Post on 13-Apr-2017
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
Democratic struggle is as old as the Nigerian State. The new democratic
experiment in Nigeria, after many years of military rule came into reality on the
29th May 1999, thus, setting the pace for the Fourth Republic. The term
democracy is capable of having many definitions and connotations to different
school of thoughts. However, the definition by Obasanjo and Mabogunje (1992)
which states that the concept of democracy should be examined from two points of
view, that is; as ideology and as politics captures it all. Democracy, as ideology is
the philosophy of governance which sets a high premium on the basic freedom or
fundamental human rights of the citizen, the rule of law, provision of basic
infrastructures, the flow of information and the right of choice between alternative
political positions democracy as politics is concerned with the institution and
processes of governance. These institutions and the procedures of governance that
they elicit tend to foster consensus whilst promoting and sustaining respect for the
ideology of democracy. When viewed as politics, various institutions tend to
collaborate to promote the act of governance, which is facilitated by the provisions
of the existing Constitution of a Country.
In an ideal democracy, there exist the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.
These various arms of government perform complimentary roles, all working
together to promote the rule of law and to ensure that the citizens of a nation enjoy
good governance. The constitution empowers the legislative arm of government to
make laws; it also gives it certain oversight functions over the activities of the
executive arm. Against this background, Godowoli (2001) classifies these
oversight functions as a model of intergovernmental relations, which can be
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described as a body of activities or interactions occurring between the executive
arm of government and the legislative arm. It is a form of systematic check and
balance on the activities of government, which is constitutionally backed up. The
complexity of the nature and patterns of oversight functions arises from the
number of programmes and activities which different levels of government are
engaged in within a specified period. These series of activities call for efficient and
orderly management. Accordingly, the efficient, orderly coordination and
management of activities and programmes brings to light the human dimension of
legislative oversight functions, which is very critical. (Janda et al 2002). The
dimension of legislative oversight function in the fourth Republic brings a lot of
question to mind especially with the amount of valuable resources, in terms of
human material and financial that was committed to this venture whose outcome
has never improved nor strengthened the country’s political process and service
rendered to the masses. This study shall examine the legislative institutions and
oversight functions in the National Assembly within the period of 2011 to 2015. It
evaluates the extent to which these oversight functions were performed and the
impact it has on the programmes of the executive arm of government as well as the
citizenry within the specified period.
1.2 Statement of Problem
The long reign of the military government in Nigeria and its subsequent
intervention in the political affairs of the nation has rubbed off on the political
class and the development of democratic institutions. The performance and
appropriate responsibility of the elected leaders as enshrined in the constitution has
always been hampered by lack of experience and greed on the part of the political
actors.
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The performance of oversight functions by the legislative arm of government in
Nigeria has over the years fallen below expectation. This is as a result of poor
commitment on the part of the leadership of this nation to the provisions of the
nation’s constitution. Corruption, greed and the deteriorating infrastructural
facilities have hampered the performance of government business.
Rather than provide qualitative service for the people, the elected representatives
had always contrived the democratic space, muzzled opposition, overturn electoral
choices and in the end engendered the rule of law and order within the democratic
space.
The executive on its part has always cash on the corruption tendencies on the part
of the legislative arm by attempting to bribe them anytime a crisis occurs or a
discovery is made in the execution of programmes that negates constitutional
provisions.
This study shall attempt to examine some of these problems with a view to
evaluating the performance of legislative oversight functions and how this has
affected the provision of social services to the citizenry during the said period.
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The broad aim of this study is to examine the performance of legislative oversight
functions during the period between 2011 and 2015, with reference to the Nigeria’s
National Assembly and with particular focus on the Appropriation and Health
Committees etc.
The study also has the following objectives:
i. To examine the meaning, model and objectives of legislative oversight
functions in the National Assembly,
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ii. To examine the factors that determine the nature of legislative oversight
functions,
iii. To highlight the goals of legislative oversight functions,
iv. To evaluate the achievements of the legislative arm of government during
the fourth republic in the performance of oversight functions, and
v. To examine the challenges confronting the legislative arm of government
in the performance of legislative oversight functions.
1.4 Research Questions
The following questions will be addressed in the course of this study.
i. What is the nature of the legislative institutions in the Nigeria?
ii. What is the meaning of legislative oversight function and how is it been
carried out?
iii. What are the goals of the legislative oversight functions?
iv. How far has the legislative arm of government gone in the attainment of
these goals?
v. What are the challenges confronting the performance of legislative
oversight function in the Assembly?
vi. How can these challenges be addressed?
1.5 Research Hypothesis
Two hypotheses have been formulated in the course of this study.
Ho: The performance of legislative oversight functions has very significant
impact on the activities of the National assembly during the period within
2011 to 2015.
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Hi: The performance of legislative oversight functions has no significant impact
on the activities of the National assembly during the period within 2011 to
2015.
1.6 Significance of the Study
The belief by the people in a democratic system of government gave rise to the
uproar that ensures the emergence of the forth republic after many years of military
rule. One of the institutions that guarantees adequate participation of the people in
a democratic government is the legislative arm, charged with the responsibility of
making appropriate legislation for the nation and also acting as a watchdog on the
executive. Hence the legislative arm plays a pivotal role in any democratic
dispensation.
This study is significant in the sense that the performance of legislative oversight
functions of the legislative institutions is paramount and cannot be over
emphasized. The strengthening of the laws and legislations are very significant part
of the administration of democratic government, which must not be neglected.
The study is also said to be significant in the sense that it will serve as a useful
avenue for evaluating the legislature during the said period; their impacts,
challenges and prospects. It will also be useful in promoting greater understanding
of the importance of intergovernmental relations and interactions in Nigeria.
The study is also important in the sense that it will serve as a contribution to
knowledge as well as a reference point for future research endeavor with similar
disposition.
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1.7 Scope of the Study
This study will focus extensively on the performance of legislative oversight
functions of the National assembly within the period 2011 to 2015.
1.8 Research Methodology
The research design is intended to specify the methods and procedure of the study
and also state the nature of the study. In the presentation of this research study both
the exploratory and descriptive research designs were used. The justification for
this is that both method deals with determination, evaluation and explanation of
past events essentially for the purpose of gaining a better and clearer understanding
of the present and making a more reliable prediction of the future especially as it
relates to the topic under consideration.
The data used in this research study were mainly from two sources: the primary
source which involves the carrying out of a survey study through the
administration of a questionnaire to a group of selected respondents and the
secondary source which entails extracts from textbooks, literatures, journals and
publications internet. This source constitutes a larger portion of the literature
review. All relevant extractions have been duly acknowledged.
The primary data required for this study was collected through the administration
of a structured questionnaire to a selected group of respondents within and outside
the National Assembly. Specific attention was given to respondents who were
selected from the legislative arm to drive home the issues involved.
Because the population is very large, the researcher decided to select samples from
the population upon which the study was based. Since a good sample must as
nearly as possible reflect representative of the entire population, care was taken to
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ensure that the sample size is large enough to convey a measure of credibility to
the outcome of the study. Care was also taken to ensure that the choice of the
sample is left to chance, so as to reduce the possibility of bias in sampling.
In order to facilitate easy administration and collection of questionnaires, a total
number of 200 questionnaires were administered to respondents, of these 197 were
returned. The sample size for this work is therefore 197. The use of bias sampling
technique was adopted, where respondents who have little or deep knowledge of
the area under study were selectively chosen from the populace.
The responses to the questions raised in the questionnaire were analyzed by using
the chi-square (X2). The objective of the analysis was to establish the extent of
variation between the observed frequency (actual perception of the people on the
legislative institutions and the performance of oversight functions during the said
period) and the expected frequency (statistical expectation regarding respondent’s
perception on the topic). It therefore aims at testing the independence of perception
held by the respondents.
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CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
2.0 Introduction
This chapter review relevant literature on the same thematic areas in order to
identify areas of convergence and divergence views of renowned authors,
researchers and writers. This chapter also covers conceptual review, empirical
studies and theoretical framework of the topic under study.
The organization of any polity is the task of the government who is the custodian
of the sovereignty of the entire citizenry which collectively and willingly they have
submitted to it in return for peaceful and meaningful co-existence propelled by law
and good government. It is therefore trite to say that the extent to which the
activities or efforts of the components of the state especially human beings are
effectively and efficiently galvanized towards productive activities and in the best
interest of the state and the citizens determines the extent of the “goodness” or
otherwise of its government. It is again not dubitable that a critical instrument for
the organization of the state is law which government relies on day in, day out to
ensure societal equilibrium. Legislation which is a product of institutionalized law-
making process is by far the most important arsenal from which government
derives its laws. The foregoing, therefore, lends credence to the avowed roles and
responsibilities of legislation as a source of law in any society and by implication,
on the Legislature which is wholly and constitutionally responsible for making
these laws. The task of this section therefore is to critical x-ray and review
literatures that have been written in the area of legislative oversight function in
developing and developed countries of the world.
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2.1 The Legislature
Most African countries that re-democratized in the 1980s (Boadi, 1998) and those
that democratized thereafter have had to tackle some evident rots and conflicts left
behind by the military administrations. However, the post-military era challenges
facing the states have been partially blamed on colonial legacies (Osaghae, 1998).
While some of the challenges indeed are both the direct and indirect consequences
of colonialism, the greatest social, political and economic troubles facing most of
the African states today are in most cases self-inflicted. Mismanagement of
national resources, high official corruption, absence of institutional accountability,
authoritarianism, political instability, violence, and inter-tribal strife and wars have
at varying degrees undermined the ability of most of the African states to develop
and progress on the continents. Among the states that have been in this ways
seriously affected is Nigeria. Although Nigeria became independent in 1960, it has
failed to meet the high expectations reposed in it at independence. Indeed, the
Nigerian state appeared to have fallen from the position it once occupied in its
early years of political independence in the 1960s. Some of the countries that
became independent at the same time with Nigeria have today left her far behind in
terms of political maturity and economic advancement, societal cohesion and
national development (Osaghae, 1998, Nnamani, 2003).
Osaghae (1998) identified three major challenges that have been confronting
Nigeria since independence, namely political instability evidenced by high regime
overthrow often prompted by constant military coups; low level of national
cohesion manifesting in the form of incessant inter-ethnic struggles, religious
violence and adversarial politics, which are induced by the polarization and
division among the various ethnic and religious groups; and economic crisis
evidenced by huge debt burden lasting up till 2005, poor living condition of
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majority of the citizenry and lopsided and skewed distribution of national wealth
resulting in inequality and wide gap between the rich few and the wretched
masses.
Most writers on Nigerian politics have attributed the regressive economic
condition, absence of national unity and the political volatility in the country to
the prolonged military rule (Ajayi, 2011). The democratic rule, no doubt, died at
infancy in 1965, 1983 and 1993. In the three republics of Nigeria, democracy did
not last for over six years. Consequently, the restoration of democracy in 1999
was seen as a welcome development, although there were skeptics who did not
believe that the new democracy could survive due to the predatory instinct of the
Nigerian military class. Nevertheless, the return of representative democracy was
expected to mark a departure from the authoritarian-styled policy-making process
that characterized the earlier, successive military regimes – regimes that did not
only undermine institutional accountability but also robbed the political system of
the checks and balance as well as participatory politics fundamental to system
efficiency and good governance.
With the restoration of democracy and the attendant adoption of a presidential
arrangement in 1999, the executive and legislative organs were made separate and
functionally distinct, unlike during the military administrations. While the
executive organ continued to exist under successive military regimes and law and
policy-making role and policy implementation were solely borne by the executive,
the creation of a presidential arrangement under the fourth republic meant that the
legislature would have to take up some of the responsibilities that the executive
organ had exclusively performed previously.
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Being the representatives of the various constituents, the members of the National
Assembly, comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives, have the
mandate to debate and reflect the concerns, opinions and interests of the
constituents in government policy decisions. The legislature was expected to
reverse the decline in the economy, stabilize the polity and integrate the society,
generally. It was expected to take actions and initiate necessary reforms with a
view to transforming the state, and changing its poor national picture, as Osaghae
(1998) painted. Nigerians under the new democratic dispensation should be proud
of their beloved country.
Structure and Function of Legislative Institution
The roles the legislature performs in a democracy and the extent to which the roles
are performed vary with the system of government in place, as well as they differ
from one country to another. Essentially, the legislative institution provides for the
citizenry the platform for participatory political process. However, the
participation afforded by the legislative institution is the indirect type, as it will be
practically impossible for the electorate to gather in one place for policy decisions,
implementation and governance. Fashagba (2011) noted:
The presence of legislative institution in any
modern polity suggests the indirect participation of
the electorates in the making of decisions on issues
that affect their daily lives. Not only is the
presence of a legislature salient to the
acceptability of democratic regime, but also the
extent to which the legislature demonstrates
capability to freely express itself and asserts its
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power determine how democratic the government
is.
Government in a democratic system implies the rule of the majority. Apparently,
the legislature is one democratic institution that allows the various constituencies
to which a state is delineated elect their representatives. When elected, the
representatives are expected to represent the views, concerns and interests of their
constituents in the legislature. In fact, central to representative democracy is the
notion that elected representatives of the people constitute the legislative arm of
government (Kousoulos, 1982). Indeed, representation of citizens in parliament is
at the core of liberal democracy.
The legislature, hence, is saddled with enormous roles in any democratic system.
This is even especially so where the institution enjoy a huge measure of autonomy
in determining their internal operations, where there is constitutional provisions
for operational and institutional independence. According to Fish and Kroenig
(2009), the study of modern government and politics involving contemporary
nation-states is impossible without an appreciation of the role of the legislature.
Fashagba (2009) also affirmed that in modern democracies the roles of
representation, law-making and oversight of administration are often ascribed to
the legislature. In his view, Alabi (2010) established the power to make laws as
distinctively resided with modern parliaments. It is however important to point out
that while legislatures are often vested with the law-making role, some legislatures
contribute effectively in initiating bills and raising policy issues for the House to
deliberate upon but others simply debate whatever proposals the executive present
to it. Of course, the former in addition to initiating bills deliberate on policy
proposals and bills emanating from the executive.
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Oversight function is also a very important role of the modern legislature.
Oversight function particularly appears to preoccupy modern legislatures.
According to Verney (1969), the watchdog function is perhaps more important for
a legislative assembly than that of law-making (p. 167). The legislature provides
the institutional mechanism for ensuring accountability and good governance.
