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The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2006
TajikistanPeaceNegotiationsConorMcAuliffe
The1997peaceaccordthatendedTajikistans
civilwar
was
the
culmination
of
ahard
fought,
threeyearlong negotiation process a process
characterized by extended periods of deadlock,
often interruptedby spasmsofviolencebetween
thewarringparties. Despitethesedifficulties,the
final agreement between the government of
Tajikistanand the Islamistdemocraticopposition
was a watershed event for the region: it
representedthefirstandonlytimeinhistorythat
Central Asias neoCommunist politicians were
forced to share power with an Islamic political
opposition.1
The agreement, however, was not an
inevitableororganicoutgrowthofthenegotiation
process. Therewasagreatreluctanceonthesides
ofboth parties to settle the conflict definitively,
even after the prospects of outright military
victoryhadallbutvanished. TheUnitedNations
sponsored talks dragged on for two and a half
years before internal and external forces
combined to create the necessary conditions for
agreement. Whatwere these forces? How did
theseforcestransformanegotiationdeadlockinto
afinal
settlement
in
the
course
of
less
than
six
months? What can this case tell us about the
viabilityof
agreements
reached
under
pressure?
These questions will be addressed through the
lensofripeness,aconceptthatRichardHaasshas
defined asthe existenceof theprerequisites for
diplomaticprogress.2
Background
Tajikistan is a
landlocked,
mountainouscountry
located in western
Central Asia
bordering
Afghanistan, China,
Uzbekistan, and
Kyrgyzstan. Its
population of 7.2
million is primarily
(85 percent) Sunni
Muslim, although
there is a sizable
groupof IsmailiShia
Muslims living inthe
remote
eastern
province of Gorno
Badakhshan. As the countrys official language,
Tajik, evolved fromPersian,Tajikistan isunique
in the predominantly Turkishspeaking Central
Asia. Asaresultofitsruggedterrainandlackof
economic development, Tajikistan is a highly
fragmented society. Political identity may be
The final agreementbetween the
government ofTajikistan and the
Islamist-democraticopposition was a
watershed event for theregion: it representedthe first and only timein history that Central
As ias neo-Communistpoliticians were forcedto share power with an
Islamic po liticalopposition
ConorMcAuliffe,FletcherMALDDecember2006, isa
secondyear student concentrating on international
security studies and public international law. His
upcoming MALD thesis focuses on the Taliban
resurgenceinAfghanistan.
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determinedby a complexmixture of factors, the
mostprominentbeingregionoforigin.
While the conflict that erupted in 1992was
ostensibly a competition between neo
CommunistswithtiestotheformerSovietregime
and a coalition of new Islamist and nationalist
parties,manyscholarsassertthattheconflictwas
at its root a power struggle among regional
identity groups.3 During the Soviet era, the
Leninabad and Kulyab regions were heavily
favored,andelitesfromtheseregionsformedthe
coreoftheCommunistpartyapparatus. Withthe
erosionofSovietcentralcontrolintheperestroika
era, other regional identity groups sought to
challengetheexistingpowerstructure.4
Thenew
political movements resulting from this period
were dominated by
representativesof
the
Garm and Gorno
Badakhshan regions,and,
although these
movements attempted to
differentiate themselves
ideologically from the
Communists, they also
servedasvehicles for the
advancement of regional
economic and political
interests.
The most powerful
of the new movements
was the Islamic
Renaissance Party of
Tajikistan (IRP). The IRP
capitalized on the
resurgence of Islam as a social and ideological
force and sought to establish Tajikistan as an
Islamic state. The other main branch of new
political movements can broadly be termed
democratic
and
consisted
of
three
secular
nationalistparties thatwereat leastnominally in
favor of political reform and economic
liberalization.5 In Tajikistans first post
Communist presidential election, an alliance of
convenience emergedbetween the Islamist and
democratic factions to challenge the Leninabad
andKulyabdominatedCommunistparty,which
remained the strongest political party in the
country. The Islamistdemocratic coalitions
candidate was defeated by the Communist
candidate, Rahmon Nabiev, in an election that
manyclaimedwasrigged.
After coming to power in 1991, however,
Nabievhadlittlemorethannominalcontrolofthe
country,andbythespringof1992Tajikistanwas
beset with deepening divisions along complex
ideological, ethnic, and regional lines. InMay,
antigovernmentdemonstrations inDushanbeby
opposition supporters became violent. The
intervention of Russian troops stationed in
Tajikistan temporarilyprevented theoutbreakof
fullscalecivilwar,andNabievagreedtocreatea
coalitionGovernment ofNational Reconciliation
(GNR) that incorporated the opposition Islamist
and democratic
parties.This
new
government,
however, never
gained the support
of the traditional,
Sovietera political
elites from the
Kulyab and
Leninabad regions
anditwastherefore
unable to
consolidatecontrol
ofthecountry.
Forthenextsix
months, anarchy
andbrutal violence
spread throughout
Tajikistan in a
Hobbesianwarofallagainstall. Fought largely
between regional militias, it was most violent
where nationallevel political competition
intersectedwith localantagonisms.6 Nabievwas
kidnapped
and
forced
to
resign
in
September.
