Post on 28-Oct-2014
Chapter 1
Background of the Problem
Pork barrel politics is defined as the practice of targeting expenditure to
particular districts, states or regions based on a clear set of political considerations
(Agnani & Aray, 2010).
A significance of pork barrel studies is explained by Nograles and
Lagman, (2010) in which they establish that understanding the workings of pork
barrel is crucial given that the projects implemented thru the use of these funds
complements and links the national development goals of a country down to the
grassroots level. This is essential especially in the workings of democratic
countries.
Madison as cited by Nograles and Lagman, (2010) stressed that it is just
necessary that the legislative branch of government should be held accountable to
be examined in the processes of utilization of pork barrel funds because the
legislative body has a more direct affinity given that the money comes from their
constituents. According to Hird, (1991) the social value and of most government
projects can be empirically tested through the monitoring and examining of the
utilization of the pork barrel funds.
The literature on pork barrel distribution has also gained popularity
through time especially in underdeveloped areas or countries. This is explained by
Kawanaka, (2007), he posits that pork barrels play a politically significant role in
less developed countries or areas given that legislators are able to buy off voters
for their re-election. This established relationship signifies that in order to acquire
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position legislators being rational agents should secure enough pork barrel funds
and construct projects which are seen to be beneficial to their districts or areas
even if in some cases this may be inefficient in a national perspective (Hird,
1991).
In the case of the Philippines, according to Keefer and Khemani, (2008)
pork barrel politics may be viewed to have employed a negative image. The
reason behind such is due to the presence of weak institutions such as political
parties or agencies that could monitor the use of these pork barrel funds. The
increase of coalitions in the country may it be through the merging of political
parties or the increasing number of committees in Congress shows that Also given
the clientelist environment in which the government operates affects the use of the
pork barrel funds which is suppose to be a tool for the citizens to receive better
services from the government.
This research therefore aims to build on the studies explaining how
coalitions through the rural committees in Congress influence the distribution of
pork barrel funds. This will add on to the study of how the government as an
institution especially that of the legislative branch controls and monitors the use
of these funds which are known to be used for local development.
The researcher will be applying the theory on positive choice theory on
legislative coalitions by Shepsle and Weingast (1994) which states that
committees influence decision making process by employing certain strategies
such as bargaining, committee size and agenda setting strategy and in doing so
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these committees are able to acquire a greater advantage and leverage towards the
distribution of funds or the pursuit of their electoral goals.
The researcher will use key informant interviews and document analysis
as the methods to gather all the relevant data to explain how the rural committees
influence the distribution of pork barrel funds in the country.
Research Question
This study will answer the following question:
How do coalitions (i.e. through formation of rural committees in
Congress) influence the distribution of pork barrel funds?
Definition of Terms
Term Definition
Coalitions An alliance of persons or groups with
varying individual interests but in the
pursuit of the same goal and the
membership to such could be
temporary, a matter of convenience or
for greater advantage (Agnani & Aray,
2010)
Rural Committees Committees in Congress which focuses
on local development projects (i.e.
roads, livelihood projects, trainings and
education, use of agricultural and
aquatic resources) (Nograles &
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Lagman, 2008)
Influence the ability to affect decisions of policy
makers.
Pork Barrel Funds “a tool used by politicians to create
projects for social welfare and to extend
influence amongst its constituents”
(Hird, 1991).
Research Objectives
This study aims to:
Provide a clearer understanding on how coalition formation in
Congress takes place
Examine how the dynamics of coalition formation affect the
distribution of pork barrel funds
Clarify the importance of coalitions such as committees in
Congress to the distribution of pork barrel funds
Significance of the Research
This research will be able to contribute to the literature on coalitions and
pork barrel distribution and explain the dynamics and processes involved in the
distribution of such political resource. In theory its contribution is to focus on the
study of coalition formation which takes into consideration committees in
Congress. According to (Stein & Bickers, 1994) studies on committees as
coalitions affecting distributive policies such as pork barrel funded programs is
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essential in both theories of coalition formation and pork barrel spending. Though
there is a growing literature during the 1980’s and 1990’s, most studies were done
in the United States. This study is significant by contributing to such literature
and by providing a clearer understanding on the dynamics of Congress as an
institution given the formation of these committees.