Stapenhurst also noted that ‘In most countries, the legislature is constitutionally
mandated as the institution through which governments are held accountable to
the electorate’. The role of oversight of executive administration thus specifically
entails: scrutinizing and authorizing revenues and expenditures of the government
and ensuring that the national budget is properly implemented. The constitutional
power to participate in budgetary appropriation gives the legislature needed
political influence to shape governance, and possibly carry out reforms that are
sustainable. In this regard, Saffell (1989) asserted that ‘no function of the congress
is more jealously guarded or more basic to administrative control than the power
of the purse’ (p. 69). In the same vein, Posner and Park (2007) affirmed
‘Legislatures in some countries have gained a role in approving macro fiscal
frameworks’. The Nigerian legislature belongs to the class of legislative
assemblies vested with preponderance of power over fiscal matters, perhaps.
The modern legislature equally performs representational function. Principally,
the people’s representatives for the singular fact that they are elected by the
people, especially under a democratic regime, hold the mandate of their
constituencies within the polity (Davies, 2004). Sodaro put it thus: ‘the essence of
representative democracy lies in the delegation of governmental power and
responsibility to a small number of people by the citizenry as a whole’ (2007, p.
179). Consequently, the elected members of the legislature are expected to pursue
good public policies for national development; this is most characteristic of
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electorates in the developed democracies of the world. In the emerging
democracies some variation may be seen, in terms of what the representational
roles of the legislators specifically are. Beyond public policy goals, patronage
opportunities for members of the constituencies are expected, by electorates in
emerging democracies, from their elected representatives in the legislature. This
other electorates are so predisposed as the result of their high level of
impoverishment and their neglect especially under the prolonged military rule.
It is noteworthy that the modern legislature serves as an agent of reform in the
state (Reed & Scheimer, 2003). In a state where some members of parliament are
ideologically inclined the desire to implement their reform agenda will greatly
influence their behaviors in the assembly. There is the instance of Japan in 2003
when some members of the ruling party switched parties to form a new party: the
party defectors sought to push for their reform agenda which they could not
achieve in their former part. Moreover, Nelson Polsby (cited in Ornstein, 1992)
observed that the legislature may be broadly categorized into area and
transformative legislatures (cited in Orstein, 1992). As area legislature, the
assembly serves as forum for discussion of ideas and policies and it provides a
formal platform for deliberation among significant political forces in the life of a
political system. Conversely, the transformative legislature actively translates
ideas into laws. The transformative legislature enjoys a huge measure of
institutional autonomy to act on bills or policy proposals emanating either within
the assembly itself or from the executive arm of the government. They mold and
transform bills and proposals into laws, irrespective of the source.
Nevertheless, a legislature can be transformative in function, a reformer in
character, but such behavior is cautiously exhibited. According to Saffell (1989, p.
66), a common strategy is for congressmen to be conservative, clinging to past
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positions, while cautiously reaching for new positions on a few issues. This
suggests that a legislature may sometimes find it very difficult to openly and
passionately champion the necessity for a drastic reform, unless the action will
improve the political fortune of the members pushing for the reform. Discarding
old ideas for new ones thus means that not only has the society bought into the
reform proposals but also the expected benefits of electoral rewards for the
proponents far outweigh the cost. When this is the case, very many legislators
willingly pursue reform agenda in the legislature. However, where the political
cost is seen to outweigh the benefit, personal interest of the legislators will dictate
that they tread with caution, as far as reform agenda are concerned. This perhaps
explains why reform agenda have been difficult to push through in the Nigerian
legislature in the current fourth republic. Notwithstanding, some legislators have
attempted to push for one reform or the other (Lewis, 2009).
Power of the Legislature under the 1999 Constitution
The extent to which the legislature of any state can shape governance and public
policy as well as initiate reforms and push them to successful end is a function of
the level of power given to it by the constitution on one hand and the extent to
which the executive defer to it, on the other hand. Unlike the executive arm which
most often wields a preponderant of discretionary power, in addition to its explicit
constitutional power (Fashagba 2009), the legislature is strictly guided by the
provisions of the constitution that established it. Indeed, for most part of the 1980s
and 90s, precisely a period spanning fifteen years and five months between
January 1984 and May 28, 1999, the Nigerian military was in power, ruling
through decrees and by administrative fiat (Akintayo, 1999). The military
however transferred power to a civilian government under a new constitution in
May, 1999. The 1999 Nigerian constitution which was amended in 2010 is
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currently undergoing another amendment process. The constitution was based on
the presidential system. This translates into the separation of governmental
powers, institutions and personnel under three distinct arms. In other words, the
executive, legislature and judiciary were created as separate institutions, with each
institution manned by distinct personnel. Consequently, each arm of the Nigerian
government draws its power from the 1999 constitution (amended in 2010). In this
study, the interest is particularly on the power vested in the legislature.
The Nigerian central legislature, known as the National Assembly, enjoys a broad
range of power under the 1999 constitution. This is perhaps so not only to rid the
state of its immediate authoritarian past, but also to enable it initiates, molds and
shapes policy on the democratic platform of the fourth republic. Section 4, sub-
section 1 vests the power to make law for the nation in the National Assembly
comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives. In sub-section 2 of
section 4, the constitution provides that:
The National Assembly shall have power to make
laws for the peace, order and good governance of
the federation or any part thereof with respect to
any matter included in the exclusive legislative list
spelt out in part 1 of the second schedule to this
constitution.
In addition to having the exclusive power to make laws on items in the exclusive
list, the National Assembly is equally vested with power to make laws with
respect to any matters in the concurrent list. This is provided for in the sub-section
4a of section 4. This means that the central legislature shares the power to make
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laws with the states (constituent units of the federation) on matters captured in the
concurrent list.
In a similar vein, the National Assembly is vested with a unique power that makes
it the only institution of the democratic government that can openly and legally
amend the constitution of Nigeria. This is captured in section 9 of the 1999
constitution. However, the amendment of any section of the constitution by the
National Assembly must be supported by the resolutions of not less than two-
thirds majority of all the members of the central legislature and approved by
resolution of the houses of assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the states.
There are thirty-six states in the Nigerian federation among which twenty are
required to support any proposed amendment to any part of the constitution before
such amendment can become valid.
Furthermore, in section 80 of the 1999 constitution, the legislature is vested with
the power to authorize expenditure from consolidated revenue fund of the
federation. The sub-section 3 of the section gives the power to authorize
withdrawal from public funds of the federation to the National Assembly. Also, it
is also part of the power of the legislature to prescribe the manner of withdrawal
of money from the public funds of the federation. The section of the constitution
gives the power to authorize spending and raising funds to the legislature. This
power of the purse importantly allows the legislature immense influence in
shaping government policies, certainly (Saffell, 1989; Verney, 1969). The power
to debate, deliberate, mold and/or amend the annual budgetary appropriation
proposal presented by the executive president is hence the opportunity to shape
the state policies and influence governance. In this manner, the central legislature
ultimately collaborates with the executive to meet the aspirations of the governed.
This legislature’s role in budgetary appropriation proposal, therefore, in a state
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where lack of institutional accountability and participatory policy-making under
successive military regimes bred mismanagement of national resources and
dysfunctional public policy, is of an uttermost imperative. With the legislature-
executive collaboration on budgetary appropriation under the democratic
Nigeria’s fourth republic the economic crisis and erosion of national cohesion
under the juntas should be reversed. There is yet the power to impose tax or duty
vested in the National Assembly, stipulated in section 163 of the 1999
constitution.
And the legislature is given power to intervene in the judicial administration. For
instance, the power to indicate cases in which appeals may be right, cases arising
from judgments in the court of appeal to be referred to the Supreme Court, is
vested in the National Assembly by the provisions of section 233 and sub-section
21. The legislature is also given the power to override executive veto on any bill.
Where the legislature decides to make a bill it has passed have the full force of
law, it can decide to use its two-thirds majority power to pass the bill into law.
Consequently, the bill so passed by the two-thirds members of the National
Assembly will no longer require presidential assent to become a law.
Considering the enormous constitutional powers vested in the central legislature,
in addition to the fact that it has absolute power to determine its internal
operations (stipulated in section 101 of the 1999 Nigerian constitution), as well as
constitute a distinct and independent body, the legislature of the fourth republic is
maximally equipped, politically and constitutionally, to shape and influence
government policies, and serve as springboard for new ideas and policy reforms.
The extent to which the legislature is able to use these powers, the level at which
it is able to come up with policy initiatives, and the degree to which it is
responsive to public opinions, society's developmental challenges and aspirations
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will determine its impact level on re-engineering the nation, socially,
economically and politically.
2.1.1 The Committee System
Each Branch of the National Assembly meets in plenary session or through one of
its committees. It would be unimaginable to conceive a situation where all the
legislative proposals, report form oversights etc. of the National Assembly are
considered in plenary session. The size of the Assembly of which a good
proportion would want to participate in any discussion before the House would
render this impracticable. As a result, the Assembly has been characterized by a
stable system of committees with fixed functions and jurisdiction. Michael (1979)
Each House may appoint a committee of its members for such special or general
purpose as in its opinion would be better regulated and managed by means of such
a committee, and may by resolution, regulation or otherwise, delegate any
functions exercisable by it to any such committee. However, neither House is
empowered to delegate to a committee, its power to decide whether a Bill shall be
passed into law or its power to pass a resolution on any matter. (Section 62 of the
1999 Constitution) The National Assembly has several different kinds of
committees, which can be grouped into four. These are the Committee of the whole
House, the Standing Committees, the Special Committees and the select
Committees. (By Virtue of the 1999 Constitution)
Committee of the whole House
The Committee of the whole House as its name suggests, is the whole Senate or
House of Representatives sitting as a committee. This usually happens after a Bill
has been read the second time when it shall stand committed to the whole House
unless the House decides to commit it to a standing or select Committee. In such a
situation, the President or Deputy President of the Senate or the Speaker or Deputy
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Speaker, as the case may be, vacates the chair. However, he continues as the
Chairman of the Committee of the whole House.
Standing Committees
These are sometimes called ‘General Purpose Committees’ and are appointed at
the beginning of the life of each legislature. Under the 1979 Constitution, there
were twenty-seven of these in the House of Representatives and twenty-two in the
Senate. Each Standing Committee in the House of Representatives and the Senate
at that time had twenty-five and eleven members respectively.
Special Committees
These are sometimes called “Special Purposes Committees” and are appointed at
the beginning of each legislative session, though any other special committee may
be appointed by either House and assigned such duties as the need may arise. The
most important of the Special Committees is the Committee of Selection,
appointed at the beginning of every session. Under the 1979 Constitution, in the
Senate, it consisted of the President, the Deputy President and four other senators
while in the House of Representatives, it was made up of the Speaker, Deputy
Speaker and nominees of political parties in accordance with their numerical
strength in the House. Its functions include nominating members to serve on ad
hoc special committees and on parliamentary delegations.
Select Committees and Examples of Committees
The Senate or the House of Representative may appoint a Select Committee of ten
or fifteen members respectively to consider any matter that may be referred to it.
The nomination in each case is by the Committee of Selection after a notice has
been given on a motion made and a question put.
2.1.3 The Oversight Functions
The oversight function of the legislature in Nigeria finds legislative importance in
Section 88, Sub-sections 1(a)- (b) and 2(a)-(b) of the 1999 Constitution of the
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Federal Republic of Nigeria which provides that “each House of the National
Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its journal or in the Official
Gazette of the Government of the Federation to direct or cause to be directed an
investigation into (a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to
make laws; and (b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or
government department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of or
responsibility for (i) executing or administering laws enacted by the National
Assembly, and (ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be
appropriated by the National Assembly”. Sub-section 2(a)-(b) stipulates that “the
powers conferred on the National Assembly under the provisions of the section are
exercisable only for the purpose of enabling it to (a) make laws with respect to any
matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing laws;
and (b) expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration
of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration
of funds appropriated by it”. Besides, Section 89 of the 1999 Constitution
empowers the legislature to procure evidence, summon persons to give evidence
and require such evidence to be given on oath through examination of witnesses.
The National Assembly has the power to summon persons to procure additional
document or oral evidence and (where necessary) issue a warrant to compel
attendance by any person so required, on the pain of punishment if they fail to
attend. The legislature has the constitutional responsibility to supervise and
regulate the activities of the executive arm of government of the federation to
eschew waste and ensure fiscal discipline, observance of the rule of law and strict
compliance in implementing laws as passed by the legislature, and execution of
development programmes and policies. If the National Assembly loses faith in an
agency, the Congress can respond in a number of ways to put things in their proper
perspectives. For example, Congress can pass a law to overrule agency decisions,
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and/or to narrow the agency’s jurisdiction. It can use its appropriations power to
restrict the agency’s funding. It can also narrow the agency’s regulatory authority.
Ezeani (2010) noted that in spite of the importance of legislative oversight in
contemporary democratic governance, it has been controversial in all ramifications
in the political scene, and has remained the major source of executive and
legislative conflict in Nigeria. A former Attorney-General of the Federation and
Minister of Justice, Honourable Justice Oluwadare Aguda had once argued that
oversight functions as was carried out by the legislature was often unconstitutional
and violates the principle of separation of powers which is basic to democratic
government. He observed that “the legislature in Nigeria is systematically usurping
the functions of both the executive and the judiciary”, warning that “this could
hamper political stability and socio-economic development”
Therefore, the central thesis of the criticisms of legislative oversight is its integrity
which has been subjected to questions by critics who contend that oversight has
become a political tool for the harassment and blackmail of members of the
executive branch and perceived political enemies or rivals. It is argued that this
scenario gave credence to former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s stance on
different occasions on oversight functions, whereby it is alleged that he directed
some of his Ministers to ignore National Assembly summons because he
considered such political aberrations as undue interference, illegal acts and
ungodly avenues for corruption and extortions of resources from the Ministers.
Notwithstanding, the legislature with its robust legal instruments, is the symbolic
arm of government that determines the effectiveness or otherwise of democratic
governance. The power of legislative oversight is not without limitations as was
rightly captured by Chief Justice Warren as he succinctly observed that:
22
The power of congress to conduct investigation is
inherent in the legislative process. The power is
broad; it encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed
or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of
defect in our social, economic or political system
for the purpose of enabling congress to remedy
them. It comprehends probes into department of
the Federal Government to expose corruption,
inefficiency and waste. But broad as this power of
inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general
authority to expose the private affairs of
individuals without justification in terms of the
functions of the congress nor is the congress a law
enforcement or trial agency. There are functions of
the executive and judicial departments of
government. No enquiry is an end in itself; it must
be related to, and in furtherance of the legislative
task of the congress. Investigation conducted
solely for the personal aggrandizement of the
investigators or to “punish” those investigated is
indefensible. Warren (2012)
It is expressly explicit from the above jurist’s assertion that the primary objective
of legislative power is, generally speaking, to lie down, be they decision rules or
conduct rules and to carry out oversight and investigative function. It must be
recognized that the legislative’s power to investigate is not absolute as it has some
23
legal impediments. This was made known by the court in Tony Momoh Vs. Senate
of the National Assembly (1982) NCLR 105. In that case, the Court of Appeal
clearly held that section 82 of the 1979 Constitution (akin to section 88 of the 1999
Constitution) is not designed to enable the legislature usurp the general
investigating functions of the executive nor the adjudicative functions of the
judiciary. Any invitations by the legislature to any person outside the purpose
defined in section 82(2) that is now 88(2) of the 1999 Constitution is invalid. The
prosecution of the persons guilty of corrupt practices or gross inadequacies or
misconduct in the discharge of the public office is left to the executive. This only
reinstates the doctrine of separation of power between the various arms of
government. Invariably, the oversight functions of the legislature end up with
identifying corruption, misconduct of public officers, resource waste or
inefficiency in service, review of government actions and activities for good
governance, etc. and findings thereof are referred to the appropriate arm of
government for further necessary actions in order to address the issues raised
therein inappropriate and acceptable procedures.
