these ideasto me or to the Chiefs of Staff General Wavell begged theSecretary of State for War not to send any telegram on thissubject but to tell us verbally about it when he got homeThus for some weeks we remained without knowledge ofthe way their minds were moving It is clear from mymessage of October 26 that any forestalling operation on alarge scale in the Western Desert would command my keensupport We were all however until Mr Edenrsquos return leftunder the impression that Wavell and Wilson were stillwedded to the defensive battle at Mersa Matruh and wouldwait there until they were attacked The only action theyseemed to contemplate in this extremely serious crisis wasto send a battalion or so to Crete a few air squadrons toGreece and make some minor diversions against theDodecanese and a small though desirable offensive in theSoudan This seemed by no means good enoughemployment for the very large forces with which at greatrisk exertion and cost we had furnished themOur correspondence during this period was thus on bothsides based upon misunderstanding Wavell and theSecretary of State thought that for the sake of givingineffectual aid to Greece we were pressing them todissipate the forces they were gathering for an offensive inthe Western Desert We on the other hand not creditingthem with offensive intentions objected to their standing


idle or trifling at such a crucial moment In fact as willpresently be seen we were all agreed On November 1indeed Mr Eden telegraphed cryptically

We cannot from Middle East forces send sufficientair or land reinforcements to have any decisiveinfluence upon course of fighting in Greece To sendsuch forces from here or to divert reinforcements nowon their way or approved would imperil our wholeposition in the Middle East and jeopardise plans for anoffensive operation now being laid in more than onetheatre3 After much painful effort and at the cost ofgrave risks we have so far as our land forces areconcerned now built up a reasonably adequatedefensive3 force here We should presently be in aposition to undertake certain offensive operations whichif successful may have far-reaching effects on thecourse of the war as a whole It would surely be badstrategy to allow ourselves to be diverted from this taskand unwise to employ our forces in fragments in atheatre of war where they cannot be decisivehellip Thebest way in which we can help Greece is by striking atItaly and we can do that most effectively from areaswhere our strength has been developed and where ourplans are laid I am anxious to put before you in detailat the earliest date the dispositions and plans whichhave been worked out here and propose hellip to returnhome by the shortest route leaving on the 3d

This telegram crossed one from me to him at Khartoumwhich afterwards had to be repeated back to Cairo whitherhe had repaired


3XI40


Gravity and consequence of Greek situationcompels your presence in Cairo However unjust it maybe collapse of Greece without any effort by us will havedeadly effect on Turkey and on future of war Greeksprobably as good as Italians and Germans not yet onthe spot Establishment of fuelling base and airfield inCrete to be steadily developed into permanent warfortresses [is] indispensable This is being done Butsurely effort must be made to aid Greece directly evenif only with token forces Quite understand howeveryone with you is fixed on idea of set-piece battle atMersa Matruh For that very reason it is unlikely tooccur Enemy will await completion pipeline anddevelopment of larger forces than are now concentrat-ed Your difficulties in attacking across the desertobvious but if you have no major offensive of your ownin Libya possible during next two months then youshould run risks to stimulate Greek resistance Overseventy thousand men sent to Middle East Commandsince June and thirty thousand reaching you beforeNovember 15 fifty-three thousand by end of the yearArmoured regiments have started in big convoyyesterday Cannot therefore believe that various minoroffensives of which you speak plus major defence atMersa Matruh will outvalue need of effective action inGreece

No one will thank us for sitting tight in Egypt withever-growing forces while Greek situation and all thathangs on it is cast away Loss of Athens far greaterinjury than Kenya and Khartoum but no necessity forsuch a price to be paid Read carefully Palairetrsquos (ourminister in Athens) telegrams New emergencies mustbe met in war as they come and local views must notsubjugate main issue No one expected Italy so late inthe year would attack Greece Greece resistingvigorously with reasonable aid from Egypt and Englandmight check invaders I am trying to send substantialbomber and fighter reinforcements to Crete andGreece flying from England with stores by cruiser Ifthis proves feasible details will be cabled tomorrow orMonday Trust you will grasp situation firmly abandon-ing negative and passive policies and seizing


opportunity which has come into our hands ldquoSafetyfirstrdquo is the road to ruin in war even if you had thesafety which you have not Send me your proposalsearliest or say you have none to make

And again4XI40

We are sending you air reinforcements arriving asfully explained in accompanying message from Chiefsof Staff Send at once to Greece one Gladiatorsquadron and two more Blenheim squadrons three inall If necessary send a second battalion to CreteAgreeably with arrival of our air reinforcementsaforesaid and at earliest send one more Gladiatorsquadron Anti-aircraft guns for airfields in Greeceshould precede arrival of squadrons

It was proposed at this time to ask the Greeks to keep theirCretan division in the island I therefore minuted


6XI40

It will be difficult to deny the Greeks the use of thisCretan division If that be so we shall certainly have toput more troops on the island It is important that thereshould be a certain number of troops and that it shouldbe thought by the enemy that we are landingconsiderable numbers The area to be watched is veryextensive and the consequences of a counter-attackwould be most disastrous

Pray let me know your views


7XI40

We shall render poor service to Greece if inconsequence of our using Crete for our own purposeswe deny them the use of two-thirds of their Fifth


Division The defence of Crete depends on the Navybut nevertheless there must be a certain deterrent forceof troops on shore I doubt if the two battalions ofBritish and the three remaining Greek battalions will besufficient I am much obliged to you for telegraphing asI asked to General Wavell He must provide in meal orin malt

(1) Three or four thousand additional British troopsand a dozen guns These need not be fully equipped ormobile

(2) He must do this from forces which he will not beusing in the possibly impending battle

(3) We must tell the Greeks we release [for servicewith their main army] the six battalions and the artilleryof the Fifth Greek Division

Every effort should be made to rush arms orequipment to enable a reserve division of Greeks to beformed in Crete Rifles and machine guns are quitesufficient in this case To keep a Greek division out ofthe battle on the Epirus front would be very bad and tolose Crete because we had not sufficient bulk of forcesthere would be a crime

It was time Mr Eden should come home to report to us ashe earnestly desired The following telegrams are self-explanatory

Mr Eden to PrimeMinister

3XI40

All strongly of the opinion I should return home asrapidly as possible in order to put whole position asseen from here before you Earnestly hope you willagree to this Propose to leave tomorrow morningPerfectly prepared to fly back here if required after Ihave seen you but am convinced that this meetingbetween us is most urgent It is impossible to explainposition and plans fully by telegram

Please reply urgently


Assent was given and the Secretary of State began hisjourney The following points were made in hissimultaneous telegrams to me

Conference [in Cairo] discussed situation in CreteAdmiral Cunningham emphasised the value ofpossession of Crete to us as a means of securingEastern Mediterranean and of interfering with Italiantransit traffic to North Africa It would not however bepossible to base fleet on Suda Bay for more than a fewhours at a time at present owing to lack of anti-submarine protection

He does not consider Italian attempt to take Crete isto be anticipated in the near future nor unless and untilGreece is overrun He and Wavell have concertedarrangements for sending at once to Crete a part of thereinforcements referred to in my telegram of November1 Admiral Cunningham does not consider it isnecessary to keep any large British military garrison inCrete and is convinced that once the Cretans areorganised one battalion together with anti-aircraftdefences would suffice We then discussed thegeneral question of help to Greece As we said onSeptember 22 ldquoany assistance we may be able to giveto Greece cannot be given until German-Italian threatto Egypt is finally liquidated the security of Egypt beingvital to our strategy and incidentally to the future ofGreecerdquohellip

Chief cry for help is for air reinforcements Number30 Blenheim Squadron left today for Athens Longmoreagain emphasised his extreme reluctance to add anymore squadrons to the Greek commitment in presentconditions He feels that to do so would lead to a largewastage of his aircraft from Italian attack whilst theaircraft are on Greek or Cretan aerodromes unpreparedwith protecting pens adequate ground anti-aircraftdefence and other precautions of such nature whichare difficult to improvise at short noticehellipIn general allCommanders-in-Chief were strongly of the opinion thatthe defence of Egypt is of paramount importance to ourwhole position in the Middle East They consider that


from the strategical point of view the security of Egypt isthe most urgent commitment and must take prece-dence of attempts to prevent Greece being overrun Itis also essential if we are to retain the support ofTurkeyhellip

He added in my private cipher the following5XI40

Although reinforcements ordered in Chiefs of Staffsrsquotelegrams involve additional risks in Western Desertand probably increased casualties these risks must befaced in view of political commitments to aid GreeceWithdrawal though it will hamper arrangements madein Western Desert will not entirely dislocate them Butany increase in commitment or attempt to hasten rateof despatch to Greece beyond that now laid down willmean serious risk to our position in Egypt Uncertainfactor still remains date by which air reinforcementsparticularly fighters arrive in Egypt to replace thosesent to Greece Experience hitherto shows thatprevious forecasts have not been fulfilled and time-table is sadly behind Now feel that there is nothingfurther I can do here and propose leave tomorrowmorning by air

The Secretary of State for War got back home onNovember 8 and came that evening after the usual raidhad begun to see me in my temporary underground abodein Piccadilly He brought with him the carefully guardedsecret which I wished I had known earlier Nevertheless noharm had been done Mr Eden unfolded in considerabledetail to a select circle including the CIGS and GeneralIsmay the offensive plan which General Wavell andGeneral Wilson had conceived and prepared No longerwere we to await in our fortified lines at Mersa Matruh an


Italian assault for which defensive battle such long andartful preparations had been made On the contrary withina month or so we were ourselves to attack The operationwas to be called ldquoCompassrdquoAs will be seen from the map Marshal Grazianirsquos Italianarmy then above eighty thousand strong which hadcrossed the Egyptian frontier was spread over a fifty-milefront in a series of fortified camps which were separated bywide distances and not mutually supporting and with nodepth in the system Between the enemyrsquos right flank atSofafi and his next camp at Nibeiwa there was a gap ofover twenty miles The plan was to make an offensivespring through this gap and turning towards the seaattack Nibeiwa camp and the Tummar group of camps insuccession from the west ndash that is to say from the rearMeanwhile both the Sofafi camps and the camp at Meiktilaon the coast were to be contained by light forces For thispurpose there were to be employed the 7th ArmouredDivision the 4th Indian Division now complete and the16th British Infantry Brigade together with a compositeforce from the garrison of Mersa Matruh This plan involveda serious risk but also offered a glittering prize The risk layin the launching of all our best troops into the heart of theenemyrsquos position by a move of seventy miles on twosuccessive nights over the open desert and with the perilof being observed and attacked from the air during theintervening day Besides this the food and petrol had to benicely calculated and if the time-scale went wrong theconsequences must be graveThe prize was worthy of the hazard The arrival of ourvanguard on the sea at Buq Buq or thereabouts would cutthe communications of three-quarters of Marshal Grazianirsquosarmy Attacked by surprise from the rear they might well beforced as a result of vigorous fighting into mass surrenders


In this case the Italian front would be irretrievably brokenWith all their best troops captured or destroyed no forcewould be left capable of withstanding a further onslaughtnor could any organised retreat be made to Tripoli along thehundreds of miles of coastal roadHere then was the deadly secret which the Generals hadtalked over with their Secretary of State for War This waswhat they had not wished to telegraph We were alldelighted I purred like six cats Here was something worthdoing It was decided there and then subject to theagreement of the Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet togive immediate sanction and all possible support to thissplendid enterprise and that it should take first place in allour thoughts and have amid so many other competingneeds first claim upon our strained resourcesIn due course these proposals were brought before the WarCabinet I was ready to state the case or have it stated Butwhen my colleagues learned that the Generals on the spotand the Chiefs of Staff were in full agreement with me andMr Eden they declared that they did not wish to know thedetails of the plan that the fewer who knew them thebetter and that they whole-heartedly approved the generalpolicy of the offensive This was the attitude which the WarCabinet adopted on several important occasions and Irecord it here that it may be a model should similardangers and difficulties arise in future times

The Italian Fleet had not reacted in any way against ouroccupation of Crete but Admiral Cunningham had for sometime been anxious to strike a blow at them with his nowaugmented naval air forces as they lay in their main base atTaranto The attack was delivered on November 11 as the


climax of a well-concerted series of operations duringwhich Malta received troops and further navalreinforcements including the battleship Barham twocruisers and three destroyers reached Alexandria Tarantolies in the heel of Italy three hundred and twenty miles fromMalta Its magnificent harbour was heavily defendedagainst all modern forms of attack The arrival at Malta ofsome fast reconnaissance machines enabled us to discernour prey The British plan was to fly two waves of aircraftfrom the Illustrious the first of twelve and the second ofnine of which eleven were to carry torpedoes and the resteither bombs or flares The Illustrious released her aircraftshortly after dark from a point about a hundred and seventymiles from Taranto For an hour the battle raged amid fireand destruction among the Italian ships Despite the heavyflak only two of our aircraft were shot down The rest flewsafely back to the IllustriousBy this single stroke the balance of naval power in theMediterranean was decisively altered The air photographsshowed that three battleships one of them the new Littoriohad been torpedoed and in addition one cruiser wasreported hit and much damage inflicted on the dockyardHalf the Italian battle fleet was disabled for at least sixmonths and the Fleet Air Arm could rejoice at havingseized by their gallant exploit one of the rare opportunitiespresented to themAn ironic touch is imparted to this event by the fact that onthis very day the Italian Air Force at the express wish ofMussolini had taken part in the air attack on Great BritainAn Italian bomber force escorted by about sixty fightersattempted to bomb Allied convoys in the Medway Theywere intercepted by our fighters eight bombers and fivefighters being shot down This was their first and last


intervention in our domestic affairs They might have foundbetter employment defending their fleet at Taranto

I kept the President well informed


16X140

I am sure you will have been pleased about TarantoThe three uninjured Italian battleships have quittedTaranto today which perhaps means they arewithdrawing to Trieste

And again


21XI40

You may be interested to receive the following navalnotes on the action at Taranto which I have asked theAdmiralty to prepare

1 This attack had been in Commander-in-ChiefMediterraneanrsquos mind for some time he had intendedto carry it out on October 21 (Trafalgar Day) when themoon was suitable but a slight mishap to Illustrious ledto a postponement During his cruise in the CentralMediterranean on October 31 and November 1 it wasagain considered but the moon did not serve and itwas thought an attack with parachute flares would beless effective Success in such an attack was believedto depend on state of moon weather an undetectedapproach by the Fleet and good reconnaissance Thelatter was provided by flying-boats and a Glenn Martinsquadron working from Malta On the night of


November 1112 all the above conditions were metUnfavourable weather in the Gulf of Taranto preventeda repetition on 12th13th

2 Duplex pistols were used and probably contribut-ed to the success of the torpedo attack

3 The Greek Ambassador at Angora reported onNovember 11 that Italian Fleet was concentrating atTaranto in preparation for an attack on CorfuReconnaissance on November 13 shows thatundamaged battleships and eight-inch-gun cruisershave left Taranto ndash presumably owing to the attack on11th12th

I now addressed General Wavell


14XI40

Chiefs of Staff Service Ministers and I haveexamined general situation in the light of recent eventsItalian check on Greek front British naval successagainst battle fleet at Taranto poor showing Italianairmen have made over here encouraging reportsreceived of low morale in Italy Gallabat your ownexperiences by contacts in Western Desert above allthe general political situation make it very desirable toundertake operation of which you spoke to Secretary ofState for War

It is unlikely that Germany will leave her flagging allyunsupported indefinitely Consequently it seems thatnow is the time to take risks and strike the Italians byland sea and air You should act accordingly inconcert with other Commanders-in-Chief


26XI40


News from every quarter must have impressed onyou the importance of Compass in relation to wholeMiddle East position including Balkans and Turkey toFrench attitude in North Africa to Spanish attitude nowtrembling on the brink to Italy in grievous straits andgenerally to the whole war Without being over-sanguine I cannot repress strong feelings of confi-dence and hope and feel convinced risks inseparablefrom great deeds are fully justified

2 Have asked Admiralty to inquire about partassigned to Fleet If success is achieved presume youhave plans for exploiting it to the full I am having aStaff study made of possibilities open to us if all goeswell for moving fighting troops and also reserveforward by sea in long hops along the coast andsetting-up new supply bases to which pursuingarmoured vehicles and units might resort Withoutwishing to be informed on details I should like to beassured that all this has been weighed explored andas far as possible prepared

It seems difficult to believe that Hitler will not beforced to come to the rescue of his partner andobviously German plans may be far advanced for adrive through Bulgaria at Salonika From severalquarters we have reports in that Germans do notapprove of Mussolinirsquos adventure and that they areinclined to let him pay the price himself This makes meall the more suspicious that something bad is bankingup ready to be let off soon Every dayrsquos delay is in ourfavour It might be that Compass would in itselfdetermine action of Yugoslavia and Turkey andanyhow in event of success we should be able to giveTurkey far greater assurances of early support than ithas been in our power to do so far One may indeedsee possibility of centre of gravity in Middle East shiftingsuddenly from Egypt to the Balkans and from Cairo toConstantinople You are no doubt preparing your mindfor this and a Staff study is being made here

As we told you the other day we shall stand by youand Wilson in any well-conceived action irrespective ofresult because no one can guarantee success in warbut only deserve it


Tell Longmore that I much admire his calling-in ofthe southern squadrons and accepting the risk ofpunishment there If all is well Furious and her outfitshould reach Takoradi tomorrow This should makeamends for all the feathers we have had to pull out ofhim for Greece where the part played by RAF inGreek victories has been of immense military andpolitical consequence All good wishes to you both andto the Admiral who is doing so splendidly I rejoice thathe should feel Suda Bay ldquoan inestimable benefitrdquo


26XI40

I suggest the following to our Ambassador in TurkeyWe have placed before you the various arguments

for and against Turkish intervention which haveoccurred to the Staff officers who have reported uponthe matter but we do not wish to leave you in anydoubt of what our own opinion and your instructionsare We want Turkey to come into the war as soon aspossible We are not pressing her to take any specialsteps to help the Greeks except to make it clear toBulgaria that any move by Germany through Bulgaria toattack Greece or any hostile movement by Bulgariaagainst Greece will be followed by immediate Turkishdeclaration of war We should like Turkey andYugoslavia now to consult together so as if possible tohave a joint warning ready to offer Bulgaria andGermany at the first sign of a German movementtowards Bulgaria In the event of German troopstraversing Bulgaria with or without Bulgarian assis-tance it is vital that Turkey should fight there and thenIf she does not she will find herself left absolutelyalone the Balkans will have been eaten up one by oneand it will be beyond our power to help her You maymention that by the summer of 1941 we hope to haveat least fifteen divisions operating in the Middle Eastand by the end of the year nearly twenty-five We donot doubt our ability to defeat Italy in Africa


6 PM The Chiefs of Staffs are in general agree-ment with the above

PrimeMinister to FirstLord First Sea Lordand General Ismayfor COS CommitteeCAS to see

30XI40

Furiousshould return home at once and carryanother load of aircraft and pilots as reinforcement forthe Middle East Every effort should be made to put offher refit till after she has carried this force CASshould say what composition of force is best


1XII40

Exactly what have we got and done at Suda Bay[Crete] ndash ie troops AA guns coast defence gunslights wireless RDF nets mines preparation ofaerodromes etc

I hope to be assured that many hundreds of Cretansare working at strengthening the defences andlengthening and improving the aerodromes

General Ismay for COS Committee

1XII40

The continued retreat of the Italians in Albania andthe reports which we have received today of difficultiesof feeding and watering their forces in the LibyanDesert together with other reports of aircraft beingmoved back to Tripoli to be safer from our attackscombined with safe arrival at Takoradi of thirty-threeHurricanes with first-class pilots all constitute new factsentitling us to take a more confident view of thesituation which should be communicated to GeneralWavell

The enormous advantage of being able once anenemy is on the run to pull supplies and fighting troopsforward eighty miles in a night by sea and bring fresh


troops up to the advance guard is very rarely offered inwar General Wavellrsquos reply to my telegram does notseem to take any account of this and considering howmuch we have ourselves at stake I do not think weshould be doing our duty if we did not furnish him withthe results of our Staff study It is a crime to haveamphibious power and leave it unused Therefore Iwish the study if favourable to be telegraphed It musthowever be ready by the 3d at latest

I add the following general observation The fact thatwe now have established ourselves at Suda Bayentitles us to feel much easier about Malta While theFleet is or may be at Suda it will be most unlikely thatany large landing will be attempted at Malta which wehave already reinforced by tanks and guns from MiddleEasthellip The possession of Suda Bay has made anenormous change in the Eastern Mediterranean

The story of Suda Bay is sad The tragedy was not reacheduntil 1941 I believe I had as much direct control over theconduct of the war as any public man had in any country atthis time The knowledge I possessed the fidelity andactive aid of the War Cabinet the loyalty of all mycolleagues the ever-growing efficiency of our war machineall enabled an intense focusing of constitutional authority tobe achieved Yet how far short was the action taken by theMiddle East Command of what was ordered and what weall desired In order to appreciate the limitations of humanaction it must be remembered how much was going on inevery direction at the same time Nevertheless it remainsastonishing to me that we should have failed to make SudaBay the amphibious citadel of which all Crete was thefortress Everything was understood and agreed and muchwas done but all was half-scale effort We were presentlyto pay heavily for our shortcomings


The Italian invasion of Greece from Albania was anotherheavy rebuff to Mussolini The first assault was repulsedwith heavy loss and the Greeks immediately counter-attacked In the northern (Macedonian) sector the Greeksadvanced into Albania capturing Koritza on November 22In the central sector of the northern Pindus an Italian Alpinidivision was annihilated In the coastal zone where theItalians had at first succeeded in making deep penetrationsthey hastily retreated from the Kalamas River The Greekarmy under General Papagos showed superior skill inmountain warfare out-manoeuvring and outflanking theirenemy By the end of the year their prowess had forced theItalians thirty miles behind the Albanian frontier along thewhole front For several months twenty-seven Italiandivisions were pinned in Albania by sixteen Greek divisionsThe remarkable Greek resistance did much to hearten theother Balkan countries and Mussolinirsquos prestige sank low

On November 9 Mr Neville Chamberlain died at hiscountry home in Hampshire I had obtained the Kingrsquospermission to have him supplied with the Cabinet papersand until a few days before the end he followed our affairswith keenness interest and tenacity He met the approachof death with a steady eye I think he died with the comfortof knowing that his country had at least turned the cornerAs soon as the House met on November 12 I paid a tributeto his character and career

At the lychgate we may all pass our own conductand our own judgments under a searching review It isnot given to human beings happily for them forotherwise life would be intolerable to foresee or topredict to any large extent the unfolding course of


events In one phase men seem to have been right inanother they seem to have been wrong Then again afew years later when the perspective of time haslengthened all stands in a different setting There is anew proportion There is another scale of valuesHistory with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trailof the past trying to reconstruct its scenes to revive itsechoes and kindle with pale gleams the passion offormer days What is the worth of all this The onlyguide to a man is his conscience the only shield to hismemory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions It isvery imprudent to walk through life without this shieldbecause we are so often mocked by the failure of ourhopes and the upsetting of our calculations but withthis shield however the Fates may play we marchalways in the ranks of honour

Whatever else history may or may not say aboutthese terrible tremendous years we can be sure thatNeville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerityaccording to his lights and strove to the utmost of hiscapacity and authority which were powerful to savethe world from the awful devastating struggle in whichwe are now engagedhellip Herr Hitler protests with franticwords and gestures that he has only desired peaceWhat do these ravings and outpourings count beforethe silence of Neville Chamberlainrsquos tomb Long hardand hazardous years lie before us but at least we enterupon them united and with clean heartshellip

He was like his father and his brother Austen beforehim a famous Member of the House of Commons andwe here assembled this morning members of allparties without a single exception feel that we doourselves and our country honour in saluting thememory of one whom Disraeli would have called ldquoanEnglish worthyrdquo


13Lend-Lease

Roosevelt Re-elected President mdash BritishMunitions Contracts in the United StatesmdashLordLothian Visits Me at Ditchley mdashldquoCash and CarryrdquoNovember 1939 mdash British Losses of Dollars inthe Twilight WarmdashA New Era May 1940 mdash IDraft My Letter of December 8 1940 to thePresidentmdashThe Common Interests of Britain andthe United StatesmdashNeed of Forward PlanningmdashBritish Recovery Since JunemdashImpending Peril onthe Atlantic in 1941 mdash Our Shipping LossesmdashBritish and German Battleship Strength mdash TheMenace of Japan mdash The Atlantic LifelinemdashAmerican Influence on EiremdashMy Request for TwoThousand Additional Aircraft a Month mdash ArmyEquipment mdash How to Pay the Bill mdash Appeal tothe United States mdash The Presidentrsquos DiscoveryldquoLend-Leaserdquomdash His Press Conference ofDecember 17 mdashldquoEliminate the Dollar SignrdquomdashLend-Lease Bill Presented to CongressmdashSuddenDeath of Philip Lothian mdash I Choose Lord Halifaxas His SuccessormdashMy Tribute to Lord HalifaxmdashMr Eden Returns Home to the Foreign OfficemdashCaptain Margesson Secretary of State for WarmdashWaiting for Lend-LeasemdashNew Year Greetings tothe President

ABOVE THE ROAR AND CLASH OF ARMS there now loomedupon us a world-fateful event of a different order The


presidential election took place on November 6 In spite ofthe tenacity and vigour with which these four-yearlycontests are conducted and the bitter differences ondomestic issues which at this time divided the two mainparties the Supreme Cause was respected by theresponsible leaders Republicans and Democrats alike AtCleveland on November 2 Mr Roosevelt said ldquoOur policyis to give all possible material aid to the nations which stillresist aggression across the Atlantic and Pacific OceansrdquoHis opponent Mr Wendell Willkie declared next day atMadison Square Garden ldquoAll of us ndash RepublicansDemocrats and Independents ndash believe in giving aid to theheroic British people We must make available to them theproducts of our industryrdquoThis larger patriotism guarded both the safety of theAmerican Union and our life Still it was with profoundanxiety that I awaited the result No newcomer into powercould possess or soon acquire the knowledge andexperience of Franklin Roosevelt None could equal hiscommanding gifts My own relations with him had beenmost carefully fostered by me and seemed already to havereached a degree of confidence and friendship which was avital factor in all my thought To close the slowly built-upcomradeship to break the continuity of all our discussionsto begin again with a new mind and personality seemed tome a repellent prospect Since Dunkirk I had not beenconscious of the same sense of strain It was withindescribable relief that I received the news that PresidentRoosevelt had been re-elected


6XI40


I did not think it right for me as a foreigner to expressany opinion upon American politics while the electionwas on but now I feel you will not mind my saying that Iprayed for your success and that I am truly thankful forit This does not mean that I seek or wish for anythingmore than the full fair and free play of your mind uponthe world issues now at stake in which our two nationshave to discharge their respective duties We areentering upon a sombre phase of what must evidentlybe a protracted and broadening war and I look forwardto being able to interchange my thoughts with you in allthat confidence and good will which has grown upbetween us since I went to the Admiralty at theoutbreak Things are afoot which will be rememberedas long as the English language is spoken in anyquarter of the globe and in expressing the comfort Ifeel that the people of the United States have onceagain cast these great burdens upon you I must avowmy sure faith that the lights by which we steer will bringus all safely to anchor

Curiously enough I never received any answer to thistelegram It may well have been engulfed in the vast massof congratulatory messages which were swept aside byurgent workUp till this time we had placed our orders for munitions inthe United States separately from though in consultationwith the American Army Navy and Air Services The ever-increasing volume of our several needs had led tooverlapping at numerous points with possibilities of frictionarising at lower levels in spite of general good will ldquoOnly asingle unified Government procurement policy for alldefence purposesrdquo writes Mr Stettinius1ldquocould do thetremendous job that was now aheadrdquo This meant that theUnited States Government should place all the orders forweapons in America Three days after his re-election thePresident publicly announced a ldquorule of thumbrdquo for the


division of American arms output As weapons came off theproduction line they were to be divided roughly fifty-fiftybetween the United States forces and the British andCanadian forces That same day the Priorities Boardapproved a British request to order twelve thousand moreaeroplanes in the United States in addition to the eleventhousand we had already booked But how was ail this tobe paid for

In mid-November Lord Lothian flew home from Washingtonand spent two days with me at Ditchley I had been advisednot to make a habit of staying at Chequers every week-endespecially when the moon was full in case the enemyshould pay me special attention Mr Ronald Tree and hiswife made me and my staff very welcome many times attheir large and charming house near Oxford Ditchley is onlyfour or five miles away from Blenheim In these agreeablesurroundings I received the Ambassador Lothian seemedto me a changed man In all the years I had known him hehad given me the impression of high intellectual andaristocratic detachment from vulgar affairs Airy viewyaloof dignified censorious yet in a light and gay mannerhe had always been good company Now under the samehammer that beat upon us all I found an earnest deeplystirred man He was primed with every aspect and detail ofthe American attitude He had won nothing but good willand confidence in Washington by his handling of thedestroyer-cum-bases negotiations He was fresh fromintimate contact with the President with whom he hadestablished a warm personal friendship His mind was nowset upon the dollar problem this was grim indeed


Before the war the United States was governed by the pre-war Neutrality Act which obliged the President onSeptember 3 1939 to place an embargo on all shipmentsof arms to any of the belligerent nations Ten days later hehad called Congress to a special session to consider theremoval of this ban which under the appearance ofimpartiality virtually deprived Great Britain and France of allthe advantages of the command of the seas in the transportof munitions and supplies It was not until the end ofNovember 1939 after many weeks of discussion andagitation that the Neutrality Act was repealed and the newprinciple of ldquoCash and Carryrdquo substituted This stillpreserved the appearance of strict neutrality on the part ofthe United States for Americans were as free to sellweapons to Germany as to the Allies In fact however oursea-power prevented any German traffic while Britain andFrance could ldquocarryrdquo freely as long as they had ldquocashrdquoThree days after the passage of the new law ourPurchasing Commission headed by Mr Arthur Purvis aman of outstanding ability began its work

Britain entered the war with about 4500000000 in dollarsor in gold and in United States investments that could beturned into dollars The only way in which these resourcescould be increased was by new gold-production in theBritish Empire mainly of course in South Africa and byvigorous efforts to export goods principally luxury goodssuch as whisky fine woollens and pottery to the UnitedStates By these means an additional two thousand milliondollars were procured during the first sixteen months of thewar During the period of the ldquoTwilight Warrdquo we were tornbetween a vehement desire to order munitions in America


and gnawing fear as our dollar resources dwindled Alwaysin Mr Chamberlainrsquos day the Chancellor of the ExchequerSir John Simon would tell us of the lamentable state of ourdollar resources and emphasise the need for conservingthem It was more or less accepted that we should have toreckon with a rigorous limitation of purchases from theUnited States We acted as Mr Purvis once said toStettinius ldquoas if we were on a desert island on short rationswhich we must stretch as far as we couldrdquo2

This had meant elaborate arrangements for eking out ourmoney In peace we imported freely and made paymentsas we liked When war came we had to create a machinewhich mobilised gold and dollars and other private assetswhich stopped the ill-disposed from remitting their funds tocountries where they felt things were safer and which cutout wasteful imports and other expenditures On top ofmaking sure that we did not waste our money we had tosee that others went on taking it The countries of thesterling area were with us they adopted the same kind ofexchange-control policy as we did and were willing takersand holders of sterling With others we made specialarrangements by which we paid them in sterling whichcould be used anywhere in the sterling area and theyundertook to hold any sterling for which they had noimmediate use and to keep dealings at the official rates ofexchange Such arrangements were originally made withthe Argentine and Sweden but were extended to a numberof other countries on the Continent and in South AmericaThese arrangements were completed after the spring of1940 and it was a matter of satisfaction ndash and a tribute tosterling ndash that we were able to achieve and maintain themin circumstances of such difficulty In this way we were ableto go on dealing with most parts of the world in sterling and


to conserve most of our precious gold and dollars for ourvital purchases in the United StatesWhen the war exploded into hideous reality in May 1940we were conscious that a new era had dawned in Anglo-American relations From the time I formed the newGovernment and Sir Kingsley Wood became Chancellor ofthe Exchequer we followed a simpler plan namely to ordereverything we possibly could and leave future financialproblems on the lap of the Eternal Gods Fighting for lifeand presently alone under ceaseless bombardment withinvasion glaring upon us it would have been false economyand misdirected prudence to worry too much about whatwould happen when our dollars ran out We were consciousof the tremendous changes taking place in Americanopinion and of the growing belief not only in Washingtonbut throughout the Union that their fate was bound up withours Moreover at this time an intense wave of sympathyand admiration for Britain surged across the Americannation Very friendly signals were made to us fromWashington direct and also through Canada encouragingour boldness and indicating that somehow or other a waywould be found In Mr Morgenthau Secretary of theTreasury the cause of the Allies had a tireless championThe taking-over of the French contracts in June had almostdoubled our rate of spending across the Exchange Besidesthis we placed new orders for aeroplanes tanks andmerchant ships in every direction and promoted thebuilding of great new factories both in the United States andCanada

Up till November 1940 we had paid for everything we hadreceived We had already sold $335000000 worth of


American shares requisitioned for sterling from privateowners in Britain We had paid out over $4500000000 incash We had only two thousand millions left the greaterpart in investments many of which were not readilymarketable It was plain that we could not go on any longerin this way Even if we divested ourselves of all our goldand foreign assets we could not pay for half we hadordered and the extension of the war made it necessary forus to have ten times as much We must keep something inhand to carry on our daily affairsLothian was confident that the President and his adviserswere earnestly seeking the best way to help us Now thatthe election was over the moment to act had comeCeaseless discussions on behalf of the Treasury wereproceeding in Washington between their representative SirFrederick Phillips and Mr Morgenthau The Ambassadorurged me to write a full statement of our position to thePresident Accordingly that Sunday at Ditchley I drew up inconsultation with him a personal letter On November 16 Itelegraphed to Roosevelt ldquoI am writing you a very longletter on the outlook for 1941 which Lord Lothian will giveyou in a few daysrdquo As the document had to be checkedand rechecked by the Chiefs of Staff and the Treasury andapproved by the War Cabinet it was not completed beforeLothianrsquos return to Washington On November 26 I senthim a message ldquoI am still struggling with my letter to thePresident but hope to cable it to you in a few daysrdquo In itsfinal form the letter was dated December 8 and wasimmediately sent to the President This letter was one ofthe most important I ever wrote As it gives a view of thewhole situation agreed to by all concerned in London andas it played a recognisable part in our fortunes it deservesstudy


10 DOWNING STREET WHITEHALLDecember 8 1940

MY DEAR MR PRESIDENT

1 As we reach the end of this year I feel you willexpect me to lay before you the prospects for 1941 Ido so with candour and confidence because it seemsto me that the vast majority of American citizens haverecorded their conviction that the safety of the UnitedStates as well as the future of our two Democraciesand the kind of civilisation for which they stand isbound up with the survival and independence of theBritish Commonwealth of Nations Only thus can thosebastions of sea-power upon which the control of theAtlantic and Indian Oceans depend be preserved infaithful and friendly hands The control of the Pacific bythe United States Navy and of the Atlantic by the BritishNavy is indispensable to the security and trade routesof both our countries and the surest means ofpreventing war from reaching the shores of the UnitedStates

2 There is another aspect It takes between threeand four years to convert the industries of a modernstate to war purposes Saturation-point is reachedwhen the maximum industrial effort that can be sparedfrom civil needs has been applied to war productionGermany certainly reached this point by the end of1939 We in the British Empire are now only abouthalfway through the second year The United States Ishould suppose is by no means so far advanced aswe Moreover I understand that immense programmesof naval military and air defence are now on foot in theUnited States to complete which certainly two yearsare needed It is our British duty in the commoninterest as also for our own survival to hold the frontand grapple with the Nazi power until the preparationsof the United States are complete Victory may comebefore two years are out but we have no right to countupon it to the extent of relaxing any effort that ishumanly possible Therefore I submit with very great


respect for your good and friendly consideration thatthere is a solid identity of interest between the BritishEmpire and the United States while these conditionslast It is upon this footing that I venture to address you

3 The form which this war has taken and seemslikely to hold does not enable us to match the immensearmies of Germany in any theatre where their mainpower can be brought to bear We can however by theuse of sea-power and air-power meet the Germanarmies in regions where only comparatively smallforces can be brought into action We must do our bestto prevent the German domination of Europe spreadinginto Africa and into Southern Asia We have also tomaintain in constant readiness in this island armiesstrong enough to make the problem of an overseainvasion insoluble For these purposes we are formingas fast as possible as you are already aware betweenfifty and sixty divisions Even if the United States wereour ally instead of our friend and indispensable partnerwe should not ask for a large American expeditionaryarmy Shipping not men is the limiting factor and thepower to transport munitions and supplies claimspriority over the movement by sea of large numbers ofsoldiers

4 The first half of 1940 was a period of disaster forthe Allies and for Europe The last five months havewitnessed a strong and perhaps unexpected recoveryby Great Britain fighting alone but with the invaluableaid in munitions and in destroyers placed at ourdisposal by the great Republic of which you are for thethird time the chosen Chief

5 The danger of Great Britain being destroyed by aswift overwhelming blow has for the time being verygreatly receded In its place there is a long graduallymaturing danger less sudden and less spectacular butequally deadly This mortal danger is the steady andincreasing diminution of sea tonnage We can endurethe shattering of our dwellings and the slaughter of ourcivil population by indiscriminate air attacks and wehope to parry these increasingly as our sciencedevelops and to repay them upon military objectives inGermany as our Air Force more nearly approaches the


strength of the enemy The decision for 1941 lies uponthe seas Unless we can establish our ability to feedthis island to import the munitions of all kinds which weneed unless we can move our armies to the varioustheatres where Hitler and his confederate Mussolinimust be met and maintain them there and do all thiswith the assurance of being able to carry it on till thespirit of the Continental Dictators is broken we may fallby the way and the time needed by the United Statesto complete her defensive preparations may not beforthcoming It is therefore in shipping and in thepower to transport across the oceans particularly theAtlantic Ocean that in 1941 the crunch of the wholewar will be found If on the other hand we are able tomove the necessary tonnage to and fro across saltwater indefinitely it may well be that the application ofsuperior air-power to the German homeland and therising anger of the German and other Nazi-grippedpopulations will bring the agony of civilisation to amerciful and glorious end