In the empirical level, this study will be able to explain the dynamics of
the multitude of actors involve in the legislative body which forms coalitions in
order to influence the distribution of pork barrel funds. By looking into rural
committees which targets local development the researcher will then be able to
shed light if there is indeed a significant relationship on the formation of such
coalitions and if it affects the distribution of pork barrel funds in the country.
Scope and Limitations
It is important to note that in writing this project the researcher focuses on
coalitions through rural committees in Congress. The study differentiates rural
committees from other committees due to the fact that the objective of such
committees is to form local development projects and these committees are target
specific given that they already have certain aspects where to focus on, example
would be the Committees on Roads and Highways, which targets the creation,
maintenance and other related matters on road. This then could shed light on the
influence of these committees in the distribution of pork barrel funds given that
these coalitions are target specific. On the other hand the limitation of the study is
its focus on analyzing a specific type of committee in Congress, also another
limitation of the study is that given the varying factors that could influence the
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distribution of pork barrel funds, one cannot completely generalize that the rural
committees are the only ones which influence the distribution of these pork barrel
funds.
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Chapter 2
Review of Related Literature
In order to understand how coalitions influence legislative policies and
decisions, it is helpful to look at different studies and cases. The first part of this
chapter will look into empirical researches on various types of coalitions and their
influence. The second part will look into the different theories employed by
different authors in understanding the relationship between coalitions and their
level of influence on distributive policies.
In understanding the mechanisms of coalitions and how it influence
distributive policies, it can be noted that the literature is strong in theory, but lacks
in cases this is because most cases center on political party coalitions however
several authors such as Weingast, (1979), Cox and Mcubbins (1988), Schofield
and Laver, (1985) and Collie, (1988) mentioned that there is a need to explore
other coalitions in the legislature environment and other areas in government.
They highlighted the role of committees in Congress, local government coalitions
and majority blocs as important to understand and expand the various theories on
coalition formation and explain how actors interact and cooperate in pursuit of
their own objectives and acquire payoffs. Though there are existing cases on
coalitions in Congress through committees, it is limited because empirical
researches were mostly done in United States.
Cases on Coalition Formation and its Influence
Coalitions play a central role in legislatures, cabinet formation in
parliamentary governments, international agreements and many political and
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collective action settings. However the discussion in this study focuses on the
literature on coalitions regarding cooperative game theory which explains that the
formation of these coalitions is seen as a cooperative strategy to have a stronger
influence in policy or decision making which leads to a greater allocation of
incentive mechanisms or benefits amongst the members.
In line with this statements, (Baron, 1989 p.1049) defines coalition as an
important feature of a legislative structure which is viewed to be composed of a
set of members in which during the legislative process at which proposals are
made, these members finds at their best interest to coordinate with other members
in order to advance their electoral goals and ensure allocation of benefits. Baron,
(1989) highlights coalitions in the legislative structure because it is in this
institutional setting wherein one can really see how influential coalitions are. An
example given was how the members of coalitions in Congress may propose a
project which allocates benefits among their districts but on the other hand it can
also be the case that a member may propose a project that allocates more on his or
her district than to the districts of other coalition members. This then posits that
the strategy employed in coalition formations in Congress is a cooperative one
due to the pursuit of individual electoral objectives of legislators (Baron, 1989).
Government coalitions are mostly a common feature in presidential
democracies during the last wave of democratization. This is according to Aleman
and Saiegh, (2007) wherein they study different types of coalition formation in
Chile. They classify coalitions under three categories, one is under coalitions in
the form of legislative committees, and the second is coalitions formed by
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political parties and lastly coalitions of the majority bloc in the legislature (p.
257).
The study of these authors looked into comparing which among the three
categories of government coalitions are influential and centers not just on
electoral objectives but also on policy based alliances. The results highlighted that
political parties serves as the most influential among other forms of coalitions.
This is due to the following reasons, the structure of parties in Chile is
characterized by five main political parties, and these parties are only allowed to
present two candidates per district. The allocation of seat in Congress is only
given to the two candidates per district if they can acquire votes which are
doubled than their opponents. Therefore, electoral pacts are already observed
during the campaign of these parties, with 60 districts, all of these five political
parties ensure that they are able to establish enough number of votes to give them
assurance of seats in Congress (Aleman & Saiegh , 2007, pp.264-265).