The Meaning Objective and Function of Legislative Oversight Function
According to Ndoma-Egba (2012), legislative oversight refers to the power of the
legislature to review, monitor and supervise government agencies, programmes,
activities and policy implementation strategies of the executive arm of government.
This is to ensure that the arm sustains the principles of good governance, remains
responsive, transparent and accountable to the electorates. The committee structure
of the National Assembly (House of Representatives and Senate) is being used to
execute oversight functions through supervision, watchfulness, or curtail excesses,
review of executive actions and activities. Oversight functions ensure that activities
of the executive arm of government and its agencies are kept under constant
surveillance and scrutiny by the legislature. A leading role for the legislature has
24
always been adjudged an essential defense against executive tyranny. The
legislature monitors, raises queries and (where necessary) censors executive
activities, activities of government agencies (such as ministries, departments,
parastatals, etc.) to ensure good governance and accountability (Onuoha, 2009).
John Locke (quoted in Johari, 1989) noted that it may be too great a temptation to
human frailty, apt to grasp at power for the same persons who have the power of
making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they
may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make. When the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body
of magistrates, there can be no liberty because apprehension may arise, lest the
same monarch or Senate should enact tyrannical laws, and execute them in a
tyrannical manner (Johari, 1989:280). Heywood (1997:318) observed that the
legislative and representative roles of assemblies have declined in significance;
greater emphasis has been placed on the ability of assemblies to constrain or check
executive power. Assemblies have increasingly become scrutinizing bodies, the
principal role of which is to deliver responsible or accountable government. He
noted that assemblies are not always effective in calling executives to account. For
example, in the National People’s Congress in China, control by a monopolistic
party, party loyalty has turned the assembly into a mere propaganda weapon, with
government policy nearly always being approved by unanimous votes. This means
that party discipline also constrains parliamentary scrutiny of the executive. In
essence, the principal function of the assembly in this context is to uphold and
support government actions and activities as majority of the members of
parliament belong to the governing party. The ruling political party ideology and
interest override national interest to retain, sustain and consolidate political power.
The legislative oversight, a critical aspect of the functions of the legislature other
than law making, have been severally compromised and often misused to serve
25
personal interest. These lapses have given rise to query why the legislative
oversight, a robust mechanism institutionalized to checkmate the excesses of the
executive arm of government and its agencies to curb waste in governance,
corruption, absolutism in the exercise of political power, has been compromised.
The end of absolute executive power is affirmed by giving to the legislature, and to
it alone, the right or power to make laws. In this context, arbitrary government is
replaced by a formal procedure for law making. Therefore, if the painstaking
process for passing bills into law is eloquent signal to demonstrate the degree of
importance attached to government by rules rather than individual arbitrariness,
why do law makers compromise the very ingredient for checks and balances in
governance? Thus the criticism as to the relevance of legislative oversight in
democracy, the primary objective of this article is to investigate the activities of the
legislature on its legislative oversight functions and the effectiveness of this organ
in ensuring accountability, responsiveness and sustainability of good governance in
Nigeria polity.
Challenges of Law-Making and Lawmakers Oversight Function in Nigeria
The foregoing analysis of the score card of the legislature in Nigeria shows that a
lot needs to be done by the legislature to ensure or promote good governance in
Nigeria and a considerable difference can be done through oversights. The law-
making process is beset with a legion of challenges that need to be addressed
squarely for the legislature to be truly independent of the executive in conducting
oversights and achieve the much-needed succor for Nigerians through legislation.
The challenges include the following:
Lack of Established Democratic Culture
The Nigeria’s fledgling democracy is at its infancy, Eine, O.I, (op.cit at 2008). The
debilitating effect of prolonged military rule in Nigeria has produced negative
consequences that continue to haunt individuals and institutions in Nigeria. The
26
legislature is not an exception. The legislature today is truly not independent of the
Executive and therefore, is often incapacitated from acting as the watchdog of
executive activities. Annan, K (2005) Thus, the inordinate ambition of members
and leadership of the legislative houses often sees them hob-nobbing with the
executive such that valuable time for law-making is lost in the process of lobbying
for juicy leadership positions and committees in the legislative houses.
Corruption And Nepotism
Corruption and nepotism have been the bane of public life in Nigeria. It is often
rumored that bills hardly sail through the legislature until members have had their
hands greased. Oyewo .O, (2007) The implication of this, therefore, is that debates
on such bills either at the plenary or committee levels cannot be subjected to
thorough scrutiny in the best interest of Nigerians who are the objects of such bills
eventually when they become laws. It is indeed not too gratifying that such
primordial and mundane issues have roles to play in passage of bills into law.
Personal Interests and Ambition of the Legislators
It is common knowledge that a good number of members of the legislative houses
at both federal and state levels pursue pure selfish interests that often inhibit them
from combating the challenges of law-making. Members pursue contracts from the
leadership of the houses and even from the executive such that they easily
compromise when it comes to contributing meaningfully to debates on the floor of
the house. At times, some members resort to absenteeism from the floor of the
house and do not participate at all in the proceedings. Again, many of the
legislators have ambitions to contest for leadership positions in the house or
membership and chairman of juicy committees. A lot of valuable legislative time is
wasted while pursuing these ambitions.
Interference With Legislative Oversight Functions By The Executive
27
The legislature is given a lot of powers in the constitution to perform oversight
functions and act as the watchdog of the executive. (See for example, Section 88 of
the Constitution) Again, the legislature must screen and approve certain appointees
of the executive. (See Sections 147, 154(1), 171(4), 231, 238 and 250 of the 1999
Constitution). The legislature is further empowered to even remove the President,
Vice President, Governor and the Deputy Governor through impeachment
procedure provided for in the constitution. (See Sections 148 and 188 of the
constitution). It is however disheartening to say that the exercise of the above
function to ensure good governance for the benefit of all and sundry is often
interfered with and hampered by the executive. This is done, first and foremost, by
the executive ensuring that their cronies are elected as the leaders of those houses
through excessive politicking orchestrated and funded by the executive. Again,
where the legislature musters enough courage and ventures to carry out any of the
oversight functions, the executive often resorts to the use of money to pursue a
“divide and rule” agenda to break the rank and file of the legislators. The effect of
the game is that good governance is denied to Nigerians who are entitled to have
same.
Benefit of Legislative Oversight to the Nigerian Democratic System
The principle of separation of power is the major ingredient of democracy
which guarantees that the executive arm of government does not control the
affairs of the legislature nor the judiciary. The doctrine of the separation of
powers implies that there should be three separate organs of government with
their separate sets of functions and powers. The presidential system of
government being practiced in Nigeria makes provision for separation of
powers, apportioning disparate powers and duties to the executive, legislative
and judicial arms of government. Essentially, the legislature as a symbol of true
democracy makes laws which the executive is under obligation to implement.
28
The judiciary is legally called upon in the determination of civil rights and
obligations to interpret the laws. This system of government understands from
the onset that powers may be abused and therefore introduced a system that
guarantees checks and balances amongst the three arms of government.
Therefore, through the power of interpretation, the courts can declare laws
made by the legislature unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect
whatsoever. On the other hand, the legislature has the power of oversight over
the execution and administration of laws by the executive. The executive holds
the powers of investigation, coercion and implementation of laws and can as
well use these powers to call the legislature and judiciary to order (Onyekpere,
2012).
In other words, it implies that the three organs of government should be kept
apart from each other in the interest of individual liberty and it is a perfect
system created for the overall benefit of the citizens. The functions of the
government should be differentiated and performed by different organs
consisting of different bodies of persons so that each department be limited to
its respective sphere of activity and not be able to encroach upon the
independence and jurisdiction of another (Johari, 1989:280). The principal
function of the executive is to execute laws, orders, rules, regulations, decrees,
prevention of the breaches of law, rendering a host of social welfare services
and meting punishment to the delinquents so as to maintain peace and good
government. On the other hand, in spite of its primary function of legislating
laws, amending or repealing existing laws, the legislature serves a number of
overlapping objectives and purposes to improve the efficiency, economy, and
effectiveness of governmental operations; evaluate programmes and
performance; detect and prevent poor administration, waste, abuse, arbitrary
and capricious behaviour, or illegal and unconstitutional conduct; protect civil
29
liberties and constitutional rights; inform the general public and ensure that
executive policies reflect the public interest; gather information to develop new
legislative proposals or to amend existing statutes; ensure administrative
compliance with legislative intent; and prevent executive encroachment on
legislative authority and prerogatives encapsulates in oversight functions
(http://en.wikipedia.org.wiki/Congressional_oversight). It also executes the
functions of oversight over the actions or inactions and other activities of the
executive and its agencies.
Legislative oversight encourages checks and balances; it enthrones fiscal
discipline, good governance, accountability and transparency in public offices.
It promotes accountability in government through enforcing efficiency and cost
effectiveness in course of generating people-centred policies and programmes
necessary to address the numerous challenges confronting governments at all
levels. Congressional oversight takes place when the National Assembly (the
Senate and the House of Representatives) continually review the effectiveness
of the executive arm in carrying out the congressional mandates through
supervision, watchfulness, or review of executive actions and activities. This
helps the National Assembly to establish issues and address problem areas in
order to make the necessary improvements or changes to create an effective
process. This legislative process brings to the knowledge of the public what the
executive branch is doing, and it affords the electorates the opportunity to see
what public office holders are actually doing, whether they are really serving
their collective interest or not. Most often, the public is not aware of what the
government is actually doing. This gives credence to Woodrow Wilson’s (1885)
classic study of the legislative branch as he observed that:
The informing function of Congress should be
preferred even to its legislative function. Unless
30
Congress have and use every means of acquainting
itself with the acts and dispositions of the
administrative agents of the government, the
country must be helpless to learn of how it is being
served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these
things and sift them by every form of discussion, the
country must remain in embarrassing, crippling
ignorance of the very affairs which it is most
important it should understand and direct. Wilson
(1885)
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Various theories abound that could be adopted as framework upon which the
literature could be built, these theories range from; Structural Functionalism,
Systems theory and theory of checks and balance. All three theories will be
discussed subsequently but for the purpose of this study we will adopt the theory of
checks and balance.
System Theory and Structural Functionalism Theory
Although structural functionalism finds its roots much earlier than systems theory,
as researchers use it today, it is based on systems theory. Structural functionalism
traces its beginnings back to the ancient Greeks and the writings of Aristotle
(Susser, 1992). Systems theory emerged much later. Although the discussion of
systems began with biologists in the l9th century systems theory was not fully
articulated until the 1920s. Ludwig von Bertalanry (1956, 1962), who developed
general systems theory was a principal in establishing it as a field of study.
Although systems theory originated later than functionalism, when researchers
study functions within their structures – such as is the case in committees in the
legislature functioning as organs in a system – they do it within the scope of
31
systems. The study of political systems came into its own with the adoption of a
structural-Functional approach.
The systems approach of David Easton (1965a, l965b) and Karl W. Deutsch (1963)
grew out of sociological and communication theory and a move toward the theory
and data of politics (Almond & Powell, 1966). Easton and Deutsch followed a
communication, or cybernetic, model to study politics. Gabriel A. Almond's study
of political systems grew out of a tradition of political theory and draws from
sociological and communications theories. While Easton and Deutsch adopted a
purely systems approach, Almond applied structural functionalism to systems
theory. Both have value in the study of political systems.
Systems Theory
A system, according to Anatol Rapoport (1966, 1968), is a set of interrelated
entities connected by behavior and history. Specifically, he stated that a system
must satisfy the following criteria:
1. One can specify a set of identifiable elements – committees.
2. Among at least some of the elements, one can specify identifiable relations –
committees and the body of legislature.
3. Certain relations imply others.
4. A certain complex of relations at a given time implies a certain complex (or one
of several possible complexes) at a later time. (Rapoport, 1966)
This definition is broad enough to include systems as different as the solar system
and language. Social systems, including economics and politics or in this case the
various committees and the body of legislature and their constituents, fit within the
definition. Social systems might be described as a class of entities (individuals,
families, institutions) with relations among them (communication channels,
influence, obligations). Systems are classified by the "nature of their relation to
their environments" and the search for laws governing the behavior of each class
32
(Rapoport, 1968). Systems appear to have "a will" of their own and a 'purpose" to
maintain a steady state. Living systems do this through homeostasis mechanisms
that restore equilibrium. Social systems have similar mechanisms (Rapopo 1968).
While systems in the physical sciences (like the solar system, chemical reactions,
and ecological systems) are extremely rigorous, social systems are less precise. In
social systems, the elements and relations are vague and hard to define. As the
basic unit of social systems, roles are commonly difficult to identify and classify.
For the "hard" sciences, this ambiguity would be regarded as problematic, but with
the social sciences, it would be commonplace (Rapopo 1966).
The Political System
A long-standing problem of political science has been to describe and account for
the internal structure of the political system. According to William Mitchell
(1968), structure is generally applied to patterns of power and authority that
characterize the relationships between the rulers and the ruled. These relationships
are enduring and thus predictable. In systems theory the unit of analysis for these
power relations is regarded as a concept developed in social psychology and
applied to sociology. Political roles deal with decision making on behalf of society
and with performing actions that implement the decisions and allocate scarce
resources. In analyzing the political system, the researcher typically describes these
roles and the people performing them. Traditionally, the main approach to
classification has been "the distribution of power" or more practically the
supervision of members of legislatures on resources already allocated – in the form
of oversight – (Mitchell, 1968) among the members of the system. Because the one
dimension of roles has inadequately described political systems, systems analysts
have developed more inclusive variables that lend themselves better to
measurement (Mitchell, 1968). Talcott Parsons (1951) put forth a set of variables
33
that he called pattern-variables. Gabriel Almond (1956; Almond & Coleman,
1960) suggested classifying structures based on;
(a) The degree of differentiation between structures,
(b) The extent to which the system is "manifest" or "visible,"
(c) The stability of the functions of the various roles, and
(d) The distribution of power. Mitchell (1968) added a fifth dimension, concerning
the "sustainability of roles."
