Mcauliffe - Tajikistan Peace Negotiations

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The Fletcher School Al Nakhlah Tufts University160 Packard Avenue Medford, MA 02155-7082 U.S.A Tel: +1.617.627.3700

The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2006

TajikistanPeaceNegotiationsConorMcAuliffe

The1997peaceaccordthatendedTajikistans

civilwar

was

the

culmination

of

ahard

fought,

threeyearlong negotiation process a process

characterized by extended periods of deadlock,

often interruptedby spasmsofviolencebetween

thewarringparties. Despitethesedifficulties,the

final agreement between the government of

Tajikistanand the Islamistdemocraticopposition

was a watershed event for the region: it

representedthefirstandonlytimeinhistorythat

Central Asias neoCommunist politicians were

forced to share power with an Islamic political

opposition.1

The agreement, however, was not an

inevitableororganicoutgrowthofthenegotiation

process. Therewasagreatreluctanceonthesides

ofboth parties to settle the conflict definitively,

even after the prospects of outright military

victoryhadallbutvanished. TheUnitedNations

sponsored talks dragged on for two and a half

years before internal and external forces

combined to create the necessary conditions for

agreement. Whatwere these forces? How did

theseforcestransformanegotiationdeadlockinto

afinal

settlement

in

the

course

of

less

than

six

months? What can this case tell us about the

viabilityof

agreements

reached

under

pressure?

These questions will be addressed through the

lensofripeness,aconceptthatRichardHaasshas

defined asthe existenceof theprerequisites for

diplomaticprogress.2

Background

Tajikistan is a

landlocked,

mountainouscountry

located in western

Central Asia

bordering

Afghanistan, China,

Uzbekistan, and

Kyrgyzstan. Its

population of 7.2

million is primarily

(85 percent) Sunni

Muslim, although

there is a sizable

groupof IsmailiShia

Muslims living inthe

remote

eastern

province of Gorno

Badakhshan. As the countrys official language,

Tajik, evolved fromPersian,Tajikistan isunique

in the predominantly Turkishspeaking Central

Asia. Asaresultofitsruggedterrainandlackof

economic development, Tajikistan is a highly

fragmented society. Political identity may be

The final agreementbetween the

government ofTajikistan and the

Islamist-democraticopposition was a

watershed event for theregion: it representedthe first and only timein history that Central

As ias neo-Communistpoliticians were forcedto share power with an

Islamic po liticalopposition

ConorMcAuliffe,FletcherMALDDecember2006, isa

secondyear student concentrating on international

security studies and public international law. His

upcoming MALD thesis focuses on the Taliban

resurgenceinAfghanistan.


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Al Nakhlah2

determinedby a complexmixture of factors, the

mostprominentbeingregionoforigin.

While the conflict that erupted in 1992was

ostensibly a competition between neo

CommunistswithtiestotheformerSovietregime

and a coalition of new Islamist and nationalist

parties,manyscholarsassertthattheconflictwas

at its root a power struggle among regional

identity groups.3 During the Soviet era, the

Leninabad and Kulyab regions were heavily

favored,andelitesfromtheseregionsformedthe

coreoftheCommunistpartyapparatus. Withthe

erosionofSovietcentralcontrolintheperestroika

era, other regional identity groups sought to

challengetheexistingpowerstructure.4

Thenew

political movements resulting from this period

were dominated by

representativesof

the

Garm and Gorno

Badakhshan regions,and,

although these

movements attempted to

differentiate themselves

ideologically from the

Communists, they also

servedasvehicles for the

advancement of regional

economic and political

interests.

The most powerful

of the new movements

was the Islamic

Renaissance Party of

Tajikistan (IRP). The IRP

capitalized on the

resurgence of Islam as a social and ideological

force and sought to establish Tajikistan as an

Islamic state. The other main branch of new

political movements can broadly be termed

democratic

and

consisted

of

three

secular

nationalistparties thatwereat leastnominally in

favor of political reform and economic

liberalization.5 In Tajikistans first post

Communist presidential election, an alliance of

convenience emergedbetween the Islamist and

democratic factions to challenge the Leninabad

andKulyabdominatedCommunistparty,which

remained the strongest political party in the

country. The Islamistdemocratic coalitions

candidate was defeated by the Communist

candidate, Rahmon Nabiev, in an election that

manyclaimedwasrigged.

After coming to power in 1991, however,

Nabievhadlittlemorethannominalcontrolofthe

country,andbythespringof1992Tajikistanwas

beset with deepening divisions along complex

ideological, ethnic, and regional lines. InMay,

antigovernmentdemonstrations inDushanbeby

opposition supporters became violent. The

intervention of Russian troops stationed in

Tajikistan temporarilyprevented theoutbreakof

fullscalecivilwar,andNabievagreedtocreatea

coalitionGovernment ofNational Reconciliation

(GNR) that incorporated the opposition Islamist

and democratic

parties.This

new

government,

however, never

gained the support

of the traditional,

Sovietera political

elites from the

Kulyab and

Leninabad regions

anditwastherefore

unable to

consolidatecontrol

ofthecountry.

Forthenextsix

months, anarchy

andbrutal violence

spread throughout

Tajikistan in a

Hobbesianwarofallagainstall. Fought largely

between regional militias, it was most violent

where nationallevel political competition

intersectedwith localantagonisms.6 Nabievwas

kidnapped

and

forced

to

resign

in

September.