Also the existence of the clear set of ideologies of these political parties
gives them a more influential role in policy decisions. According to Aleman and
Saiegh, (2007) three of these political parties are leftist and centers on economic
policies and distributional policies. This clear ideology makes them form alliances
and coalitions especially in formulating policies and in voting for who should be
the representatives of the different districts during elections (p. 266).
On the other hand an interesting note in this study is the coalition of the
majority bloc especially in policy proposals, members of the majority always
stand close to each other in policy proposals which makes it easier for these
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proposals to reach the final vote in Congress. Also there exists an implicit
agreement on what matters should not be discussed in the floor of the Congress.
This then posits that the majority bloc has agenda control and is always
cooperative (p. 257).
Another study which supports political parties as the most influential form
of coalitions was done by Dhillon, (2003) by comparing the pre and post
formation of coalitions among political parties in United Kingdom. The author
was able to identify those political parties which are smaller in size enters
coalitions before and after elections which leads to greater gains because of the
leverage they get whether through monetary resources or other support incentives.
However the bigger parties which usually comprised majority of these coalitions
form coalitions or enter into coalitions before elections this is due to the reduction
of uncertainty factors, in which the author defines that given that bigger parties
would not want to lose their position in office, they would encourage participation
amongst smaller parties to ensure that they are able to get perfect information on
the their status in various areas especially during elections (pp. 14-15).
However it is also important to note that after the formation of coalitions
and during the policy making process these coalitions of political parties are not
solely for the pursuit of electoral objectives and incentives. According to Dhillon,
(2003) an instance wherein the parliamentary was passing two important bills and
had offer concessionaries for the losing coalition, instead of accepting, the
coalition still pursued and petitioned for the adoption of these bills which were
focusing on reforms on labor policies.
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This idea of coalitions influencing policy outcomes and decision making
through an agreement on the distribution of resources and binding commitments
was also strengthened by Karume, (2003) when he studied the functions of
political coalitions in the South African context. According to Karume, (2003)
there are three notable functions of coalitions firstly coalitions are viewed to be
power alliances wherein two or more parties join together to be able to form a
majority in the government. Secondly, coalitions are structured for strengthening
opposition; in the case of South Africa there is a need for an opposition coalition
to consolidate democracy. Through this opposition there will always be system of
checks and balances which would target the ruling majority. Lastly, coalitions are
considered to act as mediators in times of political or civil conflicts (p.7).
The author cites the following examples regarding party coalitions during
the 1999 elections, three parties namely the NNP, DP and Federal Alliance
formed the Democratic Coalition in order to prevent the dominance of then
majority party ANC. Such is needed given that the formation of an opposition
coalition will serve as a gateway for an even distribution of resources in terms of
financial and media support. Another reason for the establishment of such
coalition is to establish a strong legislative alliance in order for these opposition
parties to acquire seats in the Kwazutu Natal legislature (pp. 7-8).
Though most literature on coalition formation centers on parliamentary
regimes and political parties, there are some studies which also tested coalition
formation theories on multi party presidential democracies, such is seen in the
case of Uruguay.
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Altman, (2000) highlights the role of coalitions in presidential democratic
systems because these coalitions increases the ability of the executive to get its
program through the legislature and at the same time coalitions may it be in the
form of political parties, committees or majority blocs has a better chance of
forming policy proposals or providing solutions to pressing national problems
(pp. 259-260). However an interesting part of this study is the incentive
mechanisms highlighted in forming coalitions under a presidential system.
The author posits the case of Uruguay as an interesting case to study given
that there are pre-electoral and post electoral coalitions and there is the emergence
of increase in committees in Congress through time (Altman, 2000 pp. 262).
“Uruguay is a country with a highly fractionalized party system, which was very
evident after the re-democratization in 1985 which paved way for the emergence
of different types of coalitions in the government” (p.263). However the author
before testing his theory on Uruguay already clarified that though there are a lot
of existing theories and literature on coalition formation, there are not enough
studies focusing on presidential democracies which also serve as a significance of
his research.