TheParliamentcastavoteofnoconfidenceinthe
GNR in a special session and elected Imomali
Rakhmonov, a neoCommunist from theKulyab
region,asactingheadofstate. Rakhmonov,with
the support of two militias opposed to the
Islamistdemocraticalliance,begantoconsolidate
powerandexecuteaviolentcampaignagainstthe
IRPandotheroppositionforces. Theopposition,
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now formally aligned as the United Tajik
Opposition (UTO),was forced out ofDushanbe
but maintained strongholds in the central
Karategin region, in themountainous region of
GornoBadakhshan in the east, and a
headquartersinTaloqaninnorthernAfghanistan.
As the war continued into 1993 and 1994, the
Rakhmonov regime and the UTO insurgency
settled into a military stalemate. Although
defeated in thebattle for central authority,UTO
military commanders nonetheless continued to
wage a costly guerrilla war against the
Rakhmonovregimewellinto1996.
Inter-Tajik Peace Negotiations
Even as the military
stalemate became apparent in
1993and
1994,
neither
the
Rakhmonov regimenor theUTO
was committed to a negotiated
settlement. Thecostsofwartothe
political leadership had not yet
become critical, making
compromisemore attractive than
the continuation of military
operations. Therewere,however,
external forces and internal
considerationspushingtheparties
toat
least
begin
negotiations.
The work of the UN,
particularlythatoftheUNSpecial
Envoys, was instrumental in
bringingthewarringpartiestothe
negotiating table. The UN had
been actively involved in Tajikistan since its
September 1992 factfinding mission. In April
1993, the UN increased its efforts tomediate a
resolutionbyappointing IsmatKittaniof Iraqas
Special Envoy to Tajikistan.7 Intensive
preliminary
discussions
with
both
sides,
lasting
from May 1993 until the first official round of
interTajik talks in April 1994, worked through
such issues as the venue for first round of talks
andtheroleofthirdpartyobservers. Kittanis,as
well as subsequent SpecialEnvoys, engagement
of other regional governments also played an
importantpart ingarnering regional support for
UNpeacemaking initiatives. Consultationswith
Russia,Uzbekistan,Kyrgyzstan,Kazakhstan,Iran,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan resulted in these
countriesbecomingofficialobserverstotheinter
Tajiktalks.8
Other strong external forces pushed the
government toward negotiations. Russia, for
example,wasconcernedwiththeinstabilityonits
vulnerable southern flank itsbulwark against
theMuslimworld. SinceRakhmonovwasheavily
dependent on the passive support of the 25,000
Russian troops still stationed in Tajikistan to
remain in power, Russia was able to exert
significant pressure on the government to enter
negotiationswith theopposition.9 OtherCentral
Asian governments, notably
Uzbekistan, alsomade it clear to
Rakhmonov that theypreferreda
negotiatedsettlement
to
ongoing
instabilityintheregion.
The interests of thewarring
parties themselves also
contributed to their respective
decisions to enter the
negotiations. Although the war
was not yet costly enough to
compel either side to seek a
permanent settlement, it had
slipped into a mutually
destructivestalemate
where
both
sides were suffering a
degradationofmilitary capacities
and political support caused by
worsening humanitarian
conditions in their respective
territories.10
The government sought to
strengthen its uncertain hold on powerwithout
ceding toomuch to the opposition. Oneway it
could accomplish this would be to agree to a
ceasefire, consolidate its political gains, and
hopefully
generate
enough
economic
growth
or
anaidpackage to further reinforcebothmilitary
capacityandpoliticalstability.
Al though the war wasnot yet costly enough
to compel either side toseek a permanentsettlement, it had
slipped into a mutuallydestructive stalematewhere both sides weresuffering a degradation
of mil itary capacitiesand political support
caused by worseninghumanitarianconditions in their
respective territories
Similarly, the opposition agreed to begin
negotiations in thehopes of gaining concessions
from the government without renouncing its
ultimategoalofcontrollingthecountry. Another
important factorbehind thedecision tonegotiate
was the ongoing civil strife inAfghanistan and
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the fear on the part of both sides that the
instability in Afghanistan could spill over into
Tajikistan and exacerbate the existing violence
andinstability. Thiswasespeciallythecasewith
the ethnic Pamiri wing of the opposition in
GornoBadakhshan, where continuing flows of
Afghan refugees threatened to overwhelm the
alreadyscarceresourcesoftheregion.11
The interTajik negotiations began in April
1994 and concluded in June 1997 with a final
peace accord. The negotiations can be broken
down into threedistinctphases. The firstphase
lasted from the beginning of the talks to the
August 1995 agreement signed on the
fundamental principles for a comprehensive
political solution. Thisphaseof thenegotiations
wascharacterizedbyextendedperiodsofpolitical
deadlockinterspersed
with
occasional
but
significant advances. The ceasefire andprisoner
exchange agreement of September 1994 and the
general agreement on principles were the two
most noteworthy accomplishments of the first
phaseofnegotiations.
The second stage of negotiations, primarily
encompassing the continuous fifth round of the
negotiations,wasnotable for its lackofprogress
on substantive elements of the agreement.12
Lasting over a year until December 1996, the
secondphase
of
negotiations
was
essentially
a
deadlock where increasing levels of national
violence led to an overall deterioration of
negotiations. Disagreements over the venue for
thefifthroundoftalksoccupiedmuchoftheFall
of1995,andbythetimenegotiationsresumedon
November30inAshkabad,intensefightinginthe
oppositioncontrolled center of the country
(around Tavildara & Garm) overshadowed the
talks. In July 1996 the government and the
oppositiondidagreetoarenewaloftheceasefire
and
an
exchange
for
prisoners
of
war,
but
the
ceasefirebrokedownshortlythereafterasaresult
ofongoingattacksandcounterattacks,especially
in the Karategin Valley near the opposition
strongholdofGarm.