But do not let us underrate the task6 Our shipping losses the figures for which in

recent months are appended have been on a scalealmost comparable to that of the worst year of the lastwar In the five weeks ending November 3 lossesreached a total of 420300 tons Our estimate of annualtonnage which ought to be imported in order tomaintain our effort at full strength is forty-three milliontons the tonnage entering in September was only atthe rate of thirty-seven million tons and in October ofthirty-eight million tons Were this diminution to continueat this rate it would be fatal unless indeed immenselygreater replenishment than anything at present in sightcould be achieved in time Although we are doing all wecan to meet this situation by new methods the difficultyof limiting losses is obviously much greater than in thelast war We lack the assistance of the French Navythe Italian Navy and the Japanese Navy and above allof the United States Navy which was of such vital helpto us during the culminating years The enemycommands the ports all around the northern andwestern coasts of France He is increasingly basing his


submarines flying-boats and combat planes on theseports and on the islands off the French coast We aredenied the use of the ports or territory of Eire in whichto organise our coastal patrols by air and sea In factwe have now only one effective route of entry to theBritish Isles namely the northern approaches againstwhich the enemy is increasingly concentratingreaching ever farther out by U-boat action and long-distance aircraft bombing In addition there have forsome months been merchant-ship raiders both in theAtlantic and Indian Oceans And now we have thepowerful warship raider to contend with as well Weneed ships both to hunt down and to escort Large asare our resources and preparations we do not possessenough

7 The next six or seven months [will] bring relativebattleship strength in home waters to a smaller marginthan is satisfactory Bismarck and Tirpitz will certainlybe in service in January We have already King GeorgeV and hope to have Prince of Wales in the line at thesame time These modern ships are of course farbetter armoured especially against air attack thanvessels like Rodney and Nelson designed twenty yearsago We have recently had to use Rodney ontransatlantic escort and at any time when numbers areso small a mine or a torpedo may alter decisively thestrength of the line of battle We get relief in Junewhen Duke of York will be ready and shall be stillbetter off at the end of 1941 when Anson also will havejoined But these two first-class modern 35000-ton3fifteen-inch-gun German battleships force us tomaintain a concentration never previously necessary inthis war

8 We hope that the two Italian Littorios will be out ofaction for a while and anyway they are not sodangerous as if they were manned by GermansPerhaps they might be We are indebted to you for yourhelp about the Richelieu and Jean Bart and I daresaythat will be all right But Mr President as no one willsee more clearly than you we have during thesemonths to consider for the first time in this war a fleet


action in which the enemy will have two ships at leastas good as our two best and only two modern ones Itwill be impossible to reduce our strength in theMediterranean because the attitude of Turkey andindeed the whole position in the Eastern Basindepends upon our having a strong fleet there Theolder unmodernised battleships will have to go forconvoy Thus even in the battleship class we are in fullextension

9 There is a second field of danger The VichyGovernment may either by joining Hitlerrsquos New Order inEurope or through some manoeuvre such as forcing usto attack an expedition despatched by sea against theFree French Colonies find an excuse for ranging withthe Axis Powers the very considerable undamagednaval forces still under its control If the French Navywere to join the Axis the control of West Africa wouldpass immediately into their hands with the gravestconsequences to our communications between theNorthern and Southern Atlantic and also affectingDakar and of course thereafter South America

10 A third sphere of danger is in the Far East Hereit seems clear that Japan is thrusting southwardthrough Indo-China to Saigon and other naval and airbases thus bringing them within a comparatively shortdistance of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies It isreported that the Japanese are preparing five gooddivisions for possible use as an overseas expeditionaryforce We have today no forces in the Far East capableof dealing with this situation should it develop

11 In the face of these dangers we must try to usethe year 1941 to build up such a supply of weaponsparticularly of aircraft both by increased output at homein spite of bombardment and through ocean-bornesupplies as will lay the foundations of victory In view ofthe difficulty and magnitude of this task as outlined byall the facts I have set forth to which many others couldbe added I feel entitled nay bound to lay before youthe various ways in which the United States could givesupreme and decisive help to what is in certainaspects the common cause


12 The prime need is to check or limit the loss oftonnage on the Atlantic approaches to our island Thismay be achieved both by increasing the naval forceswhich cope with the attacks and by adding to thenumber of merchant ships on which we depend For thefirst purpose there would seem to be the followingalternatives

(1) The reassertion by the United States of thedoctrine of the freedom of the seas from illegal andbarbarous methods of warfare in accordance with thedecisions reached after the late Great War and asfreely accepted and defined by Germany in 1935 Fromthis United States ships should be free to trade withcountries against which there is not an effective legalblockade

(2) It would I suggest follow that protection shouldbe given to this lawful trading by United States forces ie escorting battleships cruisers destroyers and airflotillas The protection would be immensely moreeffective if you were able to obtain bases in Eire for theduration of the war I think it is improbable that suchprotection would provoke a declaration of war byGermany upon the United States though probably seaincidents of a dangerous character would from time totime occur Herr Hitler has shown himself inclined toavoid the Kaiserrsquos mistake He does not wish to bedrawn into war with the United States until he hasgravely undermined the power of Great Britain Hismaxim is ldquoOne at a timerdquo

The policy I have ventured to outline or somethinglike it would constitute a decisive act of constructivenon-belligerency by the United States and more thanany other measure would make it certain that Britishresistance could be effectively prolonged for thedesired period and victory gained

(3) Failing the above the gift loan or supply of alarge number of American vessels of war above alldestroyers already in the Atlantic is indispensable tothe maintenance of the Atlantic route Further could notthe United States Naval Forces extend their sea-controlof the American side of the Atlantic so as to prevent themolestation by enemy vessels of the approaches to the


new line of naval and air bases which the United Statesis establishing in British islands in the WesternHemisphere The strength of the United States NavalForces is such that the assistance in the Atlantic thatthey could afford us as described above would notjeopardise the control of the Pacific

(4) We should also then need the good offices of theUnited States and the whole influence of its Govern-ment continually exerted to procure for Great Britainthe necessary facilities upon the southern and westernshores of Eire for our flotillas and still more importantfor our aircraft working to the westward into theAtlantic If it were proclaimed an American interest thatthe resistance of Great Britain should be prolonged andthe Atlantic route kept open for the importantarmaments now being prepared for Great Britain inNorth America the Irish in the United States might bewilling to point out to the Government of Eire thedangers which its present policy is creating for theUnited States itself

His Majestyrsquos Government would of course take themost effective measures beforehand to protect Irelandif Irish action exposed it to German attack It is notpossible for us to compel the people of Northern Irelandagainst their will to leave the United Kingdom and joinSouthern Ireland But I do not doubt that if theGovernment of Eire would show its solidarity with thedemocracies of the English-speaking world at thiscrisis a Council for Defence of all Ireland could be setup out of which the unity of the island would probably insome form or other emerge after the war

13 The object of the foregoing measures is toreduce to manageable proportions the presentdestructive losses at sea In addition it is indispensablethat the merchant tonnage available for supplying GreatBritain and for the waging of the war by Great Britainwith all vigour should be substantially increasedbeyond the 1250000 tons per annum which is theutmost we can now build The convoy system thedetours the zigzags the great distances from which wenow have to bring our imports and the congestion ofour western harbours have reduced by about one-third


the fruitfulness of our existing tonnage To ensure finalvictory not less than three million tons of additionalmerchant shipbuilding capacity will be required Onlythe United States can supply this need Looking to thefuture it would seem that production on a scalecomparable to that of the Hog Island scheme of the lastwar ought to be faced for 1942 In the meanwhile weask that in 1941 the United States should makeavailable to us every ton of merchant shipping surplusto its own requirements which it possesses or controlsand to find some means of putting into our service alarge proportion of merchant shipping now underconstruction for the National Maritime Board

14 Moreover we look to the industrial energy of theRepublic for a reinforcement of our domestic capacity tomanufacture combat aircraft Without that reinforce-ment reaching us in substantial measure we shall notachieve the massive preponderance in the air on whichwe must rely to loosen and disintegrate the Germangrip on Europe We are at present engaged on aprogramme designed to increase our strength to seventhousand first-line aircraft by the spring of 1942 But it isabundantly clear that this programme will not suffice togive us the weight of superiority which will force openthe doors of victory In order to achieve such superiori-ty it is plain that we shall need the greatest productionof aircraft which the United States of America iscapable of sending us It is our anxious hope that in theteeth of continuous bombardment we shall realise thegreater part of the production which we have planned inthis country But not even with the addition to oursquadrons of all the aircraft which under presentarrangements we may derive from planned output inthe United States can we hope to achieve thenecessary ascendancy May I invite you then MrPresident to give earnest consideration to animmediate order on joint account for a further twothousand combat aircraft a month Of these aircraft Iwould submit the highest possible proportion should beheavy bombers the weapon on which above allothers we depend to shatter the foundations ofGerman military power I am aware of the formidable


task that this would impose upon the industrialorganisation of the United States Yet in our heavyneed we call with confidence to the most resourcefuland ingenious technicians in the world We ask for anunexampled effort believing that it can be made

15 You have also received information about theneeds of our armies In the munitions sphere in spite ofenemy bombing we are making steady progress hereWithout your continued assistance in the supply ofmachine tools and in further releases from stock ofcertain articles we could not hope to equip as many asfifty divisions in 1941 I am grateful for the arrange-ments already practically completed for your aid in theequipment of the army which we have already plannedand for the provision of the American type of weaponsfor an additional ten divisions in time for the campaignof 1942 But when the tide of dictatorship begins torecede many countries trying to regain their freedommay be asking for arms and there is no source towhich they can look except the factories of the UnitedStates I must therefore also urge the importance ofexpanding to the utmost American productive capacityfor small arms artillery and tanks

16 I am arranging to present you with a completeprogramme of the munitions of all kinds which we seekto obtain from you the greater part of which is ofcourse already agreed An important economy of timeand effort will be produced if the types selected for theUnited States Services should whenever possibleconform to those which have proved their merit underthe actual conditions of war In this way reserves ofguns and ammunition and of airplanes becomeinterchangeable and are by that very fact augmentedThis is however a sphere so highly technical that I donot enlarge upon it

17 Last of all I come to the question of FinanceThe more rapid and abundant the flow of munitions andships which you are able to send us the sooner will ourdollar credits be exhausted They are already as youknow very heavily drawn upon by the payments wehave made to date Indeed as you know the ordersalready placed or under negotiation including the


expenditure settled or pending for creating munitionsfactories in the United States many times exceed thetotal exchange resources remaining at the disposal ofGreat Britain The moment approaches when we shallno longer be able to pay cash for shipping and othersupplies While we will do our utmost and shrink fromno proper sacrifice to make payments across theExchange I believe you will agree that it would bewrong in principle and mutually disadvantageous ineffect if at the height of this struggle Great Britain wereto be divested of all saleable assets so that after thevictory was won with our blood civilisation saved andthe time gained for the United States to be fully armedagainst all eventualities we should stand stripped tothe bone Such a course would not be in the moral oreconomic interests of either of our countries We hereshould be unable after the war to purchase the largebalance of imports from the United States over andabove the volume of our exports which is agreeable toyour tariffs and industrial economy Not only should wein Great Britain suffer cruel privations but widespreadunemployment in the United States would follow thecurtailment of American exporting power

18 Moreover I do not believe that the Governmentand people of the United States would find it inaccordance with the principles which guide them toconfine the help which they have so generouslypromised only to such munitions of war and commodi-ties as could be immediately paid for You may becertain that we shall prove ourselves ready to sufferand sacrifice to the utmost for the Cause and that weglory in being its champions The rest we leave withconfidence to you and to your people being sure thatways and means will be found which future generationson both sides of the Atlantic will approve and admire

19 If as I believe you are convinced Mr Presidentthat the defeat of the Nazi and Fascist tyranny is amatter of high consequence to the people of the UnitedStates and to the Western Hemisphere you will regardthis letter not as an appeal for aid but as a statement


of the minimum action necessary to achieve ourcommon purpose

A table was added showing the losses by enemy action ofBritish Allied and neutral merchant tonnage for the periodsgiven4

The letter reached our great friend when he was cruisingon board an American warship the Tuscaloosa in thesunlight of the Caribbean Sea He had only his ownintimates around him Harry Hopkins then unknown to metold me later that Mr Roosevelt read and re-read this letteras he sat alone in his deck-chair and that for two days hedid not seem to have reached any clear conclusion He wasplunged in intense thought and brooded silentlyFrom all this there sprang a wonderful decision It wasnever a question of the President not knowing what hewanted to do His problem was how to carry his countrywith him and to persuade Congress to follow his guidanceAccording to Stettinius the President as early as the latesummer had suggested at a meeting of the DefenceAdvisory Commission on Shipping Resources that ldquoItshould not he necessary for the British to take their ownfunds and have ships built in the United States or for us tolend them money for this purpose There is no reason whywe should not take a finished vessel and lease it to them forthe duration of the emergencyrdquo It seems that this idea hadoriginated in the Treasury Department whose lawyersespecially Oscar S Cox of Maine had been stirred bySecretary Morgenthau It appeared that by a statute of 1892the Secretary for War ldquowhen in his discretion it will be forthe public goodrdquo could lease Army property if not requiredfor public use for a period of not longer than five years


Precedents for the use of this statute by the lease ofvarious Army items from time to time were on recordThus the word ldquoleaserdquo and the idea of applying the leaseprinciple to meeting British needs had been in PresidentRooseveltrsquos mind for some time as an alternative to a policyof indefinite loans which would soon far outstrip allpossibilities of repayment Now suddenly all this sprang intodecisive action and the glorious conception of Lend-Leasewas proclaimedThe President returned from the Caribbean on December16 and broached his plan at his press conference next dayHe used a simple illustration

Suppose my neighbourrsquos house catches fire and Ihave a length of garden hose four or five hundred feetaway If he can take my garden hose and connect it upwith his hydrant I may help him to put out the fire Nowwhat do I do I donrsquot say to him before that operationldquoNeighbour my garden hose cost me fifteen dollarsyou have to pay me fifteen dollars for itrdquo No What isthe transaction that goes on I donrsquot want fifteen dollarsndash I want my garden hose back after the fire is over

And againThere is absolutely no doubt in the mind of a very

overwhelming number of Americans that the bestimmediate defence of the United States is the successof Great Britain defending itself and that thereforequite aside from our historic and current interest in thesurvival of Democracy in the world as a whole it isequally important from a selfish point of view and ofAmerican defence that we should do everythingpossible to help the British Empire to defend itself

FinallyWhat I am trying to do is to eliminate the dollar sign


On this foundation the ever-famous Lend-Lease Bill was atonce prepared for submission to Congress I described thisto Parliament later as ldquothe most unsordid act in the historyof any nationrdquo Once it was accepted by Congress ittransformed immediately the whole position It made us freeto shape by agreement long-term plans of vast extent for allour needs There was no provision for repayment Therewas not even to be a formal account kept in dollars orsterling What we had was lent or leased to us because ourcontinued resistance to the Hitler tyranny was deemed tobe of vital interest to the great Republic According toPresident Roosevelt the defence of the United States andnot dollars was henceforth to determine where Americanweapons were to go

It was at this moment the most important in his publiccareer that Philip Lothian was taken from us Shortly afterhis return to Washington he fell suddenly and gravely illHe worked unremittingly to the end On December 12 inthe full tide of success he died This was a loss to thenation and to the Cause He was mourned by wide circlesof friends on both sides of the ocean To me who had beenin such intimate contact with him a fortnight before it was apersonal shock I paid my tribute to him in a House ofCommons united in deep respect for his work and memory

I had now to turn immediately to the choice of hissuccessor It seemed that our relations with the UnitedStates at this time required as Ambassador an outstandingnational figure and a statesman versed in every aspect of


world politics Having ascertained from the President thatmy suggestion would be acceptable I invited Mr LloydGeorge to take the post He had not felt able to join the WarCabinet in July and was not happily circumstanced inBritish politics His outlook on the war and the eventsleading up to it was from a different angle from mine Therecould be no doubt however that he was our foremostcitizen and that his incomparable gifts and experiencewould be devoted to the success of his mission I had along talk with him in the Cabinet Room and also atluncheon on a second day He showed genuine pleasure athaving been invited ldquoI tell my friendsrdquo he said ldquoI have hadhonourable offers made to me by the Prime Ministerrdquo Hewas sure that at the age of eighty-two he ought not toundertake so exacting a task As a result of my longconversations with him I was conscious that he had agedeven in the months which had passed since I had askedhim to join the War Cabinet and with regret but also withconviction I abandoned my planI next turned to Lord Halifax whose prestige in theConservative Party stood high and was enhanced by hisbeing at the Foreign Office For a Foreign Secretary tobecome an Ambassador marks in a unique manner theimportance of the mission His high character waseverywhere respected yet at the same time his record inthe years before the war and the way in which events hadmoved left him exposed to much disapprobation and evenhostility from the Labour side of our National Coalition Iknew that he was conscious of this himselfWhen I made him this proposal which was certainly not apersonal advancement he contented himself with saying ina simple and dignified manner that he would servewherever he was thought to be most useful In order toemphasise still further the importance of his duties I


arranged that he should resume his function as a memberof the War Cabinet whenever he came home on leave Thisarrangement worked without the slightest inconvenienceowing to the qualities and experience of the personalitiesinvolved and for six years thereafter both under theNational Coalition and the Labour-Socialist GovernmentHalifax discharged the work of Ambassador to the UnitedStates with conspicuous and ever-growing influence andsuccessPresident Roosevelt Mr Hull and other high personalities inWashington were extremely pleased with the selection ofLord Halifax Indeed it was at once apparent to me that thePresident greatly preferred it to my first proposal Theappointment of the new Ambassador was received withmarked approval both in America and at home and wasjudged in every way adequate and appropriate to the scaleof events

I had no doubt who should fill the vacancy at the ForeignOffice On all the great issues of the past four years I hadas these pages have shown dwelt in close agreement withAnthony Eden I have described my anxieties and emotionswhen he parted company with Mr Chamberlain in thespring of 1938 Together we had abstained from the voteon Munich Together we had resisted the party pressuresbrought to bear upon us in our constituencies during thewinter of that melancholy year We had been united inthought and sentiment at the outbreak of the war and ascolleagues during its progress The greater part of Edenrsquospublic life had been devoted to the study of foreign affairsHe had held the splendid office of Foreign Secretary withdistinction and had resigned it when only forty years of age


for reasons which are in retrospect and at this time viewedwith the approval of all parties in the State He had played afine part as Secretary of State for War during this terrificyear and his conduct of Armv affairs had brought us veryclose together We thought alike even without consultationon a very great number of practical issues as they arosefrom day to day I looked forward to an agreeable andharmonious comradeship between the Prime Minister andthe Foreign Secretary and this hope was certainly fulfilledduring the four and a half years of war and policy which laybefore us Eden was sorry to leave the War Office in all thestresses and excitements of which he was absorbed but hereturned to the Foreign Office like a man going home

I filled Mr Edenrsquos place as Secretary of State for War bysubmitting to the King the name of Captain Margesson atthat time the Chief Whip to the National Government Thischoice excited some adverse comment David Margessonhad been for nearly ten years at the head of theGovernment Whiprsquos Office in the House of Commons andit had fallen to him to marshal and to stimulate the patientand solid Conservative majorities which had so longsustained the Baldwin and Chamberlain Administrations Ihad as a leading figure among the Conservativedissentients from the India Bill had many sharp passageswith him In the course of those eleven years of myexclusion from office my contacts with him had been notinfrequent and generally hostile I had formed the opinionthat he was a man of high ability serving his chief whoeverhe was with unfaltering loyalty and treating his opponentswith strict good faith This opinion was also held by theWhips of the Labour and Liberal Parties and such areputation is of course essential to the discharge of this


particular office When I became Prime Minister it wasgenerally expected that I should find someone else for thetask but I was quite sure that I should receive fromMargesson the same skilful and faithful service that he hadgiven to my predecessors and in this I had been in no waydisappointed He had served in the First World War andthrough much of the worst of it as a regimental officergaining the Military Cross He thus had a strong soldierlybackground as well as a complete knowledge of the Houseof CommonsIn Margessonrsquos place I appointed Captain James Stuartwith whom also I had had many differences but for whosecharacter I had high respect

The interval between November 1940 and the passage ofLend-Lease in March 1941 was marked by an acutestringency in dollars Every kind of expedient was devisedby our friends The American Government bought from ussome of the war plants which they had built to our order inthe United States They assigned them to the Americandefence programme but bade us go on using them to thefull The War Department placed orders for munitions that itdid not need immediately so that when finished they couldbe released to us On the other hand certain things weredone which seemed harsh and painful to us The Presidentsent a warship to Capetown to carry away all the gold wehad gathered there The great British business ofCourtaulds in America was sold by us at the request of theUnited States Government at a comparatively low figureand then resold through the markets at a much higher pricefrom which we did not benefit I had a feeling that thesesteps were taken to emphasise the hardship of our position


and raise feeling against the opponents of Lend-LeaseAnyhow in one way or another we came throughOn December 30 the President gave a ldquofireside chatrdquo onthe radio urging his policy upon his countrymen

There is danger ahead ndash danger against which wemust prepare But we well know that we cannot escapedanger by crawling into bed and pulling the covers overour headshellip If Britain should go down all of us in allthe Americas would be living at the point of a gun agun loaded with explosive bullets economic as well asmilitary We must produce arms and ships with everyenergy and resource we can commandhellip We must bethe great arsenal of Democracy


31XII40

We are deeply grateful to you for all you saidyesterday We welcome especially the outline of yourplans for giving us the aid without which Hitlerismcannot be extirpated from Europe and Asia We canreadily guess why you have not been able to give aprecise account of how your proposals will be workedout Meanwhile some things make me anxious

First sending the warship to Capetown to take upthe gold lying there may produce embarrassing effectsIt is almost certain to become known This will disturbpublic opinion here and throughout the Dominions andencourage the enemy who will proclaim that you aresending for our last reserves If you feel this is the onlyway directions will be given for the available Captowngold to be loaded on the ship But we should avoid it ifwe can Could we for instance by a technicaloperation exchange gold in South Africa for gold heldfor others at Ottawa and make the latter available formovement to New York We must know soon becausethe ship is on its way


My second anxiety is because we do not know howlong Congress will debate your proposals and how weshould be enabled to place orders for armaments andpay our way if this time became protracted RememberMr President we do not know what you have in mindexactly what the United States is going to do and weare fighting for our lives What would be the effect uponthe world situation if we had to default in payments toyour contractors who have their workmen to payWould not this be exploited by the enemy as acomplete breakdown in Anglo-American co-operationYet a few weeksrsquo delay might well bring this upon us

Thirdly apart from the interim period there arises agroup of problems about the scope of your plan afterbeing approved by Congress What is to be done aboutthe immense heavy payments still due to be madeunder existing orders before delivery is completedSubstantial advance payments on these same ordershave already denuded our resources We havecontinued need for various American commodities notdefinitely weapons ndash for instance raw materials andoils Canada and other Dominions Greece and refugeeallies have clamant dollar needs to keep their wareffort alive I do not seek to know immediately how youwill solve these latter questions We shall be entirelyready for our part to lay bare to you all our resourcesand our liabilities around the world and we shall seekno more help than the common cause demands Wenaturally wish to feel sure that the powers with whichyou propose to arm yourself will be sufficiently wide todeal with these larger matters subject to all properexamination

Sir Frederick Phillips is discussing these matterswith Mr Secretary Morgenthau and he will explain thewar commitments we have in many parts of the worldfor which we could not ask your direct help but forwhich gold and dollars are necessary This applies alsoto the Dutch and Belgian gold which we may becomeunder obligation to return in specie in due course

They burned a large part of the City of London last

night and the scenes of widespread destruction here


and in our provincial centres are shocking but when Ivisited the still-burning ruins today the spirit of theLondoners was as high as in the first days of theindiscriminate bombing in September four months ago

I thank you for testifying before all the world that thefuture safety and greatness of the American Union areintimately concerned with the upholding and theeffective arming of that indomitable spirit

All my heartiest good wishes to you in the New Yearof storm that is opening upon us


14Germany and Russia

Hitler Turns EastwardmdashStalinrsquos Attempts toPlacate GermanymdashCommunist Machinations inthe British FactoriesmdashProjects of Dividing theBritish EmpiremdashSoviet MiscalculationsmdashMolotovrsquosVisit to BerlinmdashHis Meeting with Ribbentrop andwith the FuehrermdashSoviet-Nazi NegotiationsmdashABritish Air Raid IntervenesmdashFurther Argumentwith the FuehrermdashSecond British Air RaidmdashTalksin a DugoutmdashStalinrsquos Account Given to Me inAugust 1942 mdashHitlerrsquos Final Resolve to InvadeRussiamdashMilitary PreparationsmdashThe DraftAgreementmdashThe Soviets Ask for MoremdashAmbas-sador Schulenburgrsquos Efforts to Reach anAgreementmdashHitler VeiledmdashldquoOperation Bar-barossardquo December 1940

HITLER had failed to quell or conquer Britain It was plainthat the Island would persevere to the end Without thecommand of the sea or the air it had been deemedimpossible to move German armies across the ChannelWinter with its storms had closed upon the scene TheGerman attempt to cow the British nation or shatter theirwarmaking capacity and will-power by bombing had beenfoiled and the Blitz was costly There must be manymonthsrsquo delay before ldquoSea Lionrdquo could be revived and withevery week that passed the growth ripening andequipment of the British home armies required a larger


ldquoSea Lionrdquo with aggravated difficulties of transportationEven three-quarters of a million men with all theirfurnishings would not be enough in April or May 1941What chance was there of finding by then the shipping thebarges the special landing-craft necessary for so vast anoversea stroke How could they be assembled under ever-increasing British air-power Meanwhile this air-power fedby busy factories in Britain and the United States and byimmense training schemes for pilots in the Dominionscentred in Canada would perhaps in a year or so make theBritish Air Force superior in numbers as it was already inquality to that of Germany Can we wonder then thatHitler once convinced that Goeringrsquos hopes and boasts hadbeen broken should turn his eyes to the East LikeNapoleon in 1804 he recoiled from the assault of the islanduntil at least the Eastern danger was no more He must henow felt at all costs settle with Russia before stakingeverything on the invasion of Britain Obeying the sameforces and following the same thoughts as Napoleon whenhe marched the Grand Army from Boulogne to UlmAusterlitz and Fried-land Hitler abandoned for the momenthis desire and need to destroy Great Britain That must nowbecome the final act of the dramaThere is no doubt that he had made up his own mind by theend of September 1940 From that time forth the airattacks on Britain though often on a larger scale throughthe general multiplication of aircraft took the second placein the Fuehrerrsquos thoughts and German plans They might bemaintained as effective cover for other designs but Hitlerno longer counted on them for decisive victory Eastwardho Personally on purely military grounds I should not havebeen averse from a German attempt at the invasion ofBritain in the spring or summer of 1941 I believed that theenemy would suffer the most terrific defeat and slaughter


that any country had ever sustained in a specific militaryenterprise But for that very reason I was not so simple asto expect it to happen In war what you donrsquot dislike is notusually what the enemy does Still in the conduct of a longstruggle when time seemed for a year or two on our sideand mighty allies might be gained I thanked God that thesupreme ordeal was to be spared our people As will beseen from my papers written at the time I never seriouslycontemplated a German descent upon England in 1941 Bythe end of 1941 the boot was on the other leg we were nolonger alone three-quarters of the world were with us Buttremendous events measureless before they happenedwere to mark that memorable yearWhile to uninformed continentals and the outer world ourfate seemed forlorn or at best in the balance the relationsbetween Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia assumed thefirst position in world affairs The fundamental antagonismsbetween the two despotic Powers resumed their sway onceit was certain that Britain could not be stunned andoverpowered like France and the Low Countries To do himjustice Stalin tried his very best to work loyally and faithfullywith Hitler while at the same time gathering all the strengthhe could in the enormous mass of Soviet Russia He andMolotov sent their dutiful congratulations on every Germanvictory They poured a heavy flow of food and essential rawmaterials into the Reich Their Fifth Column Communistsdid what they could to disturb our factories Their radiodiffused its abuse and slanders against us They were atany time ready to reach a permanent settlement with NaziGermany upon the numerous important questions openbetween them and to accept with complacency the finaldestruction of the British power But all the while theyrecognised that this policy might fail They were resolved togain time by every means and had no intention as far as


they could measure the problem of basing Russianinterests or ambitions solely upon a German victory Thetwo great totalitarian empires equally devoid of moralrestraints confronted each other polite but inexorableThere had of course been disagreements about Finlandand Rumania The Soviet leaders had been shocked at thefall of France and the end of the Second Front for whichthey were so soon to clamour They had not expected sosudden a collapse and had counted confidently on a phaseof mutual exhaustion on the Western Front Now there wasno Western Front Still it would be foolish to make anyserious change in their collaboration with Germany till itcould be seen whether Britain would give in or be crushedin 1940 As it gradually became apparent to the Kremlinthat Britain was capable of maintaining a prolonged andindefinite war during which anything might happen aboutthe United States and also in Japan Stalin became moreconscious of his danger and more earnest to gain timeNevertheless it is remarkable as we shall see whatadvantages he sacrificed and what risks he ran to keep onfriendly terms with Nazi Germany Even more surprisingwere the miscalculations and the ignorance which hedisplayed about what was coming to him He was indeedfrom September 1940 to the moment of Hitlerrsquos assault inJune 1941 at once a callous a crafty and an ill-informedgiant

With these preliminaries we may come to the episode ofMolotovrsquos visit to Berlin on November 12 1940 Everycompliment was paid and all ceremony shown to theBolshevik envoy when he readied the heart of NaziGermany During the next two days long and tense


discussions took place between Molotov and Ribbentropand also with Hitler All the essential facts of theseformidable interchanges and confrontations have been laidbare in the selection of captured documents published earlyin 1948 by the State Department in Washington under thetitle ldquoNazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941rdquo On this it isnecessary to draw if the story is to be told or understood

Molotovrsquos first meeting was with Ribbentrop1

November 12 1940

The Reich Foreign Minister said that in the letter toStalin he had already expressed the firm conviction ofGermany that no power on earth could alter the factthat the beginning of the end had now arrived for theBritish Empire England was beaten and it was only aquestion of time when she would finally admit herdefeat It was possible that this would happen soonbecause in England the situation was deterioratingdaily Germany would of course welcome an earlyconclusion of the conflict since she did not wish underany circumstances to sacrifice human lives unnecessari-ly If however the British did not make up their mindsin the immediate future to admit their defeat they woulddefinitely ask for peace during the coming yearGermany was continuing her bombing attacks onEngland day and night Her submarines wouldgradually be employed to the full extent and wouldinflict terrible losses on England Germany was of theopinion that England could perhaps be forced by theseattacks to give up the struggle A certain uneasinesswas already apparent in Great Britain which seemed toindicate such a solution If however England were notforced to her knees by the present mode of attackGermany would as soon as weather conditionspermitted resolutely proceed to a large-scale attackand thereby definitely crush England This large-scaleattack had thus far been prevented only by abVspparaweather conditions


Any attempt at a landing or at military operations on

the European Continent by England or by Englandbacked by America was doomed to complete failure atthe start This was no military problem at all This theEnglish had not yet understood because apparentlythere was some degree of confusion in Great Britainand because the country was led by a political andmilitary dilettante by the name of Churchill whothroughout his previous career had completely failed atall decisive moments and who would fail again this time

Furthermore the Axis completely dominated its partof Europe militarily and politically Even France whichhad lost the war and had to pay for it (of which theFrench incidentally were quite aware) had acceptedthe principle that France in the future would never againsupport England and de Gaulle the quixotic conquerorof Africa Because of the extraordinary strength of theirposition the Axis Powers were not thereforeconsidering how they might win the war but rather howrapidly they could end the war which was already won

After luncheon the Soviet Envoy was received by theFuehrer who dilated further upon the total defeat of Britain

The war [he said] had led to complications whichwere not intended by Germany but which hadcompelled her from time to time to react militarily tocertain events

The Fuehrer then outlined to Molotov the course ofmilitary operations up to the present which had led tothe fact that England no longer had an ally on theContinenthellip The English retaliatory measures wereridiculous and the Russian gentlemen could convincethemselves at first hand of the fiction of allegeddestruction in Berlin As soon as atmosphericconditions improved Germany would be poised for the


great and final blow against England At the momentthen it was her aim to try not only to make militarypreparations for this final struggle but also to clarify thepolitical issues which would be of importance duringand after this showdown He had therefore re-examined the relations with Russia and not in anegative spirit but with the intention of organising thempositively ndash if possible for a long period of time In sodoing he had reached several conclusions

1 Germany was not seeking to obtain military aidfrom Russia

2 Because of the tremendous extension of the warGermany had been forced in order to oppose Englandto penetrate into territories remote from her and inwhich she was not basically interested politically oreconomically

3 There were nevertheless certain requirementsthe full importance of which had become apparent onlyduring the war but which were absolutely vital toGermany Among them were certain sources of rawmaterials which were considered by Germany as mostvital and absolutely indispensable

To all this Molotov gave a non-committal assent

Molotov asked about the Tripartite Pact2 What wasthe meaning of the New Order in Europe and in Asiaand what rocircle would the USSR be given in it Theseissues must be discussed during the Berlin conversa-tions and during the contemplated visit of the ReichForeign Minister to Moscow on which the Russianswere definitely counting Moreover there were issuesto be clarified regarding Russiarsquos Balkan and Black Seainterests about Bulgaria Rumania and Turkey Itwould be easier for the Russian Government to givespecific replies to the questions raised by the Fuehrer ifit could obtain the explanations just requested TheSoviet would be interested in the New Order in Europe


and particularly in the tempo and the form of this NewOrder It would also like to have an idea of theboundaries of the so-called Greater East Asian Sphere

The Fuehrer replied that the Tripartite Pact wasintended to regulate conditions in Europe as to thenatural interests of the European countries andconsequently Germany was now approaching theSoviet Union in order that she might express herselfregarding the areas of interest to her In no case was asettlement to be made without Soviet-Russian co-operation This applied not only to Europe but also toAsia where Russia herself was to co-operate in thedefinition of the Greater East Asian Sphere and whereshe was to designate her claims there Germanyrsquos taskin this case was that of a mediator Russia by nomeans was to be confronted with a fait accompli

When the Fuehrer undertook to try to establish theabove-mentioned coalition of Powers it was not theGerman-Russian relationship which appeared to him tobe the most difficult point but the question of whether acollaboration between Germany France and Italy waspossible Only now hellip had he thought it possible tocontact Soviet Russia for the purpose of settling thequestions of the Black Sea the Balkans and Turkey

In conclusion the Fuehrer summed up by statingthat the discussion to a certain extent represented thefirst concrete step toward a comprehensive collabora-tion with due consideration for the problems ofWestern Europe which were to be settled betweenGermany Italy and France as well as for the issues ofthe East which were essentially the concern of Russiaand Japan but in which Germany offered her goodoffices as mediator It was a matter of opposing anyattempt on the part of America to ldquomake money onEuroperdquo The United States had no business in Europein Africa or in Asia

Molotov expressed his agreement with thestatements of the Fuehrer upon the rocircle of America andEngland The participation of Russia in the TripartitePact appeared to him entirely acceptable in principleprovided that Russia was to co-operate as a partner


and not be merely an object In that case he saw nodifficulties in the matter of participation of the SovietUnion in the common effort But the aim and thesignificance of the Pact must first be more closelydefined particularly with regard to the delimitation ofthe Greater East Asian Sphere

When the conferences were resumed on November 15Molotov mentioned the question of the strip of

Lithuanian territory and emphasised that the SovietGovernment had not received any clear answer yetfrom Germany on this question However it awaited adecision Regarding the Bukovina he admitted that thisinvolved an additional territory one not mentioned inthe secret protocol Russia had at first confined herdemands to Northern Bukovina Under the presentcircumstances however Germany must understandthe Russian interest in Southern Bukovina But Russiahad not received an answer to her question regardingthis subject either Instead Germany had guaranteedthe entire territory of Rumania and completelydisregarded Russiarsquos wishes with regard to SouthernBukovina

The Fuehrer replied that it would mean a consider-able concession on the part of Germany if even part ofBukovina were to be occupied by Russiahellip

Molotov however persisted in the opinionpreviously stated that the revisions desired by Russiawere insignificant

The Fuehrer replied that if German-Russiancollaboration was to show positive results in the futurethe Soviet Government would have to understand thatGermany was engaged in a life-and-death strugglewhich at all events she wanted to conclude successful-lyhellip Both sides agreed in principle that Finlandbelonged to the Russian sphere of influence Insteadtherefore of continuing a purely theoretical discussionthey should rather turn to more important problems


After the conquest of England the British Empirewould be apportioned as a gigantic world-wide estate inbankruptcy of forty million square kilometres In thisbankrupt estate there would be for Russia access tothe ice-free and really open ocean Thus far a minorityof forty-five million Englishmen had ruled six hundredmillion inhabitants of the British Empire He was aboutto crush this minority Even the United States wasactually doing nothing but picking out of this bankruptestate a few items particularly suitable to the UnitedStates Germany of course would like to avoid anyconflict which would divert her from her struggle againstthe heart of the Empire the British Isles For thatreason he (the Fuehrer) did not like Italyrsquos war againstGreece as it diverted forces to the periphery instead ofconcentrating them against England at one point Thesame would occur during a Baltic war The conflict withEngland would be fought to the last ditch and he hadno doubt that the defeat of the British Isles would leadto the dissolution of the Empire It was a chimera tobelieve that the Empire could possibly be ruled andheld together from Canada Under those circumstancesthere arose world-wide perspectives During the nextfew weeks they would have to be settled in jointdiplomatic negotiations with Russia and Russiarsquosparticipation in the solution of these problems wouldhave to be arranged All the countries which couldpossibly be interested in the bankrupt estate wouldhave to stop all controversies among themselves andconcern themselves exclusively with the partition of theBritish Empire This applied to Germany France ItalyRussia and Japan

Molotov replied that he had followed the argumentsof the Fuehrer with interest and that he was inagreement with everything that he had understood

Hitler then retired for the night After supper at the SovietEmbassy there was a British air raid on Berlin We had


heard of the conference beforehand and though not invitedto join in the discussion did not wish to be entirely left out ofthe proceedings On the ldquoAlertrdquo all moved to the shelterand the conversation was continued till midnight by the twoForeign Secretaries in safer surroundings The Germanofficial account says

Because of the air raid the two Ministers went intothe Reich Foreign Ministerrsquos air-raid shelter at 940 PMin order to conduct the final conversation

The time was not yet ripe said Ribbentrop for

discussing the new order of things in Poland TheBalkan issue had already been discussed extensivelyIn the Balkans we had solely an economic interest andwe did not want England to disturb us there Thegranting of the German guarantee to Rumania hadapparently been misconstrued by Moscowhellip In all itsdecisions the German Government was guided solelyby the endeavour to preserve peace in the Balkans andto prevent England from gaining a foothold there andfrom interfering with supplies to Germany Thus our[German] action in the Balkans was motivatedexclusively by the circumstances of our war againstEngland As soon as England conceded her defeat andasked for peace German interests in the Balkanswould be confined exclusively to the economic fieldand German troops would be withdrawn from RumaniaGermany had as the Fuehrer had repeatedly declaredno territorial interests in the Balkans He could onlyrepeat again and again that the decisive question waswhether the Soviet Union was prepared and in aposition to co-operate with us in the great liquidation ofthe British Empire On all other questions we wouldeasily reach an understanding if we could succeed inextending our relations and in defining the spheres ofinfluence Where the spheres of influence lay had beenstated repeatedly It was therefore ndash as the Fuehrer hadso clearly put it ndash a matter of the interests of the Soviet