The reason for such is due to the established notions under presidential
democracies and party coalitions. First is that the president is most likely to be the
one who has more influence in the citizens in terms of evaluating government
performance, may it be positive or negative. Thus under a presidential system
there are less incentives to join or form a coalition given that the credit on good
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governance is not usually attributed to the party coalition of the president
(Altman, 2000 p. 268)
Another is the assumption that these party coalitions attempts to maximize
votes in the next elections and the vote outcomes are determined by the voter’s
evaluation of government performance. Consequently the president’s approval
rating has a powerful effect on parties’ decisions to associate themselves or to
distance themselves in the government. Thus this affects the incentive
mechanisms available to these coalitions given that in order to ensure re-election,
these coalitions or the members of these coalitions should ensure that they align
themselves with the president (Altman, 2000 p.269).
In the findings of his study, the author was able to conclude that though
there are established notions that the president most often than not has a greater
influence in how coalitions will be sustained and formed, Altman, (2000) was
able to test that in the case of Uruguay this is not the case. Also in terms of
ideological affinity which is viewed to be crucial in party coalitions, in the case of
Uruguay, this has no significant relationship into how parties will more likely to
be influential. Rather the incentives which are the distribution of payoffs to these
coalitions are seen to be the important and crucial factor for coalitions to be
influential to their constituents (p. 275-276). With this the author recommends
that further studies on coalitions on multi party presidential democracies should
be done in cross country basis. Also Altman, (2000) mentioned that coalition
studies should not only focus on party system coalitions but on other types of
political coalitions (p.276). We then identify this as a gap of the studies on
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coalitions which previous authors mentioned also identifies and seek to further
explore.
Likewise, a study done by Sened, (1996) on the influence of coalitions in
the legislature looked into the committees in the legislature. The author posits that
it is more likely that legislators will acquire the policy and office pursuits which
they seek due to the establishment of these committees. Also, ideological beliefs
and affinities to the majority speaker or president may not be the most reliable
measure of the extent of influence of these coalitions because the financial
incentives which are labeled as pork barrel funds is more significant due to the
fact that distributions and use of these funds require a solid and feasible projects
which the constituencies would likely benefit from (p 351). Therefore this could
translate for a better image in the part of the legislators leading to re-election or a
better performance in the government.
The author used regression analysis to measure the degree of influence of
these committees and the results showed that there exists a significant relationship
on how these committees are able to lobby their interest and pursue their policies
in order to achieve a greater distribution of pork barrel funds (Sened, 1996 p.368).
The findings relate to Caplow (1959) study on further development of political
coalitions, in which he identified that legislators can form coalitions and distribute
funds to their constituents via two ways. First is by a proportional tax on labor
income and the other is through borrowing in capital markets. These public
revenues are used to finance provision of public goods in which all citizens
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benefit from and to provide for targeted district specific transfers which is
interpreted as pork barrel spending.
Theories on Coalition and Distributive Policies
In order to understand the link between coalitions and distributive policies
it is important to understand the literature examining and linking these two
concepts.
The studies on coalitions have been seen to be everywhere but most often
than not it is associated to a political nature. According to Kelley, (1968) there are
four subjects that most theories revolve in studying coalitions; one is the study of
coalition formation, bargaining in coalitions, the payoffs receive in coalitions and
the last one is the maintenance of these coalitions (p.62). The author further
defined coalitions as a group of individuals who are most likely than not in the
pursuit of the same goal, is able to pool their resources to the attainment of such
goal, is likely to communicate often in order to achieve that goal and has an
agreement on the distribution of payoffs and benefits received when achieving the
goal (p.62-63).
Browne & Rice (1979) cited Kelley, (1968) and explained that in the
process of forming coalitions there is the notion of the law of situation under
which these coalitions will operate. The authors mentioned three; the first is the
continuous situations wherein these coalitions attempt to secure control over
rewards which are always present and associated to them. Examples of such are
power and prestige which coalitions pursue in order to acquire to gain more
influence. Power in this sense is not just measured in terms of position but also in
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the acquisition and distribution of resources. Second is the episodic situations in
which parties or coalitions try to win over rewards in competition, example of
such is in the case of control in policy outputs in a multi party setup. Lastly
terminal situations in which only one coalition is formed or moves given that
there is only one reward available (p.67-68).
