Post on 22-Jun-2020
https://www.isecpartners.com
Dan Guido NYM InfraGard, 05/11/2011
The Exploit Intelligence Project
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Intro and Agenda
I work for iSEC Partners NYC, Seattle, SF – specialize in Application Security
I don’t have a product to sell you
Today, I’m going to be sharing data and my analysis of attacker capabilities and methods An informed defense is more effective and less costly
EIP shows that intelligence-driven, threat-focused approaches to security are practical and effective Discuss techniques (“tradecraft”) to make it effective
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WARNING!
The commentary is really important for this talk.
If you’re a reporter, please contact me and I’ll be happy to provide that commentary
for any section you’re interested in:
dguido@isecpartners.com
We Have An Analysis Problem
Or, you’re counting the wrong beans!
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Let’s Talk About Vulnerabilities
*IBM X-Force 2010 Trend and Risk Report
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How many vulnerabilities did you have to pay attention to?
2010 2009
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since 2006
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Vulnerability Origin
*Secunia Yearly Report 2010
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Targets Attacked (2010)
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5
2
1
Flash / Reader
Java
Internet Explorer
Quicktime
Exploitation is focused on dominant platforms
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Wheel of Vulnerability Fortune
*Secunia: The Security Exposure of Software Portfolios
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Vulnerability Origin (2009-2010)
Where were massively exploited vulnerabilities first disclosed?
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
TargetedAttack
Zero-dayDisclosure
ZDI VendorAdvisory
(Non-ZDI)
UnknownVulnerability
2010 2009
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Google Chrome is Insecure!
*Bit 9 Research Report: Top Vulnerable Apps – 2010
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How many vulnerabilities were massively exploited in Google Chrome in 2010?
Are we doing something wrong?
Yes, you’re doing it backwards!
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We Have to Start at Attacks
Where do bad guys get their info from?
How do bad guys view the new vulns that come out?
How effective are my defenses against this attacker?
1. 2. 3.
Maslow’s Internet Threat Hierarchy
# of Attacks Value of Data Loss
APT
Targeted
Mass Malware
IP
$$$
Banking Credentials
Mass Malware
How does it work?
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Kill Chain Model
Systematic model for evaluating intrusions
Helps us objectively evaluate attacker capabilities
Align defense to specific processes an attacker takes
Typically used as a model to defend against APT
Evolves beyond response at point of compromise
Assumes unfixable vulnerabilities
First described by Mike Cloppert
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Recon
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Weaponization
5-20 exploits, $200-$2000 dollars
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Delivery
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Exploitation
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Installation
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Command and Control
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Actions on Objectives
Leads to Cyber Pompeii
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Process Overview Recon
Weaponize
Delivery
Exploit
Install
C2
Actions
Millions of Infected Sites
Thousands of IPs
Thousands of Vulnerabilities
Millions of Malware Samples
Thousands of IPs
N/A
Tens of Exploits The last point that you have control of your data
Existing defenses attack the most robust aspects of mass malware operations
Going on the Offensive
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Exploit Kit Popularity (2011)
*ThreatGRID Data
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000#
of
Ma
lici
ou
s U
RL
s
Exploit Kit Popularity
AVG Threat Labs
Malware Domain List
Krebs on Security
Malware Intelligence
Contagio Dump
Malware Tracker
M86 Security
…
Data Sources
Blackhole
Bleeding Life
CrimePack 3.1.3, 3.0, 2.2.8, 2.2.1
Eleonore 1.6, 1.4.4, 1.4.1, 1.3.2
Fragus
JustExploit
Liberty 2.1.0, 1.0.7
LuckySploit
Phoenix 2.5, 2.4, 2.3, 2.2, 2.1, 2.0
SEO Sploit pack
Siberia
Unique Pack
WebAttacker
YES
Zombie
Data Processing
Decode Jsunpack
Generic JS Unpacker
Decodeby.us PHP De-obfuscation
Detect YARA Project
Generic scanning engine
Relate SHODAN HQ
Python API for ExploitDB, MSF, CVE
Live Testing Vmware
Windows XP/7
Note: All free tools except VMWare/Windows
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Jsunpack/YARA Rules
rule IEStyle
{
meta:
ref = “CVE-2009-3672”
hide = true
impact = 8
strings:
$trigger1 = “getElementsByTagName” nocase fullword
$trigger2 = “style” nocase fullword
$trigger3 = “outerhtml” nocase fullword
condition:
all of them
}
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Jsunpack vs Eleonore 1.4.1
vuln_search.py
CVE Name ID
Exploit DB Author Date ID Name
Metasploit Authors Description ID
Name Rank
References Vendor URLs (ex. MSB) ZDI Other Notable URLs
Powered by:
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Sample Results: CVE-2010-1818 Exploit DB
08/30/2010 Ruben Santamarta Apple QuickTime "_Marshaled_pUnk" Backdoor 14843
