Post on 14-Feb-2019
Le prospettive dell’Economia Mondiale ed Europea
July 6, 2015
Emilio Rossi EconPartners Oxford Economics
erossi@oxfordeconomics.com emilio.rossi@econpartners.it
2
Real GDP Growth Compound annual growth rates, in %
Source: EconPartners calculations on Oxford Economics data
CA
GR
, in
%
-1
2
4
7
10
Japan NAFTA Emerging Asia
2003-2007 2007-2014 2014-2018
AE recovering after 2008 crisis, EM slowing
Long-term - “Secular” Stagnation? Overly pessimistic
Real GDP Growth Compound annual growth rates, in %
Source: EconPartners calculations on Oxford Economics data
3
CA
GR
, in
%
0
2
4
6
8
Advanced Economies Emerging Markets Developing Economies
2003-2007 2007-2014 2014-2035
Share of World GDP – Technical progress vs demography
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
1000 1500 1820 1913 1950 2006 2012 2017 2030
Avanzati Emergenti
Source: Calculations Giovannini on A. Maddison, 2001, Groningen University data
5
Advanced Emerging
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Oct 2014 forecast
Impact of extra QE
Source: Oxford Economics / Haver Analytics
Model-implied impact of additional QE on GDP% year
Forecast
• Weak growth and near-zero inflation point to massive QE until 2018 • Depreciation likely; Yen per USD 130 by end-2015, 135 by end-2016 • Fiscal tightening >1% of GDP will be a drag in each of next 3-years • By end-2016, QE means BoJ will own close to 40% of government debt • QE a short-term medicine - in absence of structural reforms, GDP will still be
capped at 1% at best
7
Japan – More QE, but only short-term impact on GDP
Gross Fixed Investment unbalanced
• Productivity slowdown, rebalancing to more consumer oriented economy, real estate downturn - increasingly dampening domestic demand and activity
• Local government revenues will be hit hard this year, as more than 40% of overall revenues are related to property
• Steep stock market gains look out of line with fundamentals • Chinese 2015 GDP growth at 6.6%, falling to 6.1% next year
8
China – rebalancing, ULC, real estate weigh on growth
• GDP in EM set to rise just 3.6% in 2015 – and just 2.2% ex-China (slowest since 2001)
• High debt and commodity dependence are drags on EM growth • Private sector debt ratio in emerging Asia higher than in G7, private debt in EM
(ex-China) up 20% since 2007 • Risk of a deleveraging cycle in highly indebted countries, especially in case of
external shocks9
EM growth to slow further
4. Eurozone - Is the pick-up in growth here to stay?
• After a recent soft patch, Eurozone economic data have once again begun to strike a slightly more positive tone – not only weak euro effect
• Solid household spending prospects and lending showing signs of life...finally! • ECB measures supporting investment • Draghi signals bond volatility for a prolonged period • Impact from eventual Grexit depending on implementation (orderly vs disorderly)
11
ECB – QE reversing previous tightening
15
ECB Balance Sheet
Source: EconPartners calculations on ECB data Note: PSPP = Public sector purchase programme; CBPP3 = Covered bond purchase programme; ABSPP=Asset-back securities purchase programme.
• The majority of Greeks do not rightly comprehend the meaning of a foreign loan, but simply conclude that it is some European method of making a present - J.Emerson and W.H.Humphreys, London 1826
• La Grèce est le seul exemple connu d'un pays vivant en pleine banqueroute depuis le jour de sa naissance. Tous les budgets, depuis le premier jusqu'au dernier, sont en déficit. Aujourd'hui, elle renonce à l'espoir de s'acquitter [à] jamais – E. About, La Grèce contemporaine, Paris, 1858
17
Greece – NO vote should not come as a surprise
• Mildly favorable global context - weak oil and commodities prices, overall monetary expansionary and neutral fiscal policies
• Growth in AEs compensates for growth slowdown in EMs • Change in growth parameters
• No Secular stagnation but lower growth rates for a prolonged period
• World trade loosing steam as a world growth engine • EU needs to revise governance and Treaties to adapt them to a changed
and further changing world • In a low growth environment, fiscal policies become more difficult to
balance • no space for inefficient public expenditure • need to reduce taxes and push on investment, growth
• Policies aimed at increasing potential output become even more crucial than in the past
19
Summary and final considerations
World GDP Growth% Change on Previous Year
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018US 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.8 2.7 2.8Japan 1.6 -0.1 0.8 1.8 0.8 0.6Eurozone, of which: -0.4 0.9 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.6 Germany 0.2 1.6 2.0 2.2 1.7 1.3 France 0.7 0.2 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.5 Italy -1.7 -0.4 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.0UK 1.7 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.5China 7.7 7.4 6.6 6.1 5.7 5.5India 6.4 7.2 7.5 7.5 7.0 6.8Brazil 2.7 0.1 -1.3 0.7 2.6 3.2Mexico 1.7 2.1 2.7 3.1 3.4 3.5Eastern Europe 1.9 1.5 -0.7 2.5 3.5 3.7MENA 1.5 2.3 3.0 3.9 4.2 4.3World 2.5 2.6 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.2World, at PPP 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.8 3.9 3.9
20
Oxford Economics World Forecast
Long-term - “Secular” Stagnation? Overly pessimistic