Crucial to both works of these authors mentioned above is Riker (1962),
work on the Theory of Political Coalitions. According to this theory, there are
three crucial elements in understanding coalitions. First is the n-person games
model that is the “size principle” that is the tendency of winning coalitions toward
the minimal winning size. Second important feature is the strategic principle
wherein participants move into the minimal winning coalition and lastly the
disequilibrium principle which is the selective elimination of participants in the
coalition.
In discussing his theory, Riker mentioned that given the rationality of
man, forming coalitions is just enough to ensure winning and not to make it
larger, given that payoffs are limited and it should be maximized by the right size
of coalition. However, Riker admits that the limitation of the first principle in
reality is that not everyone has full information on who belongs to the coalition or
worst that who remains loyal to their coalitions. Therefore he explains his strategy
principle wherein coalitions engage in different strategies by using policy
proposals, bargaining, tactics and resources to have leverage in pursuing their
electoral objectives and for greater benefits to be spread out in all members of the
coalition (pp. 32-33).
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Hence, Budge and Laver, (1986) in their study on Office Seeking and
Coalition Theory further explained this strategy principle wherein parties may not
share a common perception of a policy space, however given that there are
incentives available once they are able to acquire position, bargaining can be one
of the strategies these parties would engage into when they enter coalitions. The
authors posited that being rational actors, though having different policy
preferences, entering into coalitions would enable them to resolve conflicts
because bargaining strategies can be employed and in the long run they may be
able to forward their own preferences (pp.500-501).
In addition, Hird, (1991) cited Budge and Laver’s work in their study of
the political economy of pork and explained that though it is important to
highlight the role of bargaining strategies for coalitions to advance their
objectives and have a greater distribution of incentives such as pork barrel funds,
the empirical researches on such subject matter varies across time periods and
countries, therefore there is a need to further explore and research on the said
matter.
To further understand the development of such theories on coalition we
now look into the distributive policies which is mentioned as the pay offs that
these coalitions seek to pursue. According to Lancaster, (1986) legislators and
constituents will always have that “electoral connection.” This connection is
established by looking into these legislators as rational actors and in the other side
the constituents demand constituency services. This constituency service is also
known as a distributive policy and an example of such is pork barrel funds. The
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rationale according to Lowi, (1964) as cited by Lancaster, (1986) a distributive
policy stems from a political decision that concentrates benefits to constituencies.
The author further discussed this by explaining that characteristics of pork barrel
funded projects is that benefits are geographically targeted whereas the costs are
dispersed through general taxation.
Furthermore, Weingast, (1994) developed a criteria which gives thorough
and clear understanding on these distributive policies. These policies contain the
following, divisibility, whereas projects are local and can vary in size and scope.
Second is expenditure, main task of these policies is the allocation of a given
amount of fund and lastly scope in which funds are generally distributed and
targeted to certain legislative constituencies or areas defined as districts.
In recent studies done by Evans, (2004) she discusses that though pork
barrel and distributive policies are mentioned in previous studies in different
aspects, some sees it as synonymous others see it as pork barrel being a subset of
distributive policies there has to be a clear distinction that both is proper to say.
Pork barrel may be a subset of distributive policies if its economic implications
would be considered, such as the efficiency or inefficiency of the outputs or
projects wherein these funds where put into use. On the other hand, if political
uses will be highlighted rather than the economic benefits, then it can be seen that
distributive policies is interchangeable with pork barrel given that the discussion
centers on the incentive mechanisms in understanding the relationship of the
legislators and its constituencies.
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In addition, Cox and Mccubbins, (1986) put forward a model on why
coalitions pay importance to these distribution policies. Given that legislators are
rational actors, the formation of alliances may serve three types of groups which
should help them ensure re-election. First are their supporters, next is the
opposition or the groups that have constantly opposed them and lastly the swing
groups or those who have not expressed support or has been hostile to them.
However most studies agree on the notion that these legislature coalitions would
distribute pork barrel to those who have supported them and remained loyal to
them, on the other hand Portillo, (2011) cited Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) in his
study on the case of pork barrel politics in the case of Honduras that legislature
coalitions still value the importance of these swing voters because the rational
way to do is to acquire as much votes needed to acquire seat and that would
happen if they don’t just serve their electoral constituencies, therefore greater
distribution of pork barrel funds is needed for them to be able to create projects
valuable to these swing voters as well.