TheParliamentcastavoteofnoconfidenceinthe

GNR in a special session and elected Imomali

Rakhmonov, a neoCommunist from theKulyab

region,asactingheadofstate. Rakhmonov,with

the support of two militias opposed to the

Islamistdemocraticalliance,begantoconsolidate

powerandexecuteaviolentcampaignagainstthe

IRPandotheroppositionforces. Theopposition,

The Fletcher School Al Nakhlah Tufts University


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Fall 2006 3

now formally aligned as the United Tajik

Opposition (UTO),was forced out ofDushanbe

but maintained strongholds in the central

Karategin region, in themountainous region of

GornoBadakhshan in the east, and a

headquartersinTaloqaninnorthernAfghanistan.

As the war continued into 1993 and 1994, the

Rakhmonov regime and the UTO insurgency

settled into a military stalemate. Although

defeated in thebattle for central authority,UTO

military commanders nonetheless continued to

wage a costly guerrilla war against the

Rakhmonovregimewellinto1996.

Inter-Tajik Peace Negotiations

Even as the military

stalemate became apparent in

1993and

1994,

neither

the

Rakhmonov regimenor theUTO

was committed to a negotiated

settlement. Thecostsofwartothe

political leadership had not yet

become critical, making

compromisemore attractive than

the continuation of military

operations. Therewere,however,

external forces and internal

considerationspushingtheparties

toat

least

begin

negotiations.

The work of the UN,

particularlythatoftheUNSpecial

Envoys, was instrumental in

bringingthewarringpartiestothe

negotiating table. The UN had

been actively involved in Tajikistan since its

September 1992 factfinding mission. In April

1993, the UN increased its efforts tomediate a

resolutionbyappointing IsmatKittaniof Iraqas

Special Envoy to Tajikistan.7 Intensive

preliminary

discussions

with

both

sides,

lasting

from May 1993 until the first official round of

interTajik talks in April 1994, worked through

such issues as the venue for first round of talks

andtheroleofthirdpartyobservers. Kittanis,as

well as subsequent SpecialEnvoys, engagement

of other regional governments also played an

importantpart ingarnering regional support for

UNpeacemaking initiatives. Consultationswith

Russia,Uzbekistan,Kyrgyzstan,Kazakhstan,Iran,

Pakistan, and Afghanistan resulted in these

countriesbecomingofficialobserverstotheinter

Tajiktalks.8

Other strong external forces pushed the

government toward negotiations. Russia, for

example,wasconcernedwiththeinstabilityonits

vulnerable southern flank itsbulwark against

theMuslimworld. SinceRakhmonovwasheavily

dependent on the passive support of the 25,000

Russian troops still stationed in Tajikistan to

remain in power, Russia was able to exert

significant pressure on the government to enter

negotiationswith theopposition.9 OtherCentral

Asian governments, notably

Uzbekistan, alsomade it clear to

Rakhmonov that theypreferreda

negotiatedsettlement

to

ongoing

instabilityintheregion.

The interests of thewarring

parties themselves also

contributed to their respective

decisions to enter the

negotiations. Although the war

was not yet costly enough to

compel either side to seek a

permanent settlement, it had

slipped into a mutually

destructivestalemate

where

both

sides were suffering a

degradationofmilitary capacities

and political support caused by

worsening humanitarian

conditions in their respective

territories.10

The government sought to

strengthen its uncertain hold on powerwithout

ceding toomuch to the opposition. Oneway it

could accomplish this would be to agree to a

ceasefire, consolidate its political gains, and

hopefully

generate

enough

economic

growth

or

anaidpackage to further reinforcebothmilitary

capacityandpoliticalstability.

Al though the war wasnot yet costly enough

to compel either side toseek a permanentsettlement, it had

slipped into a mutuallydestructive stalematewhere both sides weresuffering a degradation

of mil itary capacitiesand political support

caused by worseninghumanitarianconditions in their

respective territories

Similarly, the opposition agreed to begin

negotiations in thehopes of gaining concessions

from the government without renouncing its

ultimategoalofcontrollingthecountry. Another

important factorbehind thedecision tonegotiate

was the ongoing civil strife inAfghanistan and



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the fear on the part of both sides that the

instability in Afghanistan could spill over into

Tajikistan and exacerbate the existing violence

andinstability. Thiswasespeciallythecasewith

the ethnic Pamiri wing of the opposition in

GornoBadakhshan, where continuing flows of

Afghan refugees threatened to overwhelm the

alreadyscarceresourcesoftheregion.11

The interTajik negotiations began in April

1994 and concluded in June 1997 with a final

peace accord. The negotiations can be broken

down into threedistinctphases. The firstphase

lasted from the beginning of the talks to the

August 1995 agreement signed on the

fundamental principles for a comprehensive

political solution. Thisphaseof thenegotiations

wascharacterizedbyextendedperiodsofpolitical

deadlockinterspersed

with

occasional

but

significant advances. The ceasefire andprisoner

exchange agreement of September 1994 and the

general agreement on principles were the two

most noteworthy accomplishments of the first

phaseofnegotiations.

The second stage of negotiations, primarily

encompassing the continuous fifth round of the

negotiations,wasnotable for its lackofprogress

on substantive elements of the agreement.12

Lasting over a year until December 1996, the

secondphase

of

negotiations

was

essentially

a

deadlock where increasing levels of national

violence led to an overall deterioration of

negotiations. Disagreements over the venue for

thefifthroundoftalksoccupiedmuchoftheFall

of1995,andbythetimenegotiationsresumedon

November30inAshkabad,intensefightinginthe

oppositioncontrolled center of the country

(around Tavildara & Garm) overshadowed the

talks. In July 1996 the government and the

oppositiondidagreetoarenewaloftheceasefire

and

an

exchange

for

prisoners

of

war,

but

the

ceasefirebrokedownshortlythereafterasaresult

ofongoingattacksandcounterattacks,especially

in the Karategin Valley near the opposition

strongholdofGarm.