Metasploit Ruben Santamarta, jduck Apple QuickTime 7.6.7 _Marshaled_pUnk Code Execution “… exploits a memory trust issue in Quicktime…” exploit/windows/browser/apple_quicktime_marshaled_punk Rank: Great
Refs http://reversemode.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=69&Itemid=1 OSVDB-67705
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Recap
Mapping of Exploit Kits -> CVEs + Metadata
Analysis Results
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What I Intend to Prove The rise of Java exploitation was easily predictable
Via exploit kit trending and research community interest
Via basic browser attack graph analysis
DEP is a significant obstacle for MM exploit writers They evade DEP by stealing exploit code from targeted attacks
No demonstrated capability to evade memory protections
MM exploit writers greatly prefer public code over custom dev Best available data sources are increasingly:
Exploit code used in targeted attacks
Exploit code published by security researchers as zero-day
Worst data sources are vendor advisories with limited details
Targeting Trends
Java from 2008 to Present
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Targeting Trends
Java, Round One
12-08 – Prominent researcher finds CVE-2008-5353
08-09 – Wins a Pwnie (researcher interest runs high)
08-09 – ZDI submissions start trickling out
11-09 – 1 kit incorporates CVE-2008-5353
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Java, Round Two
11-09 – ZDI publishes 2nd batch of Java vulns CVE-2009-3867
01-10 – Three kits integrate 1st and 2nd vulns CVE-2008-5353 and CVE-2009-3867
04-10 – 3rd batch of researcher disclosures CVE-2010-0886, CVE-2010-0840, CVE-2010-0842
Back and forth between researchers/malware keeps interest in Java running high
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From April 2010 onwards, new Java exploits are added to almost all popular exploit kits
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Java Today
Popularity
11 out of 15 kits include at least one Java exploit (73%)
7 out of 15 kits include more than one (46%)
Where did this trend come from?
Who followed who? The malware or research community?
Why can we even compare these two groups together?
What is next?
Java and Flash will continue to be a pain point
Quickest path to install malware in IE and Firefox
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Public Exploit Code Preferred
Gradient of Information Detail
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
TargetedAttack
Zero-dayDisclosure
ZDI VendorAdvisory
(Non-ZDI)
UnknownVulnerability
2010 2009
Capabilities Assessment
If we only had a time machine
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Optimized Defense
Jan 1, 2009 – what can we put in place to mitigate all exploits for the next two years? Restrictions: no patching allowed
2009 recap Internet Explorer 7, Firefox 3.0
Adobe Reader 9
Java, Quicktime, Flash, Office 2007
Windows XP SP3
Dataset represents 27 exploits
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Slice and Dice
Memory Corruption
(19)
Logic (8)
Partition exploits based on mitigation options
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19 Memory Corruption Exploits
5 unique targets
IE, Flash, Reader, Java, Firefox, Opera
Do I have my sysadmins adhere to patch schedules or have them test and enable DEP in four applications?
Patch schedules: Monthly, Quarterly, Ad-hoc
Two years: 60+ patches in these apps
I choose Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
Good choice! It mitigates 14 exploits.
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8 Logic Flaws
4 unique targets
Java, Reader, IE, Firefox, FoxIt
Do we have a business case to justify getting repeatedly compromised by mass malware?
No? Remove Java from the Internet Zone in IE
Configure Reader to prompt on JS execution
Disallow embedded executables from running in PDFs
This leaves two exploits, one in IE and one in FF
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Most Severe Exploits 2009-2010
IE Help Center XSS
Firefox SessionStore
Reader libTIFF
Reader CoolType SING
Flash (IE) newfunction
Quicktime (IE) _Marshaled_pUnk
Java getSoundBank
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Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit
Microsoft utility that adds obstacles to exploitation On XP: DEP, SEHOP, Null Page, Heap Spray, EAT filter
Distributed as an MSI, controlled via CLI or Registry
Apply it to one application at a time Harden legacy applications
Temporary protections against known zero-day
Permanent protections against highly targeted apps
http://blogs.technet.com/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer-Components-PostAttachments/00-03-35-03-78/Users-Guide.pdf
The most effective anti-malware product in existence?
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Most Severe Exploits 2009-2010
IE Help Center XSS
Firefox SessionStore
The Firefox exploit is only in one kit. We can make an informed decision about the amount
of risk we are assuming.
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Intelligence-Driven Mitigations
Easy mitigations (22 out of 27 exploits) DEP on IE, Firefox, and Reader
No Java in the Internet Zone
Disallow embedded executables from running in PDFs
Hard mitigations (all the rest) EMET on IE and Reader, the two most attacked apps
Upgrade to IE8 for that pesky Help Center XSS
Disallow Firefox, patch it, or accept the risk
Extremely limited susceptibility going forward
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Taking It Further
Mass malware exploits are:
1. Result of users browsing internet sites
2. Shortest path to install malware w/ a single exploit
Malicious
HTML
Chrome
IE8
IE7, Plugins,
Java, Flash,
etc.