This then leads us to see how coalitions value these distributive policies
and this can be seen in institutions such as the Congress. Stein and Bickers,
(1994) pointed out that electoral structures can therefore be seen as necessary but
not entirely sufficient for the existence of pork barrel activity. Other structures
may be seen to affect or alter the relationship between electoral systems and pork
barrel distribution. An example provided is the legislative committees present in
Congress.
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Bickers and Stein, (1994) cited the United States as a country with an
institutional facilitator of distributive allocations and that is through the
committees and sub committees in the legislative body. The reason for such is that
committees being considered as coalitions may act and specialize in certain policy
areas which could provide specialization to these legislators to craft policy
proposals where there is a higher chance of funds distribution. As a result there is
also an increase in the chance of opportunity for re-election (p.74).
In line with this, Collie, (1988) mentioned that legislators who enter into
committees may reflect a preference political and public in nature. These
legislators can be still occupied with re election goals however given that they are
able to satisfy their constituencies they may opt to pursue national programs
which guarantee efficiency and equity as well and not just dwell on individual
policy or office pursuits (p. 450).
Another study done by Evans, (1994) investigated the role of committees
in getting a hold on distributive benefits. The study showed that the strength of
how committees are able to acquire greater benefits lie on the leadership of the
committee leader. The leader is able to use certain strategies such as bargaining,
enforcement mechanism and for some cases these committees may be able to
accept side payments especially from those groups who would want the bill or
law be passed immediately (p. 899).
In line with this Peabody, (1974) already highlighted the role of the
committee leader in a previous study and identified the connection between the
committee leaders and the party leaders in Congress. The author’s findings stated
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that the advantage of the committee is that it can be a combination of different
actors coming from different parties united to attain a certain goal and whoever
becomes the committee leader has the greater advantage given that he has the
control over the power and the party leader from where he originally belong can
still lobby for their own interest (pp.145-146).
A study by Oppenheimer, (1983) supported the role of committees and
mentioned that most studies on committees were developed during the 1960’s and
there was recognition that these committees are essential given that they can
shape policies and budgets. But on the other side, there was a lack of evidence
and pursuance of this study in the years after that which led to major gaps on the
literature.
Although that was the case Battaglini and Coate, (2008) cited works of
several authors such as Ferno, (1973), Westefield, (1978) and Manley, (1979)
which all focused on studying the committee on appropriations which is
considered to be important in the distribution of funds amongst the various
committees and legislators in Congress. However, the studies centered on the
norms, behavior and policy of this committee alone which can be seen as limited
given that it may be the case that the influence does not come to such committee
alone but also from the other committees as well.
Another significant contribution made was done by Eulau, (1984) wherein
the study he made center on the strategies employed by these committees in order
to achieve greater payoffs or benefits and at the same time allowing for the
passage of their said policy proposals. The strategies are as follows the committee
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size, the rules and norms observed in their committees, the policy beliefs and their
motivational resources such as ideological commitment which gives them greater
influence in the environment they are in.
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Chapter 3
Framework
Theoretical Framework
To explain how the coalitions through the form of rural committees
influence the distribution of pork barrel funds this study will use the positive
choice theory on legislative coalitions by Shepsle & Weingast, (1994).
According to the authors, the theory highlights the strategies employed by
coalitions to advance their interests in order to acquire their goals. The theory
targets the coalitions formed in the legislative arena. Shepsle & Weingast, (1994)
mentioned three strategies done by coalitions to influence decision making or
policy outcomes. These strategies are done in a collective manner and are labeled
as collective strategies. These three strategies are agenda setting, bargaining and
the size of the coalitions (p. 157).
The agenda setting strategy is measured in different degrees and levels.
Depending on the type of coalitions, this can be seen in how coalitions propose
certain policies and proposals in favor of a bigger payoff or return for them. By
aligning their proposals to a specific project or target these coalitions are able to
influence the passage of their proposals easily and are able to get a greater
distribution of incentives may it be in the form of financial assistance or other
means (pp. 158-159).