InDecember1996,afterayearofdiplomatic

exertion with little to show for it, a significant

breakthroughoccurred,markingthebeginningof

the third and final phase of the interTajik

negotiations. Rakhmonov flew toKhosDeh, in

northernAfghanistan, tomeet resistance leader

SaidAbdulloNuri onDecember 10 and 11.The

twoleadersagreedtothetextofadraftagreement

outlining the next steps in the peaceprocess, as

well as to a renewal of the ceasefire for the

duration of the interTajik talks. The formal

agreement was signed two weeks later in

Moscow, along with another agreement

delineatingthemainfunctionsandpowersofthe

Commission on National Reconciliation that

would oversee the implementation of the final

peace accord. Thereafter, negotiations moved

rapidly; all remaining outstanding issues were

resolved between January andMay 1997. The

issues resolved in this critical period included

substantive agreements on the future status of

refugees;the

disarmament

and

reintegration

of

UTO forces into the national army; the

legalizationoftheIRP;anda30percentquotafor

oppositionfigures ingovernmentposts.OnJune

27,1997inMoscow,NuriandRakhmonovsigned

theGeneralAgreement on the Establishment of

PeaceandNationalAccordinTajikistan,formally

endingtheUTOsmilitaryoppositionandpaving

the way for the implementation phase of the

accords.

Ashasbeenshown,thepeaceagreementdid

notappear

overnight;

it

was

the

result

of

a

tortuous negotiation process lasting over three

years. Theremarkableprogressmadeinthefirst

part of 1997 is even more striking when

juxtaposedagainstthediplomaticstalemateofthe

prior period. The rapid conclusion of the

negotiation process raises important questions

about thedynamicof thenegotiationasawhole.

Two in particular merit attention. First, what

factors account for the lack of progress in the

second phase of negotiations? Second, what

changed

towards

the

end

of

1996

to

break

the

impasse?

Absence of Ripeness Prior to December 1996

RichardHaasshas identifiedfourconditions

underwhichaconflictmaybeconsideredripefor

resolution. All four conditions inhismodel are

necessary,andtheabsenceofanyoneissufficient

toprecludeagreement. The four conditionsare:



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(1)amutuallyacceptableprocessorapproach to

negotiations; (2) the existence of sufficient

concessions on both sides to convince

constituents;(3)thecapacityofleaderstoagreeto

an accord; and (4) shared perceptions on the

desirabilityofanaccord.13

Thelackofprogressin

the interTajiknegotiationsbetweenAugust1995

andDecember 1996 can largelybe explainedby

the fact that these four necessary preconditions

werenotallpresent. Inotherwords,theconflict

wasnotyetripeforresolution.

1. Mutually acceptable approach to negotiations

The first requirement that of amutually

acceptableapproach to thenegotiationswas in

place as early as April 1994. From that point

onward, no disagreement existed between the

partiesover

the

necessity

of

the

UN

in

overseeing

negotiations.14

TheUNwasseenasanimpartial,

objective mediator by both sides. The basic

agendaforthepeacenegotiationswasnegotiated

atthefirstsession,establishingasharedvisionfor

thebasicoutlineof thepeaceplanand thebroad

issuesunderdiscussion.15

Theconsensusonthese

issuesneverdisappeared, and continued toplay

an important role in perpetuating the parties

engagement in talks, even during periodswhen

fightingwasintenseandnosubstantiveadvances

were

forthcoming

at

the

negotiating

table.

The

UNs mediation efforts had the full support of

other important actors such as theUN Security

Council, foreign governments, and other

internationalorganizations.16

2. Sufficient ConcessionsHaass writes that reaching a settlement

dependsonsufficientcompromiseonbothsides

toallow leaders topersuade theircolleaguesand

citizens that the national interest was

protected.17

Haassasserts that thiscondition is

oftennot

very

difficult

to

achieve,

but

intrastate

conflicts canbe amore challengingenvironment

for conflict resolution than traditional interstate

wars. Civil war is often perceived, rightly or

wrongly, as a zerosum affair. The evidence on

Tajikistan suggests, however, that the general

outlineoftheeventualsettlementwasunderstood

wellbefore theparties converged on amutually

acceptable solution in early 1997. InDecember

1995, at a negotiation session in Ashkabad, the

UTO delegation presented a set of elaborate

proposals on political and military issuesThe

core of the oppositions proposals was the

establishment of a council of national

reconciliation for a transitional period of up to

twoyears.18

While rejectedby thegovernment

at the time, a Commission on National

Reconciliationwas eventually agreed tobyboth

ofthenegotiatingparties,butnotuntil1997the

Commission represents a major pillar of the

ultimateagreement, and it resolvedmanyof the

outstanding political differences between the

parties. The absence of a fair and reasonable

formulawasnotasignificantcauseforthefailure

to reach a negotiated settlement during the

secondphase

of

negotiations.

3. Willingness to settle: Sufficient strength orweakness

By the end of 1995 there was a mutually

acceptedformatforthenegotiationsandthebasis

ofthefinalaccordhadalreadybeenproposed,but

Haasss third prerequisite was not readily

apparent. Leadersofthenegotiatingpartieswere

neithersufficientlystrongtopermitcompromise

(because of popularity or force) or sufficiently

weak

that

compromise

cannot

be

avoided.