R. Gordon: • Ageing (and expensive health technology) leads to higher savings • Slowing technical progress - leading to lower TFP for a sustained period -
and scarce investment demand despite low rates • Impact of technical changes in previous industrial revolutions (steam power,
electricity, combustion engine, running water…) much greater than current changes (questionable)
L. Summers: • excess savings ! no attainable interest rate that brings the economy to full
employment ! CBs pushed to zero interest rates, can’t activate adequate demand
• Capital flight from EM - lowering interest rates of AE assets • Shortage of safe assets (QE related) • Income inequality • Trade lesser growth engine K. Rogoff: • High debt levels and need for deleveraging (weighing on demand)
21
• Unione Europea (UE) – Processo iniziato anni 50 e culminato nel Trattato Maastricht 1992-93
• Scudo contro ripetersi dei conflitti sanguinosi dei secoli passati • Volontà di ruolo politico ed economico in mondo globalizzato • Processo di condivisione di sovranità tra Stati • Euro – passo (prematuro?) nel processo di unificazione
• Euro oggi • moneta comune di 19 Stati dell’UE e di oltre 330 milioni di cittadini • 24,4% delle riserve valutarie mondiali (18% nel 1999) contro il
61,2% del $/USA • 59 paesi e territori con moneta vincolata, direttamente o
indirettamente, all’euro
Fonte: Consiglio Europeo, 12 febbraio 2015
22
Europa - temi di fondo
• Contesto globale timidamente favorevole
• prezzi petrolio e commodities deboli
• politiche monetarie complessivamente accomodanti
• politiche fiscali mediamente neutrali
• …ma in contesto di bassa crescita
• Economie avanzate in progressivo, lento miglioramento
• Emergenti in rallentamento, in alcuni casi preoccupante, e con rischi crescenti
• Rischi globali orientati sul lato negativo - mercati finanziari, Cina, USA, Europa (Grexit)
23
Economia globale - temi di fondo
Diverging monetary policies
Central bank policies diverge in 2015, but overall supportive: •Fed raises rates to 0.6-0.65% by year-end •ECB to keep rates on hold for a long period
•BoJ purchases equivalent to 15% of GDP 2015; 20% in 2016 •PBoC to cut interest rates and reduce reserve requirements further in 2015
• On a six-month annualised basis, US and Eurozone broad money is growing at the same speed as in China …
• …highlighting healthier prospects for US and Eurozone…
• …but also pointing to continued slowing growth in China
• «Il fatto che l'area dell'euro non si sia ripresa dalla crisi allo stesso modo degli Stati Uniti potrebbe indicare che un’unione monetaria incompleta si adegua molto più lentamente di un’unione dotata di un assetto istituzionale più completo» (sito Commissione Europea)
• Report di 4 Presidenti (2012) – visione EMU… senza Presidente del Parlamento Europeo – discrasia democratica tra PE e istituzioni di governo UE
• Piano Juncker (Nov. 2014) – Ottimistico sulla leva di investimenti privati - capitale 21 miliardi (di cui 13 effettivi) «crea» 315 miliardi investimenti
• Report dei 5 Presidenti (22 Giugno 2015) – 3 fasi • «Approfondire facendo»: strumenti e trattati esistenti per rilanciare
competitività e convergenza, politiche bilancio responsabili – fino a giugno 2017
• «Completare l’UEM» - Libro Bianco primavera 2017 • Fase finale – • Energia, digitale, mercato dei capitali, beni e servizi indicati come
mercati di cui completare l’unificazione 26
Europa – Governance farraginosa rallenta decisioni
• Report dei 5 Presidenti (22 Giugno 2015) – 3 fasi • «Approfondire facendo»: strumenti e trattati esistenti per rilanciare
competitività e convergenza, politiche bilancio responsabili – fino a giugno 2017
• «Completare l’UEM» - Libro Bianco primavera 2017 • Fase finale – • Energia, digitale, mercato dei capitali, beni e servizi indicati come
mercati di cui completare l’unificazione
27
Europa – Governance farraginosa rallenta decisioni
• Non ci sono vincitori o vittoria di Pirro • Grecia dovrà adottare misure austerità in ogni caso – oppure
diventare un paese da default seriale – manifatturiero 9% del PIL • Le classi deboli della Grecia le più penalizzate dal prolungamento
della crisi • Europa ha confermato debolezze di governance politica,
amplificandole nella gestione del caso Greco • Disillusione in larghi strati della popolazione, sentimento Europeista
in declino • Nessuna revisione dei trattati in senso solidaristico – Report dei 5
Presidenti buona base ma prudente nella tempistica • Dietro alla crisi europea, rifiuto di prendere atto del trasferimento
epocale di risorse verso emergenti – I tassi di crescita post-WW2 o degli anni ‘90 e fino alla crisi saranno irripetibili per alcuni decenni
• Ritracciamento del livello di benessere nelle economie avanzate storicamente pericoloso dal punto di vista sociale (esempio di Alvin Hansen, 1938) 28
Crisi Grecia
6. What consequences from Grexit ?
• Would Grexit doom Greek GDP to a further severe and prolonged slump? • A 30% decline in GDP followed by very slow recovery – would leave Greece’s post-crisis
recovery in GDP worse than 99% of historical post-crisis precedents since 1980 • The channels that have shrunk output in historical crises – asset price collapse,
deleverage, fiscal adjustment – have already doomed Greece • A disorderly Grexit would bear nasty consequences and impact also EZ growth