In analyzing the bargaining strategy, this can be further studied by looking
into the negotiations done especially during committee meeting reports and
documents which pertains to how these coalitions will be able to come up with
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more support. Basically this can be seen in campaigns, advocacies and the outside
source in which these coalitions engaged with so as to further advance their
influence especially during the open interrogation of their proposed bills and
policies wherein technical experts, civil society groups will be invited to engaged
in.
Lastly the size of coalitions can be seen as a strategy to gain greater
influence especially if through time these coalitions had been growing or have
been increasing.
Thesis
The ability of coalitions to influence decisions or control policy outcomes
depends on the strategies it uses during the policy making process i.e. if these
coalitions are able to exercise control through bargaining, agenda setting and
committee size.
Definition of Terms
Terms Conceptual Definition
Coalitions An alliance of groups or a set of individuals with the same goal or objective and holds on a common pool of resources in order to gain leverage to pursue these goals (Shepsle & Weingast, 1994)
Influence The ability to alter decisions or control outcomes (Shepsle & Weingast, 1994 p. 156)
Pork Barrel
Considered as a distributive policy which is targeted to a specific district or constituencies of legislators and is essential to create projects which may help in the pursuit of reelection (Shepsle & Weingast, 1994)
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Diagram
Operational Framework
In this study the coalitions is indicated by the rural committees in
Congress and by using the different indicators of the collective strategies, the
researcher will be able to examine if indeed these coalitions have a greater
influence in how pork barrel is distributed to them. By examining the documents
regarding the proposed projects and implemented programs or projects by these
rural committees one can see how they are able to set the agenda and by looking
into the reports the researcher will be able to find out the bargaining strategies
adopted by these committees. Lastly the increase in the size of committees and the
number of committees in Congress will also further give us a better understanding
if there is indeed a significant relationship between the rural committees and how
pork barrel funds are distributed given that they use this strategies. Also it should
be clear that the researcher only focuses on the distributive policies in the theory
given that it is the one that can easily be measured through the use of pork barrel
fund distribution and spending. Also it is more applicable in the Philippines given
those coalitions formed in the country are for temporary purposes or is for the
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Coalitions Collective Strategies
Electoral Objectives
Economies of scale
Reduce uncertainty outcomes
Distributive Policies
advancement of certain interests and also a leverage to acquire pork barrel funds
based from several studies done regarding the pork barrel politics in the country.
Thesis
Rural Committees in Congress employ certain collective strategies such as
agenda setting which can be seen in the policies they propose, bargaining that is
their mobilization on how they are able to push forth their interest and the size of
committee which can influence the votes on how policies such as pork barrel
funds should be distributed to them.
Definition of Terms
Terms Operational Definition
Coalitions In this study the coalitions would be the rural committees in Congress such as the Committees on Agriculture and Food, Fisheries, Public Works and Highways, Technical and Higher Education and Rural Development.
Influence In this study influence refers to the ability to control or distribute electoral objectives such that of the distribution of pork barrel funds.
Pork Barrel
In this study pork barrel is the funds used for country development and is measured through the Philippine Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
Diagram
26
Rural Committees
Policy proposals, mobilizing
resources, size of the
committee
Electoral objective
Acquiring a greater Distribution of pork barrel funds
Chapter IV
Design and Methods
Conceptualization and Measurement
As explained earlier, the purpose of the study is to shed light on how
coalitions through the form of rural committees influence the distribution of pork
barrel funds. In particular, the study focuses on examining the Committees on
Agriculture and Food, Fisheries, Public Works and Highways, Technical and
Higher Education and Rural Development because these committees targets local
development which pork barrel funded programs focused on.
By using the theory of legislative coalitions by Shepsle & Weingast,
(1994) the researcher is able to explain how coalitions through the form of rural
committees in Congress, influence the distribution of the pork barrel funds. The
theory posits that legislators are rational actors who have individual electoral
objectives and moves in a competitive environment; therefore in order to achieve
these objectives and lessen their environmental constraints, there is a need for
cooperation amongst these legislators which is done through the formation of
coalitions. By forming such coalitions these legislators may gain leverage in
acquiring more pork barrel funds which is said to be one of the electoral
objectives which they seek to achieve once they are in position.