Union and Germany requiring that the partners standnot breast to breast but back to back in order tosupport each other in the achievement of theiraspirations

In his reply Molotov stated that the Germans wereassuming that the war against England had alreadyactually been won If therefore as had been said inanother connection Germany was waging a life-and-death struggle against England he could only construethis as meaning that Germany was fighting ldquofor liferdquo andEngland ldquofor deathrdquo As to the question of collaborationhe quite approved of it but he added that they had [to]come to a thorough understanding This idea had alsobeen expressed in Stalinrsquos letter A delimitation of thespheres of influence must also be sought On this pointhowever he (Molotov) could not take a definitive standat this time since he did not know the opinion of Stalinand of his other friends in Moscow in the matterHowever he had to state that all these great issues oftomorrow could not be separated from the issues oftoday and the fulfilment of existing agreementshellip

Thereupon Herr Molotov cordially bade farewell tothe Reich Foreign Minister stressing that he did notregret the air-raid alarm because he owed to it such anexhaustive conversation with the Reich ForeignMinister

When in August 1942 I first visited Moscow I receivedfrom Stalinrsquos lips a shorter account of this conversationwhich in no essential differs from the German record butmay be thought more pithy

ldquoA little while agordquo said Stalin ldquothe great complaintagainst Molotov was that he was too pro-German Noweveryone says he is too pro-British But neither of usever trusted the Germans For us it was always life anddeathrdquo I interjected that we had been through thisourselves and so knew how they felt ldquoWhen Molotovrdquo


said the Marshal ldquowent to see Ribbentrop in Berlin inNovember of 1940 you got wind of it and sent an airraidrdquo I nodded ldquoWhen the alarm sounded Ribbentropled the way down many flights of stairs to a deepshelter sumptuously furnished When he got inside theraid had begun He shut the door and said to MolotovlsquoNow here we are alone together Why should we notdividersquo Molotov said lsquoWhat will England sayrsquolsquoEng-landrsquo said Ribbentrop lsquois finished She is no more useas a PowerrsquolsquoIf that is sorsquo said Molotov lsquowhy are we inthis shelter and whose are these bombs which fallrsquordquo

The Berlin conversations made no difference to Hitlerrsquosdeep resolve During October Keitel Jodl and the GermanGeneral Staff had under his orders been forming andshaping the plans for the eastward movement of theGerman armies and for the invasion of Russia in the earlysummer of 1941 It was not necessary at this stage todecide on the exact date which might also be affected bythe weather Having regard to the distances to be traversedafter the frontiers were crossed and the need of takingMoscow before the winter began it was obvious that thebeginning of May offered the best prospects Moreover theassembly and deployment of the German Army along thetwo-thousand-mile front from the Baltic to the Black Seaand the provision of all the magazines camps and railwaysidings was in itself one of the largest military tasks everundertaken and no delay either in planning or in actioncould be tolerated Over all hung the vital need forconcealment and deceptionFor this purpose two separate forms of cover were used byHitler each of which had advantages of its own The firstwas an elaborate negotiation about a common policy basedon the partition and distribution of the British Empire in the


East The second was the domination of RumaniaBulgaria and Greece with Hungary on the way by asteady influx of troops This offered important military gainsand at the same time masked or presented an explanationfor the building-up of the German armies on the southernflank of the front to be developed against RussiaThe negotiations took the form of draft proposals byGermany for the accession of Soviet Russia to the Three-Power Pact at the expence of British interests in the OrientIf Stalin had accepted this scheme events might for a timehave taken a different course It was possible at anymoment for Hitler to suspend his plans for invading RussiaWe cannot attempt to describe what might have happenedas the result of an armed alliance between the two greatempires of the Continent with their millions of soldiers toshare the spoil in the Balkans Turkey Persia and theMiddle East with India always in the background and withJapan as an eager partner in the ldquoGreater East AsiaSchemerdquo But Hitlerrsquos heart was set on destroying theBolsheviks for whom his hatred was mortal He believedthat he had the force to gain his main life-aim Thereafter allthe rest would be added unto him He must have knownfrom the conversations at Berlin and other contacts that theproposals which he made Ribbentrop send to Moscow fellfar short of Russian ambitionsA draft bearing no date of a Four-Power Pact was found inthe captured correspondence of the German Foreign Officewith the German Embassy in Moscow This apparentlyformed the basis for Schulenburgrsquos conversation withMolotov reported on November 26 1940 By this GermanyItaly and Japan were to agree to respect each otherrsquosnatural spheres of influence In so far as these spheres ofinterest came into contact with each other they would


constantly consult each other in an amicable way withregard to the problems arising therefromGermany Italy and Japan declared on their part that theyrecognised the present extent of the possessions of theSoviet Union and would respect themThe Four Powers undertook to join no combination ofPowers and to support no combination of Powers whichwas directed against one of the Four Powers They wouldassist each other in economic matters in every way andwould supplement and extend the agreements existingamong themselves The agreement would continue for aperiod of ten yearsTo this there was to be a secret protocol by which Germanydeclared that apart from the territorial revisions in Europeto be carried out at the conclusion of peace her territorialaspirations centred in the territories of Central Africa Italydeclared that apart from territorial revisions in Europe herterritorial aspirations centred in the territories of Northernand Northeastern Africa Japan declared that her territorialaspirations centred in the area of Eastern Asia to the southof the Island Empire of Japan and the Soviet Uniondeclared that its territorial aspirations centred south of thenational territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of theIndian OceanThe Four Powers declared that reserving the settlement ofspecific questions they would mutually respect theseterritorial aspirations and would not oppose theirachievement3

As was expected the Soviet Government did not acceptthe German project They were alone with Germany in


Europe and at the other side of the world Japan lay heavyupon them Nevertheless they had confidence in theirgrowing strength and in their vast expanse of territoryamounting to one-sixth of the land-surface of the globeThey therefore bargained toughly On November 26 1940Schulenburg sent to Berlin the draft of the Russian counter-proposals These stipulated that the German troops shouldbe immediately withdrawn from Finland which under theCompact of 1939 belonged to the Soviet Unionrsquos sphere ofinfluence that within the next few months the security of theSoviet Union in the Straits should be assured by theconclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the SovietUnion and Bulgaria which geographically is situated insidethe security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the SovietUnion and by the establishment of a base for land andnaval forces of the USSR within range of the Bosphorusand the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease thatthe area south of Batum and Baku in the general directionof the Persian Gulf should be recognised as the centre ofthe aspirations of the Soviet Union that Japan shouldrenounce her rights to concessions for coal and oil inNorthern SakhalinNo effective answer was returned to this document Noattempt was made by Hitler to split the difference Issues sograve as these might well justify a prolonged and carefulstudy in a friendly spirit by both sides The Soviets certainlyexpected and awaited an answer Meanwhile on both sidesof the frontier the forces already heavy began to grow andHitlerrsquos right hand reached out towards the Balkans

The plans prepared on his instructions by Keitel and Jodlhad by now reached sufficient maturity to enable the


Fuehrer to issue from his headquarters on December 181940 his historic Directive Number 21

OPERATION BARBAROSSAThe German Armed Forces must be prepared to

crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign4 even beforethe conclusion of the war against England

For this purpose the Army will have to employ allavailable units with the reservation that the occupiedterritories must be secured against surprise attacks

For the Air Force it will be a matter of releasing suchstrong forces for the eastern campaign in support of theArmy that a quick completion of the ground operationsmay be expected and that damage to Eastern Germanterritory by enemy air attacks will be as slight aspossible This concentration of the main effort in theEast is limited by the requirement that the entirecombat and armament area dominated by us mustremain adequately protected against enemy air attacksand that the offensive operations against Englandparticularly her supply lines must not be permitted tobreak down

The main effort of the Navy will remain unequivocal-ly directed against England even during an easterncampaign

I shall order the concentration against Soviet Russiapossibly eight weeks before the intended beginning ofoperations

Preparations requiring more time to begin are to bestarted now ndash if this has not yet been done ndash and are tobe completed by May 15 1941

It is to be considered of decisive importancehowever that the intention to attack is not discovered

The preparations of the High Commands are to bemade on the following basis

IGeneral PurposeThe mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is

to be destroyed in daring operations by driving forwarddeep armoured wedges and the retreat of units


capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territoryis to be prevented

In quick pursuit a line is then to be reached fromwhich the Russian Air Force will no longer be able toattack German Reich territory The ultimate objective ofthe operation is to establish a defence line againstAsiatic Russia from a line running approximately fromthe Volga River to Archangel Then in case ofnecessity the last industrial area left to Russia in theUrals can be eliminated by the Luftwaffe

In the course of these operations the Russian BalticSea Fleet will quickly lose its bases and thus will nolonger be able to fight

Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force is tobe prevented by powerful blows at the very beginningof the operation

IIProbable Allies and their Tasks1 On the flanks of our operation we can count on

the active participation of Rumania and Finland in thewar against Soviet Russia

The High Command will in due time concert anddetermine in what form the armed forces of the twocountries will be placed under German command at thetime of their intervention

2 It will be the task of Rumania together with theforce concentrating there to pin down the enemy facingher and in addition to render auxiliary services in therear area

3 Finland will cover the concentration of theredeployed German North Group (parts of the XXIGroup) coming from Norway and will operate jointly withit Besides Finland will be assigned the task ofeliminating Hango

4 It may be expected that Swedish railroads andhighways will be available for the concentration of theGerman North Group from the start of operations at thelatest

IIIDirection of OperationsA Army (hereby approving the plans presented to

me)


In the zone of operations divided by the PripetMarshes into a southern and northern sector the maineffort will be made north of this area Two Army Groupswill be provided here

The southern group of these two Army Groups ndash thecentre of the entire front ndash will be given the task ofannihilating the forces of the enemy in White Russia byadvancing from the region around and north of Warsawwith especially strong armoured and motorised unitshellipOnly a surprisingly fast collapse of Russian resistancecould justify aiming at both objectives simultaneouslyhellip

The Army Group employed south of the PripetMarshesis to make its main effort in the area fromLublin in the general direction of Kiev in order topenetrate quickly with strong armoured units into thedeep flank and rear of the Russian forces and then toroll them up along the Dnieper River

The German-Rumanian groups on the right flank areassigned the task of

(a)protecting Rumanian territory and thereby thesouthern flank of the entire operation

(b)pinning down the opposing enemy forces whileArmy Group South is attacking on its northern flankand according to the progressive development of thesituation and in conjunction with the Air Forcepreventing their orderly retreat across the Dniesterduring the pursuit

[and] in the north of reaching Moscow quicklyThe capture of this city means a decisive success

politically and economically and beyond that theelimination of the most important railway centre

B Air ForceIts task will be to paralyse and to eliminate as far as

possible the intervention of the Russian Air Force aswell as to support the Army at its main points of effectparticularly those of Army Group Centre and on theflank those of Army Group South The Russianrailroads in the order of their importance for theoperations will be cut or the most important near-byobjectives (river crossings) seized by the boldemployment of parachute and airborne troops


In order to concentrate all forces against the enemyAir Force and to give immediate support to the Armythe armament industry will not be attacked during themain operations Only after the completion of themobile operations may such attacks be considered ndashprimarily against the Ural regionhellip

IV All orders to be issued by the Commanders-in-Chief on the basis of this directive must clearly indicatethat they are precautionary measures for the possibilitythat Russia should change her present attitude towardsus The number of officers to be assigned to thepreparatory work at an early date is to be kept as smallas possible additional personnel should be briefed aslate as possible and only to the extent required for theactivity of each individual Otherwise through thediscovery of our preparations ndash the date of theirexecution has not even been fixed ndash there is dangerthat most serious political and military disadvantagesmay arise

V I expect reports from the Commanders-in-chiefconcerning their further plans based on this directive

The contemplated preparations of all branches ofthe Armed Forces including their progress are to bereported to me through the High Command [OKW]

ADOLF HITLER5

From this moment the moulds had been shaped for thesupreme events of 1941 We of course had no knowledgeof the bargainings between Germany and Russia fordividing the spoils of our Empire and for our destruction norcould we measure the as yet unformed intentions of JapanThe main troop movements of the German armieseastward had not yet become apparent to our activeIntelligence Service Only the infiltration and gradualmassing in Bulgaria and Rumania could be discerned Had


we known what is set forth in this chapter we should havebeen greatly relieved The combination against us ofGermany Russia and Japan was the worst of our fearsBut who could tell Meanwhile ldquoFight onrdquo


15Ocean Peril

Disguised Surface Raiders mdash Excursion of theldquoScheerrdquomdash The ldquoJervis Bayrdquo Saves the Convoy mdashFurther Depredations of the ldquoScheerrdquomdash A Surprisefor the ldquoHipperrdquomdash Disproportionate Strains mdash TheU-Boat Peril Dominates mdash Increasing Strangle-hold upon the Northwestern Approaches mdashGrievous Losses mdash A Cruel Stroke of Fortune mdashThe Diverrsquos Anxieties mdash Need to Shift the Controlfrom Plymouth to Liverpool mdash Sharp Contractionof Imports mdash Losses off the Bloody Foreland mdashWithdrawal of the Irish Subsidies mdash My Telegramto the President of December 13 mdash A SombreAdmiralty Proposal mdash The Dynamite Carpet mdashReinforcement and Stimulation of the Air ForceCoastal Command mdash Eventual Success of TheirCounter-Offensive

THE destruction of the Graf Spee in the action off the Platein December 1939 had brought to an abrupt end the firstGerman campaign against our shipping in the wide oceansThe fighting in Norway had as we have seen paralysed forthe time being the German Navy in home waters What wasleft of it was necessarily reserved for the invasion projectAdmiral Raeder whose ideas on the conduct of theGerman war at sea were technically sound had somedifficulty in carrying his views in the Fuehrerrsquos councils Hehad even at one time to resist a proposal made by the Armyto disarm all his heavy ships and use their guns for long-


range batteries on shore During the summer however hehad fitted out a number of merchant ships as disguisedraiders They were more powerfully armed were generallyfaster than our armed merchant cruisers and wereprovided with reconnaissance aircraft Five ships of thistype evaded our patrols and entered the Atlantic betweenApril and June 1940 whilst a sixth undertook thehazardous northeast passage to the Pacific along the northcoasts of Russia and Siberia Assisted by a Russian ice-breaker she succeeded in making the passage in twomonths and emerged into the Pacific through the BeringSea in September The object which Admiral Raeder laiddown for the conduct of these ships was threefold first todestroy or capture enemy ships secondly to dislocateshipping movements and thirdly to force the dispersion ofBritish warships for escort and patrol to counter themenace These well-conceived tactics caused us bothinjury and embarrassment By the first weeks ofSeptember these five disguised raiders were loose uponour trade routes Two of them were working in the Atlantictwo others in the Indian Ocean and the fifth after layingmines off Auckland New Zealand was in the Pacific Onlytwo contacts were made with them during the whole yearOn July 29 Raider E was engaged in the South Atlantic bythe armed merchant-cruiser Alcantara but escaped after aninconclusive action In December another armed merchantcruiser the Carnarvon Castle attacked her again off thePlate River but she escaped after some damage Up till theend of September 1940 these five raiders sank orcaptured thirty-six ships amounting to 235000 tonsAt the end of October 1940 the pocket battleship Scheerwas at last ready for service When the invasion of Englandhad been shelved she left Germany on October 27 andbroke out into the Atlantic through the Denmark Strait north


of Iceland She was followed a month later by the eight-inchgun cruiser Hipper The Scheer had orders to attack theNorth Atlantic convoys from which the battleship escortshad been withdrawn to reinforce the MediterraneanCaptain Krancke believed that a homeward-bound convoyhad left Halifax on October 27 and he hoped to intercept itabout November 3 On the 5th his aircraft reported eightships in the southeast and he set off in pursuit At 227 PMhe sighted a single ship the Mopan which he sank bygunfire after taking on board the crew of sixty-eight Bythreats he had been able to prevent any wireless reportsbeing made by the Mopan At 450 PM whilst thusoccupied the masts of the convoy HX 84 consisting ofthirty-seven ships appeared over the horizon In the centreof the convoy was the ocean escort the armed merchantcruiser Jervis Bay Her commanding officer Captain FegenRN realised at once that he was faced with hopelessodds His one thought after reporting the presence of theenemy by wireless was to engage the pocket battleship foras long as possible and thus gain time for the convoy todisperse Darkness approached and there would then be achance of many escaping While the convoy scattered theJervis Bay closed his overwhelming antagonist at fullspeed The Scheer opened fire at eighteen thousand yardsThe shots of the old six-inch guns of the Jervis Bay fellshort The one-sided fight lasted till 6 PM when the JervisBay heavily on fire and completely out of control wasabandoned She finally sank about eight orsquoclock with theloss of over two hundred officers and men With themperished Captain Fegen who went down with the ship Hewas awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously for his heroicconduct which takes an honoured place in the records ofthe Royal Navy


Not until the end of the fight did the Scheer pursue theconvoy but the wintry night had now closed in The shipshad scattered and she was able to overtake and sink onlyfive before darkness fell She could not afford now that herposition was known to remain in the area on which sheexpected that powerful British forces would soon convergeThe great majority of this valuable convoy was thereforesaved by the devotion of the Jervis Bay The spirit of themerchant seamen was not unequal to that of their escortOne ship the tanker San Demetrio carrying seventhousand tons of petrol was set on fire and abandoned Butthe next morning part of the crew reboarded the ship putout the fire and then after gallant efforts withoutcompasses or navigational aids brought the ship into aBritish port with her precious cargo In all however 47000tons of shipping and 206 merchant seamen were lostScheer determined to place as many miles as possiblebetween herself and her pursuers steamed south whereten days later she met a German supply ship andreplenished her fuel and stores On November 24 sheappeared in the West Indies where she sank the PortHobart outward-bound to Curaccedilao and then doubled backto the Cape Verde Islands Her later activities were spreadover the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans and not till April1941 did she return to Kiel after again successfullytraversing the Denmark Strait Her five monthsrsquo cruise hadyielded a harvest of sixteen ships of 99000 tons sunk orcaptured

From June onward the troop convoys (called by the codename ldquoWSrdquo)1 sailed monthly under heavy escort round the


Cape to the Middle East and India At the same time thenumerous troop convoys between ports in the Indian Oceanand the continuous stream of Canadian troops reaching thiscountry from across the Atlantic threw the utmost strain onour naval resources Thus we could not reinstitute thehunting groups which had scoured the seas for the GrafSpee in 1939 Our cruisers were disposed in the focal areasnear the main shipping routes and ships sailingindependently had to rely on evasive routing and thevastness of the oceanOn Christmas Day 1940 convoy WS 5A consisting oftwenty troopships and supply ships for the Middle East wasapproaching the Azores when it was attacked by the cruiserHipper which had followed the Scheer out a month laterVisibility was poor and the Hipper was unpleasantlysurprised to find that the escort comprised the cruisersBerwick Bona-venture and Dunedin There was a briefsharp action between the Hipper and the Berwick in whichboth ships were damaged The Hipper made off and in themist succeeded in escaping to Brest in spite of strenuousefforts by the Home Fleet and by Force ldquoHrdquo from Gibraltar tocatch her but only one ship of the convoy which carriedover thirty thousand men the Empire Trooper had to putinto Gibraltar for repairsWe could not regard the state of the outer oceans withoutuneasiness We knew that disguised merchant ships inunknown numbers were preying in all the southern watersThe pocket battleship Scheer was loose and hidden TheHipper might break out at any moment from Brest and thetwo German battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenaumust also soon be expected to play their partThe enormous disproportion between the numbers of theraiders and the forces the Admiralty had to employ to


counter them and guard the immense traffic has beenexplained in Volume I The Admiralty had to be ready atmany points and give protection to thousands of merchantvessels and could give no guarantee except for troopconvoys against occasional lamentable disasters

A far graver danger was added to these problems The onlything that ever really frightened me during the war was theU-boat peril Invasion I thought even before the air battlewould fail After the air victory it was a good battle for usWe could drown and kill this horrible foe in circumstancesfavourable to us and as he evidently realised bad for himIt was the kind of battle which in the cruel conditions ofwar one ought to be content to fight But now our life-lineeven across the broad oceans and especially in theentrances to the island was endangered I was even moreanxious about this battle than I had been about the gloriousair fight called the Battle of BritainThe Admiralty with whom I lived in the closest amity andcontact shared these fears all the more because it wastheir prime responsibility to guard our shores from invasionand to keep the life-lines open to the outer world This hadalways been accepted by the Navy as their ultimatesacred inescapable duty So we poised and ponderedtogether on this problem It did not take the form of flaringbattles and glittering achieve ments It manifested itselfthrough statistics diagrams and curves unknown to thenation incomprehensible to the publicHow much would the U-boat warfare reduce our importsand shipping Would it ever reach the point where our lifewould be destroyed Here was no field for gestures orsensations only the slow cold drawing of lines on charts


which showed potential strangulation Compared with thisthere was no value in brave armies ready to leap upon theinvader or in a good plan for desert warfare The high andfaithful spirit of the people counted for nought in this bleakdomain Either the food supplies and arms from the NewWorld and from the British Empire arrived across theoceans or they failed With the whole French seaboardfrom Dunkirk to Bordeaux in their hands the Germans lostno time in making bases for their U-boats and co-operatingaircraft in the captured territory From July onward we werecompelled to divert our shipping from the approaches southof Ireland where of course we were not allowed to stationfighter aircraft All had to come in around Northern IrelandHere by the grace of God Ulster stood a faithful sentinelThe Mersey the Clyde were the lungs through which webreathed On the east coast and in the English Channelsmall vessels continued to ply under an ever-increasingattack by air by E-boat2 and by mines As it wasimpossible to vary the east coast route the passage ofeach convoy between the Forth and London becamealmost every day an action in itself Few large ships wererisked on the east coast and none at all in the ChannelThe losses inflicted on our merchant shipping became mostgrave during the twelve months from July lsquo40 to July lsquo41when we could claim that the British Battle of the Atlanticwas won Far heavier losses occurred when the UnitedStates entered the war before any convoy system was setup along their eastern coast But then we were no longeralone The last six months of 1940 showed extremely heavylosses modified only by the winter gales and no greatslaughter of U-boats We gained some advantage by largerpatterning of depth-charges and by evasive routing but theinvasion threat required strong concentrations in the NarrowSeas and our great volume of anti-U-boat new construction


only arrived gradually This shadow hung over the Admiraltyand those who shared their knowledge The week endingSeptember 22 showed the highest rate of loss since thebeginning of the war and was in fact greater than any wehad suffered in a similar period in 1917 Twenty-sevenships of nearly 160000 tons were sunk many of them in aHalifax convoy In October while the Scheer was alsoactive another Atlantic convoy was massacred by U-boatstwenty ships being sunk out of thirty-fourAs November and December drew on the entrances andestuaries of the Mersey and the Clyde far surpassed inmortal significance all other factors in the war We could ofcourse at this time have descended upon de ValerarsquosIreland and regained the southern ports by force of modernarms I had always declared that nothing but self-preservation would lead me to this But perhaps the case ofself-preservation might come Then so be it Even this hardmeasure would only have given a mitigation The only sureremedy was to secure free exit and entrance in the Merseyand the ClydeEvery day when they met those few who knew looked atone another One understands the diver deep below thesurface of the sea dependent from minute to minute uponhis air-pipe What would he feel if he could see a growingshoal of sharks biting at it All the more when there was nopossibility of his being hauled to the surface For us therewas no surface The diver was forty-six millions of people inan overcrowded island carrying on a vast business of warall over the world anchored by nature and gravity to thebottom of the sea What could the sharks do to his air-pipeHow could he ward them off or destroy themAs early as the beginning of August I had been convincedthat it would be impossible to control the western


approaches through the Mersey and Clyde from theCommand at Plymouth


4VIII40

The repeated severe losses in the northwesternapproaches are most grievous and I wish to feelassured that they are being grappled with with thesame intense energy that marked the Admiraltytreatment of the magnetic mine There seems to havebeen a great falling-off in the control of theseapproaches No doubt this is largely due to theshortage of destroyers through invasion precautionsLet me know at once the whole outfit of destroyerscorvettes and Asdic trawlers together with aircraftavailable and employed in this area Who is in chargeof their operations Are they being controlled fromPlymouth and Admiral Nasmithrsquos staff Now that youhave shifted the entry from the south to the north thequestion arises Is Plymouth the right place for theCommand Ought not a new Command of the firstorder to be created in the Clyde or should AdmiralNasmith [C-in-C at Plymouth] move thither Anyhowwe cannot go on like this How is the southern minefieldbarrage getting on Would it not be possible after awhile to ring the changes upon it for a short time andbring some convoys in through the gap which has beenleft This is only a passing suggestion

There were always increased dangers to beapprehended from using only one set of approachesThese dangers cannot be surmounted unless theprotective concentration is carried out with vigoursuperior to that which must be expected from theenemy He will soon learn to put everything there It israther like the early days in the Moray Firth after theeast coast minefield was laid I am confident the


Admiralty will rise to the occasion but evidently a greatnew impulse is needed Pray let me hear from you

I encountered resistances The Admiralty accepted my viewin September of moving from Plymouth to the North rightlysubstituting the Mersey for the Clyde But several monthselapsed before the necessary headquarters organisationwith its operation rooms and elaborate network ofcommunications could be brought into being and in themeantime much improvisation was necessary The newCommand was entrusted to Admiral Sir Percy Noble whowith a large and ever-growing staff was installed atLiverpool in February 1941 Hence-forward this becamealmost our most important station The need andadvantage of the change was by then recognised by allTowards the end of 1940 I became increasingly concernedabout the ominous fall in imports This was another aspectof the U-boat attack Not only did we lose ships but theprecautions we took to avoid losing them impaired thewhole flow of merchant traffic The few harbours on whichwe could now rely became congested The turn-round of allvessels as well as their voyages was lengthened Importswere the final test In the week ending June 8 during theheight of the battle in France we had brought into thecountry 1201535 tons of cargo exclusive of oil From thispeak figure imports had declined at the end of July to lessthan 750000 tons a week Although substantialimprovement was made in August the weekly averageagain fell and for the last three months of the year was littlemore than 800000 tons



3XII40

The new disaster which has overtaken the Halifaxconvoy requires precise examination We heard abouta week ago that as many as thirteen U-boats were lyingin wait on these approaches Would it not have beenwell to divert the convoy to the Minches Would this nothave been even more desirable when owing to badweather the outward-bound convoys were delayed andconsequently the escort for the inward-bound could notreach the dangerous area in time

Prime Minister toChancellor of theExchequer

5XII40

Pray convene a meeting to discuss the measures tobe taken to reduce the burden on our shipping andfinances in consequence of the heavy sinkings off theIrish coast and our inability to use the Irish ports Thefollowing Ministers should be summoned TradeShipping Agriculture Food Dominions Assumingthere is agreement on principle a general plan shouldbe made for acting as soon as possible together with atime-table and programme of procedure It is notnecessary to consider either the Foreign Affairs or theDefence aspect at this stage These will have to bedealt with later The first step essential is to have agood workable scheme with as much in it as possiblethat does not hit us worse than it does the others


13XII40

I am obliged to you for your note of December 3 onsteel and I hope that you are pushing forward with thenecessary measures to give effect to your proposals

In present circumstances it seems to me intolerablethat firms should hold wagons up by delaying to unload


them and action should certainly be taken to preventthis

A sample shows that the average time taken by non-tanker cargo ships to turn round at Liverpool rose fromtwelve and a half days in February to fifteen days inJuly and nineteen and a half in October At Bristol theincrease was from nine and a half to fourteen and ahalf days but at Glasgow the time remained steady attwelve days To improve this seems one of the mostimportant aspects of the whole situation


13XII40

I see that oil imports during September and Octoberwere only half what they were in May and June andcovered only two-thirds of our consumption Iunderstand that there is no shortage of tankers that thefall is the result of the partial closing of the south andeast coast to tankers and that a large number had tobe temporarily laid up in the Clyde and others held atHalifax Nova Scotia More recently some tankers havebeen sent to the south and east coasts and oil importsincreased during November

From the reply your predecessor3 made to myMinute of August 26 I gathered that he was satisfiedwith the preparations in hand for the importation of oilthrough the west coast ports His expectations do notappear to have been fulfilled

There are two policies which can be followed tomeet this situation We can either expose oil tankers toadditional risk by bringing them to south and east coastports and thus increase our current imports or we cancontinue to draw upon our stocks relying upon beingable to replenish them from the west coast ports whenarrangements have been completed for the handling ofthe cargoes and accepting the resulting inconvenienceI should be glad if you would consider in consultationwith the First Lord to what extent each of these twopolicies should be followed

I am sending a copy of this letter to the First Lord



14XII40

Let me have a full account of the condition of theAmerican destroyers showing their many defects andthe little use we have been able to make of them so farI should like to have the paper by me for considerationin the near future


27XII40

What have you done about catapulting expendableaircraft from ships in outgoing convoys I have heard ofa plan to catapult them from tankers of which there arenearly always some in each convoy They then attackthe Focke-Wulf and land in the sea where the pilot ispicked up and machines salved or not as convenient

How is this plan viewed

As we shall see in the next volume this project was fruitfulShips equipped for catapulting fighter aircraft to attack theFocke-Wulf were developed early in 1941


27XII40

It is said that two-fifths of the decline in the fertility ofour shipping is due to the loss of time in turning roundships in British ports Now that we are confined solargely to the Mersey and the Clyde and must expectincreasingly severe attacks upon them it would seemthat this problem constitutes the most dangerous part ofthe whole of our front

Would you kindly give me a note on

1

The facts


2

What you are doing and what you propose todo

3

How you can be helped


29XII40

These [U-boat decoy ships]4 have been a greatdisappointment so far this war The question of theiralternative uses ought to be considered by theAdmiralty I expect they have a large number of skilledratings on board Could I have a list of these ships theirtonnage speeds etc Could they not carry troops orstores while plying on their routes

My indignation at the denial of the Southern Irish portsmounted under these pressures

Prime Minister to theChancellor of theExchequer

1XII40

The straits to which we are being reduced by Irishaction compel a reconsideration of these subsidies [toIreland] It can hardly be argued that we can go onpaying them till our last gasp Surely we ought to usethis money to build more ships or buy more from theUnited States in view of the heavy sinkings off theBloody Foreland

Pray let me know how these subsidies could beterminated and what retaliatory measures could betaken in the financial sphere by the Irish observing thatwe are not afraid of their cutting off our food as it would


save us the enormous mass of fertilisers and feeding-stuffs we have to carry into Ireland through the DeValera-aided German blockade Do not assemble allthe pros and cons for the moment but show what wecould do financially and what would happen I shouldbe glad to know about this tomorrow


3XII40

I gave you and each of the COS a copy of the Irishpaper The Chancellor of the Exchequerrsquos commentsare also favourable and there is no doubt subsidiescan be withdrawn at very short notice

We must now consider the military reactionSuppose they invited the Germans into their ports theywould divide their people and we should endeavour tostop the Germans They would seek to be neutral andwould bring the war upon themselves If they withdrewthe various cable and watching facilities they havewhat would this amount to observing that we couldsuspend all connections between England andSouthern Ireland Suppose they let German U-boatscome in to refresh in west coast ports of Ireland wouldthis be serious observing that U-boats have a radius ofnearly thirty days and that the limiting factor is desire ofcrews to get home and need of refit rather than needof refuelling and provisioning Pray let me have yourobservations on these and other points which mayoccur to you

I thought it well to try to bring the President along in thispolicy


13 XII40


North Atlantic transport remains the prime anxietyUndoubtedly Hitler will augment his U-boat and airattack on shipping and operate ever farther into theocean Now that we are denied the use of Irish portsand airfields our difficulties strain our flotillas to theutmost limit We have so far only been able to bring avery few of your fifty destroyers into action on accountof the many defects which they naturally develop whenexposed to Atlantic weather after having been laid upso long I am arranging to have a very full technicalaccount prepared of renovations and improvementsthat have to be made in the older classes of destroyersto fit them for the present task and this may be of useto you in regard to your own older flotillas

In the meanwhile we are so hard pressed at sea thatwe cannot undertake to carry any longer the 400000tons of feeding-stuffs and fertilisers which we havehitherto convoyed to Eire through all the attacks of theenemy We need this tonnage for our own supply andwe do not need the food which Eire has been sendingus We must now concentrate on essentials and theCabinet proposes to let De Valera know that we cannotgo on supplying him under present conditions He willof course have plenty of food for his people but theywill not have the prosperous trading they are makingnow I am sorry about this but we must think of ourown self-preservation and use for vital purposes ourown tonnage brought in through so many perilsPerhaps this may loosen things up and make him moreready to consider common interests I should like toknow quite privately what your reactions would be ifand when we are forced to concentrate our owntonnage upon the supply of Great Britain We also donot feel able in present circumstances to continue theheavy subsidies we have hitherto been paying to theIrish agricultural producers You will realise also thatour merchant seamen as well as public opiniongenerally take it much amiss that we should have tocarry Irish supplies through air and U-boat attacks and


subsidise them handsomely when De Valera is quitecontent to sit happy and see us strangle

One evening in December I held a meeting in thedownstairs War Room with only the Admiralty and thesailors present All the perils and difficulties about whichthe company was well informed had taken a sharper turnMy mind reverted to February and March 1917 when thecurve of U-boat sinkings had mounted so steadily againstus that one wondered how many monthsrsquo more fighting theAllies had in them in spite of all the Royal Navy could doOne cannot give a more convincing proof of the dangerthan the project which the Admirals put forward We mustat all costs and with overriding priorities break out to theocean For this purpose it was proposed to lay anunderwater carpet of dynamite from the seaward end of theNorth Channel which gives access to the Mersey and theClyde to the hundred-fathom line northwest of Ireland Asubmerged mine-field must be laid three miles broad andsixty miles long from these coastal waters to the openocean Even if all the available explosives weremonopolised for this task without much regard to fieldoperations or the proper rearmament of our troops itseemed vital to make this carpet ndash assuming there was noother wayLet me explain the process Many thousands of contactmines would have to be anchored to the bottom of the seareaching up to within thirty-five feet of its surface Over thispathway all the ships which fed Britain or carried on ourwarfare abroad could pass and repass without their keelsstriking the mines A U-boat however venturing into thisminefield would soon be blown up and after a while they


would find it not good enough to come Here was thedefensive in excelsis Anyhow it was better than nothing Itwas the last resort Provisional approval and directions fordetailed proposals to be presented were given on this nightSuch a policy meant that the diver would in future bethinking about nothing but his air-pipe But he had otherwork to doAt the same time however we gave orders to the RAFCoastal Command to dominate the outlets from the Merseyand Clyde and around Northern Ireland Nothing must bespared from this task It had supreme priority The bombingof Germany took second place All suitable machinespilots and material must be concentrated upon our counter-offensive by fighters against the enemy bombers andsurface craft assisted by bombers against the U-boats inthese narrow vital waters Many other important projectswere brushed aside delayed or mauled At all costs onemust breatheWe shall see the extent to which this counter-offensive bythe Navy and by Coastal Command succeeded during thenext few months how we became the masters of theoutlets how the Heinkel 111rsquos were shot down by ourfighters and the U-boats choked in the very seas in whichthey sought to choke us Suffice it here to say that thesuccess of Coastal Command overtook the preparations forthe dynamite carpet Before this ever made any appreciableinroad upon our war economy the morbid defensivethoughts and projects faded away and once again withshining weapons we swept the approaches to the isle


16Desert Victory

Suspense and Preparation mdash The Forward LeapDecember 78 mdash Complete Success mdash Pleasurein Parliament mdash My Messages to Mr Menzies andGeneral Wavell mdashldquoFrappez la Masserdquomdash TheGospel of St Matthew mdash Bardia January 3 mdashTobruk January 21 mdash One Hundred and ThirteenThousand Prisoners and Over Seven HundredGuns Taken mdash Cianorsquos Diaries mdash MussolinirsquosReactions mdash My Warnings to the House About theFuture mdash The U-Boat Menace mdash My Broadcast tothe Italian People mdashldquoOne Man and One ManOnly Guiltyrdquomdash The Revolt in Abyssinia mdash Returnof the Emperor mdash Attempts to Redeem Vichy mdashMy Message to Marshal Peacutetain and to GeneralWeygand mdash Plans for Liberating JiboutildquoOperation Marierdquomdash Airfields in Greece andTurkey mdash A Wealth of Alternatives mdash The End ofthe Year mdash I Receive a Letter from the King mdash MyReply January 5 mdash Glory of the British Nationand Empire mdash The Flag of Freedom Flies mdashMortal Peril Impends

BEFORE a great enterprise is launched the days passslowly The remedy is other urgent business of which therewas at this time certainly no lack I was myself so pleasedthat our generals would take the offensive that I did notworry unduly about the result I grudged the troops wastedin Kenya and Palestine and on internal security in Egypt


but I trusted in the quality and ascendancy of the famousregiments and long-trained professional officers andsoldiers to whom this important matter was confided Edenalso was confident especially in General Wilson who wasto command the battle but then they were bothldquoGreenjacketsrdquo1 and had fought as such in the previouswar Meanwhile outside the small group who knew whatwas going to be attempted there was plenty to talk aboutand doFor a month or more all the troops to be used in theoffensive practised the special parts they had to play in theextremely complicated attack The details of the plan wereworked out by Lieutenant-General Wilson and Major-General OrsquoConnor and General Wavell paid frequent visitsof inspection Only a small circle of officers knew the fullscope of the plan and practically nothing was put on paperTo secure surprise attempts were made to give the enemythe impression that our forces had been seriouslyweakened by the sending of reinforcements to Greece andthat further withdrawals were contemplated On December6 our lean bronzed desert-hardened and completelymechanised army of about twenty-five thousand menleaped forward more than forty miles and all next day laymotionless on the desert sand unseen by the Italian AirForce They swept forward again on December 8 and thatevening for the first time the troops were told that this wasno desert exercise but the ldquoreal thingrdquo At dawn on the 9ththe battle of Sidi Barrani beganIt is not my purpose to describe the complicated anddispersed fighting which occupied the next four days over aregion as large as Yorkshire Everything went smoothlyNibeiwa was attacked by one brigade at 7 AM and in littlemore than an hour was completely in our hands At 130 P