InDecember1996,afterayearofdiplomatic
exertion with little to show for it, a significant
breakthroughoccurred,markingthebeginningof
the third and final phase of the interTajik
negotiations. Rakhmonov flew toKhosDeh, in
northernAfghanistan, tomeet resistance leader
SaidAbdulloNuri onDecember 10 and 11.The
twoleadersagreedtothetextofadraftagreement
outlining the next steps in the peaceprocess, as
well as to a renewal of the ceasefire for the
duration of the interTajik talks. The formal
agreement was signed two weeks later in
Moscow, along with another agreement
delineatingthemainfunctionsandpowersofthe
Commission on National Reconciliation that
would oversee the implementation of the final
peace accord. Thereafter, negotiations moved
rapidly; all remaining outstanding issues were
resolved between January andMay 1997. The
issues resolved in this critical period included
substantive agreements on the future status of
refugees;the
disarmament
and
reintegration
of
UTO forces into the national army; the
legalizationoftheIRP;anda30percentquotafor
oppositionfigures ingovernmentposts.OnJune
27,1997inMoscow,NuriandRakhmonovsigned
theGeneralAgreement on the Establishment of
PeaceandNationalAccordinTajikistan,formally
endingtheUTOsmilitaryoppositionandpaving
the way for the implementation phase of the
accords.
Ashasbeenshown,thepeaceagreementdid
notappear
overnight;
it
was
the
result
of
a
tortuous negotiation process lasting over three
years. Theremarkableprogressmadeinthefirst
part of 1997 is even more striking when
juxtaposedagainstthediplomaticstalemateofthe
prior period. The rapid conclusion of the
negotiation process raises important questions
about thedynamicof thenegotiationasawhole.
Two in particular merit attention. First, what
factors account for the lack of progress in the
second phase of negotiations? Second, what
changed
towards
the
end
of
1996
to
break
the
impasse?
Absence of Ripeness Prior to December 1996
RichardHaasshas identifiedfourconditions
underwhichaconflictmaybeconsideredripefor
resolution. All four conditions inhismodel are
necessary,andtheabsenceofanyoneissufficient
toprecludeagreement. The four conditionsare:
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(1)amutuallyacceptableprocessorapproach to
negotiations; (2) the existence of sufficient
concessions on both sides to convince
constituents;(3)thecapacityofleaderstoagreeto
an accord; and (4) shared perceptions on the
desirabilityofanaccord.13
Thelackofprogressin
the interTajiknegotiationsbetweenAugust1995
andDecember 1996 can largelybe explainedby
the fact that these four necessary preconditions
werenotallpresent. Inotherwords,theconflict
wasnotyetripeforresolution.
1. Mutually acceptable approach to negotiations
The first requirement that of amutually
acceptableapproach to thenegotiationswas in
place as early as April 1994. From that point
onward, no disagreement existed between the
partiesover
the
necessity
of
the
UN
in
overseeing
negotiations.14
TheUNwasseenasanimpartial,
objective mediator by both sides. The basic
agendaforthepeacenegotiationswasnegotiated
atthefirstsession,establishingasharedvisionfor
thebasicoutlineof thepeaceplanand thebroad
issuesunderdiscussion.15
Theconsensusonthese
issuesneverdisappeared, and continued toplay
an important role in perpetuating the parties
engagement in talks, even during periodswhen
fightingwasintenseandnosubstantiveadvances
were
forthcoming
at
the
negotiating
table.
The
UNs mediation efforts had the full support of
other important actors such as theUN Security
Council, foreign governments, and other
internationalorganizations.16
2. Sufficient ConcessionsHaass writes that reaching a settlement
dependsonsufficientcompromiseonbothsides
toallow leaders topersuade theircolleaguesand
citizens that the national interest was
protected.17
Haassasserts that thiscondition is
oftennot
very
difficult
to
achieve,
but
intrastate
conflicts canbe amore challengingenvironment
for conflict resolution than traditional interstate
wars. Civil war is often perceived, rightly or
wrongly, as a zerosum affair. The evidence on
Tajikistan suggests, however, that the general
outlineoftheeventualsettlementwasunderstood
wellbefore theparties converged on amutually
acceptable solution in early 1997. InDecember
1995, at a negotiation session in Ashkabad, the
UTO delegation presented a set of elaborate
proposals on political and military issuesThe
core of the oppositions proposals was the
establishment of a council of national
reconciliation for a transitional period of up to
twoyears.18
While rejectedby thegovernment
at the time, a Commission on National
Reconciliationwas eventually agreed tobyboth
ofthenegotiatingparties,butnotuntil1997the
Commission represents a major pillar of the
ultimateagreement, and it resolvedmanyof the
outstanding political differences between the
parties. The absence of a fair and reasonable
formulawasnotasignificantcauseforthefailure
to reach a negotiated settlement during the
secondphase
of
negotiations.
3. Willingness to settle: Sufficient strength orweakness
By the end of 1995 there was a mutually
acceptedformatforthenegotiationsandthebasis
ofthefinalaccordhadalreadybeenproposed,but
Haasss third prerequisite was not readily
apparent. Leadersofthenegotiatingpartieswere
neithersufficientlystrongtopermitcompromise
(because of popularity or force) or sufficiently
weak
that
compromise
cannot
be
avoided.