Applying Systems Analysis
Easton (1966) proposed to define political systems more broadly than did
Rapoport. Easton defined a system as "any set of variables regardless of the
degree, of interrelationship among them". He preferred this definition because it
freed the researcher from the need to prove that a political system is really a
system. The only question of importance became whether the system was
interesting and thus worth studying. The analysis need only provide understanding
and an explanation of the human behavior that was of concern to the researcher.
Easton (1953, 1966) suggested that a political system was distinct from other
systems because it concerned itself with "the interactions through which values are
authoritatively allocated for a society" (1966). He divided the political
environment into two parts: the intra-societal and the extra-societal. The first
comprises those systems in the same society as the political system that are not
political systems because they do not have political interactions. Intra-societal
systems form the segments of society of which the political system is a component,
including the economy, culture, social structure, and personalities. These systems
create and shape the conditions in which the political system operates. A changing
economy culture or social structures all have impact on political life. The extra-
societal environment includes all the systems that are outside the given society.
They may form a supra-system of which the political system may be a part.
34
Structural Functionalism
The terms functional analyses and structural analyses have been applied to a great
variety of approaches (Cancian, 1968; Merton, 1968). With their broad use in the
social sciences has come discussion of the appropriateness of the use of structure
and function and the type of analysis associated with the concepts (Levy, 1968).
The functional approach is used more often than any other method in the study of
Western political science (Sussec 1992). Although structural functionalism
predated systems theory it still presupposes a "systems" view of the political world.
Similarities link functionalism to systems analysis. Susser (1992) writes that both
focuses on input—output analysis, both see political systems as striving for
homeostasis or equilibrium, and both consider feedback in their analysis. Yet
functionalism is significantly different.
Applying Functional Analysis to the Study of Politics
According to Michael G. Smith (1966), four approaches are useful in the
comparative study of political systems: process, content, function, and form.
Studies based on process and content face huge obstacles. In developed countries,
the processes of government are "elaborately differentiated, discrete and easy to
identify," but in simpler societies, the same processes are rarely differentiated and
discrete". They occur within the context of institutional activities that are difficult
to analyze for political processes. The more "differentiated and complex" the
government processes, the "greater the range and complexity" of content. Since
content and process are "interdependent and derivative," they require independent
criteria for studying government. The functional approach does not have the same
limitations as process and content, It defines government as all those activities that
influence "the way in which authoritative decisions are formulated and executed
for a society" (Easton, 1957). From this definition, various schemata were
developed to study the functions of government. Easton listed five modes of action
35
as elements of all political systems: legislation, administration, adjudication, the
development of demands, and the development of support and solidarity. These
were grouped as input and output requirements of political systems.
An Example of the Structural Functional Approach and systems Theory
Structural functionalism analysis consists of nothing more than stating empirical
questions in one of the following forms or some combination of them:
(a) What observable uniformities (or patterns) exist in the phenomenon under
study?
(b) What conditions result because of the phenomenon?
(c) What processes occur as a result of the conditions?
The first question asks: What structures are involved? The second:
What functions have resulted because of the structures? Asked in the opposite
direction, different results could occur: What functions exist? What structures
result from the functions? Another problem, according to Levy (1968), is that the
general concept of structure has many different referents, in both the biological and
the social sciences. Joseph Woodger (1948) in biology and Merton (t968) in the
social sciences have pointed to the abundance of referents given to the term
functionalism. This has led to a lot of confusion. Much of the literature is
preoccupied with function, whereas structure has been discussed less, Function
may be defined as any condition or state of affairs resulting from an operation of a
unit of the type under consideration in terms of structure. In the biological sense,
the unit is an organism or subsystem of an organism. In the social sciences, the
unit is usually a set of one or more persons (actors). Structure may be defined as
pattern of observable uniformity in terms of the action or operation taking place. In
the social sciences, the focus of analysis has been on the Criticisms of Structural
Functionalism.
36
Critics of structural functionalism view it as "a translation of Anglo-American
political norms in methodological terminology" (Susser, 1992). Structural
functionalism may be in decline as a methodological approach for the study of
politics; however, it leaves a set of terms that are still used in political jargon.
Some of those in the functionalist camp (Merton among them) rejected the notion
of this decline. Much of what was best in the political research of an entire
generation was couched in its terms (Susser, 1992). One of the main criticisms of
structural functionalism is that its categories were too undifferentiated to be of real
help in actual research (Susser 1992). Although Almond's functional taxonomy has
greater specificity and serviceability than the systems approach, it is seen as not
much more than a translation of familiar and known phenomena into blandly broad
categories. As such it promotes a terminological rather than an essential
transformation in the discipline (Susser, 1992). Another criticism is related to the
methodological approach used in functionalism. A list of functions is created
deductively and then appropriate structures are identified. In some cases, this
approach leads to "empirical contortions" to satisfy the framework. This criticism
applies to much academic research, leaving the researcher, rather than the
approach, responsible for assuring research validity. A final criticism, according to
Susser (1992), is that functionalism "harbors an ideological slant" that sustains
existing structures. It describes what exists rather than what ought to be, thus
maintaining the status quo. As if anticipating this criticism, Almond and Powell
(1966), responded to the criticism that functional-systems theories imply an
equilibrium or harmony of parts and 'that they have a static or conservative bias’.
Political systems are not necessarily harmonious or stable, they wrote, but
interdependent. The task of political science researchers is to ascertain how change
in any one of the part of a political system affects other parts and the whole. They
built political development into their approach to the study of systems. They look
37
at political systems as whole entities shaping and being shaped by their
environments. To understand the processes of political development, they examine
the interaction of the political system with its domestic and international
environments. These theories and the approach are still alive and well (Chamock,
2009; Fisher & Soemarsono, 2008; Fisk & Malamud, 2009; Mohamed, 2007;
Scheuerell, 2008). Understanding politics requires political syntax, much of which
continues to be based on structural functionalism and systems theory.
Weaknesses of the above theories
The weaknesses of functionalist and system theory is that they tend to lead to
exaggerated accounts of positive consequences of events and participation in such
events such as the performance of oversight by legislatures, however it mistakenly
assumes that there are no conflicts of interests between the different groups in
society such as the executive, legislature and judiciary and yet it doesn’t recognize
that politicking without certain checks on excesses can privilege or disadvantage
people more than others. The theory also ignores the powerful historical and
economic factors that have influenced social events and social relationships.
The long-standing problem of political science has been to describe and account
for the internal structure of the political system. According to William Mitchell
(1968), structure is generally applied to patterns of power and authority that
characterize the relationships between the rulers and the ruled. These relationships
are enduring and thus predictable. In systems theory the unit of analysis for these
power relations is regarded as a concept developed in social psychology and
applied to sociology, which is a major weakness in the application of system
theory not just to our discussion but to major arguments in the area of political
science. Functionalist theory on the other hand is centered on the idea that there is
38
a consensus in the values and norms of society and that social institutions found
within a society are integrated and function together.
• Assumptions: The conceptual assumptions underlying the approaches can be
divided into two basic areas:
The social system is the prior causal reality and the system parts are functionally
interrelated,
All social phenomena have functions for the larger social system. Concerning these
functions:
• they may be functional for the whole system or only part of it,
• there may be functional alternatives,
• there may be multiple consequences from particular phenomena, and finally,
• Dysfunctions account for tension and change in the system.
The approaches assume that systems can be identified and specified, that the
boundaries are measurable
• They are ideal model of society rather than an empirically derived one
Operational definitions are hard to come by
• At their outset they have a tendency to value stability, consensus
• They cannot explain the existence of societies in the first place
• They cannot easily explain rapid social change or breakdown of societies
Social change and social conflict became significant topics in the latter period
of functionalist dominance
39
• Rests on assumptions that are hard (perhaps impossible) to test
• Explanations can be tautological
Check and Balances Theory
The guarantee of liberty in any given government to the people is the practice of
the theory of separation of powers. This theory according to Gettel, implies that,
the three functions of the government ―should be performed by different bodies
of persons; each department (the legislature, the executive and judiciary) limited to
its own sphere of action, and within that sphere should be independent and
supreme (Chaturvedi; 2006:282). The theory of separation of powers is predicated
on the premise that, if a single group holds all the three powers of the government,
they are bound to have unlimited powers. They could prescribe any law arresting
say, criminals. Because, they exercise unlimited powers could pronounce the
criminals guilty without recourse to fair trial. It is through the separation of powers
that any given group cannot at the same time prescribe, execute and adjudicate in
any case. Otherwise, there will be no justice. That is why, it is only through the
combination of all these departments that a government can use force especially in
a military rule. The theory of separation of powers means that, a different body of
persons is to administer each of the three departments of government (The
legislative, executive and judiciary). And that, no one of them is to have a
controlling power over either of the others. Such separation is necessary for the
purpose of preserving the liberty of the individual and for avoiding tyranny. The
term ―Separation of powers originated with Baron de Montesquieu, a French
enlightenment writer. Nevertheless, the actual separation of powers amongst
different branches of government can be traced to ancient Greece. The framers of
the American constitution decided to base the governmental system on this theory
of separation of powers whereby the legislature, executive and judiciary branches
40
will be separate from each other. This gave rise to the idea of checks and balances
on each other. As a result, no one branch can gain absolute power or abuse the
power given to them like in despotic military regimes. The model of separation of
powers was first developed in ancient Greece and gained recognition by the
Roman Republic as part of the unmodified constitution of the Roman Republic. In
this model, the state is divided into branches, each with separate and independent
powers and areas of responsibility in such a way that no branch has more powers
than the other branches. This also, forms the concept of separation of church and
state as is the practice in many countries of the world depending on the applicable
legal structures and the prevailing views towards the exact roles of religion in the
given society. In respect to our discussion it will imply the roles assigned each of
the committees in oversight investigation, reporting its findings to the body of
legislature thereby strengthening in practical terms the notion of checks and
balances.
Meaning and origins of the concept
It must be noted that, the doctrine of separation of powers has been developed over
the centuries. The evolution of the concept of separation of powers can be traced to
the British Parliament‘s gradual assertion of power and resistance to the royal
decrees during the 14th century. James Harrington, an English scholar was one of
the first modern philosophers to analyze the doctrine of separation of powers.
Harrington in his essay, ―Common Wealth of Oceana (1656), built upon the
works of earlier philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli, described a
utopian political system that included a separation of powers. In his second
Treatise on Government (1690), John Locke an English Political theorist, gave the
concept of separation of powers more refined treatment. John Locke argued that
legislative and executive powers were conceptually different. But that it was
41
necessary to separate them in government institutions. However, in Locke‘s
conception, judicial power played no significant role.
The modern idea of the doctrine of separation of powers was vigorously explored
in the ―Spirit of Laws (1748) by Baron de Montesquieu a French Political writer
in his work. He based his exposition on the British constitution of the first part of
the 18th century the way he understood it. As a doctrine, it has been interpreted as,
―Where an individual occupies the position of both the executive and the
legislature, there is the danger of the legislature enacting oppressive laws which the
executive will administer to attain its own ends. Montesquieu in the process
outlined a three-way division of powers in England amongst the parliament, the
king and the courts, even though such divisions were not in existence at that time.
Montesquieu apparently believed that the stability of the English government was
due to this practice of separation of powers despite the fact that he did not use the
word ―separation. It must be realized that Plato, Aristotle, Harrington, Locke,
Montesquieu and other commentators saw the concept of separation of powers as a
way to eliminate the arbitrary powers to check dictatorial tendencies. One
condition of liberty is the separation of the legislature from the executive, and the
existence of an independent and impartial judiciary. It is also as a result of this that,
Montesquieu regarded ―the separation of powers as an essential safeguard of
liberty. According to him, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated
from the legislative and executive. That is why according to Gettel, this doctrine
implies that the three functions of the government ―should be performed by
different bodies of persons; each department limited to its own sphere of action,
and within that sphere should be independent and supreme (Chaturevedi,
2006:282).
Hence, separation of powers is presently understood to mean that, none of the
legislative, executive and judicial powers is able to interfere with the others. For
42
example, the Judges should be independent of the executive and legislature in
theory. Or that the same persons should not hold posts in more than one of the
three branches. For example, that one branch of government should not exercise
the functions of another. That is, the executive should not make laws which fall
within the purview of the legislature. That be as it may, closely related to this
theory is the ―doctrine of checks and balances. This doctrine states that,
governmental power should be controlled by overlapping authority within the
government and by giving citizens the right to criticize state actions and remove
officials from office. But the big question is, what happens in despotic military
regimes and, dictatorial civilian regimes or in parliamentary systems where the
cabinet minister must be a member of either houses of parliament as we have seen
in Mymmar (Burma), Nigeria, before 1966 Coup, Thailand, Chile, China, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) before it crumbled in 1989 with the
introduction of glass-note and prestorica by Govbachev or how about where there
is one party dominance in a political system? The whole argument in favor of
separation of powers will be meaningless as well as hopeless in the above situation
or circumstances. Nevertheless, it must be stated that, like in Italy and in most
democracies, separation of governmental powers in their constitutions has a
separate constitutional courts to review cases that raise constitutional issues. Such
democratic countries create such mechanisms to ensure judicial independence from
legislative and executive officials. However, some scholars were of the opinion
that, creating an extreme separation of powers can make government less effective
because, it increases the possibility of ―governmental paralysis. Where the leaders
in different branches of the government disagree about fundamental objectives, the
country‘s official business will come to a standstill.
43
Is separation of powers feasible?
It must be noted that, separation of powers is almost impossible to carry out in
actual practice. ―However, in a modified form the theory has been adopted in
America, Nigeria France and other countries. The President and the legislature in
U.S.A. and Nigeria for example, are both elected by the people and are responsible
to them. While the judges once appointed hold office during good behavior. But in
both U.S.A. and Nigeria for example, the President has the legislative power of
vetoing to bills and the Senate has the executive duties of sanctioning
appointments and treaties, while, the Supreme Court has the power to determine
the constitutionality of the laws. In India and France for example, where there is
parliamentary form of government in place, the executive is responsible to the
legislature because, the cabinet members are members of the legislature and
therefore performs both executive and legislative functions. In England with
parliamentary system in place, there is no separation of powers because, the House
of Lords performs judicial functions and the judiciary has jurisdiction over the
executive officers. The cabinet performs legislative functions and its members are
also the members of the parliament (Sachdeva and Gupta; 1980:221).
Separation of powers in Nigeria in theory and practice
It is interesting to note that, the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, separation of powers is a fundamental constitutional principle which spells
the roles and duties of the three arms of the government. These principles are
enunciated in the constitution as follows:
Part I Section 231(1), states that, ―the appointment of a person to the office of
Chief Justice of Nigeria shall be made by the president on the recommendation of
the National Judicial Council subject to the confirmation of such appointment by
the Senate.