19

NeitherRakhmonovnorNuriexercisedeffective

control over all parts of their constituencies or

territories. Rakhmonov, as the titular head of

state, had nominal control over theMinistry of

Interior forces (a poorly trained and poorly

equippedgroupof fighters)andhad thepolitical

allegianceof somemilitias.20

More importantly,

he still had the support of the Russian Border

Guard troops and the other CIS army troops

remaining inTajikistan to stabilize the situation.

However,asearlyas1994,theKulyabLeninabad

alliancehad

frayed

and

Rakhmonovs

hold

on

powerhadbecome increasingly tenuous. Militia

commandersthathelpedputhiminpowermade

politicaldemandsthathadtobemettoavoidthe

complete breakdown of Rakhmonovs influence

over coercive state organs. Given the internal

political crisis facing the government (even

among Rakhmonovs own supporters),



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Rakhmonovprobablydid

not feel sufficiently

secure in his position to

make significant moves

towards reconciliation

withtheopposition. Nor

had the crisiswithin the

regime reached thepoint

where Rakhmonov was

tooweaktoavoidsettling

withtheUTO.

Regardless of

whether Nuri perceived

his authority within the

UTOasstrongenoughto

conclude an agreement,

two specific

considerationsundermined

his

negotiating

flexibility andmilitated against accommodation.

First,Nurihadnomilitary constituency;hewas

highly dependent on a disparate network of

regional military commanders whose diverse

interestsand ideologiesneeded tobe considered

before any compromise couldbemadewith the

regime. Second, theverynatureof thewarand

the complex mosaic of identities and loyalties

driving it meant that political and military

allegianceswere often fluid,with the result that

anyconcession

could

precipitate

the

defection

of

a

criticalmilitary commander or local population.

Thus,evenhadan acceptable formulapresented

itself,Nuriwouldhavebeenseverelyconstrained

inhisabilitytoagreetoit.

4. Shared Perceptions on Desirability of Accord

The fourth indicator of ripeness was

unequivocallyabsentpriortoDecember1996:the

Rakhmonov government did not accept the

immediate need or desirability of a negotiated

solutionto

the

ongoing

conflict.

As

one

scholar

notes:

One of the main conditions for de

escalation, according to experts in

conflict resolution, was lacking in

Tajikistan,atleastinthefirststagesafter

theendofthewar:Amajorinfluencein

bringing about deescalation is the

prospect that the alternatives now and

inthefuturewillbeworseiftheconflict

continues unabated. As far as the

presentgovernmentwasconcerned,the

conflictwas,toallintentsandpurposes,

over, and consequently there was no

need tomake concessions to an enemy

whose activities hampered the

establishment of total control but did

notposeadirectthreattothesurvivalof

theregime.21

[T]he very nature ofthe war and the

complex mosaic ofidentities and loyalties

driving it meant thatpolitical and military

allegiances were oftenfluid, with the resultthat any concessioncould precipitate thedefection o f a critical

military commander orlocal population

Themajority of the largescale fighting had

ended by February 1993, and the ongoing

violence by itself was unlikely to dislodge

Rakhmonovfromhisseatofpower inDushanbe.

Rakhmonovsperceived

security

is

crucial

to

understanding the negotiations deadlock during

1995 and 1996. Themain forces that drove the

government to enter into the interTajik talks in

the first place Russian pressure for regional

stability and the tactical gains to be had from

buying time through negotiations hadbeen at

least partially exhausted. Until late 1996, the

government simply was not convinced that

negotiatingasettlementwasinitsbestinterest.

Appearance of Ripeness After December 1996AslateasDecember5,1996theUNSecretary

Generalwroteoffrequentceasefireviolationsthat

contradict the stated intentions of the Tajik

parties to resolve the conflict through political

means, raising serious questions regarding their

sincerity and intentions.22

Less than a week

later, Nuri and Rakhmonov initialed a draft

agreement forapermanent ceasefire,andby the

end ofJanuary,many of the outstanding issues

hadbeenresolved.

Negotiations

scholar

Louis

Kreisberg

has

suggestedathreetieredframeworkforanalyzing

theconditionsthatimpelpoliticalleaderstomove

toward accommodation and accord: domestic

pressures, the relationship between the

adversaries, and the international context.23

Kreisbergsframeworkcanbeusedtoexplainthe

development of ripeness in the interTajik

negotiationprocess.



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Fall 2006 7

First Tier: Domestic Political ConditionsIn 1996, the domestic political situation in

Tajikistan underwent several changes that

weakenedRakhmonovsholdonstatepowerand

helpedbreak thenegotiatingdeadlock. First, a

deepening economic crisis, leading to food

shortages and excessively high grain prices,

generated significant popular unrest and

undermined Rakhmonovs plan to use the

negotiations tobuy time todefeat theopposition

militarily. Second, a sense of warweariness

began topervademilitary commanders, fighters,

andpopulacealike. According toone scholarof

the conflict, field commanders began to lose

interest in the interminable and hopeless

internecinestrifeandbecamemoreconcernedto

legalizeandconsolidate [their]gains. Finally,

theregional

political

alliance

that

formed

the

core

of Rakhmonovs support base began to

deteriorate. Rakhmonovs strategic decision to

hand out important government posts to

members of his own Kulyabi regional identity

group led to resentment from the Leninabadi

elites, theotherprincipal regional identitygroup

inthealliance. Thesplinteringofthegovernment

coalition ultimately undermined Rakhmonovs

power base and severely constrained his

negotiating leverageover theopposition. Ashe

beganto

face

challenges

from

within

his

own

coalition, the threats to Tajikistans territorial

integrity grew more tangible, and the ongoing

conflictwith theUTObecame lessofanuisance

and more of an existential threat. Thus the

breakthrough in negotiations can be partially

ascribed to a weakening in Rakhmonovs

bargaining position as a result of domestic

politicaldevelopments.