19
NeitherRakhmonovnorNuriexercisedeffective
control over all parts of their constituencies or
territories. Rakhmonov, as the titular head of
state, had nominal control over theMinistry of
Interior forces (a poorly trained and poorly
equippedgroupof fighters)andhad thepolitical
allegianceof somemilitias.20
More importantly,
he still had the support of the Russian Border
Guard troops and the other CIS army troops
remaining inTajikistan to stabilize the situation.
However,asearlyas1994,theKulyabLeninabad
alliancehad
frayed
and
Rakhmonovs
hold
on
powerhadbecome increasingly tenuous. Militia
commandersthathelpedputhiminpowermade
politicaldemandsthathadtobemettoavoidthe
complete breakdown of Rakhmonovs influence
over coercive state organs. Given the internal
political crisis facing the government (even
among Rakhmonovs own supporters),
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Rakhmonovprobablydid
not feel sufficiently
secure in his position to
make significant moves
towards reconciliation
withtheopposition. Nor
had the crisiswithin the
regime reached thepoint
where Rakhmonov was
tooweaktoavoidsettling
withtheUTO.
Regardless of
whether Nuri perceived
his authority within the
UTOasstrongenoughto
conclude an agreement,
two specific
considerationsundermined
his
negotiating
flexibility andmilitated against accommodation.
First,Nurihadnomilitary constituency;hewas
highly dependent on a disparate network of
regional military commanders whose diverse
interestsand ideologiesneeded tobe considered
before any compromise couldbemadewith the
regime. Second, theverynatureof thewarand
the complex mosaic of identities and loyalties
driving it meant that political and military
allegianceswere often fluid,with the result that
anyconcession
could
precipitate
the
defection
of
a
criticalmilitary commander or local population.
Thus,evenhadan acceptable formulapresented
itself,Nuriwouldhavebeenseverelyconstrained
inhisabilitytoagreetoit.
4. Shared Perceptions on Desirability of Accord
The fourth indicator of ripeness was
unequivocallyabsentpriortoDecember1996:the
Rakhmonov government did not accept the
immediate need or desirability of a negotiated
solutionto
the
ongoing
conflict.
As
one
scholar
notes:
One of the main conditions for de
escalation, according to experts in
conflict resolution, was lacking in
Tajikistan,atleastinthefirststagesafter
theendofthewar:Amajorinfluencein
bringing about deescalation is the
prospect that the alternatives now and
inthefuturewillbeworseiftheconflict
continues unabated. As far as the
presentgovernmentwasconcerned,the
conflictwas,toallintentsandpurposes,
over, and consequently there was no
need tomake concessions to an enemy
whose activities hampered the
establishment of total control but did
notposeadirectthreattothesurvivalof
theregime.21
[T]he very nature ofthe war and the
complex mosaic ofidentities and loyalties
driving it meant thatpolitical and military
allegiances were oftenfluid, with the resultthat any concessioncould precipitate thedefection o f a critical
military commander orlocal population
Themajority of the largescale fighting had
ended by February 1993, and the ongoing
violence by itself was unlikely to dislodge
Rakhmonovfromhisseatofpower inDushanbe.
Rakhmonovsperceived
security
is
crucial
to
understanding the negotiations deadlock during
1995 and 1996. Themain forces that drove the
government to enter into the interTajik talks in
the first place Russian pressure for regional
stability and the tactical gains to be had from
buying time through negotiations hadbeen at
least partially exhausted. Until late 1996, the
government simply was not convinced that
negotiatingasettlementwasinitsbestinterest.
Appearance of Ripeness After December 1996AslateasDecember5,1996theUNSecretary
Generalwroteoffrequentceasefireviolationsthat
contradict the stated intentions of the Tajik
parties to resolve the conflict through political
means, raising serious questions regarding their
sincerity and intentions.22
Less than a week
later, Nuri and Rakhmonov initialed a draft
agreement forapermanent ceasefire,andby the
end ofJanuary,many of the outstanding issues
hadbeenresolved.
Negotiations
scholar
Louis
Kreisberg
has
suggestedathreetieredframeworkforanalyzing
theconditionsthatimpelpoliticalleaderstomove
toward accommodation and accord: domestic
pressures, the relationship between the
adversaries, and the international context.23
Kreisbergsframeworkcanbeusedtoexplainthe
development of ripeness in the interTajik
negotiationprocess.
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First Tier: Domestic Political ConditionsIn 1996, the domestic political situation in
Tajikistan underwent several changes that
weakenedRakhmonovsholdonstatepowerand
helpedbreak thenegotiatingdeadlock. First, a
deepening economic crisis, leading to food
shortages and excessively high grain prices,
generated significant popular unrest and
undermined Rakhmonovs plan to use the
negotiations tobuy time todefeat theopposition
militarily. Second, a sense of warweariness
began topervademilitary commanders, fighters,
andpopulacealike. According toone scholarof
the conflict, field commanders began to lose
interest in the interminable and hopeless
internecinestrifeandbecamemoreconcernedto
legalizeandconsolidate [their]gains. Finally,
theregional
political
alliance
that
formed
the
core
of Rakhmonovs support base began to
deteriorate. Rakhmonovs strategic decision to
hand out important government posts to
members of his own Kulyabi regional identity
group led to resentment from the Leninabadi
elites, theotherprincipal regional identitygroup
inthealliance. Thesplinteringofthegovernment
coalition ultimately undermined Rakhmonovs
power base and severely constrained his
negotiating leverageover theopposition. Ashe
beganto
face
challenges
from
within
his
own
coalition, the threats to Tajikistans territorial
integrity grew more tangible, and the ongoing
conflictwith theUTObecame lessofanuisance
and more of an existential threat. Thus the
breakthrough in negotiations can be partially
ascribed to a weakening in Rakhmonovs
bargaining position as a result of domestic
politicaldevelopments.