44
Part I Section 231(2), states that, ―the appointment of a person to the office of a
Justice of the Supreme Court shall be made by the president on the
recommendation of the National Judicial Council subject to confirmation of the
appointment by the Senate.
Section 232 (2) states that, in addition to the Jurisdiction conferred upon it by sub-
section(1) of this section, the Supreme Court shall have such original jurisdiction
as may be conferred upon it by any Act of the National Assembly.
Part II Section 4(8) states that, save as otherwise provided by this constitution,
exercise of legislative powers by the National Assembly or by a House of
Assembly shall be subject to the jurisdiction of courts of law and of Judicial
tribunals established by law and accordingly, the National Assembly or a House of
Assembly shall not enact any law, that ousts or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a
court of law or of a judicial tribunal established by law.
Chapter V (The Legislature) Section 5 8(1) States that, ―The Power of the
National Assembly to make laws shall be exercised except as otherwise provided
by this section and sub-section (5) of this section, assented to by the President.
Section 58(3) says, ―Where a bill has been passed by the House in which it
originated, it shall be sent to the other House, and it shall be presented to the
President for assent when it has been passed by that other House and agreement
has been reached between the two Houses on any amendment made on it.
Section 5 8(4) states that, ―Where a bill is presented to the President for assent, he
shall within thirty days thereof signify that he assents or that he withholds assent.
Chapter V Part II (House of Assembly of A State) Section 100(1) states that,
―The Power of a House of Assembly to make laws shall be exercised by bills
passed by the House of Assembly and, except as otherwise provided by this
section, assented to in accordance with the provisions of this section.
45
Section 100(2) states that, ―a bill shall not become Law unless it has been duly
passed and, subject to sub-section (1) of this section, assented to in accordance
with the provision of this section.
Section 100(3) states that, ―Where a bill has been passed by the House of
Assembly; it shall be presented to the Governor for assent.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the essence of the doctrine of separation of
powers is to protect the arbitrariness of rules. It by bills passed by both the Senate
and House of Representative and, prevents the danger that is most likely to
emanate by the conferment of two much powers any single person or body and
check of one power by another (The Tide; 2010:23). The power of the executive to
convene the legislature and to veto its enactments affirms of defense while the
legislative power to impeach is necessary and sufficient to hold the executive
accountable to examination without holding him hostage. The people also look
forward to the judiciary for the dispensation of justice and that of judge must
carefully but firmly set out to administer according to law which is established by
the legislature or by the binding authority of president, which itself is substantially
founded on the laws passed by the legislature (The Tide: 20 10:23). Despite the
grammatical niceties with which the constitution is coated with in practice, any
rigid separation of the state departments as stated above is obviously going to
paralyze the governmental activities of the state. In theory separation of powers
seems to imply that, the powers of government consist mainly in making,
executing and applying laws to cases through the rule of law.
The theory of separation of power is most apt in this research because, here
separation of powers appears not to operate any legal restriction on power but, it
provides the basis for important principles which the law protects such as
independence of the judiciary and in this context the committees of the national
assembly in carrying out their various oversight functions as enshrined in their
46
constitutional rights as members of the legislative arm of government. It provides a
basis for the adoption of structure processes and control which protects liberty now
and in the future for the members of such committees to effectively and efficiently
discharge their responsibilities of checks on the executive. It guards against broad
spectrum of the ills like absurd judgment avaricious and ambitious self-serving
behavior and inefficient performances of functions, in other words checks the
excesses of all the legislatures who are to carry out the function of checks on the
executive and it’s MDA’s. In respect to our topic theory of check and balance
helps to identify some of the lope holes in the parastatals and ministries which are
under the auspices of the executive arm of government. The various committees set
up by the body of legislature will by virtue of their oversight responsibility check
the excesses of the executive through its MDA’s and by this strengthen
transparency and accountability which are essential pillars of democracy. And as it
is known our system of government evolves new conventions, political practices
and events at times which also require legal rules which will need to be devised to
protect the liberty of the people and our nascent democracy. The doctrine of
separation of powers therefore provides the justification for these measures and
helps to determine their nature and scope. Apparently, there is the need to monitor
our political system, be vigilant about our liberty and advocate new measures when
the liberty is threatened.
47
CHAPTER THREE
Legislative Oversight in Nigeria
3.1 Restoration of Democratic Dispensation in Nigeria
The name Nigeria was coined by Mrs. Flora Shaw who later became the wife of
the British Governor General Lord Lugard. The entity Nigeria was an amalgam of
the hitherto empires, kingdom and chiefdoms were made under a single
administrative system. In 1960, Nigeria got its independence through the combined
efforts of Nigerians in diaspora as well as the activities of nationalist such as Sir
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo.
Three major political parties existed during this period thus Northern People’s
Congress (NPC), National Council of Nigerian and Cameroon (NCNC), and the
Action Group (AG) while the NPC has its stronghold in the north, the NCNC
dominating the south east and the A.G in the south west. NPC and NCNC formed
an alliance in the 1959 general election and subsequently won the election and
formed the government with Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as the Prime Minister and
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe as President. As the Prime Minister of the newly independent
nation, Balewa made an unparallel effort in uniting and integrating all the regions.
However his government was ousted in a military coup led by major Kaduna
Chukwuma Nzeagu in January 1966. A counter coup was staged in May 1966
where General Yakubu Gawon became the president and soon a rancor became
inevitable within the ranks of the Nigerian Army. This discontents culminated in
the three year Nigerian civil war (1967 – 1970) with its attendant loss of significant
proportion.
General Yakubu Gowon was in turn ousted by General Muritala Ramat
Mohammed. Mohammed barely spent six months as the Nigerian President when
48
Colonel Buka Dinka assassinated him. General Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded
Mohammed and later in 1973, a general election was conducted and Alhaji Shehu
Shagari became the President of the second republic. His government was marred
by series of crisis and in 1978, General Mohamed Buhari topple his government in
a military coup. Buhari also barely spent one year when General Ibrahim Badamosi
Babangida overthrew him in 1978, IBB rule for eight years (1975 – 1983) after
which a general election was conducted. The 1983 election was adjudged to be the
freest and fairest election ever conducted in the history of Nigeria. Moshood
Abiola emerged the winner of the June 12 election but the military governments
choose to hand over power to an interim government led by Shonekan. General
Sani Abacha took over power from Shonekan in 1993 and he died in 1998 in a
controversial circumstance and General Abdulsalami Abubakar took over power
and conducted the 1999 General election that ushered the third republic.
Nigeria’s democratic journey in contemporary times began with the tacit
acceptance by the military hierarchy of the need to demilitarize the nation’s
political space. This gained actual fruition on May 29, 1999 when the then General
Abdulsalami Abubakar as Head of State handed over political power to an elected
President in the person of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. For over ten years of
democratic experimentation, the nation has conducted and witnessed four general
elections which took place in 1999, 2003, 2007 and the most recent 2011 elections
respectively. All of these election, especially the first three, have had their
outcomes vehemently contested in the court of law and election tribunals; and
heavily repudiated in the domains of the general public. This has been the case
because these elections have been conducted in a fashion in which they have been
easily characterized by myriad of irregularities. These irregularities have in turn,
left the electorate and the entire masses speechless and utterly disenfranchised
49
while at the same time draining mass of qualified voters into cesspits of mortal
political apathy. For example, Fidelis and Stephen cited Oddih (in Jega and Ibeanu
eds 2007:179) has cleverly noted that “the net effect” of an election that is
characterized by “fraud and manipulations” or irregularities is that it “… can lead
to apathy, leadership crisis, political violence, assassination galore, poor political
culture and insensitivity to the needs of the people”. Fidelis and Stephen (2014
p:131) further argued that the ignoble frauds that have dogged elections in the
country have only led to the ascendancy of leaders at all levels whose kettle of
legitimacy is dry, or whose political oasis has evaporated. And, it is an
uncontrovertibly conclusion that a leader without the people’s legitimacy in a
democratic formation is naturally exposed to the vagaries of unpopular,
unacceptable government. To this end, the leader becomes susceptible to self-
destruction, at least politically.
3.2 Overview of Oversight Functions in the Fourth Republic
The oversight functions of the legislature or its investigative power has attracted
some degree of criticisms against its apparent abuse of this parliamentary
mechanism since the inception of 1999 democratic dispensation. The National
Assembly’s perception of legislative oversight function as a short-cut to richness is
generally worrisome because it negates the principle of good governance. Any
legislative investigation means a sure way of enriching the legislators involved in
the exercise, and it earns them political relevance in the system as they seem to
assume quasi-judicial demigods to those public officers being investigated. As
soon as they secure the chairmanship of these committees, the next item on their
political agenda is oversight functions, which results in the preliminary
investigation trips to parastatals and government departments under their
supervision, and subsequent public sittings (a parliamentary simulation exercise for
50
public entertainment). Most often, the orchestrated committees abandon the
substance at issue to chase the shadow with a view to humiliating and intimidating
their prey to bow to pressure and accept to negotiate for unholy settlement.
Akomolede and Bosede (2012) espoused this observation thus:
The legislature is truly not independent of the
executive and therefore, is often incapacitated from
acting as the watchdog of executive activities. Thus,
the inordinate ambition of members and leadership
of the legislative houses often sees them hob-
nobbing with the executive such that valuable time
for law-making is lost in the process of lobbying for
juicy leadership positions and committees in the
legislative houses. It is common knowledge that a
good number of members of the legislative houses
pursue pure selfish interests that often inhibit them
from combating the challenges of lawmaking.
Members pursue contracts from the leadership of
the houses and even from the executive such that
they easily compromise when it comes to
contributing meaningfully to debates on the floor of
the house. At times, some members resort to
absenteeism from the floor of the house and do not
participate at all in the proceedings. Again, many of
the legislators have ambitions to contest for
leadership positions in the house or membership and
chairman of juicy committees. A lot of valuable
51
legislative time is wasted while pursuing these
ambitions.
To buttress the inordinate ambitions of some members of the legislature, an
inference may be drawn from this scenario where in a public hearing conducted by
a committee of the House of Representatives during which specific charges of
corruption were preferred by Ms Aruma Oteh, the Director- General of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the Chairman of the House
Committee (Mr. Herman Hembe) which raised fundamental questions about
Nigeria’s system of government. The report revealed that “as part of its statutory
oversight functions, the House [of Representatives] Committee on Capital Market
and Institutions probed the manifest cause of the near collapse of the capital
market” for two years running. It was alleged that the House Committee Chairman
resorted to unguarded utterances on the accused thus: “you are not fit to regulate
the sector”. The Committee Chairman allegedly accused Ms Oteh of profligacy,
asserting that she had “been spending money as if it was going out of fashion since
assuming office one year ago. You stayed in a hotel for eight months and spent
over N30 million. In one day you spent N85,000 on food at the hotel. The other
day you spent N850,000 on food. These are the things we should look at to see
how you will regulate a market that is collapsing (The Nation Newspaper, March
21, 2012, p.2). The Director-General was completely taken aback as she could not
put up a defense immediately. Rather, she questioned the credibility of the
Chairman to preside over the probe, alleging that the Committee Chairman (Mr.
Hembe) collected a cheque to travel to the Dominican Republic to attend a
conference. He did not attend the conference nor did he return the money. She
accused him of undermining his capacity to carry out his duties as Chairman of
House Committee by asking the Securities and Exchange Commission to
contribute N39 million for the public hearing, and demanded N5 million for
52
himself to avert justice. The Director-General of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) queried why the Chairman received information from the SEC
and passed judgment based on its face value without reference to the Commission
to verify the veracities of the issues raised therein. Aguda (2012) noted that while
bribery and corruption could seriously undermine any system of government, they
are not as fundamental in the damage they can do to a system of government as the
breach of the principle of separation of powers or as a disregard for fair hearing as
illustrated above. Hence, he made reference to the time-honoured procedure for the
conduct of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings which has long been well
established by the courts in all the common law countries, including Nigeria. The
procedure requires that any person against whom any allegation is made, or whose
interest may be adversely affected by such allegation, or by any statement made,
must be clearly and fully informed of such allegations or statements in advance of
any trial or investigation involving the accused. Therefore, the principles of legal
procedure demands thus:
Before any accused person is required to make his
or her defense or counter any statements adversely
affecting him or his interest, the following
requirements must be complied with. First, the
accused must be given the details of all allegations
or statements made against him; then he must be
afforded reasonable time and opportunity to prepare
his defense effectively to all the matters at issue; he
must be able to confront and challenge his accuser
or accusers at his trial or during any investigation.
These requirements apply in all situations and to all
proceedings involving any form of trial or
53
investigation no matter who conducts the trial or
carries out the investigation and for whatever
purpose (The Nation Newspaper, March 21, 2012,
p.2)
Aguda (2012) observed that in carrying out the statutory legislative oversight
function, had the Committee Chairman followed the requisite judicial requirement
to give the accused prior notice of the charges she was going to face at the trial, he
would have found out, as the accused subsequent defense might have indicated,
that she had plausible explanations for the allegations the House Committee
Chairman was making against her. However, the most important point at issue here
is not whether the House Committee Chairman’s allegations against the SEC
Director-General were true or whether the truth lies on the domain of the accused.
The fundamental issues are that the Legislative Committee breached the principle
of separation of powers by conducting judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and in
doing so, seriously violated the most fundamental rule of fair hearing (Aguda,
2012). The legislature has reduced this all important constitutional responsibility
to mere alarm mechanism being used to blackmail or witch-hunt political
opponents, extortion of money from the parastatals, departments and ministries
under its supervision for selfish or personal aggrandizement. For instance,
“Honourable” Farouk Lawan, Chairman, House of Representatives Ad Hoc
Committee on the Monitoring of Fuel Subsidy is alleged to have been enmeshed in
a US$620,000 bribery scandal. It was alleged that in course of executing the
statutory legislative oversight function on the N1.3 trillion fuel subsidy probe, the
“honourable” House Committee Chairman was alleged to have received
US$500,000 bribe from Zenon Oil and Gas Chairman, Mr Femi Otedola to
facilitate the removal of Zenon Oil and Gas company’s name from the list of oil
marketers who bought foreign exchange from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
54
without importing petroleum products. Security operatives report is alleged to have
revealed that initially the accused denied collecting any bribe from the accuser,
later he claimed that he collected the bribe to use it as exhibit against Mr Femi
Otedola. The oil magnate alleged that the House Ad Hoc Committee Chairman
demanded US$3 million but collected $500,000 bribe as first installment for the
purpose disclosed above. Subsequently, the “honourable member” was suspended
from the House of Representatives while legislative probe into the matter is still on
course. The Clerk of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Monitoring of Fuel Subsidy,
Mr Boniface Emenalo who was also implicated in the bribery scandal had as well
been suspended from the House. “Honourable” Emenalo allegedly collected a
bribe sum of US$120,000 from Adetola, making the total bribery sum to $620,000
(http://thisday-staging.portal.dmflex.net/articles/icpcon- standby).These incidents
are incredibly terrible, shameful, disgraceful and egregious legislative oversight
outings of the 21st century in a developing country. The Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Honourable Aminu Waziri Tambuwal, in a swift and subtle
reaction to the unfortunate and quite embarrassing development, reprimanded his
fellow parliamentarians (a tactful caveat) thus:
When we elected to pursue the entrenchment of
probity, accountability and transparency in the
conduct of government business as a cardinal
legislative agenda, we advised ourselves never to
expect that it will be an easy task. Accordingly, I
have had cause to occasionally sound a note of
warning and reminder that our constitutional task is
inescapably hazardous requiring total commitment,
diligence, transparency, determination and sacrifice
… we shall not hesitate to sanction anyone who in
55
the course of these investigations overreached
himself or uses the process to intimidate anyone or
engages in corruption. Legislators must continue to
adhere to their legislative agenda and remain not
only sensitive to the yearnings and aspirations of
Nigerians but also proactive on all matters of urgent
national importance (http://thisday
staging.portal.dmflex.net/articles/icpc-onstandby).
