SECURE ELEMENT

THE CORNER STONE FOR A SAFE CONNECTED OBJECT

GUILLAUME CRINONBUSINESS DEV MANAGER

People6B

DataThings20-50B

INTERNET OF THINGS – OUR OPPORTUNITY

First step1990-

1G/2G/3G/4GxDSL/Fiber/Sat

Mature mkt

Second step1995-

Data centersCloud computing

Booming mkt

Third step2005-

M2M - IoTLower cost connection

Lower power connectionBooming mkt

Internet of Everything

May 15

• Connecting people was once luxury, a privilege reserved to the rich

• Connecting people is now a mature business reaching saturation

• Connecting “things” was once luxury reserved to high-end machines

• Expanding the market of connected “things” is simply pushing down the cost boundary

THE IOT IS OUR 2ND TELECOM REVOLUTION

Hardware value of the connected “thing”

Complex machine

Simple machine

Complex object

Simple object

Smart sensor

Disposable sensor

Connected

Not worth connecting

May 15

… you get exposed while poorly protected

4May 15

BEING CONNECTED IS GREAT UNLESS…

5

HOW SECURE ARE STANDARD MCUS ?

It takes 16min, a laptop, Matlab, a 150€ USB

oscilloscope & probe to extract an AES128 key

from any non-secure MCU

Courtesy of Driss Aboulkassimi – CEATech – FR – driss.aboulkassimi@cea.frMay 15

• Security requirements depend both on the value of what is being protected and the anticipated attacks

• Questions to ask• How valuable is the data or service being protected?• To whom is it valuable to?• Who does the system require me to trust?• What are the skills/time/resources necessary to attack the system?• What would the cost of compromise be, including loss of time and

manpower, loss of reputation, costs to fix already fielded systems?

6May 15

SPENDING MONEY ON SECURITY

7May 15

RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

$ $$$$ $$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$

$ $$$$ $$$$ $$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$

$ $ $$$$ $$$$$ $$$$$$$

$ $ $$ $$$$ $$$$$$

$ $ $$ $$$ $$$$$$

Near certainty

Highly likely

Likely

Low likelihood

Not likely

Min

imal

Min

or

Mod

erat

e

Sign

ifica

nt

Seve

re

CONSEQUENCES

LIKE

LIHO

OD

8

SHIFTING RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

$ $$$$$$ $$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$

$ $$$$$ $$$$$ $$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$

$ $$$ $$$$$ $$$$$ $$$$$$$

$ $ $$$ $$$$$ $$$$$$

$ $ $$ $$$$ $$$$$

Near certainty

Highly likely

Likely

Low likelihood

Not likely

Min

imal

Min

or

Mod

erat

e

Sign

ifica

nt

Seve

re

CONSEQUENCES

LIKE

LIHO

OD

May 15

9May 15

ATTACK TREE – COST OF ATTACK

Do not pay for water at home

Slow down meter

Alter electronics

Insert pulse divider between spinning

contact and counter

Alter mechanics

…

Alter firmware

Disassemble firmware and

reprogram

Fool data reporting to concentrator

Report fake water consumption with

dummy meter

Reverse engineer wireless protocol and security key

Hack my record @ water company

Find back-door on water company IT

systemBribe employee

10May 15

SECURE CONNECTIVITY PROTOCOL MODEL

Network association request

Object identity check

(Network identity check)

(Exchange of session key(s) and nonces)

Exchange of messagesEncryption - Integrity

11May 15

SECURITY TOOLBOX FOR CONNECTED OBJECTS= CRYPTOGRAPHY

Non-repudiation

Confidentiality

IP protection

Anti-cloning

Data integrity

Access control

Encryption

Securememory

Signature

Authentication

Signature

Authentication

• Authentication• Proving someone’s identity by

verifying the validity of identification parameters:• PIN code• Secret key• Password• Biometrics• Certificate

• Encryption• Encoding messages so that

unauthorized readers cannot understand them

• ≠ Steganography• Concealing the messages from

unauthorized readers12May 15

CRYPTOGRAPHY IS A SCIENCEDEFINITIONS 1/2

• Integrity• Providing evidence that a message

has not been altered by a third party• Checksum can be considered as a

very basic integrity algorithm

• Digital signature• Association of

• Authentication of sender• Integrity of message

• Secure Element• Crypto-dedicated IC• Tamper-resistant to side-channel

attacks• Vault for keeping secret keys

13May 15

CRYPTOGRAPHY IS A SCIENCEDEFINITIONS 2/2

STATE-OF-THE-ART CRYPTOGRAPHY IN HISTORYANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES

-700 -150 0 800 1500

Scytale –transposition

Bellaso, Vigenère, Gronsfeld –polyalphabeticsubstitutionCaesar’s substitution

cipher

Abu Yusuf Al-Kindi, invents frequency analysis and breaks Caesar’s cipher

Polybius square

Plaintext A V N E T M E M E C

Key T E C H D A Y T E C Ciphertext T Z P L W M C F I E

Birth of private key

May 15

LWC

1880 1900 1920 1945 1975 1990 2000 2010

STATE-OF-THE-ART CRYPTOGRAPHY IN HISTORYCONTEMPORARY PERIOD

Franck MillerOne-Time-Pad –Polyalphabeticsubstitution“Perfect secrecy”