Second Tier: Relations between Adversaries
Kreisbergs second tier ismainly concerned
withshifts
in
the
balance
of
power
between
the
two parties. While scholars disagree overwhat
power relationship is most conducive to de
escalation, the consensus is that changes in this
balance can often serve to break a deadlocked
negotiationprocess. Suchchangesoccurredinthe
relationshipbetweentheRakhmonovgovernment
andtheUTOneartheendof1996. Thedomestic
political context that undermined Rakhmonovs
own position also weakened his negotiating
position visvis the opposition. Furthermore,
theoppositionmadeaseriesofmilitaryadvances
in1996indicatingagraduallyencroachingparity
bytheweakerparty,24
andultimatelyhelpingto
convinceRakhmonovoftheneedtosettlethecivil
wardefinitively.
Third Tier: The International ContextThe third tier proved to be the most
important in ripening the Tajik conflict for final
resolution. Events and decisions taking place
outsideofTajikistanexertedadisproportionately
large influence on the
course of the interTajik
negotiations. The most
significantof
these
factors
was the surgingmilitary
campaign of the Taliban
in Afghanistan,
culminating in their
capture of Kabul in
September1996. Another
key driver toward de
escalation was the
converging political
interests of Russia and
Iran,
the
two
major
regionalpowers,topromotepeaceinTajikistan.25
Additionally,Uzbekistan,forreasonsrelatedtoits
own political and security interests as themost
populous and powerful of the Central Asian
states,withdrew its support for theRakhmonov
regime. Uzbekistans actions further weakened
the regime and contributed to Rakhmonovs
decisiontosettletheconflictwiththeUTO.
As Rakhmonov beganto face challenges from
within his owncoalition, the threats toTajikistans territorialintegrity grew more
tangible, and theongoing conflict withthe UTO became less
of a nuisance and moreof an existential threat
The Afghan Talibans capture of Kabul
catalyzed the Tajik peace process by rendering
bothsidesalternativestoanegotiatedsettlement
significantlyriskier
and
less
appealing.
Haass
notes that as a rule, crisis or nearcrisis can
contribute to diplomacy if there is a shared
recognition that steps must be taken to avoid
developments that will be costly to all
concerned.26
At the endof 1996, thiswas true
forbothparties. TheRakhmonovregime,already
besetbymountingdomesticproblems,nowfaced
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in the Taliban a radical Islamic regime with
potentiallyregionalambitions. TheUTO, for its
part,facedanequallypressingthreat. Itsmilitary
viabilitydependedon thesanctuaryandsupport
it received from antiTaliban ethnic Tajik
guerrillas in northern Afghanistan who, reeling
from the Taliban campaign, had retreated into
their stronghold in the Panjshir Valley.
Furthermore,somesuspectthatAfghanNorthern
Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, under
pressure to secure his own supply routes into
Tajikistan,attempted tocutadealwith theTajik
government, potentially cutting off the UTO in
theprocess.27
Thus, a crucial component of the
UTOs military strategy was under serious
pressure, including also the possibility of a
Taliban incursion or fullscale invasion in
Tajikistan.
TheTalibansrisewasalsointimatelyrelated
tothesecondmajorinternationalpressureleading
to negotiation ripeness: the convergence of
RussianandIranianinterestinasettlementofthe
Tajik conflict. Russias primary interest in
Tajikistan was quite simple: To establish and
maintainmilitary security at almost any cost in
thehope of seeingCentralAsiabecome a stable
buffer zone between their homeland and the
Islamicworldtothesouth.28
RussianandCentral
Asianleaders
were
fearful
that
the
Taliban,
once
inpower,wouldattempttospreadtheirreligious
andpoliticalbeliefs toother states in the region,
destabilizingtheexistingsecular,neoCommunist
regimes.29
Evenworse,theleadersofthesestates
were uncertain that theTalibans
announced plans to liberate
CentralAsianMuslimswouldbe
limited to religious
proselytizing.30
Russias
economicinterestinpreservingits
monopoly
on
Central
Asias
natural resources especially
Caspian Sea oil and natural gas
deposits led Russia to seek a
settlementinTajikistaninorderto
keep the region free of the U.S.
andotherWesterninfluences.31
Iran also came to prioritize
stability in Tajikistan. Iran was
not enthusiastic about having a violently anti
Shia,Sunnifundamentalistrevolutionarystateon
its eastern border, and thus supported Afghan
ShiafactionsandlatertheNorthernAlliance. But
by 1996 the forces fighting to the Talibanwere
closetodefeat.Inorderfortheseforcestoremain
a viablemilitary opposition to theTaliban, they
neededastableandsecurerearbaseinTajikistan,
whichaffirmedIransconvictionintheneedfora
final resolution to theTajik civilwar. Also, like
Russia, Iranhadan interest inkeepingAmerican
andEuropeanpoliticalandeconomicintervention
outof itsperceived sphereof influence.32
Thus,
Russian and Iranian interestswere aligned, and
both regional powers used their influence to
pressurethesidestoreachanagreement.