It is important to note that coalitions in Congress can be measured
through studying Congress committees (Shepsle & Weingast, 1994). The
27
researcher will be looking into the projects proposed and implemented by the
Committees on Agriculture and Food, Fisheries, Public Works and Highways,
Technical and Higher Education and Rural Development which are all classified
to be rural committees; these committees centers on local development through
the creation of soft and hard infrastructures in which pork barrel funds are mostly
distributed.
The researcher will use the mixed method which is a combination of
qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. The reason for such is because a
study by Kawanaka, (2007) already used the quantitative analysis of pork barrel
distribution in the Philippines and one of the hypothesis tested was that those who
are members of rural committees receives larger amounts of pork barrel funds
than those who are non-members. The result showed a significant relationship
which means that those who are members of such committees receive greater
distributions of pork barrel funds however the author recommended that more
rural committees should be tested to justify that committees really play an
influential role in the distribution of pork barrel funds in the country because he
only compared two committees which are the Agriculture and Food and Fisheries.
By using the same formula and regression analysis used by the Kawanaka,
(2007) the researcher will be able to test and strengthen the case. Also by using
qualitative analysis, the researcher will be able to justify if these rural committees
are said to be influential through examining the documents pertaining to the
projects proposed and implemented by these committees and looking into how
many were passed and the amount of funds allocated in the creation of these
28
projects may it be soft or hard infrastructures. Also by conducting an interview
among members of these rural committees, the researcher will be able to solidify
the hypothesis of the study.
Table
Term Conceptual Operational Indicator
Coalitions An alliance of groups
or a set of individuals
with the same goal or
objective and holds
on a common pool of
resources in order to
gain leverage to
pursue these goals
(Shepsle & Weingast,
1994)
In this study the
coalitions would
be the rural
committees in
Congress such as
the Committees
on Agriculture
and Food,
Fisheries, Public
Works and
Highways,
Technical and
Higher Education
and Rural
Development.
Influence The ability to alter
decisions or control
outcomes (Shepsle &
In this study
influence refers to
the ability to
-programs
proposed by
these
29
Weingast, 1994 p.
156)
control or
distribute
electoral
objectives such
that of the
distribution of
pork barrel funds.
committees; i.e.
the proposals
passed and
implemented,
funds allocated
to such projects;
the size of the
committees
through time; if
it increases or
decreases, the
bargaining
strategies which
can be seen in
the committee
meetings
documents
Pork Barrel Funds Considered as a
distributive policy
which is targeted to a
specific district or
constituencies of
legislators and is
In this study pork
barrel is the funds
used for country
development and
is measured
through the
30
essential to create
projects which may
help in the pursuit of
reelection (Shepsle &
Weingast, 1994)
Philippine
Development
Assistance Fund
(PDAF).
Case Study Design
The study on the coalitions through the form of rural committees in
Congress and how it influences the distribution of pork barrel funds is a typical
case. This is because it only confirms the existing literature that these coalitions in
the form of committees influence the distribution of pork barrel funds.
Data Requirements and Method of Data Collection
For this study, two methods will be used in gathering which are
documentary analysis and interview.
The interviews to be conducted will include those persons who were
directly involved in the case and have sufficient knowledge on the programs or
projects constructed by these committees. Therefore it is just necessary to focus
on the chairpersons of the committees, however the researcher will still interview
other members of the committees especially those who have proposed the most
number of bills per committee which were passed and implemented.
Public Officials
1. Rep. Wilfredo Mark M. Enverga (Chaiperson, Committee on Rural
Development)
31
2. Rep. Benhur L. Salimbangon (Chairperson, Committee on Aquaculture
and Fisheries Resources)
3. Rep. Mark Llandro L. Mendoza (Chairperson, Committee on Agriculture
and Food
4. Rep. Juan Edgardo M. Angara (Chairperson, Committee on Higher and
Technical Education)
5. Rep. Ronald M. Casalan (Chaiperson, Committee on Public Works and
Highways)
Also official documents on the distribution of PDAF, its allocation on the
projects of the committees as well as the evaluation reports of DBM is
necessary in order to see the influence of these rural committees in the
distribution of pork barrel funds.
32
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