M the attack on the Tummar camps opened and bynightfall practically the whole area and most of its defenderswere captured Meanwhile the 7th Armoured Division hadisolated Sidi Barrani by cutting the coast road to the westSimultaneously the garrison of Mersa Matruh whichincluded the Coldstream Guards had also prepared theirblow At first light on the 10th they assaulted the Italianpositions on their front supported by heavy fire from thesea Fighting continued all day and by ten orsquoclock theColdstream Battalion Headquarters signalled that it wasimpossible to count the prisoners on account of theirnumbers but that ldquothere were about five acres of officersand two hundred acres of other ranksrdquoAt home in Downing Street they brought me hour-to-hoursignals from the battlefield It was difficult to understandexactly what was happening but the general impressionwas favourable and I remember being struck by amessage from a young officer in a tank of the 7th ArmouredDivision ldquoHave arrived at the second B in Buq Buqrdquo I wasable to inform the House of Commons on the 10th thatactive fighting was in progress in the desert that fivehundred prisoners had been taken and an Italian generalkilled and also that our troops had reached the coast ldquoIt istoo soon to attempt to forecast either the scope or the resultof the considerable operations which are in progress Butwe can at any rate say that the preliminary phase has beensuccessfulrdquo That afternoon Sidi Barrani was capturedFrom December 11 onward the action consisted of apursuit of the Italian fugitives by the 7th Armoured Divisionfollowed by the 16th British Infantry Brigade (motorized) andthe 6th Australian Division which had relieved the 4thIndian Division On December 12 I could tell the House ofCommons that the whole coastal region around Buq Buqand Sidi Barrani was in the hands of British and Imperial


troops and that seven thousand prisoners had alreadyreached Mersa Matruh

We do not yet know how many Italians were caughtin the encirclement but it would not be surprising if atleast the best part of three Italian divisions includingnumerous Blackshirt formations have been eitherdestroyed or captured The pursuit to the westwardcontinues with the greatest vigour The Air Force arenow bombing the Navy are shelling the principal roadopen to the retreating enemy and considerableadditional captures have already been reported

While it is still too soon to measure the scale ofthese operations it is clear that they constitute a victorywhich in this African theatre of war is of the first orderand reflects the highest credit upon Sir ArchibaldWavell Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson the Staff officerswho planned this exceedingly complicated operationand the troops who performed the remarkable feats ofendurance and daring which accomplished it Thewhole episode must be judged upon the background ofthe fact that it is only three or four months ago that ouranxieties for the defence of Egypt were acute Thoseanxieties are now removed and the British guaranteeand pledge that Egypt would be effectually defendedagainst all comers has been in every way made good

The moment the victory of Sidi Barrani was assured ndashindeed on December 12 ndash General Wavell took on his owndirect initiative a wise and daring decision Instead ofholding back in general reserve on the battlefield the 4thBritish Indian Division which had just been relieved hemoved it at once to Eritrea to join the 5th British IndianDivision for the Abyssinian campaign under General PlattThe division went partly by sea to Port Sudan and partly byrail and boat up the Nile Some of them moved practicallystraight from the front at Sidi Barrani to their ships andwere in action again in a theatre seven hundred miles awayvery soon after their arrival The earliest units arrived at


Port Sudan at the end of December and the movementwas completed by January 21 The division joined in thepursuit of the Italians from Kassala which they hadevacuated on January 19 to Keren where the main Italianresistance was encountered General Platt had as we shallsee a hard task at Keren even with his two British IndianDivisions the 4th and 5th Without this farseeing decision ofGeneral Wavellrsquos the victory at Keren could not have beenachieved and the liberation of Abyssinia would have beensubject to indefinite delays The immediate course ofevents both on the North African shore and in Abyssiniaproved how very justly the Commander-in-Chief hadmeasured the values and circumstances of the situationsI hastened to offer my congratulations to all concerned andto urge pursuit to the utmost limit of strength


13XII40

I am sure you will be pleased about our victory inLibya This coupled with the Albanian reverses maygo hard with Mussolini if we make good use of oursuccess The full results of the battle are not yet tohand but if Italy can be broken our affairs will be morehopeful than they were four or five months ago

Mr Churchill to MrMenzies PrimeMinister of Australia

13XII40

I am sure you will be heartened by the fine victorythe Imperial armies have gained in Libya This coupledwith his Albanian disasters may go hard with MussoliniRemember that I could not guarantee a few monthsago even a successful defence of the Delta and Canal


We ran sharp risks here at home in sending troopstanks and cannon all round the Cape while under thethreat of imminent invasion and now there is a rewardWe are planning to gather a very large army represent-ing the whole Empire and ample sea-power in theMiddle East which will face a German lurch that wayand at the same time give us a move eastward in yourdirection if need be Success always demands agreater effort All good wishes


13XII40

I send you my heartfelt congratulations on yoursplendid victory which fulfils our highest hopes TheHouse of Commons was stirred when I explained theskilful staff work required and daring execution by theArmy of its arduous task The King will send you amessage as soon as full results are apparentMeanwhile pray convey my thanks and compliments toWilson and accept the same yourself

The poet Walt Whitman says that from every fruitionof success however full comes forth something tomake a greater struggle necessary Naturally pursuitwill hold the first place in your thoughts It is at themoment when the victor is most exhausted that thegreatest forfeit can be exacted from the vanquishedNothing would shake Mussolini more than a disaster inLibya itself No doubt you have considered taking someharbour in Italian territory to which the Fleet can bringall your stuff and which will give you a new jumping-offpoint to hunt them along the coast until you come upagainst real resistance It looks as if these people werecorn ripe for the sickle I shall be glad to hear from youyour thoughts and plans at earliesthellip

As soon as you come to a full stop along the Africancoast we can take a new view of our prospects andseveral attractive choices will be open

By December 15 all enemy troops had been driven fromEgypt The greater part of the Italian forces remaining in


Cyrenaica had withdrawn within the defences of Bardiawhich was now isolated This ended the first phase of thebattle of Sidi Barrani which resulted in the destruction ofthe greater part of five enemy divisions Over 38000prisoners were taken Our own casualties were 133 killed387 wounded and 8 missing


16XII40

The Army of the Nile has rendered glorious serviceto the Empire and to our cause and we are alreadyreaping rewards in every quarter We are deeplyindebted to you Wilson and other commanders whosefine professional skill and audacious leading havegained us the memorable victory of the Libyan DesertYour first objective now must be to maul the Italianarmy and rip them off the African shore to the utmostpossible extent We were very glad to learn yourintentions against Bardia and Tobruk and now to hearof the latest captures of Sollum and Capuzzo I feelconvinced that it is only after you have made sure thatyou can get no farther that you will relinquish the mainhope in favour of secondary action in the Soudan orDodecanese The Soudan is of prime importance andeminently desirable and it may be that the two Indianbrigades [ie the 4th British Indian Division] can bespared without prejudice to the Libyan pursuit battleThe Dodecanese will not get harder for a little waitingBut neither of them ought to detract from the supremetask of inflicting further defeats upon the main Italianarmy I cannot of course pretend to judge specialconditions from here but Napoleonrsquos maxim ldquoFrappezla masse et tout le reste vient par surcroitrdquo seems toring in onersquos ears I must recur to the suggestion madein my previous telegram about amphibious operationsand landings behind the enemyrsquos front to cut off hostiledetachments and to carry forward supplies and troopsby sea


Pray convey my compliments and congratulations toLongmore on his magnificent handling of the RAFand fine co-operation with the Army I hope most of thenew Hurricanes have reached him safely Tell him weare filling up Furious again with another even largerpacket of flyables from Takoradi He will also get thosethat are being carried through in [Operation] ldquoExcessrdquoBoth these should arrive early in January


18XII40

St Matthew Chapter VII verse 72

General Wavell to Prime MinisterSt James Chapter I verse 173

Bardia was our next objective Within its perimeterseventeen miles in extent was the greater part of four moreItalian divisions The defences comprised a continuous anti-tank ditch and wire obstacles with concrete block-houses atintervals and behind this was a second line of fortificationsThe storming of this considerable stronghold requiredpreparation The 7th Armoured Division prevented allenemy escape to the north and northwest For the assaultthere were available the 6th Australian Division the 16thBritish Infantry Brigade the 7th Battalion Royal TankRegiment (twenty-six tanks) one machine-gun battalionone field and one medium regiment of corps artilleryTo complete this episode of desert victory I shall intrudeupon the New Year The attack opened early on January 3One Australian battalion covered by a strong artilleryconcentration seized and held a lodgment in the westernperimeter Behind them engineers filled in the anti-tank


ditch Two Australian brigades carried on the attack andswept east and southeastward They sang at that time asong they had brought with them from Australia which soonspread to Britain

Have you heard of the wonderful wizardThe wonderful Wizard of OzAnd he is a wonderful wizardIf ever a wizard there was

This tune always reminds me of these buoyant days By theafternoon of the 4th British tanks ndashldquoMatildasrdquo as they werenamed ndash supported by infantry entered Bardia and by the5th all the defenders had surrendered Forty-five thousandprisoners and 462 guns were takenBy next day January 6 Tobruk in its turn had been isolatedby the 7th Armoured Division and on the 7th the leadingAustralian brigade stood before its eastern defences Herethe perimeter was twenty-seven miles long and similar tothat of Bardia except that the anti-tank ditch at many pointswas not deep enough to be effective The garrisonconsisted of one complete infantry division a corpsheadquarters and a mass of remnants from the forwardareas It was not possible to launch the assault till January21 when under a strong barrage another Australianbrigade pierced the perimeter on its southern face The twoother brigades of the division entered the bridgehead thusformed swinging off to left and right By nightfall one-thirdof the defended area was in our hands and early nextmorning all resistance ceased The prisoners amounted tonearly 30000 with 236 guns The Desert Army had in fiveweeks advanced over two hundred miles of waterless andfoodless space had taken by assault two strongly fortified


seaports with permanent air and marine defences andcaptured 113000 prisoners and over 700 guns The greatItalian army which had invaded and hoped to conquerEgypt scarcely existed as a military force and only theimperious difficulties of distance and supplies delayed anindefinite British advance to the westThroughout these operations vigorous support wasprovided by the Fleet Bardia and Tobruk were in turnheavily bombarded from the sea and the Fleet Air Armplayed its part in the battle on land Above all the Navysustained the Army in its advance by handling about threethousand tons of supplies a day for the forward troopsbesides maintaining an invaluable ferry service forpersonnel through the captured ports Our victorious armywas also greatly indebted for their success to the masterywhich the Royal Air Force gained over the RegiaAeronautica Although in inferior numbers theaggressiveness of our pilots soon established a completemoral ascendancy that gave them the freedom of the airOur attacks on enemy airfields reaped a rich reward andhundreds of their aircraft were later found wrecked andabandoned


It is always interesting to see the reactions of the other sideThe reader is already acquainted with Count Ciano andshould not be too hard on weak people who follow easilyinto wrong courses the temptations of affluence and officeThose who have successfully resisted all such temptationsshould form the tribunal When Ciano faced the firing-squadhe paid his debts to the full Villains are made of a differenttexture We must not however imagine that it is better to bea rare villain than a Ciano or one of the multitudinouspotential Cianos

We have the Ciano diaries jotted down each day4 Thediary

December 8 Nothing newDecember 9 Intrigues against BadoglioDecember 10 News of the attack on Sidi Barrani

comes like a thunderbolt At first it doesnrsquot seem


serious but subsequent telegrams from Grazianiconfirm that we have had a licking

Ciano saw his father-in-law twice on this day and found himvery calm ldquoHe comments on the event with impersonalobjectivity hellip being more preoccupied with Grazianirsquosprestigerdquo On the 11th it was known in the inner circle atRome that four Italian divisions must be considereddestroyed and even worse Graziani dwelt upon the daringand design of the enemy rather than upon any counter-measures of his own Mussolini maintained his composureldquoHe maintains that the many painful days through which weare living must be inevitable in the changing fortunes ofevery warrdquo If the British stopped at the frontier nothingserious would have happened If on the contrary theyreached Tobruk ldquohe thinks the situation would verge on thetragicrdquo In the evening the Duce learned that five divisionshad been ldquopulverisedrdquo in two days Evidently there wassomething wrong with this armyOn December 13 a ldquocatastrophic telegramrdquo came fromGraziani He contemplated retiring as far as Tripoli ldquoin orderto keep the flag flying on that fortress at leastrdquo He wasindignant that he should have been forced into sohazardous an advance upon Egypt by Rommelrsquos undueinfluence on Mussolini He complained that he had beenforced into a struggle between ldquoa flea and an elephantrdquoApparently the flea had devoured a large portion of theelephant On the 15th Ciano was himself by no meanssure that the English would be content to stop at thefrontier and records his opinion in that sense Graziani indefault of military deeds served up to his master bitterrecriminations Mussolini remarked perhaps with somejustice ldquoHere is another man with whom I cannot get angry


because I despise himrdquo He still hoped that the Britishadvance would be stopped at least at Derna

I had kept the House daily informed of our progress in thedesert and on December 19 I made a long statement onthe general war position I described the improvement ofour home defence and urged increasing vigilance We mustexpect a continuance of the air attacks and theorganisation of shelters the improvement of sanitation andthe endeavour to mitigate the extremely bad conditionsunder which people had to get their nightrsquos rest was the firsttask of the Government at home ldquoThe Air-RaidPrecautions the Home Office and the Ministry of Healthare just as much in the front line as are the armouredcolumns which are chasing the Italians about the LibyanDesertrdquoI also thought it necessary to utter a warning about thesinkings in the Atlantic

They still continue at a very disquieting level not sobad as in the critical period of 1917 but still we mustrecognise the recrudescence of the danger which ayear ago we seemed to have mastered We shallsteadily increase from now on our resources in flotillasand other methods of defence but we must regard thekeeping-open of this channel to the world againstsubmarines and the long-distance aircraft which arenow attacking as the first of all of our military tasks

I thought it the moment to address the Italian people by thebroadcast and on the night of December 23 I reminded


them of the long friendship between Britain and Italy Nowwe were at war

hellip Our armies are tearing and will tear the Africanarmy to shreds and tattershellip What is all this aboutWhat is all this for

Italians I will tell you the truth It is all because ofone man One man and one man alone has ranged theItalian people in deadly struggle against the BritishEmpire and has deprived Italy of the sympathy andintimacy of the United States of America That he is agreat man I do not deny but that after eighteen yearsof unbridled power he has led your country to the horridverge of ruin can be denied by none It is one man whoagainst the Crown and Royal Family of Italy againstthe Pope and all the authority of the Vatican and of theRoman Catholic Church against the wishes of theItalian people who had no lust for this war has arrayedthe trustees and inheritors of ancient Rome upon theside of the ferocious pagan barbarians

I read out the message I had sent to Mussolini on becomingPrime Minister and his reply of May 18 1940 and Icontinued

Where is it that the Duce has led his trusting peopleafter eighteen years of dictatorial power What hardchoice is open to them now It is to stand up to thebattery of the whole British Empire on sea in the airand in Africa and the vigorous counter-attack of theGreek nation or on the other hand to call in Attila overthe Brenner Pass with his hordes of ravenous soldieryand his gangs of Gestapo policemen to occupy holddown and protect the Italian people for whom he andhis Nazi followers cherish the most bitter andoutspoken contempt that is on record between races

There is where one man and one man only has ledyou and there I leave this unfolding story until the daycomes ndash as come it will ndash when the Italian nation willonce more take a hand in shaping its own fortunes


It is curious that on this same day Mussolini speaking ofthe morale of the Italian Army remarked to Ciano5ldquoI mustnevertheless recognise that the Italians of 1914 were betterthan these It is not flattering for the regime but thatrsquos howit isrdquo And the next day looking out of the window ldquoThissnow and cold are very good In this way our good-for-nothing Italians this mediocre race will be improvedrdquo Suchwere the bitter and ungrateful reflections which the failure ofthe Italian Army in Libya and Albania had wrung from theheart of this dark figure after six months of aggressive waron what he had thought was the decadent British Empire

This was a time when events were so fluid that everypossible stroke had to be studied beforehand and thus thewidest choice of action lay open to us Our victory in Libyahad already stimulated the revolt against Italy in Abyssinia Iwas most anxious that the Emperor Haile Selassie shouldre-enter his country as he desired to do The Foreign Officethought this step premature I deferred to the judgment ofthe new Secretary of State but the delay was short and theEmperor eager to run all risks was soon back on his nativesoil

(Action this day)Prime Minister toForeign Secretaryand General Ismayfor COS Committee

30XII40

It would seem that every effort should be made tomeet the Emperor of Ethiopiarsquos wishes We havealready I understand stopped our officers from


entering the Galla country It seems a pity to employbattalions of Ethiopian deserters who might inflame therevolt on mere road-making We have sixty-fourthousand troops in Kenya where complete passivityreigns so they surely could spare these road-makersOn the first point I am strongly in favour of HaileSelassie entering Abyssinia Whatever differencesthere may be between the various Abyssinian tribesthere can be no doubt that the return of the Emperorwill be taken as a proof that the revolt has greatlyincreased and will be linked up with the rumours of ourvictory in Libya

I should be glad if a favourable answer could bedrafted for me to send to the Emperor


31XII40

One would think the Emperor would be the bestjudge of when to risk his life for his throne In yourMinute you speak of our being ldquostampeded intopremature and possibly catastrophic actionrdquo I do notwish at all to be ldquostampededrdquo but I should like to knowsome of the reasons why nothing is to be done forsome months yet by the Emperor I should have hopedthe telegram to him could have been more forthcomingand the one to Sir Miles Lampson rather more positiveThese are however only matters of emphasis and ifwith your knowledge you are apprehensive of givingmore clear guidance I do not press for alteration of thetelegrams

The question of what pledges we give to HaileSelassie about his restoration and what are our ideasabout the Italian position in East Africa assuming thatour operations prosper as they may is one which I wasglad to hear from you this morning is receiving ForeignOffice attention


Finally I was most anxious to give Vichy its chance to profitby the favourable turn of events There is no room in warfor pique spite or rancour The main objective mustdominate all secondary causes of vexation For someweeks past the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the GeneralStaff of the War Office had been preparing anExpeditionary Force of six divisions and making plans ifthe French attitude should become favourable to land inMorocco We had the advantage of M Dupuy theCanadian representative at Vichy as a channel ofcommunication with Marshal Peacutetain It was necessary tokeep the United States informed for I already sensed thePresidentrsquos interest in Tangier Casablanca and indeed inthe whole Atlantic seaboard of Africa the Germanoccupation of which by U-boat bases was held by theAmerican military authorities to endanger the security of theUnited States Accordingly with the full approval of theChiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet the following messagewas sent by the hand of M Dupuy to Vichy and notified bythe Foreign Office to our Chargeacute drsquoAffaires in Washington

Prime Minister toMarshal Peacutetain

31XII40

If at any time in the near future the FrenchGovernment decide to cross to North Africa or resumethe war there against Italy and Germany we should bewilling to send a strong and well-equipped Expedi-tionary Force of up to six divisions to aid the defence ofMorocco Algiers and Tunis These divisions could sailas fast as shipping and landing facilities were availableWe now have a large well-equipped army in Englandand have considerable spare forces already welltrained and rapidly improving apart from what areneeded to repel invasion The situation in the MiddleEast is also becoming good


2 The British Air Force has now begun its expan-sion and would also be able to give importantassistance

3 The command of the Mediterranean would beassured by the reunion of the British and French Fleetsand by our joint use of Moroccan and North Africanbases

4 We are willing to enter into Staff talks of the mostsecret character with any military representativesnominated by you

5 On the other hand delay is dangerous At anytime the Germans may by force or favour come downthrough Spain render unusable the anchorage atGibraltar take effective charge of the batteries on bothsides of the Straits and also establish their air forces inthe aerodromes It is their habit to strike swiftly and ifthey establish themselves on the Moroccan coast thedoor would be shut on all projects The situation maydeteriorate any day and prospects be ruined unless weare prepared to plan together and act boldly It is mostimportant that the French Government should realisethat we are able and willing to give powerful andgrowing aid But this may presently pass beyond ourpower

A similar message was sent by another hand to GeneralWeygand now Commander-in-Chief at Algiers No answerof any kind was returned from either quarter

At this stage we may review the numerous tasks andprojects for which plans and in most cases preparationshad been made and approval in principle obtained The firstwas of course the defence of the island against invasionWe had now armed and equipped though not in all casesat the highest standard of modern equipment nearly thirtyhigh-class mobile divisions a large proportion of whomwere Regulars and all of whose men had been under


intense training for fifteen months Of these we consideredthat apart from the coastal troops fifteen would besufficient to deal with oversea invasion The Home Guardnow more than a million men had rifles and somecartridges in their hands apart from our reserve Wetherefore had twelve or fifteen divisions available foroffensive action overseas as need and opportunity aroseThe reinforcement of the Middle East and especially of theArmy of the Nile from Australia and New Zealand and fromIndia had already been provided for by shipping and byother arrangements As the Mediterranean was still closedvery long voyages and many weeks were required for allthese convoys and their escortsSecondly in case Vichy or the French in North Africashould rally to the common cause we had prepared anExpeditionary Force of six divisions with an air componentfor an unopposed and assisted landing in Moroccan Atlanticports principally Casablanca Whether we could move thisgood army to Morocco or to Ceuta opposite Gibraltar morerapidly than the Germans could come in equal numbersand equipment through Spain depended upon the degreeof Spanish resistance We could however if invited and ifwe liked it land at Cadiz to support the SpaniardsThirdly in case the Spanish Government yielded to Germanpressure and became Hitlerrsquos ally or co-belligerent thusmaking the harbour at Gibraltar unusable we held ready astrong brigade with four suitable fast transports to seize oroccupy some of the Atlantic islands Alternatively if thePortuguese Government agreed that we might for thispurpose invoke the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1373ldquoFriends to friends and foes to foesrdquo we might set up withall speed a base in the Cape Verde Islands This operationcalled ldquoShrapnelrdquo would secure us the necessary air and


refueling bases to maintain naval control of the criticalstretch of the route round the CapeFourthly a French de Gaullist brigade from England withWest African reinforcements was to be sent round theCape to Egypt in order to effect the capture of Jibouti incase conditions there became favourable (ldquoOperationMarierdquo)6

Preparations were also being made to reinforce Maltaparticularly in air power (ldquoOperation Winchrdquo) with the objectof regaining control of the passage between Sicily andTunis As an important element in this policy plans hadbeen made for the capture by a brigade of commandos ofwhich Sir Roger Keyes wished to take personal commandof the rocky islet of Pantellaria (ldquoOperation Workshoprdquo)Every effort was ordered to be made to develop a strongnaval and air base in Crete at Suda Bay pending themovement thither of any reinforcements for its garrisonwhich a change in the Greek situation might require Wewere developing airfields in Greece both to aid the GreekArmy and to strike at Italy or if necessary at the Rumanianoilfields Similarly the active development of airfields inTurkey and technical assistance to the Turks was inprogressFinally the revolt in Abyssinia was being fanned by everymeans and respectable forces were based on Khartoum tostrike in the neighbourhood of Kassala on the White Nileagainst the menace of the large Italian army in Abyssinia Amovement was planned for a joint military and navaladvance from Kenya up the East African coast towards theRed Sea to capture the Italian fortified seaports of Assaband Massawa with a view to the conquest of the Italiancolony of Eritrea


Thus I was able to lay before the War Cabinet a widechoice of carefully considered and detailed enterpriseswhich could at very short notice be launched against theenemy and certainly from among them we could find themeans for an active and unceasing overseas offensivewarfare albeit on a secondary scale with which to relieveand adorn our conduct of the war during the early part of1941 throughout which the building up of our main warstrength in men and munitions in aircraft tanks andartillery would be continuously and immensely expanded

As the end of the year approached both its lights and itsshadows stood out harshly on the picture We were aliveWe had beaten the German Air Force There had been noinvasion of the island The Army at home was now verypowerful London had stood triumphant through all herordeals Everything connected with our air mastery over ourown island was improving fast The smear of Communistswho obeyed their Moscow orders gibbered about acapitalist-imperialist war But the factories hummed and thewhole British nation toiled night and day uplifted by a surgeof relief and pride Victory sparkled in the Libyan Desertand across the Atlantic the Great Republic drew evernearer to her duty and our aidAt this time I received a very kind letter from the King

SANDRINGHAMJanuary

2

1941

My dear Prime Minister

I must send you my best wishes for a happier NewYear and may we see the end of this conflict in sightduring the coming year I am already feeling better formy sojourn here it is doing me good and the change of


scene and outdoor exercise is acting as a good tonicBut I feel that it is wrong for me to be away from myplace of duty when everybody else is carrying onHowever I must look upon it as medicine and hope tocome back refreshed in mind and body for renewedefforts against the enemy

I do hope and trust you were able to have a littlerelaxation at Christmas with all your arduous work Ihave so much admired all you have done during thelast seven months as my Prime Minister and I have soenjoyed our talks together during our weekly lun-cheons I hope they will continue on my return as I dolook forward to them so much

I hope to pay a visit to Sheffield7 next Monday I cando it from here in the dayhellip

With renewed good wishes

I remain Yours very sincerely

GEORGE R I

I expressed my gratitude which was heartfelt

January 5 1941

Sir

I am honoured by Your Majestyrsquos most graciousletter The kindness with which Your Majesty and theQueen have treated me since I became First Lord andstill more since I became Prime Minister has been acontinuous source of strength and encouragementduring the vicissitudes of this fierce struggle for life Ihave already served Your Majestyrsquos father andgrandfather for a good many years as a Minister of theCrown and my father and grandfather served QueenVictoria but Your Majestyrsquos treatment of me has beenintimate and generous to a degree that I had neverdeemed possible

Indeed Sir we have passed through days andweeks as trying and as momentous as any in the


history of the English Monarchy and even now therestretches before us a long forbidding road I have beengreatly cheered by our weekly luncheons in poor oldbomb-battered Buckingham Palace and to feel that inYour Majesty and the Queen there flames the spirit thatwill never be daunted by peril nor wearied byunrelenting toil This war has drawn the Throne and thepeople more closely together than was ever beforerecorded and Your Majesties are more beloved by allclasses and conditions than any of the princes of thepast I am indeed proud that it should have fallen to mylot and duty to stand at Your Majestyrsquos side as FirstMinister in such a climax of the British story and it isnot without good and sure hope and confidence in thefuture that I sign myself ldquoon Bardia Dayrdquo when thegallant Australians are gathering another twentythousand Italians prisoners

Your Majestyrsquos faithful and devoted servant andsubject

WINSTON S CHURCHILL

We may I am sure rate this tremendous year as the mostsplendid as it was the most deadly year in our long Englishand British story It was a great quaintly organised Englandthat had destroyed the Spanish Armada A strong flame ofconviction and resolve carried us through the twenty-fiveyearsrsquo conflict which William II and Marlborough wagedagainst Louis XIV There was a famous period withChatham There was the long struggle against Napoleon inwhich our survival was secured through the domination ofthe seas by the British Navy under the classic leadership ofNelson and his associates A million Britons died in the FirstWorld War But nothing surpasses 1940 By the end of that


year this small and ancient island with its devotedCommonwealth Dominions and attachments under everysky had proved itself capable of bearing the whole impactand weight of world destiny We had not flinched orwavered We had not failed The soul of the British peopleand race had proved invincible The citadel of theCommonwealth and Empire could not be stormed Alonebut upborne by every generous heartbeat of mankind wehad defied the tyrant in the height of his triumphAll our latent strength was now alive The air terror hadbeen measured The island was intangible inviolateHenceforward we too would have weapons with which tofight Henceforward we too would be a highly organised warmachine We had shown the world that we could hold ourown There were two sides to the question of Hitlerrsquos worlddomination Britain whom so many had counted out wasstill in the ring far stronger than she had ever been andgathering strength with every day Time had once againcome over to our side And not only to our national sideThe United States was arming fast and drawing ever nearerto the conflict Soviet Russia who with callousmiscalculation had adjudged us worthless at the outbreakof the war and had bought from Germany fleeting immunityand a share of the booty had also become much strongerand had secured advanced positions for her own defenceJapan seemed for the moment to be overawed by theevident prospect of a prolonged world war and anxiouslywatching Russia and the United States meditatedprofoundly what it would be wise and profitable to doAnd now this Britain and its far-spread association of statesand dependencies which had seemed on the verge of ruinwhose very heart was about to be pierced had been forfifteen months concentrated upon the war problem trainingits men and devoting all its infinitely varied vitalities to the


struggle With a gasp of astonishment and relief the smallerneutrals and the subjugated states saw that the stars stillshone in the sky Hope and within it passion burned anewin the hearts of hundreds of millions of men The goodcause would triumph Right would not be trampled downThe flag of Freedom which in this fateful hour was theUnion Jack would still fly in all the winds that blewBut I and my faithful colleagues who brooded with accurateinformation at the summit of the scene had no lack ofcares The shadow of the U-boat blockade already cast itschill upon us All our plans depended upon the defeat ofthis menace The Battle of France was lost The Battle ofBritain was won The Battle of the Atlantic had now to befought

END OF BOOK TWO


Publisherrsquos NoteThe following changes in the text were received too late forinclusion in the first edition but will appear in their properplaces in future editionsPage 45 line 1

forNeufchacircteau-sur-AisnereadNeufchacirctel-sur-Aisne

Page 101 line 4 from bottomforeight hundred and fifty vesselsreadeight hundred and sixty vessels

Page 102 correction of official listBRITISH SHIPS


Page 115 footnote added with reference to tableThese figures are taken from a final analysis of the

Admiralty records The War Office figure for the totalnumber of men landed in England is 336427

Page 129 line 17for1 PM the next dayread1 AM the next day

29 line 17for Novemberread December

Page 232 line 9 from bottomformodern eight-inch cruisersreadread modern eight-inch-gun cruisers

Page 233 2 lines from bottomforOn the night of July 3readread In the early morning of July 3

Page 237 line 1forat Martiniquereadread in the French West Indies


Appendices


Contents


APPENDICES

A Prime Ministerrsquos Personal Minutes and Telegrams MaymdashDecember 1940B Weekly Losses at Sea by Enemy Action of British Alliedand Neutral Merchant TonnageC Aircraft Strength Battle of Britain 1940D Correspondence Relating to Dakar between MrChurchill and Mr MenziesE List of Operational Code Names for 1940mdash1941F List of Abbreviations

Appendix A

PRIME MINISTERrsquoS PERSONAL MINUTES AND TELEGRAMS

MAYndash DECEMBER 1940

MAY

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for those concerned

18V40

The proximity fuze and the necessary rocketprojectors have hitherto been treated as importantprotection for ships but even larger numbers will beneeded even some perhaps more urgently for theprotection of aircraft factories and other exceptionallyimportant points What is being done about this Letproposals be made tomorrow for setting up thenecessary manufacture Are any modifications in thedesign of the projectors necessary The Director ofNaval Ordnance (DNO) can go on with the ship sideof the business but be careful no hold-up takes placein the supply for the vulnerable points ashore Reporttomorrow night what organisation or measures arerequired to procure this production

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for the Colonies

23V40

I am in full agreement with the answer you proposeto Wedgwoodrsquos1 Questions and 1 do not want Jewishforces raised to serve outside Palestine The main andalmost the sole aim in Palestine at the present time is


to liberate the eleven battalions of excellent Regulartroops who are now tethered there For this purposethe Jews should be armed in their own defence andproperly organised as speedily as possible We canalways prevent them from attacking the Arabs by oursea-power which thus them off from the outer worldand by other friendly influences On the other hand wecannot leave them unarmed when our troops leave asleave they must at a very early date


24V40

I should be much obliged if you would have a talkwith Lindemann so as to get at some agreed figuresupon aircraft outputs both recent and prospective Ihave for a long time been convinced that the AirMinistry do not make enough of the deliveries withwhich they are supplied and Lindemann is obtaining forme returns of all aircraft in their hands so that one cansee what use is made of them

It is of the highest importance that all aircraft instorage and reserve should not only be made availablefor service but that these should be organised insquadrons with their pilots Now that the war is comingso close the object must be to prepare the largestnumber of aircraft even as you said training and civilaircraft to carry bombs to enemy aerodromes on theDutch Belgian and French coasts I must get a fullview of the figures both of delivery and employmentand this can be kept up to date weekly


24V40

Let me have on one sheet of paper a statementabout the tanks How many have we got with theArmy How many of each kind are being made eachmonth How many are there with the manufacturersWhat are the forecasts What are the plans for heaviertanks

NOTEndash The present form of warfare and the proofthat tanks can overrun fortifications will affect the plans


for the ldquoCultivatorrdquo and it seems very likely that only areduced number will be required


24V40

I am sure there are far too many committees of onekind and another which Ministers have to attend andwhich do not yield a sufficient result These should bereduced by suppression or amalgamation Secondly aneffort should be made to reduce the returns with whichthe Cabinet is oppressed to a smaller compass andsmaller number Pray let proposals be made by theCabinet Office Staff for effecting these simplifications


27V40

In your communiqueacute today you distinguish in severalcases between enemy aircraft ldquoput out of actionrdquo orldquodestroyedrdquo Is there any real difference between thetwo or is it simply to avoid tautology If so this is not inaccordance with the best authorities on English Senseshould not be sacrificed to sound

2 Will you also report today whether you would likethe weather to be clear or cloudy for the operations onthe Belgian coast

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay and CIGS

29V40

The change which has come over the war affectsdecisively the usefulness of ldquoCultivator Number 6rdquo Itmay play its part in various operations defensive andoffensive but it can no longer be considered the onlymethod of breaking a fortified line I suggest that theMinister of Supply should today be instructed to reducethe scheme by one-half Probably in a few days it willbe to one-quarter The spare available capacity couldbe turned over to tanks If the Germans can make tanksin nine months surely we can do so Let me have yourgeneral proposals for the priority construction of an


additional thousand tanks capable of engaging theimproved enemy pattern likely to be working in 1941

There should also be formed if it does not alreadyexist an anti-tank committee to study and devise allmethods of attacking the latest German tanks Pray letme have suggested list of names

JUNE


3VI40

Has anything been done about shipping twentythousand internees to Newfoundland or St Helena Isthis one of the matters that the Lord President has inhand If so would you please ask him about it I shouldlike to get them on the high seas as soon as possiblebut I suppose considerable arrangements have to bemade at the other end Is it all going forward


3VI40

The Cabinet were distressed to hear from you thatyou were now running short of pilots for fighters andthat they had now become the limiting factor

This is the first time that this particular admission offailure has been made by the Air Ministry We knowthat immense masses of aircraft are devoted to themaking of pilots far beyond the proportion adopted bythe Germans We heard some months ago of manythousands of pilots for whom the Air Ministry declaredthey had no machines and who consequently had tobe ldquore-musteredrdquo as many as seven thousand werementioned all of whom had done many more hours offlying than those done by German pilots now frequentlycaptured How then therefore is this new shortage tobe explained

Lord Beaverbrook has made a surprising improve-ment in the supply and repair of airplanes and inclearing up the muddle and scandal of the aircraftproduction branch I greatly hope that you will be able


to do as much on the personnel side for it will indeedbe lamentable if we have machines standing idle forwant of pilots to fly them


3VI40

You are not presenting me as I should like every fewdays or every week with a short clear statement ofthe falling-of or improvement in munitions production Iam not able to form a clear view unless you do this


3VI40

See attached paper [Production ProgrammesMemorandum by Chiefs of Staff] which seems tocontain a lot of loose thinking Evidently we must ldquopullforwardrdquo everything that can be made effective in thenext five months and accept the consequentretardation of later production but there is no reasonwhatever to alter so far as I can see the existingapproved schemes for a three yearsrsquo war Indeed theywill be more necessary than ever if France drops out

Pray let me have your views

Prime Minister to ProfessorLindemann (Secret)

7VI40

I am much grieved to hear of the further delay in theproximity fuze (PF)

Considering the enormous importance of this andthe directions I have given that all possible pressureshould be put behind it it would surely have been rightto have two or three firms simultaneously making theexperimental pattern so that if one failed the othercould go on

Please report to me what has been doneYou have not given me yet either a full statement of

the production which is already ordered in rockets forthe proximity fuze and in rockets for the ordinary fuzebefore we get the PF

It is of the utmost importance that you should goforward with the stabilising bomb-sight as we must


knock out their aircraft factories at the same rate thatthey affect ours If you will gather together (a) all thepeople interested in the PF and (b) all those interestedin the stabilised bomb-sight I will next week receivetheir reports and urge them on


11VI40

It was decided on December 22 at a conference onbomb-sight design that urgent action should be taken toconvert two thousand six hundred ABs Mark II intostabilised high altitude bomb-sights over ninety percentof the drawings then being completed Please let meknow exactly what followed How is it that only onebomb-sight was converted I should be very glad if youwould look at the files and ascertain who wasresponsible for stifling action


11VI40

This report2is most interesting and I shall be glad ifyou will arrange to use the squadron you mentionedyesterday for the purpose of infecting the reachesmentioned where the traffic is reported to be so heavyWe do not need to ask the French permission for thisbut only for the continuous streaming of the navalfluvials This I am doing Meanwhile you should act assoon as you can on the lower reaches Kindly reportwhat you will do


16VI40

Have you considered the advisability of raising aWest Indies Regiment It might have three battalionsstrongly officered by British officers and be representa-tive of most of the islands to be available for ImperialService to give an outlet for the loyalty of the nativesand bring money into these poor islands

At present we are short of weapons but these willcome along


Prime Minister to First Lordof the Admiralty

17VI40

I am content with your proposed disposition of theheavy ships in the West namely Repulse and Renownto maintain the blockade at Scapa Rodney Nelsonand Valiant at Rosyth to cover the island Hood and ArkRoyal to join Resolution at Gibraltar to watch over thefate of the French Fleet

It is of the utmost importance that the fleet atAlexandria should remain to cover Egypt from an Italianinvasion which would otherwise destroy prematurely allour position in the East This fleet is well placed tosustain our interests in Turkey to guard Egypt and theCanal and can if the situation changes either fight itsway westward or go through the Canal to guard theEmpire or come round the Cape onto our trade routes

The position of the Eastern fleet must be constantlywatched and can be reviewed when we know whathappens to the French Fleet and whether Spaindeclares war or not

Even if Spain declares war it does not follow that weshould quit the Eastern Mediterranean If we have toquit Gibraltar we must immediately take the Canarieswhich will serve as a very good base to control thewestern entrance to the Mediterranean

Prime Minister to Minister ofHome Security

20VI40

I understand that it was settled last Saturday thatyour department was to take on the executive control ofsmoke as a means of hiding factories and similarindustrial targets I should be glad to know whom youhave put in charge of this work which I regard as of thehighest importance and what progress he has made

Prime Minister to Admiralty 23VI40I do not think it would be a good thing to keep Hood

and Ark Royal lolling about in Gibraltar Harbour wherethey might be bombed at any time from the shore


Surely when they have fuelled they should go tosea and come back only unexpectedly and for shortvisits

What is being done


24VI40

Has any news been received of the Germanprisoner pilots in France whose return to this countrywas solemnly promised by M Reynaud


24VI40

It does not seem to be necessary to address thePresident again upon the subject of destroyers today ortomorrow Evidently he will be influenced by whathappens to the French Fleet about which I am hopefulI am doubtful about opening Staff talks at the presenttime I think they would turn almost entirely from theAmerican side upon the transfer of the British Fleet totransatlantic bases Any discussion of this is bound toweaken confidence here at the moment when all mustbrace themselves for the supreme struggle I will sendthe President another personal telegram about thedestroyers and flying-boats a little later on