Second Tier: Relations between Adversaries

Kreisbergs second tier ismainly concerned

withshifts

in

the

balance

of

power

between

the

two parties. While scholars disagree overwhat

power relationship is most conducive to de

escalation, the consensus is that changes in this

balance can often serve to break a deadlocked

negotiationprocess. Suchchangesoccurredinthe

relationshipbetweentheRakhmonovgovernment

andtheUTOneartheendof1996. Thedomestic

political context that undermined Rakhmonovs

own position also weakened his negotiating

position visvis the opposition. Furthermore,

theoppositionmadeaseriesofmilitaryadvances

in1996indicatingagraduallyencroachingparity

bytheweakerparty,24

andultimatelyhelpingto

convinceRakhmonovoftheneedtosettlethecivil

wardefinitively.

Third Tier: The International ContextThe third tier proved to be the most

important in ripening the Tajik conflict for final

resolution. Events and decisions taking place

outsideofTajikistanexertedadisproportionately

large influence on the

course of the interTajik

negotiations. The most

significantof

these

factors

was the surgingmilitary

campaign of the Taliban

in Afghanistan,

culminating in their

capture of Kabul in

September1996. Another

key driver toward de

escalation was the

converging political

interests of Russia and

Iran,

the

two

major

regionalpowers,topromotepeaceinTajikistan.25

Additionally,Uzbekistan,forreasonsrelatedtoits

own political and security interests as themost

populous and powerful of the Central Asian

states,withdrew its support for theRakhmonov

regime. Uzbekistans actions further weakened

the regime and contributed to Rakhmonovs

decisiontosettletheconflictwiththeUTO.

As Rakhmonov beganto face challenges from

within his owncoalition, the threats toTajikistans territorialintegrity grew more

tangible, and theongoing conflict withthe UTO became less

of a nuisance and moreof an existential threat

The Afghan Talibans capture of Kabul

catalyzed the Tajik peace process by rendering

bothsidesalternativestoanegotiatedsettlement

significantlyriskier

and

less

appealing.

Haass

notes that as a rule, crisis or nearcrisis can

contribute to diplomacy if there is a shared

recognition that steps must be taken to avoid

developments that will be costly to all

concerned.26

At the endof 1996, thiswas true

forbothparties. TheRakhmonovregime,already

besetbymountingdomesticproblems,nowfaced



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in the Taliban a radical Islamic regime with

potentiallyregionalambitions. TheUTO, for its

part,facedanequallypressingthreat. Itsmilitary

viabilitydependedon thesanctuaryandsupport

it received from antiTaliban ethnic Tajik

guerrillas in northern Afghanistan who, reeling

from the Taliban campaign, had retreated into

their stronghold in the Panjshir Valley.

Furthermore,somesuspectthatAfghanNorthern

Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, under

pressure to secure his own supply routes into

Tajikistan,attempted tocutadealwith theTajik

government, potentially cutting off the UTO in

theprocess.27

Thus, a crucial component of the

UTOs military strategy was under serious

pressure, including also the possibility of a

Taliban incursion or fullscale invasion in

Tajikistan.

TheTalibansrisewasalsointimatelyrelated

tothesecondmajorinternationalpressureleading

to negotiation ripeness: the convergence of

RussianandIranianinterestinasettlementofthe

Tajik conflict. Russias primary interest in

Tajikistan was quite simple: To establish and

maintainmilitary security at almost any cost in

thehope of seeingCentralAsiabecome a stable

buffer zone between their homeland and the

Islamicworldtothesouth.28

RussianandCentral

Asianleaders

were

fearful

that

the

Taliban,

once

inpower,wouldattempttospreadtheirreligious

andpoliticalbeliefs toother states in the region,

destabilizingtheexistingsecular,neoCommunist

regimes.29

Evenworse,theleadersofthesestates

were uncertain that theTalibans

announced plans to liberate

CentralAsianMuslimswouldbe

limited to religious

proselytizing.30

Russias

economicinterestinpreservingits

monopoly

on

Central

Asias

natural resources especially

Caspian Sea oil and natural gas

deposits led Russia to seek a

settlementinTajikistaninorderto

keep the region free of the U.S.

andotherWesterninfluences.31

Iran also came to prioritize

stability in Tajikistan. Iran was

not enthusiastic about having a violently anti

Shia,Sunnifundamentalistrevolutionarystateon

its eastern border, and thus supported Afghan

ShiafactionsandlatertheNorthernAlliance. But

by 1996 the forces fighting to the Talibanwere

closetodefeat.Inorderfortheseforcestoremain

a viablemilitary opposition to theTaliban, they

neededastableandsecurerearbaseinTajikistan,

whichaffirmedIransconvictionintheneedfora

final resolution to theTajik civilwar. Also, like

Russia, Iranhadan interest inkeepingAmerican

andEuropeanpoliticalandeconomicintervention

outof itsperceived sphereof influence.32

Thus,

Russian and Iranian interestswere aligned, and

both regional powers used their influence to

pressurethesidestoreachanagreement.