DEP
Bypass
DEP
Bypass
Sandbox
Escape
Install
SpyEye
*DDZ – Memory Corruption, Exploitation and You
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Google Chrome Frame
“X-UA-Compatible: chrome=1”
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Google Chrome Frame Internet sites standardized around HTML/JS
This is why you don’t need IE6 or IE7 at home
For internet sites, add HTTP header w/ Bluecoat
Browser is sandboxed Uses auto-updated Google version of Flash No other plugins are loaded
Maintain whitelist of internet sites that need IE Typically, established vendor relationships
All intranet websites will load with IE as usual
Seamless to the user, mitigates all exploits in use
Maslow’s Internet Threat Hierarchy
# of Attacks Value of Data Loss
APT
Targeted
IP
$$$
Banking Credentials
Now you’re ready to defend against more advanced attackers
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Intelligence-Driven Conclusions Don’t wait to act with Flash and Java Pay attention to targeted attack disclosures in 2011
Force malware authors to use multiple exploits
Seriously consider Google Chrome Frame
Are your consultants/MSSPs/scanners evaluating vulnerabilities the same way that attackers are?
Intelligence-Driven Response Informed defense is more effective and less costly Threat-focused security is practical Attack data is necessary to adequately model your risk
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Thanks Rcecoder, Mila Parkour, Francois Paget, Adam Meyers
Exploit Pack Table on Contagio Dump & Exploit Kit Source
Mike Cloppert and Dino Dai Zovi Inspiration, ideas, and encouragement
Chris Clark Getting started with the research process at iSEC
John Matherly Creating SHODAN and fixing my bugs
Dean De Beer ThreatGRID data, screenshots, and background material
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References and Q&A Updates with more data at SummerCon, 6/10
Related Presentations (online) Memory Corruption, Exploitation, and You – DDZ Intelligence-Driven Response to APT – M. Cloppert Any Mandiant Presentation
Related Presentations (at SOURCE) 2011 Verizon Data Breach Report, Hutton Fuel for Pwnage, Diaz and Mieres Dino Dai Zovi Keynote
dguido@isecpartners.com
Frequently Asked Questions
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Network Detections
Q: What do you think about network detections?
A: Apply the same analysis process (kill chain) to the adversary you care about and determine major source of overlaps in intrusions. You may find better indicators than simply IP addresses. ie., “Hey, all the malicious domains attacking me are
registered with the same whois data.”
or, “All the domains that compromise me have low TTL values in common.”
See some of Mike Cloppert’s writings
See ThreatGRID when it comes out
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Keeping Up
Q: How can we keep up with this data? You did a point in time assessment, but I want this going forward.
A: This analysis process and data should be picked up by the security industry and used effectively. AV companies have been doing you a disservice by not doing this in the past. They should start now.
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Cheating with EMET Q: Aren’t you cheating by saying we should use EMET to mitigate past exploits?
A: If we were smart enough to enable mitigations like DEP, we would have had a solid 1.5
years where we weren’t affected by mass malware mem corruption exploits at all, buying us a huge amount of time to investigate other mitigations techniques.
The exploits that EMET was needed for came after the tool was released in Oct 2009. If you had someone performing this analysis, you could have observed the exploits that bypassed DEP and responded the same way I did. Intelligence gathering is not a static process, we have to continue collecting and responding to new information.
There are more ways to use this intelligence. For instance, since we know that Flash and targeted attacks are so rapidly incorporated into mass exploitation campaigns, we would have known on April 11th that CVE-2011-0611 would be a significant issue. The patch came out on April 15th, but I doubt many orgs patched over the weekend or enabled other mitigating options before it was massively exploited on April 18th. With this data in hand, they would have realized the seriousness of the original event on the 11th.
Finally, by following this analysis process we were able to identify EMET as one mitigation that worked more effectively than any other product you can buy. Why isn’t someone making a product out of EMET and selling it??
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Software Diversity
Q: What are your thoughts on software diversity as a defensive technique?
A:
Crimeware packs subvert safety through diversity by targeting the most widely installed software including popular 3rd party applications like Firefox and Opera.
Related: the easiest network to detect security incidents in is one that is entirely homogenous.
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Is ZDI “Bad”?
No, but ZDI employs a similar rating system for vulnerabilities it decides to purchase vs. vulnerabilities malware authors decide to abuse. The fact that a company spent money to purchase a vulnerability means more than a CVSS score.
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Future Analysis Zero-Days
Are the number of bugs exploited as zero-day increasing? Why? Do researchers follow zero-day disclosure trends or vice-versa?
Interaction with researcher community How do researcher disclosures correlate with massive
exploitation?
Exploit writer sophistication How much code is modified from public PoC’s? Exactly how many exploits are stolen from Metasploit? Are there certain kits that are continuously ahead of the curve? What do adoption patterns look like for new versions of kits?
Expect new results some time in June