25VI40

The cruel penalties imposed by your predecessorupon the Jews in Palestine for arming have made itnecessary to tie up needless forces for their protectionPray let me know exactly what weapons and organisa-tion the Jews have for self-defence


25VI40

Thank you for your letter of June 22 about increas-ing the import of steel from the United States Iunderstand that owing to the transfer of the French


contracts to us our volume of purchases for the comingmonth has more than doubled and that we are nowbuying at the rate of about 600000 tons a month Thisis satisfactory and we should certainly get as muchfrom the United States as we can while we can


26VI40

I am sure we shall gain nothing by offering toldquodiscussrdquo Gibraltar at the end of the war Spaniards willknow that if we win discussions would not be fruitfuland if we lose they would not be necessary I do notbelieve mere verbiage of this kind will affect theSpanish decision


28VI40

Although our policy about the French Navy is clear Ishould like to have an appreciation by the Admiralty ofthe consequences which are likely to follow namely ahostile attitude by France and the seizure by Germanyand Italy of any part of the French Navy which wecannot secure I should like to have this on Sundaynext

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay (Secret)

28VI40

This is a very unsatisfactory figure [of civilianlabour]3 When I mentioned fifty-seven thousand theother day in the Cabinet I was assured that theyrepresented a very small part of what were actuallyemployed and that one hundred thousand was nearerthe mark and that many more were coming in beforethe end of the week Now instead we have a figure ofonly forty thousand Pray let me have a full explanationof this

It is very wrong that fighting troops should be keptfrom their training because of the neglect to employcivilian labour


The question must be brought up at the Cabinet onMonday


28VI40

Let me see a list of prominent persons you havearrested


29VI40

If we could have large supplies of multiple projectorsand rockets directed by Radar irrespective of cloud ordarkness and also could have the proximity fuzeworking effectively by day and to a lesser extent inmoonlight or starlight the defence against air attackwould become decisive This combination is thereforethe supreme immediate aim We are not far from it inevery respect yet it seems to baffle us Assemble yourideas and facts so that I may give extreme priority andimpulse to this business


29VI40

It seems to me that the blockade is largely ruined inwhich case the sole decisive weapon in our handswould be overwhelming air attack upon Germany

We should gain great relief in the immediate futurefrom not having to maintain an army in France orsending supplies of beef coal etc to France Let meknow about this

How has the question of beef supplies beenaffected We are freed from the obligation to supply theFrench Army with beef There is really no reason whyour Army at home should have rations far exceedingthe heavy munitions workersrsquo The complications aboutfrozen meat and fresh meat ought also to be affectedby what has happened although I am not sure whichway


JULY


2VII40

If it be true that a few hundred German troops havebeen landed on Jersey or Guernsey by troop-carriersplans should be studied to land secretly by night on theislands and kill or capture the invaders This is exactlyone of the exploits for which the Commandos would besuited There ought to be no difficulty in getting all thenecessary information from the inhabitants and fromthose evacuated The only possible rein forcementswhich could reach the enemy during the fighting wouldbe by aircraft-carriers and here would be a goodopportunity for the Air Force fighting machines Pray letme have a plan

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for Foreign Affairs

3VII40

I could not reconcile myself to leaving a largenumber of influential Frenchmen who are the adherentsof the Peacutetain Government free to run an active andeffective propaganda in our Service circles and inFrench circles in this country against the whole policyof aiding General de Gaulle to which we are publiclyand earnestly committed The attempt to set up aFrench Government in Morocco and to obtain control ofthe Jean Bart and other vessels and to open up acampaign in Morocco with a base on the Atlantic is inmy opinion vital It was most cordially adopted by theCabinet in principle and apart from technical details Ishould find very great difficulty in becoming a party toits abandonment and to our consequent relegation tothe negative defensive which has so long provedruinous to our interests

(Action this day)


Prime Minister to VCNSand ACNS

5VII40

Could you let me know on one sheet of paper whatarrangements you are making about the Channelconvoys now that the Germans are all along the Frenchcoast The attacks on the convoy yesterday both fromthe air and by E-boats were very serious and I shouldlike to be assured this morning that the situation is inhand and that the Air is contributing effectively

Prime Minister to First Lord ofthe Admiralty Secretary ofState for War and Secretaryof State for Air

5VII40

(Sir E Bridges to implement)It has been represented to me that our colleagues

not in the War Cabinet but above the ldquolinerdquo aredepressed at not knowing more of what is goingforward in the military sphere It would be advanta-geous if each of the Service Ministers could in rotationhave a talk with them answer questions and explainthe general position If a weekly meeting wereinstituted this would mean that each Service Ministerwould meet them every three weeks I trust this wouldnot be too heavy a burden upon you Nothing mustever be said to anybody about future operations thesemust always be kept in the most narrow circles butexplanations of the past and expositions of the presentoffer a wide field On the assumption that the above isagreeable to you I am giving directions through SirEdward Bridges

Prime Minister to ColonelJacobs

6VJI40

Obtain a most careful report today from the JointIntelligence Staff of any further indication of enemypreparations for raid or invasion Let me have thistonight



8VII40

In the fierce light of the present emergency thefighter is the need and the output of fighters must bethe prime consideration till we have broken the enemyrsquosattack But when I look round to see how we can winthe war I see that there is only one sure path We haveno Continental army which can defeat the Germanmilitary power The blockade is broken and Hitler hasAsia and probably Africa to draw from Should he berepulsed here or not try invasion he will recoileastward and we have nothing to stop him But there isone thing that will bring him back and bring him downand that is an absolutely devastating exterminatingattack by very heavy bombers from this country uponthe Nazi homeland We must be able to overwhelmthem by this means without which I do not see a waythrough We cannot accept any lower aim than airmastery When can it be obtained


11VII40

Generally speaking the losses in the Bomber forceseem unduly heavy and the Bremen raid from whichonly one out of six returned is most grievous At thepresent time a very heavy price may be paid (a) for information by reconnaissance of the conditions in theGerman ports and German-controlled ports and rivermouths (b) for the bombing of barges or assemblies ofships thus detected Apart from this the long-rangebombing of Germany should be conducted with adesire to save the machines and personnel as much aspossible while keeping up a steady attack It is mostimportant to build up the numbers of the Bomber forcewhich are very low at the present time


11VII40

You should I think prepare a Bill vacating the seatof any Member of Parliament who continues during the


present war outside the jurisdiction for more than sixmonths without the leave of the Secretary of State


12VII40

What is being done to reproduce and install thesmall circular pillboxes which can be sunk in the centreof aerodromes and rise by means of a compressed-airbottle to two or three feet elevation like a small turretcommanding the aerodrome I saw these for the firsttime when I visited Langley Aerodrome last week Thisappears to afford an admirable means of anti-parachutedefence and it should surely be widely adopted Letme have a plan


12VII40

Now is the time to popularise your administrationwith the troops by giving to all regiments and units thelittle badges and distinctions they like so much I sawthe London Irish with their green and peacock-bluehackles We can easily afford the expense of bronzebadges the weight of which is insignificant in metal Allregimental distinctions should be encouraged TheFrench Army made a great specialty of additional unofficial regimental badges which they presented topeople I liked this-idea and I am sure it would amusethe troops who will have to face a long vigil I amdelighted at the action you have taken about bands butwhen are we going to hear them playing about thestreets Even quite small parade marches are highlybeneficial especially in towns like Liver pool andGlasgow in fact wherever there are troops and leisurefor it there should be an attempt at military display


12VII40

1 The contacts we have had with the Italiansencourage the development of a more aggressivecampaign against the Italian homeland by bombard-


ment both from air and sea It also seems mostdesirable that the Fleet should be able to use Maltamore freely A plan should be prepared to reinforce theair defences of Malta in the strongest manner with AAguns of various types and with airplanes Malta wasalso the place where it was thought the aerial minebarrage from the ldquoEgglayerrdquo would be useful Finallythere are the PE fuzes4 which will be coming along atthe end of August which should give very gooddaylight results If we could get a stronger Air Forcethere we might obtain considerable immunity fromannoyance by retaliation

2 Let a plan for the speediest anti-aircraft reinforce-ment of Malta be prepared forthwith and let me have itin three days with estimates in time It should bepossible to inform Malta to prepare emplacements forthe guns before they are sent out


12VII40

Will you bring the following to the notice of theChiefs of Staff

It is the settled policy of His Majestyrsquos Governmentto make good strong French contingents for land seaand air service to encourage these men to volunteer tofight on with us to look after them well to indulge theirsentiments about the French flag etc and to havethem as representatives of a France which is continuingthe war It is the duty of the Chiefs of Staff to carry thispolicy out effectively

The same principle also applies to Poles DutchCzech and Belgian contingents in this country as wellas to the Foreign Legion of anti-Nazi Germany Merequestions of administrative inconvenience must not beallowed to stand in the way of this policy of the State Itis most necessary to give to the war which Great Britainis waging single-handed the broad internationalcharacter which will add greatly to our strength andprestige

I hope I may receive assurances that this policy isbeing whole-heartedly pursued I found the conditions


at Olympia very bad and there is no doubt that theFrench soldiers were discouraged by some officersfrom volunteering An opportunity of assisting theFrench would be to make a great success of theirfunction of July 14 when they are going to lay a wreathon the Foch statue


13VII40

Draw Admiralty attention to the importance of allthese ships especially Western Prince What is herspeed It would be a disaster if we lost these fiftythousand rifles Draw attention also to the immenseconsequence of the convoy which is leaving New Yorkbetween July 8 and 12 When will these variousconvoys be in the danger zone When will they arriveLet me have a report on the measures to be taken


13VII40

I am receiving from various sources suggestions thatthere should be another day of prayer and humiliation

Will you find out privately what is thought about thisby the Archbishop


14VII40

It seems to me very important that everybody shouldbe made to look to their gas-masks now I expect agreat many of them require overhauling and it may wellbe Hitler has some gas designs upon us Will youconsider how the necessary overhauls can be set onfoot Action should be taken at once

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for VCAS

15VII40

I am in full agreement with your proposal forbombing during the present moon-phase I do notunderstand however why we have not been able toobtain results in the Kiel Canal Nothing could be more


important than this as it prevents any movement ofprepared shipping and barges from the Baltic forinvasion purposes I heard that you had dropped anumber of bombs into this area but that they did nogood Let me know what you have done about it in thepast How many raids how many bombs what kind ofbombs and what is the explanation that the canal stillworks Can you make any plans for bettering results inthe 1 inure This is surely a matter of the very highestimportance and now is the time when it counts most


15VII40

Make sure that overhead cover against bombingattack is provided for the fourteen-inch gun A structureof steel girders should be put up to carry sandbag coversimilar to that over the six-inch guns which are mountedalong the coast All should be camouflaged You will betold that it will be necessary to change the guns afterone hundred and twenty rounds In that case thestructure will have to be taken to pieces and put upagain after the gun is changed There should be nodifficulty in this


17VI140

Press the War Office continually to develop theForeign Legion either by pioneer battalions orotherwise Let me have weekly reports


18VII40

I certainly do not propose to send a message by thesenior child to Mr Mackenzie King or by the junior childeither If I sent any message by anyone it would bethat I entirely deprecate any stampede from this countryat the present time5

(Action this day)



19VII40

I have noticed lately very many sentences imposedfor indiscretion by magistratesrsquo and other courtsthroughout the country in their execution of recentlegislation and regulation All these cases should bereviewed by the Home Office and His Majesty movedto remit the sentence where there was no malice orserious injury to the State By selecting some of thosecases which have recently figured in the public eyeand announcing remission publicly you would give thenecessary guidance without which it is difficult for localcourts to assess the lead and purpose of Parliament


20VII40

I have drawn attention to this danger before I do notthink Hood should be left lying in Gibraltar Harbour atthe mercy of a surprise bombardment by heavyhowitzers Both she and Ark Royal should go to sea fora cruise with or without Valiant and Resolution as maybe thought fit They could return to fuel or to carry outany operations provided the Spanish situation has notfurther deteriorated Pray let me have your proposals


20VII40

Donrsquot you think we might go very slow on all thisgeneral and equitable fair and honourable peacebusiness between China and Japan Chiang does notwant it none of the pro-Chinese want it and so far fromhelping us round the Burma Road difficulty it will onlymake it worse I am sure that it is not in our interest thatthe Japanese should be relieved of their preoccupationWould it not be a good thing to give it a miss for amonth or so and see what happens


20VII40


You may care to see this [letter from ColonelWedgwood on ldquoLondon Defencerdquo] The only scale ofattack which it seems to me need be contemplated forthe centre of Government is say five hundredparachutists or Fifth Columnists What is the presentplan and what is the scale against which it is beingprovided

You might do something for Jos He is a grand-hearted man

Prime Minister to Ministerwithout Portfolio

20VII40

I am rather doubtful from information which hasreached me whether our home timber resources arebeing adequately developed

This of course is primarily a matter for the Ministerof Supply who I know has made certain departmentaladjustments recently with this particular end in view


21VII40

Let me have a statement showing the scheme ofdefence for the Central Government Whitehall etcWhat was the scale of attack prescribed and who wasresponsible for taking the measures What was thereason for attempting to put an anti-tank obstacleacross St Jamesrsquos Park Who-ordered this Whenwas it counter-ordered


23VII40

I am told that the refuelling of fighter aeroplanescould be much more rapidly achieved if there weremore tankers on the aerodromes and considering thatan attack by air would make every minute gained inreturning the fighters to the air most precious I shouldbe glad if measures were taken at once to double it orgreatly increase the fuelling facilities



23VII40

I do not seem to have had any answer from you tomy query about whether the 2d Canadian Division andall it stands for is being frittered away in Iceland


23VII40

1 It is of course urgent and indispensable thatevery effort should be made to obtain secretly the bestpossible information about the German forces in thevarious countries overrun and to establish intimatecontacts with local people and to plant agents This Ihope is being done on the largest scale as opportunityserves by the new organisation under MEW None ofthis partakes of the nature of military operations

2 It would be most unwise to disturb the coasts ofany of these countries by the kind of silly fiascos whichwere perpetrated at Boulogne and Guernsey The ideaof working all these coasts up against us by pin-prickraids and fulsome communiques is one to be strictlyavoided

3 Sir Roger Keyes is now studying the wholesubject of medium raids ndash ie not less than five normore than ten thousand men Two or three of thesemight be brought off on the French coast during thewinter As soon as the invasion danger recedes or isresolved and Sir R Krsquos paper-work is done we willconsult together and set the Staffs to work upondetailed preparations After these medium raids havehad their chance there will be no objection to stirringup the French coast by minor forays

4 During the spring and summer of 1941 largearmoured irruptions must be contemplated Thematerial for these is however so far ahead of us thatonly very general study of their possibilities is nownecessary and no directions need be given to the Staffupon them until the end of August



24VII40

Apart from the anti-Nazi Germans who can begin bybeing pioneers rifles and ammunition should be issuedto all foreign corps Whether this should be from BritishService rifles now in the possession of the HomeGuard but in process of being replaced by Americanrifles or whether the foreign corps6 should be armedwith American rifles direct has no doubt beenconsidered On the whole I am inclined to the formersolution It is most urgent to rearm the Poles and theFrench as we may need them for foreign service in thenear future The armament of these foreign corps ranksafter the armament of British troops so far as rifles areconcerned but they have priority over the Home GuardThey ought to have a small proportion of Bren gunsetc even at the expense of our own men What isbeing done to furnish them with artillery Surely someof the 75rsquos can be made to serve the purpose ThePolish unit should be ripened as much as possiblePray let me have a weekly report of numbers andweapons

(Action this day)Prime Minister to First LordFirst Sea Lord and VCNS

25VII40

I cannot help feeling that there is more in the plan oflaying mines behind an invaderrsquos landing than theNaval Staff felt when I mentioned the matter threeweeks ago In the interval I sent a reminder asking thatit should be further considered

If an invader lands during the night or morning theflotillas will attack him in rear during the day and theseflotillas will be heavily bombarded from the air as partof the air battles which will be going on If howeverwhen night falls a curtain or fender of mines can be laidclose inshore so as to cut off the landing-place fromreinforcements of any kind these mines once laid willnot have to be guarded from air attack and consequent-ly will relieve the flotilla from the need of coming back


on the second day thus avoiding losses from the airand air protection At any rate I think it improvident notto provide for the option whether to seal off the hostilelanding by attack of flotillas or mines There may beseveral landings and you may want to leave onesealed off with mines in order to attack another Ofcourse all the above would apply still more if thelanding had got hold of a port instead of merely abeach

Pray let this matter have further attention and alsosay what craft are available for the purpose or howsoon they can be provided or adapted

Prime Minister to VCNS 25VII40Let me have a report of how far the German Dutch

and Belgian harbours have been sealed up by mines orobstructions


26VII40

I saw Mr Quo yesterday at his request andexplained to him frankly the position about the BurmaRoad I told him verbally of the message I sent throughthe Foreign Office to Chiang Kai-shek He was naturallyanxious to extort some promise from me about whatwould happen when the three months had expired Isaid it all depended upon what the situation was thenand that I could make no forecast I assured him weshould put no pressure on General Chiang to consentto terms or negotiations against his will and policy MrQuo seemed fairly satisfied though rueful

Prime Minister to Chancellorof the Exchequer

28VII40

Now that the Rumanian Government are helpingthemselves to the property of British subjects ought wenot to show the Rumanians that we shall use theirfrozen fund to compensate our people I understandthat about six weeks ago you blocked Rumanian assets


in London We have been treated odiously by thesepeople

AUGUST


1VIII40

In view of the threatening attitude of Japan it isvitally important to know about Bismarck and TirpitzPray let me have your latest information It seems to methat a great effort will have to be made by the Air Forceto disable these ships as their apparition in the nextfew months would be most dangerous

2 Assuming Japan goes to war with us or forces usinto war I suppose you would send Hood three eight-inch-gun cruisers two Ramillies and twelve long-radiusdestroyers to Singapore

Let me have the legends [ie construction details]of the completed Japanese battle-cruisers


2VIII40

I pray that we may never have to make thiswidespread distribution but I am in full accord with theprinciples on which the Admiralty would propose tomeet the strain I should have thought that Hood wouldbe a greater deterrent than Renown Please let mehave a report of the possibility of air attack on Bismarckand Tirpitz This seems to me to be one of the mostvital steps to take Apart from this there is no need tomake any new dispositions at the present time onaccount of Japanese war-risk

I was much concerned to hear of the sinking of thethree tankers off Tory Island I should like to see youmove some destroyers from the East Coast thither Wehad better wait however until the August moon-phase


is over During this time also the American guns andrifles will be distributed to the troops


2VIII40

Next week one of my principal tasks must be goingthrough this scheme of the Air Ministry for increasingthe pilots and for the training of pilots Lord Beaver-brook should be asked for his views beforehand

2 Let me have a report on the plans for lectures ontactical subjects for the troops in the autumn

3 What has been done about the collection of scrapof all kinds Let mersquohave a short report on one pagecovering the progress made this year

4 When at the Admiralty f took a special interest inthe work of the Salvage Department and held ameeting there four months ago A naval officer CaptainDewar was then in charge Let me have a report onwhat has happened to salvage since that day

5 I am also expecting this week to reach asettlement about the functions of the ARP and policein the case of invasion The Lord Privy Seal wasdealing with this in the first instance At the same timewe must consider allowing transfers from ARP to theHome Guard and their being made available forfighting purposes To what extent has the payment ofthe ARP personnel been discontinued or restricted Itought to be continually restricted

6 Let me have a report on the progress and futureconstruction of the tank divisions There should be fivearmoured divisions by March 31 [1941] and two moreby the end of May Let me know how far the presentprospects of men and material allow of this Let meknow also what are the latest ideas for the structureand organisation of an armoured division This shouldbe prepared on one sheet of paper showing all theprincipal elements and accessories


2VIII40


It is very important to get on with the uniforms for theHome Guard Let me have a forecast of deliveries

(Action this day)Prime Minister to First Lord 2VIII40

My objection was to anything in the nature of sinkingat sight or sinking without due provision for the safety ofthe crews Provided this is excluded there can be noreason against sinking a captured ship if owing to airattack or other military reasons it is impossible to bringher into port as a prize The disadvantages of sinking aship and losing valuable tonnage are obvious and I donot see why in nineteen cases out of twenty theAdmiralty cannot put a prize crew on board and sendthe ship in in the ordinary way I see no objection tothe action taken in the Hermione case7 which fallsentirely within the general principles set forth above


2VIII40

The whole question of holidays and reduced hoursshould be considered by the Cabinet at an early date Itis far too soon to assume that the danger has passedIt is a great mistake to tell the workpeople that they aretired On the other hand certain easements areindispensable Please communicate with Mr BevinLord Beaverbrook and the Minister of Supply so thattheir views may be in readiness for Cabinet conversa-tion I should also like to know what is being doneabout holidays for the Civil Service and for Ministersand persons in high Service positions Something willhave to be done about this but we must be very carefulnot to be caught while in an August mood

Prime Minister to Lord PrivySeal and Home Secretary

3VIII40

The attached memorandum by Lord Mottistone onduties of police in the event of invasion raises a verydifficult question and one that must be speedily settledWe cannot surely make ourselves responsible for a


system where the police will prevent the people fromresisting the enemy and will lay down their arms andbecome the enemyrsquos servant in any invaded area Iconfess I do not see my way quite clearly to theamendments required in the regulations In principlehowever it would seem that the police should withdrawfrom any invaded area with the last of His Majestyrsquostroops This would also apply to the ARP and the firebrigades etc Their services will be used in otherdistricts Perhaps on invasion being declared thepolice ARP fire brigades etc should automaticallybecome a part of the military forces


3VIII40

All secret service reports about affairs in France orother captive countries are to be shown to MajorMorton who is responsible for keeping me informedMake sure this instruction is obeyed


3VIII40

It seems quite possible that a portion of General deGaullersquos forces will be used in the near future Ittherefore becomes of the utmost consequence andurgency to complete the equipment of his threebattalions company of tanks headquarters etcEvidently action is being taken already but I shall bemuch obliged if you will accelerate this action by everymeans in your power and also if you will let me know inwhat way the situation has improved since MajorMorionrsquos Minute of yesterday

Prime Minister to Sir EdwardBridges and othersconcerned

3VIII40

I think the circular about work in the factories andholidays for whole establishments should whatever theagreement of the Production Council be brought beforethe Cabinet on Tuesday by the Minister of Labour Wemust give holidays without creating a holiday


atmosphere It would therefore seem desirable toannounce only that ldquosuch local arrangements as arepossible are being made for staggered holidaysrdquo orsomething like that

2 I approve Sir Horace Wilsonrsquos letter to Depart-ments It arose out of my instructions to him

3 I shall be very glad if you will adjust the holidaysof Ministers and make sure that the Services arrangefor similar relief in case of high military officers at thecentre of Government

Prime Minister to Sir EBridges

4VIII40

I circulate to my colleagues the enclosed report onthe first use of the UP weapon with the wire curtain atDover This appears to be of high importance and maywell inaugurate a decisive change in the relations ofground and air particularly in respect of ships and portsexposed to dive-bombing attack


4VIII40

What are you doing to focus the discussions onfood shipping and agricultural policy for the secondtwelve months of the war I thought it looked like18000000 tons of shipping [for food] plough up1500000 more acres and instruct the Food Depart-ment to submit a plan both for increasing rations andbuilding up further food reserves This should bepossible on the above basis


4VIII40

The danger of Japanese hostility makes it all themore important that the German capital ships should beput out of action I understand that the Air Force intendto make heavy attacks on these ships as soon as thereis sufficient moon Scharnhorst and the Gneisenauboth in floating docks at Kiel the Bismarck at Hamburgand the Tirpitz at Wilhelm-shaven are all targets ofsupreme consequence Even a few monthsrsquo delay in


Bismarck will affect the whole balance of sea-power toa serious degree 1 shall be glad to hear from you


5VIII40

I am not satisfied with the volume or quality ofinformation received from the unoccupied area ofFrance We seem to be as much cut off from theseterritories as from Germany I do not wish such reportsas are received to be sifted and digested by the variousIntelligence authorities For the present Major Mortonwill inspect them for me and submit what he considersof major interest He is to see everything andsubmitauthentic documents for me in their original form

Further I await proposals for improving andextending our information about France and for keepinga continued flow of agents moving to and fro For thispurpose naval facilities can if necessary be invokedSo far as the Vichy Government is concerned it is notcreditable that we have so little information To whatextent are Americans Swiss and Spanish agentsbeing used


5VIII40

What orders are extant for the future production of UP multiple projectors in groups of twenties tens fivesand also single projectors

What amount of ammunition (a) of the ordinaryrocket (b) of the aerial mine (c) of the PE fuze (d) ofthe radio fuze is on order What are the forecasts ofdeliveries in the next six months in all cases

Presently the PE fuze will probably supersede theaerial mine for use in multiple projectors mounted on HM ships This will entail an alteration of the projectortubes The Admiralty should be asked to study thisbetimes so that the new tubes can be fitted on theexisting mountings of HM ships with the least possibledelay from the moment that this change appearsdesirable


The Admiralty should also be asked to reportwhether any progress has been made on firing shortaerial mines from shipsrsquo guns

I wish to refresh my memory with what happenedabout this before 1 left the Admiralty


6VIII40

I saw it stated that you were piling up large reservesof coal during the summer for use during the winter Ishould be glad to know how far this very wiseprecaution has advanced We were very short andanxious in January last and I hope you are takingprecautions


7VIII40

Please let me know what is being done to train menin the use of the sticky bomb which is now beginning tocome through in quantity


9VIII40

Ask for a statement of the Ministry of Supplyimportation programme under various heads ProfessorLindemann should be consulted about these heads Letme see them

The programme for the second year of the war hasnot yet been presented to me in a coherent form


9VIII40

I was much concerned to find that the 1st Divisionwhich has an exceptionally high proportion ofequipment and includes a Brigade of Guards shouldbe dispersed along the beaches instead of being heldin reserve for counter-attack What is the number ofdivisions which are now free and out of the line andwhat is the argument for keeping divisions with a highequipment of guns etc on the beaches



9VIII40

If it came to a choice between hampering airproduction or tank production I would sacrifice thetank but 1 do not think this is the case as the points ofoverlap are not numerous and ought to be adjustable Igathered from you that you thought you could arrangewith the Minister of Supply


9VIII40

It is important to keep General de Gaulle active inFrench on the broadcast and to relay by every possiblemeans our French propaganda to Africa I am told theBelgians will help from the Congo

Have we any means of repeating to the WestAfrican stations the agreement made between us andde Gaulle


10VIII40

Let me have a weekly return of the deliveries totroops of the American 75rsquos and the 300 rifles to HomeGuard with consequent liberation by them of Lee-Metfords Begin at once


10VIII40

The Prime Minister would be glad to have a reportfrom the COS Committee after conference with theC-in-C Home Forces upon the small-arms ammunitionposition on the beaches and with the reserves


11VIII40

I felt sure you would take advantage of thebreakdown of the export market to increase our stocksall over the country I hope you will press on with this


especially as regards our essential gas water andelectricity works I note that the gas and electricitysupplies are about twenty per cent up we cannot gowrong in piling up such well-distributed stocks whichare sure to be used sooner or later

I am sending a note to the Minister of Transport tocall his attention to the position of the railways

The tremendous upset in your plans due to thecollapse of France and the loss of three-quarters of ourexport markets must have put a great strain on yourDepartment It must be very difficult after all your effortsto increase production to explain the sudden slump butI have no doubt the men will understand Indeed whatyou tell me about the fortitude of the Kent miners is anencouraging sign of the spirit which I believe informs allthe workingmen in the country


11VIII40

In view of certain activities we are planning forGeneral de Gaulle it is of the highest importance thatthe broadcasting of French news in North and WestAfrica should be carried to the highest point Pleasemake sure that the BBC conform to this requirementand let me have a report on Monday to the effect thatall is satisfactorily arranged

I cannot emphasise too strongly that you have fullauthority to make the BBC obey

(Action this day)Prime Minister to Minister ofTransport

11VIII40

I should be grateful for a full report on the stepstaken by your Department to deal with the difficultieswhich may arise from the bombing and closing of ports

One-quarter of our imports it seems normallycomes in through the port of London and one-fifththrough the Mersey with a tenth each throughSouthampton the Bristol Channel and the HumberWe must envisage these entrances being wholly orpartially closed either one at a time or even several at


a time but I have no doubt you have worked out plansto take account of the various contingencies

In view of our large accretions of shipping it maywell be that port facilities and roadway facilities may bea more stringent bottleneck than shortage of tonnageso that the preparations you make to meet the variouspossible eventualities may well be of the greatestimportance


12VIII40

How does the position now stand about a TimberController under the Ministry of Supply

Ask for a short summary from the Ministry of Supplyof the present timber position and policy

Prime Minister to Lord PrivySeal and CaptainMargesson

12VIII40

It would probably be convenient for me to make ageneral statement on the war covering the first yearand also the first quarter of the new Governmentbefore the House rises This would be expected and Isuppose Tuesday the 20th would be the best dayThis should of course be in public session Perhapsyou will let me know what you wish An announcementcould be made in good time this week

It would save me a lot of trouble if a record could betaken at the time so that the speech could be repeatedover the wireless in the evening or such parts of it asarc of general interest Can this be arranged without aresolution If not could a resolution be passed thisweek I do not think the House would object


12VIII40

The drafts [about instructions to police in case ofinvasion] submitted do not correspond with my view ofthe recent Cabinet decision We do not contemplate orencourage fighting by persons not in the armed forcesbut we do not forbid it The police and as soon as


possible the ARP Services are to be divided intocombatant and non-combatant armed and unarmedThe armed will co-operate actively in fighting with theHome Guard and Regulars in their neighbourhood andwill withdraw with them if necessary the unarmed willactively assist in the ldquostay putrdquo policy for civiliansShould they fall into an area effectively occupied by theenemy they may surrender and submit with the rest ofthe inhabitants but must not in those circumstancesgive any aid to the enemy in maintaining order or inany other way They may assist the civil population asfar as possible


13VIII40

I should be glad to know what stocks of coal arenow held by the railways and how they compare withthose normally held With the stoppage of our exporttrade to Europe there should be a great surplus justnow and no doubt you are taking advantage of this tofill up every available dump so that we shall have a well-distributed stock for the railways in case of anyinterruptions or even in case of another very hardwinter Negotiations about price should not be allowedto hold up the process of restocking If necessarysome form of arbitration will have to be employed tomake sure that the prices paid are fair


13VIII40

If owing to lack of equipment and other facilities itis necessary to limit the numbers of the active HomeGuard would it not be possible to recruit a HomeGuard Reserve members of which would for the timebeing be provided with no weapons and no uniformother than arm bands Their only duties would be toattend such courses of instruction as could beorganised locally in the use of simple weapons like theldquoMolotov cocktailrdquo and to report for orders in the eventof invasion


Unless some such step is taken those who arerefused enlistment will be bewildered and disappointedand one of the primary objects of the Home Guardwhich was to provide for the people as a whole anopportunity of helping to defend their homes will belost I am anxious to avoid the disappointment andfrustration which the stoppage of recruiting for theHome Guard is likely to cause to many people

Please let me know what you think of this proposal


19VIII40

Is it true that Admiral [John] Cunningham says thatthe only suitable day for ldquoMenacerdquo [Dakar] is September12 and that if this day is missed owing to storm noother days will be open till the 27th or 28th when tideand moon will again be satisfactory All this raises mostgrave questions The Admiral cannot take up a positionthat only in ideal conditions of tide and moon can theoperation be begun It has got to be begun as soon aspossible as long as conditions are practicable eventhough they be not the best People have to fight in waron all sorts of days and under all sorts of conditions Itwill be a great misfortune if there is any delay beyondthe 8th Pray report to me on this today


21VIII40

I am not convinced by these arguments about flame-throwers The question is one to be settled relatively toother forms of war effort The prospects of invasion arerapidly receding The likelihood in an invasion of acolumn of troops marching up the very defile in whichthese installations have been laid on appears remoteThe idea of setting up a Petroleum Warfare Executiveis a needless multiplication of our apparatus I have nodoubt whatever that the method would be very effectiveit ever the occasion arose but will it arise and in thiscase would it be at the point expected Troops do notmarch along roads without having first cleared their way


by small parties and guarded their flanks on each sideof defiles

Prime Minister to First Lord 22VIII40I await your proposals about the resumption of the

capital ship programme which was approved by thelate Cabinet on my initiative This cannot be settledapart from the general demand upon steel and labourbut in principle I favour its resumption

I hope opportunity will now be taken to repair thedisastrous neglect to convert the Royal Sovereign classinto properly armoured and bulged bombarding vesselswith heavy deck armour These will be needed nextyear for the attack on Italy It is lamentable that wehave not got them now They should certainly takeprecedence over the resumption of battleshipconstruction


24VIII40

Report to me on the position of Major Jefferis Bywhom is he employed Who is he under I regard thisofficer as a singularly capable and forceful man whoshould be brought forward to a higher position He-ought certainly to be promoted Lieutenant-Colonel as itwill give him more authority

Prime Minister to CASand VCAS

24VIII40

It is of high importance to increase both the numberof squadrons and the number of aircraft and crewsimmediately available After a year of war we have onlyoperationally fit about 1750 of which again only three-quarters are immediately available You cannot restsatisfied with this which is less than the number wewere supposed to have available before the war


25VIII40


I have read with interest your memorandum on portclearance

I note that the Minister of Shipping doubts whetherthe country could be supplied through the west coastports on the scale you envisage I should be glad tohave your views on this

Does not the widespread dislocation caused by thecold spell last winter raise some doubts as to the readyadaptability of the railway system in case of suddenemergency

No doubt arrangements have been made for theimportation of oil which is not included in the food orsupply programme It appears that over two-fifths of ouroil imports come through London and Southampton inpeace-time Our stocks are high but if road transporthad to be used more fully to relieve the railways ourconsumption would of course increase

I presume that you have discussed their importprogrammes with the Ministers of Food and of Supplyso that alternative schemes will be ready in case ofgreat diversions


25VIII40

I have been following with much interest the growthand development of the new guerrilla formations of theHome Guard known as ldquoAuxiliary Unitsrdquo

From what I hear these units are being organisedwith thoroughness and imagination and should in theevent of invasion prove a useful addition to the Regularforces

Perhaps you will keep me informed of progress


25VIII40

The enclosed returns show losses of over fortythousand tons reported in a single day I regard thismatter as so serious as to require special considerationby the War Cabinet Will you therefore have prepareda statement showing the recent losses their cause themeasures which have been taken by the Admiralty to


cope with the danger any further measures which youfeel it necessary to propose and whether there is anyway in which the War Cabinet can assist the Admiralty

I should be glad if you would make this report to theWar Cabinet on Thursday next


25VIII40

Address the War Office forthwith upon the situationdisclosed at Slough Point out the danger of this largeconcentration of vehicles the desirability of dispersingand concealing the vehicles Ask that a plan should beexamined for decentralising this depot as far aspossible We should also make sure that no sedimentor surplus accumulates in the depot It would be a greatpity if a thousand valuable vehicles were ruined by anair attack


25VIII40

I visted Kenley [Air Station] on Thursday saw thegunner in question and had a rocket fired off Moreoverit was the Admiralty Committee over which I presidedearly in the year which produced the idea of usingthese distress rockets I am therefore well acquaintedwith the subject The Air Ministry not for the first timespread itself into very large demands and using itspriority barged in heavily into other forms of not lessimportant production I agree that PAC8 rockets maybe a good interim defence against low-flying attack butthey have to take their place in the general scheme Ithought myself about five thousand a month would besufficient but I am willing to agree to fifteen hundred aweek or six thousand a month This figure could besomewhat extended if the wire-recovery projects youmention were further developed and proved aneffective economy

(Action this day)



25VIII40

War Office have accepted from the War Cabinet theresponsibility of dealing with delayed-action bombsThis may become a feature of the enemy attack Anumber were thrown last night into the City causingobstruction They may even try them on Whitehall Itseems to me that energetic effort should be made toprovide sufficient squads to deal with this form of attackin the large centres The squads must be highly mobileso as not to waste men and material They must movein motor lorries quickly from one point to another Ipresume a careful system of reporting all unexplodedbombs and the time at which they fell is in operationand that this information will be sent immediately to thedelayed-action section of Home Defence which has nodoubt already been established and also the variouslocal branches The service which is highly dangerousmust be considered particularly honourable andrewards should follow its successful discharge

I should be very glad to see your plans for the newsection together with numbers and it will also beinteresting to have a short account of the work done upto date and the methods employed I presume you arein touch with all the scientific authorities you need

On the other hand I am asking the Air Ministry forinformation as to their reciprocating this process on theenemy

(General Ismay to see)

(Action this day)Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for War

25VIII40

I cannot feel you are justified in maintaining thepresent scale of communication squadrons when weare fighting so heavily The sole end should surely be toincrease the reserve and operational strength of ourfighting squadrons and to meet the problem of traineraircraft Surely your dominant idea should be ldquoStrengthfor battlerdquo Everything should be keyed onto this andadministrative convenience or local vested interests


must be made to give way In your place I should comband recomb I have been shocked to see the enormousnumbers at Mention and I would far rather give upflying on inspections altogether for members of theGovernment than that this should be made a reason forkeeping these forces out of the fight

I should have thought that Hendon could provide atleast two good squadrons of fighter or bomber aircraftof the reserve category and that they should have themachines issued to them and practise on them asoccasion serves Then they could be thrown in when anemergency came

Ought you not every day to call in question in yourown mind every non-military aspect of the Air ForceThe tendency of every Station Commander is naturallyto keep as much in his hands as possible The Admiralsdo exactly the same Even when you have had athorough search if you look around a few weeks lateryou will see more fat lias been gathered

I hope you will feel able to give some considerationto these views of your old friend


27V1II40

Will you kindly send the following to AdmiralCunningham Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean

Following from Prime Minister Minister of DefencersquoMain object of directive was to safeguard Alexan-

dria Only a limited number of troops can be maintainedMersa Matruh as GOC Middle East will inform youEvery effort is to be made to defend this position Ifhowever it and intermediate positions are forced orturned it will be necessary to hold the line fromAlexandria southward along the cultivated area [of theDelta] Air attack on the Fleet at Alexandria is notnecessarily less effective from one hundred and twentymiles distance than from twenty miles since aeroplanesoften fly at three hundred miles per hour and haveample endurance In practice it is usually thought betterto hold aerodromes a little back of the actual fightingline They do not move forward concurrently with the


fronts of armies Everyone here understands thegrievous consequence of the fall of Alexandria and thatit would probably entail the Fleet leaving the Mediter-ranean If however you have any helpful suggestion tomake for the more effective defence of Mersa Matruh orof any positions in advance of it I should be obliged ifyou would tell me

