Recovery from Disaster
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Transcript of Recovery from Disaster
Recovery from Disaster The L'Aquila, Padang and Christchurch earthquakes
...and recent
events in Emilia
David Alexander University College London
Causes of disaster natural geophysical, technological, social
History single and cumulative impact of past disasters
Human cultures
constraints and
opportunities IMPACTS
RESILIENCE Adaptation
to risk
Resilience Resistance
Risk Susceptibility
VULNERABILITY
Physical (including natural, built, technological)
Social (including cultural, political, economic
Environment Att
ribut
es
Source: McEntire 2001
Liabilities
Capa
bilities
Analysis
• registered • archived • forgotten • ignored
Vulnerability maintained -
• utilised • adopted • learned
Disaster risk reduced
+
Lessons Past
events
The process of disaster risk reduction (DRR)
• the performance of structures in earthquakes status of knowledge: systematic
• the behaviour of people in earthquakes status of knowledge: unorganised
• the epidemiology of injuries in earthquakes status of knowledge: haphazard
• the nature and remediation of multi- faceted vulnerability to earthquakes status of knowledge: unsystematic .
We need an evidence-based approach to:-
• the economics of seismic risk and impact status of knowledge: patchy
What was this absurd structure doing in a seismic zone?
Sant'Agostino di Ferrara (FE), 20-5-2012
...and this?
Dosso (FE), 20-5-2012
L'Aquila central Italy 6 April 2009 magnitude 6.3 308 dead
Padang Sumatra, Indonesia 30 September 2009 magnitude 7.6 1,115 dead
Christchurch New Zealand
22 February 2011 magnitude 6.3
185 dead
• magnitude 6.3, duration 25 seconds
• acceleration on hard rock 0.3g, on soft sediments 0.7-1.0g
• part of an earthquake swarm that has lasted many months
• the first earthquake with epicentre very near a major urban centre in Italy since 1915.
The L'Aquila earthquake of 6 April 2009
• 308 deaths
• 1,500 injuries: 202 serious, 550 moderate, 750 light
• 67,000 homeless survivors
• 100,000 buildings seriously damaged
• 16 towns devastated, 33 damaged.
Impact of the L'Aquila earthquake
• 22,000 people in hotels: common solution - unsuccessful in Irpinia, 1980
• 21,000 people in tents for 6-8 months: radical departure
• transitional accommodation ready for 65% of survivors in 8 months: major achievement, but controversial.
Government policy on shelter
Goodbye to the container home...
• 4,600 apartments in 184 buildings on 19 sites - for 15,500 residents
• €280,607 per apartment (€3,875 per square meter of living space).
C.A.S.E. - Complessi Antisismici Sostenibili ed Ecocompatibili
€1,427 per base isolator, €55,000 per building
• standard prefabs without base isolation
• 54 sites, half of them in L'Aquila city
• 8,500 people accommodated.
M.A.P. - Moduli abitativi provvisori
• social fragmentation leads to depression, isolation and marginalisation
• total lack of services and transportation
• induced dependence on private transport without infrastructure improvement
• exclusion of single person 'families'.
Problems with CASE and MAP sites
• stagnation of reconstruction through lack of funds and planning
• political paralysis and intimidation by central government
• massive rise in unemployment plus severe economic deflation
• local inflation, especially of house rents
• loss of basic services.
Problems with L'Aquila recovery policy
Organised
Spontaneous
Established
Kinship groups
Individual citizens
Disaster subcultures
Emergent groups
Citizens' organisations Charitable
NGOs
Some public stakeholders in disaster response
Schools
Workplace groups
• magnitude 7.6
• 1,115 dead, 1,250,000 affected
• 2,902 injured: 1,214 grave, 1,688 slight
• 75 public buildings destroyed
• 279,000 houses damaged: 135,000 severe, 65,000 moderate, 79,000 light.
Western Sumatra earthquake
• heavy structure but weak frame
• poor column-beam joints, soft ground floor
• high vulnerability to total collapse
• possible high death toll
• certain loss of critical functions.
Prevailing style of public buildings
...giving rise to characteristic patterns of collapse.
Serious damage put Pariaman town hall out of action.
10 hospitals and 205 clinics damaged.
• rapid deployment of transitional shelter
• robust plans to progress to permanent housing
• clear objectives for reconstruction generally followed.
New rural clinic and donated ambulance.
Visible evidence of tsunami preparedness.
Schools, hospitals and administrative bldgs must be reconstructed quickly but well.
Build Back Better
Central Business District (part demolished)
Liquefaction and lateral spreading zone Rockfall hazard area
Christchurch, Canterbury, New Zealand
Heavy emphasis on demolition rather than recovery of buildings is being driven by
insurance constraints - there is no inherent reason why this has to be so.
This building cost US$800,000 to demolish and it was not
beyond recovery.
Demolition of major buildings is costly, technically demanding and poses the question of what to put in their place: we trust that planning will be sufficiently well co-ordinated.
Even rubble management is expensive and challenging.
'Tabula rasa' - the "clean slate" approach poses the planning challenge of how to recreate a city with a good level of services and a strong sense of place.
80 historic buildings were demolished in Christchurch centre within one year: many others are at severe risk.
Although some heritage buildings will be saved, the building protection legislation has been made subordinate to planning
decisions based on short-term economics.
Christchurch Cathedral is scheduled for demolition: it is a major world heritage
building designed by George Gilbert Scott.
Some damage could have been avoided by internal buttressing after the September 2010 earthquake. There is no technical
reason why this building need be demolished.
The Catholic Cathedral lost its towers and dome: it is a unique building
in the southern hemisphere.
Use of redundant shipping containers, each filled with 20 tonnes of ballast, to buttress the building: ugly but cheap and expedient.
Use of redundant shipping containers for temporary urban regeneration in the retail sector: successful.
Conclusions
Public participation in decision making
Government paternalism
Inclusive outcomes
Social exclusion
Discontent
Satisfaction
Discontent
...or...
(must be informed)
What is welfare?
The provision of care to a minimum acceptable standard to people who are unable adequately to look after themselves.
But we also need to focus on what welfare is NOT...
Governance: democratic participation in decision
making
Livelihoods: diversity
and security
Hazards and risks: disaster
preparedness
RESILIENCE: managing risks
adapting to change securing resources
Uncertain future:
long-term trends climate change capacity to adapt
Earth- quake
Political response
National
Regional
Local
Permanent reconstruction
Bad (functional problems)
Good (functionality maintained)
Elections
Amelioration
Political impact on reconstruction
Suff- ering
Reco- very Transitional
housing and settlement
Public image of politicians
A reconstruction model
Provision of welfare should not inhibit processes of recovery and growth.
Resilience is multi-faceted: are inter- connections more important than facets?
Sustainability applies to disaster risk reduction as well as daily life.
Governance and protection of livelihoods are the root of DRR.
Common sense logic doesn't necessarily drive the politics of disaster recovery.
Five key messages
INSTRUMENTS OF DISSEMINATION
• mass media • targeted campaign • social networks
• internet
Augmentation
MASS EDUCATION PROGRAMME
SOCIAL CAPITAL
HABIT
CULTURE
The creation of a culture of civil protection
Sustainable development
and livelihoods
Sustainable civil protection programmes
Sustainable funding
Public and political support
Grazie per la vostra attenzione!
[email protected] emergency-planning.blogspot.com www.slideshare.net/dealexander