RSARivest, Shamir, Adleman

Alan TuringClaude ShannonModern cryptography

ENIGMA

Diffie-Hellman invention of public key

AES

DES

SSLTLS

WEP

WPA WPA2SSH

SHA-0 SHA-3Sir William Herschel -fingerprints

ECCKoblitz, Miller

CDMA

UWB

PGP

Banking smart cardSIM card

IPv6

iPhone802.15.4

www Wirelesswww& IoT

Cheap Secure Element

EMVco SHA-2First transatlantic radio transmission

Radio

May 15

• Since RSA, AES, ECC, SHA, cryptography has reached maturity

• “Cryptography is now by far the best settled part of Information Security” (Whitfield Diffie, 2005)

• Computational complexity for brute-force attack ~ 2^length(key)• 2048-bit key takes 2^2048 ~ 10^600 steps to solve• 10^82 atoms in universe• Assuming // computing with 1 computer per atom still takes > 10^500

steps per computer• Assuming lightning-fast computing with 10^100 steps per second• Computation would take 10^400 seconds >> life-time of galaxy

16May 15

CRYPTOGRAPHY IS MATURE

• Human factor

• Strange tendency to use “home-brewed” cryptosystems

• Misunderstanding properties of crypto components

• Easy to get implementation wrong – many subtleties

• Combining secure primitives in insecure way

• Strict efficiency requirements for crypto/security: The cost is visible but benefit invisible

• Compatibility issues, legacy systems

• Cryptography is only part of designing secure systems

• Chain is only as strong as weakest link

• A “dormant bug” is often a security hole

• Many subtle issues (e.g., caching & virtual memory, side channel attacks)

• Key storage and protection issues

17May 15

SO WHY IS NOTHING SECURE ?

18May 15

BUILDING AN UNSECURE SYSTEMWITH ALBEIT SECURE ELEMENTS

19

WHAT IS A UICC (SIM CARD) ?

32 bitCPU

SHAECCRSA

AES3DES

True Random

Gen.TIMER Flash RAM

Interface

I/O

Crypto LibraryKey Management

ISO7816protocols

JavaCard OSApplet Management

Secure StorageApplet Installer

SMS & directory storageMNO profiles Phone locking Hidden MNO

functions

Secure Hardware

Secure Firmware

JavaCard Applets

May 15

Customized and personalized by the MNO/VNO for the subscriber

20

WHAT IS A SECURE ELEMENT ?

32 bitCPU

SHAECCRSA

AES3DES

True Random

Gen.TIMER Flash RAM

Interface

I/O

Crypto LibraryKey Management

I²C&

ISO7816protocols

Applet ManagementSecure StorageApplet Installer

Usage Controlapplet

Trackingapplet

Counterfeitingapplet

IP protectionapplet

Secure Hardware

Secure Firmware

Applets

May 15

Customized and personalized by AVNET for the client

21May 15

2G/3G/4GCONNECTIVITY PROTOCOL (SIMPLIFIED)

Network association request

Object identity check

Network identity check

Exchange of session key(s) and nonces

Exchange of messagesEncryption - Integrity

22May 15

2G/3G/4GHW SECURITY HANDLED BY UICC (SIM CARD)

unique ID and keyssafely locked insideUICC (SIM card)

Network association request

Object identity check

Network identity check

Exchange of session key(s) and nonces

Exchange of messagesEncryption - Integrity

23May 15

OTHER LAN AND WANSAME CONNECTIVITY PROTOCOL MODEL

Network association request

Object identity check

(Network identity check)

(Exchange of session key(s) and nonces)

Exchange of messagesEncryption - Integrity …

24May 15

OTHER LAN AND WANHW SECURITY HANDLED BY SECURE ELEMENT

unique ID and keys locked in Secure Element by AVM Factory

Network association request

Object identity check

(Network identity check)

(Exchange of session key(s) and nonces)

Exchange of messagesEncryption - Integrity …

25

100% SECURE SUPPLY CHAIN

Secure boot-loader

Secure logistics

Chip is « unlocked »

Firmware & Applet are

loaded

Chip is personalized with secret keys

Every chip is unique

Customer

Supply chain is EMV Co compliant

User keys and certificates are generated by Avnet’s secure servers

May 15

26

BEYOND WIRELESSAPPLICATIONS OF A SECURE ELEMENT

Authentication of removable part,

consumable, electronic board….