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for Joint PlanningStaff

28VIII40

Now that the long nights are approaching thequestion of the blackout must be reviewed I am infavour of a policy not of black-out but of blnckable-outFor this purpose a considerable system of auxiliaryelectric street-lighting must be worked out The wholeof the centre of London now lighted by incandescentgas must be given priority The best methods in thecentres of other great cities must also be studied andlocal schemes must be examined Thus the lights canbe switched down and up and finally out on an air-raidwarning being given The lights themselves should notbe of a too brilliant character The subdued lighting ofshop windows must also be studied with a view toextending the facilities given last Christmas on apermanent basis Where factories are allowed tocontinue working at night in spite of the black-out therecan be no objection to extending blackable-out lightingto the surrounding districts thus tending to make thetarget less defined Consideration should also be givento decoy lighting and battle lighting in open spaces atsuitable distances from vulnerable points

Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for Air CAS andGeneral Ismay

29VIII40

I was much concerned on visiting MansionAerodrome yesterday to find that although more thanfour clear days have passed since it was last raidedthe greater part of the craters on the landing groundremained unfilled and the aerodrome was barely


serviceable When you remember what the Germansdid at the Stavanger aerodrome and the enormousrapidity with which craters were filled I must protestemphatically against this feeble method of repairingdamage Altogether there were a hundred and fiftypeople available to work including those that could beprovided from the Air Force personnel These weredoing their best No effective appliances were availableand the whole process appeared disproportionate tothe value of maintaining this fighting vantage-ground

All craters should be filled in within twenty-four hoursat most and every case where a crater is unfilled for alonger period should be reported to higher authoritiesIn order to secure this better service it will benecessary to form some crater-filling companies Youmight begin with say two of two hundred and fifty eachfor the South of England which is under this intensiveattack These companies should be equipped with allhelpful appliances and be highly mobile so that in afew hours they can be at work on any site which hasbeen cratered Meanwhile at every aerodrome in theattack area and later elsewhere there must beaccumulated by local contractors stocks of gravelrubble and other appropriate materials sufficient to fillwithout replenishment at least a hundred craters Thusthe mobile air-field repair companies would arrive tofind all the material all ready on the spot

I saw some time ago that the Germans filled in theshell holes by some process of having the gravel inwooden frameworks The VCNS drew my attention toit during the Norwegian operation and he couldperhaps put you on to the telegram referred to

In what Department of the Air Ministry does thisprocess now fall

After the craters had been refilled camouflage effortmight be made to pretend they had not been but this isa refinement


30VIII40


For all Departments concerned including ServiceDepartment Home Security MAP and Supply)

We must expect that many windows will be brokenin the bombing raids and during the winter glass maybecome scarce with serious resultant damage tobuildings if not replaced

The utmost economy is to be practised in the use ofglass Where windows are broken they should ifpossible be boarded up except for one or two panesWe cannot afford the full-sized windows in glass Allglass not needed for hothouses should be stored if thehothouses are empty I saw at Mansion a largehothouse with a great quantity of glass enough wasbroken to make it useless and I directed that the restshould be carefully stored

What is the condition of glass supply It would seemnecessary to press the manufacturers

Government buildings should all be fitted withemergency windows containing only one or two glasspanes which when the existing framework is blown incan be substituted Let me have a full report on theposition


30VIII40

If French India wish for trade they should be madeto signify association with General de GaulleOtherwise no trade This is not a matter upon which tobe easy-going Secretary of State for India to beinformed

The accession of any French possessions now is ofimportance


31VIII40

I have not approved of any further cruiser tanksbeing despatched to the Middle East beyond thosewhich have already gone Although in principle it isdesirable to complete the despatch of a full armoureddivision further movements from this country can onlybe decided in relation to situation of home forces No


decision of this importance must be taken withoutreference to me and in this case I should have toconsult the Cabinet


31VIII40

I am very glad to know that the [chemical warfare]stocks are piling up in this country Let me know whatthe total now amounts to The necessary containersshould be brought level with supply Do these stockskeep Press on

SEPTEMBER


1IX40

Of course if the glider scheme is better than --parachutes we should pursue it but is it beingseriously taken up Are we not in danger of beingfobbed off with one doubtful and experimental policyand losing the other which has already been provedLet me have a full report of what has been done aboutthe gliders


1IX40

I am deeply concerned at your news that you cannotattack these batteries of German long-range guns untilthe 16th You are allowing an artillery concentration tobe developed day after day which presently will forbidthe entry of all British ships into the Straits of Doverand will prepare the way for an attack on Dover itselfPray let me know what you propose to do about this

Surely while the big guns are actually being hoistedinto position and cannot fire back is the time for actionThe general weakness of the defences of Dover itself inheavy guns is also a matter of great seriousness Wemust not simply look at dangers piling up without anyattempt to forestall them Erebus will have to face


double the fire on the 16th that she or any other shipwould have to face in the next week

I remember well that it was customary to bombardthe Knocke and other German batteries on the Belgiancoast very frequently during the late war It waspossible to fire most accurately by night after a buoyhad been fixed and sound-ranging used I ask forproposals for action this week Look at the photographsattached


1IX40

I presume you will be thinking about what is tohappen should ldquoMenacerdquo succeed with little or nobloodshed It would seem that as soon as de Gaullehas established himself there and in the place a little tothe north he should try to get a footing in Morocco andour ships and troops could be used to repeat theprocess of ldquoMenacerdquo if it has been found to workimmediately and in a more important theatre Thisoperation may be called ldquoThreatrdquo


1IX40

I should be glad to have a full report of thearrangements being made to provide educational andrecreational facilities for the troops during the comingwinter Who will be responsible for this importantbranch of work

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for India

1IX40

1 I am sorry to say that I cannot see my way todiverting aeroplanes or AA guns from the battle nowraging here for the defence of India which is in no waypressing neither is it possible to divert Americansupplies for the building of an aircraft industry in IndiaWe are already running risks which many mightquestion in the reinforcement and re-equipment of theMiddle East and when the battle at home dies down


this theatre will absorb all our surplus for a long time tocome

2 It is very important that India should be a help andnot on the balance a burden at the present time Thedebit balance is heavy when you consider the numberof British troops and batteries locked up there and thevery exiguous Indian forces which after a year of warhave reached the field I am glad you are makingincreased efforts to form Indian divisions for the verylarge important operations which seem likely to developin the Middle East in 1941

Prime Minister to First LordFirst Sea Lord and Controller

5IX40

I continue to be extremely anxious for King GeorgeV to get away to the north It would be disastrous ifBismarck were finished and something happened toKing George V Surely the electricians etc can gonorth in her and finish up at Scapa It would be mostpainful if you lost this ship now after all these longvexatious delays just at the moment when she isfinished and most needed The Tyne is very ill-defended compared to Scapa

(Action this day)Prime Minister to ForeignSecretary

5IX40

Would it not be well to send a telegram to LordLothian expressing War Cabinet approval of themanner in which he handled the whole destroyerquestion and paying him a compliment

At the same time what is being done about gettingour twenty motor torpedo-boats the five PBY [Flying-boats] the hundred and fifty to two hundred aircraftand the two hundred and fifty thousand rifles alsoanything else that is going I consider we werepromised all the above and more too Not an hourshould be lost in raising these questions ldquoBeg while theiron is hotrdquo


(Action this day)Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for War and CIGS

8IX40

I am very pleased with this telegram [about theCavalry Division in Palestine] It has been heartbreak-ing to me to watch these splendid units fooled away fora whole year The sooner they form machine-gunbattalions which can subsequently be converted intomotor battalions and finally into armoured units thebetter Please let nothing stand in the way It is aninsult to the Scots Greys and Household Cavalry totether them to horses at the present time There mightbe something to be said for a few battalions of infantryor cavalrymen mounted on ponies for the rocky hills ofPalestine but these historic Regular regiments have aright to play a manrsquos part in the war I hope I may seeyour telegram approving this course before it goes

Prime Minister to First Lord 9IX40I have read your papers on the new programme I

understand you are going to redraft your Memorandumafter reading the one 1 presented to the Cabinet inMarch I am not content at all with the refusal toreconstruct the Royal Sovereign class9 I think theseshould have precedence over all battleships exceptthose which can finish by the end of 1942 This wouldmean that you could get on with the Howe the positionof the other five capital ships being considered nextyear when the time for presenting the navy estimatescomes I see no reason why work should not proceedon the aircraft-carrier Indefatigable and on the eightsuspended cruisers I am quite ready to approve therefilling of all slips vacated by anti-submarine craftprovided that a maximum limit of fifteen months isassigned to the completion of all new craft All verylarge-size destroyers taking over this period to buildmust be excluded from the emergency wartimeprogramme


After your final proposals are ready we can have aconference


9IX40

1 The prime defence of Singapore is the Fleet Theprotective effect of the Fleet is exercised to a largeextent whether it is on the spot or not For instance thepresent Middle Eastern Fleet which we have justpower fully reinforced could in a very short time ifordered reach Singapore It could if necessary fightan action before reaching Singapore because it wouldfind in that fortress fuel ammunition and repairfacilities The fact that the Japanese had made landingsin Malaya and had even begun the siege of the fortresswould not deprive a superior relieving fleet of its powerOn the contrary the plight of the besiegers cut off fromhome while installing themselves in the swamps andjungle would be all the more forlorn

2 The defence of Singapore must therefore bebased upon a strong local garrison and the generalpotentialities of sea-power The idea of trying to defendthe Malay peninsula and of holding the whole ofMalaya a large country four hundred by two hundredmiles at its widest part cannot be entertained A singledivision however well supplied with signals etc couldmake no impression upon such a task What could asingle division do for the defence of a country nearly aslarge as England

3 The danger of a rupture with Japan is no worsethan it was The probabilities of the Japaneseundertaking an attack upon Singapore which wouldinvolve so large a proportion of their Fleet far outsidethe Yellow Sea are remote in fact nothing could bemore foolish from their point of view Far more attractiveto them are the Dutch East Indies The presence of theUnited States Fleet in the Pacific must always be amain preoccupation to Japan They are not at all likelyto gamble They are usually most cautious and nowhave real need to be since they are involved in Chinaso deeply


4 I should have preferred the Australian Brigade togo to India rather than Malaya but only because theirtraining in India will fit them more readily for the MiddleEast I am delighted to know they can be trained in theMiddle East

5 I do not therefore consider that the politicalsituation is such as to require the withholding of the 7thAustralian Division from its best station strategically andadministratively A telegram should be drafted to theCommonwealth Government in this sense

Prime Minister to the Mayorof Tel Aviv Palestine

15IX40

Please accept my deep sympathy in lossessustained by Tel Aviv in recent air attack This act ofsenseless brutality will only strengthen our unitedresolve

Prime Minister to First Lord 15IX40l Your new programme I am very doubtful whether

the Japanese figures are correct The Naval Intelli-gence Branch are very much inclined to exaggerateJapanese strength and efficiency I am not howeveropposed to the resumption of the battleship pro-gramme provided it can be fitted in with moreimmediate wartime needs Much of the battleship plantand labour would not be useful for other purposes Praylet me have a paper showing the demands these shipswould make in each year they are under constructionin money steel and labour Every effort must beconcentrated uponHowe

2 I should be content if two R [Royal Sovereign]class vessels were taken in hand as soon as theinvasion situation has cleared and we get King GeorgeV in commission Meanwhile material can be collectedand preparations made This should enable them to beready in eighteen months from now ndash ie the summerof 1942

3 You should press on with Indefatigable but weneed not consider an additional aircraft-carrier until


early next year The drawings can however becompleted

4 I suppose you realise that the Belfast type takeover three years to build Considering a largeprogramme of cruisers is already under construction Ihope you will not press for these four to be added tothe programme of this year

5 I am all for building destroyers and I do not mindhow large they are or how great their enduranceprovided that they can be constructed in fifteen monthsThis should be taken as the absolute limit to whicheverything else must be made to conform We weremaking destroyers which took three years to buildeveryone thinking himself very clever in adding oneimprovement after another I should like to discuss thedestroyer designs with the Controller and the Directorof Naval Construction They must be built only for thiswar and have good protection from aircraft Extremespeed is not so important What you say about the U-boats working continually farther west is no doubt truebut the corvettes formerly called whalers have veryfine endurance and range

6 The submarine programme is already very largeand makes inroads on other forms of war requirementsI think you would be wise to re-examine the demand forthe fourteen additional to the twenty-four to which theTreasury have agreed

7 Great efforts should be made to produce thelanding-craft as soon as possible Are the JointPlanning Committee satisfied that these numbers aresufficient

8 I am surprised you ask for only fifty anti-E-boatsUnless this is the utmost limit of your capacity onehundred would be more appropriate

9 Speaking generally the speed of construction andearly dates of completion must at this time beconsidered the greatest virtues in new building It is nouse crowding up the order books of firms and filling theyards with shipping orders which everyone knowscannot be completed You have I presume consultedSir James Lithgow about this programme and haveheard his views upon the consequences it will have


upon merchant-shipping building and our alreadyreduced steel output It is very wrong to trench toodeeply upon the needs of other services in time of war

10 What has happened to the armoured torpedoram which I asked the DNC to design

Prime Minister to ColonelJacob

15IX40

More than a year ago it was considered possiblethat we should soon be able to develop Radar inlandSince then however we have relied entirely on theObserver Corps These have done splendid work butin cloudy weather like yesterday and today they havethe greatest difficulty in functioning accurately If wecould have even half a dozen stations which could workinland I am assured that very great advantages wouldbe reaped in interception This is especially importantover the Sheerness-Isle of Wight promontory which islikely to be the main line of air attack on London I amtold that there are duplicate installations already atsome of the stations on this sector of the coast as aninsurance against bombing These might be turnedround and put in action In other cases new stationscould be made I regard this matter as of the highesturgency

2 Tomorrow Monday Air Marshal Joubert de laFerteacute will assemble all necessary scientific authoritiesand make a report that day to me on (a) the desirabilityof the above (b) its practicability and the time it will laketo get even a few stations into action He should makeproposals for putting into service at the earliest momentsix or twelve stations and for rebuilding their reserves

3 Should a feasible scheme emerge I will myselfbring it before the Minister of Aircraft Production

Prime Minister to GeneralSikorski

17IX40

I deeply appreciated your telegram of September 14conveying the relief felt by the Polish Government thePolish armed forces and the Polish people at thefortunate escape of the King and Queen from the


recent German bombing of Buckingham Palace AsTheir Majesties stated these dastardly attacks haveonly strengthened the resolution of all of us to fightthrough to final victory


18IX40

The enemy will try by magnetic mines and otherdevices to smash as much glass as possible and thewinter is coining on We must immediately revert tomore primitive conditions in regard to daylight indwellings All glass in the country should be held andevery effort made to increase the supply Everyoneshould be encouraged or pressed to reduce window-glass to at least one-quarter of its present compasskeeping the rest as spare Windows should be filled asmay be most convenient with plywood or other fabricand the spare panes kept to replace breakages to bepreserved The quicker this can be done in the targetcentres the better Will you convene a meeting of thedepartments concerned and reach decisions for actionof a violent character and on the broadest lines invitingme to assist you in suppressing obstruction


19IX40

I sent you a Minute on this subject last night andyou were going to look into it for me

How many square feet of glass have beendestroyed up to date Can any estimate be formed Itof course our monthly production is ahead of thedamage there is no need to worry

Let me have the best estimate possible

Prime Minister to Postmaster-General

19IX40

There are considerable complaints about the PostOffice service during air raids Perhaps you will give mea report on what you are doing


Prime Minister to CIGS 21IX40I understood that all brigades from India consisted of

one British and three Indian battalions which would bethe normal and desirable formation But this telegramseems to suggest that Indian brigades have only Indiantroops H so the change made by C-in-C Middle Eastis most desirable

Prime Minister to First SeaLord and Controller

21IX40

How is the expenditure of naval ammunitionproceeding in the Middle East as well as in the NorthSea and Channel Let me know of any weak points inthe supplies which are emerging Have you got over thedifficulty of the 47 ammunition Let me have a shortnote


21IX40

Pray have a look at the Air Ministry communiqueissued in this morningrsquos papers It includes thefollowing ldquoThe enemy formations were engaged by ourfighters but cloud conditions made interception difficultReports so far received show that four enemy aircraftwere shot down Seven of our fighters have been lostthe pilots of three being saferdquo It is very unwise to let theGermans know that their new tactics have beensuccessful and that they resulted in our losing sevenfighters as against tour

We do not of course want to conceal our losses atthe present time when we are prospering but surelythere is no need to relate them to any particular action


22IX40

Make sure through every channel that all arrange-ments are made to bring these rifles [from USA] overat full speed They must be distributed in at least fourfast ships Could not some of them come by passengerliner Let me know what Admiralty can do Make sure


there is no delay at Purcorsquos [Purchasing Commission]end through repacking as described by General StrongUSA


22IX40

I asked Lord Lothian to speak to you about ourremaining desiderata The 250000 rifles are mosturgently needed as I have 250000 trained anduniformed men into whose hands they can be put Ishould be most grateful if you could arrange thenecessary release Every arrangement will be made totransport them with the utmost speed They will enableus to take 250000 303 rifles from the Home Guardand transfer them to the Regular Army leaving theHome Guard armed with about 800000 Americanrifles Even if no ammunition is available these rifleswill be none the less useful as they can draw upon thestock which has already reached us


22IX40

From every quarter the presence of General Catrouxwas demanded in Syria I therefore took the responsibili-ty in your name of inviting the General to go there It isof course perfectly understood that he holds hisposition only from you and I shall make this clear tohim again Sometimes one has to take decisions on thespot because of their urgency and difficulty ofexplaining to others at a distance There is time to stophim still if you desire it but I should consider this was avery unreasonable act

All good fortune in your enterprise tomorrow morning


23IX40

I regard the production of GL sets10 as of primeimportance and every step should be taken toaccelerate output I understand that the chief difficultyat the moment is that of obtaining the skilled labour


required and I wish everything possible to be done tomeet this requirement Speed is vital

Action this day) PrimeMinister to Secretary of Statefor War and CIGS

23IX40

There is not much in the report referred to and whatthere is applies equally to the Soudan We are piling uptroops and artillery in Kenya which are urgently neededin the Soudan

With regard to what you say about the vaststrategical front of the Kenya operation if we lie backon the broad-gauge railway from Mombasa to the lakewe have a lateral line of communication incomparablysuperior to any line by which we can be approachedand it should be possible to move our forces so as tohave sudden superior strength at the point where theenemy advance develops Although no one can say forcertain where the enemyrsquos blow will fall I am convincedthat the true disposition would economise [troops] tothe utmost in Kenya in order to reinforce the SoudanThe one concession which is needed for Kenya isabout ten cruiser tanks If these were put on suitablevehicles on the railway they could strike with deadlyeffect and with surprise at any Italian movement Butthe mere piling-up of guns and brigades is a mostpainful process to watch

In order to raise these points I must ask that themove of the mountain battery from Aden to Kenya shallbe held up and that instead the question of moving it oranother battery to the Soudan shall be consideredPlease let me have a statement showing ration riflemachine-gun and artillery strength of all troops inKenya

Prime Minister to Captain HM Destroyer ldquoChurchillrdquo

25IX40

Am delighted that your ship should be named afterthe great Duke of Marlborough and I am sending you


one of his handwritten letters for your Ward Room forluck Thank you so much for your kind message


25IX40

Lord Lothianrsquos proposal to return for a flying visitappeals to me Pray authorise it and arrange it as youthink most serviceable and convenient


26IX40

If these facts [about the use of the blind beam forbombing] are accurate they constitute a deadly dangerand one of the first magnitude I expect the Chiefs ofthe Staff to use all the resources at their disposal and togive me a report by tomorrow night (a) upon the realityof the danger (b) upon the measures to counter it Inmaking any recommendation for action the Chiefs ofthe Staff may be sure that the highest priorities and allother resources will be at their disposal


26IX40

The composition hat for air raids which Mr Bevin ispromoting seems to me of the utmost importance andif it gives a measure of protection against fallingsplinters etc it should certainly be mass-produced ona great scale and eventually made a full issue

Pray let me have a report today on the experimentalaspect and in conjunction with the Minister of Supplylet me have estimates for production


26IX40

I was delighted with your hat and something onthese lines should certainly be mass-produced as soonas possible for issue pending steel hats I think it is amistake to call it a ldquorag hatrdquo as I see is done in some ofthe papers today I hope you will think of some bettername


I am calling for a full report today from the HomeSecretary


26IX40

Considering that everything depends upon LordBeaverbrookrsquos success in obtaining the supply ofaircraft and the heavy blows he is receiving at BristolSouthampton and elsewhere I earnestly trust you willsee that his wishes are met fully and immediately in thematter of these spares

Prime Minister to Minister ofAgriculture

26IX40

I am far from satisfied at the proposal to reduce pigsto one-third of their present number by the middle of theautumn This is certainly not what was understood bythe Cabinet Why do you not ask for a greaterproportion of feeding-stuffs in the imports We couldthen see what if anything had to give way to itMeanwhile what arrangements are you making forcuring the surplus bacon that will come upon themarket through the massacre of pigs What increaseshave you been able to establish in the pig population byencouraging people to feed individual pigs fromhousehold refuse


28IX40

Recent air raids have shown that the production ofcertain vital munitions and particularly De Wildeammunition has been concentrated in one factory withthe result that output has been seriously curtailed byone successful raid Pray let me have a report on thedistribution of the production of every important keymunition It will then be possible to assess the dangerof serious reductions in output and to consider whatcan be done to distribute the risk more widely



28IX40

1 These two papers [about the supply of materialfor chemical warfare] cause me great anxiety I hadunderstood that Randle [factory] had been working atfull capacity as a result of the orders given by the WarCabinet on October 13 1939 ndash ie almost exactly ayear -ago What is the explanation of the neglect to fulfilthese orders and who is responsible for it

2 Secondly it appears that practically no stepshave been taken to make projectiles or containerseither for air or artillery to discharge these various formsof gas The programme now set out would clearly takemany months before any results are realised Let mehave an immediate report on this The highest prioritymust be given I regard the danger as very great

3 Thirdly the possibility of our having to retaliate onthe German civil population must be studied and onthe largest scale possible We should never begin butwe must be able to reply Speed is vital here

4 Fourthly instant measures should be taken toraise Randle to full production and above all todisperse the existing stock

5 What are the actual amounts in stock


29IX40

These figures [about AA fire first year of war] areencouraging You should ask General Pile however tosend in the account for September

I should like to see a return of the ammunition firedevery twenty-four hours during September as soon aspossible

(Action this day)Prime Minister to Minister ofSupply and President of theBoard of Trade

30IX40

I am sure we ought to increase our steel purchasesfrom the United States so as to save tonnage on ore 1


should like to buy another couple of million tons invarious stages of manufacture Then we should be ableto resume the plan of the Anderson shelters andvarious other steel requirements which press upon us1 would if necessary telegraph to the President

OCTOBER


4X40

This shows the very serious misconception whichhas grown up in this Ambassadorrsquos mind about theconsequences of the United States entering the warHe should surely be told forthwith that the entry of theUnited States into war either with Germany and Italy orwith Japan is fully conformable with British interests

2 That nothing in the munitions sphere cancompare with the importance of the British Empire andthe United States being co-belligerents That if Japanattacked the United States without declaring war on uswe should at once range ourselves at the side of theUnited States and declare war upon Japan

It is astonishing how this misleading Kennedy11stud that we should do better with a neutral UnitedStates than with her warring at our side should havetravelled so far A clear directive is required to all ourAmbassadors in countries concerned


9X40

hellip Anyone can see that aircraft are needed in theMiddle East What is not so easy is whether they canbe spared here Remember that we are still vastlyinferior in numbers both of fighters and bombers to theGerman air forces and that heavy losses have beensustained by our air production The Chief of the AirStaff and Secretary of State must be asked for aprecise recommendation



10X40

I have received your telegram with great pleasureand I send my best wishes to you and to all otherFrenchmen who are resolved to fight on with us Weshall stand resolutely together until all obstacles havebeen overcome and we share in the triumph of ourcause


12X40

This development of Radar with German long-rangecoastal batteries is serious We have for a long timebeen on the track of this device and I drew attention toit some weeks ago I was then told that it had to have alow priority because of other even more urgent needsPerhaps it may now be possible to bring it forwardEvidently it will turn night into day so far as defenceagainst sea bombardment is concerned

Pray see if some proposals can be made withoutinjury to other radio projects

Prime Minister to CIGS 13X40There are great disadvantages in stationing many

British troops on the West African coast In view of thealtered situation pray consider bringing one of theWest African brigades back from Kenya by one of theconvoys returning empty This should not add in anyway to shipping burdens

Prime Minister to Sir JamesGrigg

13X40

A hot discussion is raging in the ATS aboutwhether members who marry should if they wish beallowed to quit Nearly everyone is in favour of this Itseems futile to forbid them and if they desert there isno means of punishing them Only the most honourableare therefore impeded Pray let me have on one sheetof paper a note on this showing the pros and cons



14X40

Let a report be prepared on two sheets only showingwhat are the possibilities of Germany developing themunitions industries especially aircraft of the countriesshe has overrun and when these evil effects are likelyto become manifest

Prime Minister to First Lord 15X40

If you wish to circulate the Naval Staff paper12 ofOctober 13 which I have now read I do not demur Itis of course a most pessimistic and nervous paperwhich it is very depressing to receive from theAdmiralty Instances of the overdrawn character of thepaper are found in paragraph 3 which claims that wemust maintain ldquogeneral control in every seardquo whereaseffective power of passage is all we require in manycases And in paragraph 5 ldquoGerman strength in whichfrom now onward [October 15] must be counted theTirpitz and the Bismarckrdquo This is not true as even theBismarck has I suppose to work up like the KingGeorge V which should be ready as soon or earlierThe Tirpitz is three months behind the Bismarckaccording to every statement I have received and it ishoped by that time we shall have the Prince of Walesand Queen Elizabeth If such statements are made tothe Cabinet I should be forced to challenge them

2 The whole argument is meant to lead up to theidea that we must submit to the wishes of Vichybecause they have the power to drive us out ofGibraltar by bombing I fully share the desire of theNaval Staff not to be molested in Gibraltar but I do notthink that the enforcement of the blockade will lead theFrench to do this still less to declare war upon us I donot believe the Vichy Government has the power towage war against us as the whole French nation iscoming more and more onto our side I have dealt withthis in a Minute on general policy which is beingcirculated and of which I enclose you the relevantextract


3 The redeeming point in this paper is thesuggestion that we should tell the Vichy Governmentthat if they bomb Gibraltar we shall retaliate not againstsay Casablanca but Vichy to which I would add orany other place occupied by the Vichy GovernmentThis is the proper note to strike and it is also importantto bear in mind that while humbleness to Vichy will notnecessarily prevent them being ordered to make warupon us by their German masters a firm attitude willnot necessarily deter them from coming over to our side

These questions are not urgent because of thefailure to intercept Primaguet13

Prime Minister to CAS 18X40What arrangements have we got for blind landings

for aircraft How many aircraft are so fitted It ought tobe possible to guide them down quite safely ascommercial craft were done before the war in spite offog Let me have full particulars The accidents lastnight are very serious

Prime Minister to CIGS 19X40I was very much pleased last week when you told

me you proposed to give an armoured division to Major-General Hobart14 I think very highly of this officer andI am not at all impressed by the prejudices against himin certain quarters Such prejudices attach frequently topersons of strong personality and original view In thiscase General Hobartrsquos original views have been onlytoo tragically borne out The neglect by the GeneralStaff even to devise proper patterns of tanks before thewar has robbed us of all the fruits of this inventionThese fruits have been reaped by the enemy withterrible consequences We should thereforeremember that this was an officer who had the root ofthe matter in him and also vision

In my Minute last week to you I said I hoped youwould propose to me the appointment that day ieTuesday but at the latest this week Will you very


kindly make sure that the appointment is made at theearliest moment

Since making this Minute I have carefully read yournote to me and the summary of the case for andagainst General Hobart We are now at war fighting forour lives and we cannot afford to confine Armyappointments to persons who have excited no hostilecomment in their career The catalogue of GeneralHobartrsquos qualities and defects might almost exactlyhave been attributed to most of the great commandersof British history Marlborough was very much theconventional soldier carrying with him the good will ofthe Service Cromwell Wolfe Clive Gordon and in adifferent sphere Lawrence all had very closeresemblance to the characteristics set down as defectsThey had other qualities as well and so I am led tobelieve has General Hobart This is a time to try men offorce and vision and not to be exclusively confined tothose who are judged thoroughly safe by conventionalstandards

I hope therefore you will not recoil from yourproposal to me of a week ago for I think your instinct inthis matter was sound and true

Prime Minister to CIGS 19X40Are there no younger men available for this

strenuous administrative appointment [Director-General Home Guard] The bringing back of retiredofficers for posts like these causes much criticism bothin and out of Service circles Why not try to find a manstill in the forties and give him temporary rank


19X40

In view of the forecasts of small-arms ammunitionand the very great improvement in our position whichwill be effected from the factories coming into bearing inOctober and the expanding output expected beforeMarch 31 1941 and having regard to the fact thatunless there is an invasion no operations are possibleexcept in the Middle East and then only on a


comparatively moderate scale I am of opinion that avery much larger issue may be made now to theCommander-in-Chief Home Forces for practice Iunderstand he has only two million rounds a week forthis purpose and that training is grievously hamperedin consequence Although it seems a risk to deplete oursmall War Office reserve I think it should be consideredwhether from November 1 onward the amount issuedfor practice should not be doubled ndash ie four million aweek I shall be glad if you will consult the Chiefs ofStaff immediately15


20X40

1 When was the last meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief Naval Air and Military Was it not found veryuseful Who attended it

I should be willing to preside over such a meeting inthe course of the next week or so

2 Let me have a plan for the imparting of moreinformation about our war policy to these very highofficers


20X40

I am deeply concerned with the non-expansion andindeed contraction of our bomber force which must beexpected between now and April or May nextaccording to present policy Surely an effort should bemade to increase our bomb-dropping capacity duringthis period In moon light periods the presentarrangements for bombing are the best possible andthe only difficulty is our small numbers compared to themany attractive military targets On no account shouldthe limited bomber force be diverted from accuratebombing of military objectives reaching far intoGermany But is it not possible to organise a secondline bomber force which especially in the dark of themoon would discharge bombs from a considerable andsafe height upon the nearest large built-up areas ofGermany which contain military targets in abundance


The Ruhr of course is obviously indicated The objectwould be to find easy targets short runs and safeconditions

How is such a second line or auxiliary bomber forceto be improvised during the winter months Could notcrews from the training schools do occasional runsAre none of the Lysander and reconnaissance pilotscapable of doing some of this simpler bombingobserving that the Army is not likely to be in actionunless invasion occurs I ask that a whole-heartedeffort shall be made to cart a large number of bombsinto Germany by a second line organisation such as Ihave suggested and under conditions in whichadmittedly no special accuracy would be obtained Praylet me have the best suggestions possible and we canthen see whether they are practical or not

How is it that so few of our bombers are fitted withblind landing appliances MAP tells me that a numberof Lorenz equipments are available The grievouslosses which occurred one day last week ought not tobe repeated Not only do the bombers need the blindlanding facilities (which have been used in commercialaviation for years) but also if fighter aircraft are tooperate by night as they must increasingly suchaircraft must also be furnished with the means ofmaking safe landings Pray let me have your observa-tions


20X40

In connection with the plans now being developedfor night fighting not only by individual AircraftInterception fitted machines but by eight-inch fightersquadrons it is worth considering whether in any areawhere our fighters are operating and the guns have toremain out of action these guns should not fire blankcharges This would (a) confuse the enemy by theflashing on the ground and tend to make him lessaware of the impending fighter attacks ndash it would thushave a strictly military reason (b) it would make a noiseto drown the approach of our attacking fighters and


also to avoid discouraging silence for the population Itwould not be legitimate to fire blank merely for thesecond purpose but if there is a military reason theobjection disappears

Prime Minister to CIGS 20X40I am concerned by the very low state of equipment

of the Polish troops whose military qualities have beenproved so high I hope to inspect them on Wednesdaythis week

Pray let me have during Monday the best proposalspossible for equipping them I am most anxious theyshould not become disheartened

(Action this day)Prime Minister to SecretaryWar Office

20X40

It is impossible to take away steel helmets from ldquotheHome Guard in Government officesrdquo Four were killedoutside Downing Street on Thursday night Whitehall isas heavily bombed as any part of the country It will bedifficult to take helmets away from anyone to whomthey have been issued I am astonished to see that theArmy is aiming at three million helmets I was not awarethat we had three million men Let me have a full returnof all steel helmets in possession of the Regular Armyshowing the different branches ie whether field armyor training or holding battalions etc or in storehellip

Prime Minister to CIGS SirJames Grigg

21X40

This very lengthy report by General Irwin16 on howhe was carried out to Freetown and back emphasisesall the difficulties of the operation in which he wasconcerned He foresaw all the difficulties beforehandand the many shortcomings in the preparations Hecertainly felt throughout that he was plunged into themidst of a grave and hazardous undertaking on politicalrather than military grounds All this makes it the moresurprising that he should have wished to persist in this


operation with all its defects and dangers of which hewas so acutely conscious after these had been soformidably aggravated by the arrival through a navalfailure of the French cruisers and reinforcements inDakar and in the teeth of the considered opinion of theWar Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff that conditions hadnow so changed as to make the original planimpossible However any error towards the enemy andany evidence of a sincere desire to engage mustalways be generously judged This officer wascommanding a division very ably before he wasselected for the expedition and I see no reason why heshould not resume these duties now that he hasreturned He would make a mistake however if heassumed either (a) that no enterprise should belaunched in war for which lengthy preparation had notbeen made observing that even in this connectiontwenty-five Frenchmen took Duala and with it theCameroons or (b) that ships can in no circumstanceengage forts with success This might well be true inthe fog conditions which so unexpectedly andunnaturally descended upon Dakar but it would notnecessarily be true of the case where the shipsrsquo gunscould engage the forts at ranges to which the fortscould not reply or where the gunners in the forts werefrightened inefficient or friendly to the attacking force

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for the Colonies[LordLloyd]

21X40

I am afraid I have been some time in studying yournotes on the African continent and its strategic andpolitical dangers in the present war I should deprecatesetting up a special committee We are overrun bythem like the Australians were by the rabbits I see noreason to assume that we shall be at war with VichyFrance or Spain or that the South African position willdevelop dangerously I should have thought that youwould be able with your own military experience andpolitical knowledge to gather such officials of theColonial Office as you may need around you and


prepare yourself any reports you may think it right topresent to the Defence Committee or the War CabinetIf however you feel the need of being associated witha committee I suggest that the Middle East MinisterialCommittee take on the agenda you have outlined as anaddition to their present sphere

PS ndash I am trying to move one of the West Africanbrigades back from Kenya to the West Coast

(Action this day)Prime Minister to Minister ofInformation and SirAlexanderCadogan

24X40

Sir Walter Citrine leaves this country shortly for theUnited States on a mission from the Trade UnionCongress to American labour He is a man ofexceptional qualities and consequence and is a PrivyCouncillor He should certainly have a diplomatic statusconferred upon him which will facilitate his movementsThe TUC are paying all his expenses in connectionwith the purely Labour side of the business but I thinkthat any expenses he may incur in work useful in thenational interest should be defrayed by the Ministry ofInformation Perhaps the Minister would look into thisand see what can be done In any case Sir Waltershould be treated with the greatest consideration as Iam sure we can count on his entire loyalty anddiscretion

NOVEMBER

Prime Minister to CAS 1XI40How is it that when we have five hundred and

twenty crews available for bombing operations andonly five hundred and seven aircraft similarly availablewe do not draw on the aircraft storage units where alarge number are awaiting use



1XI40

Let me have on not more than two sheets of paperan analysis of the German aviators taken prisoner ofwar since July 1 showing numbers ages amount oftraining etc distinguishing between bomber andfighter prisoners Any other information about themwould be welcome


6XI40

Although 1 feel sceptical about the pocket battleshipgoing to Lorient the Air Force should be thinking ofattacking him there at the earliest moment and shouldbe warned now If he goes to Lorient he runs a chanceof being caught by you on the way in bombed while heis there and caught again on the way out There is onlyone way in and out of Lorient Very different is hisposition at Kiel where he can come out via theHeligoland Bight or through the Skagerrak or sneak upthe Norwegian Corridor to Trondhjem f would muchrather see him go to Lorient than break south or stayout on the Atlantic route or go back one side or theother of Iceland

If he continues preying on the trade you ought to beable to bring him to action

On further reflection I agree it is better our twoheavy ships should stay in the north

These notes are only for your consideration

Prime Minister to CIGS 6XI40You impressed upon me how important it was to

have a first-rate man in charge of the Home Guard andwhat a compliment to them it would be if the formerChief of the Staff in France was chosen so GeneralPownall was appointed But a few weeks later I wasastonished to learn he was to go to America on themission now discharged by General Pakenham-WalshWith some difficulty I stopped this change However alittle later Pownall was sent to Ireland Whereas I


suppose he would have done very well for the HomeGuard just as he got to know his job and men werebeginning to look to him he was whisked off tosomething else and General Eastwood took his placeThis is I think only a month ago However I dutifullyset myself to work to make General Eastwoodrsquosacquaintance and I suppose so did the principalofficers of the Home Guard f formed a favourableopinion of him particularly on account of his age whichis under fifty I suppose he has been working very hardfor the month trying to learn his immense new taskand he certainly had begun to speak about it withknowledge Now you propose to me to send him awayand to appoint a third new figure all in four months

All these rapid changes are contrary to the interestsof the Service and open to the most severe criticism Iam not prepared to agree to dismiss General Eastwoodfrom the Home Guard command If you wish to set upthis Directorate-General he must have it so far as I amconcerned However the Secretary of State will beback in two days if all goes well and I am sending acopy of this Minute to him I shall still expect to beconsulted

Prime Minister to CAS 6XI40Last night at least seven of our planes crashed on

landing or were lost The slow expansion of the bomberforce is as you know a great anxiety to me If bombingin this bad weather is imposing altogether undue risksand losses on the pilots the numbers might be slackeddown in order to accumulate our strength while at thesame time keeping various objectives alive


8XI40

Many of the executive departments naturally haveset up and developed their own statistical branches butthere appears to be a separate statistical branchattached to the Ministerial Committee on Productionand naturally the Ministry of Supplyrsquos statistical branch


covers a very wide field I have my own statisticalbranch under Professor Lindemann

It is essential to consolidate and make sure thatagreed figures only are used The utmost confusion iscaused when people argue on different statistical dataI wish all statistics to be concentrated in my own branchas Prime Minister and Minister of Defence from whichalone the final authoritative working statistics will issueThe various departmental statistical branches will ofcourse continue as at present but agreement must bereached between them and the Central StatisticalOffice