TheshiftingrelationshipbetweenUzbekistan

andthe

Rakhmonov

regime

also

encouraged

an

agreement. While Tashkents support for

Rakhmonov helped him triumph in the 1992

power struggle, developments in 1994 and 1995

soured relations between the two states.

Uzbekistans President Islam Karimov, for

example, was aggravated by Rakhmonovs

inability to subdue the UTO insurgency,which

wasalleged tomaintainclose ties to themilitant

antigovernmentIslamicMovementofUzbekistan

(IMU).33Tajikistans instability and IMUs good

relationswith

members

of

the

Islamist

opposition

inTajikistanmeantthattheIMUfoundsanctuary

in Tajikistan even without the regimes explicit

support.

The steady disenfranchisement of ethnic

Uzbekswithintherulingparty in

Tajikistan also contributed to the

rift between Karimov and

Rakhmonov. EthnicUzbeksmade

up a large part of theLeninabad

and Hissar regional elites who

were

seemingly

integrated

in

the

regime, although they were

gradually ousted by the

Kulyabis.34

Interestingly,

Karimovcontributed to thepeace

settlement notby engaging in it,

but rather by withdrawing his

support for Rakhmonov in the

hope of forcing Tajikistans

Al though it has beenregularly threatened bythe difficult ies inherent

in forging a modernnation-state in a highly

fragmented society, theagreement between the

Rakhmonov regimeand the Islamist

opposition has heldfirm



9/13

Fall 2006 9

governmentto listentothedemandsof itsethnic

Uzbeks. Intheend,however,thisstrategyproved

counterproductive. Rakhmonovs weakened

politicalpositioncompelledhimtosettlewiththe

UTO through interTajik negotiations, a process

thatexcludedethnicUzbekinterests.35

These pressures Rakhmonovsweakening

domesticpoliticalposition, theUTOgainson the

battlefield,andthereactionofregionalpowersto

Talibanand IMUadvancesresulted inripeness

foranegotiatedsolution. While themechanisms

of thenegotiationschanged little fromonephase

of the process to the next, the third and final

phase succeeded because the underlying

conditions for deescalation were now in place.

Rakhmonovs political position had become so

weak that his stalling tactics were no longer

feasible,creating

asense

of

urgency

to

solve

the

problem. External pressures, particularly those

resulting from the rise of the Taliban, helped

convincebothsidesthatacompromiseagreement

wasbetterthantherealisticalternatives.

Evaluating the Tajik Peace Agreement

Having established that the agreement in

Tajikistanwas reached as a result of significant

internal and external pressures, the question

arisesas

to

whether

this

was

asuccessful

outcome, one that might even provide some

guidance to the resolution of future conflicts of

this variety. In order to evaluate the success of

the agreement itself, it is helpful to posit some

objectivecriteriaonwhichtobasethisassessment.

1. Effectively End Combat and AddressesUnderlying Causes

The first requirement of a successful

agreementisquiteclear:itmustendthecivilwar.

This implies a settlement of both military and

politicalissues.

On

the

military

side,

the

settlementmustputanendtotheorganizedused

of forcebyacriticalmassof thewarringparties.

ThisistheprincipalachievementoftheinterTajik

peaceprocessand theprimaryreasonwhy ithas

beendeemedasuccess. Admittedly,thesituation

inTajikistantoday isunstableandtheagreement

hasbeen imperfectly implemented.36

The 1997

agreementdidnotendallviolenceinthecountry;

many warlords from both sides of the conflict

never accepted the final terms of the agreement

and still operate outside the authority of the

government.37

YetthecivilwarbetweentheUTO

and the Rakhmonov regime did end, and the

country ismuchmore secure now than it was

priortotheagreement.

Whileanendtofightingbetweentheparties

is crucial, a successful negotiated outcomemust

alsoaddress thepoliticalsourcesofacivilwar

either by resolving them or by establishing a

mutually acceptable process for doing so in the

future. Tajikistans agreement did exactly that,

settling some of the lessdifficult issues outright

(such as the future status of refugees and the

integrationofthearmedforces),andsettingupa

processfor

the

resolution

of

more

intractable

issues through a bipartisan Commission on

National Recognition, chaired by opposition

leaderNuri.

2. Includes All Factions

Second, a successful negotiated agreement

mustalso includealloftheprincipalactors. Not

doing so risks creating spoilers. InTajikistan,

the talks were specifically designed to include

otherstates in theregionaswellas theprincipal

parties.

This

helped

reduce

neighboring

states

incentives to interfere inother, lessbenignways

and instead offered them a legitimate venue for

influencing events to protect their national

interests.

However,somecriticsoftheagreementpoint

to at least one important faction excluded from

the settlement.38

Thedominance of theKulyabi

faction within the Rakhmonov regime, and the

concomitant sideliningof the traditionalpolitical

elitesfromLeninabad(withitslargeethnicUzbek

population), did pose problems in the

implementationof

the

accords.

Still,

the

challenges emerging from the socalled

Kulyabization of government39

have not

resulted in renewedmilitary conflict. In recent

years Rakhmonov hasbegun distancing himself

fromhisKulyabibaseandpromotingLeninabadis

within government to temper discontent from

northernelites.40



10/13

Al Nakhlah10

3. Implementation & SustainabilityThough oftenbehind schedule and infused

with adegree ofmistrust, theTajik agreements

majorprovisionshaveallbeenimplemented. The

Commission on National Reconciliation was

established and subsequently dissolved in

accordance with the agreements terms. An

amnesty for combatantswas declared andUTO

fightersweresuccessfullyintegratedintothenew

TajikistanNationalArmy. In 1999, the IRPwas

legalizedandpermittedtoparticipateinelections,

where they gained representation and accepted

the resultsof thepoliticalprocess.41

The limited

economicresourcesofthestatehave,infact,made

it very difficult for the government to establish

effectivecontrolovertheentirecountry,forcingit

tocededefactoauthorityoverpartsofthecountry

towarlords.

