Recovery from Disaster The L'Aquila, Padang and Christchurch earthquakes

...and recent

events in Emilia

David Alexander University College London

Causes of disaster natural geophysical, technological, social

History single and cumulative impact of past disasters

Human cultures

constraints and

opportunities IMPACTS

RESILIENCE Adaptation

to risk

Resilience Resistance

Risk Susceptibility

VULNERABILITY

Physical (including natural, built, technological)

Social (including cultural, political, economic

Environment Att

ribut

es

Source: McEntire 2001

Liabilities

Capa

bilities

Analysis

• registered • archived • forgotten • ignored

Vulnerability maintained -

• utilised • adopted • learned

Disaster risk reduced

+

Lessons Past

events

The process of disaster risk reduction (DRR)

• the performance of structures in earthquakes status of knowledge: systematic

• the behaviour of people in earthquakes status of knowledge: unorganised

• the epidemiology of injuries in earthquakes status of knowledge: haphazard

• the nature and remediation of multi- faceted vulnerability to earthquakes status of knowledge: unsystematic .

We need an evidence-based approach to:-

• the economics of seismic risk and impact status of knowledge: patchy

What was this absurd structure doing in a seismic zone?

Sant'Agostino di Ferrara (FE), 20-5-2012

...and this?

Dosso (FE), 20-5-2012

L'Aquila central Italy 6 April 2009 magnitude 6.3 308 dead

Padang Sumatra, Indonesia 30 September 2009 magnitude 7.6 1,115 dead

Christchurch New Zealand

22 February 2011 magnitude 6.3

185 dead

• magnitude 6.3, duration 25 seconds

• acceleration on hard rock 0.3g, on soft sediments 0.7-1.0g

• part of an earthquake swarm that has lasted many months

• the first earthquake with epicentre very near a major urban centre in Italy since 1915.

The L'Aquila earthquake of 6 April 2009

• 308 deaths

• 1,500 injuries: 202 serious, 550 moderate, 750 light

• 67,000 homeless survivors

• 100,000 buildings seriously damaged

• 16 towns devastated, 33 damaged.

Impact of the L'Aquila earthquake

• 22,000 people in hotels: common solution - unsuccessful in Irpinia, 1980

• 21,000 people in tents for 6-8 months: radical departure

• transitional accommodation ready for 65% of survivors in 8 months: major achievement, but controversial.

Government policy on shelter

Goodbye to the container home...

• 4,600 apartments in 184 buildings on 19 sites - for 15,500 residents

• €280,607 per apartment (€3,875 per square meter of living space).

C.A.S.E. - Complessi Antisismici Sostenibili ed Ecocompatibili

€1,427 per base isolator, €55,000 per building

• standard prefabs without base isolation

• 54 sites, half of them in L'Aquila city

• 8,500 people accommodated.

M.A.P. - Moduli abitativi provvisori

• social fragmentation leads to depression, isolation and marginalisation

• total lack of services and transportation

• induced dependence on private transport without infrastructure improvement

• exclusion of single person 'families'.

Problems with CASE and MAP sites

• stagnation of reconstruction through lack of funds and planning

• political paralysis and intimidation by central government

• massive rise in unemployment plus severe economic deflation

• local inflation, especially of house rents

• loss of basic services.

Problems with L'Aquila recovery policy

Organised

Spontaneous

Established

Kinship groups

Individual citizens

Disaster subcultures

Emergent groups

Citizens' organisations Charitable

NGOs

Some public stakeholders in disaster response

Schools

Workplace groups

• magnitude 7.6

• 1,115 dead, 1,250,000 affected

• 2,902 injured: 1,214 grave, 1,688 slight

• 75 public buildings destroyed

• 279,000 houses damaged: 135,000 severe, 65,000 moderate, 79,000 light.

Western Sumatra earthquake

• heavy structure but weak frame

• poor column-beam joints, soft ground floor

• high vulnerability to total collapse

• possible high death toll

• certain loss of critical functions.

Prevailing style of public buildings

...giving rise to characteristic patterns of collapse.

Serious damage put Pariaman town hall out of action.

10 hospitals and 205 clinics damaged.

• rapid deployment of transitional shelter

• robust plans to progress to permanent housing

• clear objectives for reconstruction generally followed.

New rural clinic and donated ambulance.

Visible evidence of tsunami preparedness.

Schools, hospitals and administrative bldgs must be reconstructed quickly but well.

Build Back Better

Central Business District (part demolished)

Liquefaction and lateral spreading zone Rockfall hazard area

Christchurch, Canterbury, New Zealand

Heavy emphasis on demolition rather than recovery of buildings is being driven by

insurance constraints - there is no inherent reason why this has to be so.

This building cost US$800,000 to demolish and it was not

beyond recovery.

Demolition of major buildings is costly, technically demanding and poses the question of what to put in their place: we trust that planning will be sufficiently well co-ordinated.

Even rubble management is expensive and challenging.

'Tabula rasa' - the "clean slate" approach poses the planning challenge of how to recreate a city with a good level of services and a strong sense of place.

80 historic buildings were demolished in Christchurch centre within one year: many others are at severe risk.

Although some heritage buildings will be saved, the building protection legislation has been made subordinate to planning

decisions based on short-term economics.

Christchurch Cathedral is scheduled for demolition: it is a major world heritage

building designed by George Gilbert Scott.

Some damage could have been avoided by internal buttressing after the September 2010 earthquake. There is no technical

reason why this building need be demolished.

The Catholic Cathedral lost its towers and dome: it is a unique building

in the southern hemisphere.

Use of redundant shipping containers, each filled with 20 tonnes of ballast, to buttress the building: ugly but cheap and expedient.

Use of redundant shipping containers for temporary urban regeneration in the retail sector: successful.

Conclusions

Public participation in decision making

Government paternalism

Inclusive outcomes

Social exclusion

Discontent

Satisfaction

Discontent

...or...

(must be informed)

What is welfare?

The provision of care to a minimum acceptable standard to people who are unable adequately to look after themselves.

But we also need to focus on what welfare is NOT...

Governance: democratic participation in decision

making

Livelihoods: diversity

and security

Hazards and risks: disaster

preparedness

RESILIENCE: managing risks

adapting to change securing resources

Uncertain future:

long-term trends climate change capacity to adapt

Earth- quake

Political response

National

Regional

Local

Permanent reconstruction

Bad (functional problems)

Good (functionality maintained)

Elections

Amelioration

Political impact on reconstruction

Suff- ering

Reco- very Transitional

housing and settlement

Public image of politicians

A reconstruction model

Provision of welfare should not inhibit processes of recovery and growth.

Resilience is multi-faceted: are inter- connections more important than facets?

Sustainability applies to disaster risk reduction as well as daily life.

Governance and protection of livelihoods are the root of DRR.

Common sense logic doesn't necessarily drive the politics of disaster recovery.

Five key messages

INSTRUMENTS OF DISSEMINATION

• mass media • targeted campaign • social networks

• internet

Augmentation

MASS EDUCATION PROGRAMME

SOCIAL CAPITAL

HABIT

CULTURE

The creation of a culture of civil protection

Sustainable development

and livelihoods

Sustainable civil protection programmes

Sustainable funding

Public and political support

Grazie per la vostra attenzione!

david.alexander@grforum.org emergency-planning.blogspot.com www.slideshare.net/dealexander