The precarious situation in Nigeria polity has made most Nigerians to lose faith in
the supposedly good intentions of the government. Jaja (2012) noted that as
Nigerians seek an end to the scourge of corruption in public sector, the
expectations are that the legislators would be more proactive rather than
reactionary in the discharge of their oversight functions. They are expected to do
this by detecting and preventing waste, inefficiency and corruption before they
take place. Unfortunately, this has not been the case as series of public hearings
and probes of agencies have been conducted without official reports on some of
these investigations at all levels of government since the inception of the new
political dispensation. The legislature is a principal arm of government through
which governments are held accountable for their actions and inactions. The public
is hapless when legislators compromise the very ingredient that protects
democracy and good governance.
Instances of Incidents of Legislative Oversight Abuse and Ultra Vires
Legislative Oversight Functions
The defects in the legislative oversight functions in Nigeria’s present system of
government have emerged explicitly in the instant executive and legislative
conflicts of interests. Its manifestation raises the question whether the National
Assembly [the Senate or the House of Representatives] have the constitutional
56
power to conduct some kind of investigations. Assuming the House has such
constitutional competence in its schedule, did it adhere to the constitutional
procedure as laid down? The response is obviously not palatable. Ironically, the
legislature claims and exercises such unbridled powers. For example, in 2007 the
Senate President was alleged to have informed the upper house that “it is our
responsibility to review the circumstances of the recent list of indicted persons by
the EFCC to ensure that the power exercised by the Agency was not contrary to the
provisions of the EFCC Act. We need to inquire why some persons whom EFCC
had charged to court for corrupt practices were not disqualified from elective
offices while persons [members of the Senate] not yet charged are now faced with
disqualification” (The Nation, February 21, 2007, p.47). The Senate President,
with his genuine intention to correct what he perceived as anomaly, erred in his
function because, following the demarcation in the borders of separation of power,
it lies in the functions of the judiciary to determine whether or not the EFCC has
acted outside the law that created it, definitely not that of the Senate (Aguda,
2012). The legislature has enjoyed unbridled latitude in its oversight functions and
has continually extended its exercise of this constitutional power into all areas of
governance without regard to functions of other arms of government. For instance,
the House [of Representatives] Committee on Aviation, under the chairmanship of
the Deputy Speaker of the House, allegedly imposed fines on some foreign airlines
accused of charging Nigerian travelers discriminatory air fares. The Committee on
Aviation conducted a public hearing where British Airways, Virgin Atlantic, Air
France, Emirate and eight other foreign airlines were allegedly found culpable in
the payment demand by the House Committee on Aviation that investigated the
matter. Apart from the alleged tax evasion, the airlines were also accused of
arbitrary fixing of fares and colluding with dubious aviation officials to
shortchange Nigerian air travelers. The Investigative Committee was said to have
57
arbitrarily ordered the airlines to refund N230 billion to the Nigerian Civil
Aviation Authority (NCAA) and mandated the airlines to make the refund or risk
necessary sanction. Besides, the committee directed NCAA to review the British
Airways Service Agreement (BASA) with British Airways. It was insinuated that
the committee was very angry with the foreign airlines and might summon them
for another round of talks in the near future. The House of Representatives here
again usurped the function of the judiciary in its oversight function. The legislature
derives its power under the Constitution “to direct or cause to be directed” an
investigation by the Executive arm of government into the alleged mismanagement
of public funds or any such or other cases. Inasmuch as the oversight function is
apt in governance, on completion of its investigation, the Committee supposed to
have passed on the report with its findings and recommendations to the parent
body [House of Representatives], urging the House for a judicial panel to be
constituted by the executive arm of the government to conduct full-fledged
inquiries on the issues raised therein. It is the constitutional responsibility of the
executive arm of government [not the legislature] to set up a judicial panel of
inquiry into the matter. It is outside the legislative function and jurisdiction to
dispense justice and impose or threaten to impose penalties. The legislature would
have as well passed jail sentence on those indicted or found culpable of the
offences, or ordered that the air-crews be detained in prison custody for further
hearing of the case in a future date. This is not the proper function of a legislative
house in a democracy where obedience of the rule of law is being respected,
protected and observed (The Nation; 2011). Until the principle of separation of
power is respected and strictly adhered to, and the doctrine of fair hearing is
properly adopted in clear terms in all sorts of legislative investigations, this area
will remain for a long time the major source of executive and legislative conflict in
governance. Any departure from this legal and constitutional procedure in the act
58
of governance would be a perversion of justice. Most often, it is observed that such
perversion of justice in our system has been the outcome of the so-called
“oversight functions” being carried out unregulated by the legislative arm of
government (Aguda, 2012). In the presidential system of government, the principle
of separation of powers is the most fundamental element, particularly in a true
democratic government. In the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, the legislature is not given the power to execute what the legislators now
brand “oversight functions” which most often involves the execution of the
judiciary and executive functions. Section 88 of the Constitution gives the National
Assembly only the power “to direct or cause to be directed” that such investigation
should be carried out into matters perceived to be anomalous in nature. The various
matters enumerated in subsection (1) of section 88 and that they “are exercisable
only for the purpose of enabling” the legislature (a) to make laws with respect to
certain specified matters; and (b) to expose corruption, inefficiency and waste. The
power is required to be exercised “by resolution published in its journal or in the
Official Gazette of the Government of the Federation. The legislature does not
seem to be observing the boundaries between it and other arms of government in
its oversight functions. There is need for committed coordination and streamlining
of government functions to harness the dividend of democracy and good
governance.
3.3 Oversight Activities of the Selected Committees from 2011 – 2015
Against the backdrop of our discussion so far, we will shed more light on the
legislative oversight outcomes or achievements of committees during the period
covered by the study. The oversight function of each committee are jurisdiction
specific, in the sense that they relate to clearly defined areas and government
59
offices, which each of them has been mandated to oversee, the oversight function
of the committee are intended to achieve the same objectives of ensuring that the
activities of the government are carried out legally, efficient and in a fashion
consistent with legislative intent. On this note, the committees will be assessed in
the context of the extent to which they have been effective in fulfilling their
respective oversight mandates.
3.3.1 Committees on Establishment and Public Service
Senates Committee on Establishment and Public Service
The committee consists of a Chairman, Vice Chairman and no member.
About the Committee:
Order XIII Rule 98. (24) of the Senate Standing Orders 2007 as amended states
that there shall be a committee to be known as Committee on Establishment and
Public Services appointed at the commencement of the life of the Senate.
The jurisdiction of the committee shall include:
(a) Federal public services matters generally including parastatals;
(b) Conditions of Service;
(c) Pension and gratuities;
(d) Training and manpower development;
(e) The office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation;
(f) Inter-governmental Affairs;
(g) Liaison between the National Assembly and the Presidency;
(h) Office of Head of Service;
(i) Consideration and Appropriation of Annual budget estimates of related
MDAs
60
House of Representative Committees on Public Service
The committee consists of a Chairman and Vice Chairman
About the Committee:
Order XVII Rule B.62.-(1) of the House Standing Orders 2007 states that there
shall be a Committee to be known
as Committee on Public Service and Federal Character consisting of not more
than 40 members appointed at
the commencement of the life of the House.
(2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall cover:
(a) Federal Public Service Matters generally;
(b) Conditions of Service;
(c) Pensions and Gratuities (Records);
(d) Matters relating to Federal Commissions and Councils as contained in the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, provided that such
Commissions and Councils are not covered by other Standing Committees;
(e) Oversight over the office of the Head of Service of the Government of the
Federation;
(f) All matters relating to the Federal Character Commission. (g) To receive
and treat complaints on non-compliance with Federal Character principles and
the law. (h) Annual budget estimates
3.3.2 Committee on Interior
Senate Committee on Interior
The committee consists of a Chairman, vice chairman and a member.
About the committee
61
There shall be a committee to be known as Committee on Internal Affairs
appointed at the commencement of the life of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the
committee shall include:
(a) Immigration and deportation;
(b) Naturalization and citizenship;
(c) Political asylum and Refugees;
(d) Prisons and other institutions for treatment of offenders;
(e) Public holidays;
(f) Aliens;
(g) Expatriates Quota;
(h) National day and other celebrations;
(i) Immigration and visas;
(j) Emigration;
(k) Passports and travel certificates;
(I) Seaman's identity;
(m) Medals and badges containing the National Flag and National Coat of Arms;
(n) Business permits;
(o) Registration of Marriages, births & deaths;
(p) Registration of Voluntary organisations;
(q) National Identity Card Project;
(r) National Civic Registration
(s) Registration of Voters, Voters Card;
(t) Elections generally;
(u) Funding of Political Parties;
(v) Independent National Electoral Commission;
(w) Demography, which includes birthrate, death rate, structure by age, sex, etc.;
62
(x) National population census;
(y) Annual budget estimates
House of Rep Committee on Interior
The committee consists of a Chairman, vice Chairman and 22 members
About the Committee:
Order XVII Rule B.37.- (1) of the House Standing Orders states that there shall
be a Committee to be known as
Committee on Internal Affairs consisting of not more than 40 members
appointed at the commencement of the life of the House.
(2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall cover:
(a) oversight the Ministry responsible for Interior;
(b) Immigration and deportation;
(c) Naturalization and citizenship;
(d) Prisons;
(e) Issuance of Nigerian passports;
(f) Public holidays, national civic registration;
(g) Aliens, emigration and business permits;
(h) Civil Defence;
(i) Expartriate Quota;
(j) National Identity Data Management;
(k) National Identity Card Scheme;
(l) Consideration and Appropriation of Annual budget estimates of
related MDAs.
3.3.3 Committee on Police Affairs
63
Senate Committee on Police Affairs
The committee consists of a chairman, vice chairman and one member
About the Committee:
Order XIII Rule 98 (46) of the Senate Standing Orders 2007 as amended states
that there shall be a Committee to be known as Committee on Police Affairs
appointed at the commencement of the life of the Senate.
The jurisdiction of the Committee shall include:
(a) Police Affairs generally;
(b) Budget relating to the operation and maintenance of police departments;
(c) Issues relating to recruitment, promotion, benefits and privileges of
members of the police force;
(d) Maintenance of law and order and ensuring internal security of the nation;
(e) Fire-arms control;
(f) Consideration and appropriation of annual budget estimates of related
Institutions.
House committee on Police Affairs
The committee consists of a chairman, vice chairman and 26 members
About the Committee:
Order XVII Rule B.56.-(1)states that there shall be a Committee to be known as
Committee on Police Affairs
consisting of not more than 40 members appointed at the commencement of the
life of the House.
(2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall cover :
(a) Ministry of Police Affairs;
(b) Nigeria Police Force;
64
(c) Interpol;
(d) Police Colleges;
(e) Police Service Commission;
(f) Maintenance of internal security and public order;
(g) Police Barracks, Police Housing and Police Post Housing Scheme;
(i) Annual budget estimates
3.3.4 Committee on Defence
Senate committee on Defence
The committee consists of a chairman, vice chairman and a member
About the Committee:
Order XIII Rule 98.(18) of the Senate Standing Orders 2007 as amended states
that there shall be a committee to be known as Committee on Defence and
Army appointed at the commencement of the life of the Senate.
The jurisdiction of the committee shall include:
(a) Payments, promotion, retirement and other benefits and privileges of
members of the Army;
(b) Size and composition of the Army;
(c) Defence headquarters;
(d) Ammunition depots, forts, arsenal reservations and establishments;
(e) Scientific research and development in support of the Army;
(f) Barrack projects;
(g) Military application of nuclear energy;
(h) Disarmament;
(i) Army cadets;
(j) Resettlement scheme for serving officers of the Army
65
(k) War graves, monuments and memorabilia;
(l) Peace keeping operations;
(m) Consideration and Appropriation of Annual budget estimates for the Army
House committee on Defence
The committee consists of a chairman, vice chairman and 23 members
About the Committee:
Order XVII Rule B.17.-(1) of the House Standing Orders 2007 states that there
shall be a Committee to be
known as Committee on Defence consisting of not more than 40 members
appointed during the life of the
House.
(2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall include:
(a) oversight the Ministry of Defence and Office of the Chief of Defence Staff
(b) Army, Navy and Air Force Departments in the Ministry of Defence;
(c) Ammunition depots, forts and arsenal.
(d) Scientific research and development in support of the armed services;
(e) Selective Service;
(f) Size and composition of the Army, Navy and Air Force;
(g) Barracks;
(h) Strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defence;
(i) Military applications of nuclear energy;
(j) Special oversight function with respect to disarmament, and military
dependants' education;
(k) Military Cadets;
(l) War Graves, Monuments and Memorabilia;
(m) Nigerian Defence Academy and Other Military Educational Institutions
66
(n) Defence Industry Corporation (DIC)
(o) Peace Keeping Operations;
(p) Veterans' measures generally;
(q) Compensation, vocational rehabilitation, and education of veterans;
(r) Re-adjustment of servicemen to civil life;
(s) Consideration and appropriation of annual budget estimates
3.3.5 Committee on Education
Senates Committee on Education
Chairman: Sen.Uche Chukwumerije, Vice Chairman: Sen. Olusola Adeyeye
About the Committee: Order XIII Rule 98.(21) of the Standing Orders of the
Senate 2007 as amended states that there shall be a committee to be known as
Committee on Education including Universal Basic Education (UBE) appointed at
the commencement of the life of the Senate.