This,

however,

is

more

astructural

challenge to the feasibility of statehood in

Tajikistan than a problem with the peace

agreementitself.

Most importantly, the agreement must be

sustainable neithersofragileastofallapartat

the first crisis nor so inflexible as to preclude

necessary recalibrations during the

implementation phase. Although it has been

regularlythreatenedbythedifficultiesinherentin

forging a modern nationstate in a highly

fragmentedsociety,

the

agreement

between

the

Rakhmonov regime and the Islamist opposition

has held firm. The final verdict has not been

delivered on the ultimate permanence of the

peace agreement,but nearly nine yearswithout

largescale fighting represents a significant

achievement.

Thusthe1997peaceagreementrepresentsat

the very least a qualified success. However,

subsequent years have posed significant

challenges, and the success of the statebuilding

effort as awhole is far from certain. Warlords

controllargeswathsofthecountrywheretherule

of law has barely been implemented. Drug

traffickingfromAfghanistanaccountsforthirtyto

fifty percent of the countrys otherwise anemic

economy.42

Theextremescarcityofresourceshas

reinforced the necessity of kinshipbased access

networks, further eroding state control and

breedingacultureofendemiccorruption. There

are still unresolved

questions about the

relationship between

Islam and the state.

Rakhmonovs

increasingly

authoritarian

tendencies and recent

showdowns with

warlords indicate a

country in constant

simmeringcrisis.43

Yetdespitealltheseproblems,

thecountryhasremainedintactandindependent.

Furthermore,many of Tajikistans currentwoes

arewelloutsidetheboundsofwhatanegotiated

settlementtoacivilwarcouldreasonablyhopeto

solve.

External pressures wellshort o f unilateral

military intervention orUN-led peace

enforcement missionscan be suffic iently

compelling to hastenthe arrival of ripeness

Conclusion

The extraordinary pressure exerted on the

parties by the Talibans rise is unique to the

context of Tajikistan. Nonetheless, some

important lessons can be gleaned from the

experienceof the interTajiknegotiationsand the

implementationofthe1997peaceaccord:

The case of Tajikistan provides further

support forHaass ripeness theory. Despite

thevaliant

efforts

of

the

UN

Special

Envoys

and at times even of the government and

UTOinterlocutors,formostofthenegotiation

process thepartieswereunwillingorunable

tomake thenecessaryconcessions toreacha

permanent accord. Only when forces

exogenous to theactualnegotiationsacted to

alter the costbenefit dynamic of

accommodation did the parties reach an

agreement.

This

does

not

mean

that

mediation

efforts

are

futile, or that one should simply let small

warsburnthemselvesout.Onthecontrary,

when the necessary forces finally converged

to create the conditions for a settlement, the

settlement was reached relatively rapidly.Theconfidencebuildingmeasuresandshared

premises that hadbeen established over the

course of the first two and a half years of



11/13

Fall 2006 11

negotiationsplayed an importantpart in the

negotiatedsettlement. Finally,thecaseofTajikistandoesnotprovideany firm support for the hypothesis that

agreements reached under pressure are

inherently unsustainable. The 1997 Tajik

peace accord was the result of myriad

domesticandinternationalpressures. Despite

the extensivedifficulties encounteredduring

the implementationphase, thesettlementhas

survivedintact.

External pressures well short of unilateral

military intervention or UNled peace

enforcement missions can be sufficiently

compelling to hasten the arrival of ripeness.

PressurefromexternalactorssuchastheUN,

Russia, Iran, and Uzbekistan were very

important in convincing the parties to enter

negotiations, and later to reaching a final

settlement.The views and opinions expressed in articles are

strictly the authors own, and do not necessarily

represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and

EditorialBoards, or theProgramfor SouthwestAsia

and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher

School.

Despite the significant weaknesses of the

eventual agreement, the outcome must be

viewed as successful. Suboptimal

agreements, while not resolving every

possibleissue,

have

intrinsic

value

and

are

oftenthebestavailableoption.

1AhmedRashid,Jihad:TheRiseofMilitantIslaminCentralAsia(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2002),

9192.2RichardN.Haass,ConflictsUnending:TheUnitedStatesandRegionalDisputes(NewHaven:Yale

UniversityPress,1991),6.3

OlivierRoy,Interregionaldynamicsofwar,inPoliticsofCompromise:TheTajikistanPeaceProcess,

Accord,Issue10,K.AbdullaevandC.Barnes,eds.(London:ConciliationResources,2001).4Iverb.NeumannandSergeiV.Solodnik,RussianandCISpeaceenforcementinTajikistan,inRussian

andCIS

Peacekeeping,

Centre

of

Russian

Studies,

Publication

no.

1,

L.

Jonson

and

C.

Archer,

eds.