Pray look into this and advise me how my wish canbe most speedily and effectively achieved


8XI40

Let me know what progress has been made inbreaking up the queues and in bringing vehicles intoservice With the earlier black-out it must be very hardon many


9XI40

Please let me have a report on the improvements ofthe Asdic and hydrophone technique which have beenmade in the last year


9XI40

Preliminary inspection seems to indicate that thetime of turn round in ports has increased in recentmonths rather than the reverse This is probably due tothe concentration of traffic on a few west coast portsAre the delays caused by inadequate port facilities orby difficulties in clearing the goods from the docksHave you a scheme to exploit to the full our largeresources of road transport if the railways proveinadequate to deal with these special problems


Prime Minister to CAS 10XI40Altogether broadly speaking one thousand aircraft

and seventeen thousand air personnel in the MiddleEast provide thirty and one-half squadrons with a totalinitial equipment of three hundred and ninety-fiveoperational types of which it is presumed threehundred are ready for action on any date Unhappilyout of sixty-five Hurricanes only two squadrons (apartfrom Malta) are available These are the only modernaircraft unless you count the Blenheim IVrsquos All the restof this enormous force is armed with obsolete or feeblemachines The process of replacement shouldtherefore be pressed to the utmost and surely itshould be possible to utilise all this skilled personnel ofpilots and ground staff to handle the new machinesTherefore ldquoremountingrdquo the Eastern Air Force ought notin principle to require more personnel except wherenew types are more complicated However as part ofthe reinforcements now being sent ndash ie fourWellington and four Hurricane squadrons ndash we aresending over three thousand additional personnel

In the disparity between the great mass of men andnumbers of aircraft on charge and the fighting productconstantly available which is painfully marked bothhere and at home lies the waste of RAF resourcesWhat is the use of the six hundred machines which arenot even included in the initial equipment of the thirtysquadrons No doubt some can be explained astraining communication and transport But how is itthat out of seven hundred and thirty-two operationaltypes only three hundred and ninety-five play any partin the fighting

I hope that a most earnest effort will be made to getfull value for men material and money out of this verylarge force first by remounting second by makingmore squadrons out of the large surplus of machinesnot formed in squadrons third by developing local OTUrsquos or other training establishments


Prime Minister to Minister ofHealth

10XI40

I see your total of homeless is down by onethousand five hundred this week to about ten thousandPlease let me know how many new you had in andhow many former went out With such a small numberas ten thousand you ought to be able to clean this up ifyou have another light week

What is the average time that a homeless personremains at a rest centre

Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for Air17

10XI40

There is a shelter at Chequers which gives goodprotection from lateral damage There is the householdto consider Perhaps you will have the accommodationinspected

The carriage drive is being turfedI cannot bear to divert Bofors from the fighting

positions What about trying a few rockets which are atpresent only in an experimental stage

I am trying to vary my movements a little during themoonlight intervals It is very good of you and yourMinistry to concern yourselves with my safety


10XI40

I hope you will look into this yourself We had thegreatest difficulty in carrying these sticky bombsthrough and there was every evidence they would nothave received fair play had I not gone down myself tosee the experiment Now is the chance to let theGreeks try this method out and it would seem that itmight be very helpful to them

What is this tale that they are dangerous to packand handle They are of course despatched withouttheir detonators and therefore cannot explode


Prime Minister to Air C-in-CMiddle East

12XI40

I am trying every day to speed up the arrivals in yourcommand of Hurricanes etc This is especiallyimportant in the next three weeks Pray report dailywhat you actually receive and how many you are ableto put into action

I was astonished to find that you have nearly onethousand aircraft and one thousand pilots and sixteenthousand air personnel in the Middle East excludingKenya I am most anxious to re-equip you with modernmachines at the earliest moment but surely out of allthis establishment you ought to be able if the machinesare forthcoming to produce a substantially largernumber of modern aircraft operationally fit Pray reportthrough the Air Ministry any steps you may be able totake to obtain more fighting value from the immensemass of material and men under your command

I am grieved that the imperative demands of theGreek situation and its vital importance to the MiddleEast should have disturbed your arrangements at thisexceptionally critical time All good wishes


12XI40

The Prime Minister has noticed that the habit ofprivate secretaries and others addressing each other bytheir Christian names about matters of an officialcharacter is increasing and ought to be stopped Theuse of Christian names in inter-departmental correspon-dence should be confined only to brief explanatorycovering notes or to purely personal and privateexplanations

It is hard enough to follow people by their surnames


12XI40

How are you getting on with the comfort of theshelters in the winter ndash flooring drainage and the likeWhat is being done to bring them inside the houses I


attach the greatest importance to gramophones andwireless in the shelters How is that going forwardWould not this per haps be a very good subject for theLord Mayorrsquos Fund I should not be surprised if theimproved lighting comes up again before many weeksare out and I hope that the preparations for it will goforward


12XI40

We shall certainly have to obtain control of Syria byone means or another in the next few months The bestway would be by a Weygand or a de Gaullistmovement but this cannot be counted on and until wehave dealt with the Italians in Libya we have no troopsto spare for a northern venture On no acount mustItalian or Caitiff-Vichy influences become or remainparamount in Syria


12XI40

I do not think this could be said without the approvalof the Air Ministry and indeed of the COS CommitteeMy own feeling would be against giving these actualfigures18 They tell the enemy too much It is likegetting one of the tail bones of the ichthyosaurus fromwhich a naturalist can reconstruct the entire animalThe more I think about it the more I am against it


15XI40

This amounts to a loss of eleven of our bombers inone night I said the other day by Minute that theoperations were not to be pressed unduly during thesevery adverse weather conditions We cannot afford tohave losses of this kind in view of your very slowreplacements If you go on like this you will break thebomber force down to below a minimum for graveemergencies No results have been achieved whichwould in any way justify or compensate for these


losses I consider the loss of eleven aircraft out of onehundred and thirty-nine ndash ie about eight per cent ndash avery grievous disaster at this stage of our bomberdevelopment

Let me have the losses during the first half ofNovember

Prime Minister to CAS 17XI40I watch these figures every day with much concern

My diagrams show that we are now not even keepinglevel and there is a marked downward turn this weekespecially in the Bomber Command Painful as it is notto be able to strike heavy blows after an event likeCoventry yet I feel we should for the present nurse theBomber Command a little more This can be done (1)by not sending so many to each of the necessaryobjectives (2) by not coming down too low in the faceof heavy prepared batteries and being content withsomewhat less accuracy and (3) by picking out softspots where there is not too much organised protectionso as to keep up our deliveries of bomb content Theremust be unexpecting towns in Germany where verylittle has been done in air raid precautions and yetwhere there are military objectives of a minor orderSome of these could be struck at in the meanwhile

2 I should feel differently about this if our bomberforce were above five hundred and if it were expand-ing But having regard to the uncertainties of war wemust be very careful not to let routine bombing and ourown high standards proceed without constant attentionto our resources These remarks do not apply ofcourse to Italy against which the full-scale risk shouldbe run The wounded Littorio is a fine target


18XI40

I was assured that sixty-four destroyers would beavailable for the northwestern approaches byNovember 15 This return of Asdic-fitted ships whichgoes to November 16 shows sixty But what is


disconcerting is that out of one hundred and fifty-onedestroyers only eighty-four are available for serviceand out of sixty for the northwestern approaches onlythirty-three are available for service When we held ourconference more than a month ago the Admiral wasfound with only twenty-four destroyers available and allthat has happened in the month that has passed is thatanother nine have been added to his available strengthBut meanwhile you have had the American destroyersstreaming into service and I was assured that therewas a steady output from our own yards I cannotunderstand why there has been this serious frustrationof decisions so unitedly arrived at nor why such animmense proportion of destroyers are laid up for onecause or another Are the repairs falling behind Whathas happened to the American destroyers Are wefailing in repairs and new construction

I should be glad to have a special conference at 10AMon Tuesday at the Admiralty War Room


18XI40

I am informed that on the night of November 67 oneof the German KG 100 Squadron19 came down in thesea near Bridport This squadron is the one known tobe fitted with the special apparatus with which theGermans hope to do accurate night-bombing usingtheir very fine beams Vital time was lost during whichthis aircraft or its equipment might have been salvagedbecause the Army claimed that it came under theirjurisdiction made no attempt to secure it and refusedto permit the naval authorities to do so

Pray make proposals to ensure that in futureimmediate steps are taken to secure all possibleinformation and equipment from German aircraft whichcome down in this country or near our coasts and thatthese rare opportunities are not squandered throughdepartmental differences

Prime Minister to PrimeMinister of New Zealand

18XI40


Your telegram is being dealt with departmentallyWe dwell under a drizzle of carping criticism from a fewMembers and from writers in certain organs of thepress This has an irritating effect and would not betolerated in any other country exposed to our presentstresses On the other hand it is a good thing that anyGovernment should be kept keen and made aware ofany shortcomings in time to remedy them You must notsuppose everything is perfect but we are all trying ourbest and the war effort is enormous and moraleadmirable All good wishes

Prime Minister to PrimeMinister of Canada

20XI40

1 I am most grateful to you for your message andfor your very generous offer to afford facilities for afurther expansion of the Joint Air Training Plan 1 amconfident that we shall be able to make excellent use ofit

2 A review of the air training requirements in thelight of the latest developments is at present inprogress and it is of the utmost value to the WarCabinet in this connection to know that in such furthermeasures as prove to be necessary they can rely onthe continuance of the whole-hearted assistance of theCanadian Government which has already made such anotable contribution to our common effort

3 As soon as our review is completed I will let youknow for your consideration what we think would bethe best direction for our further joint efforts

4 As you mention in your message any measuresfor the extension of the Joint Training Plan must formthe subject of discussion and agreement between allthe Governments concerned Would you agree to myrepeating to the Prime Ministers of the Governments ofAustralia and New Zealand the text of your messageand of this reply or would you prefer to take this actionyourself

5 Subject to your agreement we should like to offera cordial invitation to Air Vice-Marshal Breadner to paya short visit to this country Such a visit would be most


valuable for the purpose of consultation on manytraining questions and would give Air Vice-MarshalBreadner the fullest and most up-to-date information onour plans for the future development of the Air Force


22XI40

I think it would be better to let de Valera stew in hisown juice for a while Nothing could be more harmlessor more just than the remarks in the Economist Theclaim now put forward on behalf of de Valera is that weare not only to be strangled by them but to suffer ourfate without making any complaint

Sir John Maffey should be made aware of the risinganger in England and Scotland and especially amongthe merchant seamen and he should not be encour-aged to think that his only task is to mollify de Valeraand make everything including our ruin pass offpleasantly Apart from this the less we say to de Valeraat this juncture the better and certainly nothing must besaid to reassure him

Let me see the Parliamentary Questions as theycome in


22XI40

As the action has been announced it must proceedbut the conditions in Mauritius must not involve thesepeople being caged up for the duration of the war TheCabinet will require to be satisfied about this Praymake me your proposals

[Reference Proposal to ship to Mauritius Jewishrefugees who had illegally emigrated to Palestine]

Prime Minister to First Lordand First Sea Lord (GeneralIsmay to see)

22XI40

In my view Admiral Stark is right and Plan D20 isstrategically sound and also most highly adapted to ourinterests We should therefore so far as opportunity


serves in every way contribute to strengthen the policyof Admiral Stark and should not use argumentsinconsistent with it

2 Should Japan enter the war on one side and theUnited States on ours ample naval forces will beavailable to contain Japan by long-range controls in thePacific The Japanese Navy is not likely to venture farfrom its home bases so long as a superior battle-fleet ismaintained at Singapore or at Honolulu The Japanesewould never attempt a siege of Singapore with ahostile superior American Fleet in the Pacific Thebalance of the American Fleet after providing thenecessary force for the Pacific would be sufficient withour Navy to exercise in a very high degree thecommand of all the seas and oceans except thosewithin the immediate Japanese regions A strictdefensive in the Far East and the acceptance of itsconsequences is also our policy Once the Germansare beaten the Japanese would be at the mercy of thecombined fleets

3 I am much encouraged by the American navalview


23XI40

There seems to be great disparity in thesesentences [on AFS men for looting] and I wonderwhether any attempt is being made to standardise thepunishments inflicted for this very odious crime Fiveyearsrsquo penal servitude for stealing whisky for immediateconsumption seems out of proportion when comparedwith sentences of three or six months for stealingvaluables Exemplary discipline is no doubt necessaryas people must be made to feel that looting is stealingStill I should be glad to know that such cases are beingreviewed and levelled out

Prime Minister to CIGS 24XI40I sent you today two Foreign Office telegrams from

Bucharest and Sofia respectively which concur in anestimate of thirty thousand Germans or one full


division as the maximum in Rumania at the presenttime In view of this your Intelligence Branch shouldcarefully review the advice they gave to the effect thatthere were five divisions in Rumania and that thesecould be assembled on the Bulgarian-Greek frontier inthree or four days I thought myself that this estimatewas altogether too pessimistic and credited the enemywith a rapidity of movement and a degree of prepared-ness which were perhaps more serious than the factsWill you have the whole problem examined mostcarefully again I had thought myself that it would be afortnight before anything serious could happen on theGreek frontier and that perhaps it might be a monthThe great thing is to get the true picture whatever it is

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay and others concerned

24XI40

This paper shows that we have completely tailed tomake cruiser tanks and that there is no prospect of thepresent deficiency being made up in the next year Wemust therefore equip our armoured divisions in the bestpossible way open to us in these melancholycircumstances At this stage in tank productionnumbers count above everything else It is better tohave any serviceable tank than none at all Theformation and training of the divisions can proceed andthe quality and character of the vehicles be improvedlater on The ldquoIrdquo tank should not be disdained becauseof its slow speed and in default of cruisers must belooked upon as our staple for fighting We must adaptour tactics for the time being to this weapon as we haveno other Meanwhile the production of cruiser tanks andof A 22 [a new model] must be driven forward to theutmost limit


24XI40

The full order for the thirty-five thousand vehiclesshould be placed in the United States without further


delay Meanwhile the inquiry into the scale required bythe War Office is to proceed


27XI40

I was the author of this plan of pow-wow but theGreek complication seems to be serious It will be ofenormous advantage to us if Germany delays orshrinks from an attack on Bulgaria through Greece Ishould not like those people in Greece to feel that forthe sake of what is after all only a parade we hadpressed them into action which could be cited byGermany as a justification for marching The only thingto do is to put the meeting off until we can see a littlemore clearly on this very confused chessboard ofEastern Europe

I think the Dominions should be told that we arewaiting for the Greek situation to define itself moreclearly and that this ought not to take more than afortnight I do not think it is necessary to give anyreasons to the Allied Governments except to assurethem that the delay will be short

[Reference Draft telegram to General Metaxas]


28XI40

It is of no use giving me these reports five days lateThe Admiralty know every day exactly the state of theflotillas I do not know why this matter should gothrough the War Cabinet or Defence Ministry Pray tellthe Admiralty to send direct to me every week thestate opound their flotillas

I am much concerned that the patrols on thewestern approaches should only have gone up to thirtyeffective Let me see the chart showing previous weekstomorrow


28XI40

I shall be obliged if you will let me know the presentunemployment figures divided into as many categories


as is convenient and compared with (a) how they stoodat the outbreak of war and (b) when the newGovernment was formed


30XI40

It is to me incomprehensible that with the 50American destroyers coming into service we should nothave been able to raise the total serviceable to above77 by November 23 when they stood at 106 onOctober 16 What happened between October 16 andOctober 26 to beat down serviceable destroyers by 28vessels and why did they go down from 84 to 77between November 16 and November 23 ndash just at thevery time when another dozen Americans were cominginto service

Prime Minister to C-in-CHome Forces

30XI40

I have authorised the ringing of church bells onChristmas Day as the imminence of invasion hasgreatly receded Perhaps however you will let meknow what alternative methods of giving the alarm youwould propose to use on that day and secondly whatsteps would be taken to ensure that the ringing of thebells for church services and without any invasion doesnot in fact lead to an alarm There must certainly be norelaxation of vigilance

DECEMBER

Prime Minister to Secretary ofState for Dominions (GeneralIsmay to see for COSCommittee)

1XII40

All this talk about Atlantic operations and Atlanticislands is most dangerous and is contrary to thedecision to describe such operations as ldquoShrapnelrdquo Isee no need for these long and pointless telegrams


and it is becoming quite impossible to conduct militaryoperations when everything has to be spread about theDepartments and around the world like this

Kindly give me the assurance that there will be nofurther discussion of these matters by telegram withoutmy seeing the messages before they are multiplied

Let me also know exactly the lists of officials anddepartments to whom these telegrams have beendistributed

(Action this day)Prime Minister to C-in-CMediterranean (Personal andmost secret)

3XII40

Your 270 We considered whole matter this morningwith the Director of Combined Operations Sir RogerKeyes who will execute it with full control of all forcesemployed and final plans are now being prepared byhim His appointment will not be naval but limited tothese combined operations If necessary he will waivehis naval rank Cannot feel that air counter-attack willbe serious having regard to size island brokencharacter many houses and detached forts in whichcomparatively small attacking force will be inter-mingledwith defenders Enemy aircraft will not know who holdswhat till all is over and even then Italian flags may bedisplayed on soft spots

2 Capture of ldquoWorkshoprdquo21 no doubt a hazard butZeebrugge would never have got past scrutinybestowed on this Commandos very highly trainedcarefully picked volunteers for this kind of workWeather and fixed date of convoy may of courseprevent attempt in which case whole outfit will go toMalta or Suda for other enterprises If conditionsfavorable nothing will be stinted

3 Apprehensions you have that AA guns etc willbe diverted from Eastern Mediterranean and newcommitment created may be mitigated by capture ofenemy AA which are numerous Enemy unlikelyattempt recapture even though garrison left will besmall Commandos will come away after handing over


to Regular troops and be available for furtheroperations

4 Comparing ldquoWorkshoprdquo with other operation youmention in future called ldquoMandiblesrdquo22(repeatldquoMandiblesrdquo) kindly weigh following considera-tions

ldquoMandiblesrdquo requires ten or twelve thousand menand is far larger affair if the two big ones are to betaken Little ones you mention would stir up all this areawithout any important reward unless process continuedSecondly captures in ldquoMandiblesrdquo area would excitekeen rivalry of Greeks and Turks which above all wedonrsquot want now Thirdly our reports show ldquoMandiblesrdquoslowly starving and perhaps we shall get them cheaperlater Apart from the above trying ldquoWorkshoprdquo does notrule out ldquoMandiblesrdquo afterwards unless ships andlanding-craft are lost which they may be Also perhapsoperations on enemyrsquos land communications alongNorth African shore may present opportunities

5 On strategic grounds ldquoWorkshoprdquo gives good aircommand of most used line of enemy communicationswith Libyan army and also increased measure airprotection for our convoys and transports passing so-called Narrows Joint Staffs here consider very highvalue attaches to removal of this obstruction to our Eastand West communications Besides all this we need toshow ourselves capable of vehement offensiveamphibious action I call upon you therefore to useyour utmost endeavours to procure success shouldconditions be favourable at zero hour


3XII40

The King asked me today whether there was anyshortage of instruments for aircraft


4XII40

Two searchlights [at Suda Bay] seem veryinsufficient What is going to be done to increase them


2 In view of the torpedoing of the Glasgow by aseaplane while at anchor ought not ships at anchor tobe protected by nets at short range I gather this wasthe Italian method at Taranto but at the moment of theattack they had taken them off Pray let me have a noteon this

ARMY ORGANISATION


9XII40

I understand that you are asking for another big call-up shortly The papers talk about a million men Thisforces me to examine the distribution of the men youhave According to your paper twenty-seven Britishdivisions are credited to Expeditionary Force andMiddle East These divisions are accounted for at35000 men each to cover corps army and line ofcommunication troops etc plus 70000 security troopsin ME

2 The approved establishment of a British divisionat the present time is 15500 men It comprises onlynine battalions with an establishment of 850 ie about7500 The establishment of all battalions comprises aconsiderable proportion of servicing elements and Idoubt whether the rifle and machine-gun strength ndash iefighting strength ndash amounts to more than 750 Thus thetotal number of men who actually fight in the infantry ofa British division is 6750 This makes the fightinginfantry of twenty-seven divisions in what used to becalled bayonet or rifle strength 182250 It used to besaid that the infantry was ldquothe staple of the Armyrdquo towhich all other branches were ancillary This hascertainly undergone some modification under newconditions but none the less it remains broadly trueThe structure of a division is built round its infantry ofnine battalions with a battery to each battalion thenecessary proportion of signallers and sappers thebattalion brigade and divisional transport and some


additional elements the whole being constituted as anintegral and self-contained unit of 15500 men

3 When we look at the division as a unit we findthat twenty-seven divisions at 15500 official establish-ment require no less than 1015000 men This gives anactual burden of 35000 men for every divisional unit of15500 men the units themselves being already fullyself-contained Nearly 20000 men have therefore to beaccounted for for each division of the EF or ME overand above the full approved establishment of 15500

This great mass amounting to 540000 has now tobe explained We are assured that the corps army Lof C troops etc plus the 70000 security troops in theME justify this enormous demand upon the manhoodof the nation

4 One would have thought if this were concededthat the process was at an end On the contrary it isonly just beginning There still remain nearly two millionmen to be accounted for as are set out on the attachedtable and graph No one can complain of sevendivisions for the Home Field Force though it issurprising that they should require 24000 men fordivisional establishments of 15500 This accounts for170000 men

5 ADGB 500000 must be submitted to for thepresent pending improved methods of dealing with thenight-bomber and increased British ascendancy in theair

6 Two hundred thousand men for the permanentstaffs and ldquounavailablerdquo at training and holding units is adistressing figure having regard to the great marginsalready provided Staffs static and miscellaneous unitsldquoYrdquo list etc require 150000 after all the twenty-sevendivisions and the seven home divisions have been fullysupplied with corps and army troops Apart fromeverything necessary to handle an army of twenty-seven divisions and seven home divisions there is thismass of 350000 staffs and statics living well of thenation as heroes in khaki

7 Compared with the above overseas garrisonsother than ME of 75000 seems moderate India andBurma at 35000 is slender


8 One hundred and fifty thousand men for thecorps army and L of C troops for divisions other thanBritish requires to be explained in detail I understandthe Australian and New Zealand fortes had supplied agreat many of their rearward services At any rate Ishould like to see the exact distribution of this 150000in every category behind the divisions which they areexpected to serve

9 The net wastage ndash 330000 ndash is of course a purelyspeculative figure But it might well be supplied from the350000 permanent staffs static and other non-availables already referred to

10 Deducting for the moment the 330000 men forwastage which deals with the future up till March1942 and 110000 required for overseas garrisonsother than ME India and Burma we face a total of2505000 required for the aforesaid twenty-sevendivisions plus seven home divisions equal to about74000 per division If the 500000 for ADGB isomitted we still have over 2000000 men ie nearly60000 men mobilised for each of thirty-four divisions

Before I can ask the Cabinet to assent to any furthercall-up from the public it is necessary that this wholesubject shall be thrashed out and that at least a millionare combed out of the fluff and flummery behind thefighting troops and made to serve effective militarypurposes We are not doing our duty in letting thesegreat numbers be taken from our civil life and kept atthe public expense to make such inconceivably smallresults in the fighting line


9XII40

Let me have a report on the development of theSalvage Section of the Admiralty showing the work thathas been done and what expansions if any arecontemplated to meet the evergrowing need of repairsrapidly


(Action this day PrimeMinister to Minister of Worksand Buildings (Lord Reith)

9XII40

I am in general agreement with your proposals to setup machinery for the large-scale rebuilding which willbe necessary after the war Perhaps you will discusswith Sir Edward Bridges the best methods of obtaininga decision upon this ie whether by the Home PolicyCommittee or by the Cabinet

2 Your most urgent task however is to repairexisting buildings which are not seriously but onlyslightly damaged Sometimes I see a whole row ofhouses whose windows are blown out but which arenot otherwise damaged standing for weeks desertedand neglected Active measures should be taken toreplace the tiles and to close up the windows withfabric with one small pane for light and to make suchrepairs as render the houses fit for habitation Indealing with house casualties the least serious shouldclaim priority You ought to have a regular corps ofworkmen who would get this job done so that thepeople may get back into their homes which areunlikely to be hit a second time Branches of this corpsshould exist in all the great cities Not a day should belost How the expense is met or divided can be settledwith the Treasury But this question must be noimpediment on action

Pray let me have your plans for dealing with thisforthwith

(Action this day)Prime Minister to Secretaryof State for Air

14XII40

There is one thing about the warfare between the AirMinistry and MAP which is helpful to the publicinterest namely that I get a fine view of what is goingon and hear both sides of the case argued with spiritWill you very kindly address yourself to the variousstatements made in this letter attached [from LordBeaverbrook] and especially to the one that on


September 1 you had over a thousand unserviceabletrainer aircraft I have long suspected that theinefficiency which formerly ruled in the ASUs and leftus with only forty-five airplanes when the newGovernment was formed as against about onethousand two hundred now was reproduced in all thetrainer establishments and communication flights andthat a great mass of airplanes were kept in anunserviceable state and I remember particularly thestatement of one of your high officers that the TrainingCommand worked on a basis of fifty per centunserviceable Who is responsible for repair andtraining establishments If I were you I should throwthe whole business of repair on to MAP and then youwould be able to criticise them for any shortcomings

See also the figures of how repaired aircraft andengines have increased since the change was made

I recur to the point I made to you yesterday whenyou sent me your letter to MAP The Air Ministryrsquosview is that the Germans have nearly 6000 airplanes infront-line action and we have about 2000 Air Ministryalso believe that the German output is 1800 a monthout of which they provide only 400 for trainingestablishments while we out of 1400 output providealso 400 How do you then explain that the Germansare able to keep three times our establishment in front-line action with only an equal monthly subscription oftrainer aircraft Apparently on your figures which Imay say I do not accept (except for controversialpurposes) the Germans can keep three times as largea force in action as you can for the same number oftrainer planes I know that you will rightly say you arepreparing for the expansion of the future but they haveto keep going on a threefold scale and expand as well

I await with keen interest further developments ofyour controversy

Prime Minister to LordBeaverbrook (Private)

15XII40

It is a magnificent achievement23 in the teeth of thebombing Quite apart from new production the repaired


aircraft has been your own creation We now have1200 in the ASUrsquos which is a great comfortDispersion has greatly hampered you but wasabsolutely necessary as an insurance to spread the risk

In addition you have not confined yourself to merenumbers but on the contrary have pushed hard intoquality

The reason why there is this crabbing as at A24 isof course the warfare which proceeds between AMand MAP They regard you as a merciless critic andeven enemy They resent having had the MAPfunctions carved out of their show and I have no doubtthey pour out their detraction by every channel open Iam definitely of opinion that it is more in the publicinterest that there should be sharp criticism and counter-criticism between the two departments than that theyshould be handing each other out ceremoniousbouquets One must therefore accept the stimulatingbut disagreeable conditions of war


15XII40

You will see from my telegram to Mr Menzies that Ido not view the situation in the Far East as immediatelydangerous The victory in Libya has reinforced nayredoubled the argument there set forth I do not wish tocommit myself to any serious dispersion of our forces inthe Malay peninsula and at Singapore On the contraryI wish to build up as large as possible Fleet Army andAir Force in the Middle East and keep this in a fluidcondition either to prosecute war in Greece andpresently in Thrace or reinforce Singapore should theJapanese attitude change I could not commit myself tothe dispatch of many of the air craft mentionedcertainly not the PBYs [Flying-boats] at this juncturewhen we have a major peril to face on the northwesternapproaches I could not therefore agree to yourtelegram and I should have thought my own (asamended in red) was quite sufficient at the present time

Prime Minister to CAS 15XII40


How are you getting on with the development on alarge scale of aerodromes in Greece to take modernbombers and fighters and with the movement ofskeleton personnel spare parts etc there

It is quite clear to me this is going to be mostimportant in the near future and we must try not to betaken by surprise by events

I should be glad to have a fortnightly report

Prime Minister to CIGS 20XII40Please let me know the earliest date when the 2d

Armoured Division (a) will land at Suez and (b) can beavailable for action in the Western Desert

Prime Minister to CAS 20XII40I hope you will try to take a few daysrsquo rest and seize

every opportunity of going to bed early The fight isgoing to be a long one and so much depends uponyou Do not hesitate to send your deputy to anymeetings I may call

Pray forgive my giving you these hints but severalpeople have mentioned to me that you are working toohard

The possible use and counter-use of poison gasshould invasion come in the New Year rested heavilyupon me Our progress in this sphere was howeverconsiderable


21XII40

You will remember that the War Cabinet ordered aninquiry into the fact that bulk storage for two thousandtons of mustard gas which had been ordered by theCabinet in October 1938 was still not ready inOctober 1940


The latest information which I have received fromyour Ministry shows that the bulk stock of mustard gason December 9 was 1485 tons I was also informedthrough your Ministry that 650 tons of additional newstorage was to have become available last week andthat production was being increased accordingly Wasthis promise fulfilled

Meanwhile I note that the filling of the new twenty-five pounder base-ejection shell has at last begun inearnest and that 7812 of this type of shell had beenfilled by December 9 I should be glad to know how thisfigure compares with the total reserve of this type ofshell required by the Army and when this reserve islikely to be attained

None of the new six-inch base-ejection shells hasyet been filled What reserve does the Army require ofthis type of shell and when is this reserve expected tobe ready

I am sending a copy of this Minute to the Secretaryof State for War


22XII40

I learn that the Central Priority Department has beenconducting a special investigation into the requirementsof materials likely to be short

I am told that much the most serious case is that ofdrop-forgings on which the production of airplanestanks guns and transport all depend Requirements for1941 are estimated at 441000 tons Home productionis now at the rate of 208000 I am informed that thereare orders in the United States for 7000 tons and thatthese are likely to rise to an annual rate of 25000 bythe end of 1941 Even if the requirements areconsiderably overstated the deficiency is very serious

Some moderate rate of expansion at home isexpected but we need to double the output There are14000 workers in the industry but it is reported thatonly 300 recruits have been received since August thatthe industry alleges that it cannot absorb more than a


thousand new workers in each quarter and that it isdifficult to get recruits All this needs looking into

Meanwhile the only possible immediate actionseems to be to increase purchases of drop-forgings inAmerica if necessary sending a special expert there forthis purpose

Prime Minister to Minister ofWorks and Buildings

22XII40

I understand that there is a serious shortage ofaccommodation for welfare services of all kinds to meetthe needs of the homeless as well as of the evacuationschemes and that you in conjunction with the Ministerof Health have undertaken to seek for premises

I hope that you will use your utmost endeavours topress on with this work

I should be glad if you would let me have a return ofcommandeered premises which have not yet beenused for war purposes and which might be suitable foruse in this way

Prime Minister to LordChatfield

22XII40

I am grieved to find how very few George Medalshave been issued I had hoped there would be tentimes as many The idea was that you would go aboutand get into touch with local authorities where therehas been heavy bombing and make sure thatrecommendations were sent forward which could besifted and that you would stir the departments on thesubject Can you not do something more in thisdirection You ought by now to have a number oftypical cases which could be circulated to theauthorities and departments concerned who wouldthereafter be asked to match them from theirexperience

Let me know if I can be of any assistance


22XII40


Very soon the Baltic will be frozen Let me know itsstate and future prospects

What has been happening to the Swedish oreduring this summer The Naval Staff should make thenecessary inquiries

What traffic has been moving down the LeadsHow has the position of German ore supplies been

affected by the events of the last eight months Is thereany reason why we should not sow magnetic mines inthe Leads even if we do not lay a regular minefieldWe seem to have forgotten all about this story

I should be glad to have a note upon this andwhether anything can be done


22XII40

The work of the Joint Planners divides itself naturallyinto two parts (a) all the current work they do for the COS Committee and (b) the long-term future projectswhich are indicated to them and on which they arealready at work It is to these latter that I now turn Ithink it would be well to appoint a Director of FutureSchemes or some other suitable title who would guideand concert the preparation of the special schemespreside over any meetings of the Joint Plannersengaged upon them and have direct access to me asMinister of Defence I think Major Oliver Stanley (theformer Secretary of State for War) with his experienceof foreign politics and Cabinet government would beable to impart to all this work a liveliness which I cannotsupply except at rare intervals He would have to begiven a temporary Army rank to make him senior

Pray make me proposals for giving effect to this idea


22XII40

I am disturbed to see from reports sent to me by theMinister of Sup ply that deliveries to the Royal Air Forceof bombs and containers charged with gas havedropped very noticeably during the past month the total


during the four weeks from November 11 to December9 being

I understand that the reason for this decline is thatfactories have been bombed and that difficulties havebeen encountered in the supply of certain componentparts

Nevertheless it is of vital importance that we shouldhave the largest possible supply of aircraft gas-containers for immediate retaliation if need be and Ishould be glad to know what steps are being taken toimprove the delivery of these containers and what is theforecast of these deliveries over the next three months

I was concerned at the grave affronts to the rightsand liberties of the individual which the safety of theState had required Having been brought up on the Billof Rights habeas corpus and trial by jury conceptionsI grieved to become responsible even with the constantassent of Parliament for their breach In June JulyAugust and September our plight had seemed sogrievous that no limits could be put upon the action ofthe State Now that we had for the time being got ourheads again above water a further refinement in thetreatment of internes seemed obligatory We hadalready set up an elaborate sifting process and manypersons who had been arrested in the crisis werereleased by the Home Secretary who presided overthis field


22XII40

It must be remembered that these political deacutetenusare not persons against whom any offence is allegedor who are awaiting trial or on remand They arepersons who cannot be proved to have committed any


offence known to the law but who because of thepublic danger and the conditions of war have to be heldin custody Naturally I feel distressed at having to beresponsible for action so utterly at variance with all thefundamental principles of British liberty habeas corpusand the like The public danger justifies the actiontaken but that danger is now receding

In the case of Mosley and his wife there is muchprejudice from the Left and in the case of the PanditNehru from the Right I particularly asked that therigorous character of the latterrsquos imprisonment shouldbe removed In foreign countries such people areconfined in fortresses ndash at least they used to be whenthe world was still civilised

These reflections led me to look into the details ofMosleyrsquos present confinement as well as others of thatcategory Does a bath every week mean a hot bathand would it be very wrong to allow a bath every dayWhat facilities are there for regular outdoor exerciseand games and recreation under Rule 8 If thecorrespondence is censored as it must be I do not seeany reason why it should be limited to two letters aweek What literature is allowed Is it limited to theprison libraries Are newspapers allowed What arethe regulations about paper and ink for writing books orstudying particular questions Are they allowed to havea wireless set What arrangements are permitted tohusbands and wives to see each other and whatarrangements have been made for Mosleyrsquos wife to seeher baby from whom she was taken before it wasweaned

I should be grateful if you would let me know yourown view upon these matters

Prime Minister to PrimeMinister of Australia

23XII40

1 I am most grateful for your promised help atSingapore in respect both of troops and of equipmentand ammunition and hope that you will make theseavailable as proposed If so we will arrange to relieve


your troops in May by the equivalent of a division fromIndia

2 The danger of Japan going to war with the BritishEmpire is in my opinion definitely less than it was inJune after the collapse of France Since then we havebeaten off the attacks of the German Air Forcedeterred the invader by our ever-growing land strengthand gained a decisive victory in Libya Since then theItalians have shown their weakness by sea land andair and we no longer doubt our ability to defend theDelta and the Canal until or unless Germany makes herway through Turkey Syria and Palestine This wouldbe a long-term affair Our position in the EasternMediterranean is enormously improved by thepossession of Crete where we are making at Suda Baya second Scapa and also by our victories and those ofthe Greeks and the facilities we now have for buildingup strong air bases in Greece from which Italy can beattacked

3 The naval and military successes in the Mediter-ranean and our growing advantage there by land seaand air will not be lost upon Japan It is quite impossiblefor our Fleet to leave the Mediterranean at the presentjuncture without throwing away irretrievably all that hasbeen gained there and all the prospects of the futureOn the other hand with every weakening of the Italiannaval power the mobility of our Mediterranean Fleetbecomes potentially greater and should the ItalianFleet be knocked out as a factor and Italy herselfbroken as a combatant as she may be we could sendstrong naval forces to Singapore without suffering anyserious disadvantage We must try to bear our Easternanxieties patiently and doggedly until this result isachieved it always being understood that if Australia isseriously threatened by invasion we should nothesitate to compromise or sacrifice the Mediterraneanposition for the sake of our kith and kin

4 Apart from the Mediterranean the naval strainhas considerably increased When Bismarck and Tirpitzjoin the German Fleet which they may have donealready the Germans will once again be able to form aline of battle The King George V is ready but we do


not get Prince of Wales for several months nor Duke ofYork till midsummer nor Anson till the end of the year1941 For the next six months we must keep moreconcentrated at Scapa Flow than has been necessaryso far The appearance of a raiding pocket battleship inthe Atlantic has forced us to provide battleship escortagain for our convoys and we are forming hunting-groups for the raiders in the South Atlantic and ifnecessary in the Indian Ocean We have always toconsider the possibility of the undamaged portion of theFrench Fleet being betrayed by Darlan to Germany

5 For all these reasons we are at the fullest navalstrain I have seen either in this or the former war Theonly way in which a naval squadron could be found forSingapore would be by ruining the Mediterraneansituation This I am sure you would not wish us to dounless or until the Japanese danger becomes far moremenacing than at present I am also persuaded that ifJapan should enter the war the United States will comein on our side which will put the naval boot very muchon the other leg and be a deliverance from many perils

6 As regards air reinforcements for Malaya theConference at Singapore recommended the urgentdespatch of considerable numbers of aircraft With theever-changing situation it is difficult to commit ourselvesto the precise number of aircraft which we can makeavailable for Singapore and we certainly could notspare the flying-boats to lie about idle there on theremote chance of a Japanese attack when they oughtto be playing their part in the deadly struggle on thenorthwestern approaches Broadly speaking our policyis to build up as large as possible a fleet army and airforce in the Middle East and keep this in a fluidcondition either to prosecute war in Libya Greece andpresently Thrace or reinforce Singapore should theJapanese attitude change for the worse In this waydispersion of forces will be avoided and victory will giveits own far-reaching protections in many directions

7 I must tell you finally that we are sendingenormous convoys of troops and munitions to theMiddle East and we shall have nearly 300000 menthere by February This again entails heavy escort


duties But great objects are at stake and risks must berun in every quarter of the globe if we are to emergefrom all our dangers as I am sure we shall

8 I am arranging for details as regards shipping andequipment etc to be taken up direct between the WarOffice and Army Headquarters Melbourne

With all good wishes


23XII40

Please see that I have a good supply of pho-tographs of war places For instance Sollum Barcliaetc

One of your staff might be told off to give someattention to this

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for COSCommittee Note for MDupuy travelling to NorthAfrica