TheshiftingrelationshipbetweenUzbekistan
andthe
Rakhmonov
regime
also
encouraged
an
agreement. While Tashkents support for
Rakhmonov helped him triumph in the 1992
power struggle, developments in 1994 and 1995
soured relations between the two states.
Uzbekistans President Islam Karimov, for
example, was aggravated by Rakhmonovs
inability to subdue the UTO insurgency,which
wasalleged tomaintainclose ties to themilitant
antigovernmentIslamicMovementofUzbekistan
(IMU).33Tajikistans instability and IMUs good
relationswith
members
of
the
Islamist
opposition
inTajikistanmeantthattheIMUfoundsanctuary
in Tajikistan even without the regimes explicit
support.
The steady disenfranchisement of ethnic
Uzbekswithintherulingparty in
Tajikistan also contributed to the
rift between Karimov and
Rakhmonov. EthnicUzbeksmade
up a large part of theLeninabad
and Hissar regional elites who
were
seemingly
integrated
in
the
regime, although they were
gradually ousted by the
Kulyabis.34
Interestingly,
Karimovcontributed to thepeace
settlement notby engaging in it,
but rather by withdrawing his
support for Rakhmonov in the
hope of forcing Tajikistans
Al though it has beenregularly threatened bythe difficult ies inherent
in forging a modernnation-state in a highly
fragmented society, theagreement between the
Rakhmonov regimeand the Islamist
opposition has heldfirm
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governmentto listentothedemandsof itsethnic
Uzbeks. Intheend,however,thisstrategyproved
counterproductive. Rakhmonovs weakened
politicalpositioncompelledhimtosettlewiththe
UTO through interTajik negotiations, a process
thatexcludedethnicUzbekinterests.35
These pressures Rakhmonovsweakening
domesticpoliticalposition, theUTOgainson the
battlefield,andthereactionofregionalpowersto
Talibanand IMUadvancesresulted inripeness
foranegotiatedsolution. While themechanisms
of thenegotiationschanged little fromonephase
of the process to the next, the third and final
phase succeeded because the underlying
conditions for deescalation were now in place.
Rakhmonovs political position had become so
weak that his stalling tactics were no longer
feasible,creating
asense
of
urgency
to
solve
the
problem. External pressures, particularly those
resulting from the rise of the Taliban, helped
convincebothsidesthatacompromiseagreement
wasbetterthantherealisticalternatives.
Evaluating the Tajik Peace Agreement
Having established that the agreement in
Tajikistanwas reached as a result of significant
internal and external pressures, the question
arisesas
to
whether
this
was
asuccessful
outcome, one that might even provide some
guidance to the resolution of future conflicts of
this variety. In order to evaluate the success of
the agreement itself, it is helpful to posit some
objectivecriteriaonwhichtobasethisassessment.
1. Effectively End Combat and AddressesUnderlying Causes
The first requirement of a successful
agreementisquiteclear:itmustendthecivilwar.
This implies a settlement of both military and
politicalissues.
On
the
military
side,
the
settlementmustputanendtotheorganizedused
of forcebyacriticalmassof thewarringparties.
ThisistheprincipalachievementoftheinterTajik
peaceprocessand theprimaryreasonwhy ithas
beendeemedasuccess. Admittedly,thesituation
inTajikistantoday isunstableandtheagreement
hasbeen imperfectly implemented.36
The 1997
agreementdidnotendallviolenceinthecountry;
many warlords from both sides of the conflict
never accepted the final terms of the agreement
and still operate outside the authority of the
government.37
YetthecivilwarbetweentheUTO
and the Rakhmonov regime did end, and the
country ismuchmore secure now than it was
priortotheagreement.
Whileanendtofightingbetweentheparties
is crucial, a successful negotiated outcomemust
alsoaddress thepoliticalsourcesofacivilwar
either by resolving them or by establishing a
mutually acceptable process for doing so in the
future. Tajikistans agreement did exactly that,
settling some of the lessdifficult issues outright
(such as the future status of refugees and the
integrationofthearmedforces),andsettingupa
processfor
the
resolution
of
more
intractable
issues through a bipartisan Commission on
National Recognition, chaired by opposition
leaderNuri.
2. Includes All Factions
Second, a successful negotiated agreement
mustalso includealloftheprincipalactors. Not
doing so risks creating spoilers. InTajikistan,
the talks were specifically designed to include
otherstates in theregionaswellas theprincipal
parties.
This
helped
reduce
neighboring
states
incentives to interfere inother, lessbenignways
and instead offered them a legitimate venue for
influencing events to protect their national
interests.
However,somecriticsoftheagreementpoint
to at least one important faction excluded from
the settlement.38
Thedominance of theKulyabi
faction within the Rakhmonov regime, and the
concomitant sideliningof the traditionalpolitical
elitesfromLeninabad(withitslargeethnicUzbek
population), did pose problems in the
implementationof
the
accords.
Still,
the
challenges emerging from the socalled
Kulyabization of government39
have not
resulted in renewedmilitary conflict. In recent
years Rakhmonov hasbegun distancing himself
fromhisKulyabibaseandpromotingLeninabadis
within government to temper discontent from
northernelites.40
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3. Implementation & SustainabilityThough oftenbehind schedule and infused
with adegree ofmistrust, theTajik agreements
majorprovisionshaveallbeenimplemented. The
Commission on National Reconciliation was
established and subsequently dissolved in
accordance with the agreements terms. An
amnesty for combatantswas declared andUTO
fightersweresuccessfullyintegratedintothenew
TajikistanNationalArmy. In 1999, the IRPwas
legalizedandpermittedtoparticipateinelections,
where they gained representation and accepted
the resultsof thepoliticalprocess.41
The limited
economicresourcesofthestatehave,infact,made
it very difficult for the government to establish
effectivecontrolovertheentirecountry,forcingit
tocededefactoauthorityoverpartsofthecountry
towarlords.