The jurisdiction of the committee shall include: (a) Matters relating to education
generally; (b) Academic research; (c) External aid for education; (d) Educational
broadcasts; (e) Educational library services; (f) Educational statistics; (g) Federal
scholarships; (h) Institutions of higher education; (i) Vocational and non-formal
education; (j) National and international education agency; (k) Primary and
secondary education (special education); (l) Implementation of Universal Basic
Education Act; (m) Consideration and Appropriation of annual budget estimates
for related MDAs
Members: Sen. Ahmed Lawan
House of Representative Committees on Education
67
Chairman: Vice Chairman: Hon. ROSE OKOJI OKO
About the Committee: Order XVII Rule B.20.-(1) of the House Standing Orders
2007 states that there shall be a Committee to be known as Committee on
Education consisting of not more than 40 members appointed at the
commencement of the life of the House.
(2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall cover: (a) Measures relating to education
generally; (b) Academic research; (c) External aid for education; (d) Educational
broadcasts; (e) Oversight over all Parastatals under the Federal Ministry of
Education; (f) Educational library services; (g) Educational statistics; (h) Federal
scholarship; (i) Unity schools; (j) Education tax fund; (k) Institutions of higher
learning; (l) Vocational and non-formal education; (m) Universal Basic Education
(UBE); (o) Annual Budget Estimates
Members: Hon. Shehu Garba
3.3.6 Committee on Petroleum Downstream
Senate committee on Petroleum Downstream
The committee consists of a chairman, vice chairman and a member
About the Committee:
Order XIII Rule 98. (20) of the Senate Standing Orders 2007 as amended states
that there shall be a Committee to be known as Committee on Downstream
Committee on Downstream Petroleum Sector appointed at the sectors’
commencement of the life of the Senate.
The jurisdiction of the Committee shall include:
(i) Oil refineries;
(ii) Pipeline and Petroleum Products Marketing;
68
(iii) NNPC;
(iv) Ministry of Petroleum Resources;
(v) Petroleum Products Price Regulation;
(vi) Oil subsidy;
(vii) Consideration and Appropriation of Annual budget estimates of related
MDAs.
House committee on Petroleum Downstream
The committee consists of a chairman, vice chairman and 22 members
About the Committee:
Order XVII Rule B.54.?(1) of the House Standing Orders states that there shall
be a Committee to be known as
Committee on Petroleum Resources (Downstream) consisting of not more than
25 Members constituted during
the life of the House.
(2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall cover;
(a) Petroleum Refineries;
(b) Petroleum products marketing;
(c) Petrochemicals;
(d) Pipeline and Petroleum Marketing Company (PPMC);
(e) matters relating to downstream Petroleum Sector and oversight the
Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC) Downstream activities generally;
(f) Petroleum Equalization fund;
(g) Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA);
(h) in conference with relevant Committee(s) examine and scrutinize
69
the annual budget estimates of the NNPC and its subsidiaries and all oil related
companies and present same to the House for consideration and approval.
Table 1.1: Presentation of Committees and Members in the Senate
S/N Committee Name No of Members
1 Establishment & Public
Service
2
2 Interior 3
3 Police Affairs 3
4 Defence 3
5 Education 3
6 Petroleum Downstream 3
Source: National Assembly Official site
Table 1.2: Presentation of Committees and Members in the House of
Representatives
S/N Committee Name No of Members
1 Establishment & Public
Service
2
2 Interior 24
3 Police Affairs 28
4 Defence 25
5 Education 28
6 Petroleum Downstream 25
Source: National Assembly Official site
Overview of Oversight Mechanisms/Instruments used by the National
Assembly Committees
Briefs from MDAs
70
Visits to MDAs
Project inspection
Engagement with Appropriation Bill/Budgetary Function
Public/Investigative Hearing
Public petitions
Confirmation/Screening of Nominees
Interactive meetings/Sessions
Interviews
Bill Referrals
Resolutions
Committees of the National Assembly could deploy to enforce their Oversight
functions. There is a variety of instruments available for use by committees, which
are applied in varying degrees – as shall be discussed in subsequent chapter when
empirical data is recovered – some frequently, while others are used sparingly.
Direct oversight outcomes of the committees of the National Assembly
Intervention of the National Assembly led to the reform of the public
procurement Act, which effectively eliminates delays experienced by MDAs in
the access of funds for projects. The enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Act
was part of efforts by the National Assembly to address the high level of fiscal
indiscipline and mismanagement of public funds observed during oversight.
Oversight activities of committees led to drastic reduction in frequent
interruption of academic programmes in universities and other institutions in
the country. Ensured enhanced budgetary allocation to educational institutions
especially after the prolonged ASUU strike of 2013 and 2014. Instituted more
stringent measures aimed at curbing the menace of examination malpractices.
71
Instrumental to the implementation of the monetization policy with respect to
the federal ministry of education, parastatals, agencies and institutions. Through
intervention and interactions with the executive, the long confrontations
between polythnics, universities and the government were eliminated.
Enhanced funding of education programmes and projects, including assistance
to primary institutions in the area of renovation.
Their intervention led to the payment of debt owed to prison and gas
contractors. Introduced monthly imprest for all the Nigerian Prison Services in
Nigeria.
The investigation conducted on the immigration recruitment exercise which led
to the death of 16 people. The committee said insufficient funds were
responsible for the shoddy immigration recruitment exercise which led to the
death of the job seekers. At a Senate investigative hearing, members of the
committee on interior learnt that despite raising 710 million Naira from job
applicants, the recruitment consultant DRETEL Technologies Limited released
only 45 million Naira for the exercise. On March 15, the 16 job seekers died in
stampedes across Nigeria during the recruitment exercise, prompting
nationwide outrage and unearthing the huge level of unemployment in Nigeria.
Nigerians demanded to know those responsible for the exercise that caused
tears and agony for the families of those killed. From the testimonies of the
board members from the ministry of immigration and the comptroller general of
immigration, it appears the recruitment exercise was already fraught with
problems before it even began. All of this information was made possible for
public consumption due to the pro-activeness of committees of the legislature in
carrying out their oversight functions.
Raised the budget of the ministry of police affairs as recommended by the
executive. The committee on Police Affairs had on the 20th of December
72
summoned the IGP to appear before the committee and when he replied in
writing the committee members insisted that because of the seriousness
attached to the matter, he must appear before it on November 26th to explain and
answer questions as to why the police should shut out the lawmakers from
accessing the premises. It will be recalled that the Inspector-General of Police,
IGP Suleiman Abba, had declared that he would not recognize Hon. Aminu
Tambuwal as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, because doing so
would amount to subjudice since the case was still in court.
The probe of the controversy surrounding the award of contract and non-
delivery of multi-million Naira training ship for the Petroleum Training
Institute (PTI) in Effurun, Delta State. The contracts for the diving support
vessel, meant for the training of students at the institute, which was awarded to
Netsach Limited and partly paid for in 2009 during the late president Umaru
Yar’Adua's administration. It was learnt that since 2009 when the contractor
was paid the sum of N985 million, the National Assembly has been
appropriating funds for the vessel every year. According to the Chairman,
Senate Committee on Petroleum (Upstream), Senator Emmanuel Paulker, and
the discovery was made by the Joint National Assembly Committee on Gas and
Petroleum Resources (Upstream and Downstream) during the budget defence of
the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. According to him, the Committee had to
immediately set up the probe panel, comprising all the six committees on
petroleum and gas in the Senate and the House of Representatives, disclosing
that despite the yearly appropriation of funds for the vessel, it is yet to arrive the
shores of Nigeria, adding that it was the intention of the National Assembly to
find the vessel wherever it is.
CHAPTER FOUR
73
4.0 DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
4.1 Introduction
The research methodology, which present the techniques and procedures used for
this study sets out by considering the design, population, sample size and sampling
methods, research questions as well as the analytical tools employed in the analysis
and interpretation of data obtained from this study.
4.2 Presentation of Data
Two hundred (200) questionnaires were administered to respondents in the both
chambers of the legislature and from among the populace. After administration and
recollection, 197 were returned and three (3) were not returned. The returned
questionnaires represented 98.38 percent, while the unreturned questionnaires
recounted for 1.19 percent of the total questionnaires. Therefore, the analysis is
based on one hundred and ninety seven completed questionnaires, which were at
the disposal of the researcher. The analysis is sub-divided into three sections.
These are; background characteristic of respondents, substantive issues of the
research and test of hypothesis.
4.2.2 Demographic Characteristics
Question No 1
Respondents were asked to identify their sex.
Table 4.1: percentage distribution of respondents by sex
74
Sex Frequency Percentage
Male 101 52.0
Female 96 48.0
Total 197 100%
Source: Survey Research, 2015
Table 1 above indicates that males constituted 101respondents which represents
0.52% of the respondents. Female respondents were 96 representing 0.48%,
questionnaires were distributed on equal ratio to both sexes. This implies that more
males than females returned their questionnaires.
4.1.2 Question No 2
Respondents were asked to indicate their ages.
Table II: Percentage distribution of age
Age range Frequency Percentage
18 -29 90 50.7%
30 – 39 47 19%
40 – 49 60 30.3%
50 – 59 - -
60 and above - -
Total 197 100%
Source: Survey Research, 2015
75
Table II above shows that out of 197 respondents the highest proportion of 90
(50.7%) falls within the age range of 18 – 29, followed by 40 – 49 years age range
which constitutes 60 (30.3%). Respondents within the age range 30 – 39, who were
47 (19%), took third place.
4.1.3 Question No 3
Respondents were asked to indicate their religion
Table III: Percentage distribution of respondents by religion.
Alternatives Frequency Percentage
Islam 98 49.7
Christianity 72 36.5
Atheism 27 13.7
Total 197 100
Source: Survey Research, 2015
Table III above shows that out of 197 respondents, the highest proportion of 98
(49.7%) respondents practice Islam, following the above category are Christians
who constitute 72 (36.5%) respondents. The third in frequency level are atheists
who represent 27 (13.7%) respondents.
4.1.4 Question No 4
Respondents were asked to indicate their marital status
Table IV: Percentage distribution of respondents by marital status
76
Marital status Frequency Percentage
Married 120 60.9
Single 53 28.9
Divorced 12 6.1
Separated 2 1.01
Widow 7 1.56
Widower 3 1.5
Total 197 100%
Source: Survey Research, 2015
Table IV shows that the number of respondents that are single represent 120
(60.9%), the married respondents were 53 (28.9%), divorced amount for 12
(6.1%) the separated respondents were 2 (1.01%), the widow were 7 (1.56%) and
finally the respondents that were widowers were 3 (1.5%)
4.1.5 Question No 5
The interests here are the educational qualification of the respondents
Table V: Percentage distribution of respondents by educational qualification
Educational background Frequency Percentage
Primary education - -
WAEC/SSCE - -
ND/NCE 50 28%
Degree – above 147 72%
77
Total 197 100%
Source: Survey Research, 2013
Table V above shows that respondents with primary education amount for none,
none had WAEC/SSCE, while those with ND/NCE accounted for 50 (28%), those
with degree and above are 147 (72%).
SECTION B: Substantive Issues
Table 4.2: Are you a member of the current parliament?
Responses Frequency Percentage
Yes 177 89.4
No 20 10.6
Total 197 100%
Source: Survey Research, 2015
The above table shows that majority of the respondents making 177 (89.4%) are
members of parliament, while 20 (10.6%) of the respondents are not.
Table 4.2.1: Is the nature of legislative institution in Nigeria peculiar?
Responses Frequency Percentage
Yes 152 77
No 45 22.54
Total 197 100%
Source: Survey Research, 2015
78
Table VI above shows that the number of respondent that select yes were 152
(77%), while those that select no account for 45 (22.54%).
Table 4.2.2: Have Legislative oversight functions been carried out proficiently to
meet set goals?
Responses Frequency Percentage
Agree 102 51.8
Disagree 95 48.2
Undecided - -
Total 197 100%
Source: Survey Research, 2015
The above table reveals that 102 (51.8%) of respondents agree while 95 (48.2%) of
respondents selected disagree.
Table 4.2.3:How will you rate the performance of legislators in performing
oversight functions?
Responses Frequency Percentage
Intermediate 190 96.4
Low 7 3.6
High - -
Total 197 100%
Source: Survey Research, 2015
79
The table above shows that 190 (96.4%) of the respondents which constitute the
majority selected intermediate while a handful of 7 (3.6%) voted low.
Table 4.2.4: In your opinion are there challenges confronting the performance of
legislative oversight functions?
Responses Frequency Percentage
Yes 100 52.0
No 97 48.0
Total 197 100%
Source: Survey Research, 2015
The above table reveals that 100 (52.0%) of the respondents voted yes, while the
remaining 97 (48.0%) voted against.
Table 4.2.5:Can these challenges be addressed?
Responses Frequency Percentage
Agree 90 45.68
Disagree 100 50.76
Undecided 7 3.55
Total 197 100%
Source: Survey Research, 2015
The above table reveals that 90 (45.68%) of the respondents agree, 100 (50.76%)
of the respondents disagree, while 7 (3.55%) remained undecided.
80
Table 4.2.6:The performance of legislative oversight functions has very
significant impact on the activities of the National assembly during the period
within 2011 to 2015.
Responses Frequency Percentage
Agree 100 50.76
Disagree 97 49.24
Undecided - -
Total 197 100%
Source: Survey Research, 2015
The above table shows that the numbers of respondents that agree are 100
(50.76%) while those that disagree make up 95 (49.24%), this shows that those
who agree are more.
Section C: For Parliamentarians (For Senate)
Name of Committee Estab &
Pub
Service
Interior Police
Affairs
Defence Education Petroleum
Downstrea
m
No of Briefs from
MDAs
No of Visits to MDAs
No of Project inspection
81
No of Engagement with
Appropriation
Bill/Budgetary Function
No of
Public/Investigative
Hearing
No of Public petitions
No of
Confirmation/Screening
of Nominees
No of Interactive
meetings/Sessions
No of Interviews
No of Bill Referrals
No of Resolutions
Total
For House of Representatives
Name of Committee Estabs &
Pub
Service
Interior Police
Affairs
Defence Education Petroleum
Downstrea
m
No of Briefs from
MDAs
82
No of Visits to MDAs
No of Project inspection
No of Engagement with
Appropriation
Bill/Budgetary Function
No of
Public/Investigative
Hearing
No of Public petitions
No of
Confirmation/Screening
of Nominees
No of Interactive
meetings/Sessions
No of Interviews
No of Bill Referrals
No of Resolutions
Total
Source: Survey Research 2015
4.3 TEST OF HYPOTHESES
83
The statistical tool used to test this hypothesis is chi-square; it can be expressed as
follows;
X ²=∑( O−EE
) ²
Where X² = Chi-square
∑ = Summation
O = Observed Frequency
E = Expected Frequency
Observed frequency is the number of times the event has occurred, while the
expected frequency is the number of times an event is expected to occur.