Available

athttp://www.nupi.no/russland/pub/Notat530.htm. AccessedAugust19,2006.5ShirinAkiner,Tajikistan:DisintegrationorReconciliation?(London:RoyalInstituteofInternational

Affairs,2001),33&40. Thesepartieswere:Rastokhez(Rebirth)NationalFront,theDemocraticPartyof

Tajikistan,andLaliBadakhshan(TheRubyofBadakhshan). Akinersuggeststhatthedesignation

democraticforthesepartiesissomewhatmisleading,asthetermwasmostlyusedasameansof

distinguishingtheyoungergenerationofpoliticalelitesfromtheoldguardcommunistnomenklatura

theysoughttoreplace.6

Roy,Interregionaldynamicsofwar.7AmbassadorKittaniwassucceededinJanuary1994byRamiroPirizBallonofUruguay. Ambassador

PirizBallonwaslatersucceededinJune1996byGerdMerrem,whooversawtheremainderoftheTajik

peaceprocess.8

VladimirGoryayev,ArchitectureofinternationalinvolvementintheTajikpeaceprocess,inPoliticsof

Compromise:TheTajikistanPeaceProcess.9This25,000manforceconsistedofapproximately17,000borderguardsand8,000peacekeepingtroops

fromtheCommonwealthofIndependentStates(CIS). TheborderguardswerestationedinTajikistan

frombeforethecollapseoftheSovietUnionandstayedonbyagreementwiththegovernmentof

Tajikistanafterindependence. Thepeacekeepingforcewasestablishedin1993byRussia,Uzbekistan,

KyrgyzstanandKazakhstaninaccordancewithArticleVIIIoftheUNCharter(seeUNDoc.S/26610,

dated30September1993).

http://www.nupi.no/russland/pub/Notat530.htmhttp://www.nupi.no/russland/pub/Notat530.htm


12/13

Al Nakhlah12

10Akiner,40.

11ReportoftheSecretaryGeneralontheSituationinTajikistan,UNDoc.S/1994/379(4April1994).

12Thefifthroundofnegotiationswasdesignatedascontinuousbecauseunlikepriorrounds,ithadno

specificstartandenddate,butwasinsteadanongoingprocessofengagementbetweenthetwosidesin

thenegotiations.13

Haass,2729.14

UNDoc.S/1994/379(4April1994).15

ReportoftheSecretaryGeneralontheSituationinTajikistan,UNDoc.S/1995/720,AnnexI(23August

1995).16

Goryayev,ArchitectureofinternationalinvolvementintheTajikpeaceprocess.17

Ibid.18

ReportoftheSecretaryGeneralontheSituationinTajikistan,UNDoc.S/1996/212(22March1996).19

Haass,27.20

Akiner,43.21

IrinaZviagelskaya,TheTajikConflict:ProblemsofRegulation,inTajikistan:TheTrialsofIndependence,

MohammedRezaDjalilietal.,eds.(NewYork:St.MartinsPress,1997),161. Inthepassagetheauthor

quotesLouis

Kriesberg

and

Stuart

J.

Thorson,

eds.

Timing

the

De

Escalation

of

International

Conflicts

(Syracuse,NY: SyracuseUniversityPress,1991),15.22

ReportoftheSecretaryGeneralontheSituationinTajikistan,UNDoc.S/1996/1010(5December1996).23

LouisKriesberg,TimingandtheInitiationofDeEscalationMoves,inNegotiationTheoryandPractice,

J.WilliamBreslinandJeffreyZ.Rubin,eds.(Cambridge,MA:ProgramonNegotiationBooks,1999),223

231.24

Kreisberg,228.25

RigacciHay,MethodologyoftheinterTajiknegotiationprocess.26

Haass,141142.27

MohammedRezaDjaliliandFredericGrare,RegionalInterestsandAmbitionsinTajikistan:theRole

ofAfghanistan,PakistanandIran,inTajikistan:TheTrialsofIndependence,122.28

Olivier

A.

J.

Brennenkmeijer,

International

Concern

for

Tajikistan:

UN

and

OSCE

Efforts

to

Promote

PeaceBuildingandDemocratisation,inTajikistan:TheTrialsofIndependence,181.29

Rashid,104.30

SteveColl,GhostWars:TheSecretHistoryoftheCIA,Afghanistan,andbinLaden,fromtheSovietInvasionto

September10,2001(NewYork:PenguinBooks,2004),345.31

Rubin,Introduction:TheTajikistanPeaceAgreement. ThediscoveryoftheTengizoilfieldin

westernKazakhstanin1979,inadditiontotheoildepositsinAzerbaijanandnaturalgasfieldsin

Turkmenistan,madetheCaspianSeaaregionofvitalstrategicimportancefortheSovietUnion,andlater

Russia.32

Rashid,219.33

Naumkin,232.34

Naumkin,230.35

ItshouldbenotedthatAkinerisremarkablylessconfidentthanotherscholarsinspeculatingabout

Karimovsmotivations.Henotesthatafter1995,KarimovsattitudetowardstheTajikleadershipwas

characterizedbyfrequentandabruptreversals,alternatelyhostileandconciliatory. Itistemptingto

speculateonthereasonsforthisambiguitybuttoolittleinformationisavailableontheprocessofUzbek

policymakingtodetermineforcertainwhatmotiveslaybehindthesechangesoforientation. Akiner,

48.36

InternationalCrisisGroup,Tajikistan:AnUncertainPeace,(Osh/Brussels:24December2001).37

Akiner,7274.



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Fall 2006 13

38Rubin,Introduction:TheTajikistanPeaceAgreement.

39Akiner,64.

40InternationalCrisisGroup,Tajikistan:AnUncertainPeace,6.

41Rashid,242.

42Rashid,243.

43

InternationalCrisisGroup,TajikistansPolitics:ConfrontationorConsolidation?(Dushanbe/Brussels:19

May2004).


Mcauliffe - Tajikistan Peace Negotiations

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