23XII40

Should you see Generals Weygand or Nogues youshould explain that we now have a large well-equippedarmy in England and have considerable spare forcesalready well trained and rapidly improving apart fromwhat are needed to repel invasion

The situation in the Middle East is also becominggood If at any time in the near future the FrenchGovernment decide to resume the war in Africa againstItaly and Germany we would send a strong and well-equipped Expeditionary Force to aid the defence ofMorocco Algiers and Tunis These divisions could sailas fast as shipping and landing facilities were availableThe British Air Force has now begun its expansion andwould also be able to give important assistance Thecommand of the Mediterranean would be assured bythe reunion of the British and French Fleets and by ourjoint use of Moroccan and North African bases We arewilling to enter into staff talks of the most secretcharacter with General Weygand or any officersnominated by him


On the other hand delay is dangerous At any timethe Germans may by force or favour come downthrough Spain render unusable the anchorage atGibraltar take effective charge of the batteries on bothsides of the Straits and also establish their air forces inthe aerodromes It is their habit to strike swiftly and ifthey establish themselves at Casablanca the doorwould be shut on all projects We are quite ready towait for a certain time provided that there is a goodhope of bold action and that plans are being made Butthe situation may deteriorate any day and prospects beruined It is most important that the Government ofMarshal Peacutetain should realise that we are able andwilling to give powerful and growing aid But this maypresently pass beyond our power


24XII40

I see you made a speech about the Americanstaking foreign ships Could you let me have the text ofit together with any reactions you may have noticed inthe American Press I have the impression that theAmericans were not quite pleased with the requestaddressed to them as they do not consider thatsufficient use is being made of British tonnage at thepresent time In this connection you will remember myrepeated inquiries as to the amount of British tonnagenow plying exclusively between ports not in the UnitedKingdom

According to the latest monthly report of the Ministryof Shipping two and one-third million tons of Britishnon-tanker shipping of over sixteen hundred tons istrading between overseas countries Pray let me have afull explanation of this About two million tons ofNorwegian Belgian Polish shipping excluding tankersis also trading abroad


25XII40

With the new year a fresh effort must be made torestrict the circulation of secret matters in Service and


other Departments All the markings of papers in theService Departments Foreign Office Colonial andDominions Offices etc should be reviewed with a viewto striking off as many recipients as possible

The officials concerned in roneo-ing the variouscirculations should be consulted and a return made forme showing how many copies are made of differentsecret documents

Pray report to me how this object can be achieved


25XII40

No departure in principle is contemplated from thepractice of keeping the Dominions informed fully of theprogress of the war Specially full information mustnecessarily be given in respect of theatres whereDominion troops are serving but it is not necessary tocirculate this to the other Dominions not affectedAnyhow on the whole an effort should be made not toscatter so much deadly and secret information over thisvery large circlehellip There is a danger that theDominions Office Staff get into the habit of running akind of newspaper full of deadly secrets bullwhich arecircularised to the four principal Governments withwhom they deal The idea is that the more theycirculate the better they are serving the State Manyother departments fall into the same groove loving tocollect as much secret information as possible andfeeling proud to circulate it conscientiously through allofficial circles I am trying steadily to restrict andcounteract these tendencies which if uncheckedldquowould make the conduct of war impossible

While therefore there is no change in principle thereshould be considerable soft-peddling in practice

I wish to be consulted before anything of a verysecret nature especially anything referring tooperations or current movements is sent out


Prime Minister to Minister ofHealth andMinister of HomeSecurity

25XII40

I enclose Minutes of our meeting yesterday on whichaction is being taken

I am convinced there should be only one authorityinside the shelters who should be responsible foreverything pertaining to the health and comfort of theinmates This authority should be charged withsanitation and storing of the bedding etc I cannot feelthat the Home Security and Home Office with all itsburdens and duties under the enemy attack ought tobe concerned with questions affecting vermin andsanitation These ought to be in the province of theMinistry of Health who should be made responsible forthe whole interior life of the shelters big or small

Prime Minister to Sir EdwardBridges and ProfessorLindemann

26XII40

I must examine the Import Programme for 1941 nextweek 5 PMin the Lower War Room MondayTuesday and Wednesday Agenda to be drawn up byyou and Professor Lindemann Let me see by Saturdaynight here the immediate lay-out of the shippingprogramme in relation to food and supply and thedemand for the Services in the face of present lossesProfessor Lindemann will present me by Saturday nightwith the salient facts and graphs To be summoned tothe meeting the following Lord President Lord PrivySeal Minister without Portfolio Minister of AircraftProduction Minister of Supply Ministers of FoodTransport and Shipping (Ministers only)

Prime Minister to Ministry ofSupply

26XII40


The discrepancy between weapons and ammunitionis terrible in the case of the anti-tank rifles two-inch andthree-inch mortars the climax being reached with thethree-inch mortars We have enough AT rifles to equiptwenty-three and a half divisions but only enoughammunitionat 32000 rounds per month to equip fiveand a half We have enough two-inch mortars at 108per division to equip thirty-three divisions butammunition at 32400 rounds per month suffices onlyfor four and a half divisions The worst of all is the three-inch mortar where oddly enough we have at eighteenper division enough to equip nearly 40 divisions but at14000 rounds per month only enough ammunition forone and a half divisions

Prime Minister to First Lord 26XII40Provided that it can be arranged that four of the

fifteen-inch can be cocked up within six months fromnow and all other repairs be completed I agree toabandon my long-cherished hope in which I have beenso continuously frustrated of making Resolution into aneffective fighting ship for inshore action

The story of these four ships since the war beganranks with the story of the two-gun turret of the KGVclass in the most melancholy pages of the Admiraltyannals

I hope I may have your positive assurance that thesix months condition will be fulfilled barring enemyaction of course25


26XII40

I consider a greater effort should be made tointerrupt the ore traffic through the Leads duringJanuary and onwards This should certainly comebefore the Iceland-Faroes channel which is a vastoperation under taken chiefly to use mines made forquite a different purpose in conditions which havepassed away Now that we have not to give notice andcan lay secretly anywhere conditions are much morefavourable for mining the Norwegian coast than they


were last year but the need to act seems to be almostas great

Pray let me have a further report

Prime Minister to GeneralIsmay for COSCommittee and othersconcerned

26XII40

Tactical requirements must be paramount duringinvasion I am deeply anxious that gas warfare shouldnot be adopted at the present time For this very reasonI fear the enemy may have it in mind and perhaps itmay be imminent Every precaution must be kept inorder and every effort made to increase retaliatorypower

Sometimes I have wondered whether it would beany deterrent on the enemy if I were to say that weshould never use gas ourselves unless it had first beenused against us but that we had actually in store manythousands of tons of various types of deadly gas withtheir necessary containers and that we shouldimmediately retaliate upon Germany On the whole Ithink it is perhaps better to say nothing unless or untilwe have evidence that the attack is imminent After allthey can make the calculations to which ProfessorLindemann refers for themselves They would certainlysay we had threatened them with gas warfare andwould soon invent a pretext Thirdly there would be toomuch bluff in any such statement If anyone is of adifferent opinion I shall be glad to know The subjectcauses me much anxiety


26XII40

I read in the papers of many people being sen-tenced for various offences against war regulations andfor doing things which would not arise in peace-time Iam curious to know how the prison populationcompares with pre-war both for imprisonment andpenal servitude cases


I should be much obliged if you could give me a fewvery simple figures Are there a great many more nowin gaol26


27XII40

Let me have on one sheet of paper the main headsof your programme as at present settled of imports (a)in the next four months (b) for the year 1941 f shouldbe glad to have this during tomorrow (Saturday)

(Action this day)Prime Minuter to GeneralIsmay for COSCommittee

27XII40

1 I do not recognise at all the account of my viewsgiven about ldquoMarierdquo27 I was under the impression thatI had given a written Minute Pray let this be sought forIt is very unusual for me to give any directions otherthan in writing To avoid further misunderstanding thefollowing is set forth

2 The ldquoOperation Marierdquo has been regarded by theChiefs of the Staff and is considered by me to bevaluable and important For this purpose not only theForeign Legion Battalion but two other Frenchbattalions should be sailed in the January 4 convoyand deposited at Port Soudan where they can eitherintervene in Marie or in Egypt There is no use sendingonly the Foreign Legion without any other troops of theFrench forces Therefore I have asked for proposals tosail transports capable of taking the other two battalionsempty from here to Freetown so that the whole Frenchforce can go round together

Pray let me have today the proposals for givingeffect to this

There will be plenty of time to consider the politicalaspects when these troops have arrived at Port Soudan

Prime Minister to Lord PrivySeal

27XII40


You very kindly sent me a report about cold storageof meat dated November 14 and I wonder whetheryou would care to bring it up to date in the light of laterhappenings I am very much concerned about the meatposition


27XII40

1 Hitherto the production of anti-tank rifles has beena bright spot and we have nearly 30000 alreadymade On the other hand the ammunition for thisweapon is deplorably in arrear being in fact less thanone-fifth of the proper proportion The failure to ldquomarryrdquothe ammunition and the AT rifle is one of the worstblots on our present munition programme It is little lessthan a fraud on the troops to issue these largequantities of AT rifles which would quickly becomeuseless and worth no more than old iron throughammunition shortage In many cases it has not beenpossible to allow any rounds for practice at all thesehaving to be saved for actual use against the enemy

2 In these circumstances one would expect that theWar Office would have concentrated their desires onammunition instead of increasing the already giganticdisproportion of AT rifles to ammunition On thecontrary however for reasons which I have neverheard mentioned the Army requirement of AT rifles issuddenly raised from 31000 to 71000 for the samenumber of divisions When was this decision taken bywhom and what were the arguments Was anyattempt made at the time to make sure that theammunition already lagging so far behind could catchup this enormous increase in rifles Let me have a fullreport on this transaction

3 However the Germans have now twice bombedthe Small Heath factory and checked the output of ATrifles in a most decisive manner There can be nopossibility of fulfilling the increased War Office demandof 71000 at the date desired On the other hand it is tobe hoped that the ammunition supply will now have achance of overtaking the weapons It would therefore


appear that a valuable and necessary readjustment ofour programme has resulted from enemy action

4 Arising out of the above I wish to be informedwhen any large changes are made in the existingprogrammes for the Army particularly when thesenecessitate setting up new plants which can only be setup at the expense of other urgent work All importantmodifications of the equipment tables set out in mydiagrams are to be reported to me before action istaken

Prime Minister to CAS andAir Ministry

29XII40

It seems odd that only one machine should havebeen despatched from Takoradi during the weekending December 27 when no fewer than forty-four arepiled up there waiting Is there a breakdown in thehandling work at Takoradi Could we have a specialreport on conditions there Quite soon they will havethe second instalment from the Furious upon them

Action this day) PrimeMinister to Secretary of Statefor Air CAS and Ministerof Aircraft Production(Secret)

30XII40

1 I am deeply concerned at the stagnant conditionof our bomber force The fighters are going ahead wellbut the bomber force particularly crews is not makingthe progress hoped for I consider the rapid expansionof the bomber force one of the greatest militaryobjectives now before us We are of course drawingupon the bomber force for the coastal command and forthe Middle East If the bottle-neck is as I am toldcrews we must either have the pilots and personnel weare sending out to the Middle East returned to us afterthey have delivered their machines or what would beless injurious to formed squadrons have other pilots


and personnel sent back from the Middle East in theirplace The policy is to remount the Middle East andthis must be achieved before reinforcements of apermanent character can be indulged in Even beforethe recent reinforcements there were one thousandpilots in the Middle East Air Marshal Longmore mustbe told to send back an equal number of good men ofthe various classes and not add to his already grosslydistended personnel

2 In order to increase the number of crewsavailable the training must be speeded up and acertain measure of dilution accepted

3 The figures placed before me each day aredeplorable Moreover I have been told on highauthority that a substantial increase in numbersavailable for operations against Germany must not beexpected for many months I cannot agree to thiswithout far greater assurance than I have now thateverything in human wit and power has been done toavert such a complete failure in our air expansionprogramme

4 So far as aircraft are concerned the questionarises from constant study of the returns whethersufficient emphasis is put upon bomber production Thefighters are streaking ahead and it is a great comfortthat we have so good a position in them We musthowever increase our bomb deliveries on Germanyand it appears some of the types and patterns mostadapted to this are not coming forward as we hadhoped

I am well aware of the damage done by enemyaction but I ask whether it cannot be remedied andwhat further steps are possible

5 I wish to receive a programme of expansion weekby week and also a plan set forth showing whatmeasures can be taken to improve the position whichat present is most distressing and black


Appendix BAUTHORrsquoS NOTE

The first table contains the figures which were given to thePresident in my letter of December 8 19401

The second table gives the final assessment in the light ofpost-war knowledge


TABLE I

WEEKLY LOSSES AT SEA


TABLE I mdash WEEKLY LOSSES AT SEA (Continued)

TABLE II

MONTHLY TOTALS OF SHIPPING LOSSES BRITISH ALLIED ANDNEUTRAL

May 1940 to December 1940


Appendix C

AIRCRAFT STRENGTH DURING THE BATTLE OF BRITAN 1940 1

1 AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION IN 1940

2 OPERATIONAL STRENGTHS DURING THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

SUMMARISED ORDER OF BATTLE (BOMBER COMMAND) ANDBOMBER AIRCRAFT IN AIRCRAFT STORAGE UNITS

BOMBER COMMAND


AIR SUPPLY UNITS

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED TO CURRENTOPERATIONAL STANDARDS READY FOR DISPATCH


3 OPERATIONAL STRENGTHS OF FIGHTER COMMAND WEEK BYWEEK

4 COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND GERMAN FIGHTER STRENGTHDURING THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

The preceding table gives the overall strength of FighterCommand including Blenheims and Defiants But thesecannot be reckoned for the purposes of comparisons aspart of the day fighting force which consisted of Hurricanesand SpitfiresAfter taking representative dates in the period July 10ndashOctober 31 the approximate daily average of Squadronsavailable for operations of these two latter types combinedis


On the German side figures of serviceability are not atpresent available comparison can therefore be made onlyin terms of Initial Equipment The German IE was

The comparable Initial Equipment figures for BritishHurricanes and Spitfires averaged over the 12 weeks was827


Appendix D

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO DAKAR

BETWEEN MR CHURCHILL AND MR MENZIES1

Mr Menzies to the PrimeMinister

29IX40

We are very disturbed in regard to Dakar incidentwhich has had unfortunate effect in Australia First asto matter of substance

It is difficult understand why attempt was madeunless overwhelming chances of success To makewhat appears at this distance to be a halfhearted attackis to incur a damaging loss of prestige

Second as to matter of procedureIt is absolutely wrong that Australian Government

should know practically nothing of details of engage-ment and nothing at all of decision to abandon it untilafter newspaper publication I have refrained from anypublic criticism but privately can tell you that absenceof real official information from Great Britain hasfrequently proved humiliating Finally I must say franklythat Australian Government profoundly hopesdifficulties have not been underestimated in the MiddleEast where clear-cut victory is essential

Prime Minister to Mr Menzies 2X40I am very sorry to receive your message of

September 29 because I feel that the great exertionswe have made deserve a broad and generous measure


of indulgence should any particular minor operationmiscarryhellip The situation at Dakar was revolutionisedby arrival of French ships from Toulon with Vichypersonnel and the manning of the batteries by thehostile French Navy Although every effort was madethe British Navy was not able to stop these ships ontheir way After strongly testing the defences andsustaining the losses I have already reported to youthe naval and military commanders did not considerthey had the strength to effect and support a landingand I think they were quite right not to get us committedto a shore operation which could not like the navalattack be broken off at any moment and might havebecome a serious entanglement

With regard to your criticisms if it is to be laid downthat no attempt is to be made which has not ldquoover-whelming chances of successrdquo you will find that acomplete defensive would be imposed upon us Indealing with unknown factors like the degree of Frenchresistance it is impossible to avoid uncertainty andhazard For instance Duala and with it the Cameroonswere taken by twenty-five Frenchmen after theirSenegalese troops had refused to march Ought we tohave moved in this case without having overwhelmingforce at hand Secondly I cannot accept the reproachof making ldquoa half-hearted attackrdquo I hoped that you hadnot sustained the impression from these last fivemonths of struggle which has excited the admiration ofthe whole world that we were ldquoa halfhearted Govern-mentrdquo or that I am half-hearted in the endeavours it ismy duty to make I thought indeed that from the waymy name was used in the election that quite a goodopinion was entertained in Australia of these efforts

Every care will always be taken to keep youinformed before news is published but we could notprevent the German and Vichy wireless from proclaim-ing the course of events as they occurred at Dakarbefore we had received any information from ourcommanders

With regard to what you say about the Middle East Ido not think the difficulties have been underestimatedbut of course our forces are much smaller than those


which the Italians have in Libya and Abyssinia and theGermans may always help them The defection ofFrance has thrown the whole Middle East into jeopardyand severed our communications through theMediterranean We have had to face the threat ofinvasion here and the full strength of Germanyrsquos air-bombing attack on our cities factories and harboursNevertheless we have steadfastly reinforced theMiddle East and in spite of all our perils at home andscanty resources have sent over thirty thousand mennearly half our best tanks many anti-aircraft gunsneeded to protect our vital aircraft factories two of thefinest units in the Fleet the Illustrious and Valiant anda considerable number of Hurricane fighters andWellington bombers We have done this in the face ofan accumulation across the Channel and the North Seaof barges and shipping sufficient to carry half a millionmen to these shores at a single voyage and in a singlenight Therefore if the Middle East difficulties anddangers have not been fully met it is not because theMother Country has shirked her share of perils andsacrifice At present the situation in Egypt and theSoudan looks better than we feared some time agoStill my dear Prime Minister and friend as you haveallowed me to deem you I cannot guarantee ldquoclear-cutvictoryrdquo in the Middle East or that Cairo Khartoum theSuez Canal and Palestine may not fall into Italian orGerman hands We do not think they will and we aretrying our utmost to resist the attacks which aremassing against us But I can make no promises at allof victory nor can I make any promises that regrettableand lamentable incidents will not occur or that therewill not be disappointments and blunders On thecontrary I think the only certainty is that we have verybad times indeed to go through before we emerge fromthe mortal perils by which we are surrounded

I felt it due to your great position and the extremelysevere tone of your message to reply with equalfrankness

Mr Menzies to Mr Churchill 4X40


I have received your message of October 2 and amvery disturbed by some of its contents

We were and are concerned about the failure atDakar My telegram concerning it was somewhatcrudely expressed as I can see on perusing it againBut I still do not understand how it can be construed ascontaining even the faintest suggestion that you or theBritish Government are half-hearted in policy spirit orachievement

As the recent election here has left my own positionextremely precarious and I may therefore soon go outof office I would like to take the opportunity of saying toyou that I have been very proud on behalf of Australiato be associated even though at a distance with theefforts of Winston Churchill and the British peopleSuch machinery as I possess in my own country has atall times been exercised so as to encourage theAustralian people to realise that Great Britain is fightingour battles and that her heroism and superhumancheerfulness and philosophy must be for us not only ashield but an inspiration

As for yourself ndash praise from me would be animpertinence ndash but what I cabled you on September 3the anniversary of the war represented my whole heartand mind I am indeed grieved to think that you shouldhave felt my recent telegram to be either carping ordiscouraging

I say no more about Dakar because it no doubt haslessons which it is not necessary for me to underlineReal point I make is that we at this distance will learnthe lessons of events the more rapidly if informationabout those events can come to us as promptly and asfully as possible

As to the Middle East I have not sought or intendedto seek guarantees All that we ask ndash and I am sure it isgranted before the asking ndash is that the Middle Eastshould be as fully reinforced and equipped as ishumanly possible Your telegram has given me greatsatisfaction on this point

You point out that if the Middle East difficulties anddangers have not been fully met it is not because theMother Country has shirked her share of the perils or


sacrifice this is of course splendidly true But I hopethat you do not entertain any idea that Australia isshirking her share We have many thousands of men inthe Middle East as many as shipping has been able totake We have in camp in Australia further Expedi-tionary Force approximating 85000 men many ofwhom will shortly be moving to the Middle East

In spite of much public doubt caused by a real fearof what Japan may do my Government has raisednaval air and military forces and pledged ourresources to munitions production on a scale previouslyunknown and regarded only a year ago as impossible

We have done this notwithstanding the parochialinterests and issues which in the recent electionssucceeded in defeating us in the all-important State ofNew South Wales We have set no limit to ourcontribution because we know that there is no limit tothe total British risk

I mention these matters because I desire to make itclear that our anxiety about our main overseas theatreof actual participation in the war is not only intelligiblebut acute

Please my dear Prime Minister do not interpretanxieties arising from these facts as either fearfulselfish or unduly wrong-headed And above all pleaseunderstand that whatever interrogative or even criticaltelegrams I may send to you in secret Australia knowscourage when it sees it and will follow you to a finishas to the best of my abilities I certainly shall

Prime Minister to Mr Menzies 6X40I am deeply grateful for your generous message

Forgive me if I responded too controversially to what Ithought was somewhat severe criticism I am having anaccount prepared of the Dakar incident in all its stageswhich I will send for the confidential information ofyourself and your colleagues I do not propose todefend myself at any length in Parliament as such aspectacle would only gratify the enemy I am deeplygrateful for all that Australia has done under yourleadership for the common cause It has been a great


comfort having some of the Australians here duringthese anxious months I greatly admired their bearingand spirit when I inspected them They had justreceived twenty-four good field guns They are soongoing to join the rest of the Australian Army in theMiddle East where they will probably be in the forefrontof the fighting next year We shall do everything in ourpower to equip them as they deserve For the momentit seems that the situation in the Middle East is steadyShould the armies engage near Mersa Matruh theforces available during the next month or six weekswould not appear to be ill-matched in numbers Thisshould give a good chance to General Wilson who isreputed a fine tactician and the excellent troops hehas The Londoners are standing up magnificently tothe bombing but you can imagine the numerousproblems which a ruthless attack like this upon acommunity of eight million people creates for theAdministration We are getting the better of ourdifficulties and I feel confident that the act of massterror which Hitler has attempted will fail like hismagnetic mines and other deadly schemes All goodwishes personally for yourself


Appendix E

LISTOF OPERATIONAL CODE NAMES FOR 1940ndash1941

CATAPULT Seizure control or effective disablement ordestruction of all the accessible French FleetCOMPASS Offensive operations in the Western DesertCROMWELL Alarm word to be used if invasion of BritainimminentDYNAMO Naval evacuation of the BEF May 1940EXCESS Aircraft reinforcements to the Middle EastJanuary 1941HATS Passing of Fleet reinforcements throughMediterranean and running of supply convoy to MaltaMANDIBLES Operations against the DodecaneseMARIE Occupation of JibutiMENACE Occupation of DakarMULBERRY Artificial harboursOVERLORD Liberation of FranceSEA LION German plan for the invasion of BritainSHRAPNEL Occupation of Cape Verde IslandsTORCH Anglo-American invasion of North Africa


WINCH Fighter reinforcement to MaltaWORKSHOP Capture of Pantellaria


Appendix F

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA guns Anti-aircraft guns or ack-ack gunsADGB Air defence of Great BritainAFS Auxiliary Fire ServiceAFVrsquos Armoured fighting vehiclesAGRM Adjutant General Royal MarinesARP Air raid precautionsASU Air Supply UnitsAT rifles Anti-tank riflesATS (Womenrsquos) Auxiliary Territorial ServiceBEF British Expeditionary ForceCAS Chief of the Air StaffCIGS Chief of the Imperial General StaffC-in-C Commander-in-ChiefController Third Sea Lord and Chief of MaterialCNS Chief of the Naval Staff (First Sea Lord) or ISLCOS Chiefs of StaffDNC Director of Naval ConstructionEF Expeditionary ForceFO Foreign OfficeGHQ General HeadquartersGOC General Officer Commanding


GQG Grand Quartier GeneralHF Home ForcesHMG His Majestyrsquos GovernmentL of C Line of CommunicationsLDV Local Defence Volunteers [renamed Home Guard]MAP Ministry of Aircraft ProductionME Middle EastMEW Ministry of Economic WarfareM of I Ministry of InformationM of L Ministry of LabourM of S Ministry of SupplyOKH Oberkommando das Heeres Supreme Command of the

German ArmyOTU Operational Training UnitPM Prime MinisterUP Unrelated projectiles ie code name for rocketsVCAS Vice Chief of the Air StaffVCIGS Vice Chief of the Imperial General StaffVCNS Vice Chief of the Naval StaffWAAF Womenrsquos Auxiliary Air ForceWRNS Womenrsquos Royal Naval Service ldquoWrensrdquo


Notes

Book One

Chapter 1

Eisenhower ldquoCrusade in Europerdquo

1 The house in Downing Street usually occupied by theChancellor of the Exchequer

2 The Defence Committee met 40 times in 1940 76 in1941 20 in 1942 14 in 1943 and 10 in 1944

Chapter 2

1 Volume 1 page 378

2 The French ldquomobilisationrdquo of five millions included manynot under arms ndash eg in factories on the land etc

3 ldquoOperation Royal Marinerdquo was first planned in November1939 The mines were designed to float down the Rhineand destroy enemy bridges and shipping They were fedinto the river from French territory upstream See Volume IBook II pages 508ndash10


4 As other accounts of what passed have appeared I askedLord Ismay who was at my side throughout to give hisrecollection He writes

ldquoWe did not sit round a table and much may have beensaid as we walked about in groups I am positive that youdid not express any lsquoconsidered military opinionrsquo on whatshould be done When we left London we considered thebreak-through at Sedan serious but not mortal There hadbeen many lsquobreakthroughsrsquo in 1914ndash18 but they had allbeen stopped generally by counterattacks from one or bothsides of the salient

ldquoWhen you realised that the French High Command felt thatall was lost you asked Gamelin a number of questionswith I believe the dual object first of informing yourself asto what had happened and what he proposed to do andsecondly of stopping the panic One of these questionswas lsquoWhen and where are you going to counter-attack theflanks of the Bulge From the north or from the southrsquo Iam sure that you did not press any particular strategical ortactical thought upon the conference The burden of yoursong was lsquoThings may be bad but are certainly notincurablersquoldquo

5 His two volumes entitled Servir throw little light eitherupon his personal conduct of events or generally upon thecourse of the war

Chapter 4

1 Semi-armour-piercing shell


Chapter 6

1 Reynaud La France a sauveacute IrsquoEurope volume II page200 ff

2 See Reynaud op cit volume II page 209

3 Graziani Ho Difeso la Patria page 189



6Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939ndash1941 page 138

7Ibid page 142

8Ibid pages 142ndash43

9Ibid page 154

Chapter 7

1 ldquoZrdquo means the beginning of the war September 3 1939

2 In Lease-Lend ndash Weapon for Victory 1944


4 I am obliged to General Ismay for his recollection of thesewords

Chapter 11


1 See Appendix to this chapter

2 Translated

Chapter 12

1 A trench-cutting machine for attacking fortified lines

Chapter 13




4 This was an old device which I had used for the MarineBrigade of the Royal Naval Division when we landed on theFrench coast in September 1914 We took fifty of themfrom the London streets and the Admiralty carried themacross in a night

5 His brother Victor was a subaltern in the 9th Lancerswhen I joined the 4th Hussars and I formed a warmfriendship with him in 1895 and 1896 His horse reared upand fell over backwards breaking his pelvis and he wassorely stricken for the rest of his life However he continuedto be able to serve and ride and perished gloriously fromsheer exhaustion whilst acting as liaison officer with theFrench Cavalry Corps in the retreat from Mons in 1914

General Brooke had another brother Ronnie He was olderthan Victor and several years older than I In the years


1895-1898 he was thought to be a rising star in the BritishArmy Not only did he serve with distinction in all thecampaigns which occurred but he shone at the StaffCollege among his contemporaries In the Boer War hewas Adjutant of the South African Light Horse and I forsome months during the relief of Ladysmith was AssistantAdjutant the regiment having six squadrons Together wewent through the fighting at Spion Kop Vaal Krantz andthe Tugela I learned much about tactics from himTogether we galloped into Ladysmith on the night of itsliberation Later on in 1903 although I was only a youthfulMember of Parliament I was able to help him to theSomaliland campaign in which he added to his highreputation He was stricken down by arthritis at an earlyage and could only command a reserve brigade at homeduring the First World War Our friendship continued till hispremature death in 1925

6 HMS Erebus was a monitor of the First World Warmounting two fifteen-inch guns After being refitted shewent to Scapa for target practice in August Delay arose inher working up practices through defects and bad weatherand she did not reach Dover until late in September It wastherefore not until the night of September 2930 that shecarried out a bombardment of Calais

Chapter 14

1 Actually the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau which had beenat Trondheim had both been torpedoed and were out ofaction

2 Here I omitted to mention the twenty thousand whichmight come from the distant Biscay ports but as will be


seen my proposed disposition of our forces guardedagainst this potential but as we now know non-existentdanger

3 That is their approaches from the rear

4 These are of course proportions not divisionalformations

Book Two

Chapter 3

1 I was coming in one night to the Annexe when there wasa lot of noise and something cracked off not far away andsaw in the obscurity seven or eight men of the Home Guardgathered about the doorway on some patrol or duty Weexchanged greetings and a big man said from amongthem ldquoItrsquos a grand life if we donrsquot weakenrdquo

2 Trepanning consisted of making a hole in the bombcasing in order to deal with the explosive contents

3 It seems incongruous to record a joke in such sombrescenes But in war the soldierrsquos harsh laugh is often ameasure of inward compressed emotions The party weredigging out a bomb and their prize man had gone down thepit to perform the delicate act of disconnection Suddenly heshouted to be drawn up Forward went his mates andpulled him out They seized him by the shoulders anddragging him along all rushed off together for the fifty orsixty yards which were supposed to give a chance Theyflung themselves on the ground But nothing happenedThe prize man was seriously upset He was blanched and


breathless They looked at him inquiringly ldquoMy Godrdquo hesaid ldquothere was a bloody great ratrdquo

4 The reply was reassuring

5 These were the official categories ldquoYellowrdquo civil servantswere those performing less essential tasks and who couldtherefore be evacuated earlier than ldquoblackrdquo ones The latterwould remain in London as long as conditions made itpossible to carry on

Chapter 4

1 See the table at the end of chapter

Chapter 5

1 Used by President Wilson in 1917

2 Also a Wilsonian word

Chapter 6

1 To render undrinkable

2 This was the wretched word used at this time forldquoundrinkablerdquo I am sorry

Chapter 7

1 The subject is discussed in Volume I Book II Chapter IV

Chapter 8


1 Defenceless from air attack as at Namsos

2 Ciano Diaries page 281

Chapter 9

1 September 17 1940 received at 1155 AM

2 Received by the Admiralty at 756 AM on September 181940

3 See Appendix D for my correspondence with Mr Menzies

Chapter 11

1 From October 17 to 19 (inclusive) thirty-three shipstwenty-two of them British were sunk by U-boats in thenorthwestern approaches These figures include twentyships out of one convoy

2 Mr Yencken was killed in an air accident in 1944

3 Quoted by Lord Templewood in his memoirs Ambassadoron Special Mission

4 Ciano LrsquoEuropa verso la Catastrofe page 604

5 Du Moulin de la Barthegravete Le Temps des Illusions pages43-44

Chapter 12

1 Hitler and Mussolini Letters and Documents page 61


2 Commander-in-Chief Air Forces Middle East

3 Authorrsquos italics

Chapter 13

1 Stettinius Lend-Lease

2Ibid page 60

3 Actually they were nearer 45000 tons

4 See Appendix B

Chapter 14

1 See Nazi-Soviet Relations p 218 ff

2 Signed between Germany Italy and Japan on September27 1940

3 It is worth noting that though in Berlin the main emphasisof Hitler and Ribbentrop was on snaring British territory inthe draft agreement the British Empire is not mentioned byname while the colonial possessions of France Hollandand Belgium are obviously included in the areas to beshared under the secret protocol Both at Berlin and in thenegotiations in Moscow the British Empire though offeringthe most conspicuous and valuable booty was not the onlyintended victim of Hitler He was seeking an even widerredistribution of the colonial possessions in Africa and Asiaof all the countries with which he was or had been at war


4 Authorrsquos italics throughout the text of this document

5Nazi-Soviet Relations p 260 ff

Chapter 15

1 I have only heard since the war that these initials which Iused so often were an Admiralty term signifying ldquoWinstonrsquosspecialsrdquo

2 E-boat the German equivalent of British ldquolight coastalcraftrdquo

3 Sir John Reith He became Lord Reith and Minister ofWorks and Buildings on October 3 1940

4 The modern equivalent of ldquoQrdquo ships which had beeneffectively used in the 1914ndash18 war to lure the U-boats totheir destruction They were less successful in the changedconditions of this war

Chapter 16

1 Rifle Brigade and Kingrsquos Royal Rifles

2 ldquoAsk and it shall be given you seek and ye shall findknock and it shall he opened unto yourdquo

3 ldquoEvery good gift and every perfect gift is from above andcometh down from the Father of Light with whom there isno variableness neither shadow of turningrdquo


4Cianorsquos Diary 1989--18 edited by Malcolm Muggeridgepp 315-17

5Cianorsquos Diary p 321

6Prime Minister to General Ismay for COS Committee 1XII40

General de Gaulle told me that he had in mind an attemptto recover Jibouti ndash hereinafter to be called ldquoMarierdquo in allpapers and telegrams connected with the operation Hewould send three French battalions from Equatorial Africato Egypt where General Le Gentilhomme would meetthem These battalions would be for the defence of Egyptor possibly ostensibly as a symbolic contribution to thedefence of Greece There would be no secret about thisOn the contrary prominence would be given to their arrivalHowever when the moment was opportune thesebattalions would go to Jibouti being carried and escortedthither by the British Navy No further assistance would beasked from the British General de Gaulle believes andcertainly the attached paper favours the idea that LeGentilhomme could make himself master of the place bringover the garrison and rally it and immediately engage theItalians This would be a very agreeable development andis much the best thing de Gaulle could do at the presenttime It should be studied attentively and in conjunctionwith him The importance of secrecy and of nevermentioning the name of the place should be inculcated onall remembering Dakar I suppose it would take at least twomonths for the French battalions to arrive in Egypt

Kindly let me have a full report


7 Sheffield had been very heavily bombed

Appendix A

1 Mr Josiah Wedgwood MP

2 On the Royal Marine Operation see Volume I

3 Labour for defence works My former Minute dated 25VI40 is recorded in Book I Chapter VIII page 170

4 This was the photo-electric fuze and although not verysuccessful was the forerunner of the later proximity fuze

5 This refers to the Government sponsored scheme for theevacuation of children to Canada and the USA Thescheme was abandoned after the sinking of the ldquoCity ofBenaresrdquo by a U-boat on September 17 1940

7 The Hermione was a small Greek steamer which wasintercepted by our cruisers in the Aegean on July 28 1940while carrying a military cargo for Italy Our ships wereattacked by aircraft when making the interception TheHermione was therefore sunk and her crew left in boatsnear the land


8 The letters stand for ldquoParachute and Cablerdquo The PACrocket was one form of the UP weapon A description isgiven in a Minute dated January 13 1940 See Volume IBook II Appendix Part II

9 See note under my Minute of 7IX40 Book II ChapterVII and also my Minutes of 15IX40 and 26XII40 below

10 A radar set for anti-aircraft-gun control

11 United States Ambassador to Britain

12 On the naval aspect of our policy towards the VichyGovernment

13 A French merchant ship

14 General Hobart at this time a corporal in the HomeGuard was accordingly appointed to command anarmoured division and in that capacity rendereddistinguished service to the very end of the war I had apleasant talk with him on the day we first crossed the Rhinein 1945 His work was then highly esteemed by GeneralMontgomery

15 It was decided to provide the increased amount

16 See Book II Chapter IX

17 The Air Ministry began making proposals for greaterprotecton of Chequers by sending Bofors guns

18 Figures of aircraft strength proposed to he used by LordBeaverbrook in a broadcast


19 See Book II Chapter IV page 388

20Plan D Provision of all possible naval and military aid inthe European field to the exclusion of any other interestThis would involve the adoption of a strictly defensive planin the Pacific and abandonment of any attempt seriously toreinforce the Far East with accepted consequences Onthe other hand by full-scale concentration in the Europeanarea the defeat of Germany was ensured with certaintyand if subsequently it was in the American interest to dealwith Japan requisite steps would be possible

21 Capture of Pantellaria

22 Operations against Dodecanese

23 Table from Lord Beaverbrook giving comparison ofactual output of aircraft with programme

24 Paragraph in Lord Beaverbrookrsquos Minute of 141240 tothe effect that it is sometimes said that the output of theMinistry of Aircraft Production would have been equalled bythe Air Ministry if there had not been any change in May1940

25 See also my Minute of I5IX40

26 The figures were reassuring

27 Occupation of Jibuti

Appendix B

1 See Book II Chapter XIII pages 560ndash640


Appendix C

1 See Book II Chapter I

Appendix D

1 Book II Chapter IX


About the AuthorOne of the most significant leaders of the twentieth centuryWinston Churchill was born in 1874 He served as a warcorrespondent during the Boer War and after his captureand release became a national hero in England Heparlayed his celebrity into a political career getting electedto the Conservative Party just ten months after his returnChurchill joined the Liberal Party in 1904 After serving asHome Secretary under David Lloyd George he becameLord of the Admiralty but a military setback suffered inWorld War I forced him to resign Churchillrsquos political careersuffered many ups and downs during the 1920rsquos and 30rsquosowing in part to his support of King Edward VIII during hisabdication But when Hitler invaded Poland in 1939Churchill was reappointed Lord of the AdmiraltyIn 1940 Churchill succeeded Chamberlain as PrimeMinister and remained in office until 1945 During that timehe successfully guided the nation through World War IIinspiring and mobilizing the British people and forgingcrucial ties with American President Franklin DelanoRoosevelt Despite his success in the war Churchillrsquosgovernment was voted out in 1945 owing in part to thenationrsquos lack of confidence in his domestic policies Heremained in Parliament and was reelected in 1951ultimately resigning in 1955 at the age of 80After retirement from public life Churchill spent his timewriting publishing The History of the English SpeakingPeople That work along with his six-volume history of


World War II and The World Crisis his history of World WarI earned Churchill the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1953 In1963 Churchill was made an honorary US citizen WinstonChurchill died in 1965 at the age of 90


About this TitleRosettaBooks is the leading publisher dedicated exclusivelyto electronic editions of great works of fiction and non-fictionthat reflect our world RosettaBooks strives to improve thequality of its electronic books We welcome your commentsand suggestions Please write to EditorRosettaBookscomWe hope you enjoyed Their Finest Hour If you areinterested in learning more about the book and WinstonChurchill we suggest you visit the RosettaBooksConnection at



Their Finest Hour - The Eye | Front Page - Their... · 2020. 1. 17. · world, we advanced to the...

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Transcript of Their Finest Hour - The Eye | Front Page - Their... · 2020. 1. 17. · world, we advanced to the...