Where the calculated value of chi-square (X²) at the degree of freedom (V) and
0.05 level of significance is less than the tabulated value of chi-square, then we
accept the null hypothesis (Ho) and reject the alternate hypothesis (H1). Also,
where the calculated value of chi-square at the appropriate degree of freedom (df)
and the same level of significance (0.05), is greater than the tabulated value of chi-
square, then we accept the alternate hypothesis (H1) and reject the null hypothesis
(Ho).
To test the hypotheses responses to the question that is relevant to the hypotheses
will be used.
84
Hypotheses 1: The performance of legislative oversight functions has very
significant impact on the activities of the National assembly during the
period within 2011 to 2015.
It is tested using questionnaire data question number IV on the Li-chart, table VIII
Table 4.2.6: The performance of legislative oversight functions has very
significant impact on the activities of the National assembly during the period
within 2011 to 2015.
Responses Frequency Percentage
Agree 100 50.76
Disagree 97 49.24
Undecided - -
Total 197 100%
Source: Survey Research, 2015
CONTINGENCY TABLE
RESPONDENTS
( O−E ²E
)
Agree 100 98.5
Disagree 97 98.5
197
85
O E O-E O-E² O-E²/E
Agree 100 98.5 1.5 2.25 0.02
Disagree 97 98.5 -1.5 2.25 0.02
0.04
Tab
Calculated
3.84
Calculated value
Degree of freedom (df)
df = (r-1) (c-1)
(2-1) (2x1)
1x1 = 1
5% df at1 = 3.84
INTERPRETATION
Hence, since X²calculated is 0.04 and is less than the 5% at 1 which is 3.84, we
then accept the null hypothesis, so the performance of legislative oversight
functions has very significant impact on the activities of the National assembly
during the period within 2011 to 2015.
4.4 Discussion of Findings
86
The findings from the discussion above reveals that there is a clear cut
relationship between oversight function of legislature and that the significance of
the various committees in oversight to the national assembly cannot be
overemphasized. It also reveals that a weak legislature and by extension its
committees is incapable of exerting any influence in the political process of the
state and cannot be effective in ensuring checks and balance. Conversely, given
constitutional powers (either written or unwritten), the strong legislature will be
well positioned to broaden the democratic space; it can shape governance through
various media open to it.
It is also recorded that no doubt, committees in the central legislature have made
some impressive efforts at re-engineering the social, economic and political
spheres of the nation. However, the political instability, absence of national
cohesion and economic challenges in Nigeria has only been tackled at disparate
degrees. Political instability in form of constant regime change has been properly
managed, evidenced by the intervention of the legislature to prevent a breakdown
of the constitution in March 2012, spearheaded by committees. Volatile political
environment anchored by the excesses of the executive and political violence,
notwithstanding, still constitute threats to democratic survival. Because of the
level of inter-ethnic suspicion and tension in the polity, national cohesion has
remained unattainable, moreover.
This has even become complicated by the activities of some elements in the
legislature whose sole aim in being in committees is to enrich themselves illicitly.
Thus, in the political and social spheres, the legislature has not been able to put
the nation in the path of stability and normalcy as would have been anticipated.
Economically, while the state is yet to reach the expected height, it appears some
of the legislations passed by the assembly have enabled the executive to
87
implement certain policies that gradually put the country back on the part to
gradual growth. Consequently, while the legislature has sought to reengineer the
state on different fronts, it has been unable to do that because of factors both
internal and external to the assembly. Yet, much depends on the extent to which
the assembly enjoys smooth working relationship with the executive for it to get
most of its policy initiatives implemented. The Nigerian central legislature, via its
committees needs to do better on their integrity in the service of the federation.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.0 Introduction
This chapter covers the summary of the research topic, conclusion based on the
findings of the research and recommendations for further research.
5.1 Summary
88
In any democratic arrangement, the legislative arm of government occupies a
central position in the machinery of government. Indeed, it has been observed that
the legislature is the connecting thread of the democratic process and arguably it’s
most central inst i tut ion. At a 2005 UN Summit, the speakers of parliament
resolved that parliament is the central institution through which the will of the
people is expressed, laws are passed, and government is held to account (Abati,
2010: 62). In Nigeria, the legislature is the first among the three organs of
government to be so recognized in the Constitution. Traditionally, the legislature
is vested with formal law making powers, which give legislators the authority to
influence public policy. Incidental to lawmaking is the legislative oversight
function, which is as important as the law making function itself. This is because
by nature, oversight is a follow-up activity intended to ensure that legislative goals
are met. In order words, the passing of a piece of legislation does not mean that all
is well. Oversight assures that the laws work. It encompasses every attempt by the
legislature to review, monitor and supervise government activities,
programmes and policies to ensure that they are legal, effective and efficient. Now,
considering the relatively large size of government, the oversight function can best
be undertaken through the committee system in which the entire legislature is
divided into committees with assigned responsibilities. The committee system in
contemporary times has become the power house of the legislature in both
advanced and emerging democracies. The trend towards the use of committees is
often seen as one of the distinctive features of modern democracies. To ensure the
achievement of satisfactory legislative outcomes, legislation is referred to
committees for in-depth scrutiny. The committee system has worked in the more
advanced legislatures. Through committees-the legislature shapes Bills, authorizes
expenditure and scrutinizes the activities of the executive. In Nigeria, the
committee system is the medium with which the National Assembly oversees the
89
government. In recent years, particularly since the commencement of the Fourth
Assembly in 1999, this function appears to be growing in prominence.
This study has examined the oversight activities of the Committees of the
National Assembly for the period, 2011 - 2015. The overriding objective is to
assess how effective the Committees had been in the performance of the oversight
function. The study is relatively comprehensive as it covers both the theoretical
and empirical aspects of oversight. It commenced with an introduction into the
legislature, reviewing the nature and functions of legislatures and their
committees. In this introductory part, other pertinent issues were considered
covering statement of research problems, objective of the study its significance
among others. The review of related literatures to the study was carried out in
chapter two and also a theoretical framework upon which the study was built was
also adopted in this chapter. Chapter 3 looked at areas such as; restoration of
democracy in Nigeria, overview of oversight function in the fourth republic and
oversight activities of some selected committees. Chapter Four detailed the
presentation and analysis of data collated from questionnaires so administered.
Chapter Five offered the summary, conclusion and recommendations.
5.2 Conclusion
The growing trend in modern democracies is the use of the Committee system
with an obvious advantage that it permits parliament to deploy its resources
efficiently and effectively, both in terms of people and time, to examine complex
and wide ranging issues more thoroughly than when they are discussed on the
floor of the House. For one thing, the whole House does not have the luxury of
time to consider matters in all particular details; hence, committee systems are
inevitable in the legislative and oversight business of the legislature. For another,
against the backdrop of the complexity and variety of the issues that face modern
90
legislatures, the demand on the time of legislators calls for specialization and
division of labour. This purpose is often very well served by Committees. As in
other countries, legislative committees of various types have assumed much of the
work of legislatures.
In creating committees, the general practice across countries is to recognize the
existing bureaucratic institutions, such as Ministries, Departments and Agencies as
well as other areas where legislative oversight is required. In other words, all
aspects of the executive arm of government have corresponding legislative
committees through which parliamentary oversight is exercised. Indeed, it is a
constitutional requirement in most democracies of the world that committees are
fashioned this way to reflect the size and reach of government to ensure that no
part of it is left out. In some other countries, legislative Committees are categorized
into sectors and groups aside from being special, standing committees and joint
committees of the House, In effect, committees whose functions and jurisdictions
are related fall into the same category for complementarities of functions and
decisions on issues within that locale. It should be added that the workings of the
committee system are only different in largely insignificant areas.
Every aspect of oversight is backed by law. The powers may be expressed or
implied in the Constitution. Another source of powers is the Standing Orders/
Rules of the parliament. In addition, the instruments with which the functions arc
performed are many. As a matter of fact, most legislatures have developed
constitutional mechanisms and tools designed to facilitate the performance of their
oversight functions in relation to the executive branch. The performance of this
role is done through a wide range of channels, organizations and structures.
Notably, the appropriation process provides an important opportunity for the
legislature to exercise legislative oversight. Through the legislative power of the
91
purse, all the Committees, particularly the Appropriation Committee, play
prominent roles in oversight and can influence executive behaviour and
government policy direction in the process. But, the legislature must understand
the operations of the government, to be able to make informed decisions on the
laws which it passes and to conduct oversight effectively. Considering the size of
Committees relative to the total number of members in both Chambers of the
National Assembly over the period of this study, on the surface, it seems that the
Committees are rather large. But, on a second thought, the reason for this is not far-
fetched. The executive arm of government, which the National Assembly oversees,
is complex and large. As such, the Committees would grow correspondingly.
Otherwise, the National Assembly may not be able to perform its responsibilities
effectively and efficiently. Thus, the observed number of committees is intended to
match the relatively large size and often complex executive arm of government.
However, the large number of committees has its attendant implications:
members' absenteeism and limited participation or non-participation in committees'
work and general adverse impact on output. Indeed, the implication of the large size
of committees was reinforced in the analysis as there were generally cases of
absenteeism at meetings. It is important to mention, however, that membership
needs to be related to the scope of mandates. From the international comparative
assessment, there appears not to be a standard practice as to the appropriate
committee size, although between 13 and 25 members has been suggested. In
Nigeria's case, a trade-off may have to be tolerated between number of committees
and the size of committees in view of the problem of limited participation of
members in committee work because of multiple memberships of committees.
5.3 Recommendations
92
Legislative oversight function is the eyes of the people in government that watch and monitor the activities of the executive arm and its agencies in the implementation of laws, programmes and policies meant to serve the collective interest of the electorates. It dictates waste, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, corruption, mismanagement of public resources, etc. Its relevance in democratic governance need not be overemphasized. Oversight function is essentially valuable in ensuring that the intent of the legislature in legislating laws that will improve the living standard of the poor is reflected in the performance of the executive functions.
It is traditional in any research endeavor that when problems are identified,
solutions are proffered. Proffering solutions takes the shape of recommendations.
Recommendations are directed at providing the leeway to solving the research
problem. It is against this background that the following recommendations are
advanced;
As important as its role in government, it must endeavor to conduct its oversight functions within the confine of the law that established the National Assembly. It is important to respect and observe the principle of separation of power as provided in the 1999 Constitution of the Federation.
Usurpation of functions and unguided encroachment into the constitutional functions of the executive and the judiciary arms is unnecessary and should therefore be guarded against in the performance of its oversight functions. Good governance is seriously undermined by the legislature’s
93
usurpation of both executive and judicial functions. The damaging effect of the legislature’s totalitarian approach to governance is made worse by the very high level of corruption prevailing in the country, precisely located at the echelon of government hierarchy where state looting, ungodly manipulations and low budget implementations are taking place.
The legislature should live above the board in all its public and private functions. The interest and unity of the country should override personal and collective interests of the legislative members. Congressional assignments are not and will not serve as sources of exploitation to enrich oneself. Dignity, integrity, fair play, accountability and transparency in the act of governance must always be the watch word of the legislature.
The legislature should see their membership in the National Assembly as a call to national duty which demands sacrifice, commitment to duty, sincerity of purpose in all aspects of governance and a demonstration of the true representatives of the people. Fraudulent enrichment is abhorred because it is a total aberration from our social value, against ethics of good governance, a disservice to expectations and aspirations of those who mortgaged their political power into your hands to represent their interest in government. Remember, these same people you will definitely meet again
94
on your way to the village. Which face and eyes will you use to look at them?
Orderliness, patience, perseverance, diligence and patriotism provide the answer for “service to mankind”. For as long as the above fraudulent incidents persist and invariably contribute further in undermining the system of government in this country, attainment of political stability and socio-economic development is certainly elusive in the near future.
The functions of the legislative oversight should advance beyond mere investigation and recommendation. There is need for constitutional and/or legal teeth to be structured for effective and efficient legislative oversight, as a watchdog on the executive arm and its agencies, to bite culprits or cause the persons found culpable to be sanctioned to serve as deterrent. The legislature should have legal power to compel the executive arm of government to take appropriate action to institute judicial panel of inquiry on matters that have been completely investigated by the legislature and the reports on such cases have been duly passed on to the executive to take logical conclusive action.
The legislature should have legal power to ensure that the executive would actually be cause to take such conclusive action on the matters referred to it by the law-makers. The era where cases are buried for fear of exposing powerful elements in government ought to be a thing of the past.
95
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Appendix
QUESTIONNAIRE ON:
OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS OF SOME SELECTED COMMITTEES IN THE
NIGERIA’S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 2011-2015
Department of Political Science and International Relations
Faculty of Social Science,
University of Abuja.
P.M.B 117.
Dear Respondent,
I am an M.sc student of the department of Political Science and International Relations,
university of Abuja. I am carrying out a research work on; Oversight Functions of Some
Selected Committees in the Nigeria’s National Assembly, 2011-2015 as part of the
101
requirement for the award of a B.sc degree. You are requested to kindly respond to the
questions contained in the questionnaire.
All responses shall be treated with confidentiality.
In sincerity
(Name)
Reg No: (not necessary)
SECTION A
SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS
1. SEX: Male [ ] Female [ ]
2. AGE: 30 – 39 [ ]
40 – 49 [ ]
50 – 59 [ ]
60 and Above [ ]
3. RELIGION: Islam [ ] Jews [ ] Christianity [ ]
4. MARITAL STATUS: Married [ ] Single [ ] Divorced [ ]
Widow [ ] Widower [ ]
102
5. EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION: primary [ ] O’level [ ]
A’level and above [ ]
SECTION B: SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
6. Are you a member of the current parliament?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
7. Is the nature of legislative institution in Nigeria peculiar?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
If Yes, Briefly Explain_________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
8. Have Legislative oversight functions been carried out proficiently to meet set goals?
Agree [ ] Disagree [ ] Undecided [ ]
9. How will you rate the performance of legislators in performing oversight functions?
High [ ] Low [ ] Intermediate [ ]
103
10. In your opinion are there challenges confronting the performance of legislative oversight
functions?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
If Yes, Briefly explain______________________________________________________
11. Can these challenges be addressed?
Agree [ ] Disagree [ ] Undecided [ ]
12. The performance of legislative oversight functions has very significant impact on the
activities of the National assembly during the period within 2011 to 2015.
Agree [ ] Disagree [ ] Undecided [ ]
SECTION C:
FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS: Please fill in number of occurrences of each in the empty
column
Name of Committee
No of Briefs from MDAs
No of Visits to MDAs
No of Project inspection
No of Engagement with Appropriation Bill/Budgetary
Function
No of Public/Investigative Hearing
No of Public petitions
104
No of Confirmation/Screening of Nominees
No of Interactive meetings/Sessions
No of Interviews
No of Bill Referrals
No of Resolutions
105