Protection against unauthorized

modifications of software

Integrity control of every node of a

network

Sensitive data secure storage

Usage control of peripherals (medical)

Secure login to remote system

Anti-Cloning Secure tracking IP protection Usage control

May 15

27May 15

COST EFFECTIVE SAFETY IS REALITY

COST

SECURITYLEVEL

Do not dive hereAsk our experts

• AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

• CBC-MAC: Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code

• CCM*: Counter with CBC-MAC

• CDMA: Code Division Multiple Access

• DES: Data Encryption Standard

• ECC: Elliptic Curve Cryptography

• LWC: Lightweight Cryptography

• MAC: Message Authentication Code

• PGP: Pretty Good Privacy

• PKI: Public Key Infrastructure

• PRF: Pseudo-Random Function

• PRNG: Pseudo-Random Number Generator

• RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adleman

• SHA: Secure Hash Algorithm

• SSL: Secure Sockets Layer

• TLS: Transport Layer Security

• UWB: Ultra-Wide Band

• WEP: Wired Equivalent Privacy

• WPA: WiFi Protected Access

28May 15

GLOSSARY

• Boaz Barak course @ Princeton http://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/spr10/cos433/

• Bruce Schneier https://www.schneier.com/

• Simon Singh http://simonsingh.net/books/the-code-book/the-book/

• Whitfield Diffie – Before and After Public-Key Cryptography http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1BJuuUxCaaY

guillaume.crinon@avnet-memec.eu

29May 15

BIBLIOGRAPHY – FURTHER READINGCREDITS TO…

Thank you

30May 15

• Alice & Bob want to exchange messages without Eve understanding

• Private key Same key shared by Alice & Bob, unknown to Eve

Not secure in the long-term because key k is re-used EVE will eventually guess it

31May 15

PRIVATE KEY – SYMMETRIC ALGORITHMS AES

ALICEShares with Bob a secret key k

Encodes m into c = m ⊕ k

BOBShares with Alice a secret key k

Decodes c into m = c ⊕ k

c = m ⊕ k

EVE

• Alice & Bob want to exchange messages without Eve understanding

• Private keySame key shared by Alice & Bob, unknown to Eve

Secure because key Fk(r) is randomized for every message32May 15

PRIVATE KEY – SYMMETRIC ALGORITHMS AESIMPROVEMENT WITH RAND NUMBER GENERATOR

ALICEShares with Bob a secret key k and PRF Fk

Generates random number r

Computes Fk(r)

Encodes m intoc = m ⊕ Fk(r)

BOBShares with Alice a secret key k and PRF Fk

Computes Fk(r)

Decodes c into m = c ⊕ Fk(r)

EVE

EVE

• Is it possible to exchange privately between 2 entities not requiring them trusting each other, ie not having them disclose any secret ?

• Eve eavesdropping has a very complex maths problem to solve !! Discrete logarithm problem 33May 15

DIFFIE HELLMAN KEY CONTRACT

ALICEHas a secret xCalculates g^x

Calculates key(g^y)^x = g^xy

Encodes m into c = m.g^xy

BOBHas a secret yCalculates g^y

Calculates key(g^x)^y = g^xy

Decodes c into m = c.(g^x)^(|G|-b)

PUBLICP very large prime number (2048 bits) – g primitive root mod P

Group theory – Arithmetic modulo P

c = m.g^xy

EVE

• Application: 1 public key used for encryption paired with 1 private key for decryption

• Eve eavesdropping has a very complex maths problem to solve !! Discrete logarithm problem 34May 15

PUBLIC KEY – ASYMMETRIC ALGORITHMS RSA

ALICEUses public key e to encode m

Encodes m into c = (m^e)mod n

BOBKnows prime_1 & prime_2Calculates p=(prime_1-1)x(prime_2-1)Calculates d=e^-1 mod pDecodes c into m = (c^d) mod n

PUBLICn=prime_1 x prime_2 ; e coprime with (prime_1-1)x(prime_2-1)

Group theory – Arithmetic modulo P

c = (m^e)mod n

• Alice sends Bob a message with a digital signature proving: The message comes from her The message has not been altered by a third party

35May 15

AUTHENTICATION SHAINTEGRITY

ALICEShares with Bob a secret key k

Computes M=MAC(k,m)

BOBShares with Alice a secret key k

Computes MAC(k,m)

If MAC(k,m)=M then message and sender are authenticated

m, M