This,
however,
is
more
astructural
challenge to the feasibility of statehood in
Tajikistan than a problem with the peace
agreementitself.
Most importantly, the agreement must be
sustainable neithersofragileastofallapartat
the first crisis nor so inflexible as to preclude
necessary recalibrations during the
implementation phase. Although it has been
regularlythreatenedbythedifficultiesinherentin
forging a modern nationstate in a highly
fragmentedsociety,
the
agreement
between
the
Rakhmonov regime and the Islamist opposition
has held firm. The final verdict has not been
delivered on the ultimate permanence of the
peace agreement,but nearly nine yearswithout
largescale fighting represents a significant
achievement.
Thusthe1997peaceagreementrepresentsat
the very least a qualified success. However,
subsequent years have posed significant
challenges, and the success of the statebuilding
effort as awhole is far from certain. Warlords
controllargeswathsofthecountrywheretherule
of law has barely been implemented. Drug
traffickingfromAfghanistanaccountsforthirtyto
fifty percent of the countrys otherwise anemic
economy.42
Theextremescarcityofresourceshas
reinforced the necessity of kinshipbased access
networks, further eroding state control and
breedingacultureofendemiccorruption. There
are still unresolved
questions about the
relationship between
Islam and the state.
Rakhmonovs
increasingly
authoritarian
tendencies and recent
showdowns with
warlords indicate a
country in constant
simmeringcrisis.43
Yetdespitealltheseproblems,
thecountryhasremainedintactandindependent.
Furthermore,many of Tajikistans currentwoes
arewelloutsidetheboundsofwhatanegotiated
settlementtoacivilwarcouldreasonablyhopeto
solve.
External pressures wellshort o f unilateral
military intervention orUN-led peace
enforcement missionscan be suffic iently
compelling to hastenthe arrival of ripeness
Conclusion
The extraordinary pressure exerted on the
parties by the Talibans rise is unique to the
context of Tajikistan. Nonetheless, some
important lessons can be gleaned from the
experienceof the interTajiknegotiationsand the
implementationofthe1997peaceaccord:
The case of Tajikistan provides further
support forHaass ripeness theory. Despite
thevaliant
efforts
of
the
UN
Special
Envoys
and at times even of the government and
UTOinterlocutors,formostofthenegotiation
process thepartieswereunwillingorunable
tomake thenecessaryconcessions toreacha
permanent accord. Only when forces
exogenous to theactualnegotiationsacted to
alter the costbenefit dynamic of
accommodation did the parties reach an
agreement.
This
does
not
mean
that
mediation
efforts
are
futile, or that one should simply let small
warsburnthemselvesout.Onthecontrary,
when the necessary forces finally converged
to create the conditions for a settlement, the
settlement was reached relatively rapidly.Theconfidencebuildingmeasuresandshared
premises that hadbeen established over the
course of the first two and a half years of
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negotiationsplayed an importantpart in the
negotiatedsettlement. Finally,thecaseofTajikistandoesnotprovideany firm support for the hypothesis that
agreements reached under pressure are
inherently unsustainable. The 1997 Tajik
peace accord was the result of myriad
domesticandinternationalpressures. Despite
the extensivedifficulties encounteredduring
the implementationphase, thesettlementhas
survivedintact.
External pressures well short of unilateral
military intervention or UNled peace
enforcement missions can be sufficiently
compelling to hasten the arrival of ripeness.
PressurefromexternalactorssuchastheUN,
Russia, Iran, and Uzbekistan were very
important in convincing the parties to enter
negotiations, and later to reaching a final
settlement.The views and opinions expressed in articles are
strictly the authors own, and do not necessarily
represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and
EditorialBoards, or theProgramfor SouthwestAsia
and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher
School.
Despite the significant weaknesses of the
eventual agreement, the outcome must be
viewed as successful. Suboptimal
agreements, while not resolving every
possibleissue,
have
intrinsic
value
and
are
oftenthebestavailableoption.
1AhmedRashid,Jihad:TheRiseofMilitantIslaminCentralAsia(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2002),
9192.2RichardN.Haass,ConflictsUnending:TheUnitedStatesandRegionalDisputes(NewHaven:Yale
UniversityPress,1991),6.3
OlivierRoy,Interregionaldynamicsofwar,inPoliticsofCompromise:TheTajikistanPeaceProcess,
Accord,Issue10,K.AbdullaevandC.Barnes,eds.(London:ConciliationResources,2001).4Iverb.NeumannandSergeiV.Solodnik,RussianandCISpeaceenforcementinTajikistan,inRussian
andCIS
Peacekeeping,
Centre
of
Russian
Studies,
Publication
no.
1,
L.
Jonson
and
C.
Archer,
eds.
Available
athttp://www.nupi.no/russland/pub/Notat530.htm. AccessedAugust19,2006.5ShirinAkiner,Tajikistan:DisintegrationorReconciliation?(London:RoyalInstituteofInternational
Affairs,2001),33&40. Thesepartieswere:Rastokhez(Rebirth)NationalFront,theDemocraticPartyof
Tajikistan,andLaliBadakhshan(TheRubyofBadakhshan). Akinersuggeststhatthedesignation
democraticforthesepartiesissomewhatmisleading,asthetermwasmostlyusedasameansof
distinguishingtheyoungergenerationofpoliticalelitesfromtheoldguardcommunistnomenklatura
theysoughttoreplace.6
Roy,Interregionaldynamicsofwar.7AmbassadorKittaniwassucceededinJanuary1994byRamiroPirizBallonofUruguay. Ambassador
PirizBallonwaslatersucceededinJune1996byGerdMerrem,whooversawtheremainderoftheTajik
peaceprocess.8
VladimirGoryayev,ArchitectureofinternationalinvolvementintheTajikpeaceprocess,inPoliticsof
Compromise:TheTajikistanPeaceProcess.9This25,000manforceconsistedofapproximately17,000borderguardsand8,000peacekeepingtroops
fromtheCommonwealthofIndependentStates(CIS). TheborderguardswerestationedinTajikistan
frombeforethecollapseoftheSovietUnionandstayedonbyagreementwiththegovernmentof
Tajikistanafterindependence. Thepeacekeepingforcewasestablishedin1993byRussia,Uzbekistan,
KyrgyzstanandKazakhstaninaccordancewithArticleVIIIoftheUNCharter(seeUNDoc.S/26610,
dated30September1993).
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10Akiner,40.
11ReportoftheSecretaryGeneralontheSituationinTajikistan,UNDoc.S/1994/379(4April1994).
12Thefifthroundofnegotiationswasdesignatedascontinuousbecauseunlikepriorrounds,ithadno
specificstartandenddate,butwasinsteadanongoingprocessofengagementbetweenthetwosidesin
thenegotiations.13
Haass,2729.14
UNDoc.S/1994/379(4April1994).15
ReportoftheSecretaryGeneralontheSituationinTajikistan,UNDoc.S/1995/720,AnnexI(23August
1995).16
Goryayev,ArchitectureofinternationalinvolvementintheTajikpeaceprocess.17
Ibid.18
ReportoftheSecretaryGeneralontheSituationinTajikistan,UNDoc.S/1996/212(22March1996).19
Haass,27.20
Akiner,43.21
IrinaZviagelskaya,TheTajikConflict:ProblemsofRegulation,inTajikistan:TheTrialsofIndependence,
MohammedRezaDjalilietal.,eds.(NewYork:St.MartinsPress,1997),161. Inthepassagetheauthor
quotesLouis
Kriesberg
and
Stuart
J.
Thorson,
eds.
Timing
the
De
Escalation
of
International
Conflicts
(Syracuse,NY: SyracuseUniversityPress,1991),15.22
ReportoftheSecretaryGeneralontheSituationinTajikistan,UNDoc.S/1996/1010(5December1996).23
LouisKriesberg,TimingandtheInitiationofDeEscalationMoves,inNegotiationTheoryandPractice,
J.WilliamBreslinandJeffreyZ.Rubin,eds.(Cambridge,MA:ProgramonNegotiationBooks,1999),223
231.24
Kreisberg,228.25
RigacciHay,MethodologyoftheinterTajiknegotiationprocess.26
Haass,141142.27
MohammedRezaDjaliliandFredericGrare,RegionalInterestsandAmbitionsinTajikistan:theRole
ofAfghanistan,PakistanandIran,inTajikistan:TheTrialsofIndependence,122.28
Olivier
A.
J.
Brennenkmeijer,
International
Concern
for
Tajikistan:
UN
and
OSCE
Efforts
to
Promote
PeaceBuildingandDemocratisation,inTajikistan:TheTrialsofIndependence,181.29
Rashid,104.30
SteveColl,GhostWars:TheSecretHistoryoftheCIA,Afghanistan,andbinLaden,fromtheSovietInvasionto
September10,2001(NewYork:PenguinBooks,2004),345.31
Rubin,Introduction:TheTajikistanPeaceAgreement. ThediscoveryoftheTengizoilfieldin
westernKazakhstanin1979,inadditiontotheoildepositsinAzerbaijanandnaturalgasfieldsin
Turkmenistan,madetheCaspianSeaaregionofvitalstrategicimportancefortheSovietUnion,andlater
Russia.32
Rashid,219.33
Naumkin,232.34
Naumkin,230.35
ItshouldbenotedthatAkinerisremarkablylessconfidentthanotherscholarsinspeculatingabout
Karimovsmotivations.Henotesthatafter1995,KarimovsattitudetowardstheTajikleadershipwas
characterizedbyfrequentandabruptreversals,alternatelyhostileandconciliatory. Itistemptingto
speculateonthereasonsforthisambiguitybuttoolittleinformationisavailableontheprocessofUzbek
policymakingtodetermineforcertainwhatmotiveslaybehindthesechangesoforientation. Akiner,
48.36
InternationalCrisisGroup,Tajikistan:AnUncertainPeace,(Osh/Brussels:24December2001).37
Akiner,7274.
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38Rubin,Introduction:TheTajikistanPeaceAgreement.
39Akiner,64.
40InternationalCrisisGroup,Tajikistan:AnUncertainPeace,6.
41Rashid,242.
42Rashid,243.
43
InternationalCrisisGroup,TajikistansPolitics:ConfrontationorConsolidation?(Dushanbe/Brussels